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REPORTS

FROM

COMMITTEES:

EIGHT VOLUMES.

— (3.—PART II.) —

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL.

Session

12 *December* 1854 —— 14 *August* 1855.

VOL. IX.—PART II.

1854-5.

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REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES:

1854-5.

EIGHT VOLUMES:—CONTENTS OF THE

THIRD VOLUME.—PART II.

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THIRD REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON THE

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL;

WITH THE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
3 *May* 1855.

Lunæ, 29° die Januarii, 1855.

Ordered, THAT a Committee be appointed to inquire into the Condition of our Army before *Sebastopol,* and into the Conduct of those Departments of the Government whose Duty it has been to minister to the Wants of that Army.

Veneris, 23° die Februarii, 1855.

Committee nominated of,—

Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Drummond.
Sir John Pakington.
Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Layard.
Mr. Ellice.
Lord Seymour.
Sir George Lewis.
General Peel.
Mr. Bramston.
Mr. John Ball.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Seven be the Quorum of the Committee.

Jovis, 1° die Martii, 1855.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have Power to report Resolutions, and their Minutes of Proceedings, from time to time, to The House.

Ordered, THAT Sir John Hanmer be added to the Committee.

Veneris, 30° die Martii, 1855.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have Power to report the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, from time to time, to The House.

Veneris, 20° die Aprilis, 1855.

Ordered, THAT Mr. John Ball be discharged from further attendance on the Committee.

Lunæ, 23° die Aprilis, 1855.

Ordered, THAT Captain Gladstone be added to the Committee.

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THIRD REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to Inquire into the Condition of our ARMY before SEBASTOPOL, and into the Conduct of those Departments of the Government whose Duty it has been to minister to the Wants of that Army, and who were empowered to report their Opinion and the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, from time to time, to The House;

HAVE examined several other Witnesses on the subject of the Matters to them referred, and have agreed to Report the MINUTES of EVIDENCE so taken before them to The House.

3 *May* 1855.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Martis, 17° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Sir J. Hanmer.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Ellice.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Drummond.	General Peel.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Peter Benson Maxwell, Esq., called in; and further Examined.

P. B. Maxwell, Esq.

17 April 1855.

13194. *Chairman.*] HAVE you any remark to make with regard to your former evidence?—Will the Committee allow me to make an addition to my evidence on the subject upon which we left off? I was asked why I did not report to Lord William Paulet upon the state of the washing. I will explain further than I did before, my reason. I contented myself the other day by stating that I considered it no part of my duty to do so. I think it right to myself to add, that the state of the washing was one of the first things that struck my colleagues and me in entering upon our investigation; and that one of us, without loss of time, communicated home upon the subject, suggesting that washing, and wringing, and drying machines should be at once sent out from England, for the purpose of carrying on the washing effectually. Those machines were, in fact, sent out, and I believe were lying in the waters of the Golden Horn, or at all events they arrived a few days after those very instructions which had been sent out to us by the Duke of Newcastle, to report to Lord William Paulet, had reached our hands. Therefore, in any view of the case, it would have been unnecessary for us to have made any report to Lord William Paulet upon that subject.

13195. Mr. *Ellice.*] As those washing machines could only arrive at Constantinople after a considerable interval of time, was it necessary, in your opinion, that there should be no washing in the hospital at Scutari, or that you should take no means to enforce upon the commandant of the garrison the necessity of immediately attending to that most essential point?—Our duties were, according to our Commission, first, to inquire into the state of the sick and wounded, and into the state of the hospital accommodation provided for them, and next, to report to the Duke of Newcastle all such suggestions as appeared to us desirable for the improvement of the hospitals. It was only on the 22d or 23d of January that we received instructions from the Duke of Newcastle to make any suggestions on the spot.

13196. At what time did you make your report home with respect to the washing?—Two or three days after we first entered upon our inquiry. I think Dr. Cumming wrote home to Dr. Andrew Smith at once.

13197. Did it not occur to you that it would be essential to make some immediate provision for that pressing necessity?—No doubt. We examined the purveyors, and asked what they had done upon the subject. They said that the contract which had been originally entered into with an Italian had broken down, and that they were then arranging a contract with another man.

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13198. You did not think it necessary to impress upon the military Commandant, who was the supreme authority upon the spot, the necessity of some immediate remedy for that evil, whether the new contract succeeded or not?—No; it was no part of our duty to do that, nor does it appear to me that any such representations to the Commandant would have been of any avail. We thought that an improvement was in course of progress from the steps which the purveyors assured us they were taking.

13199. *Chairman.*] How long would it have been before you could have got an answer from England?—I suppose a month at least.

13200. And during that month the people would have been without washing?—I wish the Committee to understand what my duty really was. The Committee should not blame me or any man for not doing his neighbour's duty, but solely for not doing his own duty. My duty was to inquire into the state of things, and to report. I did so, and not only that, but when we found things which appeared to us susceptible of a remedy,—and what seemed to us the best remedy,—by communicating home, we did so.

13201. You were to report to whom?—The report was to be to the Duke of Newcastle.

13202. To nobody else?—The Commission was, that we should inquire into these matters, and to report to his Grace.

13203. At what time did you arrive at Balaklava?—On the 31st of December.

13204. What steps did you take upon your arrival?—Some little obstacle arose in the first instance. I believe it may have been considered merely a breach of etiquette on our part; but whatever it was, we received a letter from the Adjutant-general, written by the direction of Lord Raglan, apparently complaining that certain questions which we had thought it our duty to address to the surgeons in charge of regiments should not have been submitted to his Lordship for his Lordship's approval and sanction, and requiring at the same time that we should not submit questions to any person under his command without that sanction.

13205. Mr. *Ellice.*] Have you that letter?—Yes; the original is in the hands of the printer; it will appear in the Appendix to the Report which we have sent in.

13206. Mr. *Layard.*] Was there any general order published on that subject?—No; it was a letter which was addressed to Dr. Cumming, the chief of the Commission.

13207. Was no general order addressed to General Buller of the Second Division?—That was a divisional order, and it was an order which I deemed it my duty to report to the Adjutant-general. With respect to the letter, it was submitted to me by my colleague, Dr. Cumming, inasmuch as our Commission directed that the legal member of it himself should be the examining Commissioner. I told Dr. Cumming that it was not compatible with the view which I took of my duty to submit any questions to the control of any person's judgment but my own; and a letter was written in that sense accordingly to the Adjutant-general; stating that I was unable to comply with the condition in question, and that I must have liberty to act according to my own judgment in the conduct of the inquiry. The Adjutant-general wrote to us in answer, that Lord Raglan had no desire in any way to control or interfere with our questions, but that he required,—what appeared to us very reasonable,—that we should not examine any witnesses without first sending their names to him, in order that the Commander-in-Chief, who presided over the military duties of those gentlemen, should take care that those duties were not interfered with by us.

13208. *Chairman.*] So that, although you were sent out to inquire into the management of departments for which everybody in office and in command was responsible, before you could make any inquiry, you were required to ask their sanction to your inquiries: was that the case?—The result seemed to be that the Commander-in-Chief appeared to think it necessary that the Commissioners sent out by the Minister for War should first obtain the Commander-in-Chief's authority to examine any persons under his command.

13209. Mr. *Layard.*] Will you explain further to the Committee about the divisional order that you referred to?—Some days afterwards I was inspecting the Second Division, when a surgeon mentioned to me that he had his

answers

answers to the questions which we had issued, prepared; but that he had, a few hours before posting the letter, been prevented from doing so by receiving a copy of a divisional order, directing,—and it was curiously worded——

13210. Did you see the order?—Yes; but I have it not in my pocket; it is in the appendix to the report. The effect of it was, that officers and surgeons should not give any information upon hospital arrangements to any persons, unless acting under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. And there was a memorandum in the corner which applied peculiarly to myself; it referred to civilians, and to persons acting without such authority.

13211. *Chairman.*] So that the Queen's authority was overridden by that of the Commander-in-Chief?—Rather, that of Major-general Buller.

13212. Mr. *Ellice.*] Had you any doubt, after you received that divisional order, that the Commander-in-Chief, or an officer appointed by him, was responsible for the whole of the duties of the hospitals, and the whole of the medical administration?—I do not know whether I drew any such inference. I knew perfectly well that the military authorities were under the authority of the Major-general, and that the surgeons of the regiment must obey the orders of the Major-general.

13213. *Chairman.*] The Honourable Member meant that the head of the army was responsible for the very department that you were inquiring into?—I should not draw that inference. I do not know that it is a necessary inference.

13214. Mr. *Ellice.*] If the surgeons and officers were prevented from answering your questions by a superior authority, and they were not responsible to that authority, to what other authority were they responsible?—I dare say they would be responsible to somebody for disobeying Major-general Buller's orders.

13215. But who is that "somebody"?—I do not know.

13216. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you upon that make any remonstrance to Major-general Buller?—I wrote at once to the Adjutant-general. I was living with the Light Division at the time. I returned to the tent where I was living, and I wrote at once to the Adjutant-general.

13217. Sir *J. Pakington.*] To what effect?—Submitting the order to him and requesting that he would lay it before Lord Raglan, with the view of removing such an obstacle to our inquiry.

13218. Mr. *Layard.*] What answer did you receive?—The next day I received a letter from the Adjutant-general expressing Lord Raglan's regret that any impediment should have been thrown in our way, and stating that he had given directions to the generals of divisions that facilities should be afforded to us.

13219. Did that order stand at all in your way?—A surgeon expressed his willingness, notwithstanding the order, to give me the answers which he had drawn up to the questions.

13220. Did you receive those answers?—I said that I should be sorry that he should act at all in breach of military discipline, and that unless I was properly entitled to receive them I did not wish to receive them at all.

13221. Did you receive them?—Yes, I did.

13222. General *Peel.*] Had you been gazetted in any way as Commissioner?—No.

13223. Had you reported yourself to General Buller?—No.

13224. *Chairman.*] Did you report yourself to Lord Raglan?—Yes, I did; but I ought to state that the questions which we issued to the surgeons of the regiments were prepared while I was at Scutari, and being unaccustomed to military etiquette, I thought it probable that the fact of our being sent out would be communicated to Lord Raglan and to the military authorities. But I did not conceive it any part of my duty to write to Lord Raglan. The letter reproving us, apparently, for our omission to submit the questions to Lord Raglan, was written before we reached Balaklava; and immediately upon my arrival there, I called upon his Lordship and left my card, as a mark of personal respect; but I did not do that with the view of reporting myself officially.

13225. So that Lord Raglan had no official knowledge of your presence there, in your capacity of Commissioner?—Not to my knowledge; our Commission never was promulgated, I believe, in any general order.

13226. Mr. *Layard.*] Was your Commission gazetted in the "London Gazette"?—I think not; I never saw it.

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13227. *Chairman.*] When you arrived at Balaklava, what steps did you take to further your inquiry?—I would mention that we ourselves in all our communications always commenced by stating, "Having been instructed by the Duke of Newcastle to make certain inquiries;" but the gentlemen addressed had only our word for the truth of the assertion.

13228. What steps did you take, when you arrived at Balaklava, to further the objects of your inquiry?—We proceeded to the camp; and, as I have said before, having a near relative in the Light Division, I lived in his tent. My two colleagues remained on board the "Golden Fleece" steamer, for there was no place ashore where it was possible for them to live, and we met in the field daily, and went round the different tents and marquees. I do not think that we inspected every regiment. There may have been one or two, or perhaps three, outlying regiments, before Sebastopol, that we may not have seen, and I think there were one or two upon the heights at Balaklava that we did not see; but with those exceptions, we visited every field hospital in the place.

13229. When you visited the field hospitals, in what condition did you find them?—In a very wretched condition.

13230. Will you describe them as nearly as you can—I could describe them perhaps more accurately if the Committee would allow me to refer to my report which really embodies my own views upon the subject; I have the report here. It has not been published yet.

13231. Sir *J. Hanmer.*] Does it contain your Commission?—No; this is merely the report.

13232. Mr. *Layard.*] Is that report printed for circulation?—Yes, I believe so.

13233. Sir *J. Hanmer.*] Where is your Commission?—It will be printed in the appendix.

13234. Mr. *Layard.*] I asked you before the Committee adjourned for the Easter recess, whether any change had been made in this report; I repeat that question now?—I will tell you what changes have been made; there are two Tables; I think you will observe in page 18 and 19, that there is a very long table, and, a few pages before, a table describing the state of the field hospitals in some respects,—a smaller table. When I came to examine them with the evidence I found that mistakes had crept in here and there in the figures, mistakes of the clerk. It is a table that was prepared chiefly by Dr. Laing, while I was drawing this report, with the view of giving a synoptical view of the state of those vessels. We arranged the evidence in a tabular form as far as it was susceptible of that treatment; but mistakes crept in, and I had to make many alterations; and then there have been verbal alterations made here and there.

13235. *Chairman.*] But no material alteration has been made?—None of any sort or kind.

13236. Mr. *Layard.*] This is precisely the report which you sent in in manuscript to the Government?—Precisely, with some verbal alterations; for instance, I found that I used the word "gathered" twice in a sentence, and I altered that.

13237. *Chairman.*] In what state did you find the hospitals?—The field hospitals were as wretched as anything that can be conceived. Many of the regiments had no marquees, and in that case the only provision was bell-tents. Those bell-tents, as we state in our report, are exceedingly unsuited for the accommodation of the sick, both by reason of their shape, and also of the material of which they are made. The bell-tent lets in the wet and is very cold, and then the pole being in the middle, and the thing being circular, the men are very much wedged in.

13238. Had the men beds?—A few here and there were raised from the ground on what they call Clarke's or Smith's stretchers, which are a framework of wood with a piece of canvas stretched across, and a bar of iron at the two extremities, which are stretched by screws, and under it are feet; many of them had been sent up without feet, and some without these bars, and the consequence was that they were useless.

13239. Sir *J. Pakington.*] How were the sick men arranged in the bell-tents; did they lie with their feet inwards?—Yes; their feet towards the pole, and their heads at the circumference of the circle. We found that there were different men managed differently. We found that one surgeon managed to put

put stones under the stretchers which were without feet, and pieces of wood to stretch out the stretcher. Others not so fertile in resource, left the stretcher unused. Others complained that the stretchers took up too much room, and that they could not afford to use them, as not more than four or five patients could be accommodated in a tent.

13240. *Chairman.*] Did the great body of men lie upon the ground?—Yes, generally; but generally, I think, they were protected from the ground by a tarpauling, or nothing better than rush mats. We found different arrangements in every tent: in one hospital you would find that small boughs had been cut down, and the men lay upon them; in another a tarpauling or a water deck.

13241. What was the supply of medicine like?—It was very deficient, particularly in opiates and astringents.

13242. Did the surgeons say that they had made applications for those medicines?—Yes.

13243. To whom?—First to the surgeons of the division. There is a first-class surgeon or a deputy inspector of hospitals attached to each division, and under him there is an assistant surgeon, who keeps the medicines, and a purveyor's clerk, who keeps the medical comforts. But those divisional stores became so exhausted, and they were so destitute of the necessary supplies, that the surgeons used to send to Balaklava for what they wanted; and although they got more there, still even from that place they never were able latterly—that is, in the month of December, on to the time that we were there—to get their requisitions for opiates and astringents supplied. Medical comforts, also, such as, I think, arrowroot, sago, and brandy,—all those were deficient. They never could get those articles fully supplied on their requisitions.

13244. Was port wine deficient?—I think so; and their means of cooking were in many cases very deficient.

13245. What fuel had they?—I believe that they got up, when they could afford to get it up, (that is, when they could find fatigue parties to bring it,) charcoal from Balaklava; but the universal complaint was, that they could not get up those things because they had no means of transport.

13246. What were the sanitary precautions taken in those hospitals. How were the men furnished with the means of satisfying the wants of nature?—They were very deficient. It is most extraordinary, but wherever we went, even at Scutari, till a late period, and in the camp very generally, almost universally, there was a complaint of the want of utensils of every sort and kind. The sick men were constantly obliged to go to the rear by running out from the tents.

13247. What was the interior state of the tents; was the smell disagreeable?—Sometimes it was, but there was such a thorough ventilation that there was no smell, unless they covered up the tent close; then it was very offensive. We found sometimes that the state of the entrance showed the disease from which the men had been suffering.

13248. So that in medicine and in medical comforts the men were in the greatest possible want?—Yes.

13249. Were the men well provided with surgeons?—They had an ample supply of surgeons. We had one or two complaints. Colonel Egerton, of the 77th, mentioned to us that he had only one surgeon on duty; and there was only one in the 44th Regiment. It so happened that about the time I visited the hospital of that regiment, there was only one surgeon on duty. Some were sick and others were taken off to attend to the sick on board ship. But I think that in general the supply of surgeons was ample.

13250. Did you go to the hospital in Balaklava?—Yes.

13251. What was the condition of that hospital, as well as of the field hospitals?—It was not in a satisfactory condition; it was better than I had been led to expect. If the Committee would allow me to look at my report I could tell them more exactly. It was too crowded. The men had all bedsteads, as well as I can recollect, and bedding in sufficiency; I think there were no sheets.

13252. Did you inquire, when you were there, whether there were not houses that could be appropriated to the purposes of hospitals in Balaklava?—In Balaklava there were very small houses; they were mostly of wood, and I think the chief street was occupied by small shopkeepers.

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13253. Did you see a large house there that was called the head-quarters? — There was not a large house; it was a good sized cottage, I think, with perhaps a first floor to it; it was the Commander-in-Chief's.

13254. Was there another belonging to the Adjutant-general?—I do not remember.

13255. Was that house inhabited?—I do not know; I did not inquire. I was much more in the camp than at Balaklava till towards the end of my stay, when I was busy the whole day in examining witnesses in a very wretched specimen of a Balaklava house, where Dr. Anderson lived.

13256. Was any reason assigned to you for the deficiency of medicines there?—Yes. Dr. Hall and both the dispensers, I think, told me that they had applied repeatedly, and sent in requisitions; they gave me copies of them, and copies of them are attached to our report.

13257. To whom were those requisitions sent?—To the apothecary at Scutari.

13258. How were those requisitions answered?—The first apothecary, as I said the last day I had the honour of being here, had died; but a requisition upon him for 50 lbs. of crude opium had been answered, as well as I recollect Dr. Hall's evidence, by 5 lbs.

13259. When you were at Scutari did you find that there was any want of opium there?—Yes; Dr. Hall sent a second requisition to his successor at Scutari; as well as I recollect, that requisition was about the 16th of December. Scutari is the great central store which supplies all the hospitals in the East; when I was at Balaklava, I think it was about the 13th or 14th of January, Dr. Anderson mentioned to me that he had just received an invoice of a box containing 50 lbs. of opium; and he showed me the invoice.

13260. Did he receive the box?—Yes. The invoice did not state by what vessel the opium was to come, but it stated that it was in the charge of some assistant surgeon or surgeon. Dr. Anderson and the other medical men there were in a great state of anxiety and annoyance at not being able to find the vessel, out of the 50 or 60 that were lying at Balaklava, which contained this box; but two days afterwards it was found in the purveyor's store, having been deposited there the night before by a soldier, who had been charged to carry the box to the principal medical officer, but who had been unable to find his way to that officer's quarters. The box was opened, and I saw myself large quantities of crude opium in it. It was said to contain 50 lbs., and I presume it did.

13261. Were you at Scutari at the time of the arrival of the first requisition?—Yes, I must have been.

13262. I mean when Dr. Hall received five pounds of opium?—Yes. I must have been there then.

13263. Then at that time had you any opportunity of seeing whether there was any want of crude opium in the stores at Scutari?—I do not think that I turned my attention to that. When I first went out there, I wrote for a return, calling upon the apothecary to send me a statement of his stock the last time he had taken stock; a statement of all the medicines which he had received subsequently, distinguishing from what sources he had received them; and also a statement of the issues he had made from them; and I suppose that at that time I was waiting for the return. I made the demand about the beginning of December, and this requisition would probably arrive about the 17th or 18th. It was about that time that I began to fear that the return which I had called for would not be forthcoming, and then I took the only course that appeared to me to be open. I examined all the surgeons who had been at the hospital from the time of the battle of the Alma down to that time, as to whether they had ever wanted any medicines, and their evidence will be found in the appendix.

13264. Did they, speaking generally, say that they had received all they had required?—Yes.

13265. So that there was no want in the hospitals at that time?—At no time, from the battle of the Alma to the time of my examining those surgeons —and I think they were 14 in number—did they state that they wanted any important drug.

13266. Have you any return of the quantity of opium in the hospital at that time?—No.

13267. You cannot state whether there was any quantity of it?—I cannot.

13268. Therefore

13268. Therefore you cannot acquaint the Committee why it was that there was only five pounds sent, when 50 pounds were required?—I cannot; and I cannot divine any reasonable excuse, when I consider that Constantinople is the country of opium, and that the apothecary, if he had been left without a grain of it from England, had only to get into a caique and go to the bazaar, where he could have purchased as much as would have physicked the whole army.

13269. Do you refer to Mr. Ward?—No; the apothecary who died was Mr. Reed; and his successor was Mr. Mackintosh.

13270. Had Mr. Reed sent five pounds when 50 pounds were required?—Yes; so Dr. Hall stated.

13271. What was the case with regard to other medicines?—It was the opiates that were chiefly complained of, and astringents also were wanting at Balaklava.

13272. Did you get any account of the stock at Balaklava when you arrived there, or during your stay there?—No, I did not; the officers and clerks, both there and at Scutari, were very much worked, and I thought that having ascertained the broad fact that there was a lamentable deficiency of those medicines, it was not worth while inquiring what the actual supply was.

13273. Mr. *Ellice.*] But Dr. Hall, being the superior medical authority in the Crimea, knowing that the army was in want of those opiates and other medicines, and not having received them from his inferior medical employés at Scutari, had the power himself to order them from Constantinople, and to supply them to the army?—I presume so.

13274. Then, in fact, Dr. Hall must have been the person primarily responsible for there having been no opium at the camp?—I do not wish to draw any inference against anybody. I confess, if I had been in his place, I should, when I found that my requisitions were not complied with by the return of post, have got into the first steamer going down to Scutari, and have suspended the officer who had so neglected his duty.

13275. I wish to ascertain whether the superior officer had not himself the power of obtaining supplies, if the inferior authority had not sent them on?—Whether or not Dr. Hall had authority to purchase them in the Constantinople market himself, I really do not know. I do not know whether his instructions are simply to draw upon the apothecary, or to get the medicines wherever he can.

13276. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Had he the power to take the course you have spoken of, suspending the apothecary for not sending them?—I think so. I do not know whether he had or not; the apothecary was the inferior officer, and Dr. Hall was the supreme authority.

13277. Mr. *Layard.*] Was it a part of your instructions to inquire into the respective authorities of the persons connected with any of the departments?—My instructions were to inquire into the condition of the sick and wounded, into the supply of medical attendants, medicines, and medical comforts, and to offer any suggestions that occurred to us to the Duke of Newcastle.

13278. It strikes me that the Committee have a very indefinite idea of what your exact position was; have you your instructions here?—No.

13279. Why did you not bring them?—If I had been asked to do so I should have been very happy to bring them.

13280. I think that it is very necessary that the Committee should see the instructions under which you acted?—I should be happy to produce them.

13281. Are they in your report?—They form the first page of the appendix.

13282. You state in your evidence taken before Easter that you lost your Commission; has that Commission been recovered?—I lost my copy of it; Dr. Cumming had his copy, which lay about in his quarters, for we always met there. We consulted the Commission from time to time; my copy (as well as I recollect) I lent one day to Mr. Bracebridge.

13283. You state in your former evidence that you think another copy might be obtained; have you obtained that?—Yes; there is another copy now printed.

13284. Where is it?—It is now in the printer's hands; and I submit that the proper course would be to move for it. It will be on the table, I dare say, in the course of a few days.

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13285. Did you, before leaving England, have any communication with Dr. Cumming and Dr. Spence?—I merely shook hands with them; nothing else whatever.

13286. Did you go out together?—Yes.

13287. In the same ship?—Yes; we met at London Bridge Station. I met Dr. Cumming in the course of the day, at St. James's-place, at the medical department.

13288. Had you no special communications with him?—None whatever.

13289. It appears to me that the Commission under which you were going out was explained to you in a very unsatisfactory manner; did it not strike you so at the time?—It did; and therefore it was that I took the liberty of submitting to the Duke of Newcastle that without written instructions, pointing out exactly what my duty was, it would be impossible for me to perform it satisfactorily.

13290. Yet you went away without those instructions?—Yes; the Duke of Newcastle, I should say, assured me that those instructions should follow me.

13291. Did it not strike you that your mission was of a very delicate nature; that you were sent out to inquire into the conduct of those who really had the management of the war in the East?—I confess that I thought my Commission was so far a delicate one, that I thought that I might have to impugn the conduct of the medical department, and that it would be rather disagreeable to have two doctors as colleagues with me; and I anticipated with regret the possibility of differing from them.

13292. As I understand, your inquiries actually went to impugn the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief, to a certain extent; not that you were called upon to make an imputation, but that that might be drawn as an inference from your statements?—That is possible. In one view of my Commission, perhaps, I might have inquired very extensively into the state of things.

13293. Firstly, you state in your former evidence that you did not see your colleagues; secondly, that you did not see Mr. Sidney Herbert; and thirdly, that you had merely a slight conversation with the Duke of Newcastle, and that Dr. Andrew Smith received you very kindly, but did not give you any information whatever; did you not feel that you were going out under very peculiar circumstances, not knowing what your duties were?—What I was informed was this: it had appeared that a want of every kind of necessary for the comfort of the men in the hospitals existed.

13294. Where did you get that information from?—Before I saw Dr. Andrew Smith.

13295. Where did you get that information from?—From reading newspapers of various kinds; the "Times" chiefly, I think.

13296. You were not sent out to inquire into what you saw in the "Times"?—I understood that I was sent out for this purpose: A statement had been made that there was a want of all the necessaries required for the men in the hospital, and the Government desired to ascertain whether those statements were real or not; whether there were such wants. Such I understood to be the general object of our Commission; but as the Honourable Member very justly observes, it was very vague. I did not know precisely what I was going to do; I knew that I was to inquire into the condition of those hospitals, but I wished to have exact instructions, and the Duke of Newcastle told me that those exact instructions should follow me; and they did accordingly.

13297. You stated in your former evidence that the Duke of Newcastle honoured you with a long conversation, and that he asked you whether you understood what the matter in hand was which you had undertaken, and that you told him you did generally, though not specifically; how did you understand what the matter in hand was; from whom?—Partly from Dr. Andrew Smith, and partly from the gentleman who first asked me whether I should like to go.

13298. But Dr. Andrew Smith gave you no information whatever?—No; he gave me no written instructions; I asked him for written instructions, and he said he had none to give me.

13299. Why should you ask Dr. Andrew Smith for instructions?—I understood, when the matter was first mentioned to me, that it was to be a Commission emanating from the medical department.

13300. You

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13300. You appear to have gone out without any specific instructions, and without any explanation from head-quarters as to the object of your Commission?—I had a general idea of what it was to be.

13301. Not from head-quarters; from whom did you get that idea?—From Dr. Andrew Smith. The original intention was, that this Commission should emanate from the medical department; that is what was originally mentioned to me—that two doctors were going out, and it was thought desirable to join a barrister with them. This was to be done under the authority of the medical department.

13302. Mr. *Ellice.*] Did you consider that the medical department had any authority to issue a Royal Commission?—This was not a Royal Commission.

13303. But a Commission emanating from any Governmental authority?—If the Medical Board, or any other Board, chooses to employ and pay me for my professional services, I do not care whether they have authority to do it or not.

Lieutenant-Colonel *Alfred Horsford,* called in; and Examined.

Lieut.-Colonel A. Horsford.

13304. *Chairman.*] WHAT was your precise position in the Crimea?—I started as second in command of the First Battalion of the Rifle Brigade; and on the 19th of September, in consequence of the illness, and subsequent death of the commanding officer, I became commanding officer.

13305. When did you leave the Crimea?—I left the Crimea at the end of January.

13306. What was the condition of your regiment after the battle of Inkermann?—They were badly off for clothing.

13307. Did you ever make any requisition for clothing for them?—There was none to be given out then; they were not entitled to any at the time; the only thing that could have been given was the warm clothing; that was coming out, but which was not the usual grant to the British soldier; it was only given on this occasion.

13308. Did the warm clothing arrive?—Yes.

13309. When did it arrive?—I think about the end of November.

13310. Did the men receive their warm clothing?—They did not receive it for some time; there was a great difficulty in giving it to them.

13311. What difficulty was there?—There was a difficulty in getting the things disembarked, and a difficulty of transport after they had been disembarked.

13312. Did not the idea suggest itself to you, that you might have marched your men down and dressed them on the beach?—It was impossible, the men had not time to do it; it could not have been done; we might have sent a few daily, but then there were the authorities required to have the things issued to you, when you got down there, and there was great difficulty in it. It was understood that the whole would be issued day by day, and a certain quantity brought up to the different divisions.

13313. Was that done?—Not for a long while. It did come, and then the men got a fair share, and I believe one division as much as another. Some got their warm clothing a long time before the others.

13314. Where was the Fourth Division?—Opposite to Chapman's Battery; in the rear of it.

13315. How far from Balaklava?—I call it about six miles; between six and seven.

13316. I suppose they were served last pretty nearly?—No, I think not; I think the supply was pretty fairly divided among the different divisions. The Fourth was not so far off as the Second Division; the Second Division was by far the furthest off; about a mile the furthest.

13317. When did they begin to suffer from disease?—From cholera they suffered in the Bosphorus, mostly from cholera; we lost 40 odd men in the Bosphorus before we went to Varna. We did not land there; we went to Varna, and then from thence we continued with the remainder of the army, and disembarked with them; but we did not land at Varna.

13318. You reached the Crimea on the 14th of September?—Yes.

13319. Sir *J. Pakington.*] How strong did you land in the Crimea?—We embarked 970 odd men, I think, and I think we were about 930 when we arrived in the Crimea.

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13320. *Chairman.*] Of what did the men die on board?—Cholera.

13321. The cholera broke out in the Bosphorus, before you got to the Crimea?—Long before; during the month we were there, for we were a month in the Bosphorus.

13322. Was it very hot at that time?—Yes, very hot indeed.

13323. Were you on board ship?—Yes, for some time, and then when the cholera broke out, the men were landed and placed in camp; but the disease still continued with very slight diminution.

13324. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Were you encamped at Scutari?—No, opposite to Therapia, on the Asiatic coast.

13325. *Chairman.*] After the battle of Inkermann, what was your strength?—We lost about 275 men, under 280, killed, and by deaths from disease, including the day of the 5th; we started 930. There were, of course, a number of men absent from sickness.

13326. Sir *J. Pakington.*] And from wounds?—Yes; I have not included the wounded.

13327. What was your effective strength immediately after the battle of Inkermann?—I cannot tell what I had in hospital at the time.

13328. Can you tell what was the effective strength at the time that you left the Crimea, at the end of January?—One hundred and eighty, I think, men fit for duty.

13329. *Chairman.*] Out of 930?—Yes.

13330. Sir *J. Pakington.*] How many were there in hospital then?—There were some at Scutari, some at Balaklava, and others in the hospitals there. What I recollect most were the soldiers in the tents at the time; I should say between 40 and 50 were in our camp, and the remainder were distributed at Balaklava.

13331. How many men were in hospital at that time?—I cannot state exactly the number; it varied from day to day.

13332. *Chairman.*] How were the men fed after the battle of Inkermann?—They were fed very regularly up to the 14th of November; then from that day there was a failure some days of rations.

13333. How did they cook their rations?—The great difficulty was in finding wood; from a large army being there the wood was collected, and the little that there was of it disappeared from the surface of the earth, and all that the men had to depend upon were roots that they could pick up between our entrenchments and Sebastopol; that was where they principally got wood from. I am only talking of my own regiment; they always burnt roots.

13334. Then the place from whence they got the wood was outside the entrenchments?—Some part of it was; some part was exposed; but they generally went into a valley that was pretty safe; we never had any casualty there.

13335. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Did you know of any instances during that period of time in which any of the soldiers were obliged to eat their food wholly uncooked?—No; I have often heard it mentioned, but I never knew it; nor was it ever reported to me by any of the men, or the non-commissioned officers, or the officers.

13336. Did you hear it mentioned as having happened in your own regiment?—No, I have only heard persons talk of it, and I have seen it printed; but I know of no case myself of that having been done; I have no doubt that they had difficulties.

13337. In how many instances did your men find themselves without any rations at all?—They were never totally without rations but for two days; I know for certain after the 15th they were without meat, and biscuit was only issued to them in the afternoon.

13338. For two consecutive days?—No; there was a separation, I think, of a day.

13339. *Chairman.*] Were the men under canvas the whole time?—Yes, the whole time.

13340. Were there any hospital tents?—There was a hospital marquee up to the 15th of November, and on that day the hospital marquee, like every other, was blown down; and until, I think, the 22d of December, they were without a marquee; then a marquee was put up again; but up to that time there was a proportion of tents given instead to each regiment.

13341. Did

13341. Did you visit the hospital tents?—Yes.

13342. Were the men great sufferers in them?—They were naturally very uncomfortable in them, up to a very late date; I think I was ill in the end of December, and just about that time they had some small things given to them to lie upon. Up to that time they had not them, and they were uncomfortable; the ground was wet, and it could not be prevented.

13343. Sir *J. Pakington.*] As your battalion was reduced to 180 effective men at the end of January, do you know how many you lost by disease between the battle of Inkermann and the end of January?—It is almost impossible to tell, for several reasons: first, because as soon as a man was supposed to be too unwell to remain in the camp, if there was any mode of transport he was taken down to Balaklava, and either put in the hospital there, or embarked for Scutari; and sometimes weeks passed without our being able to tell whether a man was alive or not.

13344. Had you no regular reports as to the condition of your men made to you after they went down to Balaklava or to Scutari?—I am sorry to say never; they did come, but they never came correct.

13345. *Chairman.*] Who ought to have sent them?—They came from the commandant at the hospital, I believe; but whether the names were not given by us correctly originally, or whether they were not properly entered when they arrived at the hospital, the fact was, that when I received a list, which used to come once a week or once a fortnight, stating that such a number of men had died, and their names, I very often did not recognise them as belonging to me.

13346. Sir *J. Pakington.*] According to the general military practice, ought you not to have received regular reports?—According to military practice, you are always near your own hospital.

13347. By what time in the winter were the whole of your men supplied with warm clothing?—I do not think that they were quite supplied when I left; I left at the end of December.

13348. In your opinion, had your battalion suffered greatly by disease and death from exposure to the severity of the weather, without warm clothing during the winter?—I think they suffered mostly from hard work.

13349. But they were exposed to hard work, and had insufficient provisions and insufficient clothing?—Yes; but it will be necessary here to say, with reference to the Commissariat, that we were differently situated from any other division. Every other division had a certain quantity of transport given to them in the shape of bât horses, and we had none. As the Fourth Division was the last organised, none were given to us at all, and therefore the Commissariat had no mode of transport; and the moment the road became so bad between Balaklava and the camp, it was impossible to get our supplies.

13350. Mr. *Bramston.*] How, then, were the rations transported?—As long as the weather allowed it, by a few arabas, and different means which the Commissariat had; but when the few mules that they had died, we were obliged to send for our own things. I sent my own horses down, and the other officers did the same; almost every officer in the division did the same. They sent round to the divisions, and got their private horses to do that.

13351. Was your division worse off than the others with regard to the Commissariat?—Solely in the respect I have mentioned. From having no mode of transport, the probability is that they were worse off.

13352. With regard to the Commissariat, you stated that on some days you had no meat rations; on those days was there an increased quantity of any other provision?—I think not; I think the same quantity of biscuit was given. I fancied that we had been left without biscuit; but it appears there was not a day that we had not biscuit.

13353. Colonel *Lindsay.*] When your sick were sent down from the front to Balaklava, was a list of their names, and a list of their necessaries, sent down with them to Balaklava?—Yes; on all occasions their names were sent down, and their necessaries, such as they had.

13354. In order that they might go forward from Balaklava to Scutari, if they were sent thither?—Yes; and their arms were generally sent down to be put into store at Balaklava.

13355. You were some time at Balaklava, were you not?—Yes, latterly.

13356. Can you state whether, when the men were sent from Balaklava to Scutari, the list was sent from Balaklava with them?—That I cannot say.

 13357. *Chairman.*]

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13357. *Chairman.*] Whose duty was it to send that list?—I should say it would have gone from the principal medical officer; but I am really not positive about it; but I should say so; and that it would have gone to the principal medical officer at the hospital at Scutari, or from the senior officer at Balaklava to the senior officer commandant at Scutari.

13358. Should you not have been informed when they left Balaklava?—No; they went indiscriminately; in the best way that they could when there was transport.

13359. Then you did not know where your men were?—No; I could not tell exactly; I merely knew of those who had left my camp; I could not name their destination.

13360. Colonel *Lindsay.*] If those men were sent from one hospital to another, would it not be the duty of the purveyor to submit to the proper authorities those documents, with their names and necessaries?—Yes, I think so.

13361. General *Peel.*] You received before you embarked for the Crimea all the clothing that the regiment was entitled to for that year, did you not?—Yes.

13362. Therefore all the warm clothing they received was extra?—Yes.

13363. How did you get it at last?—We got it up by different means; sometimes the men carried it up, and sometimes my own horses did it, and those of other officers too; it was always done by private means.

13364. And your division not having any horses were, perhaps, worse off for that reason?—Yes; that was the only reason.

13365. You landed without your knapsacks, did you not?—Yes.

13366. When did you obtain them?—They were brought to Balaklava; I cannot recollect when.

13367. I suppose it was exactly the same with regard to the knapsacks as with regard to the warm clothing, you had to wait for them?—Yes; they were left there until we could move them.

13368. With regard to the cooking; when you landed you had a certain number of camp-kettles to a certain number of men; did they throw them away upon the march?—Yes, they did.

13369. Fuel is not a customary issue to the troops in the field, is it?—Never; I never saw it, and I have served in two campaigns at the Cape of Good Hope.

13370. Did you suffer more in the Crimea than it was natural to expect from landing in an enemy's country, both as to rations and other matters?—There were no sufferings, or what I considered sufferings, in the field, in the beginning, until the climate came against us, and the roads were so impracticable that we suffered from want of food.

13371. When the men were in the hospital at Balaklava, as it is not customary to report from a general hospital to the colonel of each regiment, you had no communication made to you?—None.

13372. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Do you consider that the principal cause of the sickness of the men, after the battle of Inkermann, was the hard work?—Yes; hard work and the weather, and, of course, the badness of the roads, which prevented provisions coming up.

13373. Were they called upon to do a greater quantity of work than they ought to have done in their state of health?—That is a question which it is very awkward for me to answer.

13374. I speak only from the nature of the service?—I think it was hard work for them.

13375. General *Peel.*] Did your Rifle Brigade do work in the trenches as well as the others?—Yes.

13376. Mr. *Layard.*] Did not your regiment commence hutting itself as soon as the bad weather set in?—Almost immediately; they hutted themselves in the best way they could.

13377. But your men had had some experience at the Cape, had they not?—Yes; all the old soldiers at once set to work and hutted themselves.

13378. Were not those huts which I saw in the Fourth Division, made of branches of trees, stone, and mud, all made by your men?—Yes.

13379. They formed a very good shelter, did they not?—Very good indeed, until the weather became so bad.

13380. *Chairman.*]

13380. *Chairman.*] In your campaigns at the Cape you did not suffer from the weather?—Seldom.

13381. You never wanted fuel?—Not often.

13382. Nor water?—Merely now and then.

13383. Mr. *Layard.*] Could not the men have made their huts impervious to the water?—Not without canvas.

13384. Still those huts that they did make afforded some protection?—Yes, protection from the wind; but as soon as the rain became violent it penetrated through the branches of the trees.

13385. Who was your Commissariat officer?—Most of the time, Mr. Bartlett.

13386. Were you satisfied with the way in which he discharged his duties?—I thought him very attentive; he did as well as he could, considering the difficulties which he was under; he laboured under greater difficulties than others, on account of the want of transport.

13387. Were you ever in want of ammunition?—Never.

13388. In what ship did you go from Balaklava to Scutari?—I forget the steamer's name; it was a small steamer.

13389. Had she any sick and wounded on board?—Yes.

13390. How many?—I think about 130.

13391. How many died, that you know of, on the passage down?—I was ill, and it was solely from what was related to me by the officer commanding at the time that I knew anything of it.

13392. Do you remember how many were stated to have died?—I am afraid to mention; but not many.

13393. You do not recollect the name of the ship?—At this moment I cannot.

13394. At what date was it?—On the 25th of January.

13395. Was it in the "Arabia"?—No.

13396. Was it the "Kangaroo"?—No.

13397. Or the "Sydney"?—No.

13398. Or the "Pedestrian"?—No; she arrived at the same time that I did; I remember now, it was the "Brandon."

13399. If 153 men and one officer are stated to have been the number on board the "Brandon," is that about correct?—Yes, that is about it; one officer in charge, and one medical officer besides.

13400. On the passage down six persons are stated to have died?—I thought it was five.

13401. How did you come to England?—By Marseilles.

13402. On board the "Brandon" what provision was made for the sick?—They were on the deck; the men lay on the decks.

13403. Were the decks in a very bad state?—They were clean, but they had nothing but common bedding; no mattress.

13404. Did the men suffer much?—I should say not, as many other ships lost so many; she lost only six.

14405. Were they detained any time at Scutari before landing?—I think one day.

13406. In what ship did you come to Malta?—In a French steamer from Constantinople.

13407. General *Peel.*] Did you receive any reinforcements when you were out in the East?—Forty men arrived; I think that was in the beginning of December.

13408. Were those recruits from your own depôt at home?—Yes.

13409. How did they bear the campaign in comparison with the older soldiers; did they suffer more from illness and sickness?—I think that they did suffer more.

13410. *Chairman.*] If we are to include that 40 in the strength of your battalion, in reality you had 1,000 men?—We had more than that if you include everything that has gone out; but up to the moment that I spoke of, the 40 men you have to include. There were 200 at Balaklava when I left, just arrived.

13411. Mr. *Bramston.*] Had you a sufficient number of surgeons to attend to your regiment between the battle of Inkermann and the time you came away?—We lost a surgeon from cholera the day after the battle of the Alma, and

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and his place was never filled up; but we had sufficient, and they were very careful.

13412. Did the men suffer in consequence of that loss?—I do not think they did.

13413. How were you off as to the supply of medicines?—The medical men several times complained to me of a scarcity.

13414. What did you do in consequence of that complaint?—I told them to apply to the higher authorities of their own department to get it, and sometimes they succeeded, but very often they did not.

13415. Upon the whole, the men suffered from the want of medicine, did they not?—Yes, they did.

Sir *Charles Edward Trevelyan*, K.C.B., called in; and Examined.

Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K.C.B.

13416. Lord *Seymour.*] I BELIEVE you have been Assistant Secretary of the Treasury since 1840?—Since January 1840.

13417. During the whole of that time, until the 22d of December last, the Commissariat has been under the superintendence of the Treasury?—Yes.

13418. Therefore you have had 15 years' experience of the Commissariat service?—Yes.

13419. When did the Treasury first receive directions to provide a Commissariat establishment for the military operations abroad in the course of the year 1854?—We received our first official instructions from the War Department on the 9th of February 1854; but two or three days before that I received verbal directions from the Duke of Newcastle desiring that we would send instructions to the Commissary-general at Malta, to prepare for a large increase to the garrison at Malta; that was the form in which it was considered desirable to make the communication; and we instructed him to make preparations in fresh meat and flour for this increase, as it was called, to the garrison.

13420. That was a private communication, was it not?—Yes; a personal communication to me.

13421. When was the first official direction sent to the Treasury?—Two days after that, on the 9th of February 1854. I have a copy of the letter before me.

13422. Will you have the goodness to read that letter?—"Downing-street, 9th of February 1854. Sir,—I am directed by the Duke of Newcastle to request that you will move the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to appoint an adequate staff of Commissariat officers to accompany the expedition about to proceed to the Mediterranean. The troops forming this expedition will consist of 9,500 infantry, of a regiment of cavalry, and of two companies of artillery, with two companies of sappers and miners; the horses will amount to 1,500; the expedition will be landed at Malta, and from thence may, after a shorter or longer period than can now be determined, proceed to the Dardanelles."

13423. In consequence of those directions, was any minute passed at the Treasury, or what course was taken?—The nature of the preparations to be made in consequence of this instruction was very carefully considered, and a minute was prepared, which was finally recorded under date of the 17th of February, containing a programme of the preparations; but a portion of the minute was carried into effect previously to that.

13424. Whom did that minute appoint to be the Commissary-general?—Mr. Filder.

13425. That was on the 17th of February, was it not?—Yes.

13426. Was Commissary-general Filder then in England?—Yes.

13427. What staff was appointed with him for those 10,000 men at that time?—On consideration of the nature of the service, Mr. Filder came to the conclusion that a staff of 40 officers would be sufficient, and we immediately applied ourselves to getting together a number of officers, with a certain number of subordinates.

13428. Are the Committee to understand that 40 officers were considered necessary for 10,000 men?—Yes.

13429. Does that include the subordinates?—No; we relied upon getting subordinates in the countries where the force was to act; that is, the majority of

of the subordinates; we sent out a small number of storekeepers, and temporary clerks, and book-keepers.

13430. Are the Committee to understand that the subordinate establishment was to be filled up from persons who were already either employed in the Mediterranean, or who were to be found in the Mediterranean?—Yes; it was considered that they would be best acquainted with the habits and language of the people, and we sent instructions to our Commissariat officers at Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu, to collect as many qualified persons as they could, and also to detach as many of their own subordinates as they could spare.

13431. Were any steps taken by the Treasury at that time to prepare means of transport for the army which would be sent?—The first step taken was to direct the Commissary-general at Malta to prepare a small number of Maltese carts and mules to be sent on with the force; and afterwards much more extensive measures were taken. The Maltese carts are of a very admirable kind, and they have since been generally adopted both in our army and also to a considerable extent in the French army.

13432. This was when the intention was only to send troops to Malta?—I cannot charge my memory with the date, but it was before Mr. Filder left England.

13433. When did he leave England?—Mr. Filder left England on the 4th of April.

13434. When was the Treasury informed that the troops were ordered to the Dardanelles?—I do not remember any specific intimation to that effect, but from the first we were informed that there was a high probability that they would be ordered on, and we consequently instructed Mr. Smith, the Commissariat officer in charge of the department at Corfu, to proceed by the next packet to Constantinople, taking with him a junior officer and as many subordinates acquainted with the language and manners of the country as he could collect, and to enter into communication with the Ambassador and the Consuls at Constantinople and collect information of every kind required to furnish the basis of subsequent proceedings for the supply of the army. And he afterwards received instructions from Mr. Filder to enter into contracts.

13435. Mr. Smith reached Constantinople on the 12th of March, did he not?—Yes.

13436. When he arrived at Constantinople, what preparation did he make there for the reception of the troops, either there or at Gallipoli?—He was employed for about six weeks previously to the arrival of the troops in a course of extremely active preparation; he communicated freely with the Ambassador, from whom he received very cordial assistance; with Sir John Burgoyne, who had collected much valuable information bearing upon the Commissariat operations; with the Turkish authorities, with the Consuls in the Dardanelles and at Varna, and with several British merchants at Constantinople. He acquired in that short space of time a large fund of information relating to the resources of the country; and he secured, through the Ambassador and the Turkish Government, the great barracks at Scutari, with the magazines underneath them in the lower story; and he secured other magazines on the Asiatic side, and another in the Turkish dockyard. He went down to Gallipoli, and he secured magazines there, and he arranged with Mr. Calvert for securing further storehouses at the Dardanelles. He entered into contracts for supplying the troops expected to arrive at Gallipoli. Then he returned to Constantinople, and entered into contracts for supplying 10,000 men expected to arrive there; and when the troops arrived at Constantinople those contracts came into immediate operation, and they worked extremely well; so that, from the first, there was no deficiency of any kind of commissariat supply; and Commissary-general Filder reported that on his arrival at Constantinople he found the troops being supplied with as great regularity as they were at Chobham.

13437. You stated that Commissary-general Smith made great preparations; you have told the Committee that he obtained the Scutari barracks; those barracks were obtained about the 12th of April, were they not?—Yes.

13438. Did he obtain any interpreters?—He had interpreters; the Ambassador lent him his interpreter; he had no want of them; but after Commissary-general Filder arrived ample provision was made for interpreters; Mr. Smith had two young men with him from the Ionian Islands, who were acquainted with the languages of that quarter.

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13439. What provision did he make for the transport of the baggage and troops?—It formed no part of Mr. Smith's instructions to provide transport for the main body of the army; it was at too early a stage of affairs; the plan of operations was too uncertain.

13440. At that time, what were Mr. Smith's instructions; I thought you said that he was to provide barracks?—No, that was over and above his instructions; he did that on his own responsibility, seeing that the troops would require barracks; there was no one else to provide them.

13441. Strictly speaking, what were his instructions?—I will read them, "Write to Assistant Commissary-general Smith, that my Lords have appointed him to serve under the orders of Commissary-general Filder, C. B., with the force about to proceed to the East, and direct him to give over, at the earliest practicable period, the temporary charge of the department in the Ionian islands to Deputy Commissary-general Goldsmith, after which he will repair, without delay, to Constantinople, taking with him Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Palmer and three assistant clerks or assistant storekeepers now on the establishment of the Commissariat in the Ionian islands, who have a knowledge either of the modern Greek or Turkish language, or of the *lingua Franca* used in the East, and whose services are to be replaced by the temporary appointment of other persons. He will make such preliminary inquiries as may assist his successor" (that is, in the Ionian Islands) "in ascertaining whether it would be practicable to secure, in the Ionian Islands, the services of intelligent and properly qualified persons, who have some knowledge of the languages spoken in the East, to act as temporary clerks, assistant storekeepers, issuers, or interpreters in the Commissariat attached to the force under the command of Lord Raglan; and after having inquired very particularly regarding the previous character and trustworthiness of all candidates for such employment, their names and qualifications should be noted, so that when instructions to that effect may be given, their services may be engaged at a short notice. Their pay will be the same as that which may be established for persons of their respective classes serving with the army under the command of Lord Raglan, and they will be furnished with a free passage to the place to which the troops may be ordered to proceed. On Mr. Smith's arrival at Constantinople, he will make himself acquainted with the extent to which supplies of all the different articles composing the ration of provisions, forage, and fuel, and also supplies of transport, can be obtained in the country; and he will be prepared, on receiving instructions to that effect, to make final arrangements for the supply of about 10,000 men, and 600, subsequently to be increased to 1,500 horses, on the arrival of the troops; also to engage magazines, offices, &c. He will likewise direct his inquiries to the extent to which pack mules could be obtained, either by purchase or hire, on the eastern coast of Greece, and the islands in the Archipelago, as well as on the coast of Asia Minor. Mr. Smith is authorised to issue to himself and Mr. Palmer an advance of pay, and a sum on account of travelling expenses, and to the assistant clerks or storekeepers an advance of pay, and to provide them with a passage to Constantinople."

13442. You stated, did you not, that Commissary-general Filder did not reach Constantinople till the 24th of April?—The 22d of April.

13443. As Commissary-general Smith had before then been required to make all those examinations as to what could be obtained, did Commissary-general Filder, on his arrival at Constantinople, obtain interpreters, and baggage animals, and the supplies at once that were requisite for the arrival of the troops?—He found all the supplies that were required for the troops then at Constantinople, and likely to arrive at Constantinople (I mean for the troops located at Constantinople, or likely to arrive there), being issued in sufficient quantity with perfect regularity.

13444. When did the troops arrive at Gallipoli; was it before Commissary-general Filder arrived at Constantinople?—Yes; Mr. Smith instructed his subordinate officer, Mr. Turner, to proceed to Gallipoli to undertake the provision for 4,000 or 5,000 men, under contracts which Mr. Smith had previously made in the end of March.

13445. Then as early as the 31st of March it was known to Mr. Smith that the troops would arrive at Gallipoli?—Yes; and not only that, but he had actually made contracts for provisions, and had secured magazines for them.

13446. Had

13446. Had he at that time provided any baggage animals?—He had provided none himself; the troops at Constantinople were stationary. As regards Gallipoli, a certain quantity of land transport was expected from Malta.

13447. Had any land transport arrived at Gallipoli from Malta before the troops arrived?—It arrived either with the troops, or immediately after; but Mr. Smith had also made a contract for land transport at Gallipoli; he had not purchased, for our ordinary mode of providing transport is by hiring; that he had done; he had entered into a contract for transport, and had provided by hire the transport that was required.

13448. Were there not complaints made, even at Gallipoli, as to the want of transport, when the troops landed, for conveying the baggage to the camp; and was not there at that time a great deficiency in the English preparation as compared with that of the French?—Our Commissariat, when the French troops landed, saw the French mule carts landed and trotting off with the supplies, whereas they had to labour after our troops with the heavy arabas of the country. This arises out of the superior organization of the civil department of the French army, and their constant state of preparation for war.

13449. Where were those light Maltese carts which you say had been provided for you; why had they not been brought into use instead of employing the heavy arabas?—They arrived either with the troops, or immediately after them, but they were few in number; there were only 20, and they were not sufficient for the whole force. This is Mr. Smith's notice of his contract for transport at Gallipoli: "The contract for transport is only of a temporary nature, until waggons, horses, and other pack animals can be collected by means of the Turkish Government, when more facilities will exist, and the rates of charge probably be lower."

13450. At that time it was only intended to hire transport animals?—The Commissary-general had not arrived, and the plans of the campaign had not been formed. It was not even known to what quarter the troops would be directed; it was not known whether they would proceed beyond Gallipoli and Constantinople.

13451. You stated, did you not, that Commissary-general Filder arrived on the 22d of April at Constantinople?—Yes.

13452. What aged man is Commissary-general Filder?—He was then 64.

13453. Was he physically and mentally so active that the Treasury considered that he was fitted to take the general superintendence of the whole Commissariat establishment in the East?—Yes; we considered him well fitted for the charge; for although 64 years of age, he was an officer of great experience, having gone through the whole of the Peninsular and Belgian wars, and having, after that, been in charge of one important station after another, ending with the large station of Canada; and having, after that, been Chairman of the Committee for the Revision of the Expenditure of the Civil Departments of the Army Abroad, of which Sir George Cathcart and Sir Charles Hotham were members. He was remarkably active in mind; quick, ready, and energetic.

13454. Then the Committee are to understand that he was selected, not in course of seniority, or anything of that kind, but on account of his being peculiarly qualified for the service?—He was deliberately selected as being one of our best officers, and being a man of tried and approved qualities.

13455. Shortly after his arrival, there was an increase to the force announced, was there not?—The force was gradually increased, first, I think, to 20,000, and afterwards, I think, to 25,000.

13456. When the force was increased to 25,000, what amount of Commissariat establishment was stated to be necessary for that force?—As the force was gradually increased, so we increased our means of meeting it.

13457. Upon what scale?—I have prepared two or three short selections from the correspondence relating to the establishment, which will, perhaps, be of use to the Committee. First of all, a statement of the Commissariat establishment, as it existed on the 1st of February 1854; next, a short series of correspondence, showing the state of our establishments with the army at three different periods; and, lastly, a statement of the whole of the officers and subordinates who were sent from this country from February to December. On the 31st of March we had got together 44 persons in all, of whom three were store-

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keepers, one assistant storekeeper, one printer, one office-keeper and messenger, and the others were officers and clerks.

13458. For instance, was there an assistant commissary-general to each division, or how many were there?—There was one assistant commissary-general with each division, and a deputy assistant, or an experienced clerk, with each brigade of infantry.

13459. There were four divisions, were there not?—Six, including the cavalry.

13460. Then there were six assistant commissary-generals at that time?—Occasionally a deputy assistant had to act for an assistant; but the general rule is for the assistant to be with the division, and the deputy assistant, and one experienced clerk, with each brigade.

13461. How many brigades were there?—In the five divisions of infantry there would be 10 brigades.

13462. Can you show how they were divided?—I have statements showing the gradual increase; there were 44 in all.

13463. At what time?—On the 31st of March.

13464. Then on the 5th of June they had increased to 49?—Yes.

13465. Now you are getting to Varna?—Yes.

13466. Will you state the amount of the Commissariat establishment at Gallipoli before they proceeded to Varna?—This was at Constantinople, on the 5th of June; then there were 49 persons in the rank of temporary clerk and upwards: that is, 49 officers and clerks.

13467. A portion of the force was then at Varna, was it not?—No; I think not till the early part of June. I think the force was still at Constantinople on the 5th of June. The letter is dated from Constantinople certainly, from Commissary-general Filder.

13468. On the 5th of June, at Constantinople, will you state exactly the amount of the Commissariat establishment?—Forty-nine persons in all; of whom there was one commissary-general, four deputy commissary-generals, six assistant commissary-generals, 21 deputy assistant commissary-generals, six Commissariat clerks, three acting Commissariat clerks, one bookkeeper, one storekeeper, a clerk for stationery, and six temporary clerks; those were only the persons who had been sent from England, and they did not include a large number of temporary clerks and interpreters employed by Commissary-general Filder on the spot; he had full power to employ as many qualified persons as he thought necessary.

13469. The Committee are to understand that Commissary-general Filder had ample power to provide any persons that were required for the performance of the service of the Commissariat?—Any number of persons.

13470. If anything went wrong, it was not from a deficiency of power in obtaining persons to assist him?—It was not from a deficiency of authority; so far as the country afforded resources and qualified persons, he had full liberty to obtain them.

13471. When did any portion of the force proceed to Varna?—The force proceeded to Varna in the early part of June.

13472. When the force proceeded to Varna what course did Commissary-general Filder take as to the supply of the means of transport which then probably would be required?—By that time arrangements for getting together the proper land-transport establishments were in some state of forwardness; he had ordered upwards of 200 mule carts from Malta, and had sent home a requisition for 500 mules from Spain, which we immediately took measures to obtain and send to him.

13473. When did he send home a request for 500 mules from Spain?—I believe before he left Constantinople. Three hundred mules were obtained for the army from Malta, including those for the carts; but they were not all for Commissary-general Filder. He sent an officer to Broussa to purchase mules, and he entered into a contract for mules from Smyrna. Acting under the advice of the Foreign Office, we sent a telegraphic message to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to instruct the Consul at Smyrna to purchase a considerable number of mules at that place for the service of the army; to which Commissary-general Filder replied that he had already taken means to obtain all the mules that were to be had at or in the neighbourhood of Smyrna. He also sent an officer to Shumla to arrange with Omer Pasha to obtain all the transport from Bulgaria that he could.

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could. It is proper to mention that no amount of transport that can be sent from foreign countries can be sufficient to enable an army to take the field. The resources of the country which is the scene of the operations must be drawn on as the main resource.

13474. He wrote to you and said that a certain number of mules were required for 25,000 men. What was the calculation for the amount of land transport?—The first object was to enable the army to take the field in Bulgaria, and he calculated that for that purpose 2,000 arabas and 5,000 mules would be required.

13475. Do you mean 2,000 arabas with mules, and 5,000 mules besides, or 5,000 mules in the whole?—I mean 2,000 arabas with animals to draw them, and 5,000 or 6,000 mules besides.

13476. What was the number required for the different portions of the army, for the medical department and for the baggage transport?—He did not furnish us with the details; it was not necessary that we should know them; all that it was necessary for us to know was the total amount of transport he would require.

13477. In the Commissariat regulations, is there no scheme laid down guiding the Commissariat officers as to the amount of the land transport which ought to be provided for a certain force in the field?—It forms a most important part of the business of a Commissary-general to calculate the transport requisite for the movement of an army and its different component parts; and one of the precautions that we have taken to train our officers for active service has been to induce Commissary-general Sir Randolph Routh, Commissary-general Sir John Bissett, and others of our experienced commissary-generals, to place on record the Commissariat experience of the Peninsular war, and the China and Caffre wars, which has been done in two Treatises, and placed in the hands of all the Commissariat officers, with all the details and operations, showing the transport required for each branch of the army; I have them here, and can refer to them if necessary.

13478. I wish to ascertain upon what scale Commissary-general Filder made his calculations for those 5,000 mules; was that number considered, according to those writers upon military affairs, sufficient for an army of 25,000 men?—He considered them sufficient; but I must beg to refer to my papers before I give the exact number; my impression is that it was 3,000 arabas which he required.*

13479. And 5,000 mules?—Certainly 5,000 mules.

* *See* the answers to 13677 and following questions.

13480. If the army had been required to move in July 1854 from Varna and the neighbourhood, cannot you tell the Committee what means of transport the Commissariat department had then provided?—Yes; I can give it from Mr. Filder's own letter. The date of this is the 27th of July, at Varna: "With the exception of what may be required for certain special services, the transport of a large army undertaking extensive operations in the field can only be obtained in the country in which they are to take place; it would not be possible to import by sea the number of waggons and animals required. The transport furnished by the Commissariat for the service of this army is the best the country affords. The men employed with it have been well treated and regularly paid; nevertheless, they are evidently disaffected to the service, and take every opportunity of deserting. Although the transport to be attached to the several divisions is not completed, as I have not yet received more than half the quantity for which application was made to Omer Pasha, and notwithstanding the numerous desertions that have taken place, the number of arabas and pack animals now serving with the Light and Second Divisions is equal to the conveyance of 10 days' rations of provisions and forage corn, and that to the First Division to eight days, and there is a sufficiency in the depôt to attach the same proportion to the Third Division; so that if the men were to carry three days' rations, as has hitherto been customary with a British army, it could move with rations for 13 and 11 days respectively; and if more transport should be received from Omer Pasha, a further supply could immediately follow the army. Had it been deemed necessary to continue the formation of a depôt in advance at Devna, it would have further facilitated any movement it might be intended to make, whether in advance or not."

13481. That letter does not give the number; it states that there is enough

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to give a certain supply to each of the divisions, but it does not state what number of baggage animals, or what means of transport were at that time provided for the army?—I can furnish that.

13482. *Chairman.*] Can you tell the Committee whether at any time Mr. Commissary-general Filder said that he had a sufficient number of baggage animals provided to move the army from Varna; did he ever give you that information?—Yes; I have just read a passage to the Committee from a letter from Commissary-general Filder, stating for how many days he was able to furnish provisions.

13483. My question is, whether he ever told you that he had baggage animals in sufficient numbers to move the army?—He never stated that in so many words, but he never stated anything to the contrary.

13484. So that you conclude that he had provided a sufficient number of animals to move the army from Varna with the baggage, as well as provisions and medicines?—I cannot undertake to say that he had enough to enter upon the campaign in a satisfactory manner, but he had made large provision.

13485. Lord *Seymour.*] Did he not write to the authorities under whose supervision he was in regard to the mode in which he intended to meet those services if called upon to meet them; for he had to furnish transport for the stores, for the ammunition, for the field equipment, and for the conveyance of the sick and wounded?—As he was never called upon to provide transport to enable the army to take the field in Bulgaria, he never furnished to the Treasury a statement of the manner in which he proposed to provide the transport.

13486. *Chairman.*] But surely it was the intention to take the army into Bulgaria, was not it?—That intention was entertained for a considerable period, and Commissary-general Filder made great exertions.

13487. Lord *Seymour.*] Had not Lord Raglan acquainted Commissary-general Filder that he might be called upon to prepare for active operations in the field?—I presume he had done so.

13488. Are you not aware that he had done so?—I entertain no doubt that he did.

13489. Then do you know whether or not Mr. Commissary-general Filder, having those orders given to him, was prepared to meet those orders, and did he meet those orders?—The contingency did not arise.

13490. *Chairman.*] The contingency might have arisen any day, and he was liable to be called upon any day to provide for that contingency; did he ever provide for it?—I can give the extent to which he provided for it.

13491. The question is, whether he provided the army with sufficient transport to undertake a campaign in Bulgaria?—I cannot state positively that he did; he had provided a large amount of transport; far more than sufficient for the Crimean Expedition.

13492. Mr. *Layard.*] Suppose the army had been compelled to advance to the relief of Silistria, could it have done so with the transport at its disposal?—He never reported to me either that it was sufficient or that it was not; but he had a large amount of transport.

13493. *Chairman.*] Did not that contingency suggest itself to your mind, that it might happen that the army might want to move which was at Varna?—Certainly; and Commissary-general Filder was making every possible exertion to get together the requisite amount of transport, and we supported him in every possible manner.

13494. Did he get it together?—He got together sufficient to convey the provisions in the manner which I have described.

13495. Lord *Seymour.*] You have referred to those authorities who have written upon the amount of transport required for moving an army. Do you believe that he had anything like the amount of transport which they lay down in those books as being necessary for the movement of such an army?—I find at page 37 of Sir John Bissett's Treatise an estimate of the amount of transport required for moving 53,000 men, which amounts to 16,000 horses, and baggage mules and Commissariat mules attached, 8,815.

13496. That makes 24,000 animals; therefore if we divide that by about half, that would leave about 12,000 as necessary, according to that authority, would it not?—Yes.

13497. As yet we have only heard of 5,000 being provided?—Nearly 6,000;

5,659 was the total number of animals that he had at Varna, and he had besides upwards of 1,000 arabas, equal to upwards of 3,000 horses.*

13498. Mr. *Layard.*] Were not a great many of these animals private property, belonging to the officers?—No; those were all public animals; the whole of the animals belonging to the officers were quite independent of them.

13499. It has been stated in evidence that the 5,000 odd included the officers' animals?—It included the regimental bât animals; 24 were attached to each regiment for carrying the tents and the quartermasters' stores.

13500. Were those 5,000 animals actually purchased and paid for by the Government?—Yes, 5,659 were purchased by the Government, besides the 1,000 arabas that were on hire.

13501. Mr. *Ellice.*] Did you ever form any scheme in this country, as the head of the Commissariat Department, founded upon those calculations by Sir John Bissett, as to what would be necessary to move an army of 25,000 men in the field?—I did not; it was not necessary for us to do so; it was the business of the Commissary-general to form an establishment sufficient for moving the army. Our system is to draw upon the resources of the country which is the scene of operations to the utmost practicable extent, and to send from this country only what the enemy's country or the neighbouring districts cannot furnish.

13502. Knowing, before Commissary-general Filder could possibly know it, the amount of the force which was to be sent to the East, you never originated at home any plan by which the Commissary-general could provide sufficient means of transport for that army in the field?—We placed at his disposal the only means by which a sufficient amount of transport could be provided, which was to furnish him with ample funds and with authority to purchase all the means of land transport to be obtained in the country, which he did to the extent of his ability; and besides that, we sent from Spain and Malta the further means of land transport which he required.

13503. You never gave him instructions, founded upon the experience which the Commissary officers had acquired during former wars, to provide that number of horses proportionate to the wants of the different departments of the army which were supposed to be required by Sir John Bissett's Treatise?—It was not our duty; it is the duty of the Commissary-general, who is an experienced and authoritative officer, acting under the General Commanding-in-Chief; he was possessed of full information, not only from those treatises, but from his own long experience, and it was his duty, acting under the direction of Lord Raglan, to determine what was the amount of transport required to enable the army to take the field, and to provide that amount from all the resources that the country could afford.

13504. You stated just now that the civil departments of the army in France were admirably managed; do you suppose that the French sent their army upon this expedition without having sent precise directions from Paris how the wants of the transport service were to be provided for, or without having provided those means of transport from home?—The French sent a small, but a very efficient, transport establishment with the army, which was quite unequal to enable the French army to take the field; and it depended upon the intendant-general to provide all other means of transport required.

13505. But you sent or provided no means of transport, independently of those resources which the country could furnish?—We gave the Commissary-general an unlimited draft upon Malta, where there is an excellent kind of cart in general use well adapted to the purpose.

13506. But without sketching for him any general scheme by which he was to provide means of transport?—The general course of proceeding to be adopted by him, as above described, was fully understood between us.

13507. Mr. *Layard.*] Is it not a kind of axiom with you, that the country to which the army is sent should furnish the means of access to that army?—Yes; to the fullest extent to which it can be provided.

13508. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated that among the drivers of this limited number of transport animals that were obtained, there was a great deal of desertion?—Yes. The Bulgarian drivers deserted, not, as was reported, on account

* A more particular statement of the information contained in Mr. Filder's letters respecting the means of enabling the army to move into the interior from Varna is contained in the answer to 13677, and the following questions.

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account of any ill-treatment, but because they had been absent many months from their homes with Omer Pasha's army, and because they were desirous to return to get in the harvest.

13509. Did Commissary-general Filder, when he formed a notion of the number of mules and transport animals required, also form a notion of the corps of persons required to conduct those mules and transport animals?—His first impression was that it would be advisable to act upon the general rule of hiring the transport of the country, because it is found that hired transport, as a general rule, is more efficient than the Government transport, because under circumstances of difficulty and privation, people take better care of their own animals than they do of the Government animals; but after some experience, and making some inquiries at Constantinople, he found that the hired transport of the country was not to be depended upon to that extent, and he therefore confined himself to obtaining a certain number of arabas from Omer Pasha, about 1,000, and the rest of the transport was purchased.

13510. As regards the drivers; as he purchased the animals, he had, I suppose, to hire drivers; or how did he obtain them?—He obtained them in the country.

13511. They were all natives of the country, were they not?—Yes; and they were found unequal to the duty, without proper superintendence.

13512. You state that they were found unequal to the duty, without proper superintendence; do you mean that there was not a proper superintendence over them?—His first idea was to hire transport; and when he found that he was unable to do that, he had to purchase transport, to a certain extent; and then it became necessary to have proper superintendence; upon which he wrote to the Treasury, to request that a considerable number of persons might be selected from the police corps, in England and Ireland, to be sent out to take charge of the transport, and to act as assistant storekeepers; upon which we sent large draughts of men from the Metropolitan Police, the Liverpool Police, and the Irish Constabulary.

13513. The Committee are to understand that it was while the troops were at Varna that this application was made for persons from the police to be sent out to take care of the animals?—We received the first requisition before Commissary-general Filder left Constantinople.

13514. Were the Metropolitan Police considered as persons well adapted to take care of mules?—They were intended to superintend the native drivers who had the actual care of them, and they were considered to be the most trustworthy persons who were at our disposal.

13515. Did you send out any?—Yes, we sent out a large number.

13516. When was that?—We sent them out in batches of 10 or 20 at a time, in June or July, to superintend the drivers, and to act as assistant storekeepers.

13517. Had Commissary-general Filder, in the meantime, obtained a sufficient number of drivers for his mules?—We never heard of any want of drivers; he complained of their quality, but not of any insufficiency in the number.

13518. Did he say that he could not keep them?—That refers to the arabas.

13519. With regard to the drivers generally, was he able to keep them?—Some of them may have deserted also.

13520. Did they take away the mules with them when they deserted?—I never heard of their taking the mules.

13521. Did he not lose a large number of beasts of transport when at Varna?—He lost some during Lord Cardigan's expedition to the Dobrudscha; I never heard of any other loss.

13522. When the army was at Varna, did Commissary-general Filder consult Lord Raglan as to the formation of reserved depôts for the general purposes of the army?—Yes; he arranged a system of depôts very shortly after his arrival at Constantinople; his principal depôt was at Constantinople, where large magazines were formed of salt meat, and biscuit, and rum, and the smaller articles of supply which were provided, and a reserve depôt was established at Malta.

13523. For instance, he established depôts at Constantinople, did he not, before the 5th of June, when he left for Varna himself?—Yes. Mr. Smith was left in charge at Constantinople, and of the depôt there, with full powers to replenish it by purchases on the spot, and to take charge of the supplies sent from England.

13524. That

13524. That depôt, you state, contained salt provisions and spirits?—Salt provisions, rum, biscuit, and all the articles of supply, and chopped straw.

13525. Was there an ample supply prepared at Constantinople of forage?—Mr. Filder entered into a large contract at Constantinople for hay, which afterwards failed.

13526. With whom did he enter into a contract for hay at Constantinople?—The name of the house was Samandjo, Oglu & Falanga; it was a native house.

13527. Did he expect to get hay in that country, or where was it to come from?—He expected to get it from the country, in the neighbourhood of the Sea of Marmora; the French Commissariat had obtained a considerable quantity there.

13528. Did he get it?—The contract failed for the most part; out of 8,000,000 lbs., for which he contracted, he only obtained perhaps 500,000 lbs.

13529. When did he write home and acquaint the Treasury with his difficulty in regard to obtaining forage?—The first letter in which we received from him information that there was likely to be any deficiency of forage was written when the fleet was crossing the Black Sea in September.

13530. He did not ascertain that there was any deficiency till the troops had left Varna?—No.

13531. Do you believe that there had been up to that time an ample supply?—I believe so, including chopped straw, which was to be had in any quantity, and barley, which was to be had in any quantity, and oats and hay, which had been sent out in large quantities from England on board the horse transports.

13532. What was the mode of supplying the troops at Varna and in the neighbourhood; was it by contracts, or in what way was it done?—Fresh meat was furnished by contract. He entered into large contracts at Constantinople and also at Smyrna, and when he went to Bulgaria he entered into a separate local contract in Bulgaria.

13533. Keeping to Varna, with regard to bread, what was the mode of contracting when at Varna for supplying the troops with bread; did he contract for flour and then bake it on the public account, or did he contract for the bread. I put the question, because complaints have been made with regard to the quality of the bread?—He contracted for the bread made, I believe, with a Constantinople house.

13534. Did they send the bread from Constantinople?—It was baked at Varna, under contract.

13535. Was that system found to answer?—The flour was complained of as being rather of a coarse quality, but the bread I believe was wholesome and good. Many of the ovens in which the bread was baked for the troops were destroyed by the fire at Varna.

13536. Will you state to the Committee whether Commissary-general Filder wrote to the Treasury upon this point; whether he had found it best to contract for the bread made, or whether he considered it best to contract for the flour and to have it baked on the public account?—He reported to us that he had formed contracts for baking the bread. Before he left England we had arranged a plan for sending out a steam-mill and bakery, and a letter was written to the Admiralty proposing the preparation of it; the Admiralty discouraged it, and then I wrote to Commissary-general Filder to ask his opinion upon the subject, and he stated that it would be unnecessary to prosecute the plan, as he had made satisfactory arrangements for baking.

13537. He was completely satisfied with the system of providing the bread that he had established at Varna, was he not?—He had made arrangements which he considered satisfactory.

13538. While the troops were at Varna we have heard that the forms and the vouchers required by the Commissariat created some difficulties; will you state what the forms and the vouchers were, and how many signatures were required for the supply of bread to the troops?—The form of voucher upon which the supply of bread to the troops is issued is the three daily ration return, a ration return which is prepared once in three days; and we consider this, as well as the other forms of the Commissariat, to have been reduced to the utmost possible degree of simplicity. When I took charge of the Commissariat in 1840, I found the general instructions of the department in such a state that it was impossible even for the most experienced officer to understand them; they were contained in an obsolete book of regulations and several hundred

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circulars, the greater part of which have been rescinded. Pains were then taken to reduce this mass to a simple code of regulations; and the numerous forms then in use were much curtailed, and they were printed, distinguished by consecutive numbers, at the end of the book of regulations. At the same time the accounts, which previously to that time were rather of a complex nature, and aimed at making a classification of the different services, were reduced to the utmost possible degree of simplicity, consisting of the simplest form of cash-book and store-book, all receipts being entered on one side and all the issues on the other, as they occurred; the account to be rendered to the Commissioners of Audit being merely a transcript of this simple account. Some years afterwards the book of regulations was again revised, as it now exists in its present form.

13539. Are the Committee to understand that the Treasury considered that their system of regulations with regard to the issue of provisions for the troops was as good as possible?—We considered it to be as good as we could make it; we had no amendments to propose.

13540. Did the experience of Commissary-general Filder, and of the officers under him in the East, continue you in the opinion that your regulations were good, or did they show you that any alterations were required?—Our experience continued us in the opinion that our regulations were all that the case required; but in order that forms and processes of this description may be carried out, both parties should be familiar with them. Now, as the Commissariat did not exist at all at home, and the bulk of the army came from the home station, the Commissariat and the officers and the men of the army were not accustomed to act with each other, the consequence of which was that there was a good deal of friction.

13541. *Chairman.*] Suppose I have a hundred men wanting bread, what should I have to do to obtain it?—Every three days the quartermaster would have to furnish this return, signed by the paymaster and the commanding officer. It serves both as a requisition and as a receipt.

13542. Suppose the Commissariat officer had not that form with him, could I get for my hundred men the bread that I wanted?—That would place the Commissariat officer in a very painful predicament, because this is his authority and his justification for issuing the public stores, and unless this form of requisition and receipt is furnished, it may lead to any amount of confusion and waste and insufficiency of supply.

13543. Lord *Seymour.*] Are the Committee to understand that the Commissariat officer is bound to have with him a sufficient supply of those forms?—It is the duty of the regimental officers to furnish them, and they are furnished from the War Office.*

13544. Then the Commissariat is not bound to provide them with the papers which they have afterwards to sign?—No.*

13545. *Chairman.*] Supposing in crossing a river an officer loses his bundle of forms; he gets his regiment on to the other side, and the Commissariat is on the other side; can he get the bread that is wanted?—It would be the duty of the officer, under those circumstances, to give the bread; every officer who knows his duty, when he is placed in extraordinary circumstances, will suspend the usual routine.

13546. Do you think that an extraordinary circumstance, that during a campaign an officer should lose a set of forms?—I think that, in the absence of the proper forms, a Commissariat officer should content himself with the best that could be furnished.

13547. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to the other provisions, besides bread, are they all upon the same system of supply and demand; is the demand made in the same form, and are the same signatures of two persons required?—Yes; all the ordinary rations are included in the same form; there is a separate one for forage, fuel, and light.

13548. You stated, did you not, that those forms were issued by the War Office?—They are prepared by the Commissariat Department, and prescribed by the Treasury; the actual forms are settled there, and furnished to the regimental officers by the War Office.*

13549. They

* The Answers to Questions 13543, 13544, and 13548, are subject to the explanation contained in the Answer to 14024.

13549. They are prescribed by the Treasury?—Yes.

13550. They are prescribed to the War Office?—Yes.

13551. The War Office receives a communication from the Treasury that such forms are necessary, do they not?—They form part of the book of standing regulations; and it is known to all that these are the forms required.

13552. But the forms are not signed in the book; they are separate papers, issued from the War Office to the different regiments?—Yes.*

13553. Therefore they are provided, in the first instance, by the War Office?—Yes.*

13554. And they are provided to the paymasters, or to whom?—To the quartermasters.

13555. Then he has those forms to issue: to whom does he issue them?—He prepares them, and furnishes them to the Commissariat officers.

13556. Who was it that you said signed them?—The ration return is signed by the paymaster in reference to stoppages, and by the commanding officer in reference to the number of rations.

13557. Then the quartermaster must give them to the paymaster for the paymaster to sign them?—Yes.

13558. The paymaster again brings the form under the notice of the commanding officer for him to sign, after the paymaster has signed it?—Yes. It is done by the paymaster only in reference to the ration stoppages, which is a complication we could not get rid of when we revised the Commissariat system.

13559. The stoppage of the rations on the one hand, and the supply of provisions on the other, render the account much more complex, does not it?—It renders the subsequent settlement of the accounts more complex. I am not aware that there is any difficulty found in stating the amount of the stoppage.

13560. Practically, were you informed that while the troops were in Bulgaria and in the neighbourhood of Varna, a difficulty had arisen from the forms and vouchers required?—No; we received no such information.

13561. So far as the Treasury were concerned, they were induced to think that no difficulty had arisen on account of the forms?—I have received subsequent information of a difficulty having arisen, not at Varna, but in the Crimea.

13562. *Chairman.*] It has been stated to this Committee, that a difficulty arose because a commanding officer signed his name an inch too low down, and that the men were not fed for many hours in consequence; is that in the army regulations issued by the Treasury?—Certainly not. I received another version of that. I was informed that the Commissariat officer concerned had had repeated reason to complain of the irregularity with which those ration returns were made out, and he complained of it.

13563. And the complaint was, that the name was signed an inch too low?—I am not aware of that; the officer is absent; I have seen a letter from him in which it is stated, that the ration returns were otherwise irregularly made out, and that he had complained of it on more than one occasion.

13564. Why did he not complain of the other irregularities?—Unless the officer is here to answer for himself, it is impossible that the particulars can be known.

13565. Lord *Seymour.*] The tents, and equipments of that kind for the troops, are not a part of the business of the Commissariat, but belong to the Quartermaster's department, do they not?—Yes; tents, and intrenching tools, and shoes, and blankets, and other articles of that kind, belong to the Quartermaster-general's department.

13566. Therefore if any fault was found with them, that, as I understand, does not rest with the Commissariat, but rests with the Quartermaster-general's department, or with the Ordnance, if he obtained them from the Ordnance?—The Commissariat was the only store department with this army; there was no Ordnance

* The Answers to Questions 13552 and 13553 are subject to the explanation contained in the Answer to 14024.

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Ordnance storekeeper and no Ordnance barrack-master; there was no storekeeper in charge of the Quartermaster-general's stores; it all fell upon the Commissariat. The providing the Quartermaster-general's stores, that is, the foreseeing and arranging what quantities were necessary for the army, did not belong to the Commissariat, but it was the duty of the Commissariat to take charge of such as had been provided, and to furnish such additional quantities as might be called for.

13567. Did the instructions of the Treasury to the Commissariat tell the Commissary-general that he would have to take care of all this vast amount of equipments, which are generally under the Quartermaster-general?—Yes; it was discussed with Lord Raglan at the commencement of the campaign, whether it would be advisable to have a separate store department for the Quartermaster-general's stores, and the conclusion arrived at was, that it would be better that there should be only one store department with the army, and that that should be the Commissariat, and a storekeeper and an assistant storekeeper accustomed to the care of such stores were appointed under Commissary-general Filder to assist him, and the policemen, who were sent out in large numbers afterwards, as assistant storekeepers, were partly intended for that duty.

13568. Will you state what stores you consider to be the Quartermaster-general's stores, as distinguished from the Commissariat's stores?—All articles of equipment, such as tents, shoes, blankets, nose-bags, saddles, horse-cloths, intrenching tools, and a variety of other articles.

13569. Now as to stationery, the Committee have heard that there was a want of that; was that a Commissariat supply?—That was under the directions of the War Office; but it was arranged with the War Office that a stationery clerk should be sent out with Commissary-general Filder, and a large quantity of stationery was sent out under his charge.

13570. The question is, who was to provide that; was the Commissariat?—The quantity was determined by the War Office, but it was given in charge to Commissary-general Filder; it was provided by the War Office.

13571. Upon calculations made by the War Office as to what would be sufficient?—Yes.

13572. With regard to nose-bags, it has been stated that there was a great want of them; who made the calculation as to that; was that done by the Commissariat?—No; by the Quartermaster-general; it was his duty.

13573. Before the troops came to Varna had there been any report made by the Commissariat, who had the charge of those things, whether or not they considered that they had sufficient for the purposes of the army?—None; that was not the duty of the Commissariat; it was the duty of the military authorities, and especially of the Quartermaster-general, to foresee and arrange what quantity of all those descriptions of articles would be required. The duty of the Commissariat was confined to taking charge of such of them as were in depôt, and not required for current use, and also to purchase such additional quantities as might be required, and might be procurable on the spot; and an immense burthen fell upon the Commissariat in consequence of those extraneous duties being required from them.

13574. But those extraneous duties it was, as I understand you, considered desirable by the Treasury that the Commissariat should undertake, even before the Commissariat left England?—That is, to undertake the charge of the stores; to hold them in charge, at the disposal of the military authorities.

13575. If they were to hold them, were they not to supply any deficiencies that were required?—Yes, to supply such deficiencies as might be pointed out to them, and called for upon specific requisitions from the military authorities; but it formed no part of the duty of the Commissariat to determine what quantity of those supplies was required.

13576. You think that if any deficiency arose in either tents, or horse-cloths, or nose-bags, the Commissariat was in no way to blame on that account?—In no way whatever.

13577. *Chairman.*] Had they not to transport them?—Yes, they had to convey them.

13578. Suppose they were not forthcoming because the Commissariat had not brought them, whose fault would that be?—The fault of the Commissariat, except

except so far as those articles are conveyed by bât horses, which are appropriated to each regiment, and which are under regimental management.

13579. Lord *Seymour.*] As I understand you, if there are not sufficient supplies of those articles in the depôt, it is not the fault of the Commissariat, unless they have been called upon to purchase them?—Yes, that is what I mean.

13580. But it is their fault if, having them in the depôt, they cannot supply the means of transport to convey them to the troops from the depôt?—Yes.

13581. With regard to the officers at Varna, was it settled that they should receive an allowance in lieu of baggage animals, or did the Commissariat provide them then with baggage animals?—The first impression of Lord Raglan and Commissary-general Filder was, that according to the previous practice allowances should be made to the officers for purchasing the regimental bât animals; but we pointed out to the Commissary-general that by a recent regulation the regimental transport animals would have to be provided by the Government, and they were so provided.

13582. The animals for the officers were provided by the Government?—The regimental bât animals; about 24 to each regiment.

13583. Mr. *Layard.*] They were for carrying the tents, and not for carrying the officers' baggage?—For the tents, not for the officers' baggage.

13584. Lord *Seymour.*] Did the officers receive an allowance to provide themselves with animals to carry their baggage?—It fell upon the Commissary-general to provide regimental animals, but beyond that I am not aware that he had any responsibility.

13585. Do you know, one way or the other, in what way the baggage animals were provided for the officers; do you believe that they provided them themselves?—I will supply an answer to that.

13586. The usual course, I believe, is that the officers receive an allowance, to provide themselves with baggage animals: I want to know whether that system was pursued in Varna, or whether it was departed from, and the Commissariat then undertook to provide them?—I cannot positively state, without referring to the correspondence.*

13587. You spoke of the Quartermaster-general's stores: supposing, under this arrangement, that the Commissariat should take care of those stores; that an application for more of those stores were made, for instance, for horse-cloths, for any regiment at Varna, would that application have been made direct to the Commissariat?—It would be made to the Commissariat, under directions from the military secretary; a very large number of requisitions of that sort were made, and vast quantities of supplies and equipments of that description were purchased by Deputy-Commissary-general Smith, at Constantinople, and forwarded to the army.

13588. The Quartermaster-general does not apply for those stores himself?—He applies, under the authority of the General commanding.

13589. The Committee have heard that there was a great want of horse-cloths and nose-bags; will you state how a regiment of cavalry, when they found that there was a want of horse-cloths and nose-bags, were to proceed to obtain them?—It would be provided by the Commissariat, on a requisition from the Quartermaster-general, under the authority of the General commanding.

13590. The officer commanding the regiment would apply to the Quartermaster-general?—Yes.

13591. And he would apply to the military secretary, would he not?—He would obtain the authority of the General commanding.

13592. Would he apply to the military secretary for his signature?—He would apply to the General commanding; to Lord Raglan.

13593. Do you mean that they could not get some horse-cloths for the regiment without the signature of the General commanding?—Those requisitions were sent from Varna and the Crimea in large numbers to Constantinople, and they were made on the authority of the General commanding.

13594. To give an instance, the Committee have been told that horse-cloths and nose-bags were wanted for the regiments. Suppose a regiment at Varna was in want of a certain number of those nose-bags, how did they proceed to obtain them under this arrangement?—I believe they would be obtained by an order on the Commissariat from the General commanding, through the military secretary.

* See the answer to 13663 and following questions.

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13595. The regiment would apply first to the Quartermaster-general, and the Quartermaster-general would have to apply to the military secretary?—He would have to obtain the authority of the General commanding.

13596. Then it would go to the Commissariat to supply those articles?—Yes, I believe that is so.

13597. You believe that no articles, even of so small amount as a few nose-bags, could be obtained without the consent and signature of the General commanding; is that so?—I cannot positively state. The requisitions on Constantinople were all upon the authority of the General commanding.

13598. *Chairman.*] Supposing that a captain of cavalry has under him a certain number of men, and of that number a dozen want nose-bags, what is the captain then to do?—I think it would be desirable to inquire from a practical Commissariat officer.

13599. Mr. *Layard.*] Has Commissary-general Smith arrived in England?—Yes.

13600. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated that the Commissariat officers were to to take charge of the Quartermaster-general's stores; did the Commissariat officers report periodically to the Quartermaster-general the amount of the stores belonging to his department which they had in charge?—I am not aware that they did so.

13601. Does it not occur to you that if they did not this would arise, that the Quartermaster-general being kept quite in the dark as to the amount of stores belonging to his department, he would be suddenly made acquainted that there was nothing more in store, he having had no report made to him?—I conceive that if no such reports were made, it was clearly the duty of the Quartermaster-general to require them to be made, in order to keep himself acquainted with the amount of articles in store. The Commissariat had no duty in respect to this class of stores, except as holders of the stores for the Quartermaster-general, and as purchasers of new stores when they were directed to be purchased; therefore it was the duty of the Quartermaster-general to acquaint himself whether the quantity of articles in store were sufficient, and to order any further quantities that might be required to be provided.

13602. Was it the duty of the Commissariat to report periodically to the Quartermaster-general as to the quantity of his stores that they had in their charge?—If so required; and I have no doubt that Commissary-general Filder did so report.

13603. If there was a want of stores of this kind, to whom would you attribute the fault of that deficiency?—To the Quartermaster-general; the Commissariat did all that was required, both as to holding the stores and purchasing them; beyond that it had no responsibility.

13604. So far as you believe, the Commissariat depôt always contained a sufficiency of those articles to meet any demands that might be made, or that were made upon them?—No, because repeated orders were received by the Commissariat to provide additional stores under great pressure from Constantinople and elsewhere.

13605. When they were so called upon to provide them did they provide them?—Yes, to the best of their ability; and great exertions were made to provide tarpaulings, horse-cloths, nose-bags, and a variety of other articles at a very short notice.

13606. Was it the Quartermaster-general's business to foresee the want before it arose, or whose business was that under this new system?—The only part of the system which may be said to be new is, that the Commissariat officers were the storekeepers. The determining what quantity of stores were necessary, and the ordering them to be provided, always belonged to the Quartermaster-general. Indeed even the other part of the arrangement is not new. During the Peninsular war it was the duty of the Commissariat to have charge of the Quartermaster-general's stores; but in the Waterloo campaign I believe there was a special storekeeper appointed belonging to the Storekeeper-general's department.

13607. Before the troops left Constantinople was there a sufficiency of Quartermaster-general's stores sent out from this country?—A sufficiency of Quartermaster-general's stores was not sent out to meet all the subsequent requirements of the campaign, because very large orders were sent to the Commissariat from Varna and from Balaklava.

13608. Even at Varna it was found that there was a deficiency in this class of stores?—Yes.

13609. And though that deficiency existed, you say that the fault of it does not rest upon the Commissariat?—Not at all.

13610. *Chairman.*] It rests with somebody, does it not?—Certainly.

13611. Lord *Seymour.*] Were there not, besides the regular supply of provisions issued to the troops at Varna, a number of extras issued, which we have heard were ordered for the troops, such as porter and tea, and other things of that kind?—Yes. Before the expedition left England, arrangements were made to enable the troops, as far as possible, to have the same articles of diet abroad as they had at home; and supplies of porter, sugar, tea, coffee, and rice were laid in before they left England.

13612. When the troops got to Varna, were those various provisions issued to them?—Yes.

13613. In what way were they issued; for instance, tea; was tea issued as a ration, or was it purchased at a price?—The first arrangement made was to supply those extra articles to the troops at cost price, without any charge for duty or freight, but it was found that this led to abuse, and that larger quantities were purchased than were required. Tea and coffee, for instance, sufficient for 72 days for the troops, was taken out in 30 days, and the stores were in such rapid progress of exhaustion, that it was considered desirable by Lord Raglan and the Commissary-general to fix upon a regular ration that should be issued; after which a fixed ration of sugar and coffee were issued, with a provision that any of the other articles which happened to be in store might be issued in substitution for coffee.

13614. The first arrangement was, that tea should be issued at cost price?—Yes.

13615. Then you say that so much was taken out of store that there was a fear that the store would be exhausted?—Yes.

13616. Who took it out of store; how was it obtained?—It was under regimental arrangement.

13617. Who in a regiment could obtain such a quantity?—It was done through the quartermasters and quartermaster-serjeants, by a regimental arrangement.

13618. They drew out so much in a short time that they exhausted the store?—Yes.

13619. Upon that it was determined not to issue any more tea?—It was determined to have a fixed ration of coffee and sugar, which were considered the articles most desirable for the troops.

13620. Who settled that coffee was most desirable for the troops?—Lord Raglan. The whole of these arrangements were made under the advice of a Board of Officers.

13621. If the troops were dissatisfied with being supplied with coffee instead of being supplied with tea, that complaint does not rest upon the Commissariat, but rests upon those officers who recommended it?—Yes.

13622. When those officers recommended that coffee should be supplied to the troops, in what state did they recommend that it should be supplied; or did they not notice that?—I presume in the state in which it was then issued, which was unroasted.

13623. You believe that at first the officers themselves recommended that coffee should be issued to the troops, without taking any special notice as to whether it should be roasted or unroasted?—Yes; it was then being issued unroasted; therefore, I presume, in recommending that a fixed ration should be issued, they had in contemplation unroasted coffee.

13624. Therefore, at that time, the Commissariat was in no way to blame for issuing unroasted coffee?—No.

13625. Had the troops the option of obtaining roasted coffee if they wished it?—No, not at that time. It had always been usual with armies in the field to provide coffee in an unroasted state, and to leave the troops to roast it; by a regimental arrangement coffee was so issued as a ration during the last Kafir war, and no difficulty was found by the troops in preparing it.

13626. *Chairman.*] But they were in a country in which wood was abundant?—Yes; but I am not aware that any difficulty was experienced at Varna; we heard of no complaints until the general disaster occurred before Sebastopol.

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13627. Lord *Seymour*.] Even before the troops left Varna, was there not an application for the coffee to be roasted?—We heard no complaints whatever; we took all the pains in our power to ascertain, in this country, whether it would be better that the coffee should be sent out roasted or unroasted; and finding that it was furnished unroasted to the navy; that it was furnished unroasted to the French army; and that it had been furnished unroasted to the troops throughout the last Kafir war, it was considered advisable to send it in an unroasted state; but still, to make assurance doubly sure, we sent out a small quantity in a roasted state, as an experiment; and afterwards, when we found that the troops had a difficulty in roasting it in the Crimea, owing to the want of fuel, and to their state of overwork and exhaustion, then we ordered it to be sent out roasted.

13628. Mr. *Layard*.] Were the troops supplied with any coffee-mills to grind it from the Commissariat?—No; we had no reason to suppose that they would be required; at the Cape of Good Hope they used to roast it on the tops of their camp-kettles, or in their frying-pan, and they ground it with stones; that is, they pounded it; it was issued once in three days, and they used to mix the pounded coffee with a little water, and make it into a sort of paste, and, by adding hot water to it, it always furnished a good cup of coffee.

13629. There was no complaint that the tops of the kettles were spoilt by this process?—I heard of none.

13630. It has been stated that the cooking pots became absolutely useless in consequence of being so used; do you believe that to have been the case?—It may have been; I heard of no such complaints.

13631. *Chairman*.] I have before me the evidence of Serjeant Dawson, in which he is asked: "Was the coffee given out to you ground or roasted? It was green coffee; we first had to roast the coffee, and then grind it afterwards between two stones, or what we could procure for the purpose; we had to use the lid of the mess-kettle first to roast the coffee upon.—Was the lid of the mess-kettle a good thing to roast the coffee in? It injured it; the rim of the lid, of course, by putting it on the fire, came off altogether, from the solder melting.—Did that prevent your using the kettle afterwards for other purposes? Yes, the lid; it was of no benefit to us afterwards of course after the rim came off, because there was no stay to keep it on the kettle"?—We heard of no such complaints, nor were any such made at the Cape of Good Hope. I have in my hand letters from Commissary-general Miller and Commissary-general Sir George Maclean, who conducted the Commissariat during the Kafir war, showing that no such difficulty was experienced there*, nor was any difficulty whatever experienced in the Eastern expedition so long as the troops had the means of roasting the coffee themselves. There are obvious advantages in sending it out unroasted, for it is sure to reach the troops fresh, whereas if it is sent from a distance in a roasted state it loses its flavour, and becomes injured by exposure, and by friction, and so forth. The general experience of campaigning, both in the English and French armies, shows that under all ordinary circumstances of field service, the best mode of sending out coffee is in an unroasted state.

* *Vide* Appendix, p. 355.

13632. Lord *Seymour*.] You stated that a great effort was made when the troops left England to supply them with the diet which they had been accustomed to in England, and that porter was accordingly purchased for them; were they provided with porter when they were at Varna?—They were, with the exception of one division.

13633. Was that division at Varna?—It was in the interior, and an effort was made to supply them by cutting a sandbank which separated the two lakes.

13634. Were they supplied?—The whole army was supplied with porter at Varna, excepting one division.

13635. *Chairman*.] What division was that?—I have here a letter from Commissary-general Filder, which will explain it: "Then, with respect to beer, the communication by water has been opened as far as Aladyn, by cutting through a neck of land which intervenes between the two lakes that you will observed marked on the map in the neighbourhood of Varna, and the troops claim to be supplied with porter so far as there is water conveyance. This will extend the indulgence to all the divisions but one, and I have no doubt that that one will find means of having the porter conveyed to its encampment also."

13636. Mr. *Layard.*] What is the date of that?—The 3d of July. "You may therefore calculate that our consumption will not be far short of 2,000 gallons daily." Now porter is so bulky an article that it was determined at a very early period of the expedition that it would be impossible to send it by land transport, and that its issue must be confined to places within reach of water transport.

13637. Lord *Seymour.*] The troops were there for two months after that date in July; were they supplied during all those two months with porter?—They were supplied with porter at Varna so long as the military authorities considered it desirable for them; before they left Varna the issue of porter was discontinued by Lord Raglan's directions on medical grounds.

13638. Even before they left Varna it was discontinued on those grounds?—Yes.

13639. *Chairman.*] I will read to you some answers given by the Duke of Cambridge on that matter; he was asked, "Was any reason assigned for the authorities not being able to get porter to the camp?" and his reply was, "Yes; the reason was assigned, that they could not supply the whole of the army, and it was not thought advisable to supply any particular portion of it.—Did your Royal Highness represent that the Guards were particularly anxious to have porter? Yes, I recollect stating that; but it was thought still not advisable to make an exception in favour of any special corps.—Do you think that there was enough porter to have supplied the Guards? I cannot judge of that; but having known of a large portion coming from England, I presume there was." He is also asked, "The mortality you say was greater in some regiments than in others? Certainly.—Have you any reason to know how that was? The only cause I can attribute it to, was what I have before stated, that I think many of the Guards suffered more from the want of their usual and ordinary diet, which from being in London, and near London, generally consisted of porter as a beverage"?—All I can say is, that the Commissariat supplied porter to the troops at Varna, so far as the means of transport were available; but porter is so bulky that it cannot be carried to any distance overland. I would read another extract about porter: "Then with respect to porter and ale, the troops in advance are loud in their expressions of discontent at not being supplied with those articles where they now are; yet if all the army was there, it would require the constant employment of 300 waggons to keep up the supply; this is quite impracticable."

13640. Lord *Seymour.*] Then they were only supplied when they were near Varna?—No; but they were all supplied with the exception of one division.

13641. When was the Commissariat first told to prepare for the expedition from Varna?—Instructions were given to Commissary-general Filder through the General commanding; I am not aware of the precise date.

13642. Were they not told in July to provide a number of articles required for a siege?—Yes; an order was sent to Deputy Commissary-general Smith, at Constantinople, desiring him to furnish a great quantity of planking and nails, and tools for siege platforms.

13643. Are those articles which were properly to be supplied by the Commissariat?—No; they belonged to the Ordnance; they are articles of Ordnance equipment, which, if a siege had been contemplated, should have been provided by the Ordnance.

13644. Are the Committee to understand that in this case the Commissariat were called upon to perform a duty not strictly resting with them, which took up their time when they ought to have been employed on other duties?—The Commissariat was the only store department of the army, and was the only department which was charged with the purchase of articles on a large scale, and therefore it had to make good the deficiencies of every other branch of the army, including the Ordnance.

13645. Then was there any Ordnance officer sent to Constantinople to act with the Commissariat in providing those articles?—I am not aware that there was.

13646. This order was for a very extensive supply?—Yes, for a very large quantity.

13647. There was a depôt, was there not, at Constantinople, and also a depôt of Commissariat supplies and of other supplies at Varna?—Yes.

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13648. Were any of those things lost in that conflagration which we have heard of at Varna?—Yes; there was a considerable loss.

13649. Did that fall upon the Commissariat stores or upon the Quartermaster-general's stores?—Upon both. I have a statement here; this letter is dated the 11th of August 1854: "All the biscuit and forage corn that were landed, and nearly all the Quartermaster-general's stores, have been totally destroyed. The quantity of biscuit in our storehouses on shore at the time was about 330,000 lbs., and this amount will consequently lessen by so much the remains in store, as shown by the return transmitted by me on the 9th instant. The quantity of barley, owing to the illness or death of the storekeepers, who have been in charge of the storehouses, cannot at present be known; it was, however, large; but although large it can be replaced here without difficulty." Commissary-general Filder sent a return of the Quartermaster-general's stores remaining at Varna on the 29th of July 1854, after the fire, and a return of the stores also saved from the fire.

13650. Was that return of the Quartermaster-general's stores sent home?—Yes.

13651. Upon receiving that, were any steps taken here to send out or obtain a supply to replace the articles lost and to keep up the stores to the proper amount?—Commissary-general Filder sent a return to the Treasury, merely by way of information, but any further supply that might have been required from this country must have been sent by the Quartermaster-general to the proper department, to the Ordnance.

13652. When this requisition had been sent to the proper department, and when the articles had been obtained, they would be again sent out to the Commissariat Department, which was to take charge of them?—Yes.

13653. Did you hear from the Commissariat that they had received afterwards any large supply to make up for the goods so lost?—As the Commissariat merely held the Quartermaster-general's stores, on account of the Quartermaster-general's Department, no regular returns were furnished to the Treasury of such stores.

13654. Such stores as you are speaking of would have been sent from the Ordnance Department here?—Partly from the Ordnance and partly from the army clothiers, under the directions of the War Office.

13655. Were you not informed whether or not such things were sent out to the Commissariat officers to take charge of, who were under you?—No; we received no such information; but I have no reason to doubt that large quantities of such stores were afterwards sent out, consigned to the Commissariat.

13656. If there was not a sufficiency of those things, the Committee wish to know who was to blame for there not being sufficient?—It was the duty of the Quartermaster-general to see that there were in store at all times a sufficient number of what are called Quartermaster-general's stores for the use of the army, and if the quantity in store, either after the fire at Varna, or at any other period, was insufficient, it was the duty of the Quartermaster-general to supply that deficiency, either by requisition on England, addressed to the proper department (which was not the Commissariat), or by obtaining the authority of the General commanding to purchase further stores at Constantinople.

13657. Mr. *Ellice.*] Would the Quartermaster-general make any direct requisition to any department in England except through the commanding officer of the troops?—No; by the authority of the General commanding.

13658. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to the Commissariat stores that were lost, what steps were taken to replace those articles; that, at least, naturally lay upon the Commissariat?—Yes. All through these operations, up to December, we were ahead of the Commissary-general in regard to the Commissariat supplies; and on this, and on several other occasions, it has been found that he had more than sufficient for the purpose.

13659. Up to December, are the Committee to understand that everything that was required from the Commissariat was supplied in ample quantity?—Yes; the only instruction that it was necessary for us to issue, upon Commissary-general Filder's report of the loss by fire at Varna, was that early measures should be taken for the shipment of the biscuit remaining to be supplied on former requisitions, and we wrote to the Admiralty to hasten the transmission of the supplies of biscuit which had been previously ordered; and shortly after that,

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that, when the army sailed for the Crimea, Commissary-general Filder sent me a detailed return of the quantity of Commissariat stores, of every description, under his charge; and upon that occasion also it was found that he had ample supplies, and we sent the return to the Duke of Newcastle. That letter was on the 19th of September, from the Treasury, but Commissary-general Filder's letter, reporting the state of his stores, and the departure of the army for the Crimea, is dated the 4th of September, when he stated that he had more biscuit than he wanted, and that the only article as to which he apprehended there might be any deficiency was rum, because when the men came to be employed in the trenches, they would then, no doubt, receive a larger ration than the one then issued. In the meantime we had sent large quantities of rum to Constantinople, and it was not necessary for us to take any further steps.

13660. When the army was embarked at Varna, what number of baggage animals did the Commissariat actually embark?—The whole of the animals required for the reserve ammunition were embarked, which were 1,203.

13661. The number of troops was 25,000, was it not?—Yes, about that number.

Mercurii, 18° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Sir John Hanmer.	Mr. Layard.
Mr. Ellice.	Mr. Drummond.
Mr. Bramston.	General Peel.
Sir J. Pakington.	Colonel Lindsay.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K.C.B., called in; and further Examined.

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13662. Lord *Seymour*.] THERE were one or two points in the evidence given by you yesterday which you wished to have an opportunity of considering before you gave your answers?—There were two points as to which my memory did not quite serve me, namely, the distinction between the officers' baggage horses and the regimental bât horses; next, the degree of preparation made by the Commissariat to enable the army to take the field in Bulgaria; and I also consider it due to Commissary-general Filder to read an extract from a letter which I have received from him respecting coffee.

13663. First, with regard to the difference between the officers' baggage horses and the bât horses?—The alteration in the War Office regulations, to which I alluded, was confined to the purchase of the regimental bât animals, and did not extend to the officers' baggage animals, which were purchased by themselves, as on former occasions, from their field allowance. They were therefore in addition to the Commissariat transport.

13664. Mr. *Layard*.] What do you mean by former occasions?—In former wars. That at the Cape of Good Hope was the last.

13665. Did they buy their own animals in the Kafir war?—Yes; that has always been usual.

13666. The bât horses?—No, the officers' baggage horses.

13667. Were not waggons used at the Cape chiefly?—Yes, but the officers had private horses besides for their own purposes. Wherever an officer receives field allowance he is expected to fit himself out completely in the field.

13668. Was not his baggage carried in those waggons at the Cape?—It may have been, but they had baggage horses besides. In the Peninsula that was the practice to a very great extent.

13669. Was any part of the officers' baggage carried during the late expedition to the Crimea?—I believe not; I have not heard of any being so carried.

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13670. Therefore they were entirely independent upon their own resources?—Yes; but that is in consideration of the field allowance, which they receive expressly for that purpose, to enable them to equip themselves for the field.

13671. Did that field allowance include bât horses?—No. The regimental bât horses are provided by the Commissariat; it includes the officers' horses. The allowance was issued merely to enable them to purchase them.

13672. Is that a special allowance issued during the time of war only?—Only during war. Six months' allowance is issued on the commencement of hostilities, to enable each officer to equip himself, and it is regulated according to rank.

13673. Lord *Seymour*.] That is in the War Office regulations, is it not?—Yes.

13674. When the question was put to you yesterday with reference to the number of horses which had been provided by the Commissariat while the army was still at Varna, you stated, did you not, that there were between 5,000 and 6,000 baggage animals?—Yes.

13675. That did not include the horses that belonged to the officers, and were used for their own private baggage?—No, it did not, and those horses were very numerous, and they formed an important component part of the means of conveyance of the baggage and equipments of the army, as I shall be able to show hereafter. The number of the regimental bât horses is settled by a general order of the Commander-in-chief at the commencement of a campaign. The Duke of Wellington fixed a certain number for each regiment at the commencement of the Peninsular campaign, and Lord Raglan fixed a certain number, 24, for each regiment.

13676. *Chairman*.] Does not that include the horses of the officers?—No; they are quite distinct; they are purchased by the Commissariat.

13677. Then your statement that they were a great number has nothing to do with that proportion?—It has nothing to do with the regimental bât horses; 24 bât horses were assigned to convey the tents, the Quartermaster-general's stores, and the intrenching tools. The other statement I have to make is this: the following is contained in an official memorandum submitted by Commissary-general Filder to Lord Raglan, on the 16th of February last. "If the British army, when in Bulgaria, had advanced to the Danube, it would have required for its use 5,000 pack horses (that number was actually purchased), and 3,000 waggons; or, if all the transport had consisted of pack horses, 14,000 would have been necessary." The calculation is that one cart and horse are equal to three pack horses; a cart and horse will carry 600 pounds, and a pack horse 200 pounds. Mr. Filder had 5,659 animals belonging to the Government when he left Varna; and as he had ceased to make further purchases, except of mules, from the time when it was determined to go to the Crimea, this number might have been considerably increased, if it had been necessary to provide for a campaign on the Danube. As regards arabas, Mr. Filder was dependent upon Omar Pacha, who had the entire resources of Bulgaria at his command. He made an application to Omar Pacha before he left Constantinople, through Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and the Turkish Government, for 2,000 arabas, stating, at the same time, that if the troops moved in advance of Devna, 3,000 would be required. He observed in a letter to me that as the transport existed, that is, existed in the country, and Omar Pacha was desirous to enable the army to move, he had every hope of a successful result. On July the 18th, he wrote to me from Varna, "We could have moved on from this, had it been necessary, although we are far from having such a transport establishment as I could wish, or can rely on."

13678. What is the date of that?—The 18th of July.

13679. What is the meaning of the word "could;" that is the past tense?—It was written after the change of plan had taken place, and it was determined to go to the Crimea; he was speaking of it as a past transaction. I received a great deal more from him on the subject in my demi-official correspondence.

13680. But that is altogether opposed to the evidence the Committee has received?—It is entirely confirmed by the whole tenor of Commissary-general Filder's communications to me. I had the most ample information from him, not only public but demi-official, written from mail to mail; he had never less than 1,000 arabas on hire, sometimes more; the transport in the possession of the Commissariat at Varna was irrespective of the ambulance, which was under the

the War Office, and of officers' baggage horses. Mr. Filder also observes, in his official memorandum furnished to the Commander of the Forces on the 27th of July, "Had it been deemed necessary to continue the formation of a depôt in advance at Devna, it would have further facilitated any movement it might be intended to make, whether in advance or not."

13681. Mr. *Ellice.*] When you state that the ambulance was under the direction of the War Office, who was the representative of the War Office on the spot, giving orders respecting the ambulance?—Indeed I do not know; we received no communication on the subject.

13682. Mr. *Layard.*] You state that 3,000 arabas, with that number of baggage horses, were sufficient for the army; do you mean that they were sufficient for the army whilst operating in the field, or was that number sufficient for the army whilst operating in the field and at the same time to keep up its communications with Varna, as the basis of its operations?—I understood that Commissary-general Filder deemed that it would have been sufficient for the army operating in the field with the aid of advanced depôts, for the moment it was determined to make a movement in advance, he would have commenced a system of depôts, and indeed he had begun it at Devna.

13683. Would those 3,000 arabas have been sufficient for all purposes to have kept up the communication with Varna and to supply the army in the field?—Yes; in addition to the 6,000 pack animals and all the officers' baggage animals; and I must repeat that this state of things of which I am now speaking; this quantum of transport, existed some weeks after, six weeks or longer after it had been determined not to have a campaign in Bulgaria, and if they had intermediately been employed in an active manner in collecting transport, they would have accumulated a much greater quantity.

13684. Lord *Seymour.*] You have stated that those 5,600 pack animals would have been sufficient for the army moving in Bulgaria, considering that they moved with arabas?—Yes, in addition to the 3,000 arabas; and I may mention, that Commissary-general Filder never put forth his strength as to the arabas; they were his main stay, and his great reserve. The arabas of the country, the carts of the country, abounding as they do in every village, were entirely at Omar Pacha's disposal, and the moment it was determined, if it had been determined, to have a campaign on the Danube, Omar Pacha's means would have been put in force.

13685. You stated yesterday, did you not, that they applied to Omar Pacha for a large number of arabas, but they did not obtain above half the number they wanted?—They applied for 2,000, and they got upwards of 1,000, but there was no great pressure applied.

13686. Could they have obtained 3,000?—I have no doubt of it; the Russians had almost a fabulous number. They did not get them, because the time was not come.

13687. Mr. *Layard.*] Where had the Russians obtained this fabulous number?—In the Principalities.

13688. How could we get them from the Principalities?—They brought a great number from Bessarabia; they pressed all the transport of the Principalities; with submission, I believe every village abounds in carts of some sort, in that part of the country.

13689. But why do you illustrate our position by referring to that of the Russians?—Bulgaria is a rich country; I believe it abounds in villages in the plains bordering on the Danube.

13690. Lord *Seymour.*] When you state that a number of arabas could have been obtained, that there were 5,600 pack animals, and that that was sufficient for the movement of 25,000 men in the provinces, is that consistent with the evidence which you gave yesterday as to the number of animals required according to Sir John Bissett's calculations?—For 53,000 men he wanted 24,000 pack animals; that is, 12,000 for 25,000 men; and according to that supposition, we should have had 3,000 arabas, which would have been equal to 9,000 pack animals, and 5,600 pack animals besides; so that we should have had more than the number required according to Sir John Bissett's calculation.

13691. You consider Sir John Bissett's calculation to have been made upon the notion that in Spain it was impossible to move anything by means of carts?—The ordinary standard of calculations for armies, I believe, is pack animals, and not carts, and arabas are calculated often as pack animals.

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13692. Do you believe that Sir John Bissett made that calculation entirely with reference to pack animals?—Yes; on the assumption that the whole of the baggage of the army would have been conveyed on pack animals.

13693. These 5,600 were the number at Varna before the army moved to the Crimea?—Yes.

13694. Mr. *Ellice.*] You have no information with respect to the number of animals that were required for the ambulances?—None at all. With regard to the animals that were required for the ambulances, we received no communication from the War Office. I saw the ambulances out of my window paraded on the parade ground at the Horse Guards, and I heard that old pensioners were going out in charge of them.

13695. You do not know what horses were put in requisition in Bulgaria, in addition to those that were required by the Commissariat for that service?—They had some mules, because included in those 5,659 Commissariat animals were 50 mules received from the ambulance.

13696. Then they formed a part of the number of animals which you have stated were procured?—Yes, but they were not, I imagine, held by the Commissariat for the ambulance; my impression is, that the ambulances were not taken to the Crimea, therefore those mules were transferred to the Commissariat as Commissariat mules.

13697. Lord *Seymour.*] There was another point which you said you wished to explain with reference to the coffee?—This is Commissary-general Filder's letter, dated the Crimea, the 25th of March 1855, "With respect to the issue of green coffee, upon which so much has been said and written, I would observe, that that was the state in which, as you are aware, wherever it had formed part of the soldiers' ration, it had always been issued by the Commissariat, and which is no doubt the best when the men have the means of roasting it. When, in October last, I made a requisition for roasted coffee, no complaint had up to that time, to my knowledge, been made on the subject, and when at a later period, importance was attached to it, I had reason to believe that I should receive the coffee from England in answer to that requisition, as soon as it could be obtained from Constantinople, had it been practicable to get it from thence in a satisfactory state; but I remain of opinion, that although it might have been roasted there in some fashion or another, it could not have been properly packed. It comes out from England in air-tight casks, whilst at Constantinople we have never yet been able to get any but the roughest, rudest, and most defective packages."

13698. Mr. *Layard.*] Would it not have been possible to have obtained four or five regular Turkish grinders to grind the coffee at Balaklava, or elsewhere, or to roast it and grind it?—I should think it might; but when we go on to the state of affairs in the Crimea, we shall find that the Commissariat was completely overtasked, and was barely able to provide the necessary food for the men; and probably Commissary-general Filder would make that reply, and would say that it was beyond his power to do that in addition to what was even more necessary. I was asked upon the last occasion, whether any engineer officer came to Constantinople from Varna with a requisition for the siege platforms; I said that none came, but I have ascertained from Mr. Smith since, that one young officer did come to assist Mr. Smith in obtaining the proper description of articles.

13699. Lord *Seymour.*] I asked you yesterday, what number of baggage animals altogether under the Commissariat for the purposes of transport were embarked when the army went to the Crimea, and you stated yesterday, that 1,200 animals were embarked for the reserve ammunition; will you state what number were landed, and for what different services each portion of that number was landed?—I will state in a few words Commissary-general Filder's plan of proceeding in respect to his transport animals; besides the Bulgarian arabas which he left behind, he had, when he left Varna, 5,659 animals, and a number of Maltese carts, and the appropriation of those was as follows: regimental establishment for baggage animals (that is bât animals), 842; ditto regimental animals for carrying water bags, 134, making together regimental animals, 976; reserve ammunition, 1,203; sundry services, mounting conductors and interpreters, &c., 98; and Commissariat transport, properly speaking, remaining under the immediate control of the Commissariat, 3,382, making in all, 5,659. I may say that it happened fortunately that our first batch of

of 300 mules from Alicant, arrived just before they sailed, besides a considerable number of carts from Malta.

13700. *Chairman.*] Did they take that number from Varna to the Crimea?—No. I will proceed to explain; the letter I have here is a short one, and perhaps the most authentic way would be to read it; it is dated the 2d of September, just before they started. "This is a greater number for Commissariat transport of this description than I should have considered necessary for the more limited scene of operations to which the army is now about to proceed." I may say, that one reason why it is usual to leave to the Commissary-general, acting under the directions of the General in command, to determine what the transport establishment with the army in the field should be, is that the amount of transport required must vary with the nature of the service; and we have seen that a very much larger amount was required in Bulgaria than in the Crimea.

13701. That is to say, supposed to be required?—Yes; and really required, as I shall proceed to show: "But although the animals are numerous their cost has been comparatively trifling, the larger proportion of them having been purchased at a price not exceeding 4 *l.* 10 *s.*, and the average price of the whole, excluding the Spanish and Maltese mules from the calculation, may be taken at 7 *l.* Two months' hire, had they been hired, would have amounted to as much as their cost. The ammunition animals will, in the first instance, accompany the army to the Crimea, and the regimental baggage animals will be removed as soon as transports can be spared for the purpose. A proportion of Commissariat transport, consisting exclusively of carts and draught animals, will be embarked on board one of our cattle vessels, and such part of the remainder as I consider necessary will follow; but that proportion of the animals which I deem to be in excess of what will be required in the Crimea, I shall endeavour to place out in the villages in the neighbourhood of Varna, under the responsibility of the Aghas, and the supervision of a Commissariat officer. The cost of their keep will, in this manner, be trifling. The desertion of many of the drivers also, who have hitherto been faithful to us, but who are afraid to embark for an enemy's country, renders such a measure the more necessary. In conclusion, I would beg to observe, that this part of the Commissariat Transport Establishment has been organised on the same principle as the Commissariat Transport in the Peninsula was at the close of the war, when it was in its highest state of efficiency, with the exception that having found it impracticable to provide hired animals as in the Peninsula, I have been under the necessity of substituting animals, the property of Government, which are less efficient." I would here make two remarks, the first is, that in reading the reports of our Treasury Commissaries, it will be always seen that economy goes hand in hand with efficiency; efficiency under all circumstances, and economy if possible. The other remark is, that at the commencement of those operations before Commissary-general Filder had left England, we obtained from the Hamburgh and Rotterdam cattle trade two large screw steamers fitted up to convey a large number of cattle, and placed them at Commissary-general Filder's disposal. We afterwards added a third and a fourth and even a fifth.

13702. Lord *Seymour.*] In that letter reference is made to the Peninsula, and it is stated that the usual course is to hire animals for transport?—Yes.

13703. You stated yesterday that when you hire animals for transport you hire also the person who drives them, and that he has then an immediate interest in the care of the animals?—Yes.

13704. But when the Government abandon the principle which was adopted in the Peninsula, and buy the animal, the driver has no longer any interest in the care of the animal?—None, except so far as it can be communicated to him by artificial means.

13705. You adopted one part of the Peninsula plan, namely, that of hiring the drivers, but you acted upon a new system in purchasing the animal; therefore there was no longer the same interest felt in preserving the life of the animal?—That is perfectly true.

13706. Was any system adopted to induce those hired drivers to take care of the animals?—The transport was placed under the special charge of an officer, with a number of persons sent from this country to superintend the Turkish drivers, and I have no doubt that proper care was taken, because

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until the break up of the road, and the calamities which ensued from it, there was no loss.

13707. At first you state that the whole of the transport was placed under one officer?—Yes.

13708. Who was that officer?—Mr. Charles Bagot Smith.

13709. Was he a Commissariat officer?—Yes.

13710. Did he have the superintendence of all the transport, and of all the drivers?—Yes.

13711. That was at Varna before the army started?—Yes.

13712. When they landed in the Crimea, as yet the Committee have only ascertained that of those 5,600 animals, the 1,203 which were required for the ammunition were the only number landed; what other animals were landed?—I will go on, in Commissary-general Filder's words, reading from another paper a memorandum submitted to Lord Raglan, dated Balaklava, 16th February 1855: "With respect to the English army, the means that could be appropriated on board the transports for the conveyance of animals from Varna were necessarily very limited, but we landed in the Crimea with 70 carts, equipped with mules; and the troops having secured a number of the waggons of the country, the provisions of the army were conveyed throughout the march by means of this transport, the men carrying on their persons only one day's rations." The army appear to have landed in the Crimea with 1,203 ammunition animals and 70 carts, equipped with mules.

13713. Was that the total number of horses for all purposes that the Commissariat landed in the Crimea?—I have every reason to believe that that was the whole.

13714. Mr. *Layard.*] Commissary-general Filder states that the troops marched with only one day's provisions?—Yes; "the men carrying on their persons only one day's rations."

13715. When was that?—After landing, and the whole way, as I understand, from Old Fort to Balaklava; the memorandum from which I am reading this was submitted by Commissary-general Filder to the General in command.

13716. Lord *Seymour.*] Was there no order for their landing with three days' provisions?—I am not aware of it. Commissary-general Filder repeatedly called attention to the great difference between the French and English practice on that point, which, perhaps, the Committee will allow me to state at the proper time.

13717. I want to know exactly what landed?—The nucleus with which he landed was what I have stated, 1,203 ammunition animals, and 70 carts, with mules ready equipped, his best carts. Then he proceeded to add to this amount of transport from two sources, partly from carts and waggons obtained from the Tartars, and partly and principally by sending his cattle ships as soon as he arrived at Balaklava to Varna, to bring away from Varna all the additional quantity of transport that he required. I will read his letter.

13718. By what date was this?—Written a little more than a fortnight after. I understood this recapitulation to include the 70 carts. He says, "Within a little more than a fortnight from the time of our landing, I had imported into the Crimea 216 carts, with 216 Spanish or Maltese mules, capable of conveying each 600 lbs., or 129,600 lbs., and 266 pack animals, capable of conveying 200 lbs. each, or 53,200 total, conveyed by means of public transport." That is, the property of the Government; "182,800 lbs. a day. There were at that time, in addition, in the employment of the Commissariat, 193 hired country waggons, capable of conveying each 700 lbs., 135,100 lbs.; equal, in all, to the conveyance of 317,900 lbs., which is much more than is required for the British army in respect of commissariat supplies whilst in its present position." Then he goes on to compare this with the amount of transport which the French army provided.

13719. You have stated that the mules and carts required drivers; will you state to the Committee what number of drivers were attached as a corps to those transport animals?—The general rule is a man to each cart, and a man to every two pack horses.

13720. When he landed with those animals in the Crimea, had he drivers?—To the best of my belief he had drivers in the full proportion required; I have no reason whatever to doubt it.

13721. You

13721. You believe that he had that number?—Yes; I understand him to imply that in stating that he had this transport in an efficient state.

13722. A fortnight afterwards you have stated the number he had for the transport of the army?—Yes.

13723. Was there then a corps of drivers attached to that transport service?—Yes; but it was not organised on military principles.

13724. What proof have you of that; does he state that?—No, he states nothing about the drivers; they go with the carts and the pack horses; that follows of course; it is implied.

13725. *Chairman.*] When a fortnight after landing in the Crimea, those mules were landed, where were they landed?—At Balaklava. As soon as he arrived at Balaklava, he sent off his cattle vessels to Varna to bring up as many of the remaining animals as he wanted to complete his transport, and he began to hire Tartar carts from the first; the Tartars were very favourable to us, and they were very glad to get English gold; we got a considerable number of carts from them from the very first, and had every reason to believe that we should draw largely upon the resources of the country; we got large quantities of cattle also.

13726. Lord *Seymour.*] It has been stated to this Committee that the officers had to carry their own baggage and provisions, and that this was so heavy a labour on them, that some of the officers grievously suffered from the labour which they had to undergo?—Yes. All the regimental bât animals were left behind, as I mentioned, and it must be presumed that the officers' horses were also left behind, as being less necessary; but there were those 70 Commissariat carts to carry the provisions, and a number of Tartar carts and waggons that were obtained from the first; the provisions for the troops were carried in that transport, and the troops were regularly supplied.

13727. That transport has no reference whatever to the ambulance service?—None whatever.

13728. You have no means of knowing what was landed besides, or whether anything was landed for the ambulances?—I really do not know; but I may mention, as illustrating the character of the transactions of this period of the expedition, that as regularly as an ammunition cart broke down, Lord Raglan desired the contents of a Commissariat, that is, a provision cart, to be turned out and left to the Cossacks, and the cart to be filled up with the ammunition.

13729. General *Peel.*] What I understand is this, that all the regimental transport was left behind, that is to say, the 24 animals, and it was in consequence of that that the officers naturally had to carry their own baggage; the regiments had no transport whatever, and there were 1,100 animals, and a certain number of carts appropriated entirely to the ammunition?—There were 1,200 animals appropriated to the ammunition only; they included carts.

13730. As soon as the army got into the country, they obtained a certain number of carts and horses on the spot?—Yes.

13731. And those were appropriated to conveying the rations with the troops?—Yes, in addition to the 70. I will now state what the Commissary-general, acting under the orders of Lord Raglan, did with the balance of the transport remaining at Varna, which was not required for the service in the Crimea; I will proceed to read a memorandum dated Balaklava, the 5th of October 1854, submitted to the General in command: "The Commissary-general solicits instructions respecting the disposal of the Commissariat transport animals still remaining at Varna. The number he now has with the army, with some few more of the most efficient of the animals that might be brought from Varna, would, he is of opinion, be adequate to the transport service of this army, should its operations be confined within a limited sphere, as at present. If any greater number were to be brought over than would suffice for this object, they would only add to the difficulty of feeding the horses and baggage animals already in the Crimea." Commissary-general Filder kept that consideration before him throughout, not to have more transport in the Crimea than was necessary, in order not unnecesarily to increase the conveyance of the forage that was required. "There would in that case remain between 2,000 and 3,000 animals in excess of any present want to be disposed of. As the depôt at Varna is about to be broken up, and the military withdrawn, there appears to be no other mode of disposing of such excess than either by sale or by sending the animals to Constantinople, if possible, overland,

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land, there to remain in depôt in case they should be wanted for any future service. If the former course were to be adopted the animals would fetch little or nothing, even if only a small proportion of them were to be sold, the original cost of those purchased in Bulgaria not having exceeded £. 4. 10*s.* upon the average; and if the latter, a great number of them are not worth the cost of their maintenance during the winter. On the other hand, if the operations of the army should hereafter be on a more extended scale in this country, a considerable proportion of the 2,000 or 3,000 animals which would be in excess under the foregoing supposition, would require to be brought over from Varna. Instructions also are solicited with respect to the disposal of the buffaloes remaining at Varna. Major Adye has stated that they will not be required here for the artillery service. They might be sold, probably, at Varna, but would fetch little, whilst at Constantinople animals of this description are much more valuable. If to be sent to the latter place it would be necessary that a transport should be appropriated for their conveyance, as they could not travel that distance overland." Upon which Lord Raglan made the following Order: "6th of October 1854. It being impossible to say what may be the next operation, and there being no reason to suppose that the war is near its termination, it appears to me that the most prudent course will be to send the Commissariat horses and mules in excess of our present wants, from Varna to Constantinople, by land, and have them kept in that neighbourhood, upon such rations of forage as animals doing nothing may seem to require. I think the buffaloes should not be sold. They might either be left at Varna, or sent into Rumelia, travelling towards Constantinople at a slow rate." I may observe, that as Constantinople was only 30 hours steam from Balaklava, having our reserve depôt of animals at Constantinople, was much the same thing as having it at Balaklava, with the advantage of feeding it cheaply; we even latterly conveyed fresh meat from Constantinople to Balaklava. This was the state of the land transport, as far as I am informed, up to the disasters of November.

13732. Lord *Seymour.*] It appears from that letter, dated on the 5th of October, that Commissary-general Filder considered that he had sufficient transport at Balaklava, and he could dispense with the 2,000 or 3,000 animals that were remaining at Varna?—Yes.

13733. He had then had some experience of what would be the nature of the service required of him at Balaklava?—Yes; he arrived there on the 28th of September, I think.

13734. He therefore knew that he would have not only to convey the food for the troops, but the ammunition for the purposes of the siege?—Yes.

13735. He considered that the stores he had were sufficient for every purpose?—He did; he stated so.

13736. He knew the nature of the ground between Balaklava and the position occupied by the troops?—Yes, perfectly.

13737. Having all that information, he considered that he had then between 2,000 and 3,000 animals that he could spare, at Varna, and keep within handy reach of the Crimea?—Yes.

13738. Did those animals go back to Constantinople?—Yes; they went to Constantinople under the charge of Assistant Commissary-general Uniack, and they arrived there in time to reinforce the Commissariat transport, after the disaster of November.

13739. When did Commissary-general Filder first know that he must prepare for wintering in the Crimea?—On the 8th of November. This period naturally divides itself into two or three parts; the first was the period of expectation, from the day of their arrival before Sebastopol, until the result of the opening of the fire was seen, say the 17th of October. Mr. Filder was anxious, but hopeful; but after he saw the result of the fire he began to be alarmed, and he pressed Lord Raglan for orders, as to laying in supplies for the winter, and he found a difficulty in getting precise directions from Lord Raglan. His words are, "October 23. Although we are very well off at present, I do not know that I have at any time since the opening of the campaign felt less assured with respect to the future. Lord Raglan will not, in the present state of affairs, give me any definite orders, and I can make no preparations. I require always to look three months ahead."

13740. You

13740. You stated, did you not, that on the 8th of November, he was informed that he must prepare for wintering in the Crimea?—Yes.

13741. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was he so informed by Lord Raglan?—Yes.

13742. Lord *Seymour.*] Having been told that he must prepare for the army wintering in the Crimea, what course did he take upon receiving that intimation from Lord Raglan?—Before the 8th of November, indeed as early as the 23d of October, after he had seen that the place was not likely speedily to be reduced, he wrote me an official letter, requesting an immediate reinforcement of supplies. I will read the letter: "Balaklava, 23d October 1854, Sir, I have the honour to bring to the notice of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that under the uncertainty which exists as to the future operations and position of this army, I am unable to estimate the length of time during which it may be necessary to provision the troops with biscuit sent from England, or to make any arrangements for providing for them otherwise. It will be some time, indeed, after I am in possession of the requisite information, before all the preparatory measures for entering upon another mode of supplying the troops can be completed. I would suggest, therefore, that the shipment from England, of 1,000,000 pounds of biscuit, per month, should be continued for the present, or until such time as I may notify that consignments of this article are no longer necessary. With regard to forage also it is wholly impracticable, as I have already reported, to procure either hay or straw in the country we now occupy. Pressed hay could alone be brought from a distance, and it appears from the reports of Deputy Commissary-general Smith to be improbable that the contractors at Constantinople will be able to deliver, under the agreement reported in my letter of 25th July last, a sufficient quantity of hay of good quality to meet the consumption of the troops in the Crimea. I would recommend therefore that shipments of this article from England be also continued till the future position of the army, and the practicability of making other arrangements for its supply are known." So that even while their remaining in the Crimea was doubtful, he wrote to us asking for a regular supply of 1,000,000 pounds of biscuit a month, and for a further quantity of hay, which we met by writing to the Admiralty to send 1,000,000 pounds of biscuit a month.

13743. When was that communication received?—On the 7th of November, and we wrote to the Admiralty to send him every 14 days a quantity of hay equal to that conveyed by the "Belgravia," which was upwards of 400,000 lbs.

13744. The Admiralty had of course the biscuit ready to send?—Yes; they were making great exertions.

13745. But were the Admiralty accustomed to furnish hay?—They have been accustomed to furnish hay for transport ships, but we gave them the assistance of three Commissariat officers, and latterly it has been done entirely by the Commissariat officers.

13746. On the 7th of November, you state, that the Treasury wrote to the Admiralty for a supply of biscuits; what did they do with regard to the hay?—They had a large stock of hay on hand, which had been procured for the transports; as a measure of precaution, we had desired that six months' supply of hay and oats for the horses in the transports should be provided; besides a quantity sent beforehand, 400 tons weight, they had six months' supplies, which they have been working on up to the present time.

13747. What quantity was there in store in the depôt at Constantinople on the 23d of October?—Mr. Smith will be better able to answer that question; we know that a great contract upon which Commissary-general Filder partly depended failed, and only about 500,000 lbs. of hay was got out of it, but there was an unlimited quantity of chopped straw.

13748. *Chairman.*] Were any instructions sent to Commissary-general Filder to obtain forage from the shores of the Black Sea instead of sending it from England?—That was part of his standing instructions; it is the A B C of the Commissariat business to do so.

13749. Did he attempt to obtain any?—He made every attempt.

13750. Did those attempts fail?—This attempt that I am speaking of failed.

13751. For example, did he send to Sinope?—Yes, he sent all round the Black Sea. I have a letter, saying that he had sent to all the ports of the Black Sea, and all of them failed.

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13752. Lord *Seymour.*] You state that he sent for hay?—Yes.

13753. Did he send for chopped straw?—The difficulty really was the hay; the hay was suitable for cavalry horses.

13754. Why could he not have obtained chopped straw?—That could be obtained in unlimited quantities, but the cavalry and artillery officers objected to it, though they were obliged to take it; it is excellent fodder, but there is this difference, that chopped straw is so bulky, that a ship of 600 tons only takes 50 tons weight. I know that by the Austrian vessel that ran under the batteries.

13755. *Chairman.*] There is a difference in the distance between Balaklava and Sinope and the distance between Balaklava and England?—Yes, but that does not compensate for the much greater difference between chopped straw, which cannot be pressed, and hay.

13756. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Would it not have been a cheaper plan if orders had been sent from England to supply the horses in the Crimea with the barley and chopped straw of the country, instead of sending out hay and oats from home?—My belief is not so. Owing to the extreme pressure which is applied to hay in this country by steam and hydraulic pressure, it comes cheaper to send it from this country than to send chopped straw from Constantinople, or the ports of the Black Sea.

13757. Would it not be cheaper to buy barley there than to send out oats from this country?—Perhaps so; but Commissary-general Filder was desirous that a proportion of oats should be sent out because they are sent out carefully packed in bags, which was a great advantage to him; but the barley had to be bagged as it arrived; it was laden in bulk. The cavalry and artillery officers also preferred oats.

13758. Colonel *Lindsay.*] What authority have you for saying that the artillery and cavalry officers objected to this straw?—It is stated in these papers.

13759. Mr. *Layard.*] Are you aware that Lord Lucan has stated to the Committee that barley and chopped straw were as good for the cavalry horses as hay; and that the French supplied us for a whole month with chopped straw?—Commissary-general Filder reports that circumstance, immediately after the destruction of the vessels outside the harbour, in the hurricane. As the French suffered no loss whatever from that, he applied for a loan of three vessels; he had only occasion to borrow two.

13760. It was chopped straw that they supplied, was it not?—Yes.

13761. And obtained from the country by the French?—Yes.

13762. Does he state in any of his communications that Lord Lucan was of opinion that the cavalry could have been fed upon chopped straw?—No, I think not.

13763. Was it his duty to have consulted Lord Lucan as to the mode of feeding the cavalry horses?—Yes, and I have no doubt that he did do so.

13764. *Chairman.*] Does he report that any officers said that chopped straw and barley were unfit for the cavalry horses?—My impression is that, somewhere, Commissary-general Filder says that the cavalry officers objected to chopped straw.*

* *See* the Answer to 14047.

13765. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Does he name what officers; was it done officially, or in what manner?—I think he does not name the officers. We had an unlimited quantity of chopped straw.

13766. Lord *Seymour.*] In the Crimea?—Yes; we were never without it or barley.

13767. *Chairman.*] Then how came the English to borrow from the French?—I include that.

13768. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to the animals belonging to the Commissariat, they could have been fed upon chopped straw?—Yes, and they were; the hay was reserved solely for the cavalry and artillery horses.

13769. None of those animals could have been injured in any way for want of food?—No; and the proof of that is, that the officers' horses, who had as little as the others, came through extremely well, because they were under shelter; the horses perished far more from overwork and exposure than from the want of food.

13770. Are the Committee to understand that you believe that the animals during the time that they were in the Crimea, were amply fed with chopped straw?—

straw?—I do not say that they were amply fed; what I say is that we were never without a considerable quantity of chopped straw at Balaklava, but there were other difficulties in the way of their being sufficiently fed, which I will describe.

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13771. You have spoken of a large number of animals which were landed for the Commissariat at Balaklava; were a portion of them kept at Balaklava, or were they all kept in the camp?—The village of Kadekoi, a mile or two out of Balaklava, was the head-quarters of our Commissariat transport; but latterly, when the transport animals were so much reduced, they were kept at Balaklava itself, in order that they might have their food immediately before they did their day's work, to save the waiting.

13772. On the 8th of November, when Commissary-general Filder was first informed that he would have to prepare for wintering in the Crimea, what course did he take, or did he take any course, to protect and to shelter all his baggage animals, that he then knew would have to pass the winter in the Crimea?—I am not prepared to say, and I had better not give an insufficient answer; I will reserve that point to be answered by Commissary-general Filder himself.

13773. You are not aware what course he took?—No.

13774. The whole efficiency of the army depends, as you have said, upon the efficiency of its transport service; when it was understood that the army was to pass the winter in the Crimea, the first duty of the Commissariat officer should have been to take care that his transport service was efficient, should it not?—Yes.

13775. And one great subject for his consideration should have been how to protect those animals against the inclemency of the weather?—Yes, and it remains to be told what precautions were taken for that purpose at the Commissariat transport depôt at Kadekoi and at Balaklava. I have no doubt that it will be found that the same care was taken to protect and support the Commissariat transport animals, as the other animals of the army.

13776. *Chairman.*] And you have stated that the animals died from exposure?—Yes; but that was exposure necessarily consequent upon the discharge of their duty.

13777. While they were at work?—Yes.

13778. Was not it from sleeping in the open air, and being exposed to all the inclemency of the weather?—That may have added to it; but when I come to describe the state of things bearing upon the Commissariat transport during the period of greatest calamity, it will be seen that those circumstances alone were quite sufficient to account for the destruction of the animals wholesale, without supposing any other cause.

13779. But supposing that the other cause did exist, and that they never were sheltered?—Then of course it would add to the destructive effect.

13780. Have you any evidence to show that they were sheltered?—No; but that being the duty of the officer in charge acting under Commissary-general Filder's directions, I assume that he did his duty to the extent of his power.

13781. Then if they were not sheltered, he did not do his duty?—Certainly not, if he had the means of sheltering them. I will now proceed to read an official letter from Mr. Commissary-general Filder to myself, dated the 8th of November, written on the day on which he received Lord Raglan's order, "It being probable that this army will remain in the Crimea during the ensuing winter, I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that in such event it will be dependent upon supplies sent from England for its subsistence, with the exception of fresh meat (which may be procured from the neighbouring countries to an extent which would render it necessary to provide salt meat from England only for an issue on every alternate day) and of forage corn." With the exception of those two articles the army, in his opinion, would be dependent upon England.

13782. Even for flour?—The army was fed upon biscuit at that time: "Considering the casualties to which the conveyance of supplies by sea, from England to Constantinople, and thence across the Black Sea, during the winter season, must be liable, the present state of the Commissariat supplies of this army is not, I am of opinion, satisfactory, there being no reserve of any kind. It would be desirable, consequently, that a depôt of all the different articles should

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should be formed at Constantinople with all practicable despatch. The quantity of biscuit which has latterly been sent from England would have sufficed, in some degree, towards this object, besides meeting the current consumption, but the extra allowance of this article, which has been given to the troops in consideration of their continuous labours in the trenches;" being an increase from 1 lb. to 1⅓lb. by Lord Raglan's orders: "and the number of seamen and marines which have been landed, and rationed by the Commissariat, together with the Turkish troops, now amounting to upwards of 8,000 men, for whom I have had to provide, without any such previous notice being given to me as would enable me to obtain supplies, of a quality suitable to their use, from Constantinople, has prevented the accumulation of any surplus. The provision of this article from England should be calculated at one million and a quarter of pounds per month," instead of one million, as stated in my letter of the 23d October. With respect to hay also, had the army wintered at Constantinople or its vicinity, it might have been supplied with the forage of the country, and it would have been necessary only to forward from England, as a measure of precaution, such a quantity of hay as would provide against the possibility of a scarcity: but if the army is to winter in the Crimea, it will be necessary that it should be entirely supplied with hay from England, as it would not be possible to convey by sea straw or hay loose, in sufficient quantities for its consumption; and the hay which has been delivered under contract at Constantinople, and is now being pressed there, will last but for a short time." When we received information that Commissary-general Filder had made this contract at Constantinople, we immediately purchased four hay presses in this country, moved by steam and hydraulic power, capable of pressing from 16 to 20 tons a day, and sent them out with persons accustomed to work them, and hay cutters, and so forth. Then comes the Treasury Minute upon Mr. Filder's letter, dated the 28th of November 1854, "It is necessary, in order to arrive at a right understanding of the steps which ought to be taken for forwarding further supplies to the East, that the measures already adopted for this object, of which Mr. Filder was not aware at the date of his letter, now under consideration, should be reviewed." In the Commissariat correspondence it must be borne in mind that there is constantly an action and re-action going on between the head-quarters here and the Commissariat abroad; the Commissary abroad makes it a point of policy to put a gentle pressure upon the head office, and on this occasion Commissary-general Filder was a little alarmed. The Minute recapitulates the supplies we had sent, of which Mr. Filder was not aware when he observed that the state of the Commissariat supplies with the army was not satisfactory; First, coffee, sugar, and rice. "On the 6th instant the Board of Admiralty was requested to take early steps for providing and shipping the following quantities, calculated to be sufficient for three months' supply for 40,000 men;" at this time we took 40,000 men as our standard.

13783. Lord *Seymour*.] You say that the Admiralty was requested to provide a certain supply; that does not show that the supply was sent?—No; but we presume that the Admiralty did its duty.

13784. All those quantities had been ordered from the Treasury; it does not appear that they had been actually sent?—They had been ordered from the Treasury on the 6th instant, that is, 22 days before. We have never been in the habit of carrying our interference to the shipping of the articles, except under very peculiar circumstances; we have occasionally done so.

13785. Without carrying your interference so far, it might be easy to obtain an answer to the question, whether such and such things had been actually sent?—The Admiralty appeared to us to be exerting themselves very much, and we were in constant private communication with Mr. Grant.

13786. *Chairman*.] You assume that those things were sent?—Yes, we had ordered them 22 days before. "And for shipping similar quantities, in the proportion of one-third, at intervals of a month between each shipment. It appears, therefore, that further supplies of these articles need not be immediately ordered. On the 7th instant, application was made to the Board of Admiralty for the shipment, for army service in the Crimea, of biscuit, to the extent of one million of pounds per month, and in consequence of Mr. Filder's present recommendation, it would seem to be proper that that quantity should be increased to one million and a quarter of pounds until further reports are received

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received from the Commissary-general." That disposes of the biscuit. Then with regard to "the salt meat ordered to be shipped for army service in Turkey from this country, and from Gibraltar and the Mediterranean stations," there was, before the expedition left Varna, a comparative deficiency of salt meat in the Admiralty stores at home, and we sent forward all the salt meat which could be spared from the Mediterranean garrisons, and a very large and opportune supply it was. "There does not appear to be an urgent demand for a fresh supply, and this view is corroborated by a remark of the Commissary-general on a report from his sub-accountant,* regarding supplies in general, forwarded to this Board by a letter, dated the 2d instant, to the effect that he does not at present require any more salt meat in the Crimea, showing that the quantities subsequently arriving will therefore form part of the depôt at Constantinople. Under these circumstances it will probably be sufficient to request the Board of Admiralty to be prepared to ship for Constantinople, in January next, 600,000 pounds of salt meat for army service, and similar quantities in February and March, subject to such modifications as may appear to be proper after further reports." Then the next is the spirits, "On the 17th instant, the Board of Admiralty was requested to cause to be shipped in the usual manner, for the use of Lord Raglan's army, 40,000 gallons of rum in the present month, and a like quantity in each of the two following months, and it will probably be sufficient to apprise that Board, that further advices may show the necessity of continuing similar monthly shipments for a further period of at least three months." Then comes the hay, "Hay is an article, respecting which, Mr. Filder has experienced the disappointment of finding that the supplies contracted for at Constantinople were of an inferior quality and not fit for issue, and therefore with a small exception they could not be received;" but though small comparatively, it was a large quantity that he obtained out of that contract. "On finding that this was the case, active steps were taken for sending forward supplies from England; the 'Belgravia' sailed on the 8th instant, having on board upwards of 400,000 pounds." She had, for a sailing ship, an extraordinary passage of 20 days from Portsmouth to Balaklava; 16 to Constantinople, two days at Constantinople, and then two days more to Balaklava; she arrived very opportunely at the end of November. "There are in the Admiralty store-houses, a further quantity of from 1,500,000 pounds to 2,000,000 pounds." That is the surplus which remained from the transports; at least what was provided for the transports, "all of which it is expected will be shipped in the course of the next two months, and arrangements are being made by the naval department for despatching at least 750,000 pounds by steam or sailing vessels before the middle of next month. It would seem to be desirable, that the quantity to be shipped within that period, should be increased to 1,000,000 pounds, and that the remainder should be sent forward as soon as possible afterwards. If it should be necessary to keep up this supply, purchases will have to be made by the Commissariat department in time to prevent interruption of the shipments at short intervals. Transmit to Commissary-general Filder, with reference to his letter, No. 397, dated the 8th instant, regarding the supplies for which he depends upon consignments from this country, a copy of the foregoing minute, and state, that while my Lords make every allowance for the arduous nature of his present duties, and the numerous calls upon his attention preventing him from furnishing accurate returns of his various supplies, it is nevertheless indispensable that he should give the best estimate which he can prepare, of the quantities of the several articles which he is of opinion ought to be sent from England, founded upon the nearest approximate statement of his remains in store, to which should be added the quantities, the shipment of which has been notified, and also those, the shipment of which has been ordered according to advices in his possession at the date of making his requisition." All this was upon a conjectural estimate of the quantities of each article required for the supply of 40,000 men.

* At Constantinople.

13787. Lord *Seymour*.] When he sent that letter upon which this Treasury minute was made, did he send any statement of the supplies which he had at Balaklava at the time?—He did not; and we called his attention to the deficiency, but he very soon supplied it, on the 13th.

13788. He stated, did he not, to the Treasury, that he should depend upon

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the country and the neighbourhood of the Crimea, in the Black Sea, for fresh meat, and for forage corn?—Yes.

13789. But that all other supplies were to be sent from England?—Yes.

13790. Had there been even before the end of October cases of scurvy in the army?—I cannot say positively when the cases of scurvy commenced, but we anticipated them, and I can explain to the Committee separately the measures that were taken for the supply of vegetables; that forms a separate branch of the inquiry.

13791. But at this time, as you have gone through those various items, and referred to the provision he was making for the supply during the winter, was any notice taken as to a supply of vegetables?—Notice was taken by the Treasury at a much earlier period.

13792. What was done on the 8th of November, when it was first known that the army would winter in the Crimea?—We did not wait for that intimation before sending supplies of vegetables; early in the year, before the potato crop was ripe, I made inquiries here and at Trieste, as to the practicability of sending supplies of potatoes to the hospitals at Scutari, and to the army in the Crimea, and the result of the information which I received was that there was a regular trade in potatoes between the Adriatic and the Levant, and that it would be advisable to send them from Trieste, as they ripened there sooner, and were nearer to the places where they were wanted, and we sent successive shipments, first by Lloyd's steamers and afterwards by a sailing vessel, and after that the Duke of Newcastle ordered a separate cargo from Venice, and I also wrote to Commissary-general Filder to ask what prospect there was of obtaining potatoes in the Crimea, and I have his answer.

13793. Was that before the 8th of November?—No, long before. We had also sent large quantities of rice, the staple vegetable reserve.

13794. Have you no document that will show what stores the Commissariat had in the Crimea at the time that they were called upon to prepare for wintering there?—Yes, I received a letter from Commissary-general Filder, dated the 13th of November, sending a statement of his provisions on that date; it is called an estimate, but it is really a statement of what he had. The technical term is an estimate; it includes both. It is a statement of what remained on hand, and an estimate of the quantity required for three months.

13795. The two things are totally different, the quantity possessed and the quantity required?—They are both necessary to make up a good requisition.

13796. Will you state, first, what he had, and next, what he required?—There is one item so remarkable that I may mention it separately; the Commissariat transport appears to be 2,379; that is a much larger number of animals than what could properly be called Commissariat transport, that is transport either the property of the Commissariat or hired by the Commissariat, and the difference must be made up of the regimental animals and the officers' baggage animals. Then comes the number of rations.

13797. *Chairman.*] That is in the estimate?—No, in the statement. First of all, we have a statement of the cavalry and infantry, artillery and engineers, staff and departments, and Turkish infantry to be rationed; then the number of rations; then the articles and the quantities of which the ration is composed, and then certain remarks; for instance, "3,427 Commissariat transport animals at Scutari not included for hay;" they were the reserve depôt. Then we come to the "remains in store and afloat; biscuit, 1,395,668 lbs."

13798. Lord *Seymour.*] That was at Balaklava?—Yes; in store and afloat at Balaklava. Salt meat, 1,324,275 lbs.; rum, 42,735 gallons; sugar, 191,132 lbs.; coffee, 218,291 lbs.; rice, 138,636 lbs.; and hay, 1,079,686 lbs.

13799. Do you know how much of that hay was afloat?—Yes; 800,000 lbs. in a single vessel.

13800. So that the greater part of the million was afloat?—Yes, outside of the harbour: and was cast away in the "Progress;" that was our greatest calamity, and it put out all our calculations; we took it for granted that the "Progress," which was an invaluable ship, containing our reserve of pressed hay, was safely anchored inside the harbour; it never entered into our imagination that she was exposed outside.

13801. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Those stores were all lost the very day after that letter was written?—Yes; "consignments arrived but not received into charge, 'Il Malti,' transhipped from 'Ercole' from Corfu, salt meat, 331,968 lbs.;"

lbs.;" that was the Corfu contingent of salt meat. "'Lion,' from London, biscuit, 528,080 lbs.; salt meat, 94,016 lbs.; rum, 7,312 gallons; coffee, 39,534 lbs.; rice, 50,000 lbs. Then, the "total to be deducted," which is the sum of the figures I have read before, and then the "net quantity required to make up the difference," required to supply the army for three months. Upon that we gave another order about the hay.

13802. Lord *Seymour.*] By the 13th of November it was known that the army was to stay in the Crimea, and the Commissariat establishment had already had considerable experience of the service in the Crimea; now at that time, was any statement made with regard to the road, and the transport of provisions, and other things for which the Commissariat had to provide transport from Balaklava to the camp?—Yes; Commissary-general Filder became very uneasy about the road when he saw that they were likely to remain there, and his private letters at that time are extremely interesting; there can be no objection to reading them, for they commit nobody.

13803. Are they letters that he wrote to you?—Yes; saying that he had plenty of food and plenty of transport, but nevertheless he was extremely uneasy; and he mentioned, among other reasons, the probability of the road being broken up.

13804. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What is the date of the letter in which he expresses those fears about the road?—It is dated the 13th of November, the day before the hurricane. I will read the passage, if you please: "I am full of apprehension as to our power of keeping this army supplied during the coming winter, not from want of supplies or of transport; but in this crowded little harbour only a proportion of our vessels can be admitted at a time, and a gale such as has now been blowing during the last three days here, interrupts all communication with those at anchor outside, which are, moreover, exposed on a dangerous coast to imminent risk of shipwreck. Nor can our vessels which are unladen get out; nor even our steam cattle vessels. Then, again, with all the siege and other stores which are being disembarked at the same time, we can do but little more than land sufficient supplies to keep pace with the daily consumption of the troops; and, to add to our difficulties, the road from the harbour to the camp, not being a made one, is impassable after heavy rains; our obstacles in these respects will increase as the winter comes on. We shall have many more stores also to convey than we have hitherto had; fuel, for instance," which is not an ordinary army supply in the field. "In short, I am full of anxiety and dread on this subject."

13805. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you ever communicate copies of these letters to the heads of departments in England, to the Duke of Newcastle, and others?—Yes; I sent copies of all letters to the Duke of Newcastle.

13806. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Immediately?—Yes.

13807. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you do so officially or privately?—Privately; I cannot bear in mind my sending this particular letter, but that was my habit.

13808. Lord *Seymour.*] On the 13th of November, Commissary-general Filder stated his apprehensions in regard to the road; does he in any subsequent letter, state that he had expressly called the attention of Lord Raglan, or the military authorities, to the great importance of that road as a means of supplying subsistence to the army?—He states somewhere in those papers that he called the attention of the Quartermaster-general to the subject officially. On that very day he wrote to the Quartermaster-general as he wrote to me, officially.*

13809. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You are sure that he states that in one of the letters?—Yes, I have a clear recollection of that. I will now refer to the Treasury Minute, dated the 5th December 1854: "Write to Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Julyan," a young Commissariat officer, who had shown remarkable talent for mechanics, "that a further quantity of hay being required for the Commissariat service in the Crimea, my Lords authorise him to enter into a contract for the delivery of 1,200 tons, at Manchester, at the rate of 75 tons a week, to commence three weeks after the engagement is made, and 100 tons per week after the expiration of five weeks from such date, at a rate dependent upon the inquiries which he will make, as to the current market prices, but not exceeding 7 *l.* 15 *s.* per ton of hay, properly pressed, in bales of from four to five hundred-weight, and delivered into store, at Liverpool." We had ascertained that we could get the hay of the quality we wanted,

* *See* the Answers to Questions 14034—9.

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wanted, at that rate. "Mr. Julyan will, after having entered into the contract, suggest the means which appear to him the best and most suitable for ascertaining that the hay is of proper quality." We wanted to avoid the delay of passing it before a Board of military officers. "It is desirable that this service should be executed with as little delay as possible; and after having made the preliminary arrangements, he will proceed to Manchester, and thence to Liverpool, and settle with Commander Bevis for the hire either of the magazines occupied temporarily by the Admiralty, or of other convenient magazines for the deposit of the hay, until vessels are appointed to receive it." So, besides that very large quantity of 2,000,000 lbs. being sent forward with all possible speed, we directed this further large quantity of 1,200 tons weight to be sent forward, on the 15th of the following month, December.

13810. Sir *J. Pakington.*] That is hay?—Yes. On the 28th of November we placed on record, in a Treasury Minute, that the Admiralty were sending forward with great speed 2,000,000 lbs., the balance provided for the transports, upon which we arranged, through Mr. Julyan, for sending forward with equal speed 1,200 tons, equal to 2,668,000 lbs.; this being pressed hay, of course it was very heavy.

13811. The quantity in the two orders was very nearly the same?—This was the largest of the two.

13812. When was that sent on?—It is stated in the Treasury Minute that it was going forward then; we had requested the Admiralty previously to do that, and it was being done.

13813. Are the Committee to understand that one quantity was actually sent on the 5th of December?—No; the order was given for it on that date.

13814. When was the previous quantity sent?—At present I will confine myself to saying that on the 28th of November arrangements were being made by the Naval Department for despatching at least 750,000 pounds, by steam or sailing vessels, before the middle of the following month; before the 15th of December.

13815. The other was an order given on the 5th of December?—Yes.

13816. You can give the Committee no information as to when any of those quantities were actually sent?—I have it separately.

13817. When was either of those quantities, or both of them, actually sent?—I have a list of all the quantities that have been sent; but it would be difficult to identify them.

13818. *Chairman.*] Have you got a list of all the quantities received?—I have a list of the orders given and of the actual shipments, from March till December, all the shipments within those dates.

13819. Mr. *Ellice.*] Have you no dates of the arrivals of those shipments?—I have the dates of their departure from this country; it is not usual for the arrivals of ships abroad to be reported.

13820. What was the practice of the Treasury, with respect to informing and advising the Commissary abroad of the periodical shipment of those stores?—We always sent him advice of a shipment; the Admiralty sent us an advice, and we sent it forward to the Commissary.

13821. Does the Commissary send back an answer as to the time of the arrival of those vessels and stores?—No; he does not.

13822. So that the Treasury is in perfect ignorance as to whether the stores, which have been shipped for the Commissariat abroad, arrive at their destination or not?—We know the average length of the voyage, and we are sure to be informed if there is any failure.

13823. You do not know of the arrival of any particular ship?—Not as a matter of course.

13824. Or what losses may have occurred?—Any loss that occurs is always reported to us; it is much the same as letters; all letters used to be acknowledged, but it took up so much valuable time that we discontinued the acknowledgments; we took it for granted that they would arrive.

13825. General *Peel.*] To whom were those cargoes consigned?—To Mr. Smith, who was in charge of the depôt at Constantinople.

13826. Were they under the charge of the Admiralty?—The Admiralty were responsible; they acted as our agent.

13827. Mr. *Ellice.*] Were no bills of lading sent by the Admiralty to the Treasury?

Treasury?—We received advices, but the bills of lading were forwarded to the consignees; they were sent direct to Mr. Smith.

13828. With respect to the transaction of business between the Treasury and the Admiralty, does the Treasury require no proof from the Admiralty of the shipment by bill of lading or otherwise?—Yes; we require an advice from the Admiralty of the shipment, which we forward to the officer who is the consignee.

13829. But no acknowledgment from the master of the vessel that he has actually received the cargoes, and engages to deliver them to the person to whom they are consigned?—As regularly as a cargo is shipped by the Admiralty on our requisition, we receive from the Admiralty an advice of the shipment, which advice we forward to the Commissariat officer who is the consignee, and if there is any failure in the arrival of the ship in due time we are sure to hear of it from that officer.

13830. Does not the Admiralty inform you by regular bills of lading that certain shipments have taken place, and that the cargoes have been consigned to the person to whom you desire the supplies to go?—Mr. Smith received them direct from the office of the Comptroller of Victualling and Transport, the communication to the Treasury being confined to the advice of the shipment.

13831. The principle upon which the business between the Treasury and the Admiralty is conducted seems to be this, that after you give the Admiralty directions, you do not conceive yourselves bound to follow up those directions by seeing them executed, and by receiving bills of lading, and forwarding those bills of lading to the consignees?—If there was any undue delay in the shipment of a cargo (for the advice of the shipment sent to the Treasury from the Admiralty was in the nature of a report that our order had been executed) we should have seen to it, and when there was reason for anxiety, as there was in respect to the hay, we took separate measures, and we were constantly in communication with Mr. Grant, the Comptroller of Victualling and Transports; we also assisted him by lending him Mr. Julyan and other Commissariat officers; there was no time lost.

13832. But no duplicate bill of lading or actual proof of a shipment is, in the course of the business transacted between the Treasury and the Admiralty, sent to the Treasury?—The advice of a shipment is for that purpose as good as a bill of lading, and the bill of lading is the legal document sent forward to the consignee to see to the proper delivery of the cargo.

13833. But no duplicate of it is sent to the Treasury?—No; there was no occasion for that at home; the bill of lading is for the consignee.

13834. Mr. *Layard.*] Supposing a ship had been lost between this country and its destination, would you have been officially apprised of that fact?—Yes; Mr. Smith would have reported that he had received advice and the bill of lading, for we regularly sent on the advices of shipments, and that the ship had not arrived.

13835. Take a possible case that the post should have miscarried, and that he had not received the letter of advice nor the bill of lading, would the Admiralty have apprised you of that fact?—We are always obliged to assume something.

13836. Where does the responsibility of the Admiralty cease?—It ceases when the vessel reaches the consignee.

13837. Supposing the vessel had been lost on its passage, would the Admiralty have been bound to apprise you of that fact?—Yes, and I have no doubt they would; and the consignee, our own officer, would do the same.

13838. The Admiralty would also do so?—Yes, they certainly would; they have done so when the case has occurred.

13839. Lord *Seymour.*] You have referred to the supplies that were either in Balaklava or on board ship on the 13th of November; as it was then known to Commissary-general Filder that the army would remain for the winter in the Crimea, did he make any preparation for depôts on shore?—As regards the supplies, he made the preparations which I have described.

13840. I mean storehouses?—That was one of his difficulties, and one of the chain of causes which produced the sad disaster.

13841. Is it not the duty of the Commissariat officer to consult with the officer commanding in chief as to the places where depôts should be formed, and to what extent they should be formed?—Undoubtedly, and I entertain no

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doubt that Commissary-general Filder did fully consult with Lord Raglan on the subject, and received his orders upon it, because throughout these papers he complains of the want of magazines; he speaks of it as one of his great difficulties, not as a complaint against Lord Raglan, but as one of his greatest difficulties, that he had no magazines on shore, except some paltry sheds, and therefore the daily supply of the troops, including forage, that very bulky article, was liable to all the contingencies of getting the supplies day by day from on board ship; sometimes, for instance, boats were not forthcoming, or were required for other purposes.

13842. Does he, in that voluminous correspondence with you, state that he had applied to Lord Raglan and called his Lordship's attention to the great importance of establishing those magazines on shore for the supply of the army?—No, he nowhere says so in express terms; but there is one very significant fact mentioned, which probably affords an explanation, or partly, at any rate, which is this: Commissary-general Filder had not only provided a sufficient quantity of transport to carry on the current service of the army, but he was also able to appropriate 150 mules with a proportion of carts for forming a reserve depôt on the heights, to be secured against the contingencies of weather; but they had not been employed many days in that work before the cavalry action at Balaklava occurred, and then the Commissariat chest was ordered on board ship, and all the transports were ordered out of the harbour for three days, during which it was understood to be in contemplation to evacuate Balaklava, and contract our line of defence. After that, a strong northerly wind blew, which kept them out three days more; this took off his transport animals from forming this reserve depôt. After that, came the battle of Inkermann, and then the whole of his transport was employed for some days in bringing up the reserve ammunition; they had fired away a great part of their ammunition; and then came the hurricane and the catastrophe.

13843. Had not Commissary-general Filder some vessels placed at his disposal for the conveyance of fresh provisions at that time?—Yes, we had the experience of the China expedition. There was great confusion and waste of stores during the China expedition, and when it was over we instructed Commissary-general Coffin, a remarkably able officer, to report what measures he considered it advisable to adopt, in case of another conjoint expedition, to secure regularity in the supply of the army with respect to transport; and one of his recommendations was, that a certain number of vessels should be exclusively appropriated as army victuallers. Having that experience before us, as soon as we commenced our preparations, we obtained from the Admiralty the appropriation to our purposes of two steam vessels, the "Hope" and the "Sovereign," for general purposes; we also obtained from them the two screw cattle steamers, which I spoke of before, the "Albatross" and the "Cormorant," which were entirely at Commissary-general Filder's disposal; and two more large steamers were afterwards appropriated in the same manner. And these appropriated Commissariat vessels, to which others were added afterwards, on the same principle, were our great stand-by; and it is mainly to be attributed to that arrangement that there was never any deficiency of provisions.

13844. Are the Committee to understand that there were six steamers at least that were specially attached to the Commissariat department?—Yes, at least, and more afterwards.

13845. That was considered very ample for the supply of fresh meat during the winter in the Crimea?—Yes.

13846. Therefore, if there was any deficiency in the supply of fresh meat, it was not because the means of transport by sea had not been put under the Commissariat?—No; but all the Commissariat could do was to employ the vessels; the coaling and docking them, and all the naval arrangements connected with them, were under Admiral Boxer; and he was an independent authority.

13847. Are the Committee to understand that Admiral Boxer had any power over those vessels, such as detaching them for any other service?—According to the rule laid down, he had not, and I am not aware that he did detach them for other services; but when they were sent from Balaklava to Constantinople, for cattle and horses, all the arrangements, as to fitting them, and coaling them, everything of that sort, depended upon Admiral Boxer; and throughout, especially during the worst period, we had great reason to complain of these arrangements.

13848. I will

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13848. I will read to you, from the instructions given to Captain Christie, and signed by two of the Lords of the Admiralty, as early as the 6th of April 1854, in which it is said: "In the list of vessels which have been chartered, and with which you will be furnished, there are several attached to the Commissariat department, and placed exclusively under the control of the senior officer of that department; you are not to detach those vessels from this service, but you are to afford every aid and assistance to that department which the importance of the service may require." Those instructions seem to be very definite?—I am not aware that those vessels were ever taken from the Commissariat, or otherwise appropriated.

13849. But you state now that though they were not detached for other purposes, yet that hindrances to their efficiency were put in the way by the conduct of Admiral Boxer?—I do not at all mean to say that hindrances were purposely put in the way; what I mean is, that throughout this period one great link in the chain of difficulties was the breaking up of the route between Balaklava and Constantinople; for although the cause was different, the route between Balaklava and Constantinople was almost as much obstructed as that between Balaklava and the heights before Sebastopol.

13850. Have you any papers that refer to the vessels being detained a very great length of time at Constantinople, or is there any other point which the Committee may inquire about, and as to which there seems to have been blame on the part of Admiral Boxer?—Yes, these papers contain more than one case of the kind: the "Jason," I remember, in particular.

13851. Was she one of those steamers?—No; she was subsequently placed at the disposal of the Commissariat; she was not one of the original ones; she was lent.

13852. At the time that she was lent was she to be regarded as a Commissariat vessel?—Yes; this was when the land transport was at its lowest.

13853. Can you give the Committee the date when, being a Commissariat vessel, she was delayed by anything done on the part of Admiral Boxer?—The "Jason" was first sent to Constantinople for transport animals towards the end of November. Commissary-general Filder, finding that his transport was yielding before the excessive labour of carrying provisions upon that broken-up road, and exposure and want of fodder, and the desertion of the drivers, from the sufferings they were enduring; finding that his transport was melting away under those causes, he applied to Lord Raglan to place an extra first-class steamer at his disposal, to bring up a fresh supply of transport animals from the depôt at Constantinople. The "Jason" was placed at his disposal, and he relied upon her coming back in four or five days; but instead of that, she was detained three weeks; the captain persuaded Admiral Boxer that it was necessary to place her under repairs, and she remained all that time at Constantinople. Commissary-general Filder frequently complained that Constantinople was the Capua of the army, for when his steamers got there, he found it difficult to get them back again; there was great delay in coaling and watering always, as no proper arrangements were made at Constantinople for coaling or watering the vessels.

13854. That seems to have been a fault on the part of the captain of the "Jason"?—No. I beg to be understood not to accuse him; I ought not to have mentioned his name.

13855. You have stated that he, while at Constantinople, represented to Admiral Boxer that it was necessary for him to stay there, and that Admiral Boxer allowed him to stay at Constantinople; then you have added to that, that Constantinople was the Capua of the army; that is, that it demoralised and disorganised the army?—I did not mean it to that extent, but that it was very comfortable quarters, and that the captains of vessels, when they got there, were glad of excuses to remain there.

13856. It does appear that the captain of the "Jason" improperly took advantage of some slight accident in his machinery, or something which he stated to be an accident, as an excuse for staying at Constantinople, and impeding the public service; upon what grounds do you make that charge?—There was no trial, and neither the captain of the "Jason," nor Admiral Boxer, have ever been put upon their defence; so they ought not to be prejudged. All I know is, that the "Jason" was sent from Balaklava under very emergent orders, with a strong representation that her immediate return with a full

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cargo of transport animals was necessary for the safety of the army, and that instead of being sent back at once, or another steamer being sent in place of her, in case she could not be sent, she was kept for three weeks.

13857. She was sent entirely for baggage animals?—Yes.

13858. And under a great pressure?—Yes.

13859. And under that great pressure the captain delayed, whether wrongly or not, we do not know?—Yes.

13860. That delay having occurred, and the public service having been impeded, was there any inquiry why that delay had taken place?—That I cannot say. This was one instance out of many.

13861. This was an important instance, and these vessels were placed especially, and were not to be retracted from that service; did the Commissariat represent that the captains, who were directed to be under their orders, were neglecting their duties, or did they request that an inquiry might be made?—I am not aware that any formal inquiry was made. My impression is, that complaints were made by Commissary-general Filder of the delay of the "Jason;" it is repeatedly referred to in this correspondence. I do not speak from positive information, but merely from inference arising from the fact that this delay of the "Jason" is a prominent topic of this correspondence.

13862. *Chairman.*] Was any inquiry instituted on the part of the Government at home into the conduct of that officer who had not done his duty, and who had been reported not to have done his duty by Commissary-general Filder?—I never heard of any. These papers arrived after I gave over charge of the Commissariat. I was not aware of the delay of the "Jason" before I gave over charge.

13863. Lord *Seymour.*] Was it part of the duty of the Commissariat to see that the ships which were put under their special orders did their duty?—Undoubtedly; and when you have Mr. Smith before you, I have no doubt he will tell you that he made strong representations to Admiral Boxer upon the subject of the delay of the "Jason."

13864. You mentioned another subject with reference to the delay of the "Jason," namely, that at that time, the end of November, the drivers had deserted, and the transport animals were very much reduced in number?—Yes. I come now to the period when the real calamity and disaster commenced; the road was broken up.

13865. First as to the drivers; the drivers deserted, I think you said, in great numbers?—The drivers deserted in consequence of the causes which I was proceeding to describe. The road became broken up. The first effect of that was, that whereas draught animals and carts had been principally used before, the animals could afterwards be used only as pack animals, the consequence of which was that the transport power was reduced at once by two-thirds, because, as I mentioned before, an animal could draw 600 lbs., but could only carry 200 lbs.; so that it was reduced to one-third at once. Then whereas, before the breaking up of the road, the draught animals made one trip a day; very soon after the breaking up of the road the pack animals were able to make only a trip every other day, which reduced the one-third to one-sixth. Then the state of the road was such, being knee-deep, with holes in it, that it wore and distressed extremely both animals and drivers; and the length of time they were occupied in waiting at Balaklava for the stores, carrying them up to the camp and bringing them back again, exposed all this time to the inclement weather and the severe labour of going over this almost impassable road, destroyed both animals and drivers, and the drivers began rapidly to disappear.

13866. At this time, when you were sending a vessel for more animals, and the animals were disappearing, what provision had you made for sheltering the animals which remained?—That has not been reported. I can only presume that Mr. Filder and the officer in charge of the transport made such provision as was in their power.

13867. But in that voluminous correspondence you have no statement respecting the shelter provided for the animals?—No. I have no positive information on that point.

13868. You stated that as a consequence of all this, the drivers deserted; these drivers had been brought from Varna, a great many of them?—Yes.

13869. Did they put themselves under the Russians then: what became of them?

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them?—They disappeared; great numbers of them died. I will read a paragraph on that subject. They refused to work. This is a letter from Commissary-general Filder, dated Balaklava, 16th January: "Whilst the roads to the camp were passable, the Commissariat transport was more than sufficient for the wants of the army in its present position; it was not only equal to the conveyance to the camp of all the regulated rations, but of extra rations also." Besides an extra biscuit ration, we had a treble rum ration in the trenches, and an extra quarter of a pound of meat; an extra half-pound of meat was issued at Varna, and it was reduced to a quarter of a pound in the Crimea. "A portion of it was likewise employed daily from the commencement of the siege in carrying up stores to the trenches; and in addition to this, 150 mules with a proportion of carts, which had been appropriated for the purpose of forming a depôt of provisions on the high ground at head quarters, near the camp, as a precautionary measure against bad weather and bad roads, were employed several days immediately after the battle of Inkermann in carrying up musket ammunition to the camp; but when the roads became impassable, both men and beasts perished in great numbers, owing to the fatigue they underwent in struggling to get through with the supplies, and from exposure to the wet and cold. This, as respects the animals, took place not merely with the small horses of the country, but the finest mules which had been imported from Spain for the transport service suffered equally. On perceiving that the transport animals required to be relieved alternately," that refers to the alternate days, "and before any material casualties had occurred, I made application for a steam transport to be sent to Constantinople to bring up more horses from the depôt there, and application having been subsequently made by me for other transports for the same purpose: but on every occasion, delays have taken place in despatching the vessels from causes beyond my control, and the animals have not arrived in time." He mentions a remarkable instance of the state of the road.

13870. Colonel *Lindsay*.] Does he say to whom he made representation?—To the General for the steamers, and through the General to the Admiral.

13871. Lord *Seymour*.] He stated in that letter that he had applied for other steamers, but that delays always arose in despatching them?—He says so.

13872. He applied to Lord Raglan for the steamers; does it appear whether or not he brought to Lord Raglan's notice this neglect of duty on somebody's part which gave rise to this delay in despatching them?—The letter I am reading is to the Quartermaster-general, that is, to Lord Raglan through the Quartermaster-general; this is one instance, and in another instance of the "Tonning," he did so; he then made a formal complaint to Lord Raglan, and Lord Raglan wrote to Admiral Boxer; I have the correspondence here.

13873. Was an inquiry instituted as to the delay of that vessel with respect to which a complaint was made?—No; a courteous letter was written to Admiral Boxer.

13874. Have you the letter?—I have.

13875. Sir *J. Pakington*.] This was, I understand, in consequence of a complaint of the detention of a ship at Constantinople?—The detention of the "Tonning" (steamer) which had been sent for cattle.

13876. A case similar to the "Jason;" how long after the "Jason" was this?—This is Mr. Filder's letter to me, dated 18th December, sending me a copy of Lord Raglan's letter to Admiral Boxer: "With our vast means of steam transport, it would seem that this army ought to revel in abundance, instead of being deficient of anything; but the vessels are appropriated to other services: *vide* enclosed copy of a letter from Lord Raglan to Admiral Boxer." And this is Lord Raglan's letter: "Before Sebastopol, December 14th, 1854. Sir,—I hasten to send you a letter I have this instant received from Commissary-general Filder. I was informed by Vice-Admiral Dundas that his Excellency had, when he directed you to send steamers to Marseilles for the conveyance of French troops, instructed you to forward as many as you could without checking or interfering with the supplies for the army. I am led to conclude, that in your anxiety to effect the first object, the accomplishment of the second has not been so closely attended to, and that the troops may in consequence be exposed to want; the detention of the 'Rockliffe' is most unfortunate, and may produce disastrous results." I have made a mistake; this letter is about the "Rockliffe;" and the "Tonning" was another case of delay.

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"The supply of the army can only be by sea, and it is to you I must chiefly look for sending up without delay any vessel laden either with food for the men, or forage for the horses, and stores and equipments of every description."

13877. *Chairman.*] What induced Lord Raglan to suppose that it was the desire to bring up the French troops that led to that delay?—I cannot say; my information is confined to the substance of the letter.

13878. Does Commissary-general Filder's letter suggest it at all?—I have not seen Mr. Filder's letter to Lord Raglan.

13879. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Have you read the whole of the letter?—That is the whole.

13880. Do you know what notice was taken of that letter?—No.

13881. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated that the animals died, and the drivers also, and that fresh animals were sent for in consequence, at the end of November; were fresh drivers sent for?—I presume so; the drivers came with the animals, no doubt; the animals supposed drivers.

13882. *Chairman.*] Why do you presume so?—Because it was part of the ordinary routine of the service.

13883. But we have evidence upon evidence that the routine of the service has constantly been departed from?—Then there was a failure of duty, if that was the case.

13884. Lord *Seymour.*] Was any attempt made to organise a better corps of drivers, finding this difficulty?—Yes; Mr. Filder made a very effective effort, and I am glad of the opportunity of explaining it.

13885. When was that?—As soon as he became aware that the army was to pass the winter in the Crimea he wrote to me a separate letter on the 8th of November, requesting that I would make arrangements for raising a corps of 350 drivers in Ireland. Immediately upon the receipt of that letter I gave instructions to Commissary-general Hewitson to proceed to Ireland and raise the men in the south, which he did with great zeal and success. That has formed the nucleus of the new land transport corps.

13886. Three hundred and fifty men were actually sent out from Ireland?—Yes, by fifties at a time.

13887. When did they first arrive in the Crimea?—The first company of Commissariat drivers, consisting of 50 men, embarked at Cork on the 12th January, and the second from Dublin on the same date; it was done with great speed.

13888. But not till January?—I cannot be certain. I can obtain that.

13889. At that time the animals were mostly dead, were not they?—Yes, but they had been supplied by others; there was a great waste and consumption of animals, but they were supplied by others as fast as the deficiency appeared; continual draughts were made on the depôt at Constantinople. I may finish the subject of the Commissariat land transport corps, which has now been absorbed in the War Office land transport corps. This was a short private note from Mr. Filder, written in a hurry, on the 8th of November. Then, by the next mail, I received a detailed letter, containing all the particulars, and also requesting that we would send out 30 waggons, on the French pattern, and 20 French fourgons, such as are used by the French army, and 220 Maltese carts. Those Maltese carts have been proved to be of the greatest possible value, and the only alteration which Mr. Filder desired might be made in them was to substitute iron axle-trees for wooden. At the same time he wrote to Commissary-general Wild, at Malta, to send us a specimen of a Maltese cart and harness complete. After communicating with the Duke of Newcastle, I gave instructions to Commissary-general Routh, a very experienced officer, who had given his particular attention to the subject of military transport, desiring that he would enter into a contract with the manufacturers who are in the habit of supplying Chaplin and Horne, Pickford, and other great carriers in this country. I desired him to arrange for the purchase of the whole of the carts, the 50 large waggons, and the 220 Maltese carts.

13890. They were to be made in England?—In London, by these contractors.

13891. Do you know whether they were actually sent out?—After I gave over charge of the Commissariat, the order was transferred to Woolwich, and I presume they have been made and sent out from thence.

13892. Did you give orders for the harness for them at the same time?—Yes; and also for the horses for the waggons, but not for the Maltese carts. The

waggons

waggons required stout, strong horses, such as could not readily be procured in the East.

13893. This was while you were aware that there was no road. What was the great use of these carts and waggons, whilst there was no road for the carts and waggons to go upon?—This was in anticipation of a spring campaign. The moment the Commissary-general found that the troops were to pass the winter in the Crimea, he began to make arrangements for opening the campaign in the spring. The drivers were partly to supply the place of the Turkish, and Greek, and Tartar drivers.

13894. Did not he first make arrangements for keeping the troops alive during the winter, with a view to the campaign in the spring?—Yes. What he did for that purpose was to bring draught after draught of transport animals, from the Commissariat Transport Depôt, at Constantinople; and he sent for a number of hammals also, viz. Turkish porters with their long poles.

13895. Did Mr. Filder ever state to you that any attempt had been made to improve the road which had been the cause of all these disasters and this suffering?—Yes; he wrote me that the Turkish troops were employed upon it for a time: and I have the order, directing an extra ration to them. This is his official letter to me: "21st November; Commissariat, Crimea, Balaklava. Sir,—I have the honour to lay before you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the undermentioned general orders, issued by the Commander of the Forces, viz., General After-order of 14th November, authorising the payment of a pecuniary allowance to the Turkish troops employed in repairing the roads between Balaklava and the lines, and those doing duty in the trenches; General Order of 15th November, authorising the issue of working pay to the troops employed as working parties in the trenches." This is the General After-order: "Head quarters before Sebastopol, 14th November 1854"; being the day of the hurricane. "The roads in the neighbourhood of the encampment of the troops, and especially that between Balaklava and the lines, having become so bad as to render it impossible to convey provisions to the troops, it is necesssary that immediate steps be taken to repair them; for that purpose the Turkish troops at Balaklava are at this moment most available; they will therefore be so employed, and will receive a pecuniary allowance of 3 *d.* per diem, under a captain, who will receive 1 *s.* per diem, provided the stipulated quantity of work is accomplished, otherwise not, to be determined by the superintending officer; the Turkish troops employed in the trenches will receive 3 *d.* by day and 4 *d.* by night, under the same conditions in respect to exertion as is mentioned above. By order. (signed) *T. B. B. Estcourt,* Adjutant-general."

13896. That attempt to mend the road was as early as the 14th of November?—Yes. I learned afterwards that this attempt was partial; the Turkish troops could make no hand of it; they were not equal to it.

13897. In short, that attempt came to nothing?—It came to nothing.

13898. With regard to the steamers which were despatched, about which the delay arose, was any agent on the part of the Commissariat department sent on board each of these vessels who might have informed the Commissariat whether any such delay appeared to him to be unnecessary?—We had a most invaluable agent at Constantinople, viz., Deputy Commissary-general Smith.

13899. That does not answer my question; was an agent sent on board each of these vessels?—No.

13900. Would it not have been desirable when Commissariat stores were to be sent, that an agent in charge of those stores should have been sent also?—If the service at the two ends of the line had been properly performed, I think there would have been no occasion for sending an agent on board of each vessel, for it was only 30 hours' steam.

13901. But as it had been found, and as the letter even on the 14th of December showed, that continual delays had arisen in despatching these steamers backwards and forwards, would it not have been advisable to have sent an agent?—No, I think not. It would have been a very expensive, and cumbrous, and roundabout way of doing what might have been done in a much shorter way.

13902. Why was not it done then in a shorter way?—I cannot say.

13903. How could it have been done in a shorter way?—By appointing a fit person in place of Admiral Boxer.

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13904. *Chairman.*] Then Admiral Boxer was not a fit person?—As I have been driven to give an opinion upon Admiral Boxer's qualifications as a superintendent of transport, I beg to be allowed to make these observations. I had a good deal of personal communication with Admiral Boxer before he left England with respect to the coal mines at Heraclea, and I found him very zealous and active indeed. He evidently had the public service entirely at heart, and I believe him to be a rough, honest, hearty, zealous, active sailor; but the situation in which he was placed at Constantinople required high administrative powers, and a very superior man ought to have been put there, and it is no blame to Admiral Boxer that he did not possess those high administrative qualifications.

13905. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you ever employ a supercargo?—No; we did not find it necessary with these short trajets.

13906. I mean from England out there?—First of all, the ships called at Malta in the early part of the expedition; then they all called at Constantinople, where they came under Mr. Smith's charge, and then it is only 30 hours' steam from Constantinople to Balaklava. In the China expedition there were only agents of transports, that is to say, one naval officer appointed as agent for a section of transports, and it was the same here.

13907. Then who has the charge of the cargo whilst it is on board?—The master.

13908. The captain of the ship?—Yes; and as soon as he arrives he comes under naval supervision, at Constantinople, under Admiral Boxer at that time; at Balaklava under Captain Christie.

13909. General *Peel.*] Such a person would have had no powers to do anything except to report to you?—No; that is to the Commissary upon the spot; he would still have been under Captain Christie's and Admiral Boxer's orders in everything that concerned naval arrangements. The point was to have placed fit persons in charge of the transport service at Constantinople and at Balaklava. There is an instance which I wish to give of the breaking up of the road. This is a letter dated the 13th December; the whole thing is stated again; it is so important that I had perhaps better read it; in fact, there are two letters, one dated the 3d December, and the other the 13th.

13910. Lord *Seymour.*] It is only in reference to the same matter as you have stated, namely, that the roads were almost impassable?—Yes; and that transports were ordered out of the harbour of Balaklava, and so forth. But this is what I was going to read: "I may mention in proof of the state of the roads, and that it is not the Commissariat transport alone that is unable to contend against it, that a waggon of the Royal Artillery, with 10 horses, was unable to reach the camp, having a load of only 1,400 lbs. of forage corn."

13911. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What is the date of that letter?—The 13th December. Then he speaks again about the "Jason:" "The state of affairs with respect to the supply of the troops, I regret to have to inform you, continues as reported in my letter of the 3d instant, the roads being still impassable, and the steam-vessel which was sent to Constantinople to bring up additional transport animals having been delayed there for repairs, although none were stated to be necessary before she left the fleet; had she returned with the animals in the time in which the voyage is usually performed, or the admiral superintendent at Constantinople been able to substitute another vessel for her, seeing the urgency of the service, no deficiencies of provisions would have occurred in the issues to the army."

13912. *Chairman.*] Was no inquiry made as to that stoppage?—That was after I gave over charge of the department; I cannot say.

13913. Lord *Seymour.*] To whom was that letter written?—It was addressed to me, but it went to the War department.

13914. Then the War department had all the information which that letter conveys?—Yes.

13915. Therefore, although it was removed from the Treasury it was brought more directly under the notice of the Minister-of-War?—Yes. Then there were other causes of this sad break-down. One was the state of the road on the margin of the harbour of Balaklava. Although it seems a small matter, it is exceedingly important, and I have a short letter which describes it fully; "Balaklava, 4th January 1855. Memorandum submitted by the Commissary-general;" it is addressed to Field Marshal Lord Raglan. "The Commissary-general deems

deems it his duty to bring to the notice of the Commander of the Forces the obstructions which the state of the road along the quay at Balaklava causes to the forwarding of supplies to the camp, and which have now reached such a point that there is reason to apprehend that unless the road is speedily mended the service must come to a stand. The road is, in many parts, impassable, and everywhere many inches deep in mud, so that the soldiers and civilian drivers who attend with animals to be loaded have to wait, owing to the want of all the necessary accommodation for the quick despatch of supplies, several hours standing in the wet and cold up to their knees in mud. To this, more than to any other single cause may be attributed, I am of opinion, the great mortality and sickness that have taken place amongst the Commissariat storekeepers and labourers employed on the wharf, and it is to be supposed that it must have occasioned a proportionate sickness amongst the soldiers. The suffering they experience from this cause is also no doubt the motive of the many desertions that take place amongst the Commissariat labourers, who seize every opportunity of a foreign vessel leaving the harbour to hide themselves on board and abscond." That was another cause; another was the want of magazines. I will read a short paragraph describing the consequence of the want of magazines. "Balaklava, 6th December 1854," addressed to Lord Raglan, also; these letters were sent to me by Commissary-general Filder. "Another impediment is, that we have no suitable magazines for the stores of so large an army, and as the supplies cannot be exposed on the quay to the wet and in the mud, they can, for the most part, only be landed as the transport from the divisions arrives, which requires a combination of arrangements with respect to boats, &c., very liable to fail, and to cause unavoidable delays in the issues."

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13916. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Did he give you any explanation of why he had no suitable magazines for the supply of so large an army?—No; I have never had that explanation.

13917. Only the fact?—Only the fact; he repeatedly alludes to it as one of his greatest difficulties.

13918. But never explains why he has not got them?—No; except the inference to be drawn from the transports having been sent out of harbour after the Balaklava affair.

13919. Mr. *Layard.*] Could not the Commissariat service have sent out hulks there for the purpose of becoming depôts?—Yes; but that was never suggested; the object was to get magazines on shore, and Commissary-general Filder did take the earliest opportunity of forming magazines on shore; he sent to Constantinople for materials.

13920. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What do you call "the earliest opportunity;" you are now talking of December; you say that Commissary-general Filder took the earliest opportunity of providing magazines on shore?—His proceedings must be regarded in reference to all the demands upon him. Although magazines on shore were a very great desideratum, there were others which were still more urgent; for instance, transport.

13921. I want an explanation of your own expression, that he "took the earliest opportunity;" what do you mean by "the earliest opportunity"?—As soon as he could do it with reference to other more emergent demands. I will refer to the passage: "Balaklava, 28th January 1855." This is a letter from Mr. Filder to the Under Secretary of State. "Referring to your letter of the 8th instant, informing me of the desire of the Duke of Newcastle that adequate provision should be made for the landing, storing, and forwarding to the army of the large quantities of stores and supplies consigned to my care, I would beg to observe, that my former reports will have apprised his Grace of the difficulties we experience here with respect to the landing and storing of supplies. With regard to the latter, however, some additional accommodation has been lately acquired, by the appropriation of some of the wooden houses received from Malta, which have been found too heavy to be conveyed to the camp."

13922. Mr. *Layard.*] They were not intended for that purpose; they were intended for the camp; they were merely employed as magazines, because they were too heavy to be taken up to the camp for other purposes?—Yes; but I have in my mind another instance, if I am not greatly mistaken, in which he sent to Constantinople, purposely, for the means of erecting storehouses. Mr. Smith will be able to tell you.*

* *See* the Answers to 14039–40–41.

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13923. Would not the employment of a few hulks have been a very effective mode of obviating the difficulty which existed, from the want of proper store-houses?—I think, while it was possible to adopt the better mode of having magazines on shore, it would not have been advisable to embarrass ourselves by filling hulks with stores; we had plenty of ships as store-room.

13924. But the ships were often detained, according to the evidence which we have received, for many days, and even weeks, because they could not land what they had on board; if there had been a hulk in which those stores could have been placed, those ships would have been able to get away, and the harbour would have been clear of them; as it was, six or seven ships filled up the space which one ship used as a hulk would have occupied?—It might have been advisable; it does not appear to have occurred to anybody.

13925. Do you know what kind of place Balaklava is; that it is a small town?—I knew it very well, in my mind's eye, before it was heard of in this country.

13926. Was it possible that any building should be found at Balaklava large enough for that army?—If when Balaklava was first occupied, the Quarter-master-general had apportioned it; had told it off for offices and Commissariat stores, and so forth, it would have gone a good way.

13927. But the houses were never told off, were they?—I never heard of their being so, except that one house was occupied as a head-quarter house by Lord Raglan. I think Mr. Filder also had an office there.

13928. Mr. *Ellice.*] The 28th of January, the date of that letter, was subsequent to your giving up charge of the Commissariat, was it not?—Yes; but it relates to my responsibility. With whatever took place in the months of December and January, I was closely connected.

13929. Was that the first communication of that description made by the Secretary of State to the Commissariat department?—It is a letter from the Commissariat department to the Secretary of State.

13930. But it is in answer to a communication from the Secretary of State?—Yes, of the 8th of January.

13931. Is that the first communication upon that subject, which you know of, made by the Secretary of State to the Commissariat department?—It is the first I know of on that subject. There is another extraordinary correspondence between Mr. Filder and the Quartermaster-general. When Lord Raglan received intimation from this country that large quantities of winter clothing and huts, and other things, were to be sent out, the Quartermaster-general wrote to Mr. Filder informing him of it, and asking him what extent of storage and issuers, and other arrangements of that sort, he would have available. I will read the letter, if you please.

13932. Of what date is it?—The 26th of December, signed by the Quarter-master-general, and addressed to Mr. Filder, the Commissary-general. "You are aware that vast quantities of stores, of every sort and kind, are expediting, and some even already arrived from England; huts, timber, buffalo robes, provisions, sheepskin coats, warm clothing of all kinds, &c. All these will require a great extent of storage, issuers, and much departmental arrangement. Lord Raglan is very anxious that all these details should be organised in time, so that there should be no delay in the troops receiving and having the advantage immediately of what Government has so liberally provided. I request you will be good enough to inform me of what arrangements you propose making in the way of storage, Commissariat labourers, Commissariat issuers, and transport for the conveyance of the stores alluded to, up to the troops."

13933. Lord *Seymour.*] That was the first letter, as I understand, in which the Quartermaster-general called Mr. Filder's attention to the necessity of having storehouses on shore; is that so?—So far as I am aware. Mr. Filder replied on the 30th of December: "In reply to your letter of the 26th instant, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, that the Commissariat establishment of officers and subordinates, under my orders, was only calculated for the ordinary wants of this army, and that, owing to the sickness and mortality that have prevailed to an unprecedented extent amongst the latter, they are now inadequate, without incessant labour and exposure, to the performance of the usual duties of the department. The harbour of Balaklava, moreover, with the available ground around it, is too confined to admit of the vast amount of business that has to be transacted for the

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the various services of so large an army, without the addition now contemplated, being performed with regularity and despatch. The Commissariat will, however, use every exertion to get through the additional duties adverted to under the difficult circumstances in which we are placed." Then on the 8th of January the Quartermaster-general wrote to Mr. Filder again: "I have the honour to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces observes that almost half this army is employed in fatigue parties, in carrying up provisions, warm clothing, blankets, planking, and every description of store, which service should properly be performed by the Commissariat Department. His Lordship is aware that you have, at various times and recently, received a great number of horses, and Lord Raglan requests you will have the goodness to inform me what number of transport animals the Commissariat Department is now in possession of, in what manner they are daily employed, and how many are sent up daily to each division. Lord Raglan also requests to know what steps you have taken to complete the spare ammunition horses of divisions, and the bât horses of regiments, as requested to be done in my letters, dated 18th ultimo and 6th December." Then Mr. Filder, in reply to that, spoke out: "Balaklava, 16 January 1855. Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, requesting to be furnished, for the information of the Commmander of the Forces, with a statement of the transport at the disposal of the Commissariat, and the means the department possesses of conveying up from Balaklava to the camp, the huts, timber, buffalo robes, and other stores expected shortly from England, and informing me also that a great extent of storage would be required for these articles. I accordingly transmit herewith, a return, showing the means of conveyance of every description in possession of the Commissariat, with its appropriation, and a report from Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Smith, the officer in charge of the transport depôt, on the state of the transport service, to which I have added some remarks. This latter document I beg to lay before the Commander of the Forces with the view of bringing under his notice the system of horse lifting which prevails, and the losses we have sustained in consequence. As the transport service is one of the utmost importance to this army, I may be permitted briefly to advert to the circumstances which have brought it to its present state of inefficiency. Whilst the roads to the camp were passable, the Commissariat transport was more than sufficient for the wants of the army in its present position; it was not only equal to the conveyance to the camp of all the regulated rations, but of extra rations also. A portion of it was likewise employed daily from the commencement of the siege in carrying up stores to the trenches; and in addition to this, 150 mules with a proportion of carts which had been appropriated for the purpose of forming a depôt of provisions in the high ground at head-quarters near the camp, as a precautionary measure against bad weather and bad roads, were employed during several days immediately after the battle of Inkermann, in carrying up musket ammunition to the camp; but when the roads became impassable, both men and beasts perished in great numbers, owing to the fatigue they underwent in struggling to get through with the supplies and from exposure to the wet and cold; this as respects the animals, took place not merely with the small horses of the country, but the finest mules which had been imported from Spain for the transport service suffered equally. On perceiving that the transport animals required to be relieved alternately, and before any material casualties had occurred, I made application for a steam transport to be sent to Constantinople to bring up more horses from the depôt there, and applications have been subsequently made by me for other transports for the same purpose, but on every occasion delays have taken place in despatching the vessels from causes beyond my control, and the animals have not arrived in time. A large importation of horses was, as observed by you, recently received by the Commissariat, but great losses instantly occurred, as explained in the report above-mentioned of Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Smith, of which a large proportion was owing to the practice of horse-stealing, to which I have before adverted. The ordinary transport establishment of an army, however complete and efficient it might be, would be quite inadequate to the conveyance, in addition to the usual supplies, of indefinite quantities of wooden houses, timber, and the other various stores enumerated by you. It could only be provided by having recourse to extraordinary measures, and the transport of this country" (the Crimea),

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Crimea), "not being available to us, and the roads being impassable for wheeled carriages, it would be necessary to purchase and import pack animals to an amount which could not be collected and transported by sea, particularly at this season of the year, under a period of several months. The available ground around Balaklava Harbour is moreover already totally inadequate to the vast amount of business that has to be transacted in landing and forwarding guns, ammunition, engineer stores, fascines and gabions, camp equipage, Quartermaster-general's stores, and Commissariat supplies for so large an army, and offers insurmountable obstacles to the use of a much greater number of pack animals than is at present employed. This want of space and wharfage for landing the stores, together with the total absence of suitable magazines, give rise to irregularities and delays in despatching the transport, which are unavoidable. And with respect to the ample storage which you pointed out in your letter of 26th ultimo, as being necessary to prepare, I would beg to observe, that there are no magazines in Balaklava, the hovels that have been given over to the Commissariat to serve as such being undeserving of the name, and the most valuable property consequently now lies on the wharf or in the adjoining yards in the mud, for the want of store-room. These combined causes gave rise to numerous complaints respecting the issue of stores, although the fault lies in most cases, particularly as regards Quartermaster-general's stores, with the parties making them, and is owing to their not being furnished with orders signed according to the form which has been prescribed not by the Commissariat, but by the military authorities for the protection of the army, and without the observance of which one regiment might be supplied with necessaries to the detriment of another. With respect also to the steps which I may have taken for completing the spare ammunition animals and the regimental bât horses, upon which you desire information, I have the honour to state, that the steamship 'Jason' was sent to Constantinople on 29th ultimo," that is the 29th of December; this was her second trip; "for horses for these purposes, but has been detained there with sick on board. Application was likewise made by me on the 10th instant for additional means of conveyance for bringing up a further number of transport animals from Constantinople, but it has not yet been complied with. In conclusion, I would beg to be permitted to observe, that the Commissariat did not foresee, any more than other departments, that the army would be in its present situation, otherwise precautionary measures might have been taken to mitigate some of the evils and inconveniences now experienced; in these circumstances therefore it only remains for the Commissariat to make every exertion to meet the difficulties in which the army is placed, and to carry on the service to the best of their ability."

13934. The letter, to which that was the reply, asked for two or three distinct answers; Lord Raglan wished to know how many animals the Commissariat had, and how they were employed; to those definite questions that letter seems to give no answer?—Yes, there is a statement overleaf.

13935. What is the answer as to the number of animals which they had then?—"I accordingly transmit herewith a return, showing the means of conveyance of every description."

13936. What was the number of animals which they had on that date?—There are two dates; there is one return of the 11th of January, and another of the 16th. With respect to that of the 11th January, it is a balanced account of transport: "Received from Constantinople, per 'Jason,' 16 December, 250 horses; per 'City of London,' 50; per 'Cormorant,' 50; per 'Albatross,' 85;" those are our cattle vessels; the total of those is 435. "Received from Eupatoria" (he got transport animals from Eupatoria also), "per Tynemouth,' 83; per 'Queen of the South,' 7; per 'Shooting Star,' 191;" altogether 281; making the total received 716.

13937. What quantity had he before?—It does not appear.

13938. He was distinctly asked to state, what number he had then applicable to the service of the army; he writes a very long answer which seems rather to accuse other people of being in fault, and he does not answer, as it seems to me, the very question put to him?—He answers by giving these two returns, stating the Commissariat transport in his possession at two distinct dates.

13939. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What you have read does not in the least state what was in his possession, it only states what had been received from different

places,

places, and does not even state the date when received?—My impression is, that these were all that he had at that time; that is merely my conjecture. I will finish reading this return; he then gives the numbers issued to the different divisions: "Second Division, 26; sundry persons, 12; died in camp, 19; invalid depôt, 56; not returned by Grenadier Guards, having been issued for conveyance of baggage, 20; not returned by fatigue party of 38th regiment, having been issued for the conveyance of biscuit to depôt, 24; total issued 157; remaining on the 11th January 1855, 280." So that on the 11th January he had only 280 transport animals, besides 157 which had been issued to the different divisions. They adopted a plan in these extremities, of appropriating batches of animals to the different divisions, still under Commissariat superintendence, but making a strict appropriation; so that while 157 were appropriated to particular branches of the army, 280 were remaining at the general disposal of the Commissariat, making together 437, and 279 were missing, which completes the full number of 716 animals which had been received.

13940. What is the second return?—"General return of transport employed for the service of the British army in the Crimea, 16th January 1855." Then he gives horses and mules, Light Division, First Division, and so on. "Total with the army, 333 effective horses and mules; non-effective, 170; total 503; camels 12, carts 125, arabas 18. In reserve at Constantinople" (he constantly reckons his reserve at Constantinople as part of his available means, as it was close at hand, and ought to have been immediately available), "1,071."

13941. Lord *Seymour.*] He had not found out, even then, that it was not readily available at Constantinople?—He had a right to calculate upon it, because if others had done their duty, he would have had those animals up in a short time. Public officers, acting together, must assume that each man will do his duty; if they do not, they must be held responsible, and punished.

13942. Mr. *Layard.*] It is stated, in that letter of Mr. Filder's, that a large number of these horses were stolen; was any explanation ever given to you of that?—Yes; there is a very curious report from Mr. Smith; I do not think I can give any just idea of it without reading it; it is not very long. "Transport-office, Balaklava, 11th January 1855." From Charles Bagot Smith, Deputy Assistant Commissary-general, addressed to Mr. Filder. "I beg to submit, for your information, the enclosed statement of transport under my charge this day, embracing the receipts and issues since my return from Constantinople, on 16th December last." Mr. Smith had been found a very efficient officer for transport, and he had gone to Constantinople in consequence of his ill state of health, and was brought back again. "The deficiency of animals, you will perceive, is very great, and it is to the causes which have led thereto that I would beg to advert. They may be justly attributed, in my opinion, first to the unfitness of the Turks as muleteers. On this point I would observe, that notwithstanding I have adopted every means in my power, and endeavoured to establish a proper chain of responsibility throughout the transport service under my charge, I have failed in accomplishing the end in view, as I find and have found, ever since my arrival in Turkey, that it is utterly impossible to exercise effectual control over the Turkish muleteers, who are so incorrigibly idle, and in all other respects so totally useless, that no satisfactory result can be obtained from their employment. Secondly, the severity of the weather of late has increased the natural apathy of the Turks, and has caused the death of a great many animals; but it has been found quite impossible to ascertain, either from the 'onbashees' (Turkish conductors) or the muleteers, the particulars of such loss: a still greater number have been abandoned, *en route*, to and from the camp. The difficulties which exist in loading the daily supplies, owing to the crowded and filthy state of the wharf, prevents most of the animals being despatched until the afternoon, at an hour which does not admit of their reaching their destination until very late at night, or their return to the depôt until near morning on the following day; the delay thus occasioned, the fatigue the men have to undergo, the wretchedness and misery they are subject to from having to stand about all day in the cold wet mud, the distance they are obliged subsequently to travel over a most difficult country in all weathers, renders them not only still more inefficient from exhaustion, but utterly careless and indifferent to their charge, which they abandon, laden or otherwise,

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the moment they escape from the surveillance of those placed over them, and either return to their tents or else desert. The horses suffer equally with the men. Those which are not lost have to remain nearly the whole day without food, and are consequently in a few days completely unserviceable. Such as are abandoned are rarely ever recovered, as it is impossible to obtain correct evidence of the misfortune. Another reason why so many horses soon become inefficient is, that those which arrived from Constantinople were in very miserable condition, and quite unfit for more than one week's hard work in the present season of the year. Thirdly, a very material point in explanation of our disasters is, the deplorable state of the roads leading to the front. For the last two months they have been almost wholly impassable; they are now so thoroughly out of repair, and beset with so many obstacles, that it is only to the greatest possible exertion on the part of man and horse that the supplies are transported to the camps. In the attempt the men are completely worn out, and the horses are not unfrequently left to die in the mud, from which they are unable to extricate themselves. Fourthly, very many horses have been found in the possession of individual soldiers, and entire regiments; horse-lifting has become quite a practice here, and, as bearing upon the subject, I beg to enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter received by me from Lieutenant Nixon, in charge of the horse depôt" (that was under the Commissariat; a certain number of military officers were attached to the Commissariat at Varna, and Lieutenant Nixon was not among them, so that I presume he must have been attached after the arrival of the army in the Crimea), "and a statement of one of my storekeepers, whom I sent some time ago with sick horses to the depôt at Karani. The recovery of the latter cost me considerable trouble and annoyance. Repeated instances of complaint against soldiers possessing themselves of Commissariat horses have been brought to me; but, beyond admonishing the delinquents, and retaining the horses, I have not had time to enter into the particulars of each case. The practice has become so general that a horse left for five minutes in any part of the town without its rider, is sure to disappear. I am perfectly satisfied that a great many horses which do not belong to them, are in the possession of regiments; and I would submit that some effectual steps be taken to prevent the continuance of a practice so detrimental to the public interests, and to enforce the return of such horses as may be improperly detained, or the possession of which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for. It will be found, however, a difficult matter to identify many of the horses as being public property, as the Commissariat mark is either overgrown, or has been purposely defaced, and the number of a regiment substituted on another part of the body. Some of the horses which came from Eupatoria were not branded, owing partly to the pressure which existed for their employment in conveying provisions to the front, the moment they were disembarked, and the impossibility of afterwards having it done. In conclusion, I would beg to observe that under existing difficulties, it would be quite impossible to maintain an efficient transport establishment sufficient to meet the wants of this army, without the aid of an enlisted corps of drivers, properly officered, and governed upon military principles." Mr. Filder himself on several occasions, publicly reported and privately wrote that opinion, that although the officers should not be called captains and majors, and so forth, the transport corps ought to be organised on military principles, by Commissariat officers. "The men should be furnished with a suitable uniform, otherwise they would not be recognised by those for whom they labour." That was provided for in the case of the Irish drivers. "The absence of an acknowledged uniform in any branch of the service in connexion with the army gives rise to much inconvenience, and I have found it frequently the case in reference to my superintendents and other subordinate persons whose authority is often questioned and held in contempt, although they may be in performance of important duties; and thus the public service suffers. The proportion of drivers should be, with horse and mule transport, one to every two animals." Then Mr. Filder makes a note upon that: "16th January 1855. It was not foreseen that the army would be in its present situation; but as soon as it was perceived that these men could not withstand the cold to which they would be exposed, and that they were in other respects unsuited to the service, I applied for an organised corps of drivers from England; and a portion of the men were ready for embarkation towards the

end

end of December." They were got ready in an extraordinary short space of time.

13943. Lord *Seymour*.] I thought you stated yesterday, that before that there were a number of the police sent out to overlook the drivers?—They were not sent out specially to overlook the drivers; they were sent out to form the subordinate corps of the Commissariat; to act as assistant storekeepers, issuers, conductors of stores, superintendents of transport, and for various other purposes.

13944. They had no reference to the drivers then?—Yes; that was one of the objects, and an important one, but by no means the sole object; a large number were sent out, as many as 129, including a number of persons from the Customs.

13945. One of their duties, I thought you stated, was to look after the drivers?—Yes, it was; but there were not enough of them, and they died in great numbers. I was exceedingly shocked at the number of deaths that were reported, and at the number of persons who returned home invalided from that corps; they were subject to great hardships obviously.

13946. Mr. *Layard*.] Did they preserve their police uniform, or had they a uniform in the Commissariat?—They had blue frock-coats, with Commissariat buttons, and foraging caps. They were a remarkably deserving, useful set of men.

13947. Sir *J. Pakington*.] Were they sent out from the Metropolitan Police?—From the London Metropolitan and Liverpool Police, and from the Irish constabulary. We sent them out batch after batch, 10, 20, and 30 together.

13948. Lord *Seymour*.] You stated yesterday, that from the improper superintendence of the drivers, Commissary-general Filder's first idea was to hire persons; and when he found himself unable to do that, and that it was necessary to have proper superintendents, he wrote to the Treasury, and suggested that a sufficient number of persons might be selected from the police corps of England and Ireland, to take charge especially of the transport?—I thought I corrected myself, and added that they were also to be employed as assistant storekeepers.

13949. For which large draughts of men were sent from the Metropolitan Police, the Liverpool Police, and the Irish Constabulary; I gathered, yesterday, from your evidence, that those men were sent out purposely to look after the transport service, and if they were not well qualified to take care of mules, at least their former habits had qualified them to take care that the mules were not stolen?—Yes; but the consumption of these poor men had been so great (I am sorry to use such a term), they had died, and they had been invalided in such numbers, that they were disappearing from the service; 129 were sent out as assistant storekeepers, conductors, issuers, &c., from the Metropolitan Police, the Liverpool Police, and the Irish Constabulary, and a number of lockers and weighers from the Customs, to take charge of stores, and the landing and shipping of stores; persons were also sent from the Ordnance; accustomed to the care of Quartermaster-general's stores, and Ordnance stores. I may say, to the praise of these men, that Commissary-general Filder reported that they were remarkably trustworthy, hardy, intelligent, and accustomed to overcome difficulties.

13950. With regard to the horses, you have read in that letter that even when they were sent from Constantinople they were in an unfit state to have been sent?—Yes; I cannot entirely account for that.

13951. That again would come under the Commissariat?—Yes; the Commissariat must be asked to account for it. I believe it to have been partly owing to the length of time they were kept on board; they suffered very much from the voyage. With the permission of the Committee I will read the rest of Mr. Filder's remarks, and then there are remarks by his deputy, Mr. Adams; it is a very important document. "The Commissariat transport horses have been over-worked. No horses could stand being worked daily over nearly impassable roads; but the public bât animals attached to the regiments which were furnished from the Commissariat depôt, as well as horses the private property of officers, show that the horses of the country which have not been overworked, are hardier, and retain their condition under adverse circumstances better, than English horses." Then Deputy Commissary-general Adams, who is Mr. Filder's deputy, makes his remarks. "The Commissary-general having referred the

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annexed report to me as principal Deputy Commissary-general with this army, and superintending officer, I beg to submit the following remarks. Nearly all the available transport animals are at present stationed at Balaklava, and come to the wharf immediately after being fed; it is not necessary therefore that they should be fed again before they have done any work. When they were kept at the village of Karani, and came down to Balaklava, they were invariably fed while waiting to be loaded." This shows that care was taken of them. "Since Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Smith resumed the charge, nearly all the animals have been apportioned to the divisions, and the rule is that the transport of each division should attend in rotation; but the officers, in their anxiety to get the supplies up to the front, do not always observe it; indeed the delays which frequently occur prevent every effort to establish regularity and arrangement. The different articles cannot always be landed in sufficient time and quantity. Ships become jammed in, and cannot be approached. If rum and salt meat are required, they cannot sometimes be got at, until lighter articles and biscuit are removed from above them, and many other obstructions and delays occur, which baffle the most anxious and strenuous exertions to overcome them; they are altogether beyond our power of control. There is another serious obstacle to the landing of the supplies, the want of sufficient boats, on board of steamers especially; and the plea frequently set forth is, that the charter party only requires the crew of the vessel to deliver the packages alongside. This was not the practice during the last war" (the Peninsular war he means), "when every transport was provided with a sufficient long-boat, and all boats could be employed in discharging any vessel. On Sundays too the crews often refuse to work, and fatigue parties cannot always be obtained. The boats of the men-of-war are often engaged in embarking the sick and wounded and landing Ordnance ammunition, and can only afford limited asssistance to the Commissariat. But the greatest of all our obstacles is, the totally inadequate space, and the want of magazines in Balaklava for such vast operations, and the badness and impassability of the roads, if roads they can be considered." There is a letter of remonstrance addressed by Commissary-general Filder to Captain Christie, about the want of boats.

13952. What is the date of that letter?—"Balaklava, 18th December 1854. Sir,—I beg to acquaint you that the interruption caused by the sudden withdrawal of the means of landing supplies is, at all times, attended with very serious consequences, and under existing circumstances, should not, on any account, be done without a previous reference to or communication with this department. From the want of sufficient magazines the army are entirely dependent on being furnished daily with some article or another from the shipping; and yesterday the appropriation of the long-boat of the 'Lady Valiant' to another service, caused a serious interruption to the supply of barley; and one of the regiments of cavalry, after waiting for it the greater part of the day, was obliged to return to camp without any. This will probably be attributed to the want of arrangement or otherwise of the Commissariat, and will no doubt be the cause of serious complaint, and when called upon for explanation by the Commander of the Forces, the real cause of the deficiency must be stated." I beg to submit the observation that all that I have been reading and saying strongly confirms the wisdom of the French Institution of the Intendance, namely, a central body of officers of high authority superintending, and directing, and combining all the administrative departments of an army in the field, including the sea as well as the land transport.

13953. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do not you think that the same principle would apply very much to the management and conduct of the departments at home?—Entirely so.

13954. Mr. *Layard.*] Then you would make those Intendants men of some qualification for their office; you would promote them to that office from their being men of some merit and knowledge of the business to which they were devoted?—Yes.

13955. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated that it was most important that there should have been a sufficient supply of boats to bring provisions and other Commissariat stores from the vessels to the shore, and that in former times a system had been arranged by which such boats were provided?—Yes.

13956. When the army was first sent out, and when the expedition to the Crimea was designed, was no arrangement made to meet the necessity, or was no

no person's attention called to the importance of such an arrangement, that boats should be provided?—This is another instance of the great public evil of breaking up cognate departments among different branches of the public service, instead of combining them under one head; if we, at the Commissariat, had been charged with the superintendence of the conveyance of the Commissariat stores by sea, and the landing of them, then it would have been our duty to see to it, and we should have seen to it, but it was no business of ours; it was not for us to presume on every occasion that the officers of the Admiralty would not take the measures which the occasion required, and I have been accustomed to consider this as an ordinary precaution.

13957. There are in the book which you gave me the duties of the Commissariat, and it is there stated, that it is their duty to provide not only necessary transport for land and inland navigation, but boat-hire and boats in port, and on the coast, for the use of the departments of the army abroad?—Yes.

13958. Therefore this appears, at first sight, to have been one of the general duties of the Commissariat, but if it was not so, was it not at least their duty to inquire whether such boats could be put at their disposition?—They did inquire, and complained of the absence of the precaution.

13959. On the 18th of December they began to complain of the want of boats?—They complained of it when they became aware of the existence of the evil.

13960. Show me where they stated, when they first went to Balaklava, the necessity of having boats, because that I should rather wish to hear; you stated that the provisions were kept on board ship, and that they were ordered to be constantly kept on board ship, because there was a fear of another attack from the Russians; that rendered the possession of boats more essential; I want to know whether any step was then taken to call the attention of Lord Raglan, or of the superior authorities, to the necessity of providing these boats?—In the course of these papers I find several complaints of the want of boat accommodation, and I have no doubt that proper representations were made by Commissary-general Filder.

13961. Have you any proof or any letter showing that he had made such representation?—I have just read a letter; there is a great deal on the subject in this correspondence, and I may find a reference to it before that, but I do not recollect any. But I beg to explain that the boats referred to in the Commissariat regulations are all boats under the ordinary circumstances of the service; for instance, the Commissariat establishments at Malta, Halifax, and other stations, have boats under their charge, and all the conveyance by boat of the Government stores for every department is done by these Commissariat boats. It does not extend to the loading and landing of stores to and from transports in time of war; it never was supposed to include that; that service follows from, and ought to be included in, the hire of the transport.

13962. Then the Committee are to understand that in time of peace, when it would be easy to get them, there are regulations made respecting them, but that when time of war comes, all those regulations are put aside, and there are no means of landing?—That regulation has reference neither to a state of peace nor to a state of war, but to particular local circumstances. For instance, there is a great deal of conveyance required about the harbour of Malta; at Halifax they are constantly on the water with stores and troops, and so forth. When I took charge of the Commissariat, I found that the Assistant Quartermaster-general had one boat of his own; the Officer Commanding another; the Commissariat two or three more, the Ordnance two or three more, and so on; and with great difficulty, and after several years' perseverance, I got all the departments to allow all those boats to be concentrated under the Commissariat, which has been a very economical and beneficial arrangement, so that fewer boats now suffice, and they are appropriated as they are wanted. That is an entirely different service.

13963. At Halifax and Malta it is very convenient to have boats; would it not have been very convenient at Balaklava?—But that is a different state of things to be provided for.

13964. Is it not essential?—No doubt it is, but the remedy lies in a different direction. When an army and the stores of an army are conveyed to any port abroad by a fleet of transports, the dependence for the landing of the stores from those transports must be in connexion with the hire of the transports. As observed by Mr. Adams, during the Peninsular war, it was provided for in the

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charter parties of the vessels, and it ought to have been provided for now, and we assumed that it had been so provided for. In the conveyance of Ordnance stores, for instance, which are sent abroad in great quantities to the different stations, it is regularly provided that the master of the vessel is to land them in his own boats, so that it clearly was a naval duty, and ought to have been provided for by the navy; and I repeat, that one department acting with another cannot at every step (because, if they do it once, they must be always doing it) assume that that second department will not do its duty.

13965. Mr. *Ellice.*] Did it not occur to you to suggest upon that occasion to the Admiralty that either the transports should be bound to provide boats or that some other means should be taken?—It was after I gave over charge of the Commissariat.

13966. *Chairman.*] When a transport is taken up by the Government here to convey goods to Balaklava, is it part of the contract that they are to land them from the ship, or is it part of the contract that they are not to do it?—It ought to be part of the contract that the master of the vessel should land them.

13967. If I were to take your general assumption, I should say that what ought to have been done had been done, but my experience in this Committee leads me to a directly contrary conclusion; I want to know, first, whether or not it is the rule that when a transport is taken up by the Government to convey goods to a particular place, it is part of that contract to land them from the ship to the harbour?—That was the rule during the Peninsular War, and I suppose has been so ever since; I know that for many years past it has been the rule, with respect to Ordnance stores sent abroad, because we insisted upon it on the part of the Commissariat, when the inconvenience arising from the neglect of this precaution was brought to our notice.

13968. I think we have it in evidence that the transports which took out goods to Balaklava refused to convey them from the ship to the land?—I suppose, then, it was not provided for in this instance.

13969. That their duty ended when they arrived at the harbour?—For the Commissariat to have taken up this duty would have been a very imperfect arrangement indeed, because it would have been absurd to have set up a separate establishment of boats to land goods, when all these ships had boats. I do not know where they could have been got; and why should the harbour have been crowded with a double set of boats.

13970. Colonel *Lindsay.*] You do not know anything of the contracts now?—I do not; Mr. Smith will tell you as regards the vessels at Constantinople.

13971. Lord *Seymour.*] You have spoken of these different vessels which were under the Commissariat at Balaklava, that they were sent to Eupatoria in the winter for cattle or for supplies?—Yes.

13972. At that time there was a great deal of scurvy in the army, we have been informed; we have also been informed that there was a great quantity of onions at Eupatoria; are you aware why the Commissariat, at such a time, did not endeavour to procure a supply of those onions which were lying at Eupatoria, and which were wanted at Balaklava?—I cannot answer the question, as regards onions at Eupatoria, but I know that Mr. Filder, by Lord Raglan's desire, wrote to Mr. Smith to send a cargo of vegetables from Constantinople, and Mr. Smith swept the bazaars, and in an extraordinarily short space of time freighted the "Harbinger" with 150 tons of all kinds of vegetables, principally onions, I believe, and sent them to Balaklava.

13973. *Chairman.*] Are you aware that when they arrived at Balaklava, a great many of them were thrown away?—I have a letter from Mr. Filder, dated the 28th of November, in which he says, "I will write to you about vegetables by the next mail." I felt great anxiety about vegetables at a very early period, and did all I could. "We brought a large quantity from Constantinople, but owing to a continuance of bad weather, most of them were spoilt, and the troops could scarcely be induced to come for those that were sound; they had in great measure supplied themselves with onions and potatoes that had been brought here by private enterprise, which it appears to me is the best channel for providing articles of this kind."

13974. What does he mean by its being bad weather, and destroying the vegetables on board ship?—I suppose the vessel was kept out.

13975. But she was in the harbour?—Owing to bad weather, and the improper position

position taken up by the vessel in the Bosphorus, nearly a week elapsed after the shipment of the vegetables commenced before the vessel sailed, and she may have had a long voyage.

13976. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you infer from that letter that the men had onions?—Yes, the "Harbinger" brought a great quantity of them.

13977. We have it in evidence that they never had any vegetables, excepting once?—I may mention generally that all through these operations there has been a difference of opinion among military and commissariat officers, as to the best mode of the troops being supplied with extra articles of that kind.

13978. This is the statement of a fact; we have it stated in evidence positively, that the "Harbinger" was in the harbour; that she was laden with vegetables, but that owing to certain reasons those vegetables could not be given out to the troops, and that they never had any; but this letter of Mr. Filder's states quite the contrary?—Yes; "They had in great measure supplied themselves with onions and potatoes that had been brought here by private enterprise, which it appears to me is the best channel for providing articles of this kind."

13979. *Chairman.*] That means to say, then, that the soldiers were so well supplied that they did not want what was in the "Harbinger"?—Mr. Filder seems to imply that that was partly the reason why they were indifferent to the vegetables.

13980. But we have it in evidence, that they had not any vegetables; that they were dying of scurvy, and that they went to the "Harbinger" and made application for vegetables and could not get them?——

13981. Mr. *Layard.*] More than that, we have it in evidence from a gentleman, that he went down and found a part of his own regiment who could not get vegetables, because they had not a certain form?—I cannot believe that until it is confirmed by sufficient evidence.

13982. The colonel of the regiment himself states so, Colonel Wilson?—Somewhere else, but I cannot refer to it, Mr. Filder at this, the time of their greatest distresses, the beginning of December, when it was as much as they could do to convey the ordinary rations to camp, states, that finding himself unable to convey these vegetables to camp, he induced Lord Raglan to issue an order by which the troops were allowed to go down and get them themselves.

13983. This is the passage to which I refer; Colonel Wilson says, "I found a serjeant of my regiment, who came up to me, and said, 'I should be very much obliged to you, Sir, to come with me to the Commissariat, to sign some returns.' I was astonished at this. I did not know what the Commissariat and I had to do in common, with regard to the returns; but he said that he had been sent down to get potatoes for the men, but the Commissariat refused to give them, because he had not returns properly made out." Then we asked him, "If he had not found an officer he would not have got the potatoes, would he?" he said, "No."?—Both may be true. When the potatoes first arrived, and there was a hope of getting them into use in the ordinary way, the ordinary course may have been followed of not issuing them, except on requisition; it is very easy to complain of forms, and returns, and routine; but if these forms were not observed, there would have been a general scramble.

13984. But there was a general scramble, it appears?—No; there seems to have been an authorised scramble. I am confident that after that an order was issued, saying, that any men who liked, might go down and supply themselves.

13985. *Chairman.*] That was after they were all rotten, because they were thrown overboard.

13986. Mr. *Layard.*] I am one of the witnesses who have deposed to the fact, that there was a general scramble, having myself witnessed it. At that time there were English and French, and things were in such a state that every body was allowed to go on board ship and take what he could, the vegetables having been detained till they were rotten on some account, because these forms had not been gone through, I presume?—Do not understand me as being the uncompromising advocate of the Commissariat, because, under all circumstances, under a bad system, or under a good system, or under no system at all, in times of prosperity, and in times of adversity, some people will misbehave themselves.

13987. We have some very important evidence to-day on Mr. Filder's showing; a good deal depends upon the accuracy of Mr. Filder's statements.

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There are statements in the letter you have just read which are directly contradicted by the evidence of two persons who have given evidence to the Committee?—I think they must remain in contradiction until they are cleared up upon further inquiry. It must always be borne in mind that, with regard to Mr. Filder and his officers serving in the Crimea, this is an *ex-parte* inquiry; they have no opportunity of furnishing explanations.

13988. Mr. *Drummond.*] But there is this broad outline, that we found no difficulty in sending out enormous quantities of food, and everything else, 3,000 miles, and neither Mr. Filder, nor anybody else, could find the means of taking them seven miles?—Yes, all owing to the want of seven miles of road; and another fact is, that the country has in consequence been put to the expense of a railroad to the amount of some 300,000 *l.* or 400,000 *l.*, and also to the expense of the new transport corps, which, although, no doubt, it will be a very efficient corps, will involve an extent of expenditure greatly beyond what would have been necessary if that bit of road had been made.

13989. Lord *Seymour.*] You have spoken of the Commissariat establishment, I wish to ask you generally what has been the expense per month in salaries and pay of the Commissariat establishment up to the time when it was under your direct charge; I suppose as the expense always comes to the Treasury, you can easily tell up to a later period what has been the exact amount of cost?—This is a balance sheet of the local expenditure connected with the expedition for eight months (*producing the same*). I may mention that one of the earliest arrangements which the Treasury made, was to select an experienced accountant from the Commissariat corps, to be the head of our account establishment at Constantinople, in the rear, and we sent under him several selected clerks.

13990. Who was your accountant?—Mr. Stickney; he was the gentleman who consolidated the Irish Annuities.

13991. Mr. Stickney gave some evidence before this Committee?—Yes; he has a remarkable genius for accounts; it is his forte; he is a very able accountant indeed; he has always been employed on that special and peculiar duty.

13992. And you sent him out to superintend the accounts?—Yes.

13993. I want to get the cost of the establishment by which you attempted to supply the army?—The cost of it is given in this balance sheet, for eight months: from 1st April to 30th November, 10,152 *l.*, for the pay of Commissariat officers and established clerks. Those are the first eight months of the year, and in the earlier months of course it would be very small. The amount for subordinates was 6,209 *l.*, and money allowances, to both I suppose, 2,260 *l.*, making altogether 18,621 *l.* in the first eight months. But the rate of expenditure was continually increasing. I can give you the rate for the last month, if you please. In the month of November the expense of the Commissariat establishment was, for pay of officers and established clerks, 1,965 *l.*; pay of subordinate persons, 1,945 *l.*; money allowances, that is, field allowances, and servants' allowances, and all those things, 242 *l.*

13994. Is not the expense of the whole Commissariat at the seat of war, for the year, taken in the Estimates at about 30,000 *l.*?—I do not remember; the Estimate has been made up since I gave up charge. I have no time for amateur research.

13995. You do not know what is the whole cost of the Commissariat, at the seat of war?—Here we have it, in the month of November.

13996. What is the total?—The total is the the total of those three sums; I make it 4,152 *l.* for the month of November.

13997. That would make the cost of the establishment at the rate of 50,000 *l.* a year?—Yes.

13998. That was for the supply of a force not exceeding 40,000 men?—Yes.

13999. And for the supply of 40,000 men the establishment alone costs 50,000 *l.* a year?—Yes.

14000. Have you ever compared that with the cost of the French system under their intendants?—No; I have not gone into the cost of the French system, but I am quite familiar with the numbers of each class of officers, and with their respective duties, and the whole system.

14001. Our Commissariat officers have higher pay than the officers of the same relative rank in the army?—Yes. The Duke of Wellington, in his despatches, gives a very good reason for that.

14002. I am

14002. I am only saying that that is the fact?—Yes; invidious comparisons were made in the Peninsular war, between the pay of the army officers and of the Commissariat, and the Duke of Wellington administered a rebuke to the persons who so complained. I will read it if you will allow me. The letter is addressed to Colonel Gordon, the Commissary-in-Chief. "Cartaxo, 19th December, 1810. I do not think it fair to compare the reward of any rank in the Commissariat with the reward of the same amount to the officers of the army. I am of opinion, first, that all the officers of the British army are paid too little, and much less than the officers of any other army in Europe adverting to the mode of living in England, to the value of money, and to the reward for talents and exertions in other professions; but, secondly, officers of the army have rank and other objects to look to, to which not only a Commissary cannot aspire, but from which he is precluded; and indeed, I might add that the prejudices of society against a Commissary almost prevent him from receiving the common respect due to the character of a gentleman." That opinion goes very deep indeed; quite to the root of the efficiency or inefficiency of our system of army administration. The Duke alludes to it on another occasion. He says, writing to Lieutenant-general Sherbrooke, "I am not astonished that you and the general officers should feel indignant at the neglect and incapacity of some of the officers of the Commissariat, by which we have suffered and are still suffering so much; but what I have to observe, and wish to impress upon you, is, that they are gentlemen appointed to their office by the King's authority, although not holding his commission;" it is very extraordinary that the Duke should not have been aware that the Commissariat officers did hold his Majesty's commission; that is another instance of the general neglect with which they were treated; "and that it would be infinitely better, and more proper, if all neglects and faults of theirs were reported to me, by whom they can be dismissed, rather than they should be abused by the general officers of the army. Indeed it cannot be expected that they will bear the kind of abuse they have received, however well deserved we may deem it to be; and they will either resign their situations, and put the army to still greater inconvenience, or complain to higher authorities, and thereby draw those who abuse them into discussions which will take up, hereafter, much of their time and attention." Then he goes on, "I do not enter into the grounds you had for being displeased with Mr. ————, which I dare say were very sufficient, but I only desire, that in all these cases, punishment may be left to me, who alone can have the power of inflicting it."

14003. Mr. *Layard.*] In Sir De Lacy Evans's examination, he stated that one or two Commissaries had particularly distinguished themselves, and he also expressed a regret that they should not have been promoted or that their service, should not have been acknowledged in any way. Are there no means of promoting men who show zeal and talent in the Commissary's department?—The promotion is such a very vital point, that I will give a short account of it. When the charge of the Commissariat was given to me in January 1840, by Sir Francis Baring, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, he particularly directed my attention to the subject of the promotion in the corps. The Commission on Army Promotion had lately sat and reported; and there had been great complaints of the stagnation of promotion in the Commissariat. At the end of the Peninsular War, there was a great surplus of officers and a difficulty in finding work for them, and there consequently had been a long stagnation, from which a number of very deserving and excellent officers had grievously suffered, and Sir Francis Baring desired me to look into it; I went into the question very attentively, and the conclusion I arrived at, was, that the rates of pay of each rank were sufficient, provided the stream of promotion was kept reasonably current. I also came to a decided opinion against a plan, which was very popular among the officers themselves, of having increased pay according to length of service; it appeared to me to be certain to have a deadening effect; and the plan which I submitted to Sir Francis Baring was this, that at the end of every year the state of the establishment, and of the casualties, as we technically call them, that is to say, vacancies, which had occurred during the year, and all the merits and demerits of the officers who would be likely to have any claim to promotion should be carefully gone into and considered. Ever since that, it has been done year by year with great exactness, and, I say, with gratitude, with an entire absence of political influence. I have never had any

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pressure brought to bear upon me in this respect. In the discharge of this very important and delicate duty, I have had the protection of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I never have had any Parliamentary or other influence brought to bear upon me. Our plan has been, that first of all Mr. Archer, who was the principal clerk, and was well acquainted with all the details of the service, and the claims of the officers, prepared a memorandum in detail on those points, and sent it to me with all the correspondence and statements of the claims of the officers. Then I shut myself up for a day, and went into it thoroughly myself, and prepared another memorandum. These two memoranda, with the supporting statements, were laid then before the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he decided upon them. Our principles were, first of all, to use up all the officers. We found work for them quite to the last. When the old commissaries-general were no longer fit for active service, we employed them on accounts, and in preparing such treatises as those which have been compiled with so much public advantage by Sir Randolph Routh and Sir John Bissett, and on committees, and in various other ways. We placed nobody on the half-pay list who had not a fair title to be invalided; I mean, whose health had not broken down: and we laid it down as a rule in our general instructions that the half-pay list was not to be a refuge for undeserving officers; we also promoted according to a mixed system of seniority and merit.

14004. Lord *Seymour*.] You say that you took care that the half-pay list should not be a refuge for undeserving officers?—Yes.

14005. What have you done with the undeserving officers; have you kept them on the working establishment?—No; I mean officers who have stupified their faculties by drink, or who have fallen into disreputable habits, and got into debt, and so forth.

14006. You have had no scruple in dismissing them?—We have ejected them; we have sometimes, in special cases, given them a commuted allowance, as it is called.

14007. During the 15 years for which you have had under you the management of the Commissariat, have you ejected many from the body altogether?—Yes, a great many; clerks especially. The clerks undergo a very effective probation; about three years on the average; and they have been weeded most effectively.

14008. Then the Committee are to understand that the Commissariat have been very well paid, and have got a retiring allowance, and that they are promoted strictly according to their merit?—Yes, including seniority; we never pass over a deserving senior officer if we can avoid it; but we never fail to promote, even out of his turn, a very deserving officer.

14009. Then have the public in your view everything in the general arrangements of the Commissariat department so far as appointment is concerned?—Not appointment.

14010. But so far as promotion goes?—Yes.

14011. Now as to appointment, you are not satisfied with the mode of appointment?—No. The young men who were appointed to the Commissariat were nominated by the patronage secretary as they came, the average of those who came to him. Then the only power which I had was to eliminate the worst. I examined them, and if there was any flagrant case, I was able to reject him; but if they were able to pass the sort of examination which young men pass in the Government offices, I was obliged to accept them, and there the public has suffered grievously. The Commissariat are a most honourable and excellent body of officers, and their training, as I have described, is very satisfactory, and by continually discouraging the bad and encouraging and promoting the good, we have drawn up towards the higher ranks a very efficient body of officers indeed; but they would have been still more efficient, and a great deal of public money and of private pain would have been saved, if, instead of confining ourselves to rejecting the worst, we had from the first adopted some means of selecting the best.

14012. You state in your regulation that the period of clerkship is one of probation, during which the talents and habits of application, and the attainments of a candidate for preferment may be developed, and that those clerks who shall be found not qualified for the satisfactory discharge of the duties will be at once removed?—Yes.

14013. If that regulation was strictly maintained, would not it enable you to get

get rid of those who were unqualified for the duty?—No doubt it has done a great deal. I have the memoranda, of which I am speaking, with the Treasury Minutes upon them, entered year by year in a book, and if your Lordship were to look through them, and especially the list of clerks at the close, you would find no end of clerks who had been weeded out in that way. But nevertheless the quality of a manufactured article depends mainly upon the raw material, and unless you have a high standard of raw material you cannot have a first-rate article.

14014. You say that the first examination was not sufficient, as I understand you?—No, it was not.

14015. Have you ever attempted, in communication with the different Chancellors of the Exchequer, who in the course of these 15 years have been at the Treasury, to establish a system of examination?—I very much improved it. I screwed it up as much as I could. I laid down fixed rules, and prepared a circular for the information of the young men, which I will read to the Committee if they desire it. But if I had gone beyond that, and made the examination much above that which is in use in the different public offices, I could not have stood the pressure. Even as it was, I was continually in friendly antagonism with the patronage secretary; but I make no complaints.

14016. *Chairman.*] I suppose we can get your views from the Blue Book upon the subject?—Yes.

14017. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You stated just now that the general result is, that you have a very efficient body of officers indeed; those were the words which you used; are you not content, in any public department, if you have a very efficient body of officers indeed?—No. I want to have them as efficient as they can be made, and the more especially as I have looked to the Commissariat as the nucleus for an English intendance. There are officers in it who are exceedingly well qualified, even as it is, if they were only placed in a position which would enable them to respect themselves, and cause them to be respected by others.

14018. Mr. *Ellice.*] I wish, before the Committee adjourns, to put a very important question to you; you have answered it already; but I wish to have it answered upon reflection. Has your experience, since the commencement of this war, satisfied you that the time has arrived when the different branches of our military administration should be consolidated under one head, similar to the French army authority of the *intendance militaire*?—Yes; I am confident that the time has arrived; I think the great problem of the present day is, to make popular government consistent with effective administration; and I have that confidence in my countrymen, that I believe we are quite capable of doing it; and I am disposed to think that we are in the humour for doing it.

14019. Lord *Seymour.*] I think you told me that you had somewhat considered the subject of the English system of Commissariat as compared with the French *intendance* system?—Yes. During the 40 years which have elapsed since the last war, whilst we have been reforming Parliament, and abolishing the Corn Laws, and cultivating the arts of peace, such as commerce, navigation, and mechanics, with great success, our allies the French, that highly cultivated and ingenious nation, have bestowed a large share of their attention on the elaboration and perfection of their military establishment, and they certainly have attained to great perfection; they have had great success, and we should not be ashamed of appropriating the advantage of their improvements. One of their best institutions of that kind is the comprehensive civil administration of the army under the superintendence of the *intendants*. That system of administration unites every quality of good administration. There is unity; there is authority; there is a proper division of labour; there is a proper selection of agents in the first instance, and a proper promotion and encouragement of them afterwards; the body consists, first of all, of 246 officers, who are intendents, sub-intendents, and assistants, none of whom are under the rank of captain. An intendent is appointed to each army; sometimes more than one; I think there are as many as two or three in the East; and there is nobody between him and the General; he has no superior except the General, and he has only one co-equal, who is the chief of the staff; he has all the authority and influence which is requisite to enable him to perform his very important

duties; he has under him sous-intendants and assistants, who are apportioned to the different divisions, depôts, and hospitals, and so forth.

14020. First, as to the head man, is he in a different place to our Commissary-general?—I think, nominally, he ranks only with a general officer, but practically he is the second man in the army; he is a very great man.

14021. Does not the Commissary-general communicate directly with the Commander of the Forces?—He does. No doubt the Commissary-general has great power and influence too; but there is a radical defect in this respect in the present Commissariat system. It is an unprotected unpopular arm of the service, and has been so time out of mind.

14022. *Chairman.*] He is neither civil nor military?—It is an important question whether it would be advisable to retain its civil capacity or confer upon it a military character after the practice of the French. I incline to the opinion that we had better keep it civil. I think there are circumstances which distinguish our case from that of the French, and although I would recast our civil administration of the army on the model of the French, I would not make a servile imitation. I would make an adaptation of their principle, suited to our national habits, wants, and circumstances.

Veneris, 20° die Aprilis, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	Mr. Drummond.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Colonel Lindsay.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Bramston.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K.C.B., called in; and further Examined.

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Vide Appendix.

Vide Appendix.

14023. Lord *Seymour.*] IS there anything connected with the evidence you gave the other day which you wish now to explain?—I was desired to give in a copy of a Treasury minute, dated the 7th of May 1841, laying down the rules for the examination of candidates for clerkships in the Commissariat, which I now produce.—(*The same was handed in.*) I beg leave, in order to complete that part of the subject, to give in a paper describing the mode in which our Commissariat officers are trained, dated May 1850. I also beg leave to hand in a copy of a letter from myself to Lord Raglan, dated the 13th February 1854, and Lord Raglan's answer, dated the 15th February of the same year, as indicating the spirit in which the original appointment of Mr. Filder, the Commissary-general with the expeditionary force to the East, was made and accepted.

[*The same were handed in, and are as follows:*]

My dear Lord, 13 February 1854.

I BELIEVE you are already acquainted with Commissary-general Filder, who has been appointed to the charge of the department with the force under your command. He was attached to the army in the field from the beginning to the end of the Peninsular war, since which time he has been in charge of the department at Gibraltar, Malta, the West Indies, and lastly, as Commissary-general in Canada.

In consequence of the cessation of the Kafir War, the drawing in of outposts in Canada and the West Indies, and a reserve of picked officers, who have been employed as paymasters, and on the financial business under the Board of Works in Ireland, we shall be able to give Commissary-general Filder as efficient a department as ever accompanied a British army into the field; most of the officers have seen actual service in the face of an enemy in the Kafir war, the Canadian insurrection, &c.

After communication with the Duke of Newcastle, I sent instructions to our Commissary-general at Malta by the last mail to increase his reserve of corn and live cattle; and as the Admiralty mill at Vittoriasa is fully employed by their own business, we have purchased a steam-mill, to be set up for the military service at Valetta, and it will be embarked

embarked at Liverpool for Malta in 10 days; we must take care that abundant supplies of biscuit and salt meat, as a reserve, are provided from the Admiralty and Commissariat establishments.

I also wrote by last mail to Mr. Smith, our able commissary at Corfu, to desire that he would make immediate inquiries into the resources of both coasts of the Adriatic, for supplying an army in the field, and especially to get all the information he could regarding transport, and the extent to which serviceable horses and mules might be purchased for the ammunition and baggage. I also warned him, by the Duke of Newcastle's desire, that he would probably be shortly ordered to the Dardanelles to provide the necessary transport, with the assistance of our consular and other authorities.

It is, however, of such first-rate importance that the requisite transport and other supplies should be ready on the spot against the arrival of the troops, that if the course of events continues to demand it, Commissary-general Filder will, with your Lordship's approval, send several able officers in advance to prepare everything beforehand. I leave him with confidence in your Lordship's hands, and I have merely to add that every support and assistance which he may require, in order to carry out your Lordship's commands, will be promptly given by the Treasury. We ordered 50,000 *l.* to be sent to Malta on Saturday, and shall make any further remittances which may be required."

Believe me, &c.
(signed) *C. E. Trevelyan.*

Lieut.-general Lord Raglan, G. C. B., &c. &c. &c.

My dear Sir Charles, Ordnance Office, 15 February 1854.

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 13th instant, and have to thank you very much for having selected so able and experienced an officer as Mr. Filder for the appointment of Commissary-general to the force about to be entrusted to my charge. I feel satisfied that he will conduct his important duties in the most efficient manner.

I have placed him in communication with Major Dickson, of the Artillery, who is well acquainted with the country, having been five years in Constantinople, where he was employed in the Turkish arsenal, and established a laboratory; and Mr. Filder was to see yesterday a gentleman Colonel Matson proposed to introduce to him, and who is supposed to know a good deal about the resources of Turkey. The inquiries you have desired to have made, and the precautions you have taken to secure supplies at Malta, appear most judicious.

Believe me, &c.
(signed) *Raglan.*

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K.C.B.

I beg leave to correct my answers to Questions 13543, 13544, 13548, 13552, and 13553, in my first day's evidence, in reference to some points of detail.

14024. I asked you whether the Commissariat officer was bound to have with him a sufficient supply of those forms, and you stated that it was not his duty, but the duty of the regimental officers to furnish them?—The corrected statement is this: All the numbered forms in the appendix to the Commissariat regulations, of which the ration return is one, are furnished by the officers of the Commissariat whose duty it is to issue money or stores, and, according to the regulations of the department, an ample supply of copies ought to be kept on hand. No separate return is required for forage, fuel, and light; all the rations to which the troops are entitled being included in one return. The regimental ration return is signed by the commanding officer, and countersigned by the paymaster, as vouching for the strength of the regiment to be rationed, and the receipt is signed by the Quartermaster in acknowledgment that the supplies have been duly issued.

14025. So that it would appear that the Commissariat are accustomed to provide forage, fuel, and light?—Yes.

14026. With regard to fuel, was it not part of the duties of the Commissariat to provide fuel for the army before Sebastopol?—In garrison and cantonments it is always customary for the Commissariat to provide fuel, but in the field it is usual for the troops to provide it for themselves.

14027. In such a case as that before Sebastopol, where the troops were in fact hemmed in by the enemy, and had no means of obtaining fuel from the country round them, was not it the duty of the Commissariat to provide it?—Under those very exceptional circumstances it became the duty of the Commissariat to provide fuel even in the field, so far as they were able; but to provide fuel for that army, and forage for that army, and huts, that is, houses for that army, and winter clothing, and all the other articles required to enable them to pass the winter on the heights before Sebastopol, besides provisions and the vast quantity of ammunition necessary for the siege, was an immense extra burthen, which even if the road had been kept in a proper state, could have

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have been with difficulty borne; and the road having been broken up, it became impossible.

14028. *Chairman.*] Why would it have been an extra service?—It was extra.

14029. Was it more extra than would happen to any army in the field?—Yes; because our army was in a state of siege; not only the infantry, but the cavalry.

14030. Lord *Seymour.*] You refer to the time when the road was broken up, and every thing went wrong on that account; early in November it was known that the army would have to winter in the Crimea; the Commissariat were then informed of it, were they not?—Yes.

14031. The Commissariat at that time knew the circumstances in which that army was placed, and they knew therefore at that time that they would have to supply at least fuel for the greater part of the winter; what preparation did they make for giving them that supply, or did they make any?—Commissary-general Filder made such preparation as was in his power; he sent orders to Constantinople for large supplies of charcoal, and he afterwards obtained it, and I believe other fuel, from Sinope, and, I think, Samsoun.

14032. Was there a large depôt of charcoal at Balaklava, or anywhere near there?—To the best of my belief, a supply of charcoal was constantly in store at Balaklava during the winter.

14033. It has been stated in evidence, that the troops hardly ever, and some of them, never saw any?—That must have been for want of transport, not for want of charcoal. I have before me a memorandum by Assistant Commissary-general Power, dated the 26th of January, to this effect: "Fuel and candles have been always procurable at Balaklava, by sending the regimental bât-horses for a supply."

14034. Had they any of those regimental horses to send?—They were never without regimental horses; I believe the regimental horses were kept in a better and more efficient state than the Commissariat horses, because the burden upon them was less. I was desired to search these papers for information upon one or two points; and one was as to the representation made by Mr. Filder to Lord Raglan, through the Quartermaster-general, as to the necessity for repairing the road to Balaklava; the date of it is the 13th of November 1854.

14035. That letter of Commissary-general Filder's is dated the 13th of November?—Yes; and it is referred to in a letter from Commissary-general Filder to the Quartermaster-general, dated the 17th of January.

14036. What are the terms of the letter of the 13th of November?—I have not the letter of the 13th of November, but I have the reference to it in this letter of the 17th of January.

14037. Are the words quoted in the reference?—It gives the substance.

14038. Will you give the substance?—That it was indispensable that the road from Balaklava to the camp should be repaired, and that it was extremely difficult in that state of the road to transport the requisite supplies to the front.

14039. Mr. *Ellice.*] That was on the 13th of November?—Yes. I was also desired to ascertain when Commissary-general Filder first made arrangements to erect magazines at Balaklava, and I found that information in a letter from Commissary-general Filder to the Under Secretary, dated the 19th of January 1855, in the following terms: "As soon as it became obvious that we should be obliged to winter in our present position, I sent to Constantinople for deals and artificers for the purpose of erecting sheds, which are now in course of construction."

14040. Were they not in course of construction till the 19th of January?—No; but he sent for the material in November.

14041. *Chairman.*] So that two months elapsed before that letter was written?—Yes.

14042. Mr. *Ellice.*] Did Commissary-general Filder propose at any time to Lord Raglan to erect temporary storehouses, or other means, for the storage of provisions or other Commissariat stores, at any intermediate place between Balaklava and the camp?—I am not aware that he did; but he had made considerable progress in laying up a reserve store in the camp.

14043. *Chairman.*] No, not a reserve of stores; but storehouses?—Yes; but a store implies some kind of storehouse. As he had made considerable progress in laying up a reserve store on the heights before Sebastopol, previously to the Balaklava affair, when the transports were ordered out of the

the harbour, it is to be presumed that he had some sort of accommodation there.

14044. Mr. *Ellice.*] "On the heights before Sebastopol," means at the camp, does it not?—Yes.

14045. Had he ever proposed to establish any store at any intermediate position between Balaklava and the camp?—No; I am not aware that he had.

14046. *Chairman.*] You say stores, and you presume storehouses; the evidence before this Committee just presumes the contrary, for it would appear that the stores were scattered all about Balaklava, and that they were destroyed for want of storehouses; therefore the presumption that you make is not borne out by the facts?—The confusion of things at Balaklava was mainly owing to the contracted limits of the place, and the great concourse of people to it for various purposes.

14047. That does not meet the question. You state that where stores are there, you presume there are storehouses?—I do not mean by storehouses, well-built magazines, but some accommodation for the stores; the peculiar difficulty which applied to Balaklava would not apply to the stores in the camp, because there there was plenty of room. I was also desired to refer to the place in which the occasional refusal of the cavalry to receive chopped straw was reported: it is contained in a memorandum submitted by the Commissary-general to the Commander of the Forces, on the 27th of January: "With respect to forage, I would observe that, with the exception of a few days after the hurricane, that is, from about the 21st to the 30th November, we have never been without a supply of hay or straw at Balaklava; but the state of the weather, the appropriation of the men-of-war's boats (upon which we are dependent) to the landing of guns and ammunition, and embarkation of sick and wounded, or other circumstances, have occasionally prevented a sufficient quantity from being brought on shore; and in some instances the cavalry have declined receiving chopped straw, when landed. The Brigade of Light Cavalry also experienced a deficiency, the most important one that has occurred, when it was stationed in front; the roads having been at that time wholly impassable for carts, and the distance having been considered by the military authorities to be too great for the horses to be sent to Balaklava, to bring up their own forage." That was another of Mr. Filder's difficulties: for some time, instead of the horses being stationed near the forage, they were sent to the top of the hill before Sebastopol, and the forage had to be brought up to them. Another difficulty which I may mention here was this, and it was of a very peculiar kind. I said before, that owing to the want of a proper arrangement of the sea transports, he had great difficulty in importing sufficient supplies of live cattle. He had intended to issue fresh meat every other day, and he would have been able to do so if the transport service had been properly managed; but he was not able to do so, and was consequently obliged to issue salt meat; but that had to be carried, and he had therefore to provide conveyance for the meat issued to the troops; whereas, it is well known to the Commissariat that the peculiarity of fresh meat is, that it carries itself; it is not necessary to provide conveyance for fresh meat, because it has four legs, and walks to the slaughterhouse. That embarrassed him as much as any other cause; and I believe my mention of it now will be the first time that it has been generally known.

14048. You state that the transports were not properly managed: what is the meaning of that; what transports do you allude to?—The ships.

14049. Were they not properly managed?—I stated my opinion on that subject in my last day's evidence; I gave several instances then, and I could give others.

14050. Perhaps you will be kind enough to do so?—I mean the management and arrangement of the steamers by Admiral Boxer: "In proof that the death of horses has been owing to exposure, and, in the case of the transport animals, to great fatigue in addition, it may be stated, that all horses of this army which are under shelter are almost without exception in good condition, although they have received no greater allowance of food than other horses." I can also show that the artillery, in many instances, refused to receive wet hay, with or without a proportion of dry hay.

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14051. Mr. *Layard.*] Have you seen the evidence of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan?—I read it in the newspaper.

14052. You have not seen the official Report?—No.

14053. They distinctly stated that they did not attribute the state of the horses to the want of shelter, but more to the overwork, and that those that were covered in did not suffer less?—I conjecture that the officers' horses, under any circumstances, would suffer less from overwork than the Commissariat horses.

14054. That is not the question; this letter attributes the sufferings of the horses to their not being covered in; those witnesses stated that they did not attribute it to that cause, but to their having been used for Commissariat purposes?—It was not attributed merely to their not having been covered in, but to great fatigue in addition, and exposure on the road, when they were struggling with heavy burdens through the broken-up road; I imagine that that was the main cause, when they died and were left on the road in such great numbers.

14055. *Chairman.*] When Commissary-general Filder suggested that the road ought to be mended, was it possible to have mended the road?—An attempt was made, and it failed.

14056. It failed, did it not, for the want of proper materials?—I am not competent to give an opinion whether it might have been mended at that time. I think that assistance was afterwards obtained from the French to mend the road; but I am not a competent witness upon that point.

14057. Are you aware whether there were materials for making the road at that time?—No, I am not. I presume, from an attempt being made to make it, that there were materials. My impression, from general information is, that there were materials. I know that there is an abundance of limestone there.

14058. Mr. *Drummond.*] Does Commissary-general Filder mention that all the horses belonging to the Light Cavalry that died going down, were perfect skeletons, and does he explain how they became skeletons if they had plenty to eat?—No, he does not enter into that detail; but I conceive that exposure will reduce the condition of horses.

14059. Even if well fed?—As much as want of food. I may refer now to the objection of the artillery to receive wet and dry hay together. Some of the hay which had been lost from the "Progress," we have heard of as floating about the harbour. Commissary-general Filder recovered a quantity of it, and he arranged for its being issued partly alone, and partly with a certain proportion of dry hay; and in some cases it was refused by the officers of the artillery.

14060. *Chairman.*] By whose authority was it refused?—By the officers commanding the batteries; but without reading the paper, I cannot state positively.

14061. Lord *Seymour.*] Will you just refer to the papers, and see who it was that refused it?—Captain Morris' battery refused to receive it in that state.

14062. At what date was that?—This is a letter from Commissary-general Filder to the Quartermaster-general, dated the 14th of December 1854.

14063. Mr. *Layard.*] In what state was the hay?—I had better read the letter: "Balaklava, 14th December 1854. Sir,—The inquiries which it was necessary to institute into the cause of the deficiencies in the issues of forage to Captain Morris's battery of artillery during the nine days included in the period between the 23d November and the 1st December, as represented in a letter from that officer transmitted in one from Lieutenant-colonel Dacres, have caused a delay in answering your letter of the 4th instant. I have now the honour to report, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, that these deficiencies relate to a period shortly after the hurricane of 14th November, on which occasion nearly all the hay in the possession of the Commissariat was lost. A small quantity of it however was recovered wet, and issued, in the first instance, with a portion of dry hay, and subsequently without any of the latter; but Captain Morris's battery refused to receive it in that state, whilst other batteries accepted it. There was only one of the days included in the period mentioned on which no forage was offered to Captain Morris's battery, viz., the 1st December, when, although there was a vessel laden with chopped straw

straw in the harbour, it was found impossible to land it in time. Lieutenant-colonel Dacres would appear not to be aware that a ship containing nearly all the hay in the possession of the Commissariat (amounting to 20 days' supply), having been ordered out of the harbour of Balaklava, was lost, with many other Commissariat vessels, in the hurricane of 14th ultimo." And in a previous letter to Lord Raglan, dated the 6th December, the following passage occurs: "The representations which have been made respecting the artillery waggons of the Light Division, having been sent to Balaklava for hay, without being loaded, and which have been referred to me, relate, with one exception, to a period before we had in any degree recovered from the loss we had sustained of 21 days' supply of that article by a hurricane. The batteries in question refused to receive wet hay, with, in the first instance, a portion of dry, and subsequently without any of the latter, whilst other batteries accepted it in that state. The Commissariat officers attached to divisions have not, I am of opinion, shown any want of zeal or exertions under the present trying circumstances, many of them being in the saddle all night, or until a very late hour in the night, endeavouring to bring in supplies, the arrival of which has been prevented by the impassable state of the road."

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14064. Have you got Captain Morris's letter, or any document, showing his refusal to accept that hay?—No.

14065. *Chairman.*] Did he state any reason why he refused it?—I am not aware.

14066. Mr. *Layard.*] It might have been all wet hay, and none of the dry, that was offered to him?—The words are, "A small quantity of it was recovered wet, and issued, in the first instance, with a portion of dry hay, and subsequently without any of the latter; but Captain Morris's battery refused to receive it in that state."

14067. Does that apply to the first or the second issue?—It may have applied to both; probably he took the dry hay when the two were offered together, and refused the wet hay, but "other batteries accepted it." There is another point upon which I was desired to obtain information, namely, whether Commissary-general Filder made any representations to Lord Lucan relative to the feeding of the cavalry horses. I find that he did. This is from the same letter to Lord Raglan, from Commissary-general Filder, dated the 6th of December. "With regard to the deficiency of 1,732 lbs. of hay to the Heavy Cavalry, on the 3d instant, I would observe that the regiments send a portion of their horses into Balaklava for their forage, and I have already mentioned to Lord Lucan that they do not come provided with sufficient means for carrying out their proper ration when they might draw it, for there was no deficiency on the 3d instant."

14068. Are you aware of there being a rule of the service, that the cavalry horses should not go beyond a certain distance to fetch their own forage?—I am aware that there is such a rule, but I conceive that this was a case when all rules should have been set aside which interfered with the preservation of the men and horses.

14069. Mr. *Ellice.*] But you do not know whether the horses of the heavy cavalry were stationed beyond that limit?—I presume that they were; the limit is three miles; they were stationed further than that.

14070. Lord *Seymour.*] You have stated that this was a case in which all rules should be set aside; do you mean that it was expedient that animals which the Commissariat had purchased at an average price of 7 *l.* each should not be sacrificed rather than horses that cost at least 100 *l.* each, belonging to the cavalry?—Certainly the less valuable animals should have been sacrificed in preference; but during a certain period, owing to the breaking up of the road, and the severity of the weather, and the other causes which I have described in my former evidence, the Commissariat transport was insufficient for all the services of the army, and then that departure from the usual practice became the alternative.

14071. You mean that when the Commissariat service had quite broken down it was necessary to use the cavalry horses?—Yes.

14072. *Chairman.*] How great was the distance between Balaklava and Constantinople; it has been stated to be 30 hours' sail?—From that to 35, by a good steamer.

14073. There was a large supply of horses at Constantinople?—Yes.

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14074. Could not they have been sent for?—They were sent for.

14075. But I think you stated that they arrived on the 17th of January; now the hurricane occurred on the 14th of November?—Yes; there was an undue delay in their arrival.

14076. To whom was that attributable?—It is attributable to the officer at Constantinople who was charged with the superintendence of the sea transport arrangements in the Black Sea.

14077. Then the whole of this concentrates itself upon Admiral Boxer?—It appears to do so, subject to Admiral Boxer's explanation.

14078. Mr. *Layard.*] You attribute the blame to those who had the charge of the transport service?—I attribute not the blame, because that remains to be proved; but the responsibility of the great delay in the arrival of the reinforcements of transport horses that were sent for by the "Jason" to the officer who was in charge of the sea transport service.

14079. Was the case of the "Jason" the only one that occurred?—I believe there were other cases.

14080. This extends over a long period of time; two months, at least?—Yes; it was a most critical time.

14081. Was there no other attempt made during that time, excepting that made by the "Jason" to bring horses from Constantinople to Balaklava?—Several other steamers were sent to Constantinople for horses.

14082. Were they delayed also?—I am not prepared to give detailed information in reference to each case.

14083. *Chairman.*] However, the horses did not come during that period?—They did not come in sufficient numbers.

14084. Did they come at all?—Yes; a considerable number came; and a very opportune supply of 187 superior Spanish mules arrived from Alicante, being the remainder of the 500 which had been provided under orders from the Treasury, and 50 Maltese mules, or 237 in all; they arrived on the 22d of January.

14085. Did they arrive in consequence of having been sent for by Commissary-general Filder?—Yes.

14086. Did they not arrive in consequence of their having been sent for long before?—They had been sent for some time before by Commissary-general Filder, when he saw reason to think that he should require them.

14087. That was no result of prudence occurring after the 14th of November?—I am not prepared to answer that question; I am inclined to think that the order was sent afterwards.

14088. Mr. *Layard.*] It was Colonel Kinloch who was sent for those mules, was it not?—Yes.

14089. He states that he sent for the mules, and not Commissary-general Filder?—Commissary-general Filder made a requisition on me, and I arranged that Colonel Kinloch should be sent to Spain to procure them; and the first 300 arrived at Varna immediately before the sailing of the expedition, and the remaining 200, with some more mules from Malta, arrived at the time of their utmost need in January, and were a very serviceable supply.

14000. But Colonel Kinloch states that you sent for him. I presume in the month of June; he says three months after March; and it was then you gave the orders for the mules. At that time the army was not in the Crimea at all?—No, but I have been now referring to Commissary-general Filder hastening the arrival of this second batch of Spanish mules. It was in consequence of an application made by him to Lord Raglan that the "Trent" steamer was sent for this second batch. His first intention was not to bring them forward so speedily, but finding that he was in difficulties and likely to want them, he sent for the second batch also.

14091. They were not at Constantinople; and it was owing, as far as Colonel Kinloch's evidence goes, to some neglect that they did not leave Spain very early in the year. Therefore Commissary-general Filder ought to have reckoned upon the mules being there?—Besides the mules, he sent for a considerable number of transport animals to the depôt at Constantinople; he sent, in short, for all that were required.

14092. *Chairman.*] But they did not come?—There was an undue delay in the arrival of some of them.

14093. I asked you whether any came, and you said, "Yes, Spanish mules came;

came;" those appear to have been sent for before: did any others come?—I must refer to my papers for the dates of the several arrivals of the transport animals.

14094. Mr. *Layard.*] Colonel Kinloch says that the mules were ready at the beginning of September, but they did not leave till the middle of December?—Yes. Commissary-general Filder, having a surplus number of baggage animals, when he left Varna, did not press for their being sent forward; he had more than he wanted, and he had to send 3,000 and odd back from Varna to Constantinople; but when he found that he was likely to want them, he induced Lord Raglan to order a large steamer to bring them up.

14095. Then those mules were detained in Spain, because Commissary-general Filder did not want them, not because proper means were not found to bring them to the East?—The "Trent" was appropriated to bring up the 500 mules. She was employed in the Black Sea, and she was sent to bring up the first 300, which came before the troops left Varna; and Commissary-general Filder, finding that he did not want the remainder at that time, did not send the "Trent" back again for them, but the "Trent" was employed on other services. But, afterwards, when he found that they would be of great service to the army, he then moved Lord Raglan to order the "Trent" to go for the remaining mules.

14096. Then the Committee are to understand that they were left in Spain, not from any carelessness, but purposely?—That is my belief; they were left there, because Commissary-general Filder was not at that time pressed for baggage animals, and therefore he did not send for them.

14097. *Chairman.*] Will you explain why they sent to Spain for mules; you could not get them from Constantinople to Balaklava; how was it then hat they sent to Spain for them?—The Spanish mules are a very superior order of baggage animals.

14098. But that does not at all affect the question of transporting them?—It will be found throughout that Commissary-general Filder makes a distinction between Maltese and Spanish mules, and his other baggage animals; and he considered that they would be a more valuable resource to him than the small horses and mules of the country which he had in the depôt at Constantinople.

14099. He sent a vessel to bring baggage animals from Constantinople to Balaklava, and he failed therein; failing therein for so short a distance, why did he send to Spain for them?—The two operations were quite distinct; he did both; he sent to the neighbouring depôt of Constantinople for the small mules and horses of the country which he had in reserve there, and he also sent a large steamer, the "Trent," for the more valuable baggage animals which he had in reserve in Spain and at Malta. There is a letter in this correspondence, showing that the arrival of this second batch of Spanish mules was very highly prized, and that Mr. Filder made arrangements under Lord Raglan's direction, for placing them in charge, as regards their cleaning and feeding, of a cavalry officer, with a number of dismounted dragoons.

14100. Supposing all the baggage animals that were at Constantinople, had been conveyed to Balaklava, could there have been then any want of mules or baggage animals?—There would not have been any want in point of numbers, supposing the same causes that destroyed such a large number of the baggage animals before, did not destroy the further number that would have been sent in the case supposed.

14101. Mr. *Drummond.*] That cause was the not having provided sufficient food, was it not?—The breaking up of the road and exposure to the weather, and excessive work. I explained that the mere fact of the breaking up of the road reduced our transport at one stroke to a sixth of what it had been.

14101*. Had you no knowledge beforehand, that there was no road but one?—I presumed that the ordinary military rule of preserving under all circumstances a safe and easy communication with the base of operations which was only seven miles off at Balaklava, would have been followed.

14102. Did you ever see or hear of a road in your life over which artillery passed, that was not destroyed within a month?—I have not had sufficient experience to answer that question.

14103. Had not Commissary-general Filder had sufficient experience to know

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know whether it would be possible a month afterwards to carry up the provisions?—So long as the weather was fine, the road was not broken up, and was in a perfectly passable state; quite sufficiently so for our purposes: therefore I presume that the effect of the artillery passing over it did not break it up, but that it was the weather.

14104. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is it not the duty of the Commissary-general to repair the roads, or to see that they are repaired?—No; it is the duty of the Quartermaster-general, under "The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army," to look to all matters relating to roads and communications.

14105. Lord *Seymour.*] In your examination the other day, you stated that you were going to point out to the Committee some distinct differences between the French intendance system and the English Commissariat; will you state distinctly what are the differences?—With the approval of the Committee, I will state as briefly as I can the constitution and functions of the body of persons employed in the civil administration of the French army.

14106. Will you explain exactly what are the points of difference between the two systems?—There are two ruling points of difference: one is this, that the French soldier is trained in all things to help himself, and to help those who have to provide for him; and there is another essential point of difference, which is, that the French Commissariat is a component part of the army, like the artillery and engineers, so that wherever any portion of the French army moves a corresponding portion of the Commissariat moves with it.

14107. Are the Committee to understand you to mean this, that every officer in the French army is well acquainted and accustomed to deal with the Commissariat officer attached to his division?—Yes.

14108. You being at the Treasury, made an arrangement for the transfer of the Commissariat to the War Department?—Yes.

14109. The Commissariat used to have many payments to make in the colonies, connected with other than the military service?—Yes.

14110. In making that change, will you state how those payments were provided for, whether they are left to be made still by the Commissariat, and if so, to whom the Commissariat officer who makes them is responsible?—In arranging the transfer of the Commissariat to the War Department, a great difficulty occurred, because under the general name of the Commissariat, two entirely distinct functions are included; one, the Commissariat proper, for the supply of the troops, and the other, purely financial functions of great importance, for raising, holding, and disbursing the funds, required for all branches of the public service abroad, and also for checking the extraordinary expenditure not voted by Parliament, which is the peculiar function of the Treasury. There are also duties performed by the Commissariat in connexion with the Convict service, the Liberated African service, and other services. It was found impossible, judging from the opinion of the most experienced commissaries, and from the whole course of the public service, to separate these functions. It was absolutely necessary that the officer who was charged with the civil administration of the army abroad should have the immediate and free command of money implied in the charge of the Commissariat chest; and it would also have been expensive, and very difficult, to have set up two establishments instead of one, one for the supply of the army with provisions, and another for carrying on the financial business under the Treasury. Therefore, it was found necessary to transfer the Commissariat system complete, exactly as it stood, to be administered under the directions of the Minister for War on his own behalf, so far as regarded the supply of the troops, and on behalf of the Treasury, so far as regarded the financial duties of the Commissariat; and the only duties which the Treasury retained under its own immediate directions were the issues in this country from the Commissariat chest fund (the issues from the same fund abroad being made by the commissaries under the directions of the Minister for War), and the sanctioning of the extraordinary expenditure which is conducted in this country.

14111. Considering the large balance that remains in the hands of the Commissariat officers, do you think that arrangement satisfactory, and one to be permanently maintained, as you have now stated it?—No, I think not. I consider that those duties are entirely financial, and as a permanent arrangement

ment, can only be satisfactorily managed by the financial department. We have already had sufficient experience, since the change took place, to show us that it is urgently necessary that the matter should be speedily placed on a proper footing. It is a financial regulation of vital importance, and one which was arrived at by the result of much experience of the inconvenience of the contrary practice, that instead of the officers of the different departments which carry on the public expenditure abroad, drawing separately upon the heads of their respective departments in this country, as they formerly were in the habit of doing, they should, all of them, receive the funds required by them abroad from the Commissariat chests, and that the drafts upon the Treasury should be confined to the experienced and trusted officers of the Commissariat appointed for the purpose, subject to the carefully-devised checks laid down in the Commissariat Regulations, under the directions of the Treasury.

14112. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is not this the fact, that it will be necessary now to separate entirely the banking business, which must remain under the control of the Treasury, from the issuing of money by the orders of the several departments? Up to this time the Treasury have not only raised the money and placed it in the hands of the Commissary, as the banker of the Treasury abroad, but has issued its orders to the Commissary for the expenditure of that money in the Commissariat department?—Yes.

14113. Now, then, the Secretary of War will issue his orders for the expenditure of the money, the money having been provided for under such regulations as they please by the Treasury, in the several colonies, or stations, abroad?—For that purpose it would be necessary for the Treasury to have an entirely separate establishment of officers acting under its own directions.

14114. Why cannot the Commissary-general in Canada raise the money, under the directions of the Treasury, and place it in the bank of Canada, to be drawn upon by the officer having the authority to issue that money for the public expenditure; the line of demarcation is perfectly simple and clear?—There are great difficulties in the adoption of that course. In the first place, we should not have the choice of the officers.

14115. You state that you would not have the choice of the officers; surely the Secretary-at-War and the Treasury can unite in selecting a proper officer for those purposes, as well as the Treasury alone could select one in former times?—Except the duties of a Commissary-general with an army in the field, the most important function of the Commissariat is, raising, keeping, and disbursing the public money, and especially raising it.

14116. But admitting all that, the same person who has hitherto been employed as Commissary-general in a colony, can still perform the operations of raising money, under the direction of the Treasury, and he can issue money subject to another authority, whose orders he is instructed to obey?—Yes; but I still attach great importance to the selection of the officers, because it is not merely in one colony, but in all.

14117. But ascribing great importance to the selection of that officer, is that your only difficulty?—No; I have other difficulties.

14118. Will you state them?—Another is that he would not be effectually under our control; he would be an officer of another department.

14119. Why should not an officer act as a receiver for one department and as payer for another; the Bank of England does it here for the whole of the public?—This financial function of drawing upon the Treasury, and keeping and disbursing the funds, which is carried on by the officers of the Commissariat at distant stations, in all the four quarters of the globe, requires a concentration of all the powers of check at the disposal of the Treasury; and the main check of all is, that we have the selection, and the promotion, and the punishment of the officers in our power. If we lost that, we could not be responsible for the proper performance of this most important duty.

14120. Then it seems to me that the only objection which you have, arises from your not having, in the first place, the appointment, and in the next place, an efficient control over the officer to whom you would entrust the means of raising money, while the other department of the Government would employ him for the purpose of issuing that money?—That is one objection. Another objection is, that, as a permanent arrangement, no body of men can effectually serve two masters. If the same body of officers were directly responsible both

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both to the Treasury and to the War Department, it would lead to constant embarrassment and collision.

14121. But then you come back again to the same answer; I put this further question: supposing the Treasury had its own proper officers to raise money, the only question then would be the difference of expense; the Treasury would employ the officer to raise the money, and as the banker, to hold the money, subject to the orders of the executive authority which had power to issue the money, and the only difficulty, as I understand it, which you feel, is, that you have not the power of control over the officer?—I consider that that involves the whole question.

14122. Surely it only involves the question of appointing so many officers, if it should be necessary, to raise and keep the money on the part of the Treasury?—I repeat that this is the most responsible function of the Commissariat, and the one which is most full of temptation, and which requires all our powers of selection of trustworthy agents, and the constant revision of their proceedings, and the determination of their promotion, and the power of punishment, to secure it.

14123. But admitting all that, I would ask you this, whether, if you had the selection of the proper officer to raise the money under your directions, and to hold it as a banker, subject to the orders of the authority having the power to issue it, your objection would be removed, and would that satisfy you?—That particular objection would be removed, if we had the selection, and the power of reward and punishment; but other objections would remain, one of which would be, that there would be two sets of officers to do the business, instead of one; and the greatest objection would be unremoved, which is, that it would greatly weaken the hands of the Commissary-general, especially in active service in an enemy's country, and, probably, in the face of the enemy; for all the resources of money and credit that we can place at the disposal of the Commissary-general are necessary for the safety and success of the army.

14124. You are speaking now of the exceptional case of a war, but this whole establishment for raising money goes far beyond that; you require an officer in almost every station where we have troops, or payments to make, for the purpose of raising money and holding it there, subject to such appropriation as Parliament or the Government may decide, but all these emergencies and difficulties do not occur to the officers in those colonies?—But armies, I conceive, are for war; and the real source of our present difficulties is, that we have been too much accustomed to regard them merely with reference to places where and times when peace prevails.

14125. The affairs of this country are spread over the whole globe; why should we make our arrangements for the financial administration throughout the dominions of Great Britain merely upon the principle of meeting the emergency of war in one particular country?—Our military business in the colonies is rapidly contracting; it is becoming obviously more and more important that the army at large should be in a highly efficient state; therefore I conceive that the argument, that all our arrangements should have reference to a state of war, is stronger than it ever was.

14126. Then your great objection to this division of the duties of the Commissariat is with respect to its interfering with the efficiency of the army?—That is one great objection, and the greatest. Our greatest difficulty of all was, that we had no Commissariat establishment at home, and we had to provide a Commissariat establishment in the face of that circumstance, just as if an establishment of artillery, or engineers, or medical men, had to be provided without any artillery, or engineers, or medical men, in this country. It is right that I should state in our own justification, that, in the year 1850, I urgently submitted that point to the Committee on Army Expenditure, and in proof of my having done so I will beg to put in three paragraphs.

[*The same were handed in, and are as follows:*]

The reasons for keeping a branch of the department in a state of efficiency in the United Kingdom are not, however, confined to the exigencies of the home service. The great reserve of the British army for service in every part of the world is in this country; and it is as necessary that a proportion of trained experienced Commissariat officers should be in readiness to accompany any expedition which may at any time be sent to any quarter, or to reinforce the department in any of the colonies in which rebellion or invasion is apprehended,

apprehended, as that there should be experienced medical officers, or officers of artillery, engineers, or of the civil branch of the Ordnance in reserve. An army is quite as helpless without a properly organized Commissariat (that is, without a certainty of being regularly provided with food, forage, transport, and money,) as without ammunition.

Commissariat officers able to supply troops in movement in the face of an enemy, familiar with all the intricacies of the Military and Ordnance regulations, accustomed to act with military officers of various grades, and habituated to the consideration that the economy of the public money is to be enforced by every means consistent with the due execution of the public service, require many years for their formation; and it is an important fact, as bearing on this point, that whilst the army and navy have each a half-pay list, with numerous officers of all ranks ready and willing to serve, whose assistance could be immediately obtained in case of need, nearly the whole of the officers on the half-pay list of the Commissariat are worn out, incapable, and ineligible for further duty. In all the ranks subordinate to Commissary-general not three officers fit for active service could be found. The care which has been taken to reduce the half-pay list, and to confine the department to the numbers required, on the lowest calculation, to meet the exigencies of the service might therefore prove to be a serious injury to the public interests if a small reserve, similar to that furnished by the Irish branch of the Commissariat, be not allowed.

It is at the commencement of a foreign war or domestic insurrection that the greatest liability exists to profuse expenditure, and consequently the greatest necessity for being prepared with the measures of precaution which experience has proved to be the best. It is hardly too much to say that millions might have been saved if there had been a sufficient number of well-trained Commissariat officers, of proved integrity and ability, at the beginning of the Peninsular War, leaving only the subordinate situations to be filled by new appointments. It would also have been a great advantage if, at the breaking out of the Canadian insurrection and the Kafir war, there had been a small branch of the department at home from which four or five experienced Commissariat officers might have been detached; in fact, the experience of the last 40 years has demonstrated that upon the occasion of any great and unforeseen movement of a military force, the extraordinary expenditure for the military service is considerably increased, the proceedings of the Commissariat impeded, and much confusion and loss caused by the want of a sufficient number of experienced officers to meet the urgent and important services required. The advantage of having such a reserve was experienced in 1826, when an expedition was suddenly sent from this country to Lisbon. On that occasion assistance was obtained from the Commissariat establishment serving in Ireland, and from the half-pay list (which had not then been exhausted of efficient officers), and the consequence was, that during this service the business of the Commissariat was carried on in a very regular and satisfactory manner; a large expenditure was materially economised, and an improved system of account was successfully introduced, which became the foundation of the simple and concise system established in 1843 throughout the department.

I look for the solving of the difficulty arising out of the financial relations of the Commissariat to a comprehensive re-organization of the civil administration of the army, founded on the general model of the French Intendance.

14127. Mr. *Drummond.*] Did I rightly understand you to say just now, that the state of the Commissariat was such when this war was undertaken, as to be utterly inefficient and incompetent to do the duties required of it?—No, that was not my meaning; it was very efficient so far as it existed, but it existed only in the colonies, and even there there were not more officers than were wanted; we had pared down the establishment to the lowest point, and if it had not been for the happy accident of the cessation of the Kafir war shortly before, and the reduction of the military establishments in Canada and the West Indies, and our having a small reserve of five or six officers under the Board of Works in Ireland, we should have been entirely unable to fit out a proper Commissariat establishment.

14128. Mr. *Layard.*] Are the Committee to understand you to mean, that the Government looked to you for the arrangement of the whole of the Commissariat departments under this war?—As long as I was at the head of it, it was under the Treasury, and I was the Treasury officer charged with that duty.

14129. Did the Government look to you as the responsible person for the management of the Commissariat?—I had the immediate executive charge of the Commissariat duties, acting under the general directions of the Minister for War.

14130. Supposing the Government say that the greater part of these failures are to be attributed to the mal-administration of the Commissariat department, would they by that allegation throw blame upon you?—Yes, except so far as I was able to show that there was no blame.

14131. *Chairman.*] Would the accusation mean that?—If the Government

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defended itself by saying that all our disasters were owing to the inefficiency of the Commissariat, that would raise a strong presumption that I had neglected my duty.

14132. Mr. *Layard.*] Supposing the Government, or the Secretary of War, or the Minister-at-War, states that our failures have been owing to the maladministration of the Commissariat, does that or not entail blame upon you? —Yes, it would throw a great responsibility upon me; but whether the responsibility would resolve itself into blame would depend upon circumstances.

14133. *Chairman.*] That is another question, but then the question is, was it your duty?—It was my duty, acting under the general directions of the Minister for War.

14134. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you not consider it rather an anomalous position, you being in the Treasury, to be under the direction of the Minister-at-War? —The position, no doubt, was an anomalous one; I was serving two masters, and acting in two capacities; in financial matters under the Treasury, and in general army matters under the Minister for War.

14135. You stated, did you not, that there have been, so far as you are concerned, two distinct phases in these transactions; one at the commencement, in which active operations were not immediately anticipated, and the second, when war was declared, and actually commenced? — There never was a period when it can be said that active operations were not anticipated; at first the expedition was regarded rather as one of observation, or perhaps of demonstration; the ultimate plan of operations was in a state of great doubt.

14136. I will divide them, and ask you when, in your opinion, the time of operation commenced?—The time of really effective military preparation, I mean preparation that had decidedly military operations in view, I should say, commenced from the time of the troops leaving Malta.

14137. That was about what date?—It was in the early part of April.

14138. Then it was quite evident at that time that active war operations were to be carried on in some part of the East?—It was quite evident, as the force was ordered to Constantinople, that it could be for no purpose excepting to present a face of military opposition to Russia, in the East.

14139. Such being the case, can you mention the name of any person well known in the East, and acquainted with the resources of the East, who was consulted as to what was necessary for the army in the East, as to the resources of the country, and as to various subjects upon which it would be necessary to have information, in sending an army to that country?—I can mention two persons, by reading a letter from Lord Raglan to myself, which I have already submitted to the Committee in connexion with Commissary-general Filder's appointment; the first was yourself, I believe; the name is not mentioned, but my impression is, from recollection, that it was yourself; the other was Captain Dixon: "I have placed him in communication with Major Dixon, of the artillery, who is well acquainted with the country, having been five years in Constantinople, where he was employed in the Turkish arsenal, and established a laboratory; and Mr. Filder was to see, yesterday, a gentleman Colonel Matson proposed to introduce to him, and who is supposed to know a good deal about the resources of Turkey." I may mention that both Commissary-general Filder and myself collected information from all quarters, from books, and persons, and everybody from whom we could obtain it, for our guidance.

14140. Did Commissary-general Filder ever mention to you his having had interviews with myself, for instance?—Yes, he did.

14141. Did he mention what suggestions had been made to him by me?—I cannot charge my memory.

14142. I will call your attention to particular points and probably you will remember them; did I suggest to him, that I considered it of great importance to have a depôt at Sinope, or at some port in the Black Sea?—My impression is, that you did.

14143. Did I mention to him, that he would find in the East no transport service, and that it was of the utmost importance to organise a transport service?— I cannot charge my memory with that; I recollect the result of all the information which we acquired about transport animals, which was, that there was a great abundance of transport animals of various kinds, good and bad.

14144. Did I suggest to him the organisation of bands of Armenians and persons who could be depended upon, to accompany our army?—I do not remember that.

14145. Do you know that he proposed to organise a band of Greeks, and that I told him the Greeks would probably either run away and betray the army, or were not to be depended upon?—I do not consider it safe to speak from very indistinct impressions.

14146. Then is it the fact that the only two persons who were consulted, were myself and Colonel Dixon?—No; but it is impossible now, considering the great pressure under which we are acting, to say how many persons we consulted on all the points required relating to the supplies of money and various other purposes; but we took every means of obtaining ourselves and of giving our officers correct information on all the points to which they would have to apply themselves, including languages, and I supplied them with all the books which I thought would be useful.

14147. Did you send to the embassy at Constantinople for any reports upon the state of the country?—No: but we did what we considered better, which was to send an accomplished Commissariat officer to Constantinople, who had proved himself well qualified for the duty by his good service in various parts of the world, under circumstances of great difficulty, and who happened to be serving in the East at Corfu, and therefore had already acquired some experience of Eastern manners, to make those inquiries. Besides the official communication through the Foreign Office, I wrote to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe myself, and requested him to place Mr. Smith in communication with those who would furnish him with the information he had been instructed to obtain.

14148. You have stated that in Corfu, he had obtained some knowledge of Eastern manners; will you explain how that could be?—The population of Corfu is Greek; and live cattle and other supplies for the army at Corfu are drawn from the Continent.

14149. Is not Corfu under the government of a British officer?—It is a protected state, under a Lord High Commissioner.

14150. What was the name of the gentleman to whom you have referred?—Mr. Smith.

14151. Had he ever been in Turkey before?—No.

14152. That is the gentleman who wrote a pamphlet on Turkey, is it not?—No; that was Mr. Strickland.

14153. When was he sent out?—He was stationed at Malta; and he was sent by Commissary-general Wild, who was in charge at Malta, to Constantinople, in the autumn or winter of 1853, to purchase grain; there was an apprehended deficiency of grain at Malta, and he was sent to Constantinople to buy some cargoes of grain; he was a very intelligent officer, full of observation; and in the course of a short stay at Constantinople, with the assistance of his previous reading, he collected a great deal of information.

14154. He wrote a pamphlet, did he not, founded upon his experience, having been at Constantinople only for a short time, upon the resources of Turkey?—He wrote a paper, which he sent to me, on the resources of Turkey, with regard to Commissariat matters; but this was prepared before the expedition was determined upon, and was voluntary on his part. But I thought it showed great intelligence and observation, and I ventured to send it to you, with a request that you would give me your opinion on certain parts of it, as to their correctness; or at any rate, as to the expediency of printing them (as to which I had my doubts); I was favoured with your advice, and I acted upon it.

14155. You do not happen to have my note by you?—No, I have not; but I have my letter to you.

14156. Did I not make several objections to that report, and state that the gentleman who had written it could not have been acquainted with the resources of Turkey, generally, having been only at Constantinople for a short time?—As I have lost the note I cannot state positively; the only objection of which I have a recollection is, that you objected to certain parts of the paper in which the Turkish Government and character were reflected upon; and those parts were struck out; and after making those omissions, and getting the official names corrected by Professor Johnson, of Haileybury, I had the paper

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paper privately printed for the information of our Commissariat officers, in addition to all the others.

14157. Do you consider that a residence at Constantinople, for a short time, would justify a gentleman in writing a pamphlet, or paper, upon the resources of Turkey; such pamphlet to be distributed to the Commissariat, as affording them correct information?—If he had published it on his own responsibility, as a work of authority, I should say he would have acted unwisely, but that he did not do; he sent me the paper for my information, and he had no idea that it would have been printed; it was only under the very extraordinary circumstance of an expedition being sent to a country which was entirely new to the British army, and to the Commissariat, that I had extracts printed for the information of the officers, so far as it went, in addition to a great deal of other information.

14158. Supposing a Turk came to London, and remained a fortnight, and then wrote a paper upon the resources of England, do you think that would have been a satisfactory document to act upon?—The correct parallel would be a Turkish commissary, equal to Mr. Strickland in experience and ability, who, all his way, at least from Malta to London, and probably long before, had been reading about England, and acquiring all the information in his power; and who, after coming to London, conversed with those who were best able to give him information.

14159. He could not speak Turkish, I suppose?—None of our officers could; it could not be expected; we never supposed that they would be employed there; we have always impressed upon our officers the importance of learning those languages which it was supposed they would require, such as French, Italian, and Spanish.

14160. Can you mention the name of one person who was attached to the Commissariat corps who had been in the East, who was acquainted with the languages, and who had any knowledge of the resources of the country, not derived from having been sent there expressly, and remaining a fortnight at Constantinople, but from long residence in the country?—We had one officer who was in charge of the Commissariat during the Syrian expedition, Commissary-general Ramsay, and he acquitted himself extremely well; he was sent with the expedition as Deputy Commissary-general, and he was found to do his duty to everybody's satisfaction during the Syrian expedition; then he was quite new to it, and now we sent him out again with some experience.

14161. The Syrian expedition was chiefly a maritime expedition; there was a small land expedition, but that was under the conduct of the Turks; there was only a small corps of soldiers, and it lasted only for a very short time, two or three months?—It lasted for a short period; but Mr. Ramsay's employment was entirely on shore and connected with the force on shore: Sir Charles Napier's brigade.

14162. He was in command of the fleet?—Yes; but there certainly was a force on shore; and there were regular Commissariat operations for a considerable time; and there was a considerable force to be provided for under the command of an engineer officer, Colonel Smith.

14163. What operations were undertaken in the interior?—I do not mean that they were of any great importance, but I was asked whether we had any one officer who had served in Turkey, and who had direct Turkish experience.

14164. First of all, you do not assert that this army was ordered to operate in Syria?—No.

14165. Had you a single person, I do not mean an old Commissariat officer, nor do I wish to ask you whether he was a Commissary-general, but one person attached to your Commissariat staff who, from his knowledge of the East, and its languages, could have given useful information, and have rendered important service to the army?—We had no man who completely answered that description.

14166. But any one who to any extent answered it?—Yes, many.

14167. Give me the name of one?—The officers employed on the Mediterranean stations, where they are in constant communication with Morocco and the Turkish dependencies on the northern coast of Africa, for they get all their fresh meat from thence.

14168. Was there one man who was acquainted with Turkey, not Gibraltar or

or Malta, but with Turkey, its resources and its languages?—There was no man who quite answered that description; but I should be saying wrong if I said that many of our officers did not, in some degree, answer that description.

14169. Will you mention one name?—I must explain that our officers are employed in all parts of the world; they are experienced men of business, accustomed to deal with all sorts of people; and when they have to deal with anewc ountry, after a few weeks, they acquire such a fund of information, oral, written, and printed, that they are quite competent to deal with that country. After Mr. Smith had been a fortnight at Constantinople, he was quite equal to the duties required of him.

14169.* You state that there were persons who, to a certain extent, answered the description which I have given; can you mention the name of one?—Mr. Smith himself, and Mr. Wild, who was in charge of the Commissariat at Malta; and Mr. Ramsay, who was in charge of the Commissariat with the Syrian expedition.

14170. Were those gentlemen ever in Turkey in Europe, or in Asia Minor?—No.

14171. Did I not recommend to Commissary-general Filder, and, I think, to Lord Raglan, several persons, such as the Messrs. Calvert and other gentlemen, who were most competent men, from being acquainted with the resources and languages of that country, to be employed in connexion with the Commissariat?—I have no doubt you did, and we followed that course.

14172. Will you mention the name of one man?—As soon as Mr. Smith arrived at Constantinople, he came at once into communication with those very persons; he went to Gallipoli, and he saw Mr. Calvert.

14173. I ask you whether the Commissariat employed and retained the services of men who were acquainted with the resources and languages of the country?—A great number. I can mention 100. One paper which I was to put in was a list of our establishment as it was finally formed; those are two very important papers on the Commissariat establishment; one showing it as it existed at the commencement of this expedition, and the other showing the Commissariat establishment appointed—I may say scraped together from various quarters, selecting the officers, as we best might—up to the end of December. The comparison of these two documents will be very instructive.

14174. I have been, as you know, connected for some years with Turkey and with the embassy there, and I know most of the people who have been resident there; if you will mention the name of any gentleman who was officially appointed to act in connexion with the Commissariat, I should probably be acquainted with it?—I can mention names by the hundred.

14175. Will you mention the name of any one well-known gentleman?—I will take the sons of several consuls, and they are an exceedingly intelligent class of persons. One was the son of Sir Edward Baynes, the consul at Tunis.

14176. That is not Turkey?—But it is a Mahomedan country, a dependency of Turkey; and there is Mr. Staniforth, the son of another consul; he was bred and educated at Smyrna.

14177. Where was his father consul?—My impression was that he was the son of a consul; at any rate, he was educated at the school at Smyrna, and is an accomplished linguist. There was Mr. Barker, who was also educated at Smyrna, and a Mr. Telfer, who was educated at Malta. Then I come to names without end, Armenian, Greek, and so forth; and I must be permitted to state, in reply to that question, that we did not require persons of that description for the performance of the higher class of duties of the Commissariat. Our system is this: we have a highly trained, and I must in justice to them say, a highly faithful and accomplished body of officers, who are accustomed to transact business in all parts of the world, with all sorts of people: with Jews, Turks, Greeks, and Armenians.

14178. Had you any man who was specially acquainted with the resources of the country to which he was sent?—I have said that there was no one person who fully answered the description that you gave; but our officers are accustomed to transact business of all kinds, with all sorts of people; they go from country to country doing this, from Canada to Africa, and from Africa to China; and now they have gone to Turkey, with their generally acquired habits of business; and all that was required to enable them to act with effect in Turkey, was

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was that they should receive local information from persons who were the best qualified to give it; and that they should have the assistance of linguists, clerks, and interpreters accustomed to the language and habits of business of the country.

14179. *Chairman.*] Are we to take the effect of the Crimean expedition as a proof of their ability?—The causes that have operated in reference to the Crimea are different; and they have been described.

14180. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you not make it a rule not to employ anybody in any position, except almost in the very lowest, except he were a gentleman connected with the Treasury, or the old Commissariat body?—No.

14181. Did you make any exception?—We make it a rule in all parts of the world to employ only our own officers in the important functions of raising money and making contracts and purchases; those are the purposes for which this highly-trained body of officers is employed, and we give them all the local assistance that they require for that purpose. We consider that it would not be for the advantage of the public service, on going into a new country, immediately to adopt into the department for the discharge of the higher functions of the Commissariat, the merchants and men of business of the country; we believe that, partly from their not being trained to our habits of business in connexion with the military, and partly from our not having the same hold upon them that we have upon our own officers, it would not be for the advantage of the public service. Our officers are not only good men of business, but they depend upon us for all their prospects in life; whereas, if we had made our purchases and contracts through the Constantinople merchants, and had entrusted them with the conduct of our financial operations for raising money, we should not have had the same hold upon them.

14182. You stated a little time ago that there were cases in which no rules ought to apply, and this appears to have been one; for you were going to engage in active operations in a country unknown, and instead of sending out gentlemen who had never been there before to acquaint themselves in a fortnight with the country, would it not have been better to have employed gentlemen who, from their connexion with the British Embassies, were acquainted with the resources and languages of the country?—No, I think not; I think that the approved fidelity and trained habits of business of our officers, with the assistance of the local information which they would acquire from the consuls and diplomatic officers of the country and merchants, with the assistance of clerks and interpreters, and other persons of that sort in the country, was quite sufficient to meet the purpose; and the proof of it is, that it did meet the purpose.

14183. *Chairman.*] Have we that proof?—I conceive that there has been no break down on the part of the Commissariat. An army is not a simple machine; it is a complex machine; wheel within wheel; and if one wheel gets out of gear, the machine, more or less, stops; and that was the case here.

14184. Do you suppose the Commissariat has not broken down, when the men have been proved to have been living for many days on raw food?—I say that the Commissariat has not broken down.

14185. Will you answer the question: is the Commissariat supposed to have broken down when it is proved that the men have been living for many days on raw food and insufficient food?—No.

14186. That is not a sufficient proof?—No; the break down was not in the Commissariat, because we had all the food and all the transport that was necessary; the break down was in other branches of the military administration whose efficiency is necessary for the proper working of the Commissariat.

14187. Mr. *Layard.*] You put their acquaintance with their duties at home, and their punctual performance of them in the Treasury, as above every other qualification, do you?—I say, that with the other means and appliances to which I have referred, their Commissariat training is a sufficient qualification to enable them to serve this country with good effect in all parts of the world.

14188. You had to provide for a large body of cavalry, and you sent out gentlemen perfectly well acquainted with keeping accounts and writing, but who probably knew nothing about a horse, though able to keep accounts; were they qualified to provide for horses?—Our Commissariat do know a great deal about horses.

14189. Lord Lucan states positively, in his evidence, that there was not one man

man attached to his division of cavalry who knew anything about a horse?—I cannot dispute his authority about horses; but I may say this, that if the recommendation made by me in 1851, to retain the Commissariat establishment in Ireland, and to extend it to England, had been attended to, we should then have had a satisfactory Commissariat establishment; but, as it was, we were obliged to put up with the best assistance we could get from other quarters to supplement the small and insufficient body of trained officers.

14190. You were going to send out a Commissariat, to provide for the wants of a very large army, a part of which consisted of cavalry and artillery; could not you have gone out of the general rule, and have taken somebody acquainted with the management of horses; Lord Lucan says, that he had not a single man who knew anything about a horse; and that he complained to Commissary-general Filder, "and entreated his attention to the wants of the cavalry, but to no purpose whatever;" how do you explain that?—In the first place, it is not the business of the Commissariat to be acquainted with horses, except so far as they are in charge of the transport establishment, and a very rough knowledge is sufficient for that; as to feeding horses, all that it is necessary they should understand is, not horses, but forage, and that they do thoroughly; and more than that, I would say, that the only person who is capable of giving a satisfactory answer to Lord Lucan, with his local information, is Commissary-general Filder, with his local information.

14191. But Lord Lucan states, "I am quite satisfied that the horses suffered more from the want of forage than from any other circumstance"?—No doubt; and I have in my evidence explained some of the reasons why the forage was deficient; it was not that the forage was not there, but because it had been lost in a large quantity outside the harbour, and because of the extreme difficulties that existed in bringing it from the ships in the harbour to the horses.

14192. Lord Lucan states that he nourished his horses before he got to the Crimea on barley and chopped straw, and that he found that they thrived as well upon that food as upon any other, and he considers barley and chopped straw as good for horses as anything else; supposing that your commissaries had been acquainted with that mode of feeding the horses, and the resources of the country, could they not have obtained to any amount chopped straw and barley?—Yes; and our officers were quite aware of the nourishing qualities of chopped straw and barley. Mr. Smith reported to us as early as the 19th March, that "barley and chopped straw are the invariable food of Turkish horses, and they seem to thrive admirably upon this kind of forage," and we did provide them in the largest quantities in which they could be made available; barley we always had, and although we lost 1,200,000 lbs. of barley when we lost the 800,000 lbs. of hay on the day of the hurricane, yet we never had any deficiency of barley at Balaklava, nor of chopped straw. But there was this great peculiarity in the chopped straw, that it could not be pressed, though we sent out four steam hydraulic presses and hay cutters; the experiment was tried of pressing the chopped straw, yet it did not turn out satisfactorily, and there was that great difficulty. I will instance that by the Austrian ship which drifted under the batteries of Sebastopol; that ship was of about 600 tons burthen, but she only had 50 tons of chopped straw in her.

14193. There is a question and answer here which, I think, will bring this matter to the point. Sir De Lacy Evans, who complains a good deal of the Commissariat officers, was asked, at Question 680: "You say that you had reason to complain of the commissary officers who were first sent to you; was that on account of their incompetency, or their unwillingness, to do what you wished them to do"? And his answer is, "I think it was from their incompetency; they were very good accountants, and at the Treasury here I suppose they thought if a man kept his accounts very well he was a competent commissary, but the greater number of them knew nothing whatsoever about field duty." Now, does that answer really meet the state of things?—No, I deny it; our officers have had a great deal of experience of field duty. I received a note from Captain Fishbourne just before I came here, and perhaps, as he is an independent authority, it is better that I should give my answer in his words than in mine: "It has occurred to me that you might wish some evidence as to the working of the Commissariat system; if so, Sir Josiah Cloete is in England, and I know he could give very good information of its success in

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Kaffraria. I have heard him say, as also Sir Harry Smith, that no army was better supplied; all their supplies were carried by sea from Cape Town, nearly 600 miles, with 40 miles land-carriage, and all had to be landed through a heavy surf, and their surf-boats had to be warped in on hawsers 5½ and 6 inches in circumference, which not unfrequently were broken by the violence of the surf."

14194. *Chairman.*] But there was a failure at Balaklava?—Captain Fishbourne points out one difference: "It occurs to me one great defect at Balaklava must have been that they did not have a beachmaster, with a sufficient body of men to dispose of stores as they were landed.—I am, my dear Sir Charles, very faithfully, *E. Gardiner Fishbourne.*" The substance of what I have to say is this: that a very large proportion of our officers have had actual experience of field service in the three Kafir wars, the two Canada rebellions, the operations in New Zealand, and other military operations.

14195. Mr. *Layard.*] You stated before, in answer to a question of Lord Seymour's, that none of our officers had had any experience of the Commissariat in war?—No; what I said was, that the officers and men of our army had not had experience in acting with the Commissariat. Two parties are necessary to the proper acting of this machine: one is the Commissariat officer and the other is the military officers and the men who have to act with them. The main cause of all the friction and complaint that has occurred is, that the great majority of the military officers were quite unused to act with our Commissariat officers.

14196. When this army went out, of course it would have had to act either in Bulgaria, in the Crimea, or in Asia Minor?—Yes.

14197. Supposing that it had acted in Bulgaria, the country had been very much devastated by the Turkish and Russian armies; would it not have been very important to obtain some depôt where you could collect stores of all kinds on the Black Sea?—We had a large depôt at Constantinople, and another at Varna.

14198. I will call your attention to the evidence of two witnesses who have been examined as to that fact. First, Sir De Lacy Evans; he says, in answer to the question that is put to him, "I did not ever hear that any very great magazines of provisions were made, but as the country was full of provisions at that time, no doubt there was no great difficulty about it; still it did appear unsatisfactory that there were not adequate magazines formed at once, and in readiness to be embarked for any point to which the troops might be directed;" that is with regard to Varna. I will now call your attention to the evidence of the Duke of Cambridge: "Were there any stores anywhere at Balaklava?—Not that I am aware of." "Did you see any at Constantinople when you were there?—No." The whole evidence proves that there were no magazines whatever at Constantinople?—It is very painful to me to make a statement contrary to such high and such general authority; but I positively deny that there was any want of depôts or stores; we had ample stores, not only at Constantinople and at Varna, but at Malta, and on board the transports, and elsewhere; and I have already given the Committee several proofs of it. When the fire occurred at Varna we had a stock-taking with Commissary-general Filder; we compared notes; it was found that he only wanted some trifling supply.

* *See* the Answers to 13677 and the following Questions.

14199. *Chairman.*] Yet the army at Bulgaria was never able to advance?—That is another question.* When the embarkation took place we had another stock-taking, and then we wanted only a little rum, which had been already ordered. When the crisis of all occurred, when we passed suddenly from a summer to a winter campaign, then we had another stock-taking, and we found that we were quite ahead of the Commissary-general; in the face of those facts, how can it be asserted that we were in want of supplies?

14200. Mr. *Layard.*] That applies to the supplies sent from England, salt provisions, rum, and such things; I was asking you with regard to things produced in the country?—I speak of the whole, including live cattle and barley.

14201. Where on the Black Sea was there a depôt of live cattle, and vegetables, and barley, and other things necessary for the troops?—There was a reserve depôt of 2,000 cattle at Smyrna which were never wanted, and were brought on afterwards; they were a great burden to us, as we had more than

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we wanted much nearer; there was a large depôt of live cattle at Constantinople, from which cattle were continually sent on to Balaklava.

14202. When was that?—From the time that the troops went there. At first, a considerable number were sent from Varna to Balaklava.

14203. *Chairman.*] Then they ought never to have been without fresh meat?—That was owing to the want of proper arrangements in the sea transport service to bring them up sufficiently speedily; but I repeat that we had a large and constant depôt of live cattle at Constantinople.

14204. Then when you had that large and constant depôt of live cattle at Constantinople, did the army want fresh meat?—It did for a time, on account of the insufficiency of the sea transport arrangements. When Commissary-general Filder went from Constantinople to Varna, it was a question with him, whether he should send his cattle vessels filled with cattle from Constantinople; but the information that he obtained led him to suppose that Bulgaria was even a better source of supply for live cattle than the neighbourhood of Constantinople. He consequently formed a separate local contract for Bulgaria, and cattle were drawn by it from remote nooks and corners of the country, to which neither our Commissariat officers nor even the contractors could penetrate; we had an abundant supply of live cattle in Bulgaria.

14205. Mr. *Layard.*] Up to the middle or end of December, had our troops any fresh meat except that which was supplied from Eupatoria?—The vessels were constantly sent to Constantinople and Varna for cattle.

14206. Did they ever arrive?—There were great delays, and there was a great want of arrangement in respect to the cattle vessels.

14207. And you saw at that time in the public prints, that our army was subsisting almost entirely upon salt provisions; that was a fact known at head-quarters, was it not?—Yes, I admit that.

14208. You state that there were plenty of depôts of cattle, and that the only reason that cattle was not supplied, was that there was not sufficient transport; did you ever, upon knowing that state of things, represent that there was no transport to Captain Milne or to any other person?—I said that there was an abundance of transport, and I read an extract from a letter from Commissary-general Filder, saying that with such an abundance of transport it was to be lamented that the army was not properly supplied with fresh meat.*

* *See* the Answer to 13876.

14209. To whom do you attribute the blame?—To those who had the management of the sea transport; that was an essential part of our arrangements.

14210. Did you ever make representations of that fact to Captain Milne, or to any other person in this country?—No; the knowledge came to me after I gave over the charge of the department.

14211. When was that?—On the 22d of December. I received a letter from Commissary-general Filder shortly before, in which he said he had sent his vessels to Constantinople for cattle, and expected an ample supply immediately; I may also observe that, as the result of the mission of the "Jason" to Constantinople was not known in this country for a considerable time after the 22d of December, I had no power of acting in that matter.

14212. Mr. *Layard.*] You still think that the blame is to be attached to those who had the charge of the transport service out there?—I think so.

14213. *Chairman.*] Was that the cause of the breakdown of the whole expedition; for the whole expedition did break down?—If I had to refer it to one principal cause more than another, I should say it was owing to the want of that bit of seven miles of made road.

14214. And not to the want of marine transport?—Up to the breaking up of the road, we had ample transport.

14215. Mr. *Layard.*] You stated that the live cattle could transport themselves, and did not want transport?—Yes.

14216. Therefore if the troops had been in want of salt provisions, you might have objected that the want of transport was the cause of that, but not if they wanted fresh provisions?—Yes; but I was asked for the cause of the general breakdown, and the most general cause undoubtedly was the breaking up of the road; the circumstance of the troops being supplied in undue proportion with salt provisions is a separate question, and no doubt the cause of that was the want of a proper arrangement of the sea transport.

14217. You cannot attribute their want of fresh meat to the want of land transport?—No; certainly not.

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14218. Supposing you had established a depôt at Sinope, and availed yourselves of the transport of the country, the Turkish shipping and the Greek shipping, and said: "We are going to have an establishment at Balaklava; will you undertake the supply of them?" do not you think they would have brought over quantities of cattle, vegetables, and other things?—I think that in the circumstances in which we were placed it was unnecessary. Commissary-general Filder had an abundant supply of cattle at Constantinople, and there was an abundant amount of the best description of sea transport in those four large screw steamers that were appropriated to this particular object, besides other steamers for which he applied when he wanted them; and under those circumstances no further provision was necessary; and it was far better, as a general rule, to get his cattle from Constantinople than from Sinope or Samsoun, or other ports, though they were nearer, because Constantinople was his great depôt, and he had to send there for all kinds of articles. On the 20th December, Mr. Filder wrote to Mr. Smith as follows:—"I have more cattle in the Bosphorus and at Smyrna than I know what to do with; and as to proximity, the want of every convenience for shipping cattle, and of a secure port at Samsoun, renders it further off, in point of time, than Constantinople, notwithstanding all impediments at the latter." There were also no conveniences for coaling at Sinope and Samsoun.

14219. You stated with regard to the vegetables, that after having swept the whole bazaar on one occasion, he got enough to send by the "Harbinger;" could he not have obtained a regular supply from Sinope, or elsewhere, day by day?—He could not use the vegetables which he got from Constantinople; he could not send them up to the camp. I have a very interesting letter from Commissary-general Filder, dated the 28th of November, which alludes to the live cattle: "Up to the time of the hurricane of the 14th, for such the storm was, no army was ever more abundantly supplied, and with provisions of better quality, than this had been."

14220. Does that include fresh meat?—Yes, everything, up to the hurricane. "The troops not only received articles which never before formed part of the ration of the British army, but they had extra quantities issued to them of those that had constituted part. But since the hurricane, and our consequent losses, nothing but evil has come upon us. A succession of storms and gales, and a continuance of cold and wet weather, have destroyed many of our transport animals, which are without shelter, the same as the cavalry, and the roads are all but impassable, which has ruined our waggons and carts. As yet, however, the troops have wanted for nothing, excepting forage, it having been possible only partially to substitute chopped straw for hay. I have sent to Constantinople to bring up more of our transport animals; but I am full of anxiety as to our power of continuing to supply the troops in the position they now occupy, with all the casualties arising from the storms of winter superadded. You ask, in your letter of the 13th, which I have received just as the mail is closing, whether I cannot increase the issues of fresh meat. Up to the period of the hurricane we managed to issue fresh meat on alternate days, but our cattle vessels were damaged on that occasion, although lying in the harbour, which has interrupted our supply of live cattle."

14220*. *Chairman.*] So that the interruption did not take place in consequence of the non-arrival of the "Jason"?—The "Jason" was sent for transport animals; I am now speaking of butchers' cattle. "Common winter weather will indeed, I perceive, interfere with the regular arrivals and departures of the vessels. Sailing vessels have been tried, but they were nearly a month, owing to a succession of gales, in coming from Varna, and half the cattle died. I was obliged to put a stop to such a means of conveyance; and although I have obtained from the navy the assistance of other steamers, it has been necessary to despatch them in search of hay. In short, it will be necessary to send out from England the full quantity of salt meat for which I have estimated, in order to guard against casualties of the nature I have here mentioned. I will write to you about vegetables by the next mail. We brought a large quantity from Constantinople, but owing to a continuance of bad weather most of them were spoilt, and the troops could scarcely be induced to come for those that were sound."

14221. Mr. *Layard.*] There is a statement there of Commissary-general Filder's, which is distinctly and positively denied by a number of witnesses, namely,

namely, that the troops had fresh meat every alternate day till the hurricane. This is the evidence of Sergeant Dawson, who was wounded at Inkermann. He was asked, "How many days a week had you fresh meat?" and his answer was, "I cannot answer; some days a week we did not have fresh meat at all." That is up to the 5th of November, before the storm. This is the evidence of Colonel Wilson of the Guards, who also came over after the battle of Inkermann. He was asked, "How many days, on the average, in the week, had you salt and fresh meat?" And his answer was, "On an average, I should say, five days salt and one day fresh." He also says, "I went down to Balaklava on the 15th of November;" that is, the day after the storm. Do you take that statement of Commissary-general Filder's to be true as against the evidence given before this Committee by three witnesses?—I only submit to the Committee the information which I possess. Commissary-general Filder made this statement, and I have read it before the Committee. I know him to be a most truthful person, and a man who thoroughly understands his business. I have acted with him for more than 15 years, and knew his character before that, and I never had occasion to doubt his word in the least. This is mentioned off-hand in a demi-official letter to me, so that it may be taken with some qualification, as being a general statement; he says, generally, that the army had fresh meat on alternate days up to that date; it is possible that some portion may not have had it; he did not enter into details. I may mention that Commissary-general Filder and the officers serving under him feel very keenly that a great deal of evidence has been given against them without any power on their part of furnishing explanations. I should therefore hope that the Committee would at least allow me to put in a connected series of the more important official papers bearing upon the subject.—(*The same were handed in.*)

Vide Appendix, p. 381.

14221*. The Duke of Cambridge is asked, "How often had your men fresh meat in the week when they were encamped before Sebastopol? We had a tolerable supply of fresh meat about three times a week, I think up to about the middle of October, and then afterwards we had very rarely fresh meat, almost always salt meat." How do you explain that?—I leave it to be explained by those who can speak on behalf of the Commissariat from actual knowledge of the facts.

14222. You stated that when the 10,000 men left England you considered that 40 Commissariat officers would be sufficient as a staff?—That is, Commissary-general Filder considered that 40 superior trained officers of the Commissariat would be sufficient, with the requisite number of subordinates.

14223. You stated, "On consideration of the nature of the service, Mr. Filder came to the conclusion that a staff of 40 officers would be sufficient; and we immediately applied ourselves to getting together a number of officers, with a certain number of subordinates." That was in March?—Yes.

14224. It appears that on the 31st of March you "had got together 44 persons in all, of whom three were storekeepers, one assistant storekeeper, one printer, one office-keeper and messenger, and the others were officers and clerks." That was whilst the army consisted of 10,000 men?—Yes.

14225. I find that, at Constantinople, on the 5th of June, when the army was increased, and when they were going to take active operations in the field, there were altogether 49 persons in the rank of temporary clerks and upwards?—Yes.

14226. On the 31st of March you "had got together 44 persons in all;" there was only a difference of five, though the army had been increased to 10 brigades?—Yes; but the first statement includes three storekeepers, one assistant storekeeper, one printer, and one office-keeper and messenger; while the second statement is confined entirely to the rank of clerk, and upwards; the one clerk and storekeeper was the one we borrowed from the Stationery Office; he appears in both statements; he appears at the foot of page 3 of the Constantinople Statement, and at the foot of page 1 in the other; but the three storekeepers are quite subordinate persons, and are not included in the second statement.

14227. Was the Commissariat staff, consisting of 40 men, and which had been declared to be equal to the performance of its duties, when the army consisted of 10,000 men, only increased to 49 when the army was more than doubled?—Our Commissariat staff with the army was constantly in course of increase; we were continually reinforcing it by officers who had been ordered home from the colonies. One of the first things done was to take a list of the officers

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officers serving in the colonies, and to select the best fitted for the service, and to order them home, and they were coming home from day to day. We were also borrowing from the Irish constabulary officers of that force, well-trained officers, with somewhat analogous duties, and we appointed them as acting officers; and we borrowed a few gentlemen from the public offices in London, who appeared to be well suited for the service, and some of them have done exceedingly well; we were continually sending out drafts, and no doubt very soon after the date of this second return Commissary-general Filder was in possession of a greatly increased number; and accordingly at Varna, in the 3d return, at page 8, it will be found that he had of officers and clerks 69, and of storekeepers 48.

14228. What was the effective force of the army at that time?—Twenty-five thousand, speaking roughly.

14229. Do you think that at that time there was an adequate supply of Commissariat officers?—At the time that the army left Varna there was an adequate supply in point of number, because I have it under Commissary-general Filder's hand.

14230. Will you read it, if you please; take Varna?—"At Sea, September 14th. I have now more than enough people, of one sort and another, but not enough of the right sort. I would rather have one well trained Commissariat officer than 10 police officers. When this affair is over, I will reduce and put in order the establishment of the department."

14231. I will read to you a statement of Sir De Lacy Evans; this is at Varna; he says, "At that time the deficiency of the personnel of the Commissariat was also very severely felt, and was extremely manifest; and the Commissaries applied to me, and very likely to the other division officers, to give them the help of non-commissioned officers and privates; and I believe I was obliged, very much against my consent, to send them about 100 non-commissioned officers to assist them. These are duties which ought to have been performed by the subordinate officers of the Commissariat, and it, I think, was somebody's fault that they had not provided themselves with these subordinate Commissariat officers." Here is a distinct statement that he lent 100 men, and Lord Lucan also stated that he was obliged to lend many of his own officers to do the Commissariat duty. How do you explain that?—I think that the two statements are reconcilable. I mentioned before, that we depended in the first instance upon getting a sufficient number of qualified subordinates in the country; but as our experience increased, we found that the people of the country would not properly serve our purpose, and Mr. Filder in the early part of the stay of the army at Varna had to borrow a number of non-commissioned officers and privates, and a small number of military officers, to assist him, especially in reference to the transport. In the meantime we were sending out, from week to week, one, two, or three in a week, large drafts of persons from the English and Irish police.

14232. Commissary-general Filder says that he had sufficient; more than enough; will you read that passage again from Commissary-general Filder's despatch from Varna?—It is not at Varna; it is at sea, after he had left Varna: "I have now more than enough."

14233. You never heard from him that he was not sufficiently supplied with Commissariat officers?—Yes; at Varna, in the early part of the stay of the army at Varna, he was insufficiently supplied, especially with subordinate persons, and he consequently wrote to us to send out to him those policemen, and the measure answered extremely well. There was another cause of the insufficiency of the Commissariat establishment at Varna, which was, the great proportion in which sickness and death fell upon them; it fell upon them owing to the laborious nature of their duties, in much greater proportion than upon the other branches of the army, owing to their exposure; while the troops were taking care of themselves, those poor fellows were labouring with the cattle and land transport depôts, and doing everybody's work; and this is a very important point, because out of the 69 officers and clerks at Varna, on the 23d of August, 26 were absent from duty, of whom two had died, 22 were sick, one had resigned, one was unfit for field duty; and at the same date, out of 48 storekeepers, &c., 22 were absent from duty; that is, one had died, 17 were sick, three had resigned, and one had returned to England.

14234. Lord Lucan states in another part of his evidence, "At Varna the issuing

issuing of the forage was so irregular and uncertain, that I was driven to confine the duties of one of my aides-de-camp exclusively to the superintendence of the foraging of the regiment; I have throughout felt the great inconvenience of having no Commissariat officer of rank"?—I must leave Lord Lucan and Commissary-general Filder to settle that.

14235. This is very important, because a great deal of the evidence that you have given is founded upon these statements of Commissary-general Filder; several of them have been directly contradicted by a very large mass of evidence given before this Committee, and it is very important to know how far the Committee can rely upon the statements of Commissary-general Filder?—Undoubtedly; so far as I have received information from him, I give it; and so far as it does not tally with the other statements made to the Committee, it will be necessary for Commissary-general Filder to explain it himself.

14236. You stated, did you not, that there were sufficient Commissariat preparations made at Scutari for the army?—Yes, for the arrival of the army.

14237. You state that Commissary-general Filder obtained an abundance of mules for transport at Malta; Sir De Lacy Evans states, when he got to Constantinople, "I knew nothing of the operations which were to take place at any period whatever, but I conjectured them from general report, and it was always my impression that adequate arrangements were not made by the Commissariat. I might say, that after leaving England I touched at Malta, and I inquired there, because Malta has a considerable quantity of transports; there are a great number of useful carts in Malta, and a great number of mules. I provided myself there with mules, and my staff also; and I naturally inquired of my military friends there what had been done by the Commissariat authorities who had preceded me, with regard to providing the army with means of transport, so far as that island might afford the means of doing so, and I was very much surprised to find that some excessively small number, perhaps a dozen mules or a dozen carts, I do not know the exact number, but something ludicrously small, had been purchased there and carried on to Constantinople." And the Duke of Cambridge says, in answer to the question, "All the Commissariat operations were properly carried on, were they?" "The Commissariat operations were not as satisfactory as one could have wished; even at Scutari there was a very great difficulty in getting forage; there was only one place of issue, I believe, for the whole of the troops during the time we were at Scutari." How do you meet these statements?—I meet them by opposite statements on the authority of independent persons: first of all, I meet the statement with regard to the insufficiency of the supplies at Scutari, and I must include Gallipoli, for it happens to be mixed up, on the authority of the military officers commanding at those places, and I will read this report from Commissary-general Filder, made shortly after his arrival at Constantinople: it is dated the 25th of April 1854. "Commissariat, Constantinople. I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that I reached this place on 22d instant. On my arrival, I found the contracts entered into by Assistant Commissary-general Smith in satisfactory operation; the troops assembled at Gallipoli, and this place, amounting to about 14,000 men, having been well and regularly supplied with everything needful. Some difficulty had been experienced at Gallipoli in regard chiefly to the means of transport, but which had been overcome by the exertions of Assistant Commissary-general Turner, and the officers under his orders; Lieutenant-general Sir George Brown, commanding at that post, having expressed to me his satisfaction with the manner in which the wants of the troops had been met by the Commissariat. At Constantinople no difficulty of any kind has hitherto been experienced, either in landing or provisioning the troops, notwithstanding that large bodies of them are daily arriving; and the officer in command here expressed to me in like manner his satisfaction with the Commissariat arrangements." I think that was General Adams. Then Commissary-general Filder goes on to say what further measures were necessary for establishing depôts. I meet the other statement as to the Commissariat not having sufficiently availed itself of the resources of Malta in transport, by reading a letter from Commissary-general Wild, the officer in charge at Malta, dated the 2d of September 1854. "Referring to my letter, No. 1192, of the 9th ultimo, I have the honour to report to you, for the

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the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the shipment, on the 20th ultimo, per steam ship 'Cottingham,' of 20 carts, with harness, all that could be received on board; and on the 31st ultimo, per barque 'Jelica,' taken in tow by Her Majesty's steam ship 'Spiteful,' of 112 carts, with harness, 1,210 fathoms rope (for 121 carts), 100 spare linch pins, with rings, 252 mule shoes, and 10 lbs. nails."

14238. I was talking about preparations made, not what was obtained when the wants were found out, but the preparations that were made to meet them?—Yes; but in a proper sense, it is only as wants are found out that they are provided for.

14239. But is not that a very bad system?—Our first impression was, and it was quite borne out by the event, that we might obtain at Constantinople, and the neighbouring countries, the great bulk of the transport that we required; therefore Commissary-general Filder made only a small provision of Government transport from Malta. It is a maxim with us that hired transport is better than Government transport.

14240. Is this maxim one of yours also, that wants should not be supplied till they are found out?—That they should not be supplied till there is a reasonable expectation of their arising.

14241. Could any army go into the field if such an axiom as that were to be acted upon; supposing that in the middle of Bulgaria they found that they wanted harness?—One thing is the occurrence of a want, and another is a knowledge that the want will exist. Commissary-general Filder did not make his large draft for carts and mules upon Malta, amounting altogether to 300 mules, or within three or four of that number, until the necessity of it became apparent. Though this letter is dated on the 2d of September, all the arrangements had been made before. It takes a considerable time to get together 241 carts and 300 mules, which was the whole number sent up to that date, so that Commissary-general Filder must have foreseen the importance of getting those carts and mules from Malta long before.

14242. Sir De Lacy Evans, an old and experienced general officer, did not wait till his wants were apparent, but he bought mules and other things at Malta; and he expresses his astonishment at the ludicrously small number obtained by Commissary-general Filder?—I entirely participate in the general affection and respect felt for General Sir De Lacy Evans; but it must be remarked, that he stated in his evidence that he never even conversed with Commissary-general Filder.

14243. Do you remember the reason why?—Yes; I think he stated that he had desired him to call upon him, and he did not do so.

14244. Colonel *Lindsay*.] Where was he residing?—At Constantinople.

14245. Mr. *Layard*.] There is another statement on the part of Sir De Lacy Evans when at Scutari: "I found that there was a good deal of difficulty about the issue of rations, and I was rather surprised that the Commissary-general did not come to know whether I had any directions to give him, but he was living, it appears, at Constantinople. I sent over to desire his attendance and to have his explanation; the answer was that he was unwell, and I never had the honour of seeing him. These deficiencies continued from time to time, and there were no adequate stores for the distribution of forage, nor even for the slaughtering of the cattle, or issues of meat for the troops; nor were the stores adequate with regard to bakeries, or with regard to the distribution even of biscuits." He was then in command of our troops at Scutari; how do you explain that?—Commissary-general Filder himself assigns the reason for his not having called; he stated that he was unwell. Sir De Lacy Evans was in command at Scutari only for a very few days.

14246. What do you say as to the want of provisions and proper supplies even of bread and biscuit?—That is the matter at issue; I have set against the authority of General Sir De Lacy Evans the authority of General Adams.

14247. General *Peel*.] You stated that on one occasion Lord Raglan sent to Commissary-general Filder for a return of all transport animals at his disposal; was it the duty or custom of Commissary-general Filder to report to Lord Raglan the state of his department and the means at his disposal?—The proper Commissariat common law, if I may so call it, is this: that the officer commanding should from the first take the Commissary-general to his bosom, as it were; should give him his confidence, should encourage him, should support him, should

should see that his commissariat officers acting with the different divisions and brigades are supported, and assisted, and advised by their respective officers, and that the Commissary-general should daily communicate personally with the General, and lay before him from day to day the state of the supplies. Such was the practice of the Duke of Wellington, and our commissariat treatises all point to that as the correct practice. I may observe here, that when the difficulties occurred, the Quartermaster-general entered into a formal official correspondence with the Commissary-general, telling him that there were great demands upon him in reference to the huts, the winter clothing, the fuel, and other things, and asking what provision he had made. That was during those dreadful days of December.

14248. Mr. *Ellice.*] Are there not deputy commissaries appointed to the separate divisions?—Yes.

14249. And the officers commanding those divisions are in the same relation to the deputy commissaries as the Commander-in-chief of the army is to the Commissary-general in chief?—Yes.

14250. And their applications for any supplies should be made first to the deputy commissary-general attached to their division?—Yes.

14251. If they did not receive a satisfactory answer, or sufficient supplies from the deputy commissary attached to the division, they naturally would make a complaint to the Commanding Officer of the army?—Yes.

14252. Mr. *Layard.*] The Duke of Cambridge was asked, "Did you ever see Mr. Commissary-general Filder?—Yes. Did he ever come to your division to examine its state and condition?—Never. Was it his duty to do so?—I think it would have been highly satisfactory if he had done so. I confess, considering it was a newly organised force, I think that he ought to have come." There are two other statements from Lord Lucan which I will read to you, as it is a very important matter. Lord Lucan states, "Unlike other divisions, Commissary-general Filder persisted in leaving the Cavalry Division without any superintending commissariat officer." Then he is asked, "Upon your making this representation, did you get any other commissariat officer attached to your division?—My representations to Mr. Commissary-general Filder were never attended to at any time whatever." Now it has been shown what the state of things was at Scutari. I will now go to Gallipoli. Captain Wrottesley was examined, who first went to Gallipoli, and who spoke as to the state of things there; he was asked, "Was any interpreter provided for Mr. Commissary Smith, who was acquainted with the country and the localities?—There was no interpreter; Mr. Calvert received his orders from the ambassador to assist Mr. Smith. Mr. Calvert is consul at the Dardanelles, is he not?—Yes. Do you know the distance from Gallipoli to the Dardanelles?—Thirty miles by water. Do many vessels arrive at the Dardanelles from England engaged in commerce?—I do not know; not from England, I suspect. Are you aware whether Mr. Calvert's duties at the Dardanelles are very considerable?—I do not know exactly; there are a great number of, not English ships, but a great number of Ionian ships that gave him a great deal of trouble; their crews do. In fact, Mr. Calvert carries on the consular duties at the Dardanelles?—Yes. Was he continually at Gallipoli?—He was at Gallipoli for about six or seven days, it might be ten, before the arrival of the troops. Upon the expected arrival of the French and English troops, the Turkish Government decided upon forming a Turkish commission, which was sent to Gallipoli to provide for the wants of both forces; and Mr. Calvert, I fancy, did receive orders from the ambassador to attend them. Had the French any interpreter or commissary especially sent out for that purpose?—No; he was a native of the place. Mr. Calvert speaks many languages, does he not?—He speaks Turkish very well, I understand, and he is a man of great consideration in those parts, and he has great influence with the Turkish authorities, being a man of wealth, and having resided a long time there. The army that was landed at Gallipoli was entirely dependent upon Mr. Calvert, was it not?—I should think very much so; and where he was, of course, the commissariat would have been perfectly helpless without Mr. Calvert." Mr. Calvert was consul at the Dardanelles, which is 25 or 30 miles from Gallipoli?—The answer I have to give is that the special function of the Commissary-general is to foresee and provide for the wants of the army, and to arrange and combine on a large scale: that is his peculiar *métier*, the duty

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of his position, and that Commissary-general Filder did in a very admirable manner. But this duty is one of immense volume, labour, and anxiety; and, unless the Commissary general is borne with, and supported and encouraged by the leading officers of the army, it is impossible that he can properly perform his duty. I will illustrate this by reading one or two short extracts out of the despatches and general orders of the Duke of Wellington, with regard to the commissaries having to attend military officers on all occasions: "If he had that right, every officer in the regiment has the same; and if all are to exercise it, and to call for Mr. ————'s attendance when they please, what is to become of the issues to the division?" *A fortiori*, if every body is at liberty to send when they please for the Commissary-general, what is to become of the supplies for the army? The Duke of Wellington issued this order to all the commanding officers of divisions, brigades and regiments, under circumstances perhaps somewhat similar to those which have been described: "Coimbra, 4th May 1809. The officers of the army must have observed the scarcity of all the supplies which our army requires in Portugal, at the same time that the discipline and efficiency of the troops depend upon their regular delivery. The Commander of the Forces trusts, therefore, that the general officers of the army and the commanding officers of regiments, particularly those who may be detached, will communicate constantly with the commissariat department attached to their brigades and regiments, and will advise and assist them, as far as may be in their power, in their endeavours to procure supplies for the troops." I will refer to two passages, showing what peculiar encouragement the Duke of Wellington considered that the commissaries required. He says, "The gentlemen of the commissariat are very new in their business, and I am not without grounds of complaint of their want of intelligence; but I believe they do their best, and I shall not complain of them." Then again, there is this remarkable passage to the same effect: "To the Earl of Liverpool: Gouvea, 13th September 1810. I assure your Lordship that the supply of troops is no easy matter in this country, and that the officers of the commissariat who really perform their duty require encouragement."

14253. *Chairman.*] You consider it desirable, and you stated that it was the duty of the Commanding Officer to take the leading Commissary Officer to his bosom?—I was speaking of the established practice of Generals in command.

14254. Are the Committee to conclude, from that allusion of yours, that he was not taken to the bosom of the Commanding Officer?—I am not competent to say; so far as I see any indication of the practice with the expeditionary army, I cannot give a decisive opinion; the correspondence which took place in December, between the Quartermaster-general and the Commissary-general, at the time of their greatest difficulties, would indicate the contrary practice.

14255. General *Peel.*] The object of my question was this, that if those reports were regularly made, the reports would speak for themselves, and would show what means of transport had been provided at the different periods?—That observation is a very just one. If the General in command and the Commissary-general had been in the close confidential relation which I have described as having taken place in the Peninsula between the Duke of Wellington and his Commissary-general, then the General in command in the Crimea would have known what were the means at the disposal of Commissary-general Filder in those days of disaster, and the Quartermaster-general would not by his directions have entered into that formal correspondence to ascertain what he had.

14256. The Duke of Wellington would not have trusted merely to verbal communications; he would have had a report?—A daily state of the supplies and transport was submitted by the Commissary-general to the General in command.

14257. *Chairman.*] There is an allusion in your statement; you say that if the correspondence had been such as it was in the Peninsula, such and such things would not have happened?—No, I did not say that; I was merely speaking, as a matter of fact, of what appeared to me to be the different practice in respect of the relations existing between the General in command and the Commissary-general in the Peninsula and in the Crimea.

14258. And those relations in the Crimea were such as you thought ought not to have occurred; either you meant that, or you did not mean it?—I consider

sider the practice as exemplified in the despatches and general orders of the Duke of Wellington to be the right practice.

14259. And the other, therefore, the wrong?—Yes. I think General Peel stated that the Duke of Wellington would not let such an important matter depend upon a verbal communication between him and the Commissary-general. My impression is, that that "daily state," as it was technically called, was almost all that passed in writing between him and his Commissary-general. His despatches abound with such expressions as these: "Commissary-general Kennedy and I think so and so. We intend to do so and so. I have consulted with Kennedy, and we have determined so and so."

14260. General *Peel.*] There is a difference between the evidence given and what you now state on the part of Commissary-general Filder as a matter of fact, as to the supply; the object of my question was to know whether the states would not show which of the parties was right as to the supply of meat, for instance?—Unquestionably they would, if they had been furnished. At page 36 of Sir Randolph Routh's Treatise there is this passage: "Every commissariat officer in charge of troops or stores should every morning furnish to the Commissary-general a statement of his supplies and expectations, so that this officer may submit the same daily to the General-in-Chief, who can make no forward movement except by the co-operation of this important department." The Duke of Wellington, I have always heard, prided himself more upon his management of the commissariat, than upon the command of the army.

14261. Mr. *Layard.*] You are acquainted with the collection of the Duke of Wellington's Despatches?—Yes.

14262. Are you aware that almost the very first thing that he did in the Peninsula was to draw out some most elaborate directions for the Commissariat?—Yes, he gave his principal attention to the Commissariat from the very first.

14263. Has anything of that kind been done on this occasion?—I have not heard of it; there was not the same occasion for it; the Commissariat officers were very inferior at that time to what they are now, and the regulations of the department have been of late years thoroughly simplified and revised.

14264. *Chairman.*] Was the Duke of Wellington's army at any time half starved?—Great deficiencies existed, and to such an extent that he issued a general order, saying that he did not consider it fair that the troops should pay the full stoppages, as their rations had been deficient.

14265. I now wish to call your attention to Varna. The Duke of Cambridge is asked, "When at Varna, was there any store made of corn, or forage, or food of any sort?—Not that I am aware of. Would the country round Varna have supplied the means of making such a store?—I do not know; I do not say that the country around Varna alone would, because there was a very large number of troops there; but Constantinople and all those districts would most unquestionably, in my opinion. So that if stores had been established, say at Varna, the troops might have been regularly supplied therefrom?—I cannot conceive why they should not." Then he is asked, "Can you attribute to anybody the non-establishment of such stores; whose duty was it to do that?—I presume the Commissary-general and the Commissariat Department. If they were not established, it was by their fault that they were not established?—I conceive so. Were there any stores anywhere at Balaklava?—Not that I am aware of. Did you see any at Constantinople when you were there?—No." There the Duke distinctly states that neither at Varna nor at Constantinople were there any stores of any kind?—I speak with the greatest submission and with the greatest respect for the Duke of Cambridge; but it is right, in the interests of truth and fair play, to say that the charge of the Commissariat was not his business: with submission, I do not think that his troops were starving.

14266. Mr. *Ellice.*] Were the troops starving at that time at Constantinople?—No, nor at Varna: it is as unreasonable that the Duke of Cambridge's authority should be received in respect to the arrangements of the Commissariat as it would be to receive Commissary-general Filder's authority in respect to the internal military arrangements of the Duke's division; indeed more so; it would be far more difficult to obtain the means of giving a safe opinion about the Commissariat arrangements, for they extend over half the world.

14267. Mr. *Layard.*] The question is, whether there were any depôts at Varna to supply the troops before Sebastopol; and the Duke of Cambridge says,

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says, "If there had been such depôts, the steamers could have run backwards and forwards and supplied them"?—And so they did. I have already submitted to the Committee a complete comprehensive statement of Commissary-general Filder's stores ashore and afloat when the army left Varna, showing that he had more than he wanted; he had then a great deal more biscuit than he wanted, and he gave back some to the navy. In sending a copy of the letter to the Duke of Newcastle, this short Treasury Minute was recorded, which I have already read: "Treasury, 19 September 1854. Transmit copies of this letter and of the statement to Colonel Mundy, to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle, and acquaint him, for the information of his Grace, that my Lords have already taken measures for consigning a further supply of rum from this country for the service of the army in Turkey." Commissary-general Filder says, that the only thing that he was likely to be in want of was a further supply of rum, not from any pressing necessity, but he expected that when the siege commenced, increased rations of rum would be issued in consequence of the fatigue, which was an additional proof of his foresight; and as soon as he arrived at Balaklava, the steam cattle-vessels, with which we had supplied him, were sent back to Varna, first, to bring up transport animals to Balaklava, and next, to bring up live cattle, everything else having been sent forward.

14268. You have continually referred, in the course of your evidence, to the Peninsular war; do you think that referring to any state of things in the Peninsular war is a justification of anything which exists now?—No; I referred merely in illustration.

14269. Did it occur to you to send, before the expedition was undertaken, to any of those persons who had the management of emigration or any of those large undertakings, to know how they carried on their business?—When any points occurred to us on which we required information, we obtained it from the sources which appeared to be the most suitable for the purpose.

14270. A gentleman has been examined before this Committee of the name of Mr. Thomas Mackay, at the head of a very large house at Liverpool connected with emigration, and he states that he has been in the habit of sending out large numbers of persons from this country amounting to many thousands, and he supplied them entirely with preserved meats, that he never uses salt meats, and that preserved meats and vegetables answer perfectly; did it ever occur to you to make any inquiries upon that subject?—We were in possession of full information about preserved meats; we had had a good deal of experience of them at the Cape of Good Hope during the Kafir War, and at the Mauritius, and after repeated trials they have been found unsuitable for this object; the soldiers do not like them, and they are very liable to spoil. They are only a substitute for fresh meat; when we can get fresh meat it is far better to have it; we knew that we had an abundance of fresh meat in Turkey.

14271. And yet the army had it not?—They always had it, except during the disastrous period in the Crimea, which was owing to the breaking up of the roads, and the mismanagement of the transport establishment, and the excessive crowding of the harbour, and all that chain of miserable causes.

14272. But that has been denied by four witnesses: the Duke of Cambridge, Colonel Wilson, General Sir De Lacy Evans, and Serjeant Dawson?—I am very sorry to set my authority against those witnesses; but I conceive that my statement is founded on sufficient evidence.

14273. You state that the preserved meats are not so good as fresh meat; are they not better than salt meat?—I think not.

14274. Then why should this gentleman, connected with so much emigration, employ preserved meats entirely; or why should you send preserved meats in the Arctic expeditions?—Because they had no fresh meat at all.

14275. *Chairman.*] The question was whether you thought the preserved meat better than salt meat?—I entirely admit that it is better that the men should be fed partly upon preserved meat than entirely upon salt meat; but that is not the question here; we knew that we should be able to get a very large quantity of fresh meat, and Commissary-general Filder had made his arrangements for issuing fresh meat every other day in the Crimea.

14276. Mr. *Layard.*] Then why send out any salt meat at all?—As a reserve, in case there should be a deficiency of fresh meat.

14277. Then why not send out preserved meat as a reserve?—Because we think

think that, provided a sufficient interchange of fresh meat is kept up, salt meat is better for the other article of diet than preserved meat.

14278. Mr. Mackay was asked this question: "What do you feed your emigrants upon?—Very much the same as I have stated before, bread, beef, pork, flour and pickles; and so well fed have they been, that our mortality has been less on board ship than among the same number on shore. Mr. *Ellice.*] You do not give them fresh meat on board, do you?—Yes; preserved meats. Mr. *Layard.*] How do you find them answer?—Very well, especially preserved vegetables; preserved potatoes are capital; and we find preserved carrots keep admirably; during the whole of the winter season, I sent out Swedish turnips in large quantities. Could such food have been supplied to the army in the Crimea?—Yes. Is such food very expensive?—No, not at all. As compared with fresh meat?—Very moderate indeed. The soup and bouilli is about the same price as fresh meat?"—My answer to that is, that we did send out preserved vegetables; and as there has been such a general imputation of bad motives in connexion with this expedition, it is a fortunate circumstance for me that at the period of our most active preparation I was obliged, from domestic circumstances, to be absent from London for two or three days. On that occasion I wrote a letter from Somersetshire to Mr. Petrie, the next to me in the Commissariat, the principal clerk; and I will read two or three passages from it, which will show at least the animus with which we conducted our operations: "I entirely concur in opinion with Lord Hardinge and Dr. Smith, that good porter and vegetables should be supplied to the troops, at cost price, as long as it is in our power to supply them. This is a simpler, cheaper, and safer arrangement than to undertake to supply these articles in the shape of a 'small ration,' which the troops would look upon as a right, and would be discontented when it was discontinued on taking the field. Porter and vegetables are part of the ordinary diet of the troops, and especially of the Guards. Scurvy, and dysentery, and other diseases would ensue if they were discontinued, and then they would be ordered to be issued on medical authority, and would be bought upon the spot at whatever cost. With two armies at Constantinople, besides a great concourse of people of other kinds, the cost would be frightful. Whether, therefore, we regard the efficiency of the army or the cost of the supplies, true economy requires that we should prepare and send forward these things beforehand, and not depend upon the chances of a limited and precarious local market. Whatever may be the rules under which the porter may be distributed, there can be no doubt that a large quantity will be required. The only question is whether it should be in bottles or casks, or in what proportion of both. As soon as this can be decided sufficiently for the present purpose, Mr. Grant should be requested to procure a stock of the best quality, and put it on board our ship without delay. Mr. Filder should ascertain what porter the Guards are accustomed to drink, and Mr. Grant should be requested to get that particular kind of porter. The copy of the papers on this subject was not sent to me before I left the Treasury yesterday. Pray have it sent to my house. Care should be taken that whatever quantity of preserved potatoes can be got ready should be put on board one ship. We had better order another 50,000lbs. at once, and I am of opinion that we should at once lay in a good stock of Carolina rice, and put it on board. This was mentioned by Dr. Smith, with the remark, that only an inferior quality of rice is to be had at Constantinople, and that very dear. This is the universal vegetable reserve, on account both of its wholesomeness and durability; and if the army should take the field, the advanced depôts should be supplied both with rice and preserved potatoes. Our old friend, Erichsen, who made the immense purchases for us during the Irish famine in such an able and faithful manner, might with advantage be employed to purchase rice for us. I enclose a note from him, offering his services. We could not have a better agent. I also think that we should get a stock of common tea and sugar, and coffee and cocoa, for the morning and evening meals. This would complete the ordinary diet of the soldier, and beyond this we should not go. A statement of the wholesale contract prices of these articles should be retained by the Commissariat, and the supplies furnished to the regiments should be paid for at those prices, without making any charge for freight. We shall soon want a second ship, but let us get all that can be got ready at once, on board the first ship, and send that off. The Commissariat officer who superintends the loading of the ship should go in her to Malta and Constantinople, and should

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should superintend the unloading and subsequent issues. Mr. Wild will require more assistance than we have sent him. Other officers should be sent forward without delay. The preparation of the transport train will alone require the attention of one intelligent officer. Mr. Filder must not understand me as implying by these remarks that there has been any unnecessary delay; on the contrary, considering the sudden and recent call upon him, I think he is remarkably forward with his preparations. But the task of prevision and pre-arrangement is so serious, that he requires the assistance of all the experienced thoughtful minds that can be brought to bear upon the subject. We must not forget that this expedition goes from London, the head-quarters of English vigilant public opinion, and that the health and comfort of the troops are judged now by a very different standard from that which prevailed on former occasions. Be so good as to have a copy of this letter immediately made in a plain hand on foolscap, half margin, and then give the original letter to Filder, and keep the copy, and note opposite to each paragraph, as you get the information, what has been or is being done under the head discussed in it. I write to you in preference to Filder, because he has so many other things to attend to, that he has no time for writing to me. He must be doing, rather than reporting. There is no economy like taking care of the soldier's health and comfort; we shall have more of them for it; everything will go smoother, and they will fight better."

14279. But all the witnesses who have been examined, state that nothing whatever of what you have read has been supplied; do you believe those statements or do you not?—I most certainly believe the statements which I have submitted to the Committee, else I should not have submitted them.

14280. *Chairman.*] But that is only a statement of your feeling while you were in Somersetshire, writing to your second in command?—No, it is more than that; it shows that we had made large provision.

14281. No; it speaks throughout in the future tense?—No; I beg your pardon: "We had better order another 50,000lbs. at once," and here is the order: "Write to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and request that he will move the Lords Commissioners to direct that 50,000lbs. of preserved potatoes may be provided for the use of the troops proceeding to the Mediterranean under the command of Lieutenant-general Lord Raglan. It is desirable that these potatoes should be put on board the vessel in which the provisions and other supplies are embarked."

14282. Is not that in the future tense?—But they were sent, and we heard of them afterwards.

14283. Mr. *Layard.*] It is stated there, that it would be advisable to send a Commissariat officer with a cargo; you told the Committee that no such man was ever sent with a cargo?—I was speaking then of the time of the greatest activity in the Black Sea; this was the first ship that we sent out, the steamer "Hope," which was appropriated to the Commissariat; and in order that there might be no omission such as occurred in the China war, I directed that an officer should superintend the lading of the vessel, and should go in her, and should accompany her to Malta and Constantinople, and superintend the unloading.

14284. You stated that no such officer went?—I was speaking then of the Black Sea, not this special commissariat steamer which was sent *en avant* with our first supplies, and articles of stationery and magazine implements.

14285. *Chairman.*] You mean, do you not, that with that steamer a Commissariat officer was sent, but that that was not your custom?—Yes.

14286. Therefore that only occurred in that one particular case?—Exactly; when the transports began to go by scores and hundreds, the case was different, especially in such a narrow sea as the Black Sea, in which the transports might have been efficiently superintended from Constantinople and Balaklava.

14287. Mr. *Layard.*] All the witnesses say that none of those things were obtained, not even rice; what is your impression with regard to the non-arrival of those things; did they arrive or not?—Yes, they did; and I can trace the history of those preserved potatoes. I have here a head, "Preserved Potatoes in no demand." "Head-quarters, Balaklava, 2d October 1854"—it is from Commissary-general Filder to myself.—"Adverting to your letter, No. 364, by which you advise me of the shipment, with other supplies, of 39,988 lbs. preserved potatoes," (that is a third quantity,) "I have the honour to acquaint you

you that there is no demand for this article by the troops; on the contrary, considerable quantities of it have been returned into store by the regiments after having been issued to them. I have found it wholly impracticable to frame an estimate of the probable consumption of supplies not forming part of the fixed ration, and the drawing of which in unlimited quantities is optional with the troops; but I would beg to suggest that in future no articles of this description should be sent from England for the use of this army, excepting upon requisitions, which will be from time to time submitted by me, according as I find there is likely to arise a demand for them." In other words, he requested that I would not send things that were not in demand by the troops without his asking for them, as he was the only person who could know what was wanted. I have had some experience of preserved potatoes. Knowing that the troops in the Kafir war were likely to be shut in at Fort Cox and Fort Beaufort and other detached posts by the Kafirs, we considered it advisable to send out a quantity of those preserved potatoes. For many months the troops would not look at them; but in the second year of the war they came into use in the hospitals; the troops came to appreciate them, and the whole supply was consumed.

14288. If those things answer with emigrants, why should they not answer with troops?—The habits of troops are different. I do not profess to explain all the facts. I state that such was the fact. It was only towards the end of the second year of the Kafir war that those preserved potatoes, which are an excellent article, came into use: they are merely potatoes dried and ground, and the addition of a little water makes an excellent dish of mashed potatoes. With this experience, when a new war occurred, one of the first things that we thought of was to lay in a considerable supply of preserved potatoes; but the experience of the early part of the Russian war was the same as that of the early part of the Kafir war, namely, that the troops did not like them.

14289. If we are to take this statement as a statement of the true state of things, the army was never in want of fresh meat, porter, or anything else?—All those statements and reports were written without any idea whatever of such a Committee as this making such an investigation. I cannot conceive any motive on the part of Mr. Commissary Filder for furnishing false statements of this magnitude.

14290. Do you believe that the statements that have been made before the Committee in public in England, and in the press, are true or not, according to the best of your belief?—I believe the statements which I have laid before the Committee are true. I cannot say more. I believe that the gentlemen who have made opposite statements are gentlemen of high honour, and quite incapable of saying what they do not believe to be true.

14291. *Chairman.*] I have here before me a paper which has been delivered in to the Committee, a return of all the Commissariat Stores, &c., and the second ship mentioned in the list is the "Wild Wave;" she sailed from Plymouth on the 31st of March, and I find that the date of the delivery to the consignees is the 2d of April 1854?—I never saw this return before.

14292. If you will look at the list of vessels and take the date of the deliveries to the consignees, I think, altogether, there appear to have been six deliveries; and there are only six accounted for in the list out of 38?—Yes; but it does not follow that those others have not arrived. I have not heard of the loss of a single vessel, except on the night of the hurricane.

14293. Mr. *Layard.*] By whom was the return prepared?—At the War Department. I think I can give the date of the arrival of the "Hope" at Constantinople, and the date of her departure from Malta.

14294. *Chairman.*] It only shows how incorrect this return is?—The "Hope" was such an important vessel, that in the notes which I made to refresh my memory as to the arrival of the officers in the East, I put down "The 'Hope' arrived at Constantinople the 16th of April." She carried our stationery and magazine implements, and all the most necessary articles, and the first batch of officers who arrived after Mr. Smith and his subordinates.

14295. Mr. *Layard.*] You cannot show to the Committee any reports that you have made in England upon various new inventions, either for nourishing troops, or providing forage, or anything of that kind: you went merely on the old system?—I suppose that experience in all branches of business is of importance, and those gentlemen who had experience of the business of conducting

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emigration relied upon their experience. I have had 15 years' experience of the Commissariat. I have superintended the department through two Kafir wars and various other minor operations, and I have read a great deal about it and talked a great deal about it to all who were best qualified to give me information; and therefore I set out with a considerable stock in trade of knowledge, so to speak, and I only had to complete it on certain points having more particular reference to Turkey, when I found it likely that the army was to go to Turkey. I had read a great deal about Turkey before, ever since I was a boy when I thought of going overland to India, and finding that the army was going there, I set to work and read early and late; and I talked about it to all those who were best qualified to advise me, and I obtained, as I thought, all the information that would be useful to me.

14296. I cannot find out that any new invention has been taken up. You always refer to the Peninsular war; we have never got nearer to the present time than that war. Supposing a man once went down by coach to Liverpool, would it be reasonable to say I will not go down to Liverpool by railroad because I went down 40 years ago by coach?—Certainly not; but novelty is not good *per se* as novelty, but only when a new invention is a useful and valuable one. I can show that we have made great progress since the Peninsular war. We are greatly in advance, for the Duke of Wellington had constantly to complain of the incompetency of the officers of the Commissariat; he said that he had not one capable of being made Commissary-general, or fit to be placed in charge of the Portuguese contingent. But the present state of the department is very different; several officers are fit to be made Commissary-generals. Then the Duke of Wellington was constantly suffering from want of money; it went even to the extent of trenching upon the food of the troops; he says so; and I have a note of the "bad effect of the want of money in provisioning the troops." He was obliged to have recourse to what we call bill transactions to a great extent; but we have never been without money; the system was very inferior indeed then.

14297. With regard to supplying preserved vegetables, preserved meats, and all those things which emigration companies avail themselves of, and which enable them to save men's lives, have you anything to state?—You did me the favour of pointing out one particular, in respect to which you consider that modern inventions might be had recourse to, which was preserved vegetables; and I have submitted to the Committee all that had taken place upon the subject of preserved potatoes, showing that we had no occasion to seek for a new invention, for we had that already.

14298. Some of the witnesses have stated that they never heard of preserved potatoes?—It is my duty to make an opposite statement.

14299. Mr. *Drummond.*] Let me show you one instance in which you have not advanced. The justification contained in the papers which were delivered in yesterday, for giving out unroasted coffee, is that it was so easy for the men to roast it themselves, and the Kafir war is given as an instance; but there the troops were in the middle of a wooded country, where fuel was plentiful, and you apply the same mode of action, for you do not appear to recognise the difference upon going into a country where there is no fuel?—It has always been usual for the men to roast and pound their coffee under regimental arrangements, because the same fires which cooked their food enabled them to roast their coffee; but no doubt after the hurricane, and the breaking up of the road, and all that chain of causes, a state of things arose which went even to interfering with their cooking their salt pork; in fact, the inconvenience about roasting the coffee was a part of the general break-down.

14300. So far as I understand your idea of a good Commissariat officer, it is not the man who best feeds the troops, but the man who makes the best clerk of the Treasury here?—No; the man who best feeds the troops; but for that purpose he must avail himself to the necessary extent of the commissariat system, and of commissariat experience; when they do not serve him, then he departs from the ordinary regulations; and I can give instances without end of our officers having taken upon themselves the responsibility of departing from our regulations, and of its having been approved by the Treasury in this very war. Our regulations contain a provision for their being departed from. Where a commissariat officer thinks that circumstances have arisen which make any of our regulations inapplicable, he is directed to lay the matter before the officer

officer commanding, and take his orders, and act upon them, and send the correspondence home; so that our system includes a provision for departing from our system, and making an exception from it, but still preserving the responsibility and the check.

14301. Mr. *Layard.*] You stated in your examination the day before yesterday that the forms had been simplified, and that now the forms that were necessary to go through were not a great impediment to the administration of the Commissariat business?—Yes.

14302. Is that the case?—Yes, entirely so.

14303. What do you say to this answer of Sir De Lacy Evans to Question 788: "From your experience in former campaigns, have the requirements of these documents greatly increased since those days?—It appeared to me that there was a greater stringency; I had never experienced it in the same degree; and it appeared to me almost that the regulations of the Treasury, or the technical regulations, were adopted in a sort of antagonistic spirit, rather than one of cordial concurrence with us." Then he says again, "A great deal of difficulty, and quite unnecessary difficulty, exceedingly unreasonable, I think, has been interposed by the superior Commissariat authority with regard to the issue of provisions on various occasions;" and the same evidence was given by three or four witnesses. The Duke of Cambridge states the same thing in answer to Question 3842. He complains that he got no rations from the head-quarters Commissariat; and he says, "I conceive that they ought to have had them at first, whether there was a flaw in the return or not; as it turned out, this Commissariat officer was wrong, and the officer was right, and there was no mistake in the return at all"?—I must repeat that I by no means intend to say that no Commissariat officer ever improperly held out in regard to forms. Of course, in every body of men some will make mistakes, and possibly misbehave; but I hope the Committee will not infer from any particular case a general condemnation. My answer to those instances is, that until both parties to them are examined, it cannot be seen whether it was the fault of the Commissariat officer or the military officer. Of the two, there is ground for the inference that it was most probably on the part of the military officer. The army was sent from England, and the Commissariat officers were drawn from the colonies; and they were brought together for the first time at Constantinople.

14304. Sir De Lacy Evans, who has had large experience, states that he found the regulations and forms of the Treasury much more stringent now than they were years ago; you state that they have been modified?—Yes, I state that they have been extremely simplified; and I am ready to submit the case to any practised accountant whatever.

14305. You do not agree with Sir De Lacy Evans?—No: I entirely differ from that statement of Sir De Lacy Evans. This is the spirit in which the Commissariat officers act in that matter. This is from Mr. Smith, writing from Constantinople, on the 20th of November: "My post is of the most anxious and arduous nature, but I will continue at it to the last, and do my best, under the conviction that I shall be indemnified hereafter for expenses which have to be incurred upon my own individual authority, unless an actual stoppage of the most important services were to take place at this very serious crisis; I will at least be careful that the immense confidence reposed in me shall never be abused. I cannot always report everything I do; and there are some instances in which Mr. Filder is quite silent upon the subject of extraordinary measures which I have had to adopt in furtherance of his orders, thus leaving the responsibility with me." Commissary-general Filder was quite overworked himself, and had not time to write detailed instructions on every occasion. "I allude to this, however, without any intention to complain, for most of my acts have met Mr. Filder's approval;" and ultimately they all met it.

14306. Did you ever employ, or endeavour to obtain the services of any Commissariat officer who had been in the East India Company's service?—No: the Commissariat is the least efficient branch of Indian administration; I know that, from personal knowledge.

14307. Had the army, during the campaign in Affghanistan, or other parts of India, at any time to suffer what the army has suffered in the Crimea?—If any officer, who I had reason to think would have been of real use to us, had

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offered, certainly we should have accepted him; but none such happened to offer; I did not seek them; I knew, from my 12 years' experience in India, that the Commissariat is the least efficient of all the branches of Indian administration.

14308. But it has never broken down, has it?—Things have happened in India that could not possibly have happened in our Commissariat. I will instance the case of Jotee Persad, with unexamined accounts to a vast amount, which had been subjected to no proper check. The Indian Commissariat is managed by military officers, who are posted to the duty without giving up their military character or service.

14309. Have you ever known the Indian army to suffer for want of a Commissariat?—There were no active operations while I was there.

14310. Did you ever hear of any instances of the kind?—Yes, that of Cabul. The first and greatest of all their disasters was the loss of the Commissariat stores.

14311. Those were taken by the enemy?—Yes; they were close to the fortified camp.

14312. Were there no gentlemen in London who were acquainted with the mode of carrying on the Commissariat of the Indian army, who could have been available?—There may have been, but knowing that the Indian Commissariat is conducted on quite a different principle from ours, and that it is not by any means the bright part of the Company's administration, I did not seek for such officers.

14313. Do you consider that the Commissariat department is the bright part in our administration?—I have already expressed my opinion, not only that the Commissariat officers have done their very best, but that there has been nothing which can be properly called a break-down of the Commissariat. Other branches of the military and naval administration, upon the efficiency of which the Commissariat depended, broke down, but not the Commissariat; but had those other branches retained their efficiency, Commissary-general Filder and his Commissariat officers would have carried the army through with great ease, and we should not only have saved thousands of valuable lives, but have saved all the great expense which is being laid out on the railway, and well laid out now; and the still greater, more undefined, and alarming expense of the land transport corps.

14314. *Chairman.*] Can you point out what those failures have been?—First, the omission to prepare a made road to the base of operations at Balaklava.

14315. That omission it was somebody's duty to have prevented?—Yes; under "The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army" it was the duty of the Quartermaster-general. In the book technically called "The Queen's Regulations," under the head of Quartermaster's duties, he is to look to everything relating to roads and communications. The next in order that I should mention is, the absence of a road along the border of the harbour at Balaklava; on which subject I read a memorandum from Mr. Filder.

14316. The duty to make it still belonging to the Quartermaster-general?—Yes. The next I should state is, the absence of magazines on shore; a very powerful cause.

14317. I suppose you mean buildings?—Yes; I mean the absence of the appropriation of buildings.

14318. Whose duty was it to make that appropriation?—The Quartermaster-general's. The next is, the want of a proper organisation and arrangement of the transports and other vessels in the harbour of Balaklava.

14319. Who was answerable for that organisation?—The Admiralty primarily, and Captain Christie immediately; he was their officer, and they were responsible for his appointment. The next is part of that same want of arrangement, the loss of the "Progress," for, as the Commissariat was principally interested in the "Progress," I put that first, and the "Prince," and other vessels, which, instead of being securely moored in the harbour, upon which our calculations were based, were sent outside, in the face of a stormy sea and a rocky coast.

14320. By whose order were they sent outside?—I believe by the naval authority. The next thing was the want of a proper arrangement of the transport service at Constantinople and in the Black Sea.

14321. Who

14321. Who was answerable for that?—Admiral Boxer. Next, the passing suddenly, without, to a great extent, in many departments of the army, proper preparation, from a summer campaign to a winter campaign.

14322. That answer requires explanation, because you spoke of many departments of the army; what departments?—Still, the Quartermaster-general's.

14323. What ought he to have supplied?—Of course I speak with every reservation and qualification, and with full allowance for good intentions, and the difficulties in which he was placed. Of course, strictly speaking, according to the letter of the regulations and the practice of the service, he should have provided warm clothing and huts for the troops; he should have provided warm clothing for the cavalry, and nose-bags, and every other article.

14324. Was it his duty to have provided stables for the horses?—Yes, certainly.

14325. What is the next department of the army that you will refer to?—I should speak of the vast amount of articles which had to be carried up to the troops under this very disastrous and broken-down state of things. I have mentioned huts and warm clothing, besides the immense quantity of ammunition and other stores required for carrying on a great siege. Another thing is fuel, and another is forage; and I must again allude to the very peculiar circumstance of the cavalry force being cooped up in a narrow space, and besieged. It is one of the few instances in which a cavalry force has been in a state of siege. We, the Commissariat, had calculated upon that force of Light Cavalry, supported, if necessary, by a column of infantry, sweeping the country, and bringing in supplies, as a much smaller number of the Chasseurs d'Afrique did; and we also had our eye, from a very early period, upon the extremely fertile and abundant valley of Baidar, which is in the immediate neighbourhood of our military position, and we supposed that a foraging party would have been sent out, and would have swept that valley, and have brought everything in; we did get some cattle and forage by purchase from the inhabitants.

14326. Colonel *Lindsay*.] Do not you think it likely that the Cossacks would have swept all the cattle and animals into the interior?—No; because the French got a quantity the day after they landed, and we got a great deal. We got nearly 200 carts and horses, partly hired, and partly forced.

14327. I mean as a supply for the army for a considerable period?—Yes, we got a great quantity of live cattle for a considerable period, mostly purchased, and we got a quantity of forage. The Russians were taken by surprise when we arrived at Balaklava, and everything there, and no doubt also in the neighbouring valleys, was in its usual state. Our army was not invested for some time after.

14328. *Chairman*.] Have you closed the list of your objections?—Yes, I think I have nothing more to say of importance; I may mention that it is always assumed in Military and Commissariat Treatises that forage is an article which cannot be brought from a distance, and rules are laid down for obtaining it, with the assistance of the cavalry, from the country.

14329. Mr. *Ellice*.] With reference to the different parties who are responsible for the difficulties that have existed, the public attention has been very much drawn to the shipment of porter from this country; I observe by a report delivered to this Committee, that a cargo of porter was shipped in the "Jane Cockerill," on the 18th of April 1854; that one freight of 1,935 *l*. was first paid, and that a second freight of 1,935 *l*. was paid on account of demurrage, up to the time when that demurrage was due, and that at the time that the report was made to the Committee, on the 15th of March 1855, this porter was still on board ship at the Katcha river: to whom do you ascribe the fault of that transaction?—It has to be proved that it is a fault; but the fact was this, that we sent out four cargoes of porter, but with regard to the one cargo of the "Jane Cockerill," she went to Varna, and a portion of the cargo was drunk by the troops at Varna. Then came the cholera, and the medical authorities pronounced that porter was not good for the troops during the prevalence of cholera, and rum was substituted for it sometime before they left Varna. Then, when they left Varna, Lord Raglan issued an order which gave great satisfaction at the time, that the issue of porter was to be renewed, and it was for a few days, and on the passage. Then, from the time they landed in the

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Crimea, in consequence of the great pressure upon the land transport, arising from the siege and other causes, and the immensely bulky nature of the porter, it was impossible to supply the troops with porter, and the "Jane Cockerill" remained with the rest of her cargo, in expectation, I presume, of the troops drinking the Queen's health in the Harbour of Sebastopol.

14330. Then the public have paid already two freights, and there must be a considerable additional freight now due upon this porter; do you think it was advisable to have kept the porter on board at such an enormous expense to the public, especially when you complain, on the part of the Commissariat, that you had no means of transport for other articles?—The deficiency of the transport was in steam-vessels, because, as Mr. Filder explains, he could not rely on sailing-vessels in the winter season, and with the variable weather of the Black Sea. The only sea transport that he could justifiably have used, consistently with the demands of the army for supplies of food, was steam transport; the "Jane Cockerill" was a sailing-vessel. I may observe, that the circumstance that has been mentioned, as to the "Jane Cockerill" remaining there, with her cargo on board, as a store-ship, applies to the whole of that immense fleet, which was kept there on freight, partly as store-ships, and partly to attend the movements of the troops, and to be ready for any emergency. It was the same in the China war; the great expense of conjoint naval and military expeditions is for the transport.

14331. But this transport could not have been engaged for those general purposes; she was engaged especially to carry out the porter to the East, at a definite freight of 1,935 *l.*?—Yes; but though laden with porter, she would have carried troops, and she might have been employed, in case of need, for any service for which she was fit. There was no difference between her and the other transports in this respect.

14332. *Chairman.*] Your examination is now closed, and I think you will not be sorry to go?—I am sorry to have been obliged to tell so much truth, because I feel that it may give pain to some; but if the truth be not told, innocent persons will be condemned, contrary to truth.

Lunæ, 23° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Layard.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Colonel Lindsay.	General Peel.
Mr. Bramston.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

His Grace the Duke of *Newcastle*, attending by permission of The House of Lords; Examined.

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14333. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE your Grace was really the Minister for War from the breaking out of the war with Russia until your retirement from office, when Lord Aberdeen ceased to be Prime Minister?—Yes.

14334. That was in consequence of being Colonial Minister when the war broke out?—Yes.

14335. Can you shortly state what were the powers and duties of the Minister for War, during a state of war, when conjoined with the Secretaryship for the Colonies?—The general direction of the war. It is difficult to define the powers and duties, because the Secretary of State for War became responsible for the whole conduct of the war, and had to direct everything. I am at a loss to say what did not come within the scope of his duties.

14336. Did

14336. Did he determine the number of troops to be sent upon a particular expedition when the expedition was determined upon?—Certainly.

14337. Was that entirely left to his discretion, or was it approved by the Administration?—Every order of that kind is given after deliberation in the Cabinet; he was the responsible Minister, and the person from whom all such orders emanated.

14338. All such suggestions come through him?—Yes, no doubt.

14339. Were those powers changed when the offices of the Minister for War and the Minister for the Colonies were separated?—No, there was no change made by that separation, except that, of course, the Secretary for War being relieved from the duties attached to the Secretaryship of the Colonies was enabled to devote his sole and undivided attention to the duties of war; beyond that no increased powers were given to him by that separation.

14340. Can you state to the Committee what were the regulations existing between the War Minister, and the Commander-in-chief, and the Secretary-at-War?—As I have said, the general direction of the war was, of course, in the hands of the Secretary for War, and the duties of the Commander-in-chief applied more especially to the discipline of the army; and with that the Secretary for War never interfered. Though I might have had conversations, and made suggestions, to the Commander-in-chief, I do not consider that the discipline of the army comes within the immediate scope of the Secretary for War.

14341. The Secretary-at-War has the management of the finance of the army, has he not?—Quite so.

14342. Lord *Seymour.*] Occupying the official position of Secretary for War and the Colonies, was it your duty to give directions for the movement of the troops to the Mediterranean?—Certainly.

14343. That being your duty, what course did you take to perform that duty; with what departments did you communicate?—As regarded the movement of the cavalry and infantry, I communicated with the Commander-in-chief; as regarded the movement of the artillery, the engineers, and the sappers and miners, I communicated with the Master-general of the Ordnance.

14344. Did you also communicate with the Treasury as to the Commissariat?—I did.

14345. Did you also communicate with the Director-general of the medical department?—No, not immediately at the first commencement of the war; my communications with reference to the medical department, generally speaking, until the division of the two Secretaryships, was generally conducted through the Secretary-at-War, with whom, up to the time of the separation, the medical department had been more in the habit of corresponding.

14346. You stated that you communicated with the Master-general of the Ordnance with regard to the movement of the artillery and engineers; did you communicate with the Board of Ordnance as to the military supplies requisite for such an army?—I did.

14347. Did you communicate with the Quartermaster-general in regard to that class of stores which should be placed under the Quartermaster-general?—No; I never had any immediate communication with the Quartermaster-general. I communicated always with the heads of departments.

14348. Did you submit to Her Majesty for her approval the name of the officer selected for the command?—No, that was done by the Commander-in-chief.

14349. *Chairman.*] Not by the Administration?—In the case of superior officers, such of course as Lord Raglan; their names were invariably submitted to me as Secretary of State.

14350. By whom?—By the Commander-in-chief, before he made his representation to the Sovereign; but the form has been for the Commander-in-chief to recommend to the Sovereign the appointment of generals to command.

14351. Supposing the Administration did not accord in their opinion with the Commander-in-chief, what would then occur?—The Commander-in-chief would of course defer to that opinion, and not make the representation.

14352. Was any step taken to obtain the consent of the Administration to that proposal?—Generally speaking, it was. I cannot say that it was quite invariably.

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14353. Lord *Seymour.*] I referred to Lord Raglan; did you submit to Her Majesty, for Her approval, the names of the officers selected for the command? —No; the names of the officers were submitted to the Queen by the Commander-in-chief.

14354. *Chairman.*] After having consulted through you with the Administration?—Yes; I say that was generally done, but there were exceptions.

14355. When you say "generally done," there is, I believe, only one Commander-in-chief?—No; but I considered the question put to me by Lord Seymour to apply to the other generals commanding divisions and brigades; my answer applies to them. As regards the appointment of Lord Raglan, that was mentioned to me by Lord Hardinge privately first, and in a more official manner afterwards.

14356. What were the exceptions to that rule?—If the Committee consider it desirable, I should have no objection to name them, but inasmuch as I consider that the cases in which names were not submitted, was a departure from the proper practice, and done through inadvertence, I would rather not name the individuals unless the Committee particularly desire it.

14357. The Committee are of opinion that they ought to ask for the names? —There were the cases of three generals, whose names were submitted to the Sovereign by the Commander-in-chief before I had been made acquainted with that intention.

14358. So that they were appointed without the consent or knowledge of the Administration?—Yes.

14359. And they continued in command?—Yes; but I have reason to know that those three cases all occurred through inadvertence on the part of Lord Hardinge. It was not intentional; but inasmuch as the question was put to me in a general form, I thought it necessary to mention that there were those exceptions.

14360. General *Peel.*] With regard to what rank is it usual to submit to the War Minister the names of officers to be appointed; the selection of their regiment, of course, is left to the Commander-in-chief?—Entirely.

14361. Of course the names of the commanding officers of those regiments are not submitted to the War Minister?—Never.

14362. Where does the rank begin with regard to which it is considered necessary for the Commander-in-chief to consult the War Minister as to the appointment of officers?—Drawing an analogy from a time of peace, I should say the appointment of generals.

14363. Does your Grace mean generals commanding brigades or divisions? —Both.

14364. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Or a general commanding a district?—That has been the practice in time of peace; and following that analogy, I should say that the proper practice was for the Commander-in-chief to submit to the Secretary of State, for the opinion of the Government, the names of all generals to be appointed to the army in time of war, whether generals of brigade or generals of division.

14365. General *Peel.*] The names having been approved by Her Majesty, there would be great awkwardness in the War Minister of objecting afterwards? —Certainly.

14366. *Chairman.*] The usual course was departed from; and it is the opinion of the Committee that we should ask your Grace to give us the names? —I have no objection, under these circumstances. I should state that my sole objection was for fear of a misapprehension, arising from my having mentioned those exceptions. I must again state distinctly that I had Lord Hardinge's assurance that it was an inadvertence in both cases; the cases were, the appointment of Lord Lucan, and the subsequent appointment of Brigadiers-general Torrens and Goldie.

14367. Those were the only cases in which there was any departure from the ordinary rule?—To the best of my recollection they were.

14368. Was any notice taken of that departure from the ordinary rule?— Yes; I reminded Lord Hardinge that he had made an omission, which he at once admitted.

14369. General *Peel.*] The appointment to the command of the cavalry was a very important one, was it not?—Certainly.

14370. Mr. *Layard.*] Did your Grace consider yourself responsible for the conduct of those officers to any extent?—Of course; if I had felt the objections to be so great as to have justified me in recommending Her Majesty to cancel the sanction which she had given, it would have been my duty to have done so.

14371. Then your Grace considered that there was a certain amount of responsibility falling upon you, although another person had made the appointment?—Certainly; that follows from the answer which I have just given.

14372. Lord *Seymour.*] Had you, as the Secretary for War and the Colonies, the whole scheme of the expedition, namely, the amount of the Commissariat, the amount of stores as applicable to the force about to be sent out, and the scheme of the land transport, proposed to you, and the details brought under your notice, before the expedition started?—Taking them in the order in which you have put them; as regards the Commissariat, having explained to those who managed the Commissariat, what the duties would be to be performed, and the number of troops to be supplied, I expected them to carry out the necessary arrangements for supplying the amount of requisites, both of provisions and transport. As regards the stores, I looked in the same way to the Master-general of the Ordnance and the Board of Ordnance, to adapt their supply of stores to the number which were required; at the same time, I do not mean to say that I by any means divested myself of all care for those matters in detail, for with the exception of the supplies to the Commissariat, which, being an independent department, I did not interfere with them to the same extent as I did the others; I took constant opportunities of inquiring into the amount of stores that were ordered by those different departments, and the occasions were exceedingly frequent in which I ordered the quantities which had been supplied to be greatly increased, sometimes doubled in amount.

14373. With regard to the number of medical men that were sent with the army, you stated that that did not come under your notice?—No, I did not say that that did not come under my notice, for it came under my notice at a very early stage indeed. What I said was, that as regarded my communications with the medical department, they were, generally speaking, until the separation of the two Secretaryships, carried on with the Secretary-at-War, with whom the medical department had been, up to that time, in more immediate communication; and so far from my having given the answer which was supposed, my attention was drawn to the number of medical officers to be supplied to the army within a very few days of the expedition being first determined upon. My attention was drawn to it by a very important letter which was published by the eminent army surgeon, Dr. Guthrie.

14374. You received some suggestions from Dr. Guthrie, I believe; does that paper contain them? (*a paper being handed to the Witness.*)—So far as a cursory glance at this paper enables me to judge, I apprehend that this is the sketch which he favoured me with in consequence of my application to him. The facts were these: Dr. Guthrie published in the "Times" a long letter, remonstrating against the then system of appointment, and the number of army surgeons, and other matters, and saying that he had made frequent remonstrances at the Horse Guards and at the War Office in former times, but that they had never been attended to, and he now resorted to publishing his opinions. Seeing that letter in the "Times," I immediately wrote to him, assuring him that he should receive every possible attention to any suggestions that he might make, and requesting him to call upon me for that purpose. He did so, and I believe that the paper which I hold in my hand was the paper which he furnished me with in consequence of that interview.

14375. *Chairman.*] At what period was the expedition to the East decided on?—The first order for sending any troops abroad was given on the 9th of February.

14376. When the expedition was first decided on, was it intended to make an expedition to Turkey?—Certainly.

14377. The first place to which the troops were sent was Malta, was it not?—Yes.

14378. With what object distinctly was the expedition itself undertaken?—The first immediate object was to protect the Turkish empire from the invasion with which it was then threatened by the Russian forces, which had advanced to the left bank of the Danube.

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14379. That was the origin of the determination to make war?—The course taken by the Emperor of Russia in invading the Principalities, a part of the dominions of Turkey, was the immediate cause.

14380. Why was Malta the first place of destination for the troops?—The reason was this: it was considered to be extremely desirable that, as soon as war was declared, or when any convention should be signed with Turkey, under which a military force might be sent into that territory, and without which it would have been quite improper to have sent any, that as large a force as possible should be sent. At the same time, the distance being so very great between England and any portion of the Turkish dominions, I considered it was desirable, and I recommended it to the Government, who adopted the suggestion, that we should first send out a body of 10,000 men to Malta, in order that we might have the steam transports which should convey them to Malta sent home again, to be ready to carry another similar amount, whilst those who had arrived at Malta might be conveyed by sailing transports, assisted by some of the steam-vessels of the fleet; so that the whole force of 20,000 or 25,000 men might be landed on the shores of Turkey in half the time that would have been required if none had been first sent out to Malta.

14381. When was it first determined to send the force direct to Turkey from Malta?—That is hardly a question which I can answer in that form, for it was always determined to send the whole force to Turkey; but the first order for advancing the 10,000 which landed at Malta, to Turkey, was given, to the best of my recollection, about the 21st of March. But I cannot pretend to say that I am quite accurate; I believe it was about the 21st of March.

14382. Can you state why Gallipoli was chosen as the first destination of the troops in Turkey?—Before answering that question, I think it might be desirable that I should state what steps the Government had taken in anticipation of sending any military force out of this country at all, to which my attention has not been called by any question. So early as the beginning of January, foreseeing the great probability of being obliged to send a force into that country, we sent Lieutenant-colonel Vickers and three officers of engineers to Turkey, with general directions to inspect the country and its means of defence, especially as bearing upon the capital, and also to render any assistance in the way of preparing defences which the Turkish Government might require. Those officers left this country on the 13th of January, and Lieutenant-colonel Vickers was taken seriously ill at Gibraltar and could not proceed, in consequence of which we applied to Sir John Burgoyne to recommend another officer as his successor, upon which Sir John Burgoyne very handsomely at once proposed to go himself, which he did by the very next mail, leaving this country, I think, about the 27th or the 28th of January. He made a very accurate inspection of certain parts of Turkey in Europe, and he recommended that lines should be thrown up in front of Bulahir, near Gallipoli, and also, if necessary, that the same should be done in front of Constantinople, between the Sea of Marmora, in a part described by him, and the Black Sea. Soon after he left this country, believing that he had not a sufficient staff of engineer officers, I sent out Major Dixon of the Royal Artillery, a very distinguished officer, and one who was selected on account of his knowledge of the Turkish language, he having been in the Turkish service, and acquainted with the manners and customs as well as the language of the country; I sent him out with three other engineer officers with further directions, enjoining upon them especially to examine the country with reference to its salubrity, and to ascertain what parts of the country were safe for the encampment of troops, as regards their health, and in what parts wholesome water could be procured. Those officers executed the duty to which I have referred, and Major Dixon subsequently reconnoitred the Danube and a great part of Bulgaria, Sir John Burgoyne having confined himself to Roumelia, except that he went to the camp of Omar Pasha at Shumla.

14383. Do you know the names of all the officers that were sent upon that exploration?—No; I am not able to give the Committee the names of them all from memory. I have mentioned three, one having in consequence of ill health failed to arrive there, Lieutenant-Colonel Vickers, Sir John Burgoyne, and Major Dixon.

14384. Did you seek for information as to the capabilities of the country for supplying the wants of the army?—Those directions were given to the Commissariat officers who were sent out at the very commencement, and it was one of the first steps that were taken, namely on the 7th or 8th of February.

14385. What was the result of the inquiries that were made by those officers as to the capabilities of the country to supply the wants of the army?—When the Honourable Member speaks of the capabilities of the country, of course it will be understood that the inquiries were not made in the first instance with regard to Bulgaria; but they were made with reference to Roumelia, and the first object of the expedition, namely, sending the troops to Gallipoli and to the neighbourhood of Constantinople. Commissary-general Smith was sent forward for that purpose from Corfu, in consequence of his high character and knowledge of the languages of the country. I am not sure whether he knew Turkish, but he knew Greek and Italian; and he gave favourable reports of the means of obtaining all necessary supplies; and I believe he had provided, generally speaking, a sufficiency before the arrival of any of the troops.

14386. Your Grace has not now stated the object for which the troops were sent to Gallipoli?—The reasons why they were sent to Gallipoli was in consequence of the recommendation of Sir John Burgoyne, who had been sent out in the manner I have described. He recommended, on strategical grounds, that Gallipoli should first be occupied. I should say that he did not go alone; he went with Colonel Ardent, who was sent by the Emperor of the French with him, and it was their joint recommendation that that position should be occupied.

14387. What steps were taken to prepare for the reception of the troops at Gallipoli?—The steps which I have mentioned, giving instructions to the Commissariat, they being informed of the number for whom they would have to provide.

14388. You had received information from them that they had provided for the wants of the army that should come there?—I did not receive any such information from the Commissariat directly, because at that time the Commissariat was not under me, and I corresponded with the Treasury. It was from the Treasury that I received my information.

14389. Did you receive information from the Treasury that such provision had been made?—Yes, I did.

14390. That supplies could be obtained in the country for the number of troops then intended to be sent?—Such supplies as were required. I should add that vast supplies were sent from this country.

14391. Will you be good enough to state what supplies you expected to find in the country for the army that was sent to Gallipoli as separate from those which you sent from England?—The principal was fresh meat, and of course bread, to the greatest extent to which it could be procured; but in the apprehension of the possibility of bread failing, an ample supply of biscuit was sent out.

14392. And forage for the horses?—Forage for the horses I considered ought to have been provided in that country; but nevertheless a provision was made, to a considerable extent, by sending out hay from England.

14393. To Gallipoli?—I apprehend that none could have been landed at Gallipoli. The orders were given when the troops were sent to Gallipoli; but as articles of that kind were sent out in sailing vessels, and the troops were sent out in steamers, I think it probable that nothing of the kind reached Gallipoli till after the troops had left it.

14394. You did not hear that the troops, or the cavalry, were in any want while they were at Gallipoli?—No cavalry ever landed at Gallipoli.

14395. Then, with regard to the infantry that were landed at Gallipoli, had all their wants been supplied while they were there?—I cannot say that that was the case; at first there were complaints, but to the best of my recollection they were complaints arising more from the want of land transport than from the want of provisions. I should not like to state distinctly that there were no complaints of the want of provisions.

14396. Mr. *Layard.*] The Honourable Captain Wrottesley was sent out among the very first, was he not?—Yes.

14397. He states in his evidence that General Tylden had no orders at all from England with regard to the occupation of Gallipoli, and that he only heard it casually through Commissary-general Smith: the question was this, "Then

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"Then the news that you received of troops coming out was merely such casual gossip as you may have heard from Mr. Smith?" and his reply was, "We saw his official notification that the troops were expected, and then General Tylden acted upon his own responsibility:" he was then asked, "But General Tylden had no direct orders from England upon the subject?" and his answer was, "Not that I know of"?—The first step taken here was to consult Sir John Burgoyne, as one of the most eminent men connected with military defence, and his impression, before he visited the country, was that Gallipoli was a place which ought to be occupied, and engineer officers were sent out specially to examine that point.

14398. It appears from Captain Wrottesley's evidence that whilst the Commissariat officers had notice that the troops should be sent to Gallipoli, the engineer officers had no notice whatever of it officially?—I think the Honourable Member is confusing two points. If General Tylden was one of the engineer officers originally sent out, which I think he was not, he received distinct orders to examine and report upon the capabilities of the lines of Bulahir, near Gallipioli, as the place for the landing, and the position of the troops. But as regards any subsequent orders, as to providing for the arrival of the troops, no such orders naturally were sent to General Tylden, nor ought they to have been sent to General Tylden, because he was not the proper person.

14399. Who was the responsible person?—The responsible person for providing provisions was of course the Commissariat officer to whom instructions had been sent.

14400. This question was asked Captain Wrottesley: "When the troops arrived at Gallipoli, was there any inconvenience felt from want of transport?" and he says, "Yes; when the troops arrived there were immediately great inconveniences felt; we had great difficulty in taking even the tents, but more especially engineering tools, and implements, and stores, up as far as the lines, a distance of about six miles; whose fault was that?—It is impossible for me to say whose fault it was. The duty to provide such transport undoubtedly was that of the Commissariat officer. Whether there was any excuse for the deficiency I cannot say; but my impression is that there had been considerable difficulty in obtaining animals in that part of the country, though there had been none nearer Constantinople.

14401. *Chairman.*] Was that want reported to your Grace?—No, it was not; I was not aware of any difficulties having arisen, until I received information of it from a private source.

14402. When was the expedition to Varna first decided upon?—The instructions to re-embark the troops from Scutari and to proceed to Varna were given on the 22nd of April.

14403. What steps were taken to provide for the reception of the troops at Varna?—The duty of sending forward the Commissariat officers of course devolved upon the Commander-in-chief of the army; that was a step which necessarily came within his province. The instructions from home being sent to the Commander-in-chief to advance to Varna as soon as he could, of course the first step that he took was to communicate with Commissary-general Filder, and to desire him to make such preparations as he could at Varna.

14404. You stated before that you told the officers whom you had sent out to that expedition to inquire into the sanitary condition of the country; was any such order given as to Varna?—No special order was given with reference to Varna; but general instructions were given to Major Dixon and to the officers who went out with him to make particular inquiries in all parts of the country as to malaria, as to the spots which were the most salubrious for the encampment of the troops, and especially as to the supply of water.

14405. What was the result of that inquiry as regarded Varna?—I am unable to say what was the result as regarded Varna; but this I am able to say, that it was not until Lord Raglan had received from Omar Pasha the strongest assurances of the peculiar salubrity of Varna for the encampment of his troops that he advanced there.

14406. Did the event justify that statement?—Not as regards the breaking out of the cholera, but how far that was caused by any normal state of the district of country I am unable to say; and I believe there are very few people, either medical or others, who could express a positive opinion on that subject.

14407. Sir

14407. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Did they not suffer greatly from fever there?—Yes.

14408. *Chairman.*] And did not the Russian army suffer there before, in 1828?—I am not aware of that; if the Committee wish, I can quote the words of Omar Pasha with regard to the salubrity of Varna. It is from a letter from Colonel Simmons, who wrote by the desire of Omar Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, urging the advance of the English forces to Varna, and it is dated Shumla, April 2d. The sentence to which I refer is this: he is arguing in favour of Varna as a position for the English and French forces in preference to Gallipoli; he speaks unfavourably of the salubrity of Gallipoli; and then he says, "If disembarked at Varna, by keeping clear of the lake Devna, and encamping on the heights to the southward of the town, a healthy situation would be secured, with abundance of good water, and a fine climate to restore the troops and horses after their voyage, and the barrack in the town might be made use of, if necessary, as a hospital."

14409. Did the army avoid Devna?—That I am unable to say, or whether the exact directions of Omar Pasha were carried out or not. They were, of course, in the neighbourhood of Devna, and that they must necessarily have been if in the neighbourhood of Varna.

14410. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Your Grace stated that that letter was written by the desire of Omar Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe?—Yes, it was.

14411. Do you know whether that letter was communicated to Lord Raglan?—Yes; every such letter was immediately communicated by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Foreign Office, and to Lord Raglan.

14412. Mr. *Layard.*] Did your Grace receive any reports as to the position of the army when encamped near Varna?—Yes; but of course it is not very easy to know whether the question of heights has been attended to from merely inspecting a map.

14413. Was not part of the army actually encamped upon the Lake Devna?—Near to it.

14414. Were not the Guards encamped on the Lake?—I do not know; I am not aware of it.

14415. *Chairman.*] If they did not avoid Lake Devna, they did not follow the instructions of Omar Pacha?—Certainly not.

14416. What was the precise object of the expedition to Varna?—The object of the advance to Varna was the relief of Silistria; that was the immediate object.

14417. When the siege of Silistria was raised, another expedition was determined upon?—It was.

14418. At what time of the year was the expedition to the Crimea determined upon?—We received by telegraph the intelligence of the siege of Silistria having been raised on the 27th of June; on the following day a mail left this country for Constantinople; and I wrote privately to Lord Raglan, informing him that he would receive by the next mail a despatch, as I should prepare on the following day a despatch for the decision of the Cabinet, directing him, under certain circumstances, to cross to the Crimea, and besiege Sebastopol.

14419. Was that order to Lord Raglan peremptory, or was any discretion left with him, as to deciding upon the expedition to the Crimea?—That is a question, the answer to which might be so easily misunderstood, that I think the better way would be, if it is not irregular, to read the instructions. I should say that this is a course which, under ordinary circumstances, I should not consider myself justified in taking; for being no longer a Minister of the Crown, I should think that I was precluded from reading a despatch which I had written, without the sanction of the existing Government; but considering the circumstances under which this Committee is appointed, I am disposed to think that I should not be departing from the proper course in reading it.

14420. I think, in full justification of yourself, that your Grace ought to read it?—Very well.

14421. Sir *J. Pakington.*] I presume your Grace does not feel apprehensions of any injury to the public service by reading the letter?—No. At the same time, I do not consider that an ex-Minister is, generally speaking, a very fair judge upon such a subject; he has naturally a temptation to read documents which he feels might exonerate himself; and those immediately responsible for the

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the affairs of the nation are, I think, the most proper judges. I can only say for myself, if the Committee feel that they are authorised to call for them, so far as I am concerned, it would be my desire to read the instructions which I gave to Lord Raglan, both those with regard to the siege of Sebastopol, and those which had been previously given on the 10th of April; but I am in the hands of the Committee. I think they are, upon the whole, more fair and impartial judges than I am. I should not propose to read anything that I could imagine would be prejudicial to the public service.

14422. *Chairman.*] Will your Grace be good enough to read those instructions?—In order to put the Committee in complete possession of the instructions with reference to the expedition to Sebastopol, it will be necessary that I should first read a second despatch, containing instructions to Lord Raglan, which I addressed to him on the 10th of April; in the first despatch the instructions were of a general nature, and applied to the operations which were to be immediately undertaken. The despatch of the same date, the 10th of April, was to this effect: "With reference to my despatch of this date, I have to direct your Lordship to lose no time after your arrival in Turkey in making careful but secret inquiry into the present amount and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol. Your first duty will be to prevent, by every means in your power, the advance of the Russian army on Constantinople, if it should appear that there is any present serious intention of making such an attempt; but you must bear in mind, that if the Russian general should make no demonstrations of any further onward movement, it may become essential for the attainment of the objects of the war that some operations of an offensive character should be undertaken by the allied armies. No blow which could be struck at the southern extremities of the Russian empire would be so effective for this purpose as the taking of Sebastopol. It is unnecessary to point out that the destruction of the Russian fleet is one of the certain consequences, and that a solid guarantee for the future maintenance of peace would thus be obtained. Before, however, the siege of a fortress, reported to be so strong, can be attempted, it is necessary that information which can be relied upon shall be obtained on many points on which little or nothing is at present known in England, or, as it would appear, even in Turkey. Captain Drummond, in Her Majesty's ship 'Retribution,' lately examined and reported upon the strength of the sea defences; but your Lordship will have to ascertain whether in the last few months the works have been materially strengthened on the land side, both on the south and north of the harbour, and what facilities for landing troops may exist on any part of the shore between the fortress and Kaffa on the one side, and Eupatoria on the other. The number of men in the Crimea and Sebastopol is variously estimated, but 30,000 is generally believed to be the largest force which can at present have been sent there. It will be necessary to ascertain, not only whether this is the number, but how that force is constituted. It is reported that the main, if not the only, supply of water, is derived from a source eight miles distant. This is an important fact to establish if it should be considered advisable to invest the town. The amount of provisions in the garrison is another subject for inquiry. As the siege train cannot reach its destination for three or four weeks after your arrival in Turkey, these inquiries should be made in the meantime, and I have to request your Lordship to report to Her Majesty's Government the result." The other despatch upon which I have been questioned by the Honourable Chairman, is dated the 29th of June; as I stated, two days after we heard by telegraph that the siege of Silistria had been raised. "War Department, 29th June 1854. My Lord,—In my despatch of the 10th April, marked 'Secret,' I directed your Lordship to make careful inquiry into the amount and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol. At the same time, I pointed out to your Lordship that whilst it was your first duty to prevent by every means in your power the advance of the Russian army on Constantinople, supposing any such intention to exist, it might become essential for the attainment of the objects of the war to undertake operations of an offensive character, and that the heaviest blow which could be struck at the southern extremities of the Russian empire would be the taking or destruction of Sebastopol. The events which have recently occurred, and which have become known to Her Majesty's Government by means

means of the telegraph from Belgrade, the gallant and successful resistance of the Turkish army, the raising of the siege of Silistria, the retreat of the Russian army across the Danube, and the anticipated evacuation of the Principalities, have given a new character to the war, and will render it necessary for you without delay to concert measures with Marshal St. Arnaud, and with Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, suited to the circumstances in which these events have placed the allied forces. The safety of Constantinople from any invasion of the Russian army is now for a time at least secured, and the advance of the English and French armies to Varna and Pravadi has succeeded in its object without their being called upon to meet the enemy in action. Any farther advance of the allied armies should on no account be contemplated. To occupy the Dobrudscha would be productive of no beneficial results, and would be fatally prejudicial to the health of the troops; and even if the Russian army should not cross the Pruth, but continue in occupation of the Principalities, it is the decided opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that, for the present at least, no measures should be taken by you to dislodge them. The circumstances anticipated in my despatch before referred to have therefore now arrived, and I have, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to instruct your Lordship to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol, unless with the information in your possession, but at present unknown in this country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it could not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success. The confidence with which Her Majesty placed under your command the gallant army now in Turkey is unabated; and if upon mature reflection you should consider that the united strength of the two armies is insufficient for this undertaking, you are not to be precluded from the exercise of the discretion originally vested in you, though Her Majesty's Government will learn with regret that an attack from which such important consequences are anticipated must be any longer delayed. The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear to Her Majesty's Government to be more likely to increase than diminish by delay, and as there is no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed, it is on all accounts most important that nothing but insuperable impediments, such as the want of ample preparation by either army, or the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it, should be allowed to prevent the early decision to undertake these operations. This decision should be taken solely with reference to the means at your disposal, as compared with the difficulties to be overcome. It is probable that a large part of the Russian army now retreating from the Turkish territory may be poured into the Crimea to reinforce Sebastopol. If orders to this effect have not already been given, it is further probable that such a measure would be adopted as soon as it is known that the allied armies are in motion to commence active hostilities. As all communications by sea are now in the hands of the allied powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all communication by land between the Crimea and the other parts of the Russian dominions. This would be effectually done by the occupation of the Isthmus of Perekop, and I would suggest to you that if a sufficient number of the Turkish army can now be spared for this purpose, it would be highly important that measures should be taken without delay for sending an adequate force to that point, and associating with the troops of the Sultan such English and French officers as would assist by their advice in holding, permanently, this position. With the same object, important assistance might be rendered by Admiral Dundas, if he has yet been able to obtain any vessels of a light draught which would prevent the passage of Russian troops to the Crimea through the Sea of Azof. It is unnecessary to express any opinion, at this distance from the scene, as to the mode in which these operations should be conducted, or the place at which a disembarkation should be effected; and as the latter will, of course, be decided with the advice and assistance of the French and English Admirals, it is equally unnecessary to impress upon your Lordship the importance of selecting favourable weather for the purpose, and avoiding all risks of being obliged, by storms, to withdraw from the shore the vessels of war and transports when only a partial landing of the troops has been effected. I will not, in this despatch, enter into any consideration of the operations which it would be desirable to undertake in Circassia or the coast of Abasia. The reduction of the

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the two remaining Russian fortresses of Anapa and Sujak Kaleh would be, next to the taking of Sebastopol, of the greatest importance, as bearing upon the fortunes and results of the war; but not only is their fall of far less moment than that of Sebastopol, but the capture of the latter might possibly secure the surrender of the Circassian fortresses. In the event, however, of delay in undertaking these operations being inevitable, and the transports being, in consequence, available for any other service, I wish you to consider, with his Highness Omar Pasha, and Marshal St. Arnaud, whether some part of the Turkish army might not be conveyed, by steam from Varna, and, by a combined movement with the forces of General Guyon and Schamyl, so entrap the Russian army in and around Tiflis as to compel its surrender to superior numbers. I have only further to express to you, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, their entire reliance in your judgment, zeal, and discretion; and their conviction, that whilst you will not expose the army under your command to unnecessary risk, you will not forget, that to the gallantry and conduct of your troops their countrymen are now looking to secure, by the blessing of Providence, the great objects of a just war: the vindication of national rights, and the future security of the peace of Europe."

14423. Mr. *Layard.*] Was that despatch submitted to Lord Hardinge?—Yes, it was.

14424. In drawing up directions for military movements, would the Minister of War think it necessary to consult the Commander-in-chief?—That would depend upon the nature of the instructions. If they were of that technical military character that a civilian would be unable to form a fair opinion upon them, he would.

14425. In sketching the general plan of a campaign, would it be necessary to consult the Commander-in-chief?—The sketch of a campaign would be, as I said, of a professional character, to a great extent.

14426. *Chairman.*] Did you receive any information as to the possibility of occupying Perekop, and the Sea of Azof afterwards?—I received an answer upon that point from Lord Raglan, expressing his opinion that it would not be practicable or advisable: and I am bound to say, that some four or five months afterwards we ascertained, what was not before known in this country or elsewhere until that time, that the Russians had another means of access into the Crimea, some miles to the eastward of Perekop, by a bridge.

14427. Mr. *Layard.*] What access does your Grace allude to?—A bridge which was commenced by the Russians some four or five years ago, by which they had obtained a good road—of course, more circuitous, but nevertheless a good and secure road—across the Lagoon, which extends from Perekop to the eastward, in the direction of the neck of land.

14428. Are we acquainted with the exact position of that bridge?—I have seen a plan which was sent home by the captain of a vessel, who obtained the information from some of the Tartars.

14429. Is there no other information?—No; it causes a considerable detour, as a means of bringing troops.

14430. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Supposing your Grace's instructions to have been carried out, and that the army was in possession of Perekop, would they not also cover that road by that bridge?—No; there is a distinct road besides that at Perekop, and that which, I believe, was used on the first invasion of the Crimea by the Russians, forming a kind of tongue on the eastern border of the Putrid Sea. We received information which we considered authentic, very late indeed, I think a very little before Christmas last, obtained by the captain of one of the Queen's ships, who was cruising off the shallow water in the neighbourhood of Perekop, and with directions, in short, to molest any Russian troops which might be proceeding in that direction. He ascertained from some of the Tartars that there was a new bridge which had been constructed four or five years before, and which formed a road into the Crimea, quite independent of Perekop.

14431. Mr. *Layard.*] We had consuls at Odessa and Kertsch, had we not?—Yes, until the breaking out of the war.

14432. Did they not give the British Government any information on that subject?—No; and I am sure they were entirely ignorant of it, for I saw both of them.

14433. *Chairman.*]

14433. *Chairman.*] How long after those instructions were sent out to Lord Raglan did the expedition really sail?—It sailed, I think, on the 7th of September.

14434. Has your Grace Lord Raglan's answer to that despatch?—I have. The answer to my despatch is dated the 19th of July, from Varna.

14435. *Chairman.*] Is there any objection to your Grace's reading it?—I have glanced over it hurriedly at the moment, and I do not think that there is; but not recollecting it quite as accurately as I did my own, I had, perhaps, better look it over again (*His Grace referred to the despatch*). I should say that this despatch embraces much more extensive allusions to the operations of the French than my despatch did, which was intended solely to be directions to Lord Raglan himself; but I am not aware that there is anything to which the French Government could object.

14436. Perhaps your Grace could read an extract from it?—I am very fearful of reading extracts from another person's despatch; there would not be any unfairness towards the General in Command of the troops to read his despatch, but to read garbled extracts from it, I am afraid, would be hardly fair towards him, and I think he might have good reasons to complain. If they were selected on his discretion, it would be a different thing. My own impression is, that I ought to read the whole or not any of it.

14437. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What is the date of it?—The 19th of July.

14438. Subject to your Grace's opinion whether it is or it is not injurious to the public service, I think it ought to be read?—I would say, with reference to that question, that I think it a responsibility which it would be hardly fair to throw upon me, to decide whether those matters are injurious to the public service or not. I am perfectly ready to express my own individual opinion; but as this inquiry is, more or less, and more rather than less, an inquiry into the mode in which I have conducted the business of the war, whilst it was in my hands, it would be, of course, rather unfair to throw upon me the responsibility of avoiding to give that evidence which might be perfectly necessary with a view to my own justification, but which, nevertheless, I might consider to be injurious to the public service. It is rather throwing upon me a decision upon a point as to which I am not an impartial judge.

14439. That despatch was sent to your Grace long before you left office, was it not?—Certainly. I am not prepared to shrink from any expression of opinion with regard to the production of this despatch, but I think it is hardly right to throw upon me the decision whether the evidence is injurious to the public service or whether it is not.

14440. General *Peel.*] Your Grace considers that the despatch you have read contained sufficient authority to Lord Raglan to proceed to the Crimea, without any further reference to you, if he considered the circumstances of the case justified it?—Certainly; but then I am bound to say that this despatch is a very fair statement, on the part of Lord Raglan, of his views of the expedition, so far as he was able to form them.

14441. And the despatch which you now hold in your hand, is Lord Raglan's explanation of the circumstances which induced him to delay or postpone complying with your Grace's recommendation?—No, he does not speak of delay; but I think, the Committee having decided that my despatch should be read, unless the Government sees any objection, that they ought to have Lord Raglan's answer, in fairness to Lord Raglan.

14442. Sir *J. Pakington.*] There is one question which I would put to your Grace; you stated just now that in your despatch to Lord Raglan, of the 10th of April, you suggested several very important inquiries; with regard to the force of the Russian army in the Crimea, the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol, and other points of that nature; will you state whether, between the 10th of April and the 29th of June, you ever received any information in answer to those inquiries?—No; in the very despatch which I understand the Committee have now decided to move for, Lord Raglan states that he has not been able to obtain any of the information which was required in that despatch.

14443. Is your Grace aware whether you had ever received information of Admiral Dundas having made an offer to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, before war was declared, to send a confidential agent to the Crimea, naming the person, to ascertain all those very points?—I never heard of it till this moment, and

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and I can hardly believe that any such communication can have been made, because the most urgent injunctions were sent by me to Lord Raglan, as the Committee have heard, and by Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to obtain all the information which it was in their power to obtain.

14444. When were those instructions sent?—The despatch that I have read was sent on the 10th of April.

14445. I referred to the period before the declaration of war?—War was declared on the 29th of March, but the orders to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe must have come out from the Foreign Office so immediately after the event to which the Honourable Member has referred, supposing it to have occurred, that I think the Honourable Member cannot have been correctly informed.

14446. Mr. *Drummond.*] Was your Grace not informed that Captain Drummond went a second time to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, with that very person to whom the Honourable Baronet has referred, and entreated him to allow him to go into the Crimea and ascertain the nature of the fortifications, and the strength of the force in the town of Sebastopol?—I never heard of it.

14447. Your Grace was not informed that while two Russian ships were being repaired here, Admiral Dundas having one of his ships with a hole in her bottom, requested Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's leave to send that ship into Sebastopol in order to be repaired there?—I never heard it.

14448. Mr. *Layard.*] Were copies of this despatch sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, as Ambassador at Constantinople?—I cannot answer that question. I should think not; but my practice was, that in the case of every despatch of so important a character as those I have read, I always sent a copy of it to the Foreign Office, and therefore it was competent to Lord Clarendon to have sent a copy. I cannot say that he did.

14449. To the best of your belief, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was fully informed of that which passed between the Government and Lord Raglan?—I have no doubt of it.

14450. *Chairman.*] Can you state the time at which you were first informed of the determination of the Commander of the Forces to winter in the Crimea?—I think it can hardly be called a determination on the part of the Commander of the Forces, or of anybody, to winter in the Crimea; it was an act of necessity, not of resolution. I was first persuaded of the certainty that the forces would winter in the Crimea after the intelligence of the battle of Inkermann.

14451. You state that it was a matter of necessity; did that necessarily arise from the fact of their being to the south of Sebastopol, and unable to escape, or was it in consequence of the desire to take the place?—In consequence of the desire to take the place. I mean that it was obviously necessary to winter in the Crimea, unless the expedition was to be entirely abandoned, the object for which it was undertaken being unaccomplished.

14452. Did the suggestion to winter in the Crimea first come from the Commander of the Forces or from the Ministry at home?—The suggestion for the wintering of the troops in the Crimea in reality came from neither; it was, as I said before, a necessity, which grew out of the circumstances, and which became so palpable to both, that it was assumed as a necessary consequence of the position of the army.

14453. Then do you suppose that nobody was responsible for that determination?—It is difficult to say. The resolution required would rather have been to have left the Crimea; they were in the Crimea, and they must winter in it, unless they took the resolution to leave it.

14454. When the resolution was taken not to leave it, what steps were taken to prepare for our army wintering there?—The additional steps which I took when it became evident, were to order a large quantity of fur and woollen clothing of all descriptions, to order wooden huts, and everything which to the best of my belief could conduce to the comfort of the army under such circumstances.

14455. What was the date at which you determined to issue furs and warm clothing to the army?—As to furs I can answer, but if you put it as to the warm clothing I must go back. It was not after I became convinced that the army would have to winter there, that I first ordered warm clothing to be provided; but I ordered additional warm clothing, and of warmer character, when that became evident. So early as the month of August, immediately after the prorogation of Parliament, I ordered a very large quantity of warm clothing

of

of every description, except that which might be comprehended under the general term furs.

14456. To whom were those orders issued?—They were issued to the Ordnance.

14457. Were those orders executed?—I have reason to believe that they were executed; some I know were executed, from the unfortunate circumstance of the loss of a very large proportion of them in the "Prince."

14458. That was on the 14th November?—Yes; I ordered those articles in August; and they left this country in October in the "Prince."

14459. Mr. *Layard.*] Were those extra articles, and ordered in consequence of extraordinary circumstances?—Certainly; they were articles such as are not ordinarily served out to troops, all of them; there was an additional supply of blankets; 40,000 pairs of blankets; a large quantity of rugs and woollen underclothes; 60,000 or 70,000 woollen jerseys, woollen socks, woollen drawers, woollen mitts, and everything of that description, to provide for the character of the winter quarters, which I apprehended the troops would be inevitably subject to wherever they wintered in the Turkish dominions.

14460. There was no particular place in view for wintering when the troops were sent out?—No.

14461. The clothing was not intended for an army wintering in tents, more than for an army wintering in barracks?—Yes; a large proportion of those things would not have been required if we had felt that the army would have been able to winter in comfortable barracks.

14462. *Chairman.*] Was any determination taken to provide depôts of provisions?—Certainly.

14463. Where?—At Constantinople, principally.

14464. Were any depôts formed there?—Yes; they were ordered to be formed.

14465. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Were those orders given by your Grace?—Certainly. I should say that from the moment the certainty of the troops wintering in the Crimea became obvious, I gave directions immediately for an increased supply of every article of provivion and of fuel to be forwarded in continual streams from England, in order to keep up those depôts at their proper mark.

14466. *Chairman.*] If the evidence given before this Committee goes to show that there was no depôt of provisions at Constantinople, is that different from your Grace's present belief?—Certainly; my impression is, that there was a depôt both of biscuit, salt beef, and rum at Constantinople, as well as at Malta.

14467. Was any inquiry made by your orders as to the means of supplying the army with fresh meat from the shores of the Black Sea?—From time to time I urged that question upon the Commissariat, when I found the supply of fresh meat was beginning to fail; up to the time of the commencement of the siege of Sebastopol the army had been supplied with fresh meat with very great regularity.

14468. Mr. *Bramston.*] Was the Commissariat under your Grace's direction at this time?—No, not until the 22d of December.

14469. *Chairman.*] But it was responsible to you, I suppose, through the Treasury?—Yes, it was responsible to me; but nevertheless it was not subordinate to the Secretary of State, in the way in which the military departments were. If I had given an order to Sir Charles Trevelyan, it would have been executed; but there was not that necessary reference to the Secretary of State in all Commissariat matters which was considered proper and essential, as regards the supply of stores of other kinds, from the Ordnance, for instance.

14470. Were they bound to obey your orders?—Yes.

14471. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Were you kept informed of the articles which were sent out to the Commissariat from time to time?—Not with that regularity which, if it had been a necessary system, it should have been, I think. As a matter of anxiety to myself, I took care to keep myself informed, but I was not officially kept informed; Sir Charles Trevelyan generally supplied me privately with information, but there was not an official regulation for communication with the Secretary of State.

14472. They did not report to you, then, as a system?—No.

14473. *Chairman.*] Was there any reserve of troops formed in any part of the Mediterranean for supplying the army with reinforcements in case of casualties?

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casualties?—Not till a later period; the determination to form a reserve depôt of troops at Malta was taken early in November.

14474. Were you informed by the Commander of the Forces that the troops suffered very much from overwork in the trenches before Sebastopol?—I was not until a late period.

14475. When your Grace left office you were wholly ignorant of the fact that they were suffering then?—No; I did not say that.

14476. From official information, I mean?—No, nor can I say that; one of the despatches which I received in the month of January had reference to that point, and to an application which in consequence Lord Raglan had made to General Canrobert, to make a fresh division of the lines between the two forces, the lines having been equal at the commencement of the siege, which was, of course, perfectly right under those circumstances, the forces having been then equal, or the predominance being rather in favour of the English.

14477. Did you find any difficulty in obtaining troops for the formation of those reserves?—The troops were kept up by recruits. The steps taken to form a reserve in Malta were to increase the companies of regiments from 12 to 16, so as to maintain eight companies as a fighting force with the army, four companies to be the advanced reserve in depôt at Malta, and four companies of lately raised recruits to remain in England forming a depôt.

14478. Did you determine to form those reserves in order to supply the casualties of the army?—Yes, for those two purposes; first, to have a reserve nearer the seat of war than England, which had been found to be a great inconvenience; and, secondly, as far as possible, to send the reinforcements to the army more mature in age, and especially in practice, than those whom we had hitherto been able to send from this country. Now, assuming that this plan has been followed out, the recruits do not proceed immediately from this country to the seat of war, but they go to Malta for further training, in the first instance, and subsequently they are advanced.

14479. Are you aware at all that an offer was made to the Government in December by a Spanish colonel, to provide the English Government with 10,000 Spanish troops?—I cannot say that I am aware of that particular offer having been made; there were several offers of that description made, generally speaking, to the Foreign Office, but they were not considered, when inquiry was made into them, worthy of being entertained. At the same time I would point out that at the date to which allusion has been made, a very strong feeling had been raised in this country against the employment of foreign troops.

14480. Yet the Foreign Enlistment Bill had been passed at that time, had it not?—It passed on the 23d of December.

14481. General *Peel.*] In the despatch published in the "Gazette," from Lord Raglan, at the end of December, before the one you mentioned, I think he stated that he did not conceal from you, that he would wish to have more reinforcements?—I do not remember it to have been published, nor do I remember the exact date, but there was a despatch from Lord Raglan at the time when the pressure upon the troops became so serious, in which he said he was anxious for whatever reinforcements could be sent out to him; and every exertion was made. In fact it had been made before, to send out every man that could possibly be sent, and, I am bound to say, men who under other circumstances ought not to have been sent out, from not having been long enough enlisted.

14482. *Chairman.*] Then Lord Raglan did ask for more troops?—About the time to which the Honourable Member has referred, I received a despatch from Lord Raglan, in which he uses some such expression as that which has been referred to.

14483. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Was not it in a despatch after the battle of Inkermann, in which he says, "I will not conceal from your Grace that I should have been better satisfied if I could have occupied this position in greater force"?—The despatch to which the Honourable Member refers is dated the 3d of November, before Sebastopol, and the phrase is, "Thus every possible step has been taken to secure this important point;" that is Balaklava; "but I will not conceal from your Grace that I should have been better satisfied if I could have occupied this position in greater strength."

14484. *Chairman.*] I will read to your Grace a statement which I have before me, to this effect: "In the last week of December 1854, Mr. C. Manby transmitted

transmitted to the War Department a letter from Mr. J. L. Manby, of Paris, containing an offer to furnish for the Crimea 10,000 Spanish Guerilla troops, armed, accoutred, and officered; 5,000 in three weeks, and the other 5,000 in three weeks afterwards, at the bounty of 1 *l.* sterling per man. These men were to be of the best class of Guerillas, and accustomed to their own peculiar warfare. This letter was sent to Mr. Roberts, Under Secretary of State, as it was feared that otherwise it might be lost amidst the numerous documents then inundating the War Department. A request was at the same time conveyed that if the offer was entertained, the communications might be direct with Mr. J. L. Manby, at Paris. The receipt of the letter was acknowledged, 1st January 1855." Was your Grace ever made acquainted with that fact?—I have not the slightest doubt that I was; every document of that kind invariably came before me; I entrusted nothing of that kind to the Under Secretaries; therefore unless some great mistake arose, it undoubtedly was; I do not remember the name; I remember several offers being made of Portuguese and Spanish troops, and the Government was of opinion that it was not desirable to employ either Spanish or Portuguese troops.

14485. The communication was made on behalf of Colonel ———— ?—I do not remember the name, but, as I said before, I have not the slightest doubt that the special application came before me, but after the notice had been given that the Government intended to employ a Foreign Legion, the applications, of all descriptions, which came from all parts of Europe, were so large as 20, 30, and 40 a day frequently; and I think the Committee will see that it is not very surprising that I should not recollect the name; but the number rather leads my recollection to the fact, for I do remember two or three offers of that precise number, and I recollect a similar offer of Portuguese troops to that extent, and of French troops to that extent, but the Government determined not to accept them.

14486. Mr. *Layard.*] Was an offer made on the part of the Canadian Government to furnish troops?—Not in my time. I believe some offer has been made since. But we had suggestions from individuals, in Canada, expressive of willingness, and to this extent they were accepted: the answer was sent through the Colonial Secretary to Canada to intimate the readiness with which we should accept any offer, either of regiments or of recruits.

14487. When you were in office was no offer made by the Canadian Government to furnish one or two regiments?—Not by the Canadian Government, but steps had been taken before I left office to communicate with the Canadian Government and the Government of Nova Scotia, with reference to the raising of troops.

14488. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was not an offer made of that kind by Colonel Prince from Canada?—Not during my time.

14489. Colonel *Peel.*] The force originally sent out was 10,000 men, was it not?—Yes, or rather that was the advanced portion of the army, because it was always intended that the first force should amount to the number that went to Turkey, namely, something like 25,000. The 10,000 that went to Malta was the advanced portion of the original force.

14490. It was always intended to send out 25,000?—Or thereabout.

14491. Was that number determined upon in consideration of the object which they were intended to accomplish, or was it with reference to the number of men that our army could furnish?—Both.

14492. You made application to the General Commanding-in-chief to know what number of trained soldiers there were available for such a purpose?—Yes, certainly; I went most carefully into the examination with him before the order was given.

14493. Did that admit of any reserve, or any means of reinforcing this number of 25,000?—It admitted of a reserve, which ultimately was sent out under the orders of Sir George Cathcart.

14494. Sir George Cathcart's division would only make up the number you have mentioned, namely, 25,000?—No; Sir George Cathcart's division was over and above the 25,000; 21,300 infantry were first sent out, and to that you have to add the cavalry, and artillery, and sappers and miners; and the sum total of the force sent out was upwards of 25,000.

14495. What was the force that it was considered necessary to maintain in this country, in order to keep up that army of 25,000 men?—The proper reserve

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reserve to have kept up, if it could have been, would have been larger than was kept up, and every exertion was made to increase that reserve. The utmost exertion was made, and, undoubtedly, 25,000 was a large proportion to send out, under the circumstances; but from the first moment at which the war became imminent, I sent out to recal 10 regiments from the various colonies, some of which arrived within two or three months afterwards, and the greater part of them are now, and have been, for a long while, in the Crimea.

14496. Was not the consequence of your sending out so many men originally this: that you were afterwards obliged to send out recruits who hardly knew their duty in the field?—Yes; that is to say, when we found that Lord Raglan wanted great reinforcements, as I stated in the despatch which has been referred to, it became necessary to draw upon recruits whom it would have been very advisable to have kept in this country another year, if possible.

14497. *Chairman.*] Can you charge your memory with saying whether or not answers were sent to most of those proposals, as to foreign troops?—Certainly; and if there is any instance in which an answer was not sent, it must have been entirely accidental.

14498. In the case I mentioned to you, of Mr. Manby, no answer was sent?—Then there must have been some accident; and if so, I think that, through some accident or other, that proposal never reached me. I do not, certainly, recollect the name, but the fact of his not having received an answer would lead me to suppose that the letter never reached me.

14499. I have in my hand a reply of Mr. Roberts to the first application?—What is the date of it?

14500. The date of that answer is the 1st of January; the letter runs thus: "My dear Sir,—I will, if you wish it, place your letter in the hands of the private secretary of the Duke; but at present we are flooded with similar letters; and it is only right to let you know that the details of organisation do not rest here"?—That refers to this circumstance, that it was contemplated that the Foreign Legion should be conducted by officers specially appointed for that purpose, and not by the Secretary of State; as it would have been perfectly impossible for him to have gone into all the details of so very large a concern, which it would have been absolutely necessary to enter into. I do not know what has been since done, but I appointed two officers, General Chesney, (I believe a change was afterwards made by my successor), and Colonel Pascal, who had been an officer in the old German Legion, and was thoroughly conversant with all the details of that service.

14501. Mr. *Layard.*] Were those appointments made after the Enlistment Bill had passed through the House?—Yes.

14502. Colonel Chesney had been in the East, had he not?—Yes.

14503. He had been in Asia Minor, and all parts of Turkey?—Yes.

14504. Did you revoke that appointment?—Certainly not.

14505. It was revoked immediately after you went out of office?—Yes.

14506. On what grounds?—I have not the slightest idea.

14507. Were any preparations made for enlisting foreigners before the Bill was brought before the Houses of Parliament?—No.

14508. A Bill brought before Parliament was the first step taken towards forming the Legion, was it not?—Certainly, and I stated in Parliament that the Government did not consider that it would have been becoming to have taken steps, until leave was obtained.

14509. Were means taken to ascertain whether those troops could be raised?—Yes; by private inquiries, but not by communications to Governments.

14510. Still, full information had been obtained as to the power of raising such troops on the continent?—Yes.

14511. In the replies to those questions, was the information that was obtained satisfactory?—Certainly.

14512. General *Peel.*] Did you find any alteration afterwards in the disposition of the people to enlist, in consequence of the language made use of in Parliament during the debates?—The greatest possible alteration; I received communications from those who had expressed the greatest willingness, and I saw afterwards several foreigners of the highest respectability of character, who said they had come here with the full intention to assist us, but after the way in which they had been called mercenaries and cut-throats, and other names of a reproachful nature, they would have nothing to do with it.

14513. Mr. *Layard.*] Was that Foreign Legion originally intended to be limited to Germans, or any nation in Europe; or was it to be open?—Not to any one; it was intended first to confine it to Germans, and to Swiss, subject to any extension that was considered desirable afterwards.

14514. Before you went out of office was the limit extended?—No.

14515. Therefore, if a well-known and meritorious Italian officer applied, and was rejected on the ground that the Foreign Legion was only intended to include Germans and Swiss, you think that the ground assigned was a proper and valid one?—Yes; consistent with the determination of the Government, certainly.

14516. *Chairman.*] You say you sent out warm clothing in the "Prince"?—A large portion of it.

14517. When did you first hear of her loss?—The "Prince" was lost on the 14th of November; I heard of it by telegraph; and therefore I should think it was probably on or about the 20th or 21st of November; but the accounts were so extremely confused at that time, that until we received the despatches a week later, we were not by any means certain that the "Prince" was lost; on the contrary, the information which we received from individuals who came straight from Balaklava, and who had seen her land the 46th, gave us great reason to suppose either that she was not lost, or if she were, that she had landed her cargo.

14518. What steps did you take to supply the place of those lost things?—I did not wait to ascertain the fact of the loss, for even upon the supposition that it was possible, I took instant steps to have everything procured that had been lost; the very morning the telegraph was received, agents were despatched from the Ordnance to the manufacturing districts, to purchase up all the warm clothing, like that which had been lost, which they could procure, without delay; and so rapidly was that order executed, that when we received the despatch which made the loss certain, a great part of those articles were already in London, and were shipped in vessels which had been prepared for other purposes, within a day or two afterwards.

14519. Have you ever heard of the reception of those goods by the soldiers in the Crimea?—I do not know that I have heard of those identical goods, but I have heard, from time to time, of the reception of warm clothing of every description.

14520. By the troops?—Certainly.

14521. Are you under the impression now that the troops received warm clothing before you left office?—A considerable quantity was distributed before I left office, but the intelligence of the distribution of a large part has been received since I left office.

14522. Mr. *Bramston.*] Can your Grace furnish the Committee with the names of those vessels in which this warm clothing was shipped to compensate for the loss of goods on board the "Prince"?—My impression is that one was the "Charity."

14523. Can you furnish the Committee at a subsequent period with the names of those vessels?—Certainly, but the Admiralty can furnish it more accurately.

14524. *Chairman.*] Was there any communication made to you as to what the cargo of the "Prince" consisted of?—Yes, I had a perfect list.

14525. To whom was it consigned, do you know?—The practice was to consign all those things to the Commissariat.

14526. Do you know whether there was any manifesto of the cargo sent to the consignee?—I cannot speak positively upon that; but I can say this, that it was a point I was repeatedly pressing upon the Ordnance authorities, and I was constantly inquiring of them whether those particulars had been strictly attended to; and, with the view of securing certain knowledge in the camp of everything that was shipped, I directed (so far as I recollect, in the month of August, but certainly very early,) that lists should be sent to Lord Raglan, that he might have a knowledge of everything that was sent, in addition to the lists which had been ordinarily sent before to the other departments.

14527. Was it because you thought that had not been done that you pressed it upon the Ordnance?—I had reason to fear that it had not been done, from information which was conveyed to me, but I was assured by them, upon every inquiry I made, that it had been strictly adhered to.

 14528. Do

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14528. Do you know whether the "Prince" contained any medical stores as well as warm clothing?—Yes.

14529. Do you know where the medical stores were stowed?—It was stated that they were stowed under the heavy ordnance which was also in the ship. That was stated with reference to the "Prince," and with reference to two other vessels, and it was said to have been a case of very frequent occurrence; and it was one of so disgraceful a character, if it was true, that, when I heard of it, I called upon the Ordnance to explain, and they gave the most positive denial to the fact; and under those circumstances, having an assertion made at Constantinople, with a positive contradiction on the part of the shippers in England, I appointed, in concurrence with the Secretary-at-War, a committee of three gentlemen, one on behalf of the Ordnance, another on behalf of the Admiralty, and the third selected by the War Office, to inquire into those facts, and their report has been laid before the House of Commons, and those three gentlemen having inquired into it, have stated that it was not the fact that the medical stores were placed under the ordnance.

14530. What was the statement made at Constantinople?—When the "Prince" arrived at Scutari, Dr. Menzies asked for the medical stores, which he knew to be on board, and he was told by the captain that they could not be delivered to him, for they were under the heavy Ordnance stores, which it was impossible to remove there.

14531. They were not delivered to him?—No, they were not delivered to him.

14532. Was the Captain drowned before the inquiry took place?—Yes; in the "Prince."

14533. How did the Commissioners ascertain what had been the state of the cargo when the ship was wrecked?—I have not read the evidence. I have seen the result at which they arrived, but the evidence has been published, and I believe it was by the examination of what they considered competent witnesses.

14534. Lord *Seymour.*] Were you aware, with regard to the cargo of the "Prince," that owing to the changes which took place among the officers and men of the "Prince" previously to sailing, it is very doubtful whether anyone on board knew accurately where the stores intended for Scutari were placed?—I was not aware of that until it came to light by the answers which I obtained from the Ordnance; when I remonstrated with them upon the assumed fact, which they denied, of the misplacement of the stores, they made that statement in their defence.

14535. A large vessel being sent out without any one on board knowing where the various stores were placed necessarily led to great inconvenience?—Certainly.

14636. Who was responsible, do you consider, for such inconvenience having been experienced?—I have not one word to say in defence of the circumstances relating to that affair. I consider them to be most reprehensible. Up to the time when those facts came to my knowledge, I had considered that a department of the Admiralty was responsible which undertook the shipment of goods; but it appears that there was not between the Admiralty department, or rather that department of the Admiralty, and the Ordnance, that proper understanding of their relative duties which ought to exist; and it was the fact of such circumstances as these which led the Admiralty to the conclusion, about that time, that it was necessary to revise the old form of a Transport Board, instead of conducting the business, as had been the practice since 1830, by the Board of Admiralty.

14537. *Chairman.*] So that at that time it would appear that nobody was responsible?—Or rather I think both parties ought to be responsible.

14538. Lord *Seymour.*] When you gave that order, as in the case of the order for the warm clothing, did you receive any reply from the department, that your order had been executed?—Yes, generally.

14539. You did not, as it appears, receive another letter to say that the goods you had ordered to be sent to the army had been received by the army?—No, I never received any information of the receipt of the goods; but the army Commissariat department were at the commencement of the operations constituted general storekeepers, an arrangement which I was always apprehensive would not work well, for it was over-burdening the Commissariat; but my opinion

opinion stood alone, and those of higher practical authority believed it was the best system that could be adopted, and it was certainly not until it was tried, that I found that my opinion was the correct one; I pressed it upon the Ordnance repeatedly in the course of the summer and autumn, for I thought that the Ordnance ought to have supplied a store department apart from the Commissariat, as it was too much for the Commissariat to undertake.

14540. Who opposed your opinion?—The arrangement, I am bound to say, was adopted after a very careful consideration by the Ordnance and the Commissariat together, Lord Raglan having given his opinion on the point before he left the country; it was, I believe, founded upon the existing practice, and was one with which I did not interfere until I began to feel that it was working ill, about August or September; I then called the attention of the Ordnance to it, but they were very apprehensive indeed of any change at that time being made, as it might cause greater confusion.

14541. *Chairman.*] Do you know whether any provision was made to supply the army with fresh provisions during the winter?—Certainly; but it was not always very successful, because we have heard of fresh meat sometimes not being supplied to portions of the army more than two days in a week; but means were taken to remedy that defect, and I believe it has been very much better since January last, but it was by no means complete at that time.

14542. Did you give any orders about supplying the army with preserved meats and vegetables?—Yes; I was very anxious indeed to have supplied the army with preserved meats, upon the system adopted in tin cases, which was introduced by Mr. Goldner, and I urged it upon the Admiralty; they put out tenders; but they were, probably, so alarmed at the disgraceful tricks which had been played upon them before, that they were very apprehensive of it, and the plan was eventually abandoned. As to the supply of preserved vegetables, two kinds of preserved vegetables were sent out, under my directions, one the invention of a Frenchman, whose name I forget.

14543. Mr. *Layard.*] Are not all emigrant vessels now supplied with preserved meats instead of salt meats?—I do not know whether all of them are; many are.

14544. Has not the substitution of preserved meats for salt meats effected a great change in the mortality on board the emigrant ships?—I am not aware that the change is traceable to that cause particularly; I apprehend that it is traceable to many causes; amongst others, to the much better ventilation in the ships which has been insisted upon.

14545. You still think that the preserved meats may have had some effect?—I have a very high opinion of them myself. I believe that they would be found very conducive both to health and economy.

14546. Where were those vegetables obtained which you sent out?—Those which were sent out in the largest quantity were obtained from France; it was a French invention.

14547. Did you ever obtain any information as to the mode in which the troops received them; whether they received them willingly, or whether they rejected them?—I do not remember any report as to the reception of the French preserved vegetables; but they did not receive preserved vegetables generally with any favour; for instance, the preserved potatoes they did not like at all.

14548. Were those preserved potatoes ever served out to the troops to your knowledge?—Not with my personal knowledge; I have been told so.

14549. But an officer of the Guards stated in evidence, that during the whole time of his being out there, he never saw or heard of those preserved vegetables: do you consider that that might have been possible?—Yes; it might have been possible that one individual officer may neither have heard of or seen any preserved vegetables.

14550. If it has been stated to the Committee that the troops were never without fresh meat every other day, do you believe that statement?—I have said that I believe that during a portion of the winter, fresh meat was not supplied to some of the troops more than twice a week.

14551. Do you believe that they were ever without fresh meat for a whole week?—Portions of the army may have been, but not the army generally.

14552. *Chairman.*] What do you suppose was the cause of that non-fulfilment of your intention, namely, that the troops should have fresh meat?—It was a combination

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combination of causes; first, the short supply; and secondly, the difficulty of conveying it to a portion of the army.

14553. Why was there a short supply, if supplies were sent?—I mean, of course, that the supply was not sent; it was not procured.

14554. Was there not plenty of opportunity round the shores of the Black Sea to obtain fresh meat to any extent?—I should have thought so, undoubtedly.

14555. Do you know whether any provision was made to obtain transports from Balaklava, or to Balaklava from the various ports of the Black Sea, in which fresh meat could have been obtained?—A large number of transports were left at the command of the army expressly for those purposes at very great inconvenience, for the greater portion of the transports could have been used with advantage at home in conveying troops and stores, but they were left there to facilitate the feeding and the supply of the army.

14556. Then if those transports were not employed for that purpose it was contrary to your intention?—Certainly.

14557. So far as you were concerned, you made provision for the supplying of the troops with fresh meat by that means?—The transports were left there for that amongst other purposes.

14558. When was any attempt made to furnish the troops with lodgiug fit to resist the inclement weather that was to be expected during the winter in the Crimea?—The first step in reference to huts was taken after the intelligence of the battle of Inkermann. I had had several plans suggested before that date, under the apprehension that they might become necessary, and one having been determined upon, orders were given immediately to prepare them with the greatest expedition, and directions were sent to the Admiralty to take up steamers wherever they could be found to convey them; but that was not the only step taken, because I never imagined that such a bulky article as huts could be, with rapidity, conveyed from this country to Balaklava in any very great quantity with the small number of steamers that we could procure; and I therefore sent, first, by telegraph, and, in the second instance, by a despatch through the Foreign Office, to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, directing that wood should be purchased in Constantinople for that purpose, and an additional company of sappers and miners was sent out, with plans, to superintend the manufacture of them upon the spot. I also sent directions through the Foreign Office to Lord Westmoreland, having ascertained that it was possible to get huts of a good description embarked at Trieste, which was so much nearer; and many of them arrived before the huts sent out from this country.

14559. Did you receive information that boards and the means of making huts were purchased for the army?—As regards the Austrian instructions, they were executed with great rapidity and great accuracy. As regards Constantinople, I think very little was done; and what I was assured was, that a great deal of the wood had been previously purchased for other purposes. I was surprised to hear this, for the greater part of Constantinople being built of wood, I thought there would be a supply of timber on the spot.

14560. Mr. *Layard.*] Your Grace has been at Constantinople?—Yes.

14561. *Chairman.*] You were not satisfied with the answer that you received with regard to the wood?—I was certainly at a loss to account for the fact.

14562. Who was responsible for the non-fulfilment of your orders?—That I am unable to tell the Committee. In that instance the orders were only sent at my request, for the Ambassador at Constantinople is of course under the direction of the Foreign Office.

14563. The order was sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe?—Yes.

14564. Do you know whether an answer came from him, that they could not procure the wood, or from some inferior and subordinate officer?—I really cannot say, from memory; the answers did not come direct to me, and I cannot speak to it.

14565. The answer was, I suppose, transmitted to you, was it not?—It was; all that I remember is, that there were difficulties stated to exist in the way of obtaining those supplies which I had not contemplated.

14566. Mr. *Layard.*] When an order is given from the Minister of War which passes through another department, does the Minister of War consider that his responsibility ends when the order is given, or that it extends to seeing that order fulfilled?—Undoubtedly to seeing it fulfilled. I have not the slightest

doubt

doubt that an answer was communicated by the Foreign Office, but I do not recollect by whom the answer was written, whether by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe or anybody else.

14567. Supposing the answer had been that the wood was not to be found in Constantinople; would it not have fallen to you to write again to the proper department, to express your doubt?—By the time that the answer came, the time was passed for its being of any practical use; and by the time I found that the wood could not be procured at Constantinople, the supplies had been furnished from Trieste and from home.

14568. *Chairman.*] So that supplies were eventually sent out there?—Certainly; they were also sent from Malta; and the ultimate amount must have been ample; the supply ordered from this country was, I think, covering for 25,000 men.

14569. So that on the shores of Balaklava Harbour there were landed, according to your belief, ample supplies of wood to make huts to cover 25,000 men?—More than that; sufficient to cover 25,000 men was sent from this country; I think so; it might have been 24,000; a large quantity, for I forget how many men, was sent from Trieste, and another quantity, not so large, was sent from Malta.

14570. Then how do you account, if you can account for it, for their never having had any huts at all, until a very recent period?—I apprehend that the principal cause was the inability to convey them from Balaklava to the camp.

14571. Mr. *Layard.*] You have been at Malta, have you not?—Yes.

14572. There is no wood there to speak of?—No.

14573. Therefore wood would be very scarce and expensive there?—Practically, I believe it is not so; for it is the practice to keep considerable stores of wood there, from which they drew upon this occasion; it is not so scarce or expensive as might be supposed.

14574. Wood brought from Trieste or England would have been more expensive, would it not, than wood obtained at Constantinople?—Undoubtedly, unless the wood at Constantinople was of the same character as that from England, which I believe it is not, namely, Canadian or other timber.

14575. Are you acquainted with the shores of the Black Sea?—Not extensively.

14576. You are aware that they are well wooded?—Yes; very much wooded, as the coast of Asia Minor is generally.

14577. Most of the cities on those coasts are built of wood, are they not?—Yes.

14578. Therefore if wood could not have been obtained at Constantinople, there would not have been any difficulty in obtaining it elsewhere?—I should think not; but I do not know whether it is the practice in other towns to keep those supplies of wood which would have been available; the forests on the shores of the Black Sea would not have been available, for you could not have cut the trees down and sawed them.

14579. *Chairman.*] Where there are forests there is usually cut wood, is there not?—Probably; but I cannot answer that question; Constantinople is the only town in that part of the world with which I am sufficiently acquainted to express any opinion as to the usual quantity of wood.

14580. Mr. *Layard.*] Are you aware that a quantity of the planking that was sent up for the huts could not be made use of for want of nails?—I do not believe that that was the fact; I did hear it so stated.

14581. It has been stated in evidence before the Committee?—Yes; but the Committee must forgive me if I say that a good deal of evidence which has been given is sometimes mistaken, though given, I am sure, with the greatest conviction of its truth by the individuals who so state it. I do not say positively that it was not so, but I have been assured that it was not; and there could have been no practical difficulty, even if such omission took place, because the Government officers at Malta, of whom it is impossible to speak too highly, in the instance of nails, took the precautions, which they did in many other cases, of sending large supplies of them of their own accord; therefore there could have been no want of nails.

14582. *Chairman.*] When were you first apprised of the difficulty of transporting the huts or the planking from the shores of the harbour of Balaklava

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to the camp?—I ascertained, of course, from the intelligence which was communicated to me, the state of the roads, and the difficulty of conveying warm clothing and food, and I was practically informed of the difficulty of conveying the huts and planking. I do not remember that it was specially alluded to, as the difficulty of conveying other articles arose prior to the arrival of the huts.

14583. Did the Government take any steps to get over that difficulty?—The step which I took for the eventual remedy of the difficulty, was the sending out of materials for the construction of the railway; as regards the meeting of the immediate want, I undoubtedly made inquiries, and I also wrote to ascertain whether there had not been furnished a sufficient supply of animals to convey those articles to the front.

14584. What answer did you receive to that inquiry?—The answer which I received was, that the want of forage had destroyed so many of the animals, and that so many had perished from the cold, that they had not the means of conveying those articles.

14585. Colonel *Lindsay.*] From whom did that answer come?—I received it from Lord Raglan, but of course it was conveyed to him from the department under him.

14586. Do you recollect the date of it?—It was a very short time before I quitted office; the date might have been the middle of January, probably.

14587. *Chairman.*] Were any despatches received from the chief Commissariat officer, reporting upon the defects and failures of other departments of the service?—No. First, I should say that, I received very few direct communications from the Commissariat. The Commissariat was only placed under me on the 22d of December, and as it took a month for the information to be sent out to the Commissariat, and to return, very few direct communications were received at the War department before I left; but I never received, either directly from the Commissary-general, or from the Treasury, any information of any complaint of the other departments.

14588. Were you ever informed that the troops were ill-fed, and that the horses had little or insufficient forage?—Of course I received that information. As I said before, in common with the rest of the world, I was painfully aware of it.

14589. I mean officially?—No; I think not.

14590. You obtained all that information from the newspapers, did you?—No; from complaints principally from individuals who had suffered.

14591. You were not informed that the failure on the part of the Commissariat to feed the troops was occasioned by the failure of other departments in their duties?—Not officially. I was aware privately that they had said so; that that has been their defence; but I never received in my capacity of Secretary for War any complaint from the Commissariat that the other departments prevented them from executing their duties.

14592. When did you first receive information of the break-up of the road from Balaklava to the camp?—I do not remember the exact date; it was one of those facts which unfortunately grow upon one as events follow one another; and it was seen by its consequence that things were not carried to the front.

14593. Can you tell whether any information was given you of the probable failure of the road, before the failure took place?—Certainly not.

14594. So that you remained altogether in the dark, as to the chance of the non-supply of the troops arising from the failure of the road?—Yes.

14595. So soon as you heard of the failure of that road, you took steps, did you not, to have a road made of some sort or other?—No, I cannot say that I did; because it was impossible for me to be able to judge whether the thing was practicable then. Those are things which it is absolutely necessary to leave to the officers on the spot. The step that I took, seeing that the winter was rapidly advancing, and that we had an enormous quantity of very heavy ammunition and guns to send to the front, and which it would have been impossible to carry, was to make preparations for the early formation of the railroad, to which I have already alluded.

14596. Colonel *Lindsay.*] What was the date when you took the first step to establish the railroad?—The exact day I cannot say, but it must have been quite the end of November.

14597. *Chairman.*]

14597. *Chairman.*] You had nothing to do with the formation or organisation of the Commissariat corps?—No; nothing except that, of course, whenever I heard there was any deficiency, which I did on one occasion from Lord Raglan, I communicated it to the then proper department, with a view to its being remedied.

14598. To what sort of deficiency do you allude?—To the insufficiency of the numbers.

14599. Not as to the want of capacity, on the part of the Commissariat officers, but as to their numbers?—That was, I think, the only complaint which I received from Lord Raglan. I, of course, confine myself entirely to official representations; I had individual private complaints.

14600. Did the Quartermaster-general receive no orders from you as to the fulfilment of his duties?—None whatever; all his orders are given by the Commander of the army.

14601. You had no immediate control over those officers who had the control of the harbour at Balaklava?—None; they were under the Admiralty.

14602. Your Grace, I presume, in common with the rest of the world, has heard of the confusion that existed in the harbour of Balaklava?—Certainly.

14603. Did you take any steps to prevent that state of things continuing?—I communicated with the Admiralty as regards that portion which related to their proper functions, and I took such steps as were in my power to remedy the defects which existed upon the land.

14604. Do you recollect the date when you communicated with the Admiralty?—I communicated with the Admiralty, or rather with Sir James Graham, as a colleague, frequently in private conversation, whenever I heard of anything that was wrong; but I think the conversation that I have more specifically referred to must have been about Christmas. I do not recollect the exact time.

14605. I suppose you had no authority or control over Captain Christie, as harbour-master?—None whatever.

14606. He was not responsible to you?—No; he was responsible to the Admiralty.

14607. Did you receive any complaints as to the mode in which he performed his duty?—I received no official complaints; none with which I had any right to interfere; if I had received any complaints of any officer employed by the Admiralty I should have called the attention of the Admiralty to them, with a view to their being remedied. I received complaints, of course, in the same way as private individuals have received them, but none of which I could take official notice at the time, though I took such notice of them as I could by bringing them to the knowledge of the proper authorities.

14608. Did you hear any complaints of the mode in which the transport was conducted?—Yes.

14609. Did you hear any complaints of Admiral Boxer?—Again I must draw a distinction; I had no complaints from Lord Raglan, and I was never called upon to interfere officially with reference to the conduct of Admiral Boxer; I have heard from many persons complaints as to Admiral Boxer.

14610. If persons who had duties to perform did not perform those duties, and now assign as a cause for the non-performance of their duty a want of performance on the part of Admiral Boxer, they ought to have informed you of the *lâches* of Admiral Boxer?—Certainly; and if they had done so, I should have taken immediate notice of it.

14611. So that, in fact, at this time suggesting the faults of other departments as an excuse for their own failures, is rather too late an excuse?—I certainly consider that anybody in an official position who felt that they were thwarted in the performance of their duties by the *lâches* of Admiral Boxer, or any other officer, ought, if those official persons were in any way subordinate to me, to have appealed to me; and I think that, even under any circumstances, they ought to have appealed to me, if not so subordinate.

14612. You had no power, I believe, in the selection of medical officers?—None whatever.

14613. Had you a voice in it at all?—Not in the selection of medical officers. The selection of medical officers entirely rested with Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the Medical Board; the whole of the responsibility is devolved, and properly so, upon him, for it would be perfectly impossible for anybody,

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anybody, not a medical man, to judge of the proper qualification of medical men for appointment.

14614. If there has been any failure on the part of the medical department, the person responsible as the head of that department is Dr. Andrew Smith? —That must of course depend upon circumstances. If a bad appointment has been made of any medical man, he is entirely responsible. If the medical department has failed in any other respect, it must depend upon circumstances as to whether he had proper opportunities for fulfilling his duties or not; and it would not be fair to say, as a general rule, that because the medical department under him was not successful in every instance, therefore it was the fault of Dr. Andrew Smith.

14615. Did you give orders for the formation of an hospital at Scutari?—Yes; hospitals generally. It was doubtful at one time whether the general hospital should be at Scutari or not; various places were suggested, but Scutari was eventually decided upon, when the army went to the Crimea, as the fittest place.

14616. Did you issue instructions as to such hospitals?—No, I issued no definite instructions. I left that to be executed by the Medical Board.

14617. Did you receive any complaints as to the conduct of those who were in charge of the hospitals?—No, not until a recent date; I received a despatch from Lord Raglan, stating the misconduct of one individual officer, who, I think, was tried by court martial.

14618. Do you recollect the name of that officer?—No, I do not; but he was one of the regimental surgeons or assistant surgeons.

14619. Mr. *Layard.*] Was that before the battle of the Alma?—It must have been after the battle of the Alma, or not very long before.

14620. Colonel *Lindsay.*] It was for misconduct that occurred before the battle of the Alma, was it not?—I believe it was.

14621. Mr. *Layard.*] It was the case of the "Kangaroo," was it not?—No.

14622. Was he sent to England, or was he promoted afterwards?—He was reprimanded, but he was retained there. I did not hear that he was promoted.

14623. He was not sent back to England?—I think not.

14624. *Chairman.*] When did you first determine to send out nurses to the hospital there?—It must have been about the middle of October, I think; I really cannot say exactly.

14625. What induced you to send them out?—The question of the employment of nurses in the hospital had been mooted at a very early stage, (before, in fact, the army left this country,) and the general opinion of military men was adverse to their employment. It had been tried upon former occasions, and I believe the class of women that had been tried had been ordinary hospital nurses, and they had been found to be very much addicted to drink, and often much more callous to the sufferings of the soldiers than those male attendants who had been employed more recently. Under these circumstances, they were very adverse to it, but when we found the great complaints that were made, and which were conveyed to me, not merely by the public press and by private letters, but by gentlemen who came over from Constantinople at the time, and who had recently visited the hospitals, we felt it to be our duty to take such steps as we could to remedy such a state of things, and we reverted, amongst other things, to the proposal of nurses. The difficulty was to find any lady who was competent to undertake so great a task as the organisation of such a body; and I confess I despaired, having seen one or two, of making the attempt, until Mr. Sidney Herbert, then Secretary-at-War, being personally acquainted with Miss Nightingale, with whom I had also the honour of being acquainted, suggested that it might be possible to induce her to undertake so great a task, though we felt great delicacy in proposing it. We found, however, at once, that she was willing, and we felt that anything which she undertook would be successful.

14626. Did you hear, except through the public papers and through private channels, of the miseries suffered by our troops in the hospital and on the passage from Balaklava to Scutari?—I did not.

14627. You had no official information of the sufferings of the troops?—No; and with regard to this subject, perhaps it will not be improper to answer an accusation which has been made, and to say that so far from my having neglected

neglected any statements made to me, privately or publicly, they were invariably attended to on the spot. In the very instance alluded to, that of the "Kangaroo" and the "Dunbar," as to which I have been accused by a military gentleman of having entirely neglected the matter, and taken no steps, so far from that being the case, I sent for Dr. Andrew Smith before he had left the room five minutes, and I desired him to call upon the medical men for the fullest explanation with regard to the statements which had been made as to the state of things on board those ships, and to inform them that I should not be satisfied with an ordinary denial, but I should require the time, place, and names of the medical officers on board, and every particular.

14628. Did any medical officer in command report to you that there was an insufficiency of medical stores, and medical comforts and surgeons?—Not to me; latterly they made representations to Dr. Andrew Smith, of the insufficiency of some medical supplies in the Crimea, but none, I think, with reference to the insufficiency of supplies at Constantinople at the hospitals. So far otherwise, that when I called upon Dr. Andrew Smith for an explanation, he assured me that the thing was perfectly impossible that there could be any deficiency, because more than ample supplies had been sent from home; and he gave me, at my desire, lists of every article which had been supplied. I should state, that the first complaint that I received of any deficiency in that department was when the army left Varna, when I received private complaints that there was an insufficiency of port wine and arrowroot, and what are called medical comforts for the sick in the hospital at Varna. I called upon Dr. Andrew Smith for an explanation of this, and he produced to me lists of the articles sent out, and expressed a positive opinion that it was impossible they could have been consumed. I felt satisfied that either some accident must have occurred, or by some means they had been misplaced, and therefore, in order to secure an adequate supply, I desired that a very large further supply, beyond anything that he believed to be requisite, should be instantly sent out of those and some other articles.

14629. Were you made acquainted officially with the state of things at Scutari and at Balaklava, and of the horror of the passage from Balaklava to Scutari?—Not until after the appointment of Lord William Paulet to the superintendence of the hospitals.

14630. At what date was that?—We received informations here at the end of December; he must have been appointed therefore early in December.

14631. Up to that time you had no official information of the real state of things?—No I had not.

14632. After that time, were you informed officially of what had occurred?—Not in detail.

14633. Did Lord William Paulet report to you?—I issued some very long instructions to him as soon as I knew of his appointment, and that led of course to reports from him, as to the general state of affairs.

14634. Have you his reports?—I do not think I have; they are at the War department.

14635. Did you take any steps to inquire into the conduct of the medical officers or persons in command of the hospitals?—The step which I had taken long previously, was the issuing a Commission for the purpose of inquiring into the whole state of the hospitals and the medical department generally; I mean the medical treatment of the soldiers in the Crimea.

14636. Who chose the Commission?—Two medical men were selected by Dr. Andrew Smith, and a barrister was recommended to him, I believe, by Mr. Sidney Herbert.

14637. You are not aware whether the recommendation of the barrister first came from the medical officer?—I think not.

14638. Had they a Commission?—They had.

14639. Was it a Royal Commission?—I really forget whether it was in the name of the Queen or not; it was a Commission issued by me as the Secretary of State.

14640. It was a Commission issued by you?—Certainly.

14641. Their appointment was not gazetted, was it?—I think not; therefore, I presume, it was not, in the strict sense, a Royal Commission. I should say, that if the question relating to the barrister was meant to imply that he was selected by Dr. Andrew Smith, as a friend of his, I am quite sure that it was not

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not the case in any way. I believe that the recommendation did not come from him at all, from this fact, that Dr. Andrew Smith wished that a barrister should have been, as it were, the secretary, and the two medical men the Commissioners; that the Commission should consist of two medical men, and the barrister to be secretary. To that I positively objected, saying, that the necessary consequence of it would be, that however impartial two medical men might be, the public at large would suppose that they might be biassed by having been selected by him, and that I must put the barrister in an independent position, and, in fact, make him the prominent person in the investigation, the duties of the medical men being to investigate professional subjects.

14642. Did the reports of Lord William Paulet contain complaints of the way in which things had been conducted before he was appointed?—They, of course, referred to the unsatisfactory state of matters in certain respects; but they were more answers to my despatches, which I have here, than originating in anything with himself.

14643. Lord *Seymour.*] It has been stated by Mr. Maxwell, one of the Commissioners, that the Commission was not issued when he left England?—No, it was not. Of course a Commission is a technical document; it was not formally drawn, though the objects of the inquiry were completely settled. I saw Mr. Maxwell before he went, and gave him general instructions as to what I wished him to do, and he properly said, he should wish to have it in writing. I said I was then too much occupied, but that I would get it ready with as little delay as possible; as he was about to start two days after, it should follow him by the next mail, and it did. I sent the Commission after him, I think, certainly, by the next mail.

14644. He stated that he was sometime at Constantinople before he received his instructions?—I cannot imagine how that could have been, unless there was some accident, as there were frequently accidents with the French boat; we have sometimes received two or three mails together; but I think the Commission was sent out four or five days after he left.

14645. Did his instructions direct him merely to inquire as to the details of the hospital, or as to the general government and system of management under which it was conducted?—The latter, undoubtedly; and not merely that, but everything connected with the medical department; he was desired to inquire into the hospitals in the Crimea, into the field hospitals; not only that, but into the conveyance of the sick and wounded from Balaklava to Scutari.

14646. As this was a military hospital, did you not consider that it was under the general management of the military commandant?—Certainly, the military commandant was the person responsible for the whole management of the departments at Scutari.

14647. Did you consider yourself responsible for the appointment of the military commandant who had the management of that hospital?—In the same way, of course, as I ought to be considered responsible for every subordinate appointment which is made by those who are responsible to me; but I was not consulted as to the commandant; he was appointed by Lord Raglan, on his own judgment.

14648. As there were five or six thousand men in those hospitals, was not it a sort of command that should have been bestowed upon a lieutenant-general, or some one of high rank?—I should consider that high rank, under those circumstances, is always an advantage, but I should infinitely have preferred that the individual should be a man of great activity and energy, rather than of any particular rank.

14649. *Chairman.*] Did Lord William Paulet communicate directly with you?—He did, in consequence of my communicating directly with him; the only exception which I made, besides communicating with Lord Raglan alone, was in the case of Lord William Paulet; and I did that because Lord Raglan, being in the Crimea, and Lord William Paulet at Scutari, very considerable inconvenience would have been entailed by any other course. I did not adopt that plan till matters had arrived at the point which they reached before he was appointed, when I thought it necessary to have the greatest possible rapidity of communication.

14650. So that, in fact, you communicated alone directly with Lord Raglan and Lord William Paulet?—Yes, I communicated officially with no other persons.

14651. Mr. *Layard.*] Had the Commission power to see that any suggestions of theirs should be carried out?—Originally it was only a Commission of Inquiry, and looking back upon it now I think there was undoubtedly an omission on my part, but I did not think at the time that they would have held themselves precluded from making suggestions on the spot. As I could give no authority to enforce those suggestions, I did not insert in the Commission any directions to them to make suggestions on the spot. Afterwards, in the month of January, further instructions were sent out to desire them to make suggestions to Lord William Paulet.

14652. After that period the Commissioners had the power of carrying out any improvements that they thought necessary?—No; I do not think they had any authoritative powers; they were still Commissioners of Inquiry, but instead of making their suggestions to me, they were told to make them on the spot to Lord William Paulet, and if he thought fit to carry them out, they might be carried out.

14653. Were the instructions to that Commission, and the Commissioners themselves, sent out to Lord Raglan?—A copy of the instructions was sent out.

14654. Then he was acquainted with the fact of that Commission having been appointed, and sent out there officially?—Yes. At the time when a copy was sent of the instructions to each of the three Commissioners, a copy was sent to Lord Raglan, and I think also a copy was sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; certainly to Lord Raglan.

14655. Did Lord Raglan ever make any objection to the appointment of the Commission?—No, he did not.

14656. Are you aware that general orders were issued as to the medical men giving answers to the Commissioners?—No general orders, but I heard of an order being issued by an individual officer.

14657. *Chairman.*] When the Commissioners arrived at Balaklava, Lord Raglan could not have been ignorant of their appointment, or in what character they came?—No, certainly not; and Lord Raglan gave me (privately if I recollect rightly, but certainly he gave me,) the assurance, that they should have every facility that he could afford to them.

14658. Dr. Andrew Smith has given in to this Committee certain letters containing suggestions as to the means requisite to provide for the health of the troops; are you at all aware of what those letters contained?—My impression is that he never sent in to me any such letters; has he stated that they were presented to me?

14659. No; but to the Military Secretary for you?—That would be for the Commander-in-chief.

14660. Mr. *Layard.*] The Chairman asked Mr. Maxwell, "So that, although you were sent out to inquire into the management of departments, for which everybody in office and in command was responsible, before you could make any inquiry you were required to ask their sanction to your inquiries; was that the case?" his answer was, "The result seemed to be that the Commander-in-chief seemed to think it necessary that the Commissioners, sent out by the Minister for War, should first obtain the Commander-in-chief's authority to examine any person under his command;" would you consider that necessary?—I should think so. I am sure that Lord Raglan would, from their coming out with the authority of the Secretary of State, not hesitate to give them facilities; but, as a matter of discipline, I think it would be right that Lord Raglan should issue such orders.

14661. You did not consider that the Commission clashed with the authority of the Commander-in-chief in any way?—Certainly not.

14662. *Chairman.*] Then the question was put to Dr. Andrew Smith, "To whom was that letter directed?" and his answer is, "To the Military Secretary of the Commander-in-chief:" he is then asked, "What answer did you receive?" and he says, "I got no answer for some time; but I pressed it on the Duke of Newcastle, and at last they consented to send out Dr. Brett; but his mission was unsuccessful, he having been told on the spot that the men would run away the moment they heard the firing; the corps was never raised"?—He is, I believe, mistaken with reference to that.

14663. Did you ever see that letter (*the same being handed to the Witness*)?—It is very difficult to be certain with respect to letters; some portions of the matter

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matter have undoubtedly been brought under my attention, but certainly my conviction is, that I never saw the letter. I have had some conversation with Dr. Andrew Smith, as well as with other persons, at the commencement of the war, at the date of that letter, April the 13th, with reference to the dress of the soldiers. I have no doubt, if Dr. Andrew Smith says so, that he may have drawn my attention to the fact of the coats being too tight; but I have a strong opinion that the letter was not submitted to me. I was never called upon for any determination upon it.

14664. Was it the duty of the military secretary to have given you such letter?—No, I think not. Up to a very recent date indeed the question of clothing the troops was not considered to come in any way within the province of the Secretary of State, for it was extremely doubtful whether he had any right to interfere.

14665. It is not merely a question with regard to the clothing, but it refers to the health of the soldiers?—Yes, but still it is a question as to the character of their clothing.

14666. I can conceive that the question of clothing alone does not come within the province of the Medical Board, except as regards the soldier's health; but this appears to me a most solemn protest against the then mode of clothing the soldier?—Yes.

14667. Do you not think that, under the circumstances, this letter ought to have been sent to you?—No, I do not think that any blame attaches to the Military Secretary, or to the Commander-in-chief, for not having forwarded that letter to me; if there is any blame, it rests with Dr. Andrew Smith, if it should be proved that he has not sent to me, and appealed to me under the circumstances. If he felt that it was of such great importance that an adverse decision of the Commander-in-chief, with regard to his recommendation, would endanger the health of the troops, I think that he ought to have appealed to me; but I think that that letter never was sent to me.

14668. Are you aware whether any of the improvements suggested in that letter were made?—We have had general discussions as to many things: as to the tightness of the soldiers' coats; that was a matter which was considered, and which the Commander-in-chief undertook to remedy. As to the question of the light blous, I believe it was rejected on account of the impolicy of giving a dress of that kind, in a climate where, although the day is extremely hot, the nights are often extremely cold. As to another point, namely, the stock, that is one upon which I felt very strongly, and I wrote privately to Lord Raglan upon the subject; and it was through my instrumentality, and in consequence of my remonstrances with Lord Raglan, that the stock was abandoned, and the beard allowed to be worn.

14669. Has there not been an order issued within a very few days, ordering the soldier to wear the stock again?—I have seen that that is so as to one division; but undoubtedly, in consequence of a letter which I privately wrote to Lord Raglan, wherein I considered it my duty to remonstrate upon the subject, feeling that it affected the health of the soldiers; he acted upon that representation, and ordered a discontinuance of the stock, in the month of May, I should think.

14670. General *Peel.*] That letter of Dr. Andrew Smith's, which you have just referred to, involves a change in the uniform of the army, which would be a matter for the consideration of the Commander-in-chief, and not for you?—Entirely. I say that those matters had been considered as entirely within the province of the Commander-in-chief; and therefore, if, as affecting the health of the army, Dr. Andrew Smith felt that a wrong decision had been given by the Commander-in-chief, he ought to have applied to me to take the matter into consideration, and to apply to the Government as the superior authority.

14671. Mr. *Layard.*] Supposing those recommendations were not carried out, and any evil result had ensued, you consider yourself not responsible in consequence of not having received the letters?—Certainly, I do.

14672. *Chairman.*] Will you look at this letter also (*pointing to the same in the Appendix*); that is a letter written to the Military Secretary by Dr. Andrew Smith, dated the 11th of May 1854, calling attention to the great importance of hospital ships for the sick, headed "Pressing," especially for the transport of the sick; was that letter submitted to you?—No, certainly not; the subject was submitted to me, though, I think, not by Dr. Smith; but I was perfectly aware

aware of the extreme importance of it, and my attention was drawn to that question so early as the 11th of May, but it was subsequently that a representation was made either by me, or by Mr. Sidney Herbert, I forget which, to the Admiralty, and orders were sent out by the Admiralty to direct that ships specially appropriated for the purposes of hospitals should be prepared; but those orders, I am afraid, were not carried out till they were repeated again, in consequence of further representations to the Admiralty at a later date, towards the close of the year.

14673. Your first orders were sent out in the course of the summer for preparing hospital ships?—No; I say that my attention was not drawn to the subject, publicly or privately, anything like so soon as the 11th of May 1854. It was drawn to it subsequently; and in consequence, a representation was made to the Admiralty, which led the Admiralty to send out an order to have steamers especially appropriated to hospital purposes. To the best of my recollection, it was after the news of the battle of the Alma arrived, after we had found the inconvenience of ships being appropriated to other purposes besides those of hospitals.

14674. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you consider that it was the duty of Dr. Andrew Smith to have sent you those letters?—I think that following the practice which he had heretofore pursued, the letter to which my attention has now been called, dated the 11th of May 1854, was properly sent to the Horse Guards.

14675. Will you look at the previous letter, dated April 4th; that is another letter of equal importance—(*the Witness referred to the same*)?—At the period when this letter was written, steps were taken for the organisation of an ambulance corps.

14676. Was that ever communicated to you?—No; I think certainly not. I am convinced that none of those letters were communicated to me.

14677. Dr. Andrew Smith has stated to the Committee that he had so many masters that he did not know to whom he was to apply under such circumstances; does that agree with your impression of what Dr. Andrew Smith's duties were?—I think it is to a certain extent true, but I do not think it is quite a fair representation of his position; he has been undoubtedly answerable to the Horse Guards, to the War Office, and to the Ordnance for different functions which he has had to perform; but when he says that having so many masters he did not know to whom he was responsible, I must demur to that; and I say that it is inaccurate, because I told him about the time of the prorogation of Parliament, I think, when I was brought into more immediate contact with him, that whenever he was in any difficulty he was to look alone to me; that he must consider himself responsible to me, and that any orders that I gave him were final; in short, that I was his master. In proof of this, he having represented to me the absurd forms which he was obliged to go through with reference to applications for supplies of port wine and other articles of that description, I told him that as soon as the Commissariat came immediately under me I should take steps to remove from the Admiralty the providing all articles, such as medical comforts which did not require medical knowledge to test the excellence, and place the supply of them in the hands of the Commissariat, who, I thought, were much better able to deal with them, and I desired him to supersede the whole of those forms, and to give his orders, having received prior instructions from me to obtain port wine and arrowroot, and that a temporary arrangement should be made with the Treasury in order to procure payment.

14678. Mr. *Layard.*] You stated, just now, that if Dr. Andrew Smith did not find that his recommendations were carried out, you consider that it was his duty then to have forwarded those letters to you?—Yes; if he was not satisfied with the answers which he received, and he considered that the decision that had been come to was of such a character that an appeal ought to have been made, that appeal ought to have been made to me.

14679. You do not consider that it is any justification of him if he asserts that these letters were not communicated to you, because he was not aware that you were the proper person to whom to communicate them?—After the

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day to which I am referring, when I gave him that assurance, I consider that if he thought that in the execution of his duties he was thwarted, he ought to have appealed to me.

14680. Not before that?—He might have been labouring under a misunderstanding up to that time, but I consider that from the first the Secretary of State was the proper authority to appeal to upon all those matters, in the event of the subordinate departments differing upon the proper execution of them.

14681. All these letters relate to a period previous to the prorogation of Parliament?—Yes; and I say that up to that time he might have been labouring under a misapprehension as to his proper position.

14682. *Chairman.*] Was the question of the green coffee ever brought to your notice?—Not until long after the question was decided and the complaints remedied by the issue of roasted coffee, which I believe was done just about the time that the Commissariat came over to me.

14683. Are you aware that the complaint is not remedied to this very hour?—I am certain that orders were issued for its being remedied; if it has not been so, it is contrary to orders.

14684. Did you ever hear at that time that the troops preferred tea to coffee?—No; I do not recollect hearing so.

14685. Were you ever informed that the situation of the army in the Crimea was like the situation of a crew on board a ship, and that all the precautions which are taken in the latter case, ought to be taken in the former; for example, to prevent scurvy?—That undoubtedly was the case, but I do not recollect hearing that specially stated.

14686. Was any communication made to you as to the necessity of supplying lime-juice to the army?—Yes, orders were issued immediately for the supply of a very large quantity.

14687. Then if the army wanted it at any time, it was not for the want of a supply being sent from this country?—No, certainly it was not, and to my great surprise I received an application upon the subject; because the application to England crossed the very line from which lime-juice is sent.

14688. Had the Commissary-general an unlimited supply of money?—He had what was considered to be an ample supply of money, and if that fell short, or was not ample, it was his duty to apply to the Treasury for a further supply.

14689. Had he power to buy things in that country, which the country afforded?—Certainly, under the orders of the General commanding the army.

14690. Take the case of lime-juice; you state that that country is the country from which it is supplied, and if the army wanted it, had he not the power to buy it there?—Unquestionably; and I think he should have applied to the General commanding the army for an order to that effect; but armed with that order, he would require none from home.

14691. Would you not say the same of the medical purveyor; that being in a country where opium is in a twofold sense a drug, he ought to have supplied the army by buying the drug there, instead of sending to England for it?—Most unquestionably. I would not wish to condemn that functionary without hearing his case, but unless he was tied down by most improper restrictions from the Medical Board at home, it was his duty to have done so.

14692. General *Peel.*] The Minister for War communicates only with the General commanding the army, and therefore any complaint as to inefficiency on the part of any of the departments, can only reach him officially through that source?—Certainly, that is the case.

14693. Mr. *Layard.*] You stated just now that you directed Dr. Andrew Smith not to mind forms, but to do what was necessary at once; at that time were the forms so embarrassing as to prevent the discharge of his duties?—It was so in that particular case. The question was this: it was on the occasion to which I have before referred, in which I desired him to send out an increased supply of port wine, arrowroot, and other medical comforts; he assured me that there was an ample supply already gone out; but I said,

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"For fear of accidents, send out some more." I told him not to lose a day in doing it; and he said, the loss of a day did not rest with him, or of many days, for it had to go through such a circuitous route before the order was executed; and if the wine eventually sent was not of that medical character that he considered right, it would require to go round again, and a long delay might take place; and it was upon finding that a representation was to be made, first, to the Horse Guards, then to the Admiralty, and then to the Ordnance, that I told him to supersede the whole of those forms, and to order the port wine himself, and to ascertain that it was of the proper medical quality for the purpose, and to send it off.

14694. Were those forms overridden upon that occasion?—I have every reason to hope and believe that he executed my injunctions; he never told me that he had not; he led me to suppose that he had.

14695. Supposing Dr. Smith had done what you directed him to do, would any pecuniary responsibility have fallen upon him, or upon you, in case the Treasury objected to that mode of proceeding?—I suppose, technically speaking, it would, because it had not certainly obtained the previous sanction of the Treasury; but it was a course which I took over and over again in 50 or 100 cases, in which, upon my own responsibility, I ordered things; for instance, the supply of the huts, and provisions, vegetables, and other things from Trieste, when we found that the scurvy was breaking out. I ordered them without any communication with the Treasury, though I informed them afterwards; and whenever there was a case of emergency I took upon myself to give the order, and I informed the Treasury afterwards.

14696. Have you never experienced any inconvenience on that account?—Never.

14697. Parliament did not refuse to sanction any of the accounts?—No. I do not say that it is a perfectly regular course; it deranges the whole functions of the Treasury, which ought to be an effectual check upon every other department in pecuniary matters.

14698. The great object of all the public departments should be to further the public interests, should it not?—Yes.

14699. Do you think that the forms which exist now, or that existed then, are such as to embarrass the public interests where the public interests are most at stake?—That depends on what the forms are; some of them, I think do, and others do not; for instance, in the very case to which I am referring, you may obtain the sanction of the Treasury to an expenditure in 24 hours, which under ordinary circumstances is no inconvenience at all; but where those forms require the immense circuit to which I have referred in the case of port wine, there, of course, a great practical inconvenience is felt, even under any circumstances, and the waste of the time of the clerks is even a matter of importance.

14700. General *Peel.*] Was not a purveyor appointed, after those complaints were made, attached to Dr. Andrew Smith, in order to enable him to make purchases himself without going through any other channels?—Yes; I should perhaps mention, that with regard to those medical matters (the Committee will easily understand the enormous amount of work that devolved upon me at times), as far as possible I got Mr. Sidney Herbert, the then Secretary-at-War, to assist me with the medical department; and in reference to the very question of the purveyor, if I recollect rightly, it was done through or by him, of course with my entire cognizance.

Martis, 24° die Aprilis, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Colonel Lindsay.
Lord Seymour.	General Peel.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Sir John Pakington.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

His Grace the Duke of *Newcastle*; further Examined.

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The Duke of *Newcastle.*—BEFORE the examination begins, I may be permitted to offer an explanation with reference to an answer that I gave yesterday. I am not quite certain whether I rightly understood that question. In the course of the examination, some questions were asked with reference to Perekop, and I mentioned that a road had been commenced by the Russians five years ago, at a distance from Perekop; the Honourable Member on the right of the Chairman asked me, whether I had received any information from the Consuls of Kertsch and Odessa; I understood that question to apply simply to this road, but I find that another person who was in the room yesterday, understood the question to have applied to general information received from these Consuls of the state of the Russian forces in the Crimea.

14701. Mr. *Layard.*] It merely applied to the road?—Then my answer was correct, that the Consuls did not give me any information, as they were perfectly ignorant of any such road being in existence.

14702. *Chairman.*] I have heard since of many roads across that water?—We had no authentic information of any road but one. I would also remark, that if any further questions should be asked me with reference to the correspondence with Lord William Paulet, I should like to read to the Committee the instructions which I sent to Lord William Paulet. If any further questions are to be asked upon that point, of course that would be the most appropriate moment. Although the document is rather long, it embraces a great many topics, and I think it very desirable before the conclusion of my examination, that the Committee should be in possession of the document, rather than that it should be simply put in; and if now, or at any other time, the Committee will allow me to read it, I will do so. The Chairman will recollect, that I was yesterday asked whether I corresponded direct with Lord William Paulet. I stated that that was the only exception to correspondence with the Commander-in-chief of the army alone, but that on account of the great time which was lost in communicating with Lord Raglan, in the Crimea, as soon as Lord William Paulet was appointed as commandant of the Bosphorus, I communicated direct with him. Some further questions were put to me. I have with me the instructions which I sent to Lord William Paulet, which I shall be ready to produce at any time.

14703. Mr. *Layard.*] On leaving off your Grace's examination yesterday, I asked your Grace whether you found any difficulty with regard to the forms in transacting the duties which devolved upon you as Secretary for War?—Yes, undoubtedly, considerable difficulty in some of the subordinate departments at home; but I consider that the greater difficulty has been found in the departments on the spot.

14704. Does that answer apply to the whole period of your holding office; that

that is to say, after the amalgamation of the two principal departments of war?—After the separation.

14705. I speak of the amalgamation of the Minister of War with the Secretary-at-War?—That did not take place in my time.

14706. This answer of your Grace's applies to the whole period of your holding office?—Yes, generally.

14707. And applies to the period after the separation of the department of the Colonies from that of War?—No; it was equally so before. The same system has existed throughout, and was equally felt; it was not felt, of course, so much before the breaking out of the war as subsequently, but it was equally felt before as well as after the separation of the two Secretaryships of State.

14708. Then during your Grace's period of office no change was made in that state of things?—That is to say, no change by Minute, or by positive order. I felt obliged to supersede, and did entirely supersede those forms, in numerous instances; I gave the Committee an instance yesterday, namely that of the medical department, which was perhaps one of the worst cases, in which the head of the Medical Board, in order to obtain medical comforts, was obliged to go through an immense circuit of offices before they could be procured, and frequently a repetition of that process in the converse order. The whole of that I entirely superseded; at least, I directed it to be entirely superseded; and I have every reason to believe that, practically, it was so.

14709. That was merely a personal exercise of authority?—It was so.

14710. To the best of your knowledge, to this moment those forms still exist; would the Minister-at-War have to take upon himself a personal responsibility in overriding them?—I have no knowledge of any alteration having been made; but, of course, I cannot myself answer as to anything subsequent to the last day of January, which was the day when, if I recollect rightly, I retired from office.

14711. Did your Grace ever prepare any Minute upon the subject, or any Report of any kind?—No; and in answer to that question I would observe that the real fact was, that the business of the office was so onerous that I believe it to have been perfectly impossible, during the time when I held the office (and I see no reason to suppose that it has become any lighter since), to give that continuous attention to a great alteration which would have given, at any rate, any satisfaction to myself. Feeling the inconvenience, I was obliged to tide on as I could against the inconvenience, superseding these forms in many instances by authority, rather than drawing out any great scheme, which, of course, would necessarily have met with very considerable opposition in various quarters, and would have superseded that attention which I found it absolutely necessary to devote to the current business of the office.

14712. You stated that these forms were chiefly applicable to the subordinate departments; did not the same objection apply to the higher departments; to the Ordnance, for instance?—That was what I meant by the subordinate departments; I meant the departments subordinate to the Secretary of State for War.

14713. With regard to the Ordnance, will you kindly state what were your chief difficulties; for instance, it has been stated to me, by several officials, that they submitted to you inventions, which you approved of, and that they were referred then to the Ordnance; that there were so many forms to be gone through, and such difficulties in reaching head quarters, that for many months delays took place even in considering those inventions; does that correspond with your own knowledge of the subject?—No; although I readily admit the evil which existed in that case, yet it did not arise from the forms, properly so speaking. I readily admit that the public were under a misconception, which was very natural, as to what office they ought to apply to; and that they frequently applied to the War Office, and were referred to another military department; but that I think does not properly come under the head of difficulties, or inconveniences, arising from forms. The fact is, as regards all these inventions, that the circumstance of the war stimulated to an enormous extent the ingenuity of all practical and mechanical men, and of a great many who were neither practical nor mechanical, and the suggestions and inventions which were poured into myself alone were beyond, perhaps, what would be credited by any Member of this Committee. It was extremely difficult, in many instances, to know at first sight, which should

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be rejected, and which should be investigated. As far as possible I referred these suggestions to practical men. The custom at the Ordnance for a very long while has been, that all inventions should be referred to a committee at Woolwich; that committee has not given that satisfaction to the public which the high character of the officers composing it, if taken alone, would have fully entitled it to, but I think that the composition of that committee was faulty; it was solely composed of military officers; it did not embrace chemists and others to the extent to which I think it should have done; and if the Committee think it worth while to investigate that question any further they will find a long letter of mine addressed to the Ordnance, and a correspondence with the Ordnance, in which I finally established a committee upon a different system, and which I hear is in satisfactory working at this moment, although, of course, of that I cannot speak; but I effected a change in that respect before I left the office.

14714. Perhaps your Grace would like to put those letters in?—They are not in my possession; but of course they are at the War Department, and can be obtained.

14715. Would you be desirous that they should be put in?—I should be glad of it; but of course the Committee is the best judge whether it comes within the scope of their inquiry.

14716. Are you aware whether, during the time you were in office, any invention, which, in your opinion, would have been useful to the public was very much delayed by the process which it had to undergo in the Ordnance Office?—Yes, and necessarily so; I have already said that the number of inventions suggested was enormous, and of course a committee formed of officers who had other duties to perform at Woolwich was quite incapable of keeping down the accumulation of work; I increased that Committee. I recommended that it should be formed into sub-committees, according to the class of invention, to enable them to meet the difficulties. I have no doubt that many inventions were not investigated nearly so soon as it was desirable they should be for the sake of the public interests.

14717. Then do you attribute these difficulties to the forms, the divided responsibility, or the inadequacy of the staff of the Ordnance to carry through the business; to which of the three causes?—I should say decidedly in this particular case, to the latter; but owing to the fact of there being so many separate war departments, the public were not unnaturally in ignorance to whom they should apply, and therefore to that extent the sub-division of offices may have been somewhat in the eye of the public, responsible, although not in reality so. There is no misunderstanding; the Secretary for War, the Secretary-at-War, the Horse Guards, and the Medical Board obviously had none of them anything to do with mechanical or other inventions, but it was not unnatural that the public should apply to any one of those departments, being in ignorance as to who was the proper authority.

14718. Do the same remarks apply to the Commander-in-chief's offices; the Horse Guards?—In what respect?

14719. In regard to the difficulty of carrying on business with them, in consequence of either of the three reasons which you have stated as having existed in the Ordnance?—Of course the complication, or the number of offices, does apply to a certain extent; I think not the forms; there are no forms to be gone through in the communications between the Secretary of State and the Horse Guards, it is nothing but correspondence; but upon the subject of correspondence I would state generally that I believe the present constitution of the War departments necessarily entails a larger amount of correspondence than is desirable for the public good.

14720. When you quitted office, did you think that the relations between your Department and the Horse Guards, the Ordnance, and other departments connected with the war, were on a satisfactory footing?—No, certainly not.

14721. Are you aware whether any change has been made since you left office?—I am not aware of any extensive change. I am aware of a change, the exact nature of which I do not know, in reference to the War Office. I know that the Secretaryship at War is abolished, but what is the substituted power I really am not quite aware.

14722. Were

14722. Were you ever consulted upon the subject?—I was not.

14723. Were you not requested to give the Government the benefit of the experience which you had had during the time you had held office?—I was not.

14724. With respect to the Horse Guards, during the term of your holding office, what was the exact nature of your relation with Lord Hardinge; had you to submit to Lord Hardinge, for instance, any instructions of a military character sent out to the army?—There was nothing to compel me to submit anything to Lord Hardinge, because in all matters connected with the war the Secretary of State for War is supreme. When I considered that a military opinion was requisite, I naturally applied on all matters, except those relating to the Ordnance, to Lord Hardinge.

14725. Then you carried on a correspondence with Lord Raglan, which you did not think is necessary, except as a matter of courtesy, to submit to Lord Hardinge?—Certainly; and that I should say I believe has invariably been the practice in time of war, even when the office of Secretary of State for War was combined with that of the Colonies.

14726. *Chairman.*] I think the Honourable Member used a wrong expression when he said, "as a matter of courtesy;" I suppose it was not a matter of courtesy which induced you to communicate any matter to Lord Hardinge, but the exigencies of the service?—Yes; I presume that the question was intended (at any rate I answered it in that sense) to apply to there being no official regulation which required me to refer these letters to Lord Hardinge.

14727. Mr. *Layard.*] As for instance, in the Foreign Department, despatches to the different ambassadors are generally communicated to each ambassador?—Yes.

14728. More by courtesy than by any official regulation?—For the convenience of the public service.

14729. Did Lord Hardinge make any report to your Grace upon the state of the army, or upon the war?—He communicated to me any information which he received, and which he felt it desirable that he should communicate; but at the same time, I may repeat the answer which I gave just now, that it has been the invariable practice that the Secretary of State corresponds with the Commander-in-chief of an army abroad; that the Commander-in-chief of an army abroad does not correspond with the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards. Consequently Lord Hardinge received from the army in Turkey only those official communications which it was not worth while to send to me; those which came to the Horse Guards were, of course, of a very subordinate character, relating to supplies, and various other matters; no communications upon the great operations of the war.

14730. For instance, your Grace read to us yesterday a despatch which was written in the early part of last year, giving the sketch of a military campaign?—Yes.

14731. Was that despatch communicated to Lord Hardinge, and was he asked for any military opinion upon it?—The despatch was shown by me to Lord Hardinge; and, of course, Lord Hardinge, if he had seen any reason to object, or to advise otherwise, would have communicated it to me; but I do not in any way hold Lord Hardinge responsible for anything contained in those despatches.

14732. Will you state to the Committee where Lord Hardinge's responsibility begins, and where it ends; how far is he responsible for anything which may have happened during the present campaign?—That is so very wide and general a question, that it is impossible to answer it. If the Honourable Member will be kind enough to put to me any particular question as to who is responsible for any particular portion, I will answer it to the best of my power.

14733. Do the Government consider themselves responsible for all military movements?—Certainly.

14734. The Commander-in-chief is not responsible for anything which may have taken place in the Crimea, or elsewhere, with regard to the movement of the troops?—Such, for instance, I presume you mean, as the movement of the troops from Scutari to Varna, and the subsequent expedition to the Crimea?

 14735. Yes;

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14735. Yes?—No; certainly the Commander-in-chief is not responsible for that.

14736. Is he responsible for the clothing of the troops, or any provisions, during the winter, or for the sick?—I should say the Commander-in-chief was certainly responsible for the ordinary clothing of the troops, because that comes within his province at all times. At the same time, the peculiar circumstances of the case rendered it, I thought, incumbent upon me to exercise a general supervision upon the question of clothing; and therefore, I recommended to the Commander-in-chief, and it was adopted, that a third supply of clothing should be furnished to the troops, without any deductions, this year, and other steps of that kind, which, under ordinary circumstances, would have come within the province of the Commander-in-chief.

14737. *Chairman.*] Then the responsibility of any failure which took place in the supply of winter clothing did not apply to the Commander-in-chief?—I think not, certainly, assuming that there was a failure. No blame can attach to the Commander-in-chief beyond what can be considered to attach to anybody who does not make a recommendation. It did not come within the province of the Commander-in-chief to order extra clothing for any of the troops; it came within his province to supply such clothing as is ordinarily supplied.

14738. Mr. *Layard.*] Was he officially informed that the army would winter in the Crimea?—He was kept informed of every change of circumstances, and was therefore of course as well aware as the Government was of the necessity for the troops wintering in the Crimea when it arose. As I stated yesterday, it is impossible to say that any absolute resolution was ever taken that the army should winter in the Crimea; it arose necessarily out of the circumstances of the case.

14739. But having official information that the army would winter in the Crimea or in some part of Turkey, was it his duty to see that the army was provided with winter clothing for that particular purpose, besides the common winter clothing given out to the troops?—I am hardly able to answer that question very accurately. Practically, of course, I know what was done; it was a case *per se*; it was extraordinary, and as soon as it was obvious that the troops would have to winter in the Crimea I took upon myself, in communication with the Secretary-at-War, the Commander-in-chief, and the Ordnance department, to order such amount of additional warm clothing beyond that which I had taken upon myself to order in August last, and to which I referred yesterday, as upon consultation we considered to be desirable.

14740. Do you think that the line of demarcation between the responsibility of the Minister-at-War and of the Commander-in-chief is very indefinite?—In some respects it undoubtedly is inconveniently so.

14741. Do you think that any change for the better could be made in the respective positions of the two?—Undoubtedly there are many alterations in the respective positions of the whole of the War departments which would be very desirable.

14742. Did your Grace ever draw up any report upon that subject?—No; for the reasons which I have already stated.

14743. You have never been consulted by the present Government?—No.

14744. With regard to the Ordnance Department, what was your power; how far could you control it?—I should consider my power to be complete. I mean so far, that any order given by me could not be disobeyed; but that my power of control arising from a knowledge of what was going on was complete, I am by no means prepared to say.

14745. Who appoints to the Ordnance?—The Crown.

14746. Through the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief, or of the Minister-at-War?—The principal appointments to the Ordnance have hitherto been removable with the Government of the day; they have been made, of course, upon the recommendation of that individual to whom the Crown has committed the trust of forming a Government.

14747. Then when the Government, of which you were a member, was formed, those appointments in the Ordnance, which change with the Government, were made by the members of the new Government?—Yes.

14748. Was it necessary to retain the Master-general of the Ordnance in his place?—No, it was not necessary; but I should say that for some time past a gradual

gradual improvement, I think, in that respect has been working its way, and there was a less tendency to change of those departments than existed a few years ago.

14749. Who was the Master-general of the Ordnance during the time when you were in office?—Lord Raglan. He had been Master-general in the preceding Government. He was appointed by Lord Derby's Government, upon the appointment of Lord Hardinge to be Commander-in-chief, who had been Master-general of the Ordnance before.

14750. Then on his going to the East, did he give up his appointment or did he retain it?—He retained it.

14751. Do you know what arrangements were made in consequence of his being absent from his post?—Yes. Sir Hew Ross was appointed as Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance.

14752. Was Sir Hew Ross in a stationary place, or did he change with the change of Government?—He was in a stationary place.

14753. I suppose Lord Raglan continued to receive the pay of Master-general of the Ordnance?—I believe so; but having nothing to do with the finance of the army, I am not able to answer that question.

14754. *Chairman.*] I suppose the Secretary-at-War could answer that question?—No doubt.

14755. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you know whether Lord Raglan continued to control the different departments of the Ordnance?—Certainly not; but I am unable to say that Sir Hew Ross may not privately have consulted him upon any matter not of pressing moment. Of that, of course, I am unable to speak, but Lord Raglan exercised no control over the Ordnance; it is understood that he did not.

14756. Are you acquainted with the general details of the Ordnance; I mean of the persons who hold offices there, and how they are appointed, or is that not in your department?—I had nothing to do with the appointment of any of them; but I dare say I can answer any questions which the Honourable Member wishes to put.

14757. Did any of the principal appointments in the Ordnance include men who were acquainted with the Artillery, or who had been in the Artillery?—Sir Hew Ross had been himself in the Artillery.

14758. But he was stationary?—Yes.

14759. My question applies to those appointments made by the Government?—I think not.

14760. No person appointed by the Government was acquainted with the Artillery?—No.

14761. Is not the Ordnance especially devoted to the Artillery service?—To that service and many others.

14762. Do you not think it right that when a person is appointed to a place in the Ordnance he should be acquainted with the Artillery?—I do, as regards some of the places; but I should accompany that answer with the statement that I think that the whole arrangement of the Ordnance Department requires revision. The Honourable Member must not infer from my answer that I think it is absolutely necessary, under the existing system of the Ordnance, that the heads of any of the departments should be Artillery officers, but then I think that system deficient.

14763. Did you ever make any representation on that subject?—I represented that the state of the Ordnance was extremely unsatisfactory.

14764. Has any change been made to your knowledge?—I am not aware that any has been made yet; I believe some changes are in contemplation.

14765. How far had you any control over Admiral Dundas and the Navy?—None whatever.

14766. Then, supposing there had been joint operations of the army and the fleet, the fleet would have been under the complete control of the Admiralty?—Certainly. I should say, in explanation of my answer of "None whatever," that the duties of the Secretary of State for War connected with the navy extend no further than this: that at the commencement of a war, or upon the determination by the Government to undertake any new operations, instructions are sent by the Secretary of State for War to the Admiralty with a general outline of those operations, leaving, the practical details of those operations to be carried out by the Admiralty; but the officers of the Navy are

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not responsible to the Secretary for War. The Secretary for War gives his directions to the Admiralty, and it is the duty of the Admiralty to see those instructions carried out, without any supervision of the various captains or admirals.

14767. Am I to understand you to say, that if you, as Minister-at-War, give directions to the Admiralty, your instructions are to be carried out by the Admiralty without further conference?—Yes; because, of course, any instructions of the character which would be sent by the Secretary for War are instructions decided upon by the Cabinet.

14768. In that letter which you placed before the Committee yesterday, there is a plan of operations in the Sea of Azov and elsewhere, in which the fleet was to take a prominent part; was that letter communicated to the Admiralty?—Certainly.

14769. Was it acted upon?—That I am unable to say; I am aware of this, that Sir James Graham, in consequence of the despatch which I wrote to Lord Raglan, wrote a similar despatch to the Admiral of the Fleet, I mean similar upon that point.

14770. Was any blockade enforced in the Black Sea?—No.

14771. In whose department would the enforcement of a blockade have been; in the department of the Secretary for War or of the Admiralty?—The Admiralty.

14772. Supposing the non-enforcement of a blockade had interfered with military operations, would it have been the duty of the Minister-of-War to remonstrate with the Admiralty?—Certainly; it must, of course, be understood that in all these matters it is assumed that there is a co-operation among the existing members of the Cabinet; that there would not be a disposition on the part of the First Lord of the Admiralty to use his fleet to thwart the operations of the army, which was under the more immediate direction of the Secretary for War.

14773. Are you aware whether any blockade was kept up until lately?—I have already said that it was not.

14774. Mr. *Drummond.*] Were not the orders to the English navy, to act in all matters of blockade, and things of that kind, in conjunction only with the French navy?—They were.

14775. And the French navy was under the French general?—I think not.

14776. Was not the French navy under the Commander-in-chief of the French army?—Unless I am greatly mistaken, not. Of course I answer such a question as that as it is put by a Member of the Committee, to the best of my knowledge; but I have no personal knowledge on the subject.

14777. Lord *Seymour.*] Your Grace has stated that there was no blockade of the Black Sea, although it had been stated in the House of Commons that orders had been sent to institute a blockade; do you believe that the reasons why that blockade was not enforced arose from political, and not merely from naval circumstances?—Chiefly political circumstances.

14778. *Chairman.*] Who judged of those political circumstances which led to the non-fulfilment of the order?—That would be entering into a variety of matters connected with arrangements between the English fleet and the French fleet, and communications between the heads of both fleets and the Ambassadors at Constantinople, and other matters. I think it would be more proper, if the Committee think it desirable to obtain that information, that they should obtain it from one of the present Ministers of the Crown than from me. I think that there might be inconvenience in my answering the question. I am able to answer it, and have no personal objection.

14779. My object was to learn whether the Admirals were responsible for that determination, or the Government?—I think we ought to say that the Government was responsible principally; there were difficulties raised out there. Orders were sent, as I have already admitted, to institute a blockade. Difficulties arose at the seat of war of a political character, not connected with any disobedience, on the part of the Admiral of our fleet, of the orders sent out by the Government from home, into which I hardly think that it would be right for me to enter. The Committee will have, of course, the power of obtaining the information, if they think it of importance.

14780. Mr. *Layard.*] Were any reasons sent to you from the East, which were

were considered satisfactory by the Government, for not enforcing the blockade?—Reasons were sent; that they were in all respects entirely satisfactory, I think I cannot say. Again, I would really rather not say why I consider that they were not satisfactory: they would not apply merely to those departments into which the honourable gentleman wishes to inquire.

14781. How far did Lord Raglan exercise an independent command in the East?—Independent of whom?

14782. Of the Government at home. Was all that related to the army completely within the control of Lord Raglan?—He was responsible, of course, to the Government at home, and subject to the commands of the Government at home.

14783. If a witness states, for instance, that he made a representation to Lord Raglan, with regard to organising a transport or ambulance corps, and that it was stated to him that Lord Raglan was waiting for instructions from home, do you consider that to be a sufficient reason for not having organised that corps?—I think that that would entirely depend upon the circumstances of the case. There are instances, undoubtedly, in which the Commander-in-chief of an army would not be right in taking the responsibility upon himself, if he believed that the step proposed to him was at variance with instructions from home, or with the views of the Government at home; he would be justified in not adopting it until he had ascertained that point.

14784. Lord Lucan, in his evidence, states that he proposed to organise in the Crimea, during the time of our greatest need, an ambulance corps; and that the answer which he got was a note from the Adjutant-general, to say that Lord Raglan was obliged to him for his offer, and that the case was under the consideration of the English Government; had Lord Raglan the power or not of organising such a corps, without referring to the Government at home?—He undoubtedly had the power, subject to his responsibility, if he thought that it was right and necessary to do so. The power of the Commander-in-chief of an army in the field is of course unlimited, except by his responsibility.

14785. Then there was no check, as far as the Government at home was concerned, upon Lord Raglan?—No; a plan of ambulance corps had been adopted by the Government at home before Lord Raglan left this country. I am entirely ignorant of the communication which is now referred to, but I have very little doubt that the circumstances were that Lord Raglan felt that a system having been adopted, it was desirable that the opinion of the Government at home should be obtained before that system was changed. He had the power to change it if he found that its maintenance was prejudicial, of course.

14786. Lord Lucan states, that at that time our army was greatly suffering from the want of this ambulance corps?—Lord Raglan, in all probability, may have taken a different view of the proposal.

14787. With regard to increased transport, the Commissariat, the Medical department, tents, or any thing of that kind, could Lord Raglan have acted without reference to home?—Of course if he had the means of obtaining such requisites; but as regards any increase of the Commissariat it is manifest that he could not; he must have applied at home for Commissariat officers; at least, the opportunities which he would have out there, of obtaining any persons fit to serve as Commissariat officers, would be very rare indeed. The same I should say with regard to tents; he might procure materials, and have had them brought there if the case was very urgent, and in such case he would undoubtedly have exercised his responsibility most properly.

14788. Had he the appointment of all his officers connected with the army?—No; the appointment rests with the Commander-in-chief at home. I believe in many instances the Commander-in-chief consulted Lord Raglan, as to whom he thought fitting; but the appointment rests entirely with the Commander-in-chief.

14789. To your knowledge, was any remonstrance made by Lord Raglan upon any appointment?—I am not aware of any.

14790. Never through your Grace?—Never through me. I received from Lord Raglan frequent recommendations with reference to appointment of officers with the army, promotions upon vacancies occurring, and so forth, which I invariably communicated to the Commander-in-chief; occasionally, when the

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case was one which came at all within my own knowledge, I gave a recommendation; but the responsibility of those appointments rests with the Commander-in-chief.

14791. Were those recommendations generally attended to?—Generally certainly; I am not aware of any exception.

14792. Lord Raglan had the control over his officers in the East; he could have dismissed or punished any person there?—Of course.

14793. In fact, he had the powers which are generally given to a Commander-in-chief under such circumstances?—Certainly.

14794. Can you state to the Committee what preparations were made for hospital arrangements at the commencement of the expedition to the East?—Are you speaking of hospital arrangements solely, or medical arrangements?

14795. Hospital arrangements?—The arrangements with regard to hospitals, made before the expedition sailed from this country, were of a merely provisional character, such as sending out medicines, and every requisite; it was not, of course, at that time known either where hospitals should be established, or what facilities there might be for establishing them; the establishment of hospitals grew out of the various positions of the army.

14796. Were any instructions sent out at an early period to prepare hospitals at Constantinople, or elsewhere?—Certainly; and one of the very first steps taken, when the expedition was first ordered to Gallipoli, was to ascertain through Mr. Calvert, the consul at the Dardanelles, what would be the best positions for hospitals, and he recommended Abydos amongst others; that I remember as one.

14797. At what period was that?—It was quite at the commencement, when the expedition was first ordered to Malta, and when we were aware that in all probability Gallipoli would be the place to which the troops would be first advanced.

14798. Was Mr. Calvert's suggestion attended to?—Yes, preparations were made for establishing a hospital at Abydos. I doubt whether at that time it was much used; the health of the troops whilst at Gallipoli was singularly good, and I should doubt whether any were removed to Abydos; but Abydos has since been used as a hospital, and used extensively.

14799. Dr. Smith, in answer to some questions which were put him, made the following statements; he referred to the month of August; he was asked, "Did his Grace at the time inform you that you ought to be prepared with arrangements for the casualties of the army that was immediately going to take the field?" He answered, "Not that I know of; I never knew that the army was immediately going to take the field. Did the Duke give you any information which led you to suppose that those casualties that were inseparable from war were about to take place?—Not that I recollect; he did not give me any information." Are those statements correct?—At what time is that?

14800. He refers to the month of August?—They are certainly most incorrect; I think there must be some misunderstanding as to the date. In the month of August, especially the latter part of the month of August, I was in constant communication with Dr. Smith, and to the best of my recollection, before that time, he had actually taken measures for establishing the principal hospital which now exists at Scutari.

14801. *Chairman.*] Dr. Smith was asked, "Was the conversation, when his Grace stated that, about August?—I cannot answer to that"?—When I stated what?

14802. Mr. *Layard.*] He is asked, "You stated that in August you recommended the Duke of Newcastle to give large powers to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe?—I did not mean to state that; I did not recommend his Grace to give large powers, but he told me that he had given them. Was the conversation, when his Grace stated that about August?—I cannot answer to that. About what time was that?—It might be later; later rather than earlier. Did his Grace at the time, inform you, that you ought to be prepared with arrangements for the casualties of the army that was immediately going to take the field?—Not that I know of; I never knew that the army was immediately going to take the field. Did the Duke give you any information which led you to suppose that those casualties that were inseparable from war, were about to take place?—Not that I recollect; he did not give me any information"?—I am

—I am utterly at a loss to understand the answers; my communications with Dr. Smith, as I think I stated yesterday, were almost invariably personal. At one time, and commencing at about the time to which he refers there, namely, very shortly after the prorogation of Parliament, complaints having at that time reached this country, with reference to the provision of various articles connected with the medical department, I told Dr. Smith that I thought it desirable that he should come to me every day; and although of course interviews are very often extremely inconvenient when you are pressed with business, I thought it so important, that I made that request. Unquestionably in the course of those conversations, he must have been made aware of the nature of the operations; without any detail, of course. I am at a loss to understand the answers, because I think that Dr. Smith must himself have admitted in the course of his examination, that he had made those very preparations; and if he had made those preparations, he must have made them under some information. The circumstances were these. When the army was moved from Scutari to Varna, the principal hospital was established at Varna, there being facilities there, and it being much nearer than Scutari to the position of the army. Subsequently, when the expedition was determined upon to the Crimea, the head-quarters of the hospital, if I may so say, were re-established at Scutari; and I can mention a misfortune which will corroborate that statement, namely, that when it was represented that soldiers were brought to Scutari immediately after the battle of the Alma, and that sufficient supplies of all kinds were not found in the hospital at Scutari which had been established, the answer was, that directions had been given to send back again from Varna the articles which had been conveyed there, and that though the neglect of a medical officer, combined, I believe, with some negligence on the part of the captain of a transport, those things had failed. I mention this as an incident occurring to my memory at the moment, to prove that Dr. Smith must have been mistaken in the evidence which he gave.

14803. According to your impression, every instruction was given from the War Department to authorise the establishment of proper hospitals at Scutari? —Yes; at the same time, if you ask me whether written instructions were given, they undoubtedly were not; as I say, especially under the circumstances, it was quite impossible for me, with a non-organised department, to put every matter into writing, and I found it more convenient, in the case of Dr. Smith, to give these instructions verbally. That is undoubtedly a system which, when the department is properly organised, and in complete working, is not desirable; but I mention these facts now to prove that verbally those instructions were given. There is another reason why at that moment I should probably not have given written instructions to Dr. Smith; namely, that it was very undesirable to give any facilities for clerks or others becoming acquainted with the operations which had been determined upon.

14804. I think Dr. Smith, in his examination, states that most of the communications were verbal; in that he agrees with your Grace. You consider that those verbal communications were sufficient to authorise him to prepare proper hospital accommodation at Scutari?—Certainly, and I have always understood from him, that so far as depended upon the department at home, orders were given for that establishment.

14805. Then if there was any deficiency of hospital accommodation, the responsibility would be upon Dr. Smith?—That of course depends upon whether he gave the necessary orders; if he gave the necessary orders, and they were not fulfilled, then I should not consider that he was responsible.

14806. Still you held Dr. Smith, as the head of the department, responsible for the conduct of those placed under his orders and care?—Of course.

14807. If any person did not obey the orders which Dr. Smith sent to him, still Dr. Smith would be the person whom you looked to as the responsible person?—Certainly.

14808. *Chairman.*] More especially if Dr. Smith did not make any complaint to you?—Certainly; not only did he not make any complaint to me, but I made a great many complaints to Dr. Smith, to the correctness of which he did not assent.

14809. Mr. *Layard.*] Were those complaints in consequence of official remonstrances from the East, or from mere casual reports in the public press,

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or from private sources?—The latter; I never received any official remonstrances of any kind, as I stated, I think, yesterday; if I had, I should have been in a direct position to act. When they came to me through private sources, or through the public press, of course I had no right to act upon them before all the facts were corroborated and confirmed.

14810. Was it the duty of any person out there to have made remonstrances to you on the state of the hospitals?—Yes; I should say that the commandant at the Bosphorus should have made complaints of the state of the hospitals, if they were not satisfactory to him, either to the Commander-in-chief of the army, which would have been the correct course, or, if he had felt that time was pressing, then he should have communicated them directly to me. I should not complain of him for not making the representations to me, but he ought, undoubtedly, to have made them to Lord Raglan.

14811. Were any such remonstrances made to the Commander-in-chief, and then forwarded to you?—No.

14812. Can you state any instance of mismanagement, or of the existence of any wants, which you made to Dr. Smith and which he neglected?—I should object rather to the word "neglected," because I have no reason to say that it was neglected, and I am merely answering questions hypothetically. I did not say that Dr. Smith neglected it; what I said was this, that it was constantly my duty to make complaints. I use the word "complaint" because it has been used in the opposite way by the Chairman. I said that I had frequently to make complaints to Dr. Smith, and that Dr. Smith demurred to those complaints; what I mean is this, I received complaints by private letters in some instances, by personal communications in more, and by what I saw in the public press still more, and which I made an invariable practice of communicating to Dr. Andrew Smith, and calling upon him for such explanations as he could give, and failing them, of calling for explanations from those persons who were answerable to him.

14813. Can you state any instances to the Committee?—Certainly I can; the very first instance which occurred was the one that I referred to yesterday, which arose at Varna; namely, the insufficiency of port wine and arrowroot. The second which occurred at the same place was connected with the non-delivery to the troops of the cholera belts, which had been specially ordered, under the apprehension that as cholera prevailed in different parts of the world, when the army went out it might be found to prevail there, and 40,000 belts were sent with the army; but till a considerable time afterwards none were delivered. I do not however think that the Medical department was in any degree responsible for that. Those are two of the earliest complaints. Subsequently complaints were made by one or two individuals to me personally, not from their individual observation, but from communications they had received, as to the conveyance of the wounded after the battle of the Alma to the hospitals at Scutari; and that was perhaps the strongest and most painful instance of the whole, and one, with regard to which I called upon Dr. Andrew Smith immediately for a careful and stringent inquiry. That inquiry, by Dr. Andrew Smith's orders, was made, and a full report was sent by Dr. Hall upon those cases. Subsequently many other small matters occurred, which I invariably communicated to Dr. Smith.

14814. Your impression was, that those accounts which you received were in the main correct?—No; I cannot say that that was invariably the case; but I considered it my duty, without exercising any opinion whether they were correct or not, if there was plausibility on the face of them, to investigate the matter.

14815. But Dr. Andrew Smith rather gave you to understand that he did not believe that they were true?—Yes; but I do not attach blame to him for that disbelief. He assumed that, after the directions and the positive orders which he said were given on such points, ample supplies had been sent out. It was frequently the insufficiency of the supplies of various kinds which was complained of. The Committee will recollect the lint; and Dr. Andrew Smith very naturally said he felt that such deficiency was perfectly impossible, and he could not believe such culpability as a neglect of the stores which had been sent out or their misplacement. He assured me that such and such ships had been sent out within time, amply sufficient for them, and much more than sufficient for them, to have arrived.

14816. *Chairman.*] In those letters which I brought to your notice yesterday Dr. Andrew Smith stated that he had suggested that transport ships should be sent out for the conveyance of the sick and wounded from the Crimea to Scutari?—Yes.

14817. Now you say that complaints were heard of the mode in which the sick and wounded were treated after the battle of the Alma?—Yes.

14818. Would the suggestion of Dr. Andrew Smith, if it had been attended to, have precluded the possibility of those evils arising to our soldiers?—Yes, I think, to a great extent; but it is right to say, that such suggestions were certainly not made to me by Dr. Andrew Smith at anything like so early a period. I do not say that they were not made to the Admiralty or to somebody else, which Dr. Andrew Smith may be confounding. One suggestion was made at certainly a much earlier period (it arose, I think, after the complaints at Varna), namely, that it was very desirable that the Medical department should have some vessels allotted specifically to themselves for the conveyance of their stores of all kinds from England. I made some inquiries into that question, and I found that it would be impracticable; because the Medical department was not in the habit of shipping stores of a sufficient amount to fill a ship, and it was impossible to avoid filling up that ship with other freight, and therefore that suggestion could not be brought into operation. The recommendation which he made of having hospital ships established for the conveyance of the sick and wounded from the Crimea to the hospital at Scutari, arose after the complaints which were made with reference to the "Kangaroo" and other vessels; it could hardly have arisen before, because as long as the operations were in Bulgaria the hospital ships for the conveyance of the sick were unnecessary.

14819. You saw by the date of that letter, that it purports to have been written long before the battle of the Alma?—Yes; but, as I said before, the recommendation was certainly not made to me.

14820. Mr. *Layard.*] Were no orders sent to the naval authorities, through the Admiralty in England, to prepare such hospital ships?—I think I said yesterday that upon that recommendation being made to me by Dr. Andrew Smith, which, I think, was immediately after the battle of the Alma, I communicated with Sir James Graham without loss of time; and instructions were sent out to the Admiral of the fleet to appropriate, I forget the number, but to appropriate some ships for the special conveyance of the wounded.

14821. Were those instructions ever attended to?—I have reason to believe that they were not, for a considerable time afterwards.

14822. Was any remonstrance subsequently made?—Yes. Upon finding that it had not been attended to, and that consequent evils were occurring, I again represented it to Sir James Graham; and very positive and stringent orders were sent out, accompanied with a rebuke for the non-fulfilment of the previous orders.

14823. Were they then obeyed?—I rather think they were before the arrival of the second despatch; but I am not positive.

14824. Who carried out those orders?—I should think it was Admiral Dundas; but looking at the time when he returned home, and when Sir Edmund Lyons succeeded him, I am not positive. I should think they must have arrived during the time that Admiral Dundas was there.

14825. Are you certain that they were not carried out by Sir Edmund Lyons?—No; but I think that they must have been carried out by Admiral Dundas.

14826. After that time, do you think that the arrangements were satisfactory?—I am not able to speak, of course, with reference to what has taken place in the last three months; but I hope that the system is greatly improved in consequence of the orders which were sent out.

14827. Are you satisfied now that the state of things which was said to have existed in the hospitals at Scutari, in the public press and in private communications, was in the main correct?—A question of degree is always one which it is very difficult to answer. I am quite satisfied that the state of things in the hospitals was anything but what it should have been, and one exceedingly painful and distressing to reflect upon.

14828. Mr. Macdonald states, that he had an interview with you before he went out, and that you discouraged him, and said that there was no need of any

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assistance in the hospitals?— I think that the term discouragement was not quite correct or fair as to the conversation which I had with him; he called upon me to ask me to give him a letter of introduction to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to request him to give him such facilities as he might require for the execution of the duties which had been devolved upon him. I told him that I had made the most careful inquiries of those that were responsible for the execution of such duties, and that the assurances which they gave me led me to hope that the statements were incorrect. I told him further, that I had sent out the fullest authorities some days before to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to use every exertion and to spare no expense to remedy such evils as did exist, and to supply all deficiencies, and I therefore hoped that his task would be found useless. I had reason to hope that his journey would be thrown away, but of course every facility that I could give, short of giving him authority in the hospitals, which I said I could not do, should be given him, and I promised that I would give him the letter of introduction to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe which he required. The letter of introduction preceded him. I wrote it that evening, and sent it by a messenger to Lord Redcliffe.

14829. I will read you Mr. Macdonald's words; he says: "I was told that it was not likely that a fund of that kind would be found of any use in the relief of the sick and wounded;" he is then asked: "Did he say that adequate provision had been made by the medical department in this country for the supplies of the requirements of the hospitals"? and his answer is: "Just before that accounts had reached this country of the want of supplies, and provisions of all kinds, for the relief of the sick and wounded, in the treatment of them; those statements were doubted by the Duke of Newcastle and Dr. Andrew Smith; at least they questioned the accuracy of the statements;" and he is afterwards asked: "Did the Duke of Newcastle say anything to you, to dissuade you from going, or to lead you to suppose that it was not the wish of the Government that you should go?" and his answer is: "He told me that the fund would be useless; at least that he could see no mode of using the fund properly"?—Yes; that is not at all an unfair representation of what I did say to him. I think it is a very candid statement; but I did not dissuade him in any way whatever; I had no business to do so; I told him, that so far as the Government was concerned, it had done its utmost to supply everything at the hospitals. I told him that had the assurance of those who were competent to judge of it that proper officers had been appointed, and that we could not believe that there had been such neglect as to have justified the statements that had been made; and undoubtedly, for some time afterwards, I was under the delusion, and I am ready to admit it to be so, that the state of things was far better than it proved to be.

14830. *Chairman.*] Your subsequent experience led you to know that the anticipations which you stated to Mr. Macdonald were not correct?—Yes, certainly.

14831. Mr. *Layard.*] Have you received any reports from the authorities at Scutari, or at Constantinople, upon the services rendered by the "Times" fund to the hospitals?—No, I have not.

14832. Did they ever report to you unfavourably upon the visit of Mr. Macdonald?—Certainly not.

14833. Mr. Stafford, a Member of the House, has stated to this Committee that he believed that instructions were sent out from the War Office, as to the formation of the barrack hospital and the general hospital, and it seemed to him desirable that those instructions should be produced. Were there any instructions of that kind?—There were no specific instructions as to the constitution of those two particular hospitals. There were the general instructions to which I have already referred, namely, with regard to preparing hospitals for the accommodation of the wounded, and under those instructions those hospitals were set up.

14834. *Chairman.*] Are those the instructions which you wished to read at the commencement of your evidence?—No; those are of a much later date. It was after all those abuses had been proved, and after every exertion had been made here to remedy them.

14835. Mr. *Layard.*] Have you any objection to produce those instructions?—I do not know to what that answer of Mr. Stafford's refers. There were no specific instructions to establish a barrack hospital and a general hospital; the instructions

instructions were, to the medical officers out with the army, to prepare hospitals to such an extent as might fairly be anticipated to be required for the force there, and under those instructions I apprehend that those hospitals were prepared. He may allude to instructions given by Dr. Hall.

14836. I will read the answer: he tells the Committee that there were instructions to those who had charge of the hospitals, and he is asked: "From whom do you mean the instructions were received, and when?" And his answer is: "When the Scutari hospital was given over to the Turkish authorities. It seems to me most desirable that the instructions to the Commandant, from the War Office, as to the formation of this barrack hospital and the general hospital, should be produced?"—Those instructions, if from home, must have been instructions received from Dr. Andrew Smith, I apprehend.

14837. There were none from the War Office?—None; no written instructions; no specific instructions with reference to the arrangements made for the two hospitals.

14838. Was any report sent to you on the state of the French hospitals at Constantinople?—No official reports.

14839. Still you had an account of their condition, had you not?—I had principally accounts from private sources, and persons who returned home either from the army, or in some other capacity. When I heard of anybody arriving, I generally requested them to call on me, in order that I might ascertain the state of matters, more especially in the hospitals, both French and English.

14840. Did the condition of the French hospitals contrasts favourably with ours?—I think in many respects, undoubtedly; but at the same time I think that the vast superiority has been to a considerable extent, so far as I am able to judge, more apparent than real; there are many points undoubtedly of superior excellence. I am not, of course, speaking of the state in which our hospitals were at the time to which the Honourable Member was first alluding.

14841. You do not think that there was any reason why our hospitals should not have been brought into the same state of efficiency?—Certainly not.

14842. Do you think that all necessary supplies, such as bedding, clothing, and necessaries for the sick, including medical comforts, could have been obtained at Constantinople?—I should think so, certainly; but at the same time a very large amount of everything of that kind was sent out from home. Still I should have thought that the deficiencies which existed might have been obtained from Constantinople, with proper precaution and proper care.

14843. In your opinion, there was nothing to prevent those in authority at Constantinople from supplying themselves from the bazaars or elsewhere, in case those deficiencies existed?—Certainly not; there was nothing to prevent them, even before the letter which I wrote to the Foreign Office (I do not recollect the date), requesting Lord Clarendon to give positive instructions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to be answerable for any expenditure that was required; even before that, there was power to make all the purchases that were necessary.

14844. You were speaking of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's position; will you explain to the Committee exactly how Lord Stratford was situated with regard to the hospitals at Constantinople?—I do not consider that he was in any degree responsible for the hospitals at Constantinople; he undertook, at my request, and by the orders of Lord Clarendon, a certain amount of supervision and assistance; but I cannot consider that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was in any degree responsible for any neglect or want of proper precaution which existed in the hospitals; he had no authority whatever over them; they were properly military.

14845. *Chairman.*] Whom do you consider responsible for the abominable condition in which those hospitals were?—The authorities on the spot.

14846. That is a large word, the "authorities"?—By the "authorities" I mean, of course, each in their separate degree, those who had the care and management of the hospitals.

14847. Mr. *Layard.*] It has been stated by several witnesses that the position of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe clashed a good deal with the authorities of

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the hospitals; will you state whether you think such was the case?—No; I think certainly not. I do not see how it could have clashed. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe never claimed any jurisdiction over the hospitals, nor did he interfere with them in any way till he was desired from home to do so.

14848. You stated, did you not, that all he had to do was, in case requisitions were made to him by those who had the charge of the hospitals, he had the power of attending to them?—Yes.

14849. His position in no way interfered with the duties imposed upon those who had the care of the hospitals?—Certainly not.

14850. Upon Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, no responsibility therefore rests?—No; no responsible authority. If anyone can state that he did not execute the orders sent out to him from home, then he would be responsible.

14851. So far as the Government is concerned, they have no cause to complain of deficiency on the part of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe?—I know of none; and I am not aware that the Foreign Office has any.

14852. Dr. Andrew Smith states, or seems to infer, that a great many of his difficulties, and the consequent neglect that arose, was owing to a conflict between the Medical Department and the War Department in the country; is that correct, in your opinion?—I know of no conflict whatever.

14853. He says in his evidence, in answer to a question, "I cannot exactly describe what my position is in reference to the purveying department; at times I am told that I have full power over him; at other times, I am told that I have not power, but that I must refer to the War Office; the consequence is, I cannot tell you exactly what my position in reference to the purveyor is. But if I were to find that anything was going wrong, I should assume that I had power; in the first instance I should write him; very likely he would, as he has done, cavil, and tell me that it was not in my province. Then I must go to the War Office, and get them to carry out what I feel I ought to have the power to carry out." He is then asked, "Has this uncertainty with respect to the power of providing necessaries and comforts in the hospital, been in existence ever since you have been at the Medical Board?" and he says, "Yes, and long before that." Then he is asked, "So that there is a perpetual conflict between the Secretary-at-War and you, as to which has the direct authority to see to those stores?" and he says, "There is, at least, uncertainty in regard of the purveyor." There are many other answers to the same effect?—The only conflict which can arise between the War Office, as the financial department of the army, and the Medical Board, is of a financial character; and I think it is highly probable that a conflict may have arisen at many times with regard to expense; not since the breaking out of the war, but before that time; and Dr. Andrew Smith has told me that the way in which his establishment has been starved, and has been curtailed of the means of providing against emergencies, has been the cause of a great deal of the evil which has arisen. I should say that I entirely agree with Dr. Smith in one point, namely, that the Medical Board is by no means satisfactorily constituted, and perhaps requires as much change as any of the military departments.

14854. Do you agree with this statement: Dr. Smith was asked, "You neither had power, nor supposed yourself to have power, to remedy the evils of which Dr. Menzies had informed you?" and he says, "I had none in the world, because I could not give any instructions to the supreme authority out there?—I apprehend that Dr. Andrew Smith had complete authority over Dr. Menzies, in every matter except that which entailed unauthorised expenditure; upon those points, undoubtedly, it would be right for Dr. Andrew Smith to apply for authority from home, except so far as this, that under the instructions which I referred to before, Dr. Menzies was relieved from all difficulties by the unlimited power of financial expenditure given to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

14855. But this answer goes further than that?—Yes, but I do not concur in it.

14856. You think that, as he was acquainted with the state of the hospitals out there, he had the power to remedy their condition to a certain extent?—Of course, if a man upon the spot does not carry out orders, a man at home, 3,000 miles off, has not the power to effect the remedy; but my answer was this: "I do not think that Dr. Smith was without any power which the War Office could give him."

14857. Have

14857. Have you read Dr. Smith's examination?—No, I have not.

14858. Do you consider Dr. Andrew Smith responsible for anything that may have happened in the hospitals?—That is a very difficult question to answer, and one which I think the Committee will feel to be hardly fair. I am ready to admit my own responsibility for everything. The public has thrown upon me an unbounded responsibility, and I do not complain of it. I believe it is desirable that every public servant should be held responsible for everything done by him and by those under him; but beyond this, speaking of another person, I must say that I do not think Dr. Andrew Smith can be held responsible, in the sense which is generally meant by the word "responsible," for many of the evils which occurred at the hospitals. Still, if it is proved that he did not either give directions to remedy them, or take the necessary precautions to prevent them, undoubtedly he is most blamable.

14859. Your Grace having been in the War Department, and having known the state of the hospitals there, can form an opinion as to the person or persons who are responsible for the state of things which appears to have existed in those hospitals?—No; it is really extremely difficult; and I doubt very much whether the Committee will find any two persons agree, even of those who have been upon the spot, and have had opportunities, which of course I have not had, of seeing their condition. I can only say that I have hardly received from any two persons the same opinions as to the origin of most of the evils which have arisen there. One person expresses one opinion, and another, another. I think, as I said before, that the appointment of the various officers, not of course without exception, but, generally speaking, of those connected with the hospitals at Scutari, was very unfortunate.

14860. But you would rather not express any opinion of your own upon the subject of the responsibility?—Not in the sense in which it has been put to me. I think the Committee are quite as well able to judge as I can be of that.

14861. Still it is desirable for the Committee to ascertain who really was the responsible person for the state of those hospitals; there is so much conflicting evidence upon that point, that it is desirable that the Committee should ask whether you have formed any opinion upon the subject?—I have no hesitation in repeating what I said before. I think that blame attaches in a greater or less degree to almost all connected with that establishment; not to all, but to the greater number.

14862. Are you aware whether the 39th regiment was supplied with warm clothing by the "Times" Fund?—Yes, I have understood so; and I believe the circumstances to have been these: Subsequently to its being manifest that the army would have to winter in the Crimea, every regiment and every body of drafts sent out from this country were supplied with warm clothing upon starting. The 39th regiment did not leave this country, but was ordered on from Gibraltar or Malta, I forget which, and under those circumstances they were not provided with warm clothing; there was none to give them at either of those places, and they proceeded as far as Constantinople without warm clothing. The colonel of the regiment, and I do not at all blame his precaution, not being probably aware that in the very ship which conveyed them from Constantinople to the Crimea there was an abundance of warm clothing, which might have been issued to the troops when they landed at Balaklava, and ought to have been, applied to the Commissioner of the "Times" Fund to supply him with warm clothing, which he did.

14863. Was any report of that fact made to you from the officer in command of that regiment?—No, I never heard of it till I saw it in the paper, and then I made inquiries as to how it occurred, and I received the explanation which I have now given.

14864. You agree with Mr. Macdonald, that this regiment had not a supply of warm clothing with them?—Certainly it had not, under the circumstances which I have mentioned; the other regiments which left the country at that time invariably took warm clothing for every man, but that regiment was not supplied with it.

14865. Could not that regiment have been supplied with warm clothing by the authorities at Constantinople, on application to them?—No. I think not; I apprehend there being no depôt of warm clothing at Constantinople, and the warm clothing being invariably consigned to Balaklava, there would have been

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no opportunity of supplying them at Constantinople, and if they had not been supplied by the "Times" Commissioner they must have gone to Balaklava before they were supplied.

14866. *Chairman.*] Was no power given to anybody on board to break bulk, and to supply the troops on board?—No such power was given, nor do I think it would have been desirable to have given such powers, looking to the persons who generally are in command of transports; they are not, strictly speaking, servants of the Government, and I think it would be a dangerous power to give to them. I am a strong advocate for the exercise of a fair amount of discretion and responsibility upon the part of those who are the servants of the Government; but I think it would be dangerous to give such a power to those who are not.

14867. Mr. *Layard.*] Are you aware whether any supplies had been furnished by the "Times" Commissioner, to invalids coming home?—I saw such a statement in one letter of the correspondent's, and I have no doubt that it was true.

14868. He has stated it to the Committee?—I know nothing of it; I do not at all dispute it.

14869. He stated that he supplied necessaries to invalids coming home; was there any person in Constantinople who ought to have done this on the part of the Government?—Yes; I think so, certainly.

14870. Who ought to have done it?—It ought to have been done under the direction of the Commandant at the Bosphorus; of course a person would have been appointed and directed so to do by him, but the Commandant ought, I think, to have supplied those invalids with warm clothing.

14871. Had you anything to do with the Smyrna hospital?—Yes.

14872. Were you consulted on the subject, or did you order that building at Smyrna to be converted into an hospital?—I did.

14873. Before doing so, did you ascertain whether the position was healthy?—I made such inquiries as it was possible to make in this country; I did not entail the delay of making any communication out there, but I did the best I could; I should say that for some time past I had made inquiries as to the possibility of establishing a convalescent hospital in some more salubrious spot, and I turned my attention at first to Rhodes.

14874. What are the objections to Rhodes, and other places?—The objections to Rhodes were these. I should say first, that my reason for thinking of Rhodes was that I had been there myself and was aware of the salubrity of the climate, and the great facility which existed as regards the extensive buildings which formerly belonged to the knights; but upon inquiries, through the Vice-consul there, we ascertained that those buildings were now in so very dilapidated a state, that it would be quite impossible to convert them into hospitals, and the erection of new hospitals would entail a great loss of time, in consequence of want of facilities in that island, which is very much behind hand. Another objection is that Rhodes has no market, and the communications with it are through the winter very uncertain, so that they would have been entirely dependent upon supplies from a distance. Smyrna therefore was manifestly a more appropriate place upon every account, assuming its salubrity.

14875. Yet I understood that it was only intended to occupy the Turkish building at Smyrna temporarily, and that wooden huts were to be sent there for hospital purposes?—Yes.

14876. Upon what grounds, and upon whose report, did you select Smyrna?—Upon concurrent testimonies. I think the first suggestion that I received upon the subject of a hospital at Smyrna was from a gentleman, a Member of the House of Commons, Mr. Stafford.

14877. *Chairman.*] Was that in a letter dated 6th November 1854?—I thought it was earlier than that; but he wrote a letter to me from Smyrna, in which he informed me that the English hospital there, a small establishment which had previously existed for the convenience of British sailors, was in a very bad state, and suggested that it would make a very good position for an hospital.

14878. Mr. *Layard.*] Had Mr. Stafford, to your knowledge, been much in the East?—Not that I am aware of; I did not adopt Smyrna from his recommendation; but I think the first suggestion came from him.

14879. You have been at Smyrna, have you not?—No.

14880. Are you aware whether fever has already broken out in the hospital?—I understand that fever has broken out in the hospital, but I have also understood that it has broken out in a form, and under circumstances, which do not entail a condemnation of the site. At the same time, of course the Committee will see that I am now answering entirely from hearsay; I have had no official means of judging of the success of that establishment; I am responsible for the establishment of it, though I am ignorant of its workings, as it was not finally and completely established before I left office.

14881. Was not it represented to you that the site was unhealthy?—No; I received no information to that effect from anybody; the first idea of its unhealthiness that I received was from a statement which I read in the newspaper, made by the Honourable Member himself in a speech in the House of Commons.

14882. You are not aware whether the European residents in the town generally leave the town during the spring and autumn?—No, I am not; but I am aware that there are very few towns in the East in which that does not take place.

14883. Smyrna was generally the last place, was it not, where the plague lingered in the East?—I do not know, I am sure; I know that the plague has existed at Smyrna, as it has at Constantinople and at Scutari. I certainly have had no reason to suppose that it was a place of danger in any way, or less salubrious than almost any town in that part of the East.

14884. Were any recommendations made to you with regard to Mytilene, or Tenedos, or the Princes' Islands?—No; but I am acquainted with the whole of them myself, and I rejected them principally for the reasons which I have previously stated, that there are no conveniences of any kind, no markets, and no means of obtaining anything in any of those islands, except what is brought to them from a distance, and therefore entailing very great inconveniences, and the danger of deficiencies at times when ships may fail to arrive. I think it is very desirable for the comfort of a large body of sick that they should, as far as possible, be in the neighbourhood of a great commercial town.

14885. Was any instruction sent out to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to obtain additional buildings from the Turkish Government?—Certainly.

14886. Were those additional buildings obtained?—To a certain extent; not to so large an extent as we hoped for.

14887. Have you any objection to state why they were not obtained?—I understood that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was not able to obtain more than those already obtained; in some instances, I think, the French had anticipated the application, and had obtained palaces, and other places, which were at the disposal of the Turkish government. I think we understood that they were unable to give us up more, consistently with their own wants, than they had already given to the English and French Governments.

14888. Who was responsible for the selection of the Commissioners who were sent out to the East?—Dr. Smith, the head of the medical department, selected two medical men.

14889. Do you think that it was advisable to select as the chief of that Commission a gentleman who was to succeed to the administration of the hospitals out there, upon the result of his report?—He was not, in the first instance, selected with any intention of his succeeding; but, undoubtedly, it was decided before he left England, and I had a conversation with Dr. Andrew Smith upon that question; and my first impression was, that it was undesirable, but I was satisfied with the explanations which Dr. Andrew Smith gave, and I consented to the arrangement. I should say, that the principal reason which Dr. Andrew Smith gave, and which had great weight in it, was this: he said, "I have nobody that I can recommend, who would take part in the inquiry with the same ability, the same zeal and impartiality; on the other hand, I have nobody whom I can recommend, who is so capable of succeeding to the head of the establishment; and, under these circumstances, I must put in one or the other position a man whom I consider to be inferior." Under these circumstances, and upon other considerations, I yielded to the arrangement, not thinking that the objection was insuperable; though, of course, I should say, that if there were two men who were equally capable, it was desirable to separate the appointments.

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14890. Did the Commission make any report except that which Mr. Maxwell has handed in to the Committee?—No official report.

14891. You stated yesterday that that Commission had no power to make any alterations, but only suggestions?—Yes; that is to say, it had no executive functions.

14892. Do you think that since the state of the hospitals at Scutari has been known to the Government, proper steps have been taken to remedy the evils which existed?—To the best of my knowledge and ability, I did the utmost that I could to remedy them.

14893. Do you think that no unnecessary delay has taken place in remedying those evils?—None took place here which I could have prevented.

14894. I ask you the question because Mr. Osborne, in one of his answers, has rather thrown some blame upon your department. He says, "I think there is a very great delay, if you take it that Lord William's aides-de-camp are only now on their voyage; that, at the date of the last mail, he had no secretary but simply Mr. Dixon, the interpreter, to write for him, and that I came back and saw the Duke of Newcastle on the 1st of January, which was the last interview I had with the Duke of Newcastle. I say I am not satisfied, because I should have thought those aides-de-camp might have got out before, and the men for the care of the sick, and so on, might have got out before, and I certainly should have thought that these steam transport ships might have gone more quickly. That the things are done I frankly admit, but my only complaint is the same as with regard to Smyrna"?—As soon as Mr. Osborne arrived in this country he favoured me with two long interviews, in the course of which he gave me the fullest information, and made several suggestions, and I believe, with one exception, I adopted every one of his suggestions. I will explain why I did not adopt finally one of them, but among them were these: that he should have a medical secretary, that medical secretary to have no power to assume any medical functions in the hospital; and he gave me reasons, which I thought very sound, why such an appointment would be very useful. Another suggestion was, that three or four aides-de-camp should be appointed to Lord William Paulet. He made several others, some of which will be found in the document which I have mentioned, and which I will produce, namely, the instructions to Lord William Paulet. After receiving those suggestions from Mr. Osborne, in the course of that very day I took steps for carrying them out. As regards the medical secretary, the Committee will at once see that such a person competent to perform the duties of secretary, and debarred from medical practice in the hospital, was not a very easy person to find; but I took immediate steps, through the instrumentality of a medical man in London, in whom I could place confidence, and he obtained for me one or two recommendations. Upon applying to those gentlemen I found them all unwilling to go, but finally, after a long interval, I found a gentleman fit for the appointment. But at that moment I received a private letter from Lord William Paulet, giving, as I thought, sufficient reasons why it would not at that time be desirable that a medical secretary should be sent out. Considering that he was most responsible for such a functionary, I acted upon his suggestion, and though I had found the man, I did not send him out. That is the only point in which I departed from Mr. Osborne's suggestions. As to the aides-de-camp, I not only recommended that three or four should be sent out, but I recommended that 12 should be sent out, and I applied to Lord Hardinge to recommend those officers; he necessarily required some time before he could secure them. The Committee will, of course, see that in time of war military men infinitely prefer military service to hospital service, and of course, no doubt many to whom he applied were unwilling to serve in that capacity. He eventually did find them, and I believe the whole of them have left; but those are the causes of delay to which Mr. Osborne has referred, and I do not feel that I am in any degree responsible for them.

14895. Would it not have been advisable, in the first instance, to have had one person at the head of the hospitals at Constantinople. I mean a medical man appointed and sent out from home?—There has been a medical man at the head of the medical department of the hospitals; but I think the present system of having a military man in command of hospitals, as well as of other establishments there, so as to insure uniformity and co-operation amongst them, is very important indeed. I think that a military commandant is, under the

the circumstances, absolutely necessary, or at any rate a commandant. I do not mean to say that you might not find a civilian competent to execute the duties, but I think it would not do to place a medical man at the head of the hospitals without being responsible to any commandant who had control over the other establishments and the stores for the hospitals, as well as for the army.

14896. The evidence leads the Committee to believe, that the medical man in charge of the hospitals was merely there in charge because he was the superior medical officer at Constantinople, and that any other medical officer coming down superior to him at once took his place, consequently during a short period of time there were a great many changes in the administration of the hospitals; do you think that was a desirable state of things?—Most unquestionably not; if that is a correct statement of matters there, which I rather doubt, I cannot conceive a worse possible system than that one man, because he is senior to another, should immediately supersede him in the management of a great establishment like an hospital, almost insuring the defeat of the objects for which it was founded.

14897. You think that a medical officer should have been sent out purposely for that office?—Appointed purposely; I do not say purposely sent out. There might be a person appointed under the direction and control, and with the authority of Dr. Hall, who is the head medical man with the army.

14898. Before you quitted the War Department, had any changes been made in the medical department in England?—No, there had not.

14899. Had any been contemplated?—There had been changes contemplated.

14900. Did you recommend any?—Lord Panmure is aware of my views, so far as they have gone; I did not mention to him any extensive re-organisation, but so far as regarded the change which I thought necessary I mentioned it to him.

14901. Do you know whether those views have been carried out?—I am not aware that they have.

14902. Dr. Andrew Smith, in his examination, was asked this question: "Under what superintendence and direction do you serve; who is your immediate superior?" and his answer is, "The Commander-in-chief, the Secretary at War, the Minister of War, the Master-general of the Ordnance, the Board of Ordnance, and I hardly know how many more; but those five I am bound to obey in whatever instructions I receive from them;" and to another question he says, that the only difference in his position of late is, that the Secretary for War having been merged in the Minister for War, he has one master less; does that correspond, in your opinion, with the actual state of the Medical Department?—No; I stated yesterday that I thought it was literally justified by the state of things at present existing, but that it was not practically true; and I had myself told Dr. Andrew Smith, at a very early stage of the war, that I considered that he must take his orders from me, and that the Secretary of State for War was his real and only master.

14903. With regard to the Commissariat, do you consider that Sir Charles Trevelyan is the responsible person for the administration of that department of the public service?—Yes; practically, of course, up to the 22d December. The Honourable Member knows that the Board of Treasury, nominally, has the controlling power of every thing under the Treasury; in reality, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in one department, and the First Lord of the Treasury, and various Secretaries of the Treasury, are the working heads of the establishment; and up to the 22d of December Sir Charles Trevelyan was the officer of the Treasury who had the control of the Commissariat.

14904. Having the control of the Commissariat, was he at the same time under your immediate orders, you being at the same time Minister-at-War?—No; the Treasury department stands in a different position from any other. It being a financial department, is in some respects the controlling department of all; that department which holds the purse-strings necessarily controls every other in a greater or less degree. Therefore, the fact of the Commissariat being under the management of the Treasury, for that reason amongst others, was exceedingly anomalous; and it was for that reason I always felt that a change ought to take place; for as long as it remained at the Treasury there was not so complete a subordination on the part of the Commissariat as on the part of the other departments. I did not exercise the same constant supervision and control

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trol as I did with regard to other departments. I had constant communication with Sir Charles Trevelyan; but that department was more independent of the Secretary of State at the time than any other, and that I considered most anomalous. I was entitled to give instructions to the Commissariat, and I did do so.

14905. Did you consider yourself in any way responsible, supposing any *lâches* could be proved respecting the Commissariat?—In the same way in which I have said, that every Secretary of War must be held responsible for everything done by those who are assumed to take their orders from him.

14906. You have just stated that the Commissariat was in a different position from other departments under your control, that being under the control of the Treasury?—The word "responsibility" has been frequently used; it is, of course, one which admits of a very wide interpretation. There is a moral responsibility, and an official responsibility; morally responsible, undoubtedly, for things of which I was not cognisant and which were constantly ordered by the Commissariat, I was not; officially responsible, I consider that I was; and I do not claim exemption from official responsibility for anything that was done by any of them, however ill-organised or ill-arranged it might be.

14907. How far could you have insisted upon Sir Charles Trevelyan carrying out any orders that you gave him, supposing that he refused to do so?—If he refused to carry out any orders that I directed, I must have resorted to the only means which can be resorted to; I must have appealed to the Cabinet; and if the Cabinet decided in his favour, I must have yielded or retired; and if they decided against him, he must have done the same.

14908. Still he was immediately under your control?—No; the Commissariat, until the 22d December, was less under my control than any other military department.

14909. In the middle of December it was placed under the immediate control of the War Department?—Yes.

14910. Was that done upon your representation?—No; it is a measure which has been long contemplated; it is one which has been mooted upon every investigation which has been made into the departments of the army, and it was finally decided that it should be carried out early in the month of June last.

14911. Was it carried out in accordance with your own views?—To this extent: that the Commissariat should be removed from the Treasury. I do not consider that the existing arrangement is quite in accordance with my views.

14912. Were you unable to carry out your views, or did you leave office too soon to carry them out?—No; the carrying out of my own views would be dependent upon a much larger scheme of administration; I think that the details of the Commissariat work are so complex and so extensive, that it is impossible for them to be properly executed by the Secretary of State for War himself personally; that is under the present system now adopted. I did it to the utmost of my power, but I felt that it was a very considerable addition to my heavy work, and I doubt whether it can be fairly said to be well executed by the Secretary of State for War. I think, during the war, if we are to have an establishment organised so as to be fit for war, the Commissariat ought, like other departments of the army, to be under a separate head, but entirely subordinate to the Secretary for War; there should be, I think, an officer somewhat similar to a Commissary-in-chief, though objections have been raised to that; but I do not think that it is a good system that every paper, however great or small, should come under the personal supervision of the Secretary of State for War. I think that his duties ought to be in all instances directory, and that heads of each department ought to exist, responsible to him for the due carrying out of his directions.

14913. Who has now the immediate superintendence of the Commissariat?—The head clerk, who was the head clerk when the business was conducted at the Treasury, Mr. Petrie.

14914. He was removed to the War Office, was he not?—Yes; with his whole establishment.

14915. He carries on his duties as he did before at the Treasury?—Yes.

14916. He is under the immediate superintendence of the Minister?—Yes; and under the same roof.

14917. Did you, before the expedition was undertaken, furnish Sir Charles Trevelyan with any reports upon the state of Turkey, and the resources of the country

country in general?—No; but I am bound to say that he rather furnished me. When I informed him of the intention to undertake this expedition, he supplied me with a good deal of information, which he had obtained from Sir John M'Neill, and other persons with whom he had been in private communication, in all probability in anticipation of this expedition.

14918. Was the Embassy at Constantinople ever called upon for any report upon the state of the resources of that country?—I forget whether it was called upon, or whether it was furnished without being called upon; but such report was supplied, I think, by the Embassy at Constantinople. I have a distinct recollection of a very elaborate and very interesting report, and I think it was supplied direct from the Embassy.

14919. Do you know by whom it was drawn up?—I forget.

14920. Was that report sent to the War Office, or through the Foreign Office to the War Department?—Whether a copy exists in the War Department, I cannot say; but I remember having read that document, and at the Foreign Office first, I have no doubt.

14921. Was Sir Charles Trevelyan furnished with a copy?—I have no doubt of it.

14922. Did you consider that full information had been obtained before the expedition started, as to the resources and condition of the Turkish empire?—No; I can hardly say that we had obtained full information, and I doubt very much whether anybody possesses full information even now; it is not an empire from which you can obtain that information which you can obtain from authorised statistics and other means of information which exist in most other countries of Europe.

14923. Was any person employed either on the general staff of the army, in the Commissariat, or in any other department of the public service, who was acquainted with Turkey or its resources?—Yes, I mentioned one yesterday, Major Dixon; I do not now remember the names of any others, but there were some.

14924. Major Dixon was for some time resident at Constantinople, was he not?—He was in the Turkish service, I think; I may be mistaken.

14925. He was sent out by the British Government, was he not, to instruct the Turks?—Yes; perhaps that is more correct.

14926. Had Major Dixon travelled in the interior of Turkey?—I have always understood so; he spoke the Turkish language perfectly, and I understood that he was well acquainted with the country.

14927. Do you know any other person who was attached to the expedition who spoke the Turkish language?—I do not recollect the names, but there were some; they were not numerous, as the number of Englishmen who speak the language is not numerous.

14928. Was no attempt made in England to provide interpreters for Lord Raglan and the army?—Yes, certainly.

14929. Successfully?—Yes, I have reason to suppose so; and so much so that when I obtained one who was highly competent, and well qualified in all respects (obtaining him in England), and who went out in the same ship with Sir George Cathcart, I found that neither Lord Raglan, nor any generals of division senior to Sir George Cathcart, were any longer in want of interpreters, and he was accordingly attached to Sir George Cathcart.

14930. It has been stated to the Committee, that when the army was at Varna there were no means of transporting that army into the interior, supposing an advance should have been necessary; were any reports to that effect made to the War Department in England?—No; for a time, of course, until transports had been procured, we did receive reports that the army was not in a position to advance from Varna. Before the time, however, when its destination was changed, in consequence of the raising of the siege of Silistria, we understood that though the army was not amply supplied, or so well as might be desirable, yet there was sufficient transport to enable the army to have moved to the Danube, if it had been necessary.

14931. You believe that, during some period of its stay in Bulgaria, the army was in a position to advance to Silistria?—Yes, I have reason to suppose so; I do not say they were in a position to move with the same completeness or sufficiency that either army could have done after two or three months' preparation.

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14932. If it has been stated to the Committee, by officers in command there, that the army was not in a state to move, you do not think that their statements, founded upon reports then received, give an accurate account of the state of things in Bulgaria?—No. I have official reason to suppose that such statements were not correct; and I venture to say that those are matters which no officer in subordinate rank is thoroughly competent to express an opinion upon, except generally. If Lord Raglan stated such an opinion, I would defer to it, as he had the means of knowing; that would be conclusive; but no other officer, general of division, or other, could be sufficiently acquainted with the facts of the case to be able to form an opinion upon that, or many other matters of very great importance. They gave their opinions, no doubt, to the best of their individual knowledge, according to the circumstances in which they were placed; but they had not the means of forming accurate opinions on such matters.

14933. *Chairman.*] Did Lord Raglan inform your Grace that the army was able to advance?—I had no information direct from him that they were able to advance. I do not remember that I had any information from him direct upon that point, but I had information from Commissary-general Filder, sent through the Treasury, which was conveyed to me.

14934. In your opinion, was the Commissary-general better informed of the power of the army to advance than any general of division?—Necessarily so; of course the Commissary-general at that time was entirely responsible for the transport of the army. Before I left office I made an entire change in that respect, and he is now no longer responsible; it is placed under a separate department; but then he was entirely responsible for the transport of the army, and he must have known more than any other person.

14935. You relied, did you not, upon his information, when you formed the opinion that the army was able to advance?—Certainly.

14936. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Does that arrangement to which your Grace has referred as to the transport, include the land transport as well as the sea transport?—I spoke of the land transport solely.

14937. Lord *Seymour.*] The Commissariat had informed your Grace that they were capable of moving the whole army?—It had not informed me, because the Commissariat did not communicate with me; but communications were made to the Treasury, and from a letter which I saw at the time, addressed to the Treasury, I had every reason to suppose that the army was in a state to move if it was ordered to advance. They did not say that the amount of transport was such as would have rendered it possible to have gone, for instance, into Bessarabia, but that it could have advanced for the operations that were contemplated originally on the Danube.

14938. *Chairman.*] Your Grace was asked whether you formed that opinion upon information supplied by Commissary-general Filder?—Yes.

14939. Mr. *Layard.*] We have had the evidence of several officers as to the means of transport for provisions being deficient. I wish to call your attention to a statement of Captain Wrottesley, an officer of Artillery, who gives the following evidence: "The army, in fact, left England destitute of all its most important accessories; it has always been supposed to be the duty of the Artillery to carry the small arms' ammunition for the infantry, and they brought out the small arms' ammunition waggons with them, but no horses, and the consequence of this was that a fresh demand was made upon the Commissariat for draught horses for small arms' ammunition." Are you aware of the state of the Artillery that was sent out there?—The number of horses sent out with the Artillery was the number recommended as necessary by Lord Raglan himself, as the Master-general of the Ordnance, before he proceeded in command of the army to the East; the number which he stated to be requisite was supplied, and moreover they were the first horses that were sent out, and arrived in Turkey before any cavalry arrived. I believe that the spare ammunition has, upon all former occasions, been carried by animals procured on the spot; and so far as I am aware, the Commissariat have invariably provided horses for that purpose in the country, in addition to those of a superior character which were sent from home. The Committee will understand, that at a distance of 3,000 miles to supply the whole of the horses or animals necessary to move the army would be perfectly impossible.

14940. You think that Captain Wrottesley's general statement that the army

army left England destitute of all its most important accessories, is not well founded?—I am exceedingly astonished to hear so broad a statement made by an officer of the high character and intelligence which I know Captain Wrottesley to be. I am surprised at it, undoubtedly.

14941. General *Peel.*] The Commissary-general only reports the state of his department in the field to the general commanding in chief?—Certainly; and to his superior at home.

14942. Not to the generals in command of divisions or brigades?—Never.

14943. Therefore they have no official knowledge upon the subject?—No.

14944. Mr. *Layard.*] What was Captain Wrottesley's position out there?—He originally went out as aide-de-camp to Sir John Burgoyne, if I am not very much mistaken. What his position was subsequently I am not quite positive; I think he was aide-de-camp to Sir John Burgoyne before war was declared, and when, as I said yesterday, Sir John Burgoyne and other engineer officers were sent out to examine places which might be occupied by the troops, and fortified.

14945. From his position as aide-de-camp to Sir John Burgoyne, do you conceive that he was in a position to form an opinion upon the state of the means of transport of artillery and ammunition?—Most unquestionably not; his duties as aide-de-camp ended before the expedition was sent out, General Sir John Burgoyne having returned to this country long before any troops left Malta. What his position was subsequently I cannot state. I recollect that he remained in Turkey when Sir John Burgoyne came home, but whether he afterwards served as aide-de-camp to any other general officer, or with his corps, I cannot say.

14946. Was a siege train sent out from England after Lord Raglan's departure or before?—Two siege trains were ordered to be prepared before Lord Raglan left this country; and the first siege train was sent out, I do not remember the exact date, but somewhere about the time when the troops moved from Scutari to Varna, and arrived very long indeed before the expedition to Sebastopol was ordered. The second siege train, which had been in course of preparation, was sent out and arrived before the expedition sailed to the Crimea, so that both the siege trains which were ordered at that time arrived before the expedition went to the Crimea complete.

14947. Were they both intended for the siege of Silistria or for the siege of any cities that might be taken by the Russians in Bulgaria?—For the general services of the army, in whatever operations they might be engaged; but undoubtedly with an ultimate view to that great operation which, as I said yesterday, was contemplated from the first as highly probable to be one that would be undertaken.

14948. Was that siege train supplied with any means of transport; with horses, or mules, or oxen?—Partly; not allotted specifically to itself, because the Committee will see that, in the operations upon which the siege train was to be used, the horses which were applied to the field batteries would be applicable to those purposes, and I do not think that horses were specifically sent for that purpose.

14949. How could the siege train have been moved in Bulgaria?—By the artillery horses sent out.

14950. But those were to move the field artillery?—Yes; but a sufficient number were sent out, according to the recommendation of the Ordnance department, for the conveyance of such guns as would be required for the service of the army.

14951. You think that the Ordnance received instructions, and that they ought to have sent out a sufficient number of horses to move the siege train and the field artillery, in case of operations in Bulgaria?—My first answer implies that; but if you wanted to move the whole of the guns on the same occasion, which was highly improbable, I am not prepared to say that the English horses which were sent out would have been adequate for the removal of the whole, including ammunition.

14952. Lord *Seymour.*] Do you think that they relied upon the artillery horses to move the siege train, and not on the Commissariat?—I think so, under certain circumstances; not in the case of the siege of Sebastopol.

14953. Mr. *Layard.*] Was Lord Raglan, or any other person, consulted as

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to the means of transport that were taken from this country to the seat of operations, such as waggons and things of that kind?—I cannot say positively; but I have not the slightest doubt that he was; he was consulted upon all such matters; as long as he was in this country no step was ever taken without a consultation with him, though I do not specifically remember any consultation with him on that point.

14954. I asked you that question, because Captain Wrottesley states, in answer to the question, "Were the waggons sent from England, a sort of waggon that would have answered with the small horse of that country?" "Not at all; they were large, heavy, four-wheeled waggons; it is called a Flanders waggon; then, neither waggon nor ambulance was suited to the horse of the country; neither"?—I believe that that answer is tolerably correct as regards the waggons that were sent, with the exception of those sent from Malta, which were lighter. I believe they were too heavy, as is the case of some of the ambulance carts, though that was a new establishment altogether, and adopted after the most careful consideration with those persons, medical and others, who were the best competent to give advice. They were, undoubtedly, not found, when applied to that country, so serviceable as they would have been if any of those who advised had had military experience of the country itself.

14955. At that time, who was responsible for the organisation of the land transport?—The Commissariat.

14956. They were answerable for proper means of land transport being procured in the country?—Yes.

14957. Were any representations made to you as to the deficient state of the land transport of the army?—Yes; at first there were representations. I think I said yesterday that a complaint arose very early that there were not the means of moving up the tents, and other requisites for the troops, to Bulahir, when they landed at Gallipoli. I do not recollect any complaints after that, nor could they very well have arisen, because the distance to which transport was applicable was so very short; the troops never moved very far; the furthest division from Varna was never above 17 or 18 miles.

14958. *Chairman.*] Was not it the intention to move the army up to Silistria if it was needed?—Certainly, if an emergency arose.

14959. Was not that emergency provided for?—Yes, those were the directions; and I have already said, that from the reports received from the Commissariat I had reason to suppose that those directions had been carried out.

14960. Your belief now is, that when the army was at Varna it could have advanced into the interior of Bulgaria?—Yes, in the way in which I have said; I say it was not in a position to advance in that complete form in which it would have been in the course of two or three months more of preparation, but that the preparations had advanced to a sufficient point to have enabled the army to have advanced to Silistria if they had been ordered to do so.

14961. You think that the Committee have been misinformed, if they have been informed that only a few divisions of the army could have moved up to Silistria?—Yes, certainly; of course the only way in which I can form an opinion is by looking at the opinions which have been reported from those who are responsible, and who are alone competent to form such opinions.

14962. You say, "are alone competent;" when Captain Wrottesley gave that answer, that the "wants were not provided for; that the army left England in fact destitute of all its most important accessories;" do you not think that he was in a situation to know whether that was accurate or not?—I do not think so; I do not see how he could possibly have known whether the army left England deficient of all its necessary accessories; I do not see by what means he could have arrived at that information.

14963. You think that he has hazarded a statement that is incorrect?—I think he must have given it, at secondhand. If such an opinion came from any of those who are sufficiently high in command to know the facts, of course, I should say that that was conclusive; but as regards the greater part of those facts, none but the Commander-in-chief of the army, and the various departments responsible for each, could have been aware of them.

14964. Do not you suppose that a general of division would know whether he had sufficient transport horses for his division?—Certainly, whether there was a sufficient number of horses for the removal of his own division and present with his division,

division, but it would not follow that a division that was 18 miles from Varna was unable to move to Silistria, because a sufficient number did not appear to be with the division. The Commissary-general might think that until they were required the horses should be kept at Varna, a nearer point of communication with the sea, and supplies, than by advancing them into the country. It does not necessarily follow that a general of division would know the power there was of moving his own division.

14965. You think that he was not in a position to state whether his division could advance in an operation, like the relief of Silistria, and that he was not in a position to say whether it could advance or not?—Not in a position to state positively. There might be an accidental case: for instance, if a general of division, knowing there were no horses with his division which would enable him to move, applied to the Commissary-general and inquired what horses he could send to him, and he said he should be only able to send him so many; he would thus acquire information, but he would not have arrived at that information without getting it from other sources, and it would necessarily come second hand. I do not say that the information which has been given to the Committee is therefore necessarily incorrect; I am disputing the power of a general of division, under all circumstances, and in all cases, to give accurate information.

14966. Supposing a general of division has made that statement, has he hazarded a statement without knowing the truth of what he stated?—That is a sort of moral question which I think I can hardly be expected to answer; in the case of a general of division, I cannot doubt but that he would give the best information in his power, and that he would not wilfully make a statement that he did not believe to be correct.

14967. General *Peel.*] If there had been a total want of transport, would it not have been the duty of Lord Raglan to have reported it?—Yes, certainly; and he from time to time, in his letters, states that the army has not been in a position to move, because the Commissary-general has not yet procured a sufficient number of animals, and up to the time when I am speaking of, that was the condition of the army; but if the statement from Mr. Filder was correct, it was rectified by an application being made to Omar Pasha, to supply a very large number of arabas. I should say that Omar Pasha had the whole control over the supply of carts, horses, and everything else in that country, and Commissary-general Filder only obtained a very small number from private contractors, until he applied to Omar Pasha, when he issued his edict, and a very large number was immediately supplied. Then it was that the army was stated to be in a condition to move, and that was only at the moment, just preceding the time when the raising of the siege of Silistria changed the whole aspect of affairs.

14968. *Chairman.*] During the siege of Silistria, according to your belief, the army was unable to move forward to relieve it?—Unquestionably, when the First Division arrived at Varna, it was not in a position to advance; the army was moved from Scutari to Varna by divisions at a time, as early as it was possible to move them, with a view first to the moral effect that would be produced, and secondly to the material assistance that could be rendered to the Turkish army in the siege of Silistria. Commissary-general Smith had been doing what he could to procure transport; he did it, not knowing that the army was to advance to Varna, and secured a large amount of transport. The Commissariat, as soon as the order was given to take up a position at Varna, instantly commenced to supply transport there; that necessarily took some time, and undoubtedly for a time the army could not have been in a position to move from Varna to Silistria.

14969. During the whole time of the siege of Silistria, could the army have advanced from Varna to relieve it?—I have already said, that until a short time anterior to the raising of the siege, the army was not in a position; neither army was in a position to advance to Silistria until a short time anterior to the raising of the siege.

14970. Lord *Seymour.*] The Committee have had before them a letter from Commissary-general Filder, dated the 27th of July, from Varna, in which he gives a very detailed account of the quantity of land transport he possessed; I conclude that that letter is a letter which was sent to you, and was brought

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under your notice by Sir Charles Trevelyan?—I should have thought it was rather sooner; but that I have every reason to believe is the letter to which I have referred.

14971. That shows correctly the amount of transport that had been at that time provided, and that they could have provisioned the army for 11 or 13 days?—That I have no doubt is the letter I have referred to. I was not aware that it was before the Committee.

14972. Mr. *Layard.*] With regard to land transport in the Crimea, were any representations made to you as to its deficiency?—Latterly. In the first instance, I heard some private complaints that sufficient horses had not been landed, for the purpose of carrying the officers' baggage and other things: but I received no complaints of the insufficiency of the transport generally, until a very short time indeed before I left office.

14973. When did you first receive from Lord Raglan a representation that there was a deficiency of land transport in the Crimea?—I think the first statement which I received from Lord Raglan, of any such deficiency, arose out of an answer to a letter which I addressed to him, with reference to other complaints which had arisen, as to the state of the army; and in that letter he mentioned this deficiency, and stated that the reason why that deficiency had not been rectified was, that they wanted forage when the horses were brought over, and the rapid manner in which they died after being landed.

14974. Then Lord Raglan never, until his attention was called to the subject by you, made a representation that there was a want of land transport in the Crimea?—It was not in consequence of his attention being drawn to it by me, but upon my representing other defects to him, and my calling upon him for an explanation, that he then stated the want of land transport.

14975. It was merely stated casually, in order to explain the circumstances to which you called his attention?—Yes.

14976. Do you recollect the date of that communication?—No; but I think it must have been quite the end of December.

14977. Had you any other communication from Lord Raglan, as to the want of land transport?—I think not.

14978. Are you aware that there was so complete a want of transport in the Crimea that cavalry horses, of the value nearly of 100 *l.* each, were made to do the duties of common ponies, which could have been obtained for 5 *l.* or 6 *l.*?—I have certainly the same information upon that subject which other people have. I have no reason to doubt such was the fact, but I did not receive any official information of it.

14979. You have lately stated that you recollect that Lord Raglan informed you, when the army was in Bulgaria, that there was a deficiency of land transport; that you could not believe there was such a deficiency, and that no other person had a right to form an opinion upon that subject?—No; what I stated was, that the facts were not sufficiently known to generals of division, and other officers, to enable them to give opinions upon which this Committee could satisfactorily and safely rely. I did not say that nobody had a right to form an opinion, or that those opinions were not correct, but that the facts could not be sufficiently known to anybody to enable them to form a positive opinion; of course my observation applied to such circumstances as the army was in at Varna, and not to such circumstances as the army was in before Sebastopol, where it was confined within that limited space that almost anybody could have formed his own opinion as to the number of animals there, as well as they might in a fortified town.

14980. You would not conclude, because Lord Raglan never sent you any account of the deficiency of land transport in the Crimea, that such deficiency did not exist?—No; on the contrary, I had on that occasion the same information, upon which I felt I could rely, as I had in the other case, namely, from parties responsible, that there was a deficiency. I received from the Commissary-general, not very long before I left office, a statement of the number of horses in the Crimea, and the horses which he had available, and which he could bring there, and, undoubtedly, that showed a most lamentable deficiency.

14981. Did you receive any statement as to the state of land transport in the Crimea up to the time of your quitting office?—I hurriedly read last night some answers to questions put by the Committee to Sir Charles Trevelyan, and

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if the Honourable Member refers to that, I no doubt did: and apart from having seen that, I have a recollection of a communication which I received from Mr. Filder.

14982. Did your official reports from the Crimea represent such a state of things as to the land transport as the Committee has been led to believe existed from witnesses who have been examined before them?—Yes, certainly. The last statement which I received from Commissary-general Filder of the amount of Commissariat horses which he had in the Crimea very little exceeded 400.

14983. Then it was the duty at that time of Commissary-general Filder, and not of Lord Raglan, to make those representations to the War Office?—Mr. Filder at that time was immediately responsible to the War department; before the 22d December it was his business to report to the Treasury; he reported after that time to me; this letter, to which I have referred, was addressed to me.

14984. Were any steps taken in England to remedy that state of things?—No such steps as sending out horses from hence; that was a measure which was naturally impossible. I, finding that the transport service had fallen into such a condition in the hands of the Commissariat, felt that there must be an absolute necessity for a radical change; and without assuming that any blame attached to one person or another, I felt perfectly confident that nothing but a change could set it right. Under those circumstances, I organised a separate and independent transport corps upon the military system, which I placed under Colonel M'Murdo.

14985. Was Commissary-general Filder appointed with your concurrence?—Yes, with my knowledge. I knew nothing of him. I of course took the recommendation of his then superior, Sir Charles Trevelyan, who assured me that he was one of the most intelligent and best-informed officers of the Commissariat, and the most competent for those duties, and I readily agreed to the appointment.

14986. Before that period, when the army went out, was any attempt made to organise a transport service in England?—No.

14987. General *Peel.*] Lord Raglan would have had power either to procure himself, or to order Commissary-general Filder to procure, any number of transport horses necessary, without referring home for it?—Yes.

14988. Therefore if Lord Raglan reported to you, in case of the want of transport in Bulgaria, it would be for this reason: that he was expected to make a movement which he could not do in consequence of the want of transport, and he would have reported that to you as a reason for his not doing so?—If such a want existed, it was his business to have kept me informed of it, with a view to the information of the Government, and enabling them to give directions as to the operations; it was not necessary to inform me of it for any purpose of rectifying such a defect; that was within his own power.

14989. Mr. *Layard.*] Had you anything to do with the ambulance corps in England?—Yes. I was, in fact, the person who originated the establishment of it in consequence of the communication to which I referred yesterday, which I received from Dr. Guthrie.

14990. Upon whose suggestions were pensioners sent out to form that corps?—I do not know from whom it originated; but the ambulance corps, as the Committee is probably aware, was an entire novelty in the English army. When I was satisfied by Dr. Guthrie that the establishment of an ambulance corps was necessary, it had to be considered in what form it should be best provided; under those circumstances I requested Dr. Guthrie to put himself in communication with Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the Medical Board, and Colonel Tulloch, who is well acquainted with mechanism of all descriptions, at Woolwich, and other authorities, in conjunction with Lord Raglan and Lord Hardinge, to recommend the form in which that ambulance corps should be established. As regards the vehicles, there was a great difference of opinion between Dr. Smith and Dr. Guthrie; and, as the whole thing was a novelty, we considered the best course was to try both, and we therefore sent both the ambulance carts that were recommended by Dr. Guthrie, and the ambulance waggons recommended by Dr. Smith. That being determined upon, it was, of course, necessary to consider who should be placed in charge of them; and both Lord Raglan and Lord Hardinge objected to taking from the ranks of the army efficient fighting men; and, after mature consideration, in conjunction with the medical men, and Colonel Tulloch, and others, who formed

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formed a committee upon the question, they recommended a selection of pensioners to carry it out.

14991. Did Dr. Andrew Smith, or any other person, make any remonstrance upon the employment of pensioners?—To the best of my recollection, Dr. Andrew Smith was the one who apprehended that the employment of pensioners would lead to evil. I think so; but the prevailing opinion was, that it would be the best body to select.

14992. They did completely fail, did they not?—They undoubtedly failed; but it is only fair to the men, to say that I do not consider the failure was as complete, or that they were so much to blame, as has been represented. It has been charged against them, that they were exceedingly ill-conducted and constantly drunk, and so forth. There was one unfortunate occasion which brought them into great and deserved disrepute with the army, soon after they landed at Varna, when a considerable number misconducted themselves and got drunk; I think nearly 40 were reported, but I have looked through the offences of that corps, and I do not find, with that single exception, the amount of offences exceeds the average amount with soldiers under similar circumstances. Again, as regards the selection, they were not those old men which has been stated; I believe that out of the whole, there were only two who exceeded 50 years of age. They were men who of course had been invalided under certain circumstances, but they were doubly examined with regard to their corporal fitness, and every precaution was taken. At the same time I at once say that the plan has not been successful, and it was an experiment which must never be repeated.

14993. In a very short time there were none left to commit offences; they all died or came away, did they not?—No, that is a very considerable exaggeration of the state of things; there was unfortunately a great deal of illness at Varna, and I believe the ambulance corps bore its full share of the illness upon that occasion.

14994. It has been stated to the Committee, that for a very considerable period all the ambulance duties were performed by the French for the British army: does that agree with what you heard from the Crimea?—I think that the Honourable Member is now referring to a different state of things altogether; the ambulance carts and waggons were not taken to the Crimea. I have been answering a question with reference to the corps so long as it was kept with the army; the circumstances to which the Honourable Member referred just now, took place after the state of the roads rendered it impossible to convey the sick and wounded to Balaklava on wheels at all, and the French had an invention which at that time we had not. They were machines called *cacolets*, which are a sort of pannier of a very massive description, made of iron, and slung across a mule, and they form a sort of invalid chair, and almost sofas, to be moved almost in any position; that arose in consequence of their experience in Algeria; and upon one occasion when our sick and wounded were very numerous, they lent us their mules and *cacolets* to move our wounded down to Balaklava. I should say, upon discovering that fact, and ascertaining the value of those *cacolets*, I requested the French Government to let us purchase 100 of them in France to send immediately to the Crimea, and I ordered a further number to be made, if possible, of a lighter description in this country, for their fault is their weight.

14995. Are you aware of the strength of the British army after the battle of Inkermann, say in and through November?—That is a point which has been so much disputed that I should not like to answer from memory, as it might give rise to considerable misconception; I have the means even, without referring to the War department, of answering the question from my private letters; it varied, of course, from day to day. If the Honourable Member will name any particular day I think I can give him the most authentic information upon reference to my papers, but I cannot state with any sort of accuracy the exact number off-hand.

14996. Can you state the lowest number to which the army has been reduced before Sebastopol during the time that you were in office?—First of all, before answering the question, even in the loose way in which I could from memory, I must request to know in what way the question is put; it has been frequently put as the number of bayonets. Now the number of bayonets does not of course represent fairly the state of the army, but you must add the other arms to the bayonet,

bayonet, the artillery, the cavalry, and the engineers, and you must also add those on command; you must add the bât men and others, if you want to have really the number of men capable, under any circumstances, of bearing arms and fighting.

14997. I will call your Grace's attention to an answer of the Duke of Cambridge, which will show you what the question means. He was asked, "Could you state generally what the strength of the army was after the battle of Inkermann?" and his answer was, "I understood that the army was about 13,500 men; bayonets; I mean duty men."—Yes; I should think that that, apart from the men on command and otherwise employed, was not very incorrect; but, as I said before, to that number must be added all those whom I have already mentioned.

14998. Was the army ever reduced to a lower state than that, with regard to the number of fighting men?—I think it was. I think, taking bayonets alone, it was reduced at a subsequent period to, I should think, somewhere about 1,500 less than that, but I will fill up those figures accurately if the Committee wish. I am anxious that there should be no appearance of unwillingness on my part to give what information I can, but I run considerable risk in answering such questions merely from memory; returns were sent to me by every mail of the condition of the army, as to the number of the men on the morning on which the despatch came, and they varied from day to day.

14999. You think that the army was at one time reduced to 12,000 fighting men?—No, not fighting men; bayonets.

15000. How many fighting men would that give, do you think?—Upwards of 20,000, including of course those on command, which were in some instances very numerous; I think too numerous; and I have a right to say that I think so, because it has been since altered.

15001. *Chairman.*] That would include the men in health?—Yes, but I cannot pretend to accuracy, speaking from memory.

15002. Mr. *Layard.*] The Duke of Cambridge, in reply to the question, "Supposing there had been a reserve stationed nearer Constantinople, or in the Mediterranean, and it had been possible, from the means of transport at the disposal of the English Government, to have thrown in some 8,000 or 10,000 men in a fortnight or three weeks, might not a great portion of this sickness from overwork have been prevented?" stated "Most unquestionably; I do not think that that admits of a doubt;" is that your opinion?—I think that a great deal of sickness arose from overwork.

15003. The question is this, whether if there had been a reserve within a certain distance of the Crimea, by which you could have continually thrown in small bodies of men, that would not have prevented a very great deal of the sickness?—No; it would have kept up the number, but I do not think that it would have prevented the sickness; it was invariably found that the newest arrivals were the most disposed to sickness. In many instances the regiments upon first landing were almost in as bad a condition as those who had been there for some time.

15004. The meaning of what I have read is this: that if at the moment the men had become invalided others had taken their places, those who remained would not have been so much overworked?—That is a question of numbers; the overwork arose from the extent of the lines which had been originally undertaken by the English army being too great for the reduced numbers; that of course would not have been altered by any arrangement which did not add to the number of the forces.

15005. You do not think that a reserve at Malta, or elsewhere, would have tended to diminish the sickness and the sufferings of the troops before Sebastopol?—I do not mean to say if, under such circumstances, a reserve had been used, as we used the reinforcements that we sent from this country to increase the strength of the army, to whatever extent that was, that you would not diminish the work thrown upon the reduced numbers.

15006. But the reserves sent from England were recruits, sent out without any experience of military matters, were they not?—As, of course, at the commencement of the war, any reserve that there was would have been at Malta, it would have been simply sending them on from Malta instead of from England.

15007. But if the reserve had been formed earlier, the men would have been,

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at that time, more capable of fulfilling their duties?—Yes; but the Honourable Member assumes an impossibility; you could not send a reserve from Malta when no such reserve existed; until the recruits were found at home you could not form a reserve.

15008. At that time had the Government no power to form a reserve?—No; not until we had a sufficient number of recruits to send.

15009. Could you not at that time have obtained recruits?—We had not sufficient recruits.

15010. Was that owing to any want of power, on the part of the Government, to collect them, or a want of the recruits themselves?—It was owing to the absence of willingness on the part of men to enlist to that extent; we had power to receive all recruits, up to the extent to which the House of Commons had increased the English army.

15011. Colonel *Lindsay.*] The hard work that the troops suffered from commenced after the battle of Inkermann, did it not, in consequence of the reduced number of the force?—Yes. I would hardly say that it commenced then; it commenced, perhaps, before; but it was aggravated greatly, and became a formidable grievance after the battle of Inkermann.

15012. Supposing the Government had been able, in consequence of the reserve being nearer the seat of war, to have increased the number of the army to what it was before the battle of Inkermann, say, by throwing in some 5,000 men, then the work in the trenches would have been considerably less for all those engaged, would it not?—Yes, of course; the more men you sent into the army, the lighter the work that would fall upon the remainder; they would not have to go into the trenches so frequently, or to remain so long.

15013. Then the natural inference would be that a great deal of sickness might have been saved by the work being reduced?—Five thousand would not have been sufficient to produce so great an effect as was desirable; but 5,000 would have diminished the amount of labour, and consequently to that extent the amount of sickness.

15014. General *Peel.*] Is it not the fact that you sent too large a proportion of the army out in the first instance?—That is a question which must always be a matter of opinion. For the objects for which the war was undertaken, it would have been desirable to send out a larger army, if you had had it.

15015. Mr. *Layard.*] This being to a great extent a matter of military detail, was Lord Hardinge consulted upon the question of the reserve?—Certainly; he was aware of every step that was taken for the recruiting of the army, and for sending out reinforcements; and I may say that, as regards the sending out of young recruits, I was myself the individual who was most reluctant to do it until an absolute necessity arose. We had no power of establishing a larger reserve at the commencement of the war. It may be a matter of opinion whether 25,000 men ought originally to have been sent out; but assuming that it was right to send out 25,000 men, there was not at that time the power of effecting any reserve except that which I did establish, namely, of 6,000 men. I did establish a reserve of 6,000, or rather more, between 6,000 and 7,000; and that reserve, when it was determined to go to the Crimea, Lord Hardinge advised should be sent, as well as drafts, to strengthen all the regiments; and that force was sent.

15016. Did Lord Hardinge represent to you that in no case whatever should operations be undertaken at a distance without a reserve?—No such general representation was made.

15017. Were no such representations made to the Government?—No.

15018. Were any suggestions made by you at an early period last year for organising a Turkish body of troops?—Various suggestions were made by me both to Lord Raglan and to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and to others; and they have been at length partially carried out under the Convention, which, it is known, was signed with Turkey, by which 20,000 men have been handed over to the English to be paid and officered by them. From the first I made various attempts to obtain from the Turkish nation a considerable contingent, both of cavalry and infantry; and before Lord Raglan left this country one of the points which I specially enjoined on him was to endeavour to obtain a body of light cavalry, which might be organised for the service of his army in the country, and might

might be officered either by officers from the British army or from the Indian army; the latter I considered to be preferable under the circumstances of the general employment of officers of the English army.

15019. Were your representations and suggestions carried out?—No; but I was so anxious upon that point that, in the general instructions which I sent to Lord Raglan on the 10th of April, I especially referred to the necessity of organising a corps of light cavalry.

15020. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Were those instructions precise as to the proposed strength of that force of light cavalry?—No; I put no limit upon it; I left it entirely to him, supposing that he was enabled to organise any; but he reported to me, after he had been in the country some time, that he was very much afraid that various circumstances connected with the country, and amongst others the very inferior character of the horses and their incapacity to cope with the Russian cavalry, would prevent him from forming any such corps; but he would continue to bear it in mind, and endeavour to effect it if possible.

15021. Mr. *Layard.*] Was any corps ever formed of light cavalry, or of Turkish foot?—No corps of light cavalry, such as I contemplated, and such as I have mentioned, was ever completely formed. Repeated attempts were made, from the very commencement of the war, to form a corps of Bashi Bazouks, under the command of Colonel Beatson; those attempts have failed from time to time, not from any want of zeal on the part of the officers appointed to those commands, but from the want of co-operation which they have met with from the authorities in the country, as well as apprehensions which, I am bound to say, most of our officers have felt from the character of the Bashi Bazouks; but up to the time at which I left office that attempt was continuing, under fresh instructions sent to Colonel Beatson.

15022. Do you think, if an attempt had been properly made, that either foot or irregular horse might have been organised in Turkey?—That is an opinion which I can hardly express. I was so anxious about it that I constantly urged it; but whilst those who had been accustomed to such men, like General Beatson, believed that it was possible, I think the general opinion of the officers with the army was that it would lead to more evil than good; that was the general impression in the army.

15023. Can you mention how many officers there were who were commissioned to organise the irregular cavalry?—I think there were originally only five or six English officers under General Beatson; but from the commencement of the war, I kept a list of officers willing to serve in such a capacity, and at the War Department I always had a considerable list, and it was known to Colonel Beatson that I could send him out officers when he called for them; and he did call for them, and so did General Cannon; and I supplied officers to them, the best I had.

15024. Sir *J. Pakington.*] That attempt as to the Bashi Bazouks has been entirely given up, has it not?—It was not entirely given up when I left office, nor did I despair of its success. I cannot say whether it has been since given up.

15025. Mr. *Layard.*] So far as you are aware, the Turkish troops have acted with great efficiency when commanded by English officers not specially sent out by the English Government, but as in the case of Major Nasmyth and Captain Butler at Silistria?—Certainly; I have from the first attached the greatest possible importance, both in a military and political point of view, to officering Turkish troops with English superior officers to the greatest extent.

15026. Were you consulted upon the formation of the present Turkish contingent?—Yes. That was done by me and Lord Clarendon; it was a matter connected with the Turkish Government, and negotiations were carried on through the Foreign Office.

15027. The appointment of General Vivian took place after you left office?—The appointment of all the officers was made after I left office. This matter did not progress very rapidly in Turkey. The convention was not signed in sufficient time for me to have made any selection of officers, or to have taken any active steps beyond the preparation of a list of officers, which I left in the department.

15028. Was any attempt made to raise a body of irregular cavalry in Asia Minor?—No, not in Asia Minor. I should say that at the time when the

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attempt to raise the irregular cavalry was made, the Bashi Bazouks had been brought under a most improvident demand by the Turkish Government, before the declaration of war, from all parts of the Turkish empire; in fact, Mahomedans were brought from all parts of the world. I ascertained from an officer under General Beatson, when we were attempting to organise a body of them, that there were no less than 80,000 Bashi Bazouks in Turkey in Europe.

15029. You read a despatch in which, amongst other things, the British authorities in the East were directed to undertake some kind of operations in Circassia. Can you state whether any agent was sent on the part of the British Government to Circassia?—Some naval officers were ordered to open communications with the Circassian chiefs, but they met with very great obstacles.

15030. That was on the coast?—Yes.

15031. Was anybody ordered to communicate with the chiefs in the interior?—Yes; two gentlemen volunteered to do so, and they went out with my authority and that of Lord Clarendon.

15032. Who were they?—Colonel Lloyd was one, who died of cholera; I forget the name of the other; but neither of them ever succeeded in advancing to the coast of Circassia.

15033. Did not Colonel Lloyd go into the interior?—No; not on that occasion.

15034. Had he ever been in Circassia before?—So he informed us.

15035. Had he been in Turkey before?—I have since heard doubts thrown upon that, but when he left I understood he was well acquainted with Circassia.

15036. Were the two persons who were selected to go to Circassia in any way competent to carry out the intentions of the Government?—They were not selected, as I especially said; they were two gentlemen who volunteered to go on their own account, supposing that we gave them certain facilities, which facilities we did provide without giving them any authority from the Government; those who were ordered to go by the Government were naval officers, and they were employed for that purpose; Captain Brock was one.

15037. Was Captain Brock a proper person to be sent to communicate with the Circassians?—I am not a sufficient judge; he was sent, I presume, by the Admiral in command of the fleet, under the impression that he was the fittest person. The orders were not given by me, nor to the best of my belief by any of the authorities from home, that he should be particularly employed; the orders were to open communications there, and to find the best instruments on the spot.

15038. Could Captain Brock speak a word of Turkish?—I do not know.

15039. Was not it of considerable importance to enter into communication with the Circassians?—Yes; I think it was important, and instructions were immediately sent to the Admiralty, at the breaking out of the war on the 29th of March, and those instructions were transmitted by them to the Commander of the fleet.

15040. You have stated that you received reports from our consuls in the East, as to the condition of the Russians in Odessa and the Crimea?—I did.

15041. Would it be unadvisable to submit those reports to the Committee?—I think so; but I should not have the slightest objection to give a sufficient outline in the first instance of the reports. I said yesterday that Lord Raglan having received instructions to make every possible inquiry as to the state of Sebastopol, and the number and condition of the Russian army in the Crimea, stated to me, that he had been unable to obtain any such information; and I felt it equally my duty at the commencement of the war, to do every thing I could to obtain it in this country, and every exertion was made through the means not merely of consuls in that part of the world, but of Ministers at the other courts of Europe, to ascertain the condition and position, and the relative strength of all the corps of the Russian army, and those reports were made through the Foreign Office and sent to me, and they were always sent by me with such comments as I was able to offer, to Lord Raglan. After the declaration of war, the consuls of course in the Russian empire were sent home, and I saw them as they arrived, and from them I obtained the best information we could as to what was supposed to be the strength of the Russian army; they

they did not very much vary, and they were of course invariably sent to Lord Raglan. I should say that the most valuable information I received upon that point from anybody, was from a gentleman who I regret to say is no more, Colonel Du Plat, whom I saw constantly and repeatedly day after day, and who in fact assisted me in investigating and testing all the other information I received; and that was also sent to Lord Raglan.

15042. Had you no information from anybody in the Crimea; we had no consul there, had we, anywhere nearer than Kertch?—No. Odessa on the one side and Kertch on the other.

15043. With regard to the character of the foreign legion, you stated that the foreign legion was restricted to Germans and Swiss; does that include Poles?—No.

15044. Not even the Polish subjects of Prussia?—That question was never considered; when we determined upon forming a foreign legion, we considered, for various political reasons and others, that, in the first instance, without precluding ourselves from adopting any other plan hereafter, we would not attempt to raise any corps except a corps of Germans and Swiss.

15045. You stated that some inconvenience had been felt on account of the want of a regular communication between our army and this country; that is to say, from the want of any boats and steamers belonging to the British Government; and frequently you received three or four despatches by the same boat?—Not three or four; several times two, and on one occasion three.

15046. Did you ever make any remonstrances or suggestions to the Admiralty that it would be advisable to have a regular communication between the army in the East and the British Government?—Yes, various attempts were made and suggestions considered both by the French and English Governments; every attempt was made to establish a fast communication, amongst others, through the instrumentality of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, but they were all obliged to be abandoned; some for one reason and some for another.

15047. Could not the Government have put on three or four steamers for the purpose?—No; there is a treaty with France, and that is one of the principal obstacles. I do not mean to say that it might not have been overcome, but there is a convention as to the transport of posts from Marseilles onwards to the East; there was a complexity of difficulties, and there were few matters which gave myself and other members of the Government more trouble and anxiety.

15048. The convention refers to the commercial transmission of letters; it would not refer to the Government despatches, and might not the Government have employed a steamer?—They might, if they had had steamers which could have been spared for that purpose, have established a number of fast steamers from Marseilles, to carry the Government despatches alone.

15049. Do you not think it was of the most essential importance that the Government should have been kept in continual communication with Lord Raglan and his army?—Undoubtedly; and for that purpose, finding that we could not effect, consistently with other duties, a satisfactory arrangement by steam, I recommended to the Government to sanction the establishment of what I hoped would have been in operation long before now, but which I hope is by this time in operation; namely, a submarine telegraph communication in the Black Sea, by which Lord Raglan would be able to communicate on the same day, between London and Balaklava; I have reason to believe the work is complete, and the communication ought to be opened very shortly indeed.

15050. Was not it the case, and almost up to the present time, that every notice of an important event, such as a battle in the East, came round to the public and to the Government, through private channels, before it came from an official source?—Certainly, at the beginning of the war, that was the case.

15051. Have you received any maps, plans, or any details of the country in which the army was encamped before Sebastopol?—Yes; various military plans which have been sent home by the officers, and by Lord Raglan.

15052. Had you not, in the middle of December, any accurate engineering map, showing the position of our army in the Crimea?—Yes; but of its accuracy I cannot judge.

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15053. Was it of any size?—No, it was not any complete map in itself; but the course taken was, that the maps, and everything, as the operations varied, were sent home, showing the position of the armies, and the parallels, as they were opened, and they were transferred to a general map, which was kept at the Admiralty, and varied from time to time as fresh information was received.

15054. Had you, in the middle of December, any map or plan in your possession which you think was such as the Government ought to have been furnished with of the portion of the troops in the Crimea?—As to their accuracy I cannot speak, but I cannot say that, on the whole, the maps and plans were, to my mind, satisfactory; they were not such as I should have wished to have had, and they were not as complete in their form, and I do not think they were as good, as they might have been.

15054*. Have you seen the last map published by the Admiralty?—No, I have seen no new map since I left office.

15055. Did you ever see any map at all that was creditable to our engineering establishment out there?—I cannot say that I have; I do not think they have been such as they should have been.

15056. Have you had it brought to your knowledge that, with the Russian prisoners at Constantinople, a number of Tartars, who joined us in the Crimea, were mixed?—Yes; Mr. Osborne mentioned it to me that there were six Tartars, who were with the Russian prisoners, retained in custody at Constantinople; and he told me, what I was surprised to hear, that they were so detained because no person felt authorised to release them, though it was obvious that they must have been taken under a misapprehension. I immediately communicated that fact to Lord Clarendon, with a view to their release.

15057. Do not you think that there existed there at least some extraordinary state of things which prevented the release of our own friends?—Certainly.

15058. It has been stated to the Committee that there is an apprehension that a large number of stores which were obtained in England for the army were never sent, but may have been actually stolen before they left this country; do you think that such a state of things could exist?—I certainly should hope not; that they may have been stolen in Turkey I think is more probable. I have no reason to suppose that any were stolen before they left this country. I cannot imagine that such great culpability can attach to any department as that they would have left them in such a position as to make that possible.

15059. You never had any representation made to you on the subject in England?—Never.

15060. Did you ever hear it stated that a large amount of stores ordered in England, and supposed to have been sent out, were still in this country?—Yes, I have heard it stated that a large quantity of stores, supposed to have been sent out, were, I think, at Portsmouth. I forget in what building; but I made some inquiries, and I ascertained that those stores were private stores, the gifts of charitable individuals, for which no transport could be found without interfering with the Government stores, and were waiting until means could be found for transporting them. I never have been able to authenticate the fact that the Government stores supposed to have been sent out were remaining here.

15061. Were any inquiries directed to that subject?—Yes; whenever such a statement was made, I made immediate inquiry.

15062. But the fact was not proved?—No; except in the case where they were private stores.

15063. Did the Government undertake to transmit them?—No; they never undertook anything of the kind; they could not do it when they were so much pressed for the means of conveying the Government stores.

15064. Was the camp at Chobham undertaken during your administration of the War Department?—Yes; but not after the separation. I had nothing to do with it; it was entirely in the hands of the Horse Guards.

15065. No representations were made to you in consequence of the experience

rience derived from the encampment at Chobham?—That is a different matter. I do not recollect any such suggestions; but I cannot positively say that they were not; but as to the camp at Chobham, I had nothing in the world to do with it.

15066. The object of the camp at Chobham, was to ascertain what practical wants existed in the army in case it should be sent into the field?—Yes; and to accustom the army to duties in the field.

15067. Do you know whether after the camp any report was made by the officers there as to the deficiencies and wants existing in the army?—None such were ever made to me.

15068. After you were named as Minister of War, and the separation took place, had you the appointment of the officers in the War Department?—Yes.

15069. You named two Under Secretaries, did you not?—Yes.

15070. On what grounds did you name them?—The Military Under Secretary was Colonel Mundy; he was appointed first Assistant Under Secretary, in the same capacity as Sir Henry Bunbury was in the late war; that was at a time when it was anticipated that it would be a temporary appointment, as that of Sir Henry Bunbury was, during the continuance of the war. Assuming the two Secretaryships of State would have remained combined, it was determined by Government to appoint an Assistant Military Under Secretary. I consulted with Lord Raglan as to the fittest person to select; and he informed me that he was one most difficult to find, and that he thought it required a person who had had very considerable experience in the quartermaster-general's functions, as well as others; and after taking two or three days to consider of it, he gave me two names of persons, as those he thought best qualified; those names were General Yorke and Colonel Mundy. General Yorke, whilst I was hesitating, in the course of the next two or three days, as to which would be the best selection, was appointed by Lord Hardinge, as Military Secretary at the Horse Guards; and upon that I selected Colonel Mundy. I am perfectly aware that the fact of Colonel Mundy being related to me has been stated to have been the reason of his selection; I was equally aware at the time that I should be exposed to that observation, and I was also aware how little value may be attached to any denial of such motives. I appointed him upon that high recommendation; and I believe that any inquiry into his services will show that there are very few men of his activity and time of life who have seen so much military service of a peculiar character as he has. He has served in the Quartermaster-general's department all over the world, both in England, in Ireland, and in Canada, both in that capacity and in the command of a regiment; he served in India in the first Burmese war; and he was employed five years as Quartermaster-general in Australia, and therefore I am perfectly prepared to bear any observation which may be made upon the score of his fitness. I can only express a wish that his health since his appointment has been as good as I believe his abilities to be. As regards the second Under Secretary, the necessity for appointing a second Under Secretary arose upon the separation of the War department from the Colonial department. I submitted to the Government a scheme to the best of my judgment, at that time, of what would be requisite for the establishment, and that scheme was submitted to the House of Commons towards the close, I think, of the Session. I proposed two permanent Under Secretaries, of whom one would be the then Assistant Military Under Secretary, Colonel Mundy, and that another should be a civilian; I having a strong opinion, which I now retain, that it is of the highest importance in that department, I believe more than perhaps in many others, notwithstanding the apparent anomaly, that there should be a legal man to refer to there. An objection was raised by some Members of the House of Commons to the appointment of a second Under Secretary of a permanent character, because they said it would interfere with that which they believed to be desirable, namely, a Parliamentary Under Secretary; and upon that the Government resolved to give a pledge in the House of Commons that this second Under Secretary should be only a temporary appointment. I pointed out at the time the extreme difficulty of that arrangement, as it would be impossible for me to obtain a thoroughly efficient man upon any such terms; that no one who had had any experience in

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office would take a temporary appointment. The separation took place, but that pledge having been made, I proceeded without appointing, under those circumstances, any second Under Secretary, until the work increased to such a degree that it was impossible to do without it. I removed into the present building, and I was called upon to establish a department of clerks. I then had to look about for whom I should select. Three gentlemen applied to me in the meantime for the appointment, two of them holding other appointments; but all of them, upon my informing them that I could ensure them no continuance in office, at once refused to have anything to say to it. I then appointed a gentleman whom I believed to be perfectly competent to undertake the duty, namely, Mr. Roberts, who had acted up to that time, in the capacity of my private secretary, but who, for five months, had been doing the work of the Under Secretary of State in addition to the general superintendence of my private secretaryship. Then again I was equally prepared for what has been said in Parliament and elsewhere as to the appointment; and I wish it to be understood by the Committee that I knew no more of Mr. Roberts than the Man in the Moon when he was appointed by me as my private secretary. I had never heard of him; but when I was appointed Secretary for the Colonies I thought it was very desirable for the public service that I should select for the appointment of my private secretary a gentleman of business habits; of sufficient capacity as evinced by his antecedents, and of colonial knowledge. I had great difficulty in finding anybody, the salary being so very small, but I had the good fortune to hear of Mr. Roberts, and I offered it to him; he having held the position of a judge in the island of Jamaica for a considerable time, and coming to me with the highest recommendation in many respects, both from Lord Elgin and Lord Metcalfe, two gentlemen whom I considered to be very competent to judge of his capacity. I have every reason to be satisfied with my experience of Mr. Roberts, believing as I did, and as I do now, that I was serving the public by the selection of him under the circumstances. I readily admit, if I could have got a man of great knowledge of public offices generally, and such a man as might have been obtained if the office had been of a more permanent character, I am not prepared to say that you might not have found a man more fitted than Mr. Roberts; but I believed him to be extremely well fitted, and I appointed him. I must now go on to the remainder of the establishment; and the whole of the establishment of the clerks that I selected, were from other departments, with only one single exception. I need hardly say when the new establishment had to be formed, that I had applications of an infinite character. I believe on one day I had 75 applications; they amounted at last to many hundreds; but I neglected them all, and I selected, with one single exception, the whole of the clerks upon that establishment from the other departments. I selected a certain number from the Colonial department, those who had been most acquainted with the war business whilst it was conducted in that department. I had selected for me by the Deputy Secretary-at-War two gentlemen from the War department, and I had selected for me one from the Ordnance department, and another from the Emigration Board. In short, as I said, with one exception, they were all from other departments. That single exception was an engineer officer of very high character indeed, and who has been a most valuable acquisition to that department, Captain Lefroy; a gentleman with whom I was personally unacquainted, but whom I appointed from the high character which he bore.

15071. General *Peel.*] Was the defect in the entrenching tools brought under your notice?—Yes, very early indeed. The first notice of the defects in the entrenching tools was brought before me in a private letter; it was a letter from a connexion, I believe, of one of the officers with the army; and I looked upon it as so very important a matter that I immediately wrote to the Ordnance, and desired them to make a thorough investigation of this complaint, and to report to me. They reported at considerable length, in a manner which I did not think satisfactory; and, in order to test the accuracy of that report, I sent it off to Lord Raglan, with a desire that he would call for an investigation into the facts, and inform me whether there was any truth in the charge. Lord Raglan did send a very carefully drawn up report, from various officers, in which the fact was thoroughly substantiated, that many of the tools supplied were of a very inferior description. I then again applied to the Ordnance

Ordnance for an explanation; and this explanation I did not think was altogether satisfactory; but it was this: that those that were of an inferior character must have been supplied from the out-port depôts, which had been of a very antique description, and not those which had been approved at Chobham. I, of course, replied to the Ordnance, that I considered it very reprehensible; and I desired that every tool of that description should be immediately got rid of, in order that the out-port depôts might be supplied with tools of the very best description.

15072. You stated, that besides communicating with the Admiralty as to the condition of the harbour at Balaklava, you took steps to remedy the evils on shore; what were those steps?—Perhaps, before answering that question, I should state, that I had taken a similar step upon a former occasion. Complaints were made to me of the loss of various articles at the time when the army was at Varna, and I apprehended that that had arisen from the Commissariat not being provided with a branch of its department competent to attend to the landing and warehousing of the stores, and I represented it to Sir Charles Trevelyan, and desired that a communication might be made to the Custom-house for a number of officers to be sent out to obviate those difficulties in future. When those complaints again arose, in a much more serious way, as to the condition of the harbour of Balaklava, I considered that it was necessary greatly to strengthen that establishment, and I again applied to the Custom-house and obtained from them a much larger number; I think about 40 men of various grades, headed by a very superior officer, whom I sent out to undertake the whole of that department; and I have reason to believe, though not officially, that they have been to a great extent successful. Besides that measure, I adopted this: of sending out from this country iron warehouses, which might be erected at Balaklava for stowing their goods.

15073. Were any adverse military opinions against the expedition to Sebastopol ever tendered to you?—Never. I am well aware that such a statement has been made upon many occasions, and names have been quoted, the names of Lord Hardinge and Lord Seaton. As to Lord Hardinge, I need hardly say that, of course, if he had disapproved of the expedition to Sebastopol, and his remonstrance had failed, he would have resigned the position which he held, but I did not receive any remonstrance from him, on the contrary, I had his assent and approval of the measure. As regards Lord Seaton's opinion, Lord Seaton never tendered to me any opinion at all upon the question until I had the pleasure of meeting him when I accompanied Prince Albert to the camp at Boulogne, in the beginning of September. Upon that occasion I was three or four days with Lord Seaton, and I had full opportunities of discussing the whole of that expedition with him; and I am happy to say that having laid before him everything that I had done, and every arrangement I had made, so far from having his disapproval, I had his entire assent to what had been done. I may here correct a misapprehension which has arisen, and which has given considerable pain to some military officers, as to what is alleged to have fallen from me in the House of Lords upon that question. I was represented to have stated that I was placed in such a position in this country, that there was no military officer to whom I could refer whose opinion was worth having. That statement was even placarded over the walls of London; but so far from its being correct, what I said was this: that I laboured under a very great disadvantage in this respect; that of the military officers holding official appointments in this country, only one remained here to whom I had a right to apply for advice, namely, Lord Hardinge. When I say "right," I had no right to apply to Lord Seaton, or to any other officer not holding office, for an opinion; it would have been an impertinence on my part to have done so; and I alluded to the fact that all those holding high military appointments had been sent out to the service of the army, which I considered to be a very great disadvantage, as I thought good military heads ought to be left in an official position here. I alluded to Lord Raglan, the head of the Ordnance department, to Sir John Burgoyne, another most important functionary, and to Sir George Cathcart, the Adjutant-general, all of whom, besides others, had been sent out to the army.

15074. *Chairman.*] Do not you think that any officer holding Her Majesty's Commission, would not only have been ready, but willing to give you advice?—I think

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—I think if they were, it is an exceedingly awkward thing to make an officer of the army, who does not hold an official position, responsible in that way for any act of the Government.

15075. Would he have been responsible, if you had only asked him for his opinion?—I think, if one asked for a military opinion in that form, it would be throwing a responsibility on him which he would not like to incur; but I never received any suggestion from any military officer, to which I did not give the most entire and scrupulous attention, whether I adopted it or not.

15076. Did you find that a difficulty when you entered into conversation with Lord Seaton?—No; but that was a totally different thing; I was with him for four days, and necessarily I talked to him upon those questions; I should never have thought of quoting his opinion, were it not that he has been so unfairly quoted in the other sense.

15077. General *Peel.*] It has been stated by General Sir De Lacy Evans, that the belief prevailed that the Government commenced the war with a kind of delusion that it was to be settled without the explosion of gunpowder; did any such belief exist?—Never; and I am astonished that such a statement should have been made by Sir De Lacy Evans, upon such a very slight foundation. But this, undoubtedly, I happen to know did exist, namely, that many of the officers in Turkey were themselves under that delusion; for I found that when officers came home, who had been promoted in the Guards, they seemed very much astonished that we were all preparing for war or rather for fighting, while they anticipated peace every day.

15078. The Honourable Member for Aylesbury has stated, in answer to questions put to him, that before he left England he made representations to the War Department with regard to the mode of transport in the East, generally, especially in Bulgaria, and that he had also drawn up some memoranda for the Government, but that they had only been carried out in the last two months; did such memoranda ever reach you?—No; I never heard of them; I certainly saw that evidence of Mr. Layard, and I was very much surprised at it. Mr. Layard never communicated with me, in any way whatever, and I was not aware that any communications had been made by him to any Member of the Government, except a private letter, a portion of which alone I saw, and which was written, I think, from Varna. No suggestion was ever made to me by him. I requested Mr. Layard to do me the favour to call upon me upon his return from the Crimea, in the middle of December last, and he was kind enough to do so; but neither upon that occasion, nor any other, did he make any suggestion as to Colonel M'Murdo, or a transport corps.

15079. You were asked to-day about the constitution of the Board of Ordnance, and whether it was necessary that every Member of that Board should be acquainted with artillery; you are aware that there are two distinct departments in the Board of Ordnance, the civil and military departments?—Yes.

15080. And that the civil department has nothing to do with the military department, or with the artillery?—Nothing whatever.

15081. It has been the opinion of the House of Commons, expressed over and over again, that one Member of the Board of Ordnance should be a naval officer?—In answer to that question, I stated that I considered that, in any reorganisation of the Ordnance Department, which placed its functions under separate heads, it would be desirable that an artillery officer should be at the head of one department; but I did not wish it to be inferred from that, that I thought that so long as the Board of Ordnance continued as at present, there was any necessity for an artillery officer to be on the Board. I added further to that, that I did not consider that the present Board of Ordnance was well organised.

15082. Must it not always have been contemplated that the militia was the principal source from which the army was to be recruited?—I do not know that, by any means, and I am not certain now that it will be found, practically, to be the principal means; I think it is one important means.

15083. Would it not have been desirable that the militia should have been called out?—In the first place, there was no power to do so; it was necessary to have an Act of Parliament before that was done.

15084. Who

15084. Who was responsible for calling out the militia, and applying to Parliament for the necessary power?—I had nothing to do with the militia; the Home Secretary was responsible, but I believe that has been changed since. I should state, with reference to that point, that I was of opinion, from the first, that the militia ought to have been under me, as the Secretary for War; I considered that to be of very great importance, and I sincerely trust that I am right in believing that it has since been transferred to the Secretary for War; but it was not under me when I held that office.

15085. You, as the Secretary for War, were not responsible for the militia, not having been called out?—No more than as one individual member of the Cabinet.

15086. *Chairman.*] The Cabinet could not call out the militia without an Act of Parliament?—No; I have said so.

15087. You were therefore perfectly helpless until Parliament met?—Yes.

15088. Lord *Seymour.*] You have stated that Dr. Guthrie came to you and gave you certain suggestions?—He did so at my request; he first wrote a letter in the "Times," which I saw; and seeing it, I wrote to him, and requested him to call upon me.

15089. He afterwards wrote you some suggestions, did he not?—Yes.

15090. Do you believe that those suggestions were carried into effect?—Not all of them, by any means. They were referred, as I have said with reference to the ambulance corps, to a species of committee; it was never called a committee, but it was referred to Lord Hardinge, Lord Raglan, Dr. Guthrie, Dr. Andrew Smith, Colonel Tulloch, and, I think, one or two other persons.

15091. Are you aware, that within the last few days, Mr. Guthrie, as the president of the Royal College of Surgeons, has stated to the College of Surgeons these words: "If Her Majesty's Government, by which term I include everybody concerned, from the highest to the lowest, had been pleased to adopt the suggestions I offered then in February 1854, the hospitals might have been in the same enviable state during the last winter on the Bosphorus, as they were in 1814 on the Garonne, when they were as perfect as man could make them;" and are you aware that there is a notion that none of his suggestions have been carried out?— I was not aware that he had made any such statement, nor that he considered that his suggestions had not been carried into effect to a very considerable extent. I was aware that at that time he thought they had not been carried out to the full extent that he wished, and naturally any man who is overruled in any of his suggestions, is not entirely satisfied; but from that moment to the present I have never received any communication from Dr. Guthrie, and after the way in which he was treated by me, when I specially requested him freely to communicate with me, I certainly had a right until this moment to suppose that he was not so dissatisfied as that sentence would imply.

15092. He says, "I am able to tell people what they ought to do, but I cannot make them do it; for, however unacquainted they may be with the important duties which may be intrusted to them, there are few office men in this country will learn anything but from their own experience." Does it not, therefore, appear as if none of his suggestions had been adopted by the Government?—It certainly appears so from these words, but I can only say that two of his most important suggestions were adopted, and adopted by my positive fiat, against the opinions of those with whom he had consulted. One of his suggestions was, and to which Dr. Andrew Smith objected, the ambulance carts. I insisted upon their being tried, and they were tried, and they have been found, practically, to fail. As regards the second suggestion, I am bound to say that that also failed; he recommended that a third assistant-surgeon should be appointed to every regiment. Dr. Smith greatly objected to this, and he said that it was a bad system, and that the only way was to increase the staff surgeons. He said that you would find that after a general action the regimental surgeons would attend to their own men only, and there would be a great deficiency of surgeons to attend to the wounded generally. I went most carefully into that case, and I saw so much reason and truth in both suggestions, that, in that case again, I determined to adopt both, thinking it better to err on the side of superfluity rather than deficiency. We gave a third assistant-surgeon to every regiment, as suggested by Dr. Guthrie, and increased the staff surgeons, according

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according to the suggestions of Dr. Andrew Smith. In both those important instances Dr. Guthrie's suggestions were adopted.

15093. With regard to the ambulance corps, were you aware that Dr. Andrew Smith had strongly objected to the employment of pensioners for that purpose?—I cannot say that I was aware that he had strongly objected. I have a recollection, as I said before, that he prophesied its failure, and he thought it was not a good scheme; to the best of my recollection, he wished to have soldiers taken from the ranks instead of pensioners. I will not say distinctly that he did not strongly object, but he was unfavourable to it, certainly.

15094. He has stated to the Committee, in answer to Question 8218: "I was five years at Chatham, during which time I invalided about 20,000 men; and, therefore, I know that no man, however he may look in point of face, after three or four years on the pension list, can have anything in him to enable him to do that duty. I opposed it to the very last, as far as I could, but I was overruled." I ask you, if he was overruled, on whom would the responsibility of overruling him rest?—If he was overruled, he must have been overruled by those, certainly, with whom I put him in communication, to decide the whole question of the ambulance corps. The two highest military authorities, Lord Hardinge and Lord Raglan, were consulted; and it was after consideration by them with others that the pensioners were adopted.

15095. Then Lord Raglan was one of the authorities responsible for adopting the pensioners?—Yes.

15096. When was the office of War and of the Colonies divided; and when did you take the responsibility of the War Department?—On the 12th of June.

15097. Your Grace has stated, in answer to Question 14,399, that when that separation was made, no change followed in consequence, in regard to your responsibilities?—I think what I said was this, with regard to my powers, that I did not receive any increased powers upon the separation. I may add the same with regard to my responsibilities; I do not think that they were increased or diminished.

15098. While you held office, though you had been relieved from the Colonies, you had not received any additional powers to enable you to administer the War Department?—None, but such as I had from the very first.

15099. Did you find that you had insufficient power to perform the duties that were required in your new office?—I would hardly use the word insufficiency of power; I would rather use the term "insufficiency of means;" I think that would more accurately represent the state of the case.

15100. You did find that you had insufficient means to accomplish what you required?—Certainly. I am certain, in order to enable any Secretary of State for War satisfactorily to himself, and to the public, to carry out his duties, there must be very material changes in all the War deparments.

15101. You also stated to the Committee, that your difficulties in the office were so onerous, that you had no time to reconstruct the office, and to take those additional powers that were required?—Certainly. I felt it to be perfectly impossible; over and over again I wished to have devoted a few hours to its consideration even, but I did not find the time to consider it.

15102. Before the two offices of War and the Colonies were separated, did not your Grace object to the separation, and hold the opinion that you could perform the duties of both departments?—No; it was not so much that I could perform the duties of both departments as this: I said I thought the separation was undesirable until the military departments were entirely reorganised. I thought that to divide the two secretaryships, under the idea that you were going to obtain any great good in the then state of things, was a mistake.

15103. It proved to be a mistake, so far that though the separation was made with the intention on the part of Parliament that more power and more responsibility should be given to the War Minister, yet in fact none such were given?—Yes.

15104. *Chairman.*] Was there any desire, on the part of Parliament, to increase that power and that responsibility; had you not sufficient power and sufficient

sufficient responsibility before; and was not the only thing you wanted the means?—I have said so; that I do not consider that there was a want of power so much as a want of means; in short, the tools with which one was armed to work were not of the very best character.

15105. You were hampered by your subordinates, were you not?—Yes, in many instances.

15106. Lord *Seymour.*] When you say that you were hampered by your subordinates, do you mean that the different officers who were properly under you did not act cordially with you?—No; I should be very sorry to say that, or that such an impression should exist. I do not mean to say that when I differed with some of my subordinates they were not occasionally anxious to carry out their views instead of mine, but when I insisted they gave way; and I received from everybody under me great cordiality, and a great endeavour to do their duties. I do not attach individual blame to anybody. I think that the system is bad; but I think, generally speaking, all those with whom I came in contact did their duty to the best of their power.

15107. When you undertook that separate office of the War Department, did your Grace send round to the different military departments and request that they would immediately communicate with you?—No, that was completely understood. I had been in constant communication with them before, and from the commencement of the war my attention was devoted a great deal more to the war than to the colonies.

15108. When Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the Medical Department, was asked this question, "Upon the separation of the departments of War and the Colonies, were you informed that you were to be more immediately under the department of the Secretary of War?" his answer was, that "He was not so informed"?—I think that he was not. I have already said more than once that in the commencement I left the Medical Department, to a very considerable extent, under the management of the Secretary-at-War, of course with my entire knowledge of what was done; that is to say, I acted in concert with Mr. Sidney Herbert, and left him to give directions to Dr. Andrew Smith; but from about the middle of August, when most other people were out of town, I told Dr. Andrew Smith, as great complaints came in at that time upon all matters connected with the Medical department, that I wished him to come to me every day to take orders from me.

15109. You stated, did you not, that you ordered warm clothing in August?—Yes, it must have been before the end of August; I recollect it was not before the prorogation of Parliament, which took place on the 12th; how soon afterwards I cannot say; but before the end of August.

15110. Did you send that order to the Board of Ordnance?—Certainly.

15111. Who was at the Board of Ordnance at that time; there was no Master-general?—No.

15112. And no Surveyor-general, was there?—No, he was away.

15113. The chief engineer was gone, was he not?—He went the very day of the prorogation of Parliament.

15114. Who was there left to constitute the Board of Ordnance?—There was Sir Hew Ross (he was appointed temporarily), Sir Thomas Hastings, and Mr. Monsell; that was all.

15115. Did you consider that Board then to be in a satisfactory state for the purpose of carrying on the business of such a Board?—Certainly not.

Mercurii, 25° die Aprilis, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Captain Gladstone.	Mr. Bramston.
Colonel Lindsay.	General Peel.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

His Grace the Duke of *Newcastle*; further Examined.

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15116. Lord *Seymour.*] IN continuation of the questions which I was asking your Grace yesterday, I will ask you whether, when the offices of War and the Colonies were separated, any change was made in regard to your authority in submitting appointments to Her Majesty for approval, or whether they were still submitted by the Commander-in-chief?—No change whatever was made in that respect; it has always been the practice that the appointment of officers in the army of whatever rank and to whatever military position should be submitted by the Commander-in-chief. The practice during a time of peace has always been with regard to superior appointments, such, for instance, as a General of a district in this country, or a General to command the troops in one of the colonies, that they should be submitted to one of the administration: in the case of Generals of districts in England to the Home Secretary, and in the case of a General in command of the troops in one of the colonies, to the Colonial Secretary, before the Commander-in-chief submitted his name to the Sovereign; and when the sanction of the Secretary of State was obtained, it was submitted by the Commander-in-chief. Upon the breaking out of the war, Lord Hardinge acted upon an analogous principle in referring to me, as the Secretary of State for War and Colonies, the names of the general officers who were to be appointed, in the first instance of course the Commander-in-chief Lord Raglan, and subsequently the other Generals of Divisions and Brigades.

15117. You became immediately responsible to the public for the persons appointed by the Cabinet, did you not?—Certainly.

15118. Then do you not think that it would be expedient in regard to all the superior appointments that they should be submitted to Her Majesty for approval by the Secretary for War, who is, in fact, responsible for those appointments?—Undoubtedly that is my opinion; and it is an opinion which I have expressed long ago. I think there is an incongruity in the present arrangements which is not to be found in any other case in our political system; the responsible Ministers of the Crown recommend other appointments to the Sovereign; and though I think the selection of all officers for appointments in the army should be made in the first instance by the Commander-in-chief, I am of opinion that where it is necessary to take the opinion of the Secretary of State, he is the proper person to submit those appointments to the Queen, rather than the Commander-in-chief.

15119. You have instanced some difficulties and inconveniences in regard to the forms of conducting business between the War department and the subordinate departments. I wish to ask your Grace whether, after the division of the offices, the amount of correspondence was increased or diminished between the different offices; for one object, it was understood, in making that separation was to diminish the amount of correspondence that went on between the

the different military departments of the Government?—I do not think that object was affected in any way whatever, nor could it have been to any material extent without very much greater and more extensive changes than were then effected.

15120. It would have been necessary, would it not, in order to give effect to the object of Parliament in making that change, to have brought those departments more immediately into connexion with the War Minister?—Certainly; and perhaps I may here observe, that I believe that, in order to do this thoroughly and effectually, another change which I never heard alluded to, is necessary, and which at first sight may seem a small and unimportant matter, but which really is of very much more practical importance than might be supposed, and that is, that the whole of the War Departments ought to be concentrated under one building. I do not mean that they ought to be deprived of their separate heads, each responsible to one paramount head; but the French system ought to be adopted, where the business is conducted under one roof, and where there is immediate facility for instantaneous personal communication, without which I am satisfied the business of the army cannot be satisfactorily conducted. The distance, however small it may seem, of the Ordnance Department from the present War Department, is an insuperable bar to that communication. I think that all final orders ought to be given in writing; that I consider essential; yet it is of the greatest use, and it is the only way of effectually putting an end to the perpetual correspondence backwards and forwards, that the paramount chief should have opportunities of communicating with the various heads of the departments personally before those orders are given; and that will not be done effectually until the whole comes under one roof.

15121. You have stated, that you were dissatisfied with the system under which the medical comforts were supplied, and that you very early, I think, recommended the appointment of a purveyor?—Yes; the system having been such as I have described, and perhaps the most striking instance of the anomaly being, that the medical comforts should be purchased by the Board of Admiralty, I told Dr. Andrew Smith that I considered the arrangement ought eventually to be, when the Commissariat was removed from the Treasury, that the Commissariat should be responsible for those articles; in the meantime I authorised him to take upon himself to make those purchases, and to enable him to do so, a purveyor was allotted to him for that purpose.

15122. That was early in the summer, was it not?—Not very early; it was rather early in the autumn. I do not recollect the exact date.

15123. He says in August?—Probably the end of August.

15124. Then did you consult Dr. Andrew Smith as to the duties and instructions to be given to the purveyor, and did you define his duties?—No; of course the purveyor was to be the agent for Dr. Andrew Smith, he having other duties to perform than to go into the market to purchase medical comforts; the purveyor was to do that under him, and be responsible, of course, to him.

15125. Dr. Andrew Smith has stated to this Committee, in Question 8978, that he wished to have certain regulations for the purveyor, by which the purveyor would have been placed under the direct control and orders of the medical officers, but that when he recommended those regulations, they were stopped in some office; I want to know whether your Grace was aware that his recommendations had been in that way set aside?—To the best of my recollection, what Dr. Andrew Smith must have been alluding to in that answer was, that he rather wanted a more permanent system of placing under the Medical Board the purchase of those articles. I considered that giving an unlimited power of expenditure to the Medical Board would be entirely irregular; this was a provisional arrangement pending the future arrangements of the Commissariat. I recollect distinctly objecting to some proposals of Dr. Andrew Smith, by which the system would have been more extended, and would have left a power to which I think the Treasury would have objected, and rightly so. I should hardly have said that what you have read was a very accurate account.

15126. I will read to you what he states with regard to the regulations for the

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the purveyor. He states that, if those regulations were at fault, as regarded the supply by the purveyor, the responsibility rested upon him for drawing up those regulations, and he stated that they were not printed exactly as he suggested, and that in consequence he called attention to the deficiencies, and recommended certain alterations, which were made; but the purveyor proceeded from hence before the revised edition of his suggestions was sent out?—I think your Lordship has confounded two points; the purveyor there referred to (Mr. Wreford) was the purveyor at the hospital at Scutari, and the purveyor of whom I spoke was a new appointment, a new temporary appointment of a purveyor specially allotted to Dr. Andrew Smith himself for the purchase of articles in this country; that is a totally different point.

15127. You meant a purveyor in England?—Yes; he in that answer speaks of the purveyor at Scutari.

15128. But with regard to the purveyor at Scutari, he stated that the purveyor at Scutari had not the power, and was not placed under the authority of the medical officers, and that he objected to the system under which the purveyor was not placed under the authority of the medical officers; was that ever brought under your notice?—Yes, it was. I have stated in a former answer to a question before this Committee, that I thought there were very few departments of the army which required more material and extensive alterations than the Medical department. I think the whole system extremely bad; but it would have been impossible to make that one alteration without entirely upsetting the whole arrangement; in short, making much more complete a change than that. The purveyor is, like the other officers at Scutari, under the directions of the Commandant, the principle being, no doubt, founded upon the regulation of the Treasury that the medical officer should not be the officer for expenditure.

15129. But it appears from the instructions which have been now printed, and which are now before this Committee, that it was not till the 14th of November that the purveyor was placed under the directions of the medical officer?—I think not by any orders from hence; I have no recollection of it.

15130. Are you not aware of the instructions that were issued on the 14th of November by the Secretary-at-War?—Yes, I am.

15131. In those instructions the purveyor was "to obey such orders as the Inspector-general of hospitals, or the principal medical officer in charge for the time being, may think necessary for the welfare of the sick, and the interests of the public service"?—Yes; but that I do not think embraces the point to which I referred, namely, that of expenditure.

15132. Yes, he is directed with regard to the expenditure in this way: "Should such orders involve considerations of expenditure or finance generally, which the purveyor in chief shall think it to be his duty to bring under the notice of the Secretary-at-War, he will communicate his opinions and observations direct to the Secretary-at-War, furnishing at the same time a copy of his communication to the Inspector-general of hospitals, or the principal medical officer in charge for the time being; pending, however, the reference home of such questions for the decision of the Secretary-at-War, he will act upon the requisitions of the Inspector-general, or the principal medical officer for the time being." Therefore by those regulations it would appear that the power of the medical officer was complete as to obtaining anything that he wanted?—Yes, that is to say, a very proper responsibility was thrown upon him, but not unlimited power given. I should state, with regard to all these matters, that everything connected with finance is under the Secretary-at-War, and was not under me. I had better explain the principle of those instructions; they are merely intended to obviate the excuses which were given at Scutari, that they were placed under such restrictions by the Secretary-at-War as regarded expenditure, as justified all the misfortunes which occurred; those instructions were intended to define the responsibility which was placed on officers at a distance, and which they had no right to repudiate.

15133. The difficulty which this was intended to meet, had not been brought to your Grace's notice till November; therefore, those instructions were not issued till the 14th?—Certainly; they were issued not by me, but by the financial officer of the army, the Secretary-at-War.

15134. When

15134. When was the disgraceful state of the hospitals at Scutari first brought to your Grace's notice?—In the middle of the month of October; it was not officially brought under my notice.

15135. It was first brought under your notice by a private communication?—I forget which was first; but in the same week I received three communications relating to the state of the hospitals, and one was through the public press; a second consisted of two or three private letters, and the third was from persons in England. A gentleman had recently arrived from Constantinople, who, I had reason to suppose, had visited the hospitals; and I immediately requested him to call upon me, which he did. I found that he had visited the hospitals, and I, of course, cross-examined him, and obtained from him a great deal of information.

15136. *Chairman.*] You received no official information from the doctors, or anybody in command, of the misery then existing there?—No. So far from having received such information from them, when inquiries were immediately sent out to them, they were, to a very great extent, if not entirely, denied.

15137. Lord *Seymour.*] Did you, when you received that information, send for Dr. Smith, and ask him what reports he had received?—Yes; I not only did that, but I requested this gentleman, to whom I have referred, to call upon Dr. Smith at his own house, it being then 9 o'clock or 10 o'clock at night, in order that no delay might occur.

15138. Did Dr. Andrew Smith give any reply as to those statements which were brought to your notice?—He expressed at first his entire incredulity.

15139. Did you receive from Lord Raglan any report by the commandant as to the state of the hospital?—No, I did not.

15140. Do not you think that it would have been right that the person who was in military authority over a large hospital, in which several thousand persons were, should make such reports?—I consider so undoubtedly; and that if the person in supreme authority there had not the means of correcting all the abuses, and placing the hospital upon a more efficient system himself, it was his duty to have reported it immediately to Lord Raglan, by whom it would be communicated to me.

15141. How soon did you become convinced, without going to the extent that was stated as to the mischief that had arisen in the hospital, and the mismanagement in it, that there was much that was unsatisfactory in that hospital?—I at once was convinced that there must be abuses to a very considerable extent, because so much concurrent testimony could leave no doubt upon the subject. I still hoped undoubtedly, having those strong denials from the medical gentlemen and others, that there had been a very considerable extent of exaggeration, such as is very apt to occur with persons who merely take a cursory view of what may be going on.

15142. Why did you not at once send out a gentleman qualified to superintend and to control the whole management of the hospital, when you heard that it was in an unsatisfactory condition?—For this reason, that without hearing explanations from the individual himself, it is quite impossible to know who was in fault, or whether you may not be doing a great deal more harm than good by removing a man, and placing another in his place; for instance, if he had been exerting himself to the utmost, having obtained a great knowledge of the business during the time that he was there, of course putting a new hand to correct those abuses, would have done mischief, instead of good.

15143. Did not the reports that came to your Grace's notice show you that the management was in a very unsatisfactory condition, as well as the hospital itself, and that the controlling authority was bad?—No, I do not think that they did, except so far as that the Commandant was responsible for everything there; and unless it can be proved that he had exerted himself to rectify all abuses, upon him the blame rests; beyond that I do not think that any complaint was made to me which distinctly implied blame upon the Commandant. I should say, in answer to the last question but one that was addressed to me, that I understood the question to mean, the immediate appointment of another Commandant; steps were taken in this country for sending out from hence another Commandant, but at a somewhat later period that appointment was cancelled, in consequence of our ascertaining that

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Lord Raglan had taken upon himself to appoint Lord William Paulet pending authority from home.

15144. Lord Raglan appointed the first Commandant?—He did.

15145. Did he state to you any reasons why he had selected the officer he appointed for the management of this large establishment?—I do not think he stated any specific reason; I think he expressed his conviction of his entire fitness for the appointment; I am bound to say, and it is only fair towards a gentleman upon whom my evidence may seem somewhat to reflect, to say, that even now those who have had the best opportunity of judging, and I speak of some of those who have so charitably gone out without authority or responsibility, have expressed privately their opinion, that the defect has been in the lack of administrative ability which is so often found in many individuals; and that there has been no lack of zeal or desire to do his duty on the part of the late Commandant.

15146. I think you very early wrote to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to take upon himself a certain responsibility in authorizing expenditure; why did you put that responsibility upon Lord Stratford de Redcliffe rather than send out a person to superintend the hospital, who might more properly have taken that responsibility?—Because Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has, opportunities at Constantinople of obtaining the requisite supplies, through the means of the Turkish Government, which any person sent out there would not have; of course his influence is very considerable, and, in a country like Turkey, a great many things can be obtained from the Government which cannot be obtained in the market. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had double facilities; he had such facilities as any other individual would have, and he had the facilities which his position afforded him.

15147. Did you find, practically, that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had time to attend to the hospital, or that his interference, in fact, became of any use?—It was not intended that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe should personally interfere with the hospital, but it was simply intended that he should obtain everything that was requisite for the hospital, we having a right to assume that what was requisite could be stated to him by the medical men connected with the hospital, and that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe would act upon that statement. The first step which he took was to apply to Dr. Menzies to inform him what he required.

15148. I can understand that it was convenient to communicate with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, but it hardly appears to be a fit thing to call upon an Ambassador to attend to the wants of a great hospital, containing 5,000 or 6,000 persons?—I thought I had explained that it was not to call upon him to attend to the wants of the hospital, but to insure the supplying of the wants, which should be indicated to him by others; it was not expected that he should go to the hospital, and that he should see with his own eyes, and form his own opinions as to what was wanting, but that he should be the instrument of supplying those wants.

15149. In fact he was doing what ought to have been done by a good Commandant, if you had had such a persont here?—Yes, to a certain extent, certainly, that was a portion of his duties.

15150. Mr. *Branston.*] He was desired to find funds to procure any supplies that were necessary, was he not?—He was authorised to draw upon the Government at home for any amount of funds that might be requisite for the supply of the hospitals.

15151. Mr. *Layard.*] He was merely, as I understand it, to be referred to in case of difficulties?—Something more than that; a certain amount of responsibility was thrown upon Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, but not that of judging himself of what was wanting for the hospitals.

15152. Lord *Seymour.*] You have read to the Committee a letter of the 10th of April to Lord Raglan, directing the expedition to the Crimea, and you have also referred to his answer, which has not yet been before this Committee; after receiving his answer, in the course of July, was there any further letter on the part of the Government, still urging upon him the propriety of that undertaking?—There was an answer to his despatch of the 19th of July, to which I have referred.

15153. And which pressed upon him again the importance of that undertaking?

taking? — Not again; we considered that it was unnecessary, he having indicated, in his despatch of July 19th, that he was about to undertake it.

15154. In preparing for this great military expedition in August, did you ask Dr. Andrew Smith what accommodation for the wounded he had provided?—I forget whether I asked him the question, or whether he told me without my asking him, but he informed me of the amount that he had provided.

15155. It was a large amount, was it not?—Very large.

15156. As it appeared at that time?—Yes; at that time I considered, undoubtedly, the amount which he named was considerably beyond what I hoped and thought we had reason to expect would be required.

15157. You considered that you could not enter the Crimea without some great actions, did you not?—Yes.

15158. And the hospital at Varna was at that time to be abandoned?—At least not used for that portion of the army.

15159. Therefore the whole force was dependent upon the hospital at Scutari?—It was.

15160. Had you any returns then in your office showing you the amount of accommodation prepared for the wounded at Scutari?—No, not prepared, because the orders were to be sent by Dr. Andrew Smith to prepare; therefore he indicated the amount of accommodation which he thought would be required.

15161. He did early in August send out for that purpose?—I think it must have been sooner than that; I think so; but I should be sorry to speak very positively.

15162. If there was not a sufficiency of accommodation after the engagements of the Alma and of Inkermann, that you think was not the fault of the department in this country, for not having written out and urged the preparation of such accommodation?—I did not see the actual orders sent out; but supposing they were sent out, and I have reason to believe they were by Dr. Andrew Smith, I do not think any blame attaches to him in that respect.

15163. It appears that in August, while this expedition was in contemplation by the Government, you, who were the organ of the Government in managing this affair, were dissatisfied with respect to the Medical Department?—I think I stated this, that the organisation of the Medical Department I thought was defective.

15164. You were dissatisfied with the organisation of the Ordnance Department?—Yes.

15165. You were dissatisfied with the system of the Commissariat?—With its being under the Treasury.

15166. Then all the great departments for the supply of the army were, in your opinion, at that time in an unsatisfactory state?—Yes, generally speaking, certainly.

15167. With regard to the sea transport, was your Grace at that time satisfied with the condition of the sea transport?—To say that I was satisfied with the condition of the sea transport, or dissatisfied, at the commencement of the war, would hardly be an accurate expression; for at that time it had not commenced; but I very early indeed anticipated that the system of sea transport would be found to be defective. The Committee is aware that, in the year 1830, the Transport Board was abolished, and was transferred to the Board of Admiralty. I am of opinion that that was an exceedingly good measure then, and worked well in a time of peace; but at the very beginning of the war, feeling, at that distance from the country, the enormous work which must necessarily be thrown upon those who had to conduct the sea transport, I was extremely doubtful whether it would be possible for the Admiralty to conduct it; and I expressed that opinion, and was anxious that something in the shape of a Transport Board, if not an absolute Transport Board, should be formed, that is to say, some such arrangement as this: that one Lord of the Admiralty might have the general superintendence with two others, such as an Emigration Commissioner (I speak of the Emigration Commissioners, because they have had very great experience in taking up ships of all kinds and all classes), and somebody, probably, connected with the mercantile marine of this country. I expressed that opinion; but I do not attach any blame to the Board of Admiralty for doubting its wisdom, they having had experience of the good working of their own plan during the time of peace. I must say that my anti-

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cipations of the failure of its working in time of war were realised, and, as I think, proved, by the change of opinion at the Board of Admiralty, they having, as is well known, given up the management, and the Transport Board having been revived about Christmas, or in the month of January last; but if I may venture to express an opinion, though it is hardly right to do so perhaps, I do not consider that arrangement in itself to be a complete one: I am convinced that the present sea transport system will not work well in such a war as this. I am confident that it will not work well, unless the sea transport is placed under the management of the Minister for War. I readily admit that the Transport Board would have to work for the Admiralty, as well as for the Secretary for War, and would have to convey stores and provisions for the navy, as well as for the army; but the army is so much more dependent than the Navy upon that Board, that my strong impression is that it ought not to be, as it is now, under the general management of the Admiralty, but should be under the direct control of the Secretary for War.

15168. You mean, do you not, that all the naval force which is placed under the management of the Transport Board, should be, in fact, at the disposal of the Minister for War?—Yes; that the Transport Board should be responsible to him.

15169. The Committee have been informed that a great part of the sufferings of the army arose from its excessive work, that is from its insufficiency of strength for the work which it had to perform; had you consulted Lord Hardinge and other military authorities as to the possibility of keeping up the force to the amount of 25,000 bayonets, or thereabouts, which was the force sent into the Crimea?—Certainly, and not merely once, but repeatedly; I was in constant communication with Lord Hardinge upon that point; I am glad to have this opportunity of correcting an answer which I gave yesterday, or rather of explaining an answer: a question was asked me by Mr. Layard, or the Chairman, whether Lord Hardinge drew up any memorandum with reference to the reserve; I understood the question, from the manner in which it was put, to mean, did Lord Hardinge draw up any memorandum disapproving of the plan adopted by the Government, and recommending any other? If that was the intention of the question, my answer was correct, for he never drew up such memorandum, but he drew up a great number of memoranda upon the subject of the reserve, and the means of reinforcements, if they were requisite, in concert with me; and it was in communication with Lord Hardinge, and in consequence of those memoranda, that the reserves which we had here were prepared; I have already said, that in the first instance, when the 25,000 men were first sent out, we had a reserve of one division prepared, consisting of between 6,000 and 7,000 men; that division was subsequently sent out under Sir George Cathcart, and we had already set about preparing another reserve, which eventually reached 10,000, which we sent to the Crimea, a large portion of which reserve arose from the regiments which I called in from the colonies very early in the year, I think in January, but at any rate before war was proclaimed.

15170. Was the force that landed in the Crimea 25,000 bayonets?—The first expedition sent to Turkey was, in round numbers, 25,000; that was strengthened by drafts, which were sent out in the month of July, to the extent of 3,000 and some odd hundred men, and further drafts were sent out at the time I just spoke of with the division sent out under Sir George Cathcart. The army then amounted, though I cannot speak accurately, but I should think when Lord Raglan embarked for the Crimea, the army must have numbered about 33,000 or 34,000 men at least; I think I am under the mark. The number that landed on the 14th of September at Old Fort, amounted to 27,600, if I recollect rightly.

15171. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Of all ranks?—Yes.

15172. Mr. *Bramston.*] Including artillery?—Yes; and 1,100 cavalry.

15173. Lord *Seymour.*] You considered that you had a reserve sufficient to maintain that amount of force?—Yes; but, as I have already said, not in the way in which a country would desire to do it, that had been able to make more extensive preparations than were then possible; but at the same time if we had not met with the misfortunes which have since occurred, and the enormous extent of disease, I believe that the force might have been fully kept up to that amount.

15174. Did

15174. Did you in August consult any officer of experience in the Commissariat as to the mode of insuring supplies to that force?—There was only one Commissariat officer of any experience then in this country, he having just arrived with Sir James Cathcart from the Cape, Sir George Maclean; all the other officers of experience had gone out, except, I should have said, Sir Randolph Routh, who is too old now for active service. I never myself communicated with either of those gentlemen, and, as I have explained more than once to the Committee up to the 22d of December, my communications upon all Commissariat matters were with the Treasury, and not with the Commissariat officers.

15175. You did not see the Commissariat officers yourself?—I cannot say that I never saw them. I saw Sir Randolph Routh once or twice and Sir George Maclean once, but I did not consider myself to be authorised to correspond with them as if they were immediately responsible to me; they were responsible to the Treasury at that time.

15176. Were Lord Raglan's despatches always communicated to Lord Hardinge, as well as to the Cabinet?—In some instances not; but I always communicated those despatches to Lord Hardinge, which I considered to be of a character that it was desirable he should see. Latterly I communicated to him not merely despatches, but frequently even private letters, in order that he might form his own opinion whether there was anything that he ought to notice in them.

15177. Were there any meetings of the Cabinet during August and September while this great military expedition was proceeding?—No meeting of the Cabinet was held in August after the prorogation of Parliament, which took place on the 12th, and no meeting of the Cabinet was held in September.

15178. There was one meeting of the Cabinet before the 12th of August, was there not?—There must have been more than one meeting of the Cabinet before that time in August.

15179. When was the next meeting?—The next meeting of the Cabinet was, I think, in the second week of October; I do not recollect the day.

15180. During that time you had no opportunity of bringing this matter under the consideration of your collective colleagues?—No, I had not.

15181. It seems to have been an unfortunate step that of sending out so many women with the army?—It was very well considered in the first instance, I confess it was a matter that I was always apprehensive of; but the military authorities having been accustomed to a certain number of women to go out with the army, believed that the soldiers would be dissatisfied if they had not their assistance for washing and other purposes for which women generally go with the army, and I believe fewer went than has ordinarily heretofore been the case. I think, however, it was a misfortune that any went; and latterly that practice has been abandoned.

15182. When you sent the army to the Crimea, did not you consider that arrangements must be made for their wintering somewhere there?—Certainly.

15183. What were your arrangements at that time upon that point?—It was impossible to have any fixed idea so long as the result of the siege of Sebastopol was unknown; but I conceived that either the army would find winter quarters, if Sebastopol was taken, of the most admirable character, in the south of the Crimea, or that, destroying Sabastopol, they would winter upon the shores of the Bosphorus; and I considered that, to the utmost of my power, both contingencies were provided for.

15184. When you say that you provided for both contingencies, will you explain how you provided for the contingency, for instance, of wintering in the Crimea?—It would be wrong to say that I provided for both contingencies; I mean that I provided for the only contingency that could be provided for. If they had taken Sebastopol, that contingency provided for itself.

15185. *Chairman.*] Did you provide for the contingency of their not taking Sebastopol?—I cannot say that ample provision was made from the first; that was not the contingency in the question that I replied to. I have already said, that as soon as it became apparent that a winter campaign in the Crimea was inevitable, from that instant I increased the provision which had been made, of warm clothing of every description, and I provided huts.

15186. Lord *Seymour.*] In the communications which you received from Lord Raglan, or from other military authorities with the army, were you led

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to believe that the efficiency of the service was impaired by the forms and vouchers required in the management of the army?—I am not aware of any vouchers or forms connected with the army, except as regards the Commissariat, as to which great complaints have been made. As regards the others, they are principally returns. I did consider that the returns which were made, what are called the morning states, were unsatisfactory in many respects, and I appointed two gentlemen, whom I believed to be competent to the task, to prepare new forms of a less complicated character, but which I think would work very much better; those have been sent out to the army; but I had no experience of their working, because they were sent out at the end of December, or the beginning of January. I left office before any of them were returned home; but they were printed here, and were sent out.

15187. Did you receive any information which led you to believe that the Commissariat forms were unnecessary and objectionable?—I heard complaints, and I referred to the Treasury upon that point. I never received from the Treasury any reason to suppose that those complaints were justified: the answers which I got were, that if any of the complaints were justified, it was the fault of individual officers, and not of the system; that they had acted improperly, and contrary to orders.

15188. Do you consider that the system of audit at home, namely, that Commissaries and others who sign papers are held responsible for what they sign, by its stringency is inconvenient for the service of the army?—If you were to look to efficiency alone, without reference to expenditure, and without reference to the necessary checks upon dishonesty, I should, perhaps, say so; but looking to all those circumstances combined, I am not prepared to express that opinion; certainly there are great inconveniences; for instance, such a case as this arose: I had given private instructions to Sir William Read with reference to the expenditure of 2,000 *l.* or 3,000 *l.* for the service of the army; there was no official voucher for that amount, and when the Board of Audit applied to me, I was obliged, of course, to produce my private letters as an authority; but I am not prepared to say that those checks are unnecessary or unadvisable; there are inconveniences attaching to them, no doubt; but I am afraid if you removed them, you would have very great abuses introduced, and the public would be at the mercy of dishonest servants.

15189. You stated, in answer to a question yesterday, that the maps which you received from the Crimea, you did not think creditable?—I thought them not well executed; not so well as some that I have seen produced by the French engineers.

15190. Those maps were executed by our engineer officers, who are under the Board of Ordnance, were they not?—Yes; at the same time, I did not mean to imply that there were not engineers out there who were perfectly competent to have produced as fine maps as any engineers in the world, but they were not done.

15191. If they were not done, it has not been because we had not expended enough upon mapping during peace?—Certainly not.

15192. We have expended a very large sum upon it, have we not?—Yes.

15193. Therefore, if any one department has had practice, and ought to have had experience, it is the department of the Board of Ordnance, in regard to mapping?—Certainly. I have already said that there are in that corps men as capable as any in the world.

15194. General *Peel.*] Was any special requisition made by you for a map?—No.

15195. Therefore this may have been a mere sketch that was forwarded to you?—Yes. I think I stated yesterday, no whole map was sent home; not, at least, to the Ordnance. A map was sent to the Admiralty, which was supposed to be as authentic as it could be procured, under the circumstances; and from time to time sketches were sent home, and the general map was corrected by those sketches.

15196. The engineer officers out there had something else to do than to make maps that were not called for?—Certainly. The engineer officers had, of course, during the siege been more constantly employed, and more heavily engaged, than, perhaps, any other officers in the army.

15197. Mr. *Layard.*] Was it not the duty of the engineers to have kept the

the Government fully informed as to the position of the army, and as to the operations that were going on before Sebastopol?—I think it was very desirable.

15198. I think your Grace showed me a map with which you had been supplied?—I showed you the map to which I have referred, which was kept at the Admiralty; the one I showed you was, no doubt, the one corrected up to the then most recent period.

15199. Did not it strike you that that map was totally unequal to conveying any accurate idea of the position of our army before Sebastopol?—I think it did not give a fair or adequate view, certainly.

15200. Did you ever see the map supplied to the French Government regularly by the engineers?—Yes; I have referred to that.

15201. Did you ever see any maps issued by the Admiralty officially which were at all creditable to our engineering establishment?—Some of the sketches, undoubtedly, were extremely well done.

15202. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Do not you think that this accusation thrown upon the engineers was rather the result of the engineer not having been required to send a map home, than from any deficiency of talent in the engineers' department?—I have already said, that so far from there being any deficiency of talent, the most beautiful maps to be seen are those which have been executed by our own engineers.

15203. Lord *Seymour.*] It was stated the other day that Lord Raglan was nominally the Master-general of the Ordnance; do you believe that he had nothing to do with the management of the Ordnance?—Certainly not.

15204. Do you believe that any appointment could be made in that office without his sanction?—Yes.

15205. Do not they send to him for his sanction in making some appointment?—Not that I recollect; I am not aware; I do not recollect any appointment. I recollect this case, that the solicitor died soon after Lord Raglan went out, and so far from there being no power of filling up the appointment without a reference to Lord Raglan, the delay which took place in filling it up was entirely attributable to me. I wrote to Sir Hew Ross, telling him that I wished him not to fill up the appointment, because I thought that if we should be able to make any new arrangement as to the military departments, the legal adviser of the Ordnance ought to be also the legal adviser of the other departments, and it would be very inconvenient to have separate legal advisers; but finding that it was not likely that any extensive alterations would then be made, and finding that it would be necessary to have a solicitor to the Ordnance, I withdrew that objection, and the appointment was made. I believe, in the meantime, Lord Raglan had written to Sir Hew Ross, mentioning a gentleman whom he believed to be a perfectly fit person, but in whom he had no personal interest; but again I say such reference was not required, because I again saw Sir Hew Ross, and there being a great number of candidates, in order to ensure the best appointment for the public service, I desired Sir Hew Ross to see a very eminent solicitor of this town to request from him an opinion as to which was the fittest candidate, and that one was appointed by my directions.

15206. With regard to the instructions which you sent out to Lord William Paulet, have you anything further to state to the Committee?—Yes. I yesterday mentioned to the Committee that I had sent out very full instructions to Lord William Paulet, and I said if the Committee would allow me, I would read them to the Committee, in order that they might put to me any questions which they might think fit. I have been informed this morning, by the motion, I presume, of the Chairman, that document is already before the Committee, and therefore, of course, I will be entirely guided by the Committee.

15207. Mr. *Layard.*] Your Grace has just stated, that you sent out huts to the Crimea: may I ask you at what period any communication was made to any firm with regard to those huts?—I stated yesterday that I did not know the exact date, but it was immediately after the receipt of the intelligence of the battle of Inkermann in this country.

15208. Was that communication made as early as the month of October to Messrs. Price & Co.?—No.

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15209. After that communication was made, were the huts immediately furnished?—Yes, with very great rapidity.

15210. Then as that communication had been made to Messrs. Price & Co., and they sent in their specifications, plans, and tenders, those plans were not sent to the Ordnance, but were lost, and a delay of several weeks, if not two months, took place without anything being done?—Certainly not.

15211. Such a statement as that is not correct?—Certainly not; Messrs. Price, if I recollect rightly, were not the manufacturers of the huts; it was a firm at Gloucester.

15212. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Will your Grace allow me to ask you whether it is within your knowledge that Lord Raglan, after he took the command of the army in the East, sent an officer to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to make arrangements with regard to the supplies for the army?—Is the Honourable Baronet now speaking of the commencement of the war?

15213. Yes; early in the war?—I am not aware of his having done so; he did not report it to me; I never heard of it. He communicated with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe upon all occasions, and latterly, when he found himself under some difficulties with regard to clothing, I think he sent down to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; he sent down to Constantinople, and upon all occasions he kept Lord Stratford de Redcliffe acquainted with such communications as he made to Constantinople; I never heard of the communication to which you have referred.

15214. Your Grace stated yesterday, that there had been no objection made by any high military authority to the expedition to Sebastopol?—Yes.

15215. May I ask you whether any exception was ever taken by any military authorities who were consulted by your Grace with respect to the strength of the force sent to the Crimea?—No, never.

15216. You also stated yesterday, that the recruits which had been sent out, had been in a large degree raw recruits, very young men; I wish to understand more distinctly what was the nature of the arrangement made by the Government with regard to the recruiting of the army after the expedition to Sebastopol was ordered after the 29th of June; there was no reserve, was there?—Yes; there was a reserve at that time. I have already explained that; it has been insisted upon several times in this Committee that there was no reserve; whether it was an adequate rererve, is a matter of opinion; but that there was a reserve, is undoubtedly the fact; in the first instance, I said that from the first moment when the expedition sailed, there was a reserve, what was called the reserved division, which was subsequently Sir George Cathcart's division, amounting to between 6,000 and 7,000 men; and when they left the country, there was a further reserve. I do not recollect the amount at that time, but it subsequently amounted to 10,000, the whole of which number was sent out to Lord Raglan after the battle of Inkermann; therefore up to that time there was a considerable reserve.

15217. When was Sir George Cathcart's division sent out?—It was ordered out the first week in July. I do not remember when it sailed; but the whole of it had arrived before the embarkation for the Crimea.

15218. The order for the expedition to Sebastopol was sent by Government with the despatch of the 29th of June?—Yes.

15219. Will your Grace allow me to ask you upon what you relied, as the Minister of War, for maintaining the army at its strength, considering the reductions from battle and disease, which were sure to occur?—When Sir George Cathcart's division left the country, which was subsequently to the 29th of June, we relied upon the further reserve of 10,000 men, which at that time I had prepared, and was preparing.

15220. One or two questions were addressed to your Grace yesterday with respect to the militia, and you stated that the Government could do nothing upon that subject except by an Act of Parliament; may I ask you at what period, or whether at any period, you called the attention of the Government to the necessity of embodying the militia, and securing strength from that quarter?—I really cannot recollect the exact date: the question of embodying any portion of the militia first arose upon the great reduction of the army in this country by the order for the embarkation of the first 25,000 men.

15221. It appeared at the commencement of the year, and of course at the

the commencement of the Session of Parliament, that war was imminent?—Yes.

15222. And war was declared at the end of March?—The 29th of March.

15223. Is your Grace aware that no Bill with respect to the militia was introduced into Parliament before the 1st of May?—Yes.

15224. Can you tell the Committee how soon any steps were taken by the Government for calling out the militia?—To the extent of about 16,000 men, the militia was called out as soon as that Act passed.

15225. How soon were the militia called out to any greater extent than 16,000 men?—Towards the close of the year; I forget the exact time; that is to say, to the full extent; a further number was called out between those two periods.

15226. How soon were any steps taken by the Government for calling out either the Irish or Scotch regiments of militia?—The Irish and Scotch regiments of militia were at that time not raised; there was no Irish or Scotch militia till towards the close of the year; there was no power; an Act was passed for raising the Irish and Scotch militia in the course of last Session, and it was not possible to raise that force until the end of the year; therefore it could not be embodied.

15227. Were the despatches which arrived in this country from Lord Raglan regularly communicated to Lord Hardinge?—I have said already not regularly; my practice was at first to communicate to Lord Hardinge such despatches as I thought contained information with which he should be acquainted, but more latterly I communicated them regularly to him as soon as the whole of the Cabinet had seen them; necessarily a delay of some days took place, but latterly I communicated to him all Lord Raglan's despatches.

15228. Are the Committee to understand you that the Government were systematically in the habit of consulting Lord Hardinge with respect to the best means of reinforcing and supplying the army, as to the position of the army, and other military questions?—I am certain that I, on behalf of the Government, always did.

15229. You stated yesterday, did you not, that you felt, as Minister-at-War, considerable embarrassment from the divided state of the different departments connected with the administration of the army?—Yes.

15230. Did I not understand, from a public statement made by your Grace, that that divided state of the departments was the subject of remonstrance on your part to the Government?—No; but the remonstrance which I suppose the Right Honourable Baronet alludes to, is that when the two Secretaryships were divided, I expressed an opinion that no great good would be effected by that measure without more extensive changes; that, in short, it required a great scheme of organisation, which it was perfectly impossible for me to attempt to form consistently with the heavy official duties which I had to perform.

15231. Is it the fact that that expression of opinion on the part of your Grace was overruled by the Cabinet?—It was determined by the Cabinet that at that moment nothing should be done but the separation of the two Secretaryships of State, and the removal of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Dapartment; but it was not decided that nothing else should afterwards be done, but, on the contrary, that it should be done. My fear was, that it was leading the public to expect much more advantage than could by possibility accrue from that one measure.

15232. Is it your Grace's opinion that the public interests suffered from the want of an earlier arrangement of that kind?—I think it would have been of great importance that this arrangement should have been made before the breaking out of the war; but I adhere to the opinion which I have expressed, that the greatest difficulties would have arisen, and mischief, if extensive alterations had suddenly been made at a period when it was necessary for everybody to be working as hard as he could; for though a system may be faulty, there are moments when it is almost preferable to continue it, rather than to adopt a better one which would take two or three months before it could get into gear. I still hold that opinion.

15233. Have you not expressed the opinion that at that time, when the separation of the two Secretaryships took place, it was desirable to take further steps than were taken for the consolidation of the different military departments?

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ments?—I think it would have been desirable if attention could have been paid to it in time by the proper person; and the proper person, under ordinary circumstances, to recommend such a plan, would be the Secretary for War. I do not know what the powers of other men may be, but I certainly did not possess them, and I confess, that, consistently with the duties which devolved upon me then, I felt quite incapable of undertaking so great an organisation, or rather a re-organisation.

15234. *Chairman.*] I think it fair to your Grace, that you may give what explanation you think fit, that you should hear some of the statements made, and which were referred to in the question asked of you by the Honourable Member for Aylesbury. I will read from a letter which has been received, setting forth the statements made by Messrs. Price & Potter, of Gloucester, respecting the huts: "In August last, Price & Co. were applied to by the Duke of Newcastle to supply plans, specifications, and tenders for huts in the Crimea, and that so early in August their plans, &c., were sent to the Duke of Newcastle, but for several months no communication was made to Price & Co. They then called on the Duke, and he informed them that the plans were with the Secretary-at-War, Mr. Sidney Herbert. Price & Co. at once went to the Secretary-at-War, to urge the importance of orders being given. He directed them to go to the Ordnance Office. There they went; but, lo and behold, the plans, &c., were all lost, and Price & Co. were requested to furnish fresh ones; they did so, and, after waiting for many weeks, again applied to the Duke, who shortly afterwards told Price & Co. to proceed with the huts on his own responsibility; they at once did so; but they had not proceeded more than a few days before a peremptory order came down to them from the Ordnance for them to desist proceeding with the huts. They accordingly stopped the works, and called on the Duke of Newcastle, stating how much valuable time had been lost, and, after a further delay, the Duke ultimately gave an order for the huts on his own responsibility, and they were then proceeded with, and finished, but only in time to reach the Crimea when they ceased to be wanted, and when the road was practicable, so that we lost thousands of men and horses through the delays I have referred to"?—That is, as is very often the case, a very highly coloured statement in those respects, which are not wholly inaccurate. As to dates, I should be sorry to contradict a written statement of that kind by Messrs. Price & Co.; but I am exceedingly surprised to hear it stated that those plans were sent in in the month of August. Be that as it may, the facts were these: the plans, whenever they were first sent to me, were sent at a time when, as I have said before, it was not apparent that the troops would have to winter in the Crimea; neither have Messrs. Price & Potter any right to assume any greater *prescience* than anybody else; for their scheme was intended, not for the Crimea, but for any other place where the troops might winter; and I did not consider it was desirable to go to the enormous expense of preparing huts, and sending them out in vessels, when we imagined that the troops would either have wintered in exceedingly warm and healthy winter quarters in the south of the Crimea, or upon the shores of the Bosphorus, where barracks and other buildings were prepared for their reception to a large extent; but at a subsequent date those circumstances, as I have said, were entirely altered. When I contradict the fact of the plans having been lost, I, of course, contradict anything which comes within my own knowledge. They assume that the plans were lost by me, under my directions; but I have not heard of their being lost up to this time; and that answer must have been received from the Ordnance; I never heard of it. I am sorry to say that the latter part of the statement as regards the stoppage of the preparations of those huts by the Ordnance is true. Orders were given by me, and when Messrs. Price & Potter say upon my own responsibility, they were, of course, given upon my responsibility; they were given by me, as Secretary of State, as soon as I thought it was desirable that huts should be made. Other persons had sent in plans; and I believed, upon the whole, that Messrs. Price & Potter's were the best; and I gave the orders as soon as it appeared probable that the army would have to winter in the Crimea without the advantages of the southern coast, which would have been open to them if they had taken Sebastopol. That order having been given, they proceeded with the manufacture of the huts; a difference arose at the Ordnance as to the proper form and construction of those huts, and they

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sent down by telegraph to Messrs. Price & Potter to suspend the works until this point was decided. I am now speaking entirely from recollection; I may err in some very trifling fact, but I am sure I am right in the main. I am almost confident that all these things were done by telegraph. The Ordnance stopped the work by telegraph; and Messrs. Price & Potter appealed by telegraph, unless I am very much mistaken. As soon as I heard it, I sent to the Ordnance, and had the plans brought before me. I inquired as to the points of difference, and I found that they were of a character which might have been of some importance if those buildings were to be erected for four or five years; but I considered them to be of so little importance under the circumstances, that I instantly sent to them to order them to proceed. As for the delay which had arisen, consequent upon that error, as I call it, upon the part of the Ordnance, being calculated to entail any such disaster as Messrs. Price & Potter there state, I positively deny it; it is not only a highly coloured statement, but one entirely erroneous. I altogether contradict the fact, that, consequent upon that delay, those huts arrived after they could be of any practical use; they arrived later, undoubtedly, than if by a stroke of the pen one could have conveyed them to the Crimea, which one would have desired; but they arrived in ample time to save the army from a vast amount of disaster, if there had been the means of conveying them to the front as soon as they arrived there.

15235. Do you recollect when the order was given, and when the huts left?—The exact date could be ascertained at the Ordnance; but the order was given immediately after the receipt in this country of the intelligence of the battle of Inkermann; it was not, of course, until the receipt of that intelligence that anybody in this country felt satisfied that the army would have to winter in the front of Sebastopol.

15236. Can you explain, or rather judge, of the amount of delay occasioned by that order of the Board of Ordnance?—Two or three days at the outside.

15237. General *Peel.*] What was the date and nature of your first communication to the Ordnance upon the subject of the huts?—Assuming that Price & Potter are right, as to their date of August, which in a written statement of that kind I am bound to suppose they are, though certainly it does not tally with my recollection, I did not apply to the Ordnance at all at that time, for the reason which I have stated, that at that time I did not consider that so enormous an expenditure ought to be incurred to put up huts upon the Bosphorus; when we contemplated that the troops would have been sheltered for the winter, if they went to the Bosphorus at all, in buildings which could have been supplied by the Turkish Government to a very large extent; a portion of the army being sent down probably to the Dardanelles, and some possibly to Corfu, or to Malta.

15238. Messrs. Price & Potter did not furnish you in August with plans and specifications of what they proposed to do, which you forwarded to the Ordnance in August?—I never took any step at so early a date; I did not send them to the Ordnance; I gave no order upon them, and I think they must have taken them to the Ordnance themselves.

15239. *Chairman.*] The statement is, that you sent them to the Secretary-at-War, and that he sent them to the Ordnance?—I did not send them to the Secretary-at-War.

15240. That is what they say here: "And he informed them that the plans were with the Secretary of War, Mr. Sidney Herbert"?—As this question has been mooted in so very questionable a shape, I think it only fair to say, though I have not been in the practice of contradicting the thousand-and-one falsehoods that I have seen circulated by various people; (and whether Messrs. Price & Potter are answerable for this statement that I have seen in the public press, I cannot tell;) but I have seen this statement, namely, that the English Government have been so neglectful that the French Government had anticipated them, and that Messrs. Price & Potter had been so engaged by the French Government, that they had not been able to undertake the contract for the English Government till afterwards, and the French Government had been amply supplied with huts by those gentlemen before we had. So far from that being true, the facts are precisely the reverse. The French Government did not contemplate placing their troops under huts until we had ours nearly made, and it was on hearing that ours were made that the French Government applied upon the subject. Messrs. Price & Potter

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Potter also applied to me for an introduction to the Emperor, which was given, and they went over; but the huts for the French troops were only commenced after the greater proportion of our huts were finished and some had left this country; the French troops at that time, instead of being under huts, were, as I believe they are to a great extent even at this present moment, under *tentes d'abri.*

15241. Mr. *Layard.*] At what time did the first batch of huts leave England?—I cannot say exactly the day, but it can be easily ascertained from the Admiralty; it must have either been some of the very last days of November, or the very first days of December.

15242. Sir *J. Pakington.*] I think your Grace intends to convey that, with the exception of those two or three days delay, caused by this interruption from the Ordnance, the huts were prepared as expeditiously as they could be, after the time that the Government made up their minds that the army would winter in the Crimea?—Yes.

15243. Did any unnecessary delay occur in shipping the huts at Portsmouth?—No further delay occurred in shipping the huts at Portsmouth than the extreme difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of steamers for the conveyance of those huts; there was great difficulty in obtaining them for carrying such very cumbrous articles, the demand for steamers, for the conveyance of troops, and other stores, having been so large, and the greater part of them being then in the Black Sea.

15244. That was unavoidable delay?—Yes; but the delay in sending out the earliest huts was not very great; there was greater delay in sending out the latter portion.

15245. You are not aware of any unnecessary delay with either?—No, I am not aware of any; I never received any complaint of any.

15246. Mr. *Drummond.*] Your Grace has referred to the authorities in the Ordnance: was not it Sir Frederick Smith's indecision that caused the delay?—I am not sure whether the objection was raised by him, or by the Ordnance Department; he was the officer appointed, under the Ordnance, to superintend, on the part of the Government, the execution of those huts.

15247. Was not the contract with the French Government, and the contract with our Government, entered into at the same date?—Certainly not.

15248. When the French entered into their contract, did they not send over a colonel, and some other officers, to assist in making them, and to learn how to put them up?—Very likely; I am not aware of that fact.

15249. Is your Grace aware that great delay took place after they were ready, in consequence of some dispute with the railway company about the amount to be paid upon them?—There was a delay; but to that I can give no correct answer. I had forgotten the fact; but some delay arose in consequence of the break of gauge between two railways, they having to be conveyed from Gloucester to Portsmouth; but I think the railway company was not to blame in the matter. I do recollect that some delay was occasioned, to the best of my belief, by the break of gauge, but not certainly to any material extent; it may have been a day or two.

15250. Did they not complain that their bills upon the Treasury were not paid in consequence of the non-delivery of the huts after they had been prepared by them?—They made no complaint to me; they would make that complaint to the Treasury.

15251. You stated, did you not, that on the 9th of February the Government resolved to send a military force for the defence of Turkey; was the invasion of Russia contemplated at the same time?—I have already said that from the first it was considered highly probable, if the objects of the war were not obtained by meeting the Russian forces in Turkey, that some expedition of an offensive character would have to be undertaken.

15252. Had the Ambassador at St. Petersburgh or at Constantinople been required to furnish information respecting the force in the Crimea, the nature of its defences, and the disposition of its inhabitants?—Yes.

15253. Did they furnish that information?—No; I have already said that we were never supplied with any information either from the Ambassador at Constantinople, or from the army.

15254. Or from St. Petersburgh?—The Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had left.

15255. Had

15255. Had he left before that?—Certainly.

15256. He was in possession of no information respecting the resources of the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress?—No.

15257. Does your Grace recollect at what time the fleets were ordered up to Besika Bay?—No, I really cannot speak to that from memory.

15258. The war was declared on the 29th of March?—Yes.

15259. It was some time previously to that?—Long before.

15260. Six months?—Yes; it must have been more than that.

15261. Did Admiral Dundas take any steps to acquaint himself with the force in Sebastopol, either the fleet, or the defences which protected that fleet?—The "Retribution," as is well known, went in with a message at one time into Sebastopol, and by that means obtained a very clever sketch of the place, so far as it could be seen from the deck of the "Retribution;" that was the only step that he took, that I am aware of.

15262. Were all his despatches to the Admiralty shown to your Grace?—I believe so. I saw a great number; and I have no reason to suppose that any were not sent to me; it was the constant practice that they should be sent. The rule was to send all his despatches to me.

15263. You do not recollect seeing in any of those despatches any account of any steps which he had taken, or had urged to be taken, to acquaint himself with those facts?—I do not say that he did not urge any to be taken, but I certainly do not think he stated that he had taken any. I recollect his stating what he believed to be the amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea at that time, which certainly was extremely inaccurate.

15264. But does your Grace not recollect any steps which he recommended to be taken in order to ascertain the amount of the force there?—No; I recollect nothing of the kind.

15265. Did any public servant of the Crown offer to obtain a complete plan of the fortification of Sebastopol, and if so, what notice was taken of that offer?—I stated yesterday that I never heard of any such proposal; it certainly was not made to me, and I am convinced that it was not made to any other member of the Government; if it had been, I should have heard of it; I give a most positive contradiction of any such proposal having been communicated to the Government; I think it most essential to the honour of that Government that it should be peremptorily contradicted that any such proposal was ever made; whatever blame may attach to the Government, the notion that in undertaking an expedition of that kind, we should have neglected an offer of such a nature, is nothing short of monstrous.

15266. *Chairman.*] If such an offer had been made to the Ambassador, was not it his duty to inform you of it?—Yes; not to inform me of it, but to report it to the Foreign Secretary.

15267. Mr. *Drummond.*] The proper course for the Ambassador would have been to send it to Lord Clarendon, would it not?—Yes.

15268. Mr. *Layard.*] And Lord Clarendon ought to have sent it to you?—Yes, certainly; and it would have been brought before the Cabinet. That nothing of the kind was proposed to the Government I am confident: it may turn out that this proposal was made to the Ambassador, and it may have been of a visionary description; it may have been a proposal for balloons. I have had a great many schemes proposed for taking Sebastopol by balloons; not less than 100; and the Ambassador might have thought it so extremely absurd, that he did not refer it home to the Government. I speak only of what I know, namely, that no proposal of that kind was made to the Government.

15269. When it was first contemplated that the army should winter in the Crimea, did not Lord Raglan protest against so doing, observing that the army was unprovided for such an event, and that it would be fatal to it?—The observations of Lord Raglan upon that subject are contained in the despatch to which I have already drawn the attention of the Committee, that of July the 19th, which, as I said before, I do not feel myself authorised to produce, but which I think the Committee will do right in applying to the Government for. I say that in justice to Lord Raglan, because I think that the despatches should be produced to the Committee: I think, in justice to Lord Raglan, that the Committee ought to be in possession of his despatch of July the

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the 19th: but that will not bear out in any respect the question which has been put to me.

15270. Did not he quote some authorities for his opinion, and did not your Grace, in reply, send him a pamphlet, by Dr. Lee, upon the same subject?—Inasmuch as I have heard this story circulated in private society, I think I had better explain it; but the Honourable Member, in putting that question, has entirely confounded two separate things. The story had reference to wintering in the Crimea, not to the expedition, and the circumstances were these: the first notice that Lord Raglan took of the climate was somewhere about the middle of October, when he wrote, saying, that he had heard a dreadful account of the climate of the Crimea, if they should have to winter there; (of course, at that time the supposition was, that if they wintered there at all, they would not winter in the position in which they did at last winter there,) and he sent me a short paper, describing the winter by a gentleman who was with him, and that gentleman had been resident for a long time at Kertsch. I should say that the climate of Kertsch is as different from the climate of the southern coast as the climate of Siberia is from the climate of Genoa. This gentleman, however, gave a most frightful account of the climate of the Crimea, and in replying to Lord Raglan (this was a private letter, not an official one) I said I hoped that the winter in that part of the Crimea was not as bad as had been represented by this gentleman, and that I thought he might obtain much useful information from a little book which had been published by Dr. Lee, who had been private physician to the Emperor Alexander, the brother of the Emperor Nicholas, and also private physician to Prince Woronzov, and who had obtained more absolute knowledge of that part of the country than any other Englishman.

15271. Mr. *Layard.*] Are you aware whether, immediately on the army coming round to the south of Sebastopol, an English gentleman, who had many years been a resident there, was made a prisoner?—Yes.

15272. Were any reports obtained from him as to the climate of the country?—None whatever, and I never heard what became of him. I sent out a private letter, at the request of a friend of his, to him, by a messenger; but I never heard what became of him.

15273. I believe that was Mr. Upton?—Yes.

15274. His father, and I believe himself, constructed the greater part of the works at Sebastopol?—Yes.

15275. Mr. *Drummond.*] Your Grace has stated in an answer that Lord Raglan stated that he was about to undertake the expedition; did he state that he was about to undertake it in consequence of orders, or in conformity with his own judgment?—He said that he was about to undertake it in consequence of orders, and not in consequence of any information which he had been able to obtain; for he had not obtained any.

15276. Did he state that he did not know the force he was going against, the strength of the place, nor even whether he should find any water?—No, I do not think he stated the latter, but he said what was the case, that he did not know the strength of the place, or the forces that were there. That was necessarily inferred in the answer which I last gave, that he had not obtained that information which the Government had directed him to obtain, and whatever information he had, was sent him by me, having been collected by me in this country.

15277. Then if it has been stated by anybody that the Commanders in the Black Sea conceived the project of that expedition, and resolved upon its execution, that is not true?—I hardly know what that can refer to; there is no doubt that it was undertaken under the circumstances which I have described; it was undertaken under the directions of the two Governments of France and England.

15278. By orders from home?—Certainly.

15279. Your Grace has stated the number of the troops that were to be sent; do you recollect what was the number of animals for transport that was considered necessary by the Commissariat for that body of troops, 27,000?—To what time are you referring?

15280. At any time; supposing it was an army of 10,000, 20,000, or 30,000; what number of animals did the Commissariat consider necessary?—I never asked that abstract question. My duty was to inquire whether they had procured in Bulgaria or Roumelia a sufficient number of animals to move the army.

army. As I explained yesterday, there was a letter addressed by Mr. Commissary-general Filder to the Treasury, which letter was shown to me, and which stated that he had those means. That letter, as I was kindly shown by a Member of the Committee afterwards, is already before the Committee.

15281. But at the commencement the Treasury could not possibly know the number of beasts that were necessary to move a large number of men; had they no estimate of the number of beasts per man?—Yes, of course; but those are really abstract questions, which are not practical. The number of beasts must entirely depend upon the character of them; one beast is worth two or three of another description. It must depend upon another most important point, the character of the service, and it must also depend upon whether those beasts are to carry everything on their backs, or on wheels. It is impossible to answer a question of that kind without going into a number of details, which would form a treatise on the Commissariat.

15282. Therefore, the worse the roads were, and the more impossible it was to transport on wheels, the more necessary it became to have a large supply of horses to be used as packhorses?—Of course.

15283. What extent of line was calculated as likely to form the works before Sebastopol?—Are you speaking of some time anterior to undertaking the expedition?

15284. At any time?—It was quite impossible for any calculations to be formed of what they would be likely to be when they arrived; when they arrived, they would be able to decide what they should be.

15285. What is the extent of the lines actually before Sebastopol?—I should suppose that the extent of the English lines must be six or seven miles.

15286. And the French the same?—Yes.

15287. If they have occupied a greater extent than was contemplated, does not it follow that the force sent there is not sufficient to reduce the place?—As I said before, no extent was contemplated; until they arrived there they had no knowledge of what length of lines would be necessary; then they decided what the length of those lines should be; and it was within their power, when they arrived, to have taken up shorter lines if they had chosen; and there are many military men who say now that they should have done so; but there could have been no calculation before they arrived.

15288. Did not the Commanders all say, before they left Varna, that they had not sufficient force to reduce the fortress?—Are you speaking now of the Commanders who are responsible to the Government, namely, the Commanders-in-chief?

15289. Yes?—Certainly not.

15290. To return for a moment to the wooden huts; what means were provided for carrying them from Balaklava to the front?—No means, except the animals which were in the possession of the Commissariat; and some, I believe, were actually carried by the soldiers themselves.

15291. Was not a recommendation given to your Grace to have 200 beasts bought, and sent out from this country, to draw up those huts?—I do not remember that any such recommendation was made; but it was one which, unquestionably, I could not have adopted, if it had been, because we had no means of conveying them, without, of course, withdrawing the means which we had of conveying the huts; and, what is more, 200 animals sent from here would have done very little, in comparison with the animals, though not so good, yet much more numerous, which could be obtained on the spot; there were actually in reserve at Constantinople at that time 1,000.

15292. But there were none at Balaklava, nor in the lines?—There were not sufficient; but they had 1,000 in reserve at Constantinople.

15293. Did not your Grace reply, that the soldiers could draw them up, to the person who made that proposition?—I do not recollect ever seeing such a proposition; but what I say is, that if I did, I should not have adopted it, for the reasons which I have given. I hope it will be understood that I have given the best answers I could to these questions; but if anybody knew the amount of suggestions which poured into that department every day, he would see that it is impossible for any man to answer positively. I answer to the best of my power; but my memory fails me as to names. To the best of my knowledge, no such recommendation was made to me, and if it was, I am quite sure that I thought it impracticable.

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15294. Was not a representation made by an officer of engineers, giving the weight of the huts, stating the number of tons, and that they would require to be taken up by 2,500 men for six weeks?—I now see clearly what the Honourable Member means, and from whom he has derived his information; it may have been supplied to the person from whom he received his information, by an engineer officer; but the person who made that communication to me was the Earl of Ellenborough. He did make a communication to that effect, and upon receiving that communication, I did by it what I did by everybody's communication; not merely one, but all. He has given immense attention to these subjects; but I did as to that suggestion what I did as to those of the humblest and least important person, that appeared upon the face of it to be at all practical—I referred it immediately for the opinion of competent authorities; I had it examined, and the reply to me was, that we had no means of providing against it here. I replied to Lord Ellenborough, that on the spot they were bound to have, and to the best of my belief they had, horses, and I hoped that before very long any difficulties would be removed by the railway, which I was then sending out. Lord Ellenborough sent me the communication which is referred to by the honourable gentleman.

15295. That was about November, was it not?—It was at the time that the huts were being made at Gloucester; he had been down there to see the huts, and after that, he sent me an elaborate report upon what he considered their deficiencies, and the means that would be required to convey them to the front.

15296. Was not that after the Government were aware that there were no means in the Crimea to convey them to the front?—No, undoubtedly. I have already said, that though they did afterwards find out that they had not actually in the Crimea the number of animals that were required, there were at that time upwards of 1,000, and indeed more; for later, in the month of January, there were 1,000 animals in reserve in Constantinople, which, though not in the Crimea, were available at any moment.

15297. But there was no food to feed them in the Crimea?—There might not have been food to feed them with in the Crimea, but food could have been obtained from Constantinople.

15297.* Why was salt pork, salt beef, and rum selected as the principal articles of food?—Salt pork and salt beef were, of course, selected as the animal food for the army upon all occasions when they could not obtain fresh meat. I apprehend it is not imagined that we could send fresh meat to the army from England.

15298. But there was plenty to be obtained there?—Yes; there was plenty to be obtained within a certain distance. Unless it is meant to imply that we ought not to have taken a precaution against the want of a supply of fresh meat, we had no other alternative but to send out salt pork and beef, or preserved meats.

15299. Did you see or hear any of the reports made to Admiral Dundas by the naval commander at Eupatoria, stating that immense quantities of oxen, sheep, and vegetables were to be had there?—No, I did not see any particular report; but it was a notorious fact that, at the commencement of the expedition, large supplies could be obtained from Eupatoria, and large supplies were obtained from Eupatoria; and for a time the army was extremely well fed by means of those supplies.

15300. Of course, when they suffered from dysentery and diarrhœa, the salt pork and salt beef were the very worst food that the Commissariat could give them?—No doubt it was prejudicial.

15301. Is your Grace aware how many animals have been paid for by the Government as having been sent to the Crimea, horses, oxen, buffaloes, camels; how many had been killed by the enemy, and how many had been starved by the Commissariat?—I am not able to give an accurate answer to that.

15302. Your Grace was asked respecting the insufficiency of the pickaxes; that is one of the details of the Ordnance Department; and I believe also the contracts for the waggons belong to that department?—The contracts for waggons, and everything of that kind, are managed by the Ordnance.

15303. Who is the responsible man; because we hear of departments and of authorities, but we do not get hold of the man; who was the man that ordered the

the waggons, and forgot the harness?—I am not aware of such a circumstance.

15304. Whom should the Committee call before them from the Ordnance to tell them this, Sir Frederick Smith?—No; he is in command at Portsmouth; he does not know anything about it; I should think the Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, as the head of the Board; but, of course, he would obtain information from his subordinate, at Woolwich.

15305. Can your Grace give any reason why the delay took place in the contracts for the Minié rifles?—No delay took place in the contracts, that I am aware of; great delay took place in the execution of the contracts.

15306. The delay which I mean is this: take one, for instance; a contract for 25,000 rifles and for 25,000 sights was given on the 21st of February last year, but they never gave the pattern for the sights till the 16th of March; consequently the men were all kept idle?—As the question that I am asked is about the Minié rifles, I had better inform the Committee of the steps which I took, although, of course, there are details which necessarily the subordinates are not only answerable for, but they are better able to give accurate information upon than I can; but one of the first subjects to which I turned my attention was the deficiencies not only in our Minié rifles, but in other small arms; and I certainly found so great a delay in executing the contracts made at Birmingham, that I felt it to be my duty to ensure a more rapid supply of that arm; and for that purpose I entered into a contract at Liege for a supply of 20,000 Minié rifles. I received great remonstrances upon that account, no doubt; but I believed it to be absolutely necessary, and so clearly did I consider it justifiable, that upon hearing afterwards that there was some further delay at Birmingham, I repeated my determination not to suffer these delays to occur, and I instantly ordered another contract for 20,000 at Liege; and I hope there are about this time executed for us 40,000 at Liege.

15307. Did your Grace hear that at the same time the Russians gave an order for 100,000 at Liege?—Yes; and I heard something further, of which I can also inform the Honourable Member, that one object of my second contract of 20,000 rifles was to prevent the execution of that order, which I effectually did.

15308. Mr. *Layard.*] Was any contract entered into with Prussian manufacturers?—None.

15309. Was any attempt made to do it?—Inquiries were made, but it was found not desirable.

15310. It was not on account of any delay that that contract was not entered into?—Certainly not. There was a most intelligent officer of the Ordnance who managed these contracts, and who worked extremely well; I saw him several times, and consulted him with reference to this subject; and I think if the Honourable Memeber was aware of all the facts, he would be of opinion that there were good grounds for not entering into any contracts there.

15311. Is it the fact that some Prussian manufacturers offered to make rifles cheaper than the Liege manufacturers, and that an officer was sent over to enter into a contract, but that as he had been instructed to go to Cologne, and the manufactory was a short distance from it, he did not think it right to do anything, because his instructions did not extend any distance beyond Cologne?—I feel quite certain that that must be perfectly untrue. The officer sent was not sent to enter into a contract, but to inquire into the character of the arms, and the possibility of entering into a contract, if thought desirable. The officer sent was the officer to whom I previously alluded, and from his character, I feel that I may justly contradict his having acted in so foolish a manner.

15312. Then if it has been stated to me that he went to Cologne, and our consul at Cologne stated to him that the manufactory was at Solingen, and he stated that he had no instructions to go anywhere but to Cologne, and could not do anything without instructions, that he did not obtain instructions for three weeks, though he applied for them, and then returned to England, and found that they had been purchased from Prussian manufacturers, is that incorrect?—Perfectly incorrect. It is just one of those stories which are frequently invented when people who have articles to sell are unable to sell them from private reasons. I should not be so anxious to contradict off hand any such statement, were not the officer to whom I refer really a gentleman

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of great zeal and intelligence; but I feel confident that the story is not true. I have not the slightest doubt that he did not go on to Solingen, because, for the reasons which presented themselves to him, he did not think it worth while, and, of course, he did not think it right for him to amuse himself by undertaking a journey ending in nothing.

15313. Have you any difficulty in stating the name of that officer?—I have already told the honourable gentleman that, unfortunately, my recollection of names frequently fails; I think his name is Dickson; the Ordnance will know it; I saw him several times.

15314. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to the deficiency of small arms, did you see any persons connected with the manufacture at Birmingham?—No.

15315. Are you aware in what way the order was given for small arms, whether for the entire arm, or for certain portions?—No; the habit is for separate manufacturers to supply separate parts, and they are afterwards set up under the supervision of an officer.

15316. Was not your Grace made aware that if you departed from that habit, and undertook to contract for the entire arm, you might have them with much greater certainty?—No, that was not reported to me.

15317. You did not look at the evidence given upon that subject the year before?—No, I did not; of course in these matters I held Sir Thomas Hastings as responsible to me for all the details; by that I do not mean to say that I abided by his opinions; quite the contrary; because the two orders to which I have referred at Liege were contrary to the most earnest remonstrances which he made to me.

15318. You found such difficulties under the arrangement by which the Ordnance undertook to provide small arms, that you were obliged to go to Liege for small arms?—Yes.

15319. Not having gone into the detail as between the Ordnance and the manufacturers, I understand that your Grace is not competent to say upon whom the whole of that blame rests?—No, I should not be prepared to throw any blame upon any particular individuals; I dealt with facts, and I had the public interests to protect.

15320. You gave me just now this paper of instructions to Lord William Paulet: I find that in one of your paragraphs to him you state, "With regard to the Purveying Department, I am informed that it is so insufficient, and the forms of procedure so complicated and cumbrous, as to interfere with the expeditious and ready issue of the articles required"?—Yes.

15321. You imagined, therefore, when you wrote that, that there was that strict attention to the stores in the Purveying Department, that the necessity of these forms placed a difficulty in obtaining the stores from the department?—Certainly; I think I have already said that there is no department in which I think the forms are more cumbrous and more objectionable than the Medical Department.

15322. One of the Commissioners whom you sent out, Mr. Maxwell, has informed us that there was no return given at all of the stores in the Purveying Department at Scutari; were you aware of that?—I have been aware of it since Mr. Maxwell came home, and, of course, the greatest possible blame attaches to the individual; it is a most scandalous circumstance.

15323. And that still more with regard to the medicines; there was no entry and no book, so that it was impossible to know what was in the hospital?—So I have understood; that was a gross neglect on the part of the individual, which does not militate against the fact that the system is defective by requiring very cumbrous forms, and perhaps to a certain extent that requirement may have led to the irregularity.

15324. Does not it show that, as far as the public were concerned, we had all the inconvenience of the complicated and cumbrous forms without the advantage of the regularity which those forms should have insured?—Certainly; and without also that proper check upon the individual, for which in reality they were intended.

15325. *Chairman.*] Your Grace, in answer to a question which I put to you yesterday, stated this: I said, "You were hampered by your subordinates, were you not?" and your answer was, "Yes, in many instances"?—Yes.

15326. Can you state in what way you were hampered; your subsequent explanation to Lord Seymour, I think, went rather to the conclusion, that there

was

was some misconception in my question and your answer; can you state to the Committee any instances in which you were so hampered?—I should not have used the word if it had not been used in the question which was put to me; I subsequently explained that I had, generally speaking—I will not say universally—no reason to complain of the subordinates, and that, on the contrary, in most instances they were exceedingly zealous, and worked to the best of their ability, so far as time allowed them; but what I meant to imply was, that the system was defective, and that there was not that thorough co-operation and understanding, from the highest to the lowest, which ought to exist.

15327. Colonel *Lindsay.*] With regard to the recruiting: the recruiting, although carried on by the Horse Guards, yet, I conclude, came under your Grace's cognizance, as War Minister, to some extent?—Certainly.

15328. When Parliament voted an increase to the army of 25,000 men, I believe in March last year, and 15,000 men later in May, were any steps taken beyond the ordinary system of recruiting to raise those men?—Yes, some were. That was a subject to which I turned my attention very early, and I had frequent communications with Lord Hardinge and the other military officers holding office. For a long time they were adverse to the increase of the bounty; but it was my opinion that it was a desirable measure. I, of course, yielded to opinions which I had every right to suppose were more practical than my own. I was very sorry that it was not adopted earlier, inasmuch as I think it would have been as effectual then as it was afterwards; but that was not the impression of those who, I think, were most competent to judge at the time.

15329. Then I understand your Grace that it was your opinion that it was desirable that the bounty should be raised at that time?—I thought so, certainly, and it was from a perseverance in that opinion afterwards that it was eventually done.

15330. Do you know upon what conditions the disembodied militia were allowed, in the early part of last year, to enlist into the army. At that time if a militiaman enlisted into the army, was he not bound to repay that part of the bounty which had been paid to him as a militia soldier?—Yes; but I should repeat what I said yesterday, that the militia was never under me, consequently I am, of course, giving information now which can be better obtained, during the time that I held office, from the Home Office, than from the Secretary for War. I have always expressed the opinion that that was a very bad system, and did so at the time, and I wished that the militia should be placed under the Secretary for War: that was overruled, and it has since been done.

15331. Assuming that such was the practice, do you not think it would have been extremely desirable that that check upon recruiting should have been removed, and that in case of a disembodied militiaman being willing to enlist into the army, he should have done so without repaying any part of the bounty?—Yes, that is my opinion certainly; I should say, however, that, as regards the question of recruiting, my opinion is, though I know that a great many differ from me, that we do not look sufficiently to recruiting from the population apart from the militia; I think that we have got a great deal too much into the habit of looking to the militia as the main, and perhaps in many instances the only source for enlisting into the army; I think the system of recruiting is not so complete as it might be, and that many parts of the country are entirely neglected. I wrote a letter upon that subject to the Horse Guards before I left office, calling attention to what I conceived the defective state of the recruiting; I do not know whether anything has been done upon it.

15332. Did it ever come to your Grace's knowledge that the system of making militiamen repay the bounty, did act as a check upon recruiting?—Of course.

15333. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Is there not an obvious advantage in recruiting from the militia, namely, that you have got men in some degree trained for the military service?—It is not always the case; it does not necessarily follow; very often men enlist in the militia for the express purpose of getting the double bounty, who have had very little training in the militia before they enlist in the army.

15334. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Do not you think it would have been desirable upon

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upon the declaration of war, to have called out the whole of the English disembodied militia?—I am not very strongly of that opinion, I must say.

15335. I believe your Grace stated in the House of Lords, at the close of last year, that the recruiting of the army gave the Government considerable anxiety during the last summer?—Yes.

15336. Were any steps, in consequence of that anxiety, taken at that time?—Yes; it was the falling off of the recruiting which eventually led to the steps which, as I said before, I had been anxious should be taken at an earlier period.

15337. The bounty was not increased, I believe, until after the arrival of the news of the battle of Inkermann in this country?—It was raised twice; my impression was, that the first time it was raised earlier. Again I must say, that the militia was not under me, and I am only answering, as any other member of the Government might answer, rather than as Secretary for War, that is to say, if you are now alluding to the militia.

15338. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When was the standard lowered?—The standard was not lowered till November, I think; it was lowered at the beginning of the war once, but the second time, I think, was in November.

15339. Colonel *Lindsay.*] When the militia were first embodied was there not a prohibition against their being allowed to volunteer?—Yes, I think there was.

15340. Does not your Grace think it would have been desirable that they should have been allowed to volunteer at a very much earlier date than when it was subsequently allowed?—The importance of obtaining a force as early as possible I think would have justified it.

15341. Is your Grace generally aware of what the effect of the volunteering of the militia was, as soon as it was allowed, in obtaining a number of recruits?—I did state it in Parliament; but I have forgotten the exact figures.

15342. Did not a very large number in the course of a fortnight or three weeks enlist into the regular service?—Yes; to the best of my recollection, I should think something like 2,000 in the first week, and a good many others afterwards; but of course that was in consequence of advantages which were given to the regiments of militia; besides the permission to volunteer, commissions were given to ensigns without purchase who brought a certain number of men, and other advantages which led to that great increase of recruiting.

15343. If those alterations had been made in July or August last year, instead of November or December, would not the natural result have been that you would have had, about the middle of last year, a much larger force at the disposal of the Government?—That would have been the result if you had had the power of embodying the militia earlier; but, of course, you could not have obtained that number from the disembodied militia. There was not the power to embody it until the Act of Parliament was passed.

15344. The Act of Parliament, as your Grace said, was passed in May last year?—I think it received the Royal Assent about the end of May.

15345. Consequently it was then competent for the Government to call out the militia forthwith, and also competent for the Government to allow them to volunteer?—Yes.

15346. The inference, therefore, being that they might have volunteered from so much of the embodied militia as was called out even as early as July or August?—As early as July or August I think they might.

15347. General *Peel.*] Although your Grace, as Secretary for War, was the responsible Minister for the conduct of the war, were not all important questions, such as the selection of the general officers, the number of troops to be sent out, and the purposes for which they were to be employed, submitted by you to the Cabinet?—The selection of Lord Raglan, and of two or three of the Generals of Division, was submitted by me to the Cabinet; the others I did not think it necessary to submit; but all important operations, the number of troops to be sent out, and so forth, were, of course, submitted to the Cabinet.

15348. Did you from time to time communicate to the Cabinet the despatches which you received from Lord Raglan, and the steps which you took in consequence of them?—With the exception of the time when some of the members of the Government were absent from town, a despatch was never received from Lord Raglan which I did not communicate to all the members of the Cabinet.

15349. If

15349. If the steps which you were taking were not approved of, had the members of the Cabinet an opportunity of dissenting from them?—Certainly.

15350. Therefore, although you were nominally the responsible Minister, every member of the Cabinet shared in that responsibility?—I should say so, certainly.

15351. It was therefore too late when the Motion was made for this Committee, for a member of the Cabinet to relieve himself from responsibility by retiring?—I perhaps ought to be the last person to express an opinion upon that subject; but if I had been in that position, I should not have done so, certainly.

15352. Mr. *Layard.*] Your Grace has stated that all questions of importance were submitted to the Cabinet; was that the case?—I believe I may say that all questions of importance were submitted to them, if the members of the Cabinet were in town.

15353. Will you state the longest time during which there was no meeting of the Cabinet?—I have already said, I think, in answer to a previous question by Lord Seymour, that there was no meeting of the Cabinet between the prorogation of Parliament, which was on the 12th of August, and the second week, or about the middle of October: I do not remember the precise day.

15354. And yet that was the time when the most critical operations were being carried on in the East?—Important operations were in progress.

15355. In fact, it was the most critical time, because it was the time which involved the descent on the Crimea?—The descent on the Crimea was made at that time.

15356. Can you assign a reason why during that period no Cabinet Councils were held?—No particular reason.

15357. Does it require for a Cabinet Council that any certain number of the members of the Government should be present?—No; there is no quorum.

15358. Were there at any time as many as three members of the Government in London during that period?—Generally speaking, certainly.

15359. Can you state to the Committee what members of the Government were absent from London during the period that you have mentioned, as being a period during which there was no Cabinet Council?—I dare say I could do so; but if I made any mistakes, I should feel it very unfair towards others. I believe the "Court Circular" will inform you.

15360. I take this to be a most serious question. The Committee is directed to inquire into the conduct of those who had the management of the departments connected with the War; and as you state that you consider the Government generally responsible for your acts, I think it very important to ascertain for what reason no Cabinet Councils were held during that long period?—I am quite ready to give any information which I can; but I think you will see that upon a question of that kind I might make a mistake. I certainly can recollect one or two individuals who were not present in London during the whole of that time; but if I attempted to give an exact account of the movements of the whole of the members of the Cabinet, I should very likely be doing an injustice to some of them, which I should deeply regret; and inasmuch as it is not a matter within my own control, or even within my necessary cognizance, I think it is hardly fair to put me in that position. I can only answer for myself. I was present in London the whole of the year, with the exception of three days that I was in official attendance upon Prince Albert at Boulogne, at the review by the Emperor of the French.

15361. Except at that period, your Grace was never absent from your post?—Never.

15362. Can your Grace state to the Committee why Cabinet Councils were not held?—Any special reason I cannot give: it has never been usual to hold Cabinet Councils at that period of the year. As soon as Parliament prorogues, Ministers generally consider themselves entitled to leave town, and recruit their strength; and the ordinary practice has been, that between the prorogation of Parliament and some day in October, Cabinet Councils have not been held.

15363. Nor has it been usual that during that period a great expedition should be undertaken in which the safety and honour of this country were involved?—I should say that the expedition was ordered to be undertaken by the Government before the breaking up of Parliament.

15364. But the Government could not have foreseen the result of that

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expedition; the chances of war were to be taken into consideration?—Of course.

15365. Did your Grace, having that great weight of responsibility upon you, ever remonstrate with any members of the Government as to there being no Cabinet Councils held during that long period?—I did not remonstrate with any that were absent.

15366. Did you remonstrate with any members of the Government?—In private conversation, if this is a fair question to ask, I certainly may have expressed, and probably did, that it would have relieved me from some weight of responsibility, if others of my colleagues had been present.

15367. Do you think it advisable that affairs of such enormous importance as were then referred to you, should have been settled without meetings of the Cabinet?—I think there might have been advantage, undoubtedly, if the Cabinet had been present.

15368. Was the head of the Admiralty continually in town during that period?—With the exception of, I think, about a fortnight or less. I really think these questions are not fair towards individuals; Sir James Graham was in town, generally speaking, with the exception of his official visits to the ports. He was absent for a very short time, I believe, as I am reminded by an Honourable Member, at Balmoral; that only shows how perfectly inaccurate one may be.

15369. *Chairman.*] Upon whose authority are the Cabinet Councils summoned; who is responsible for the summoning of them?—Generally speaking, and almost without exception, they are summoned upon the authority either of the Prime Minister, or of the Foreign Secretary; in my experience, I do not remember any other member of the Cabinet summoning them.

15370. So that if we want to ascertain why they were not summoned, I suppose the proper person to apply to would be the then Prime Minister?—He would have been the person to summon them, if they had been summoned. As, however, that question has been put, I may say that, with the exception of 10 days, or thereabouts, Lord Aberdeen was one of those who were here throughout the whole of that time, and therefore it was not for his convenience that Cabinet Councils were not summoned.

15371. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Is it not competent to any other Minister to require that a Cabinet Council should be held?—Yes, I imagine that any Minister might summon a Cabinet Council. I think the question put to me was, what was the practice.

15372. Mr. *Layard.*] During that time, did your Grace consider yourself in a position to undertake any operations whatever, or to take any measures whatever, without consulting the Cabinet?—Of course. There were various measures which I did take, although none of so great a character as ordering the expedition to the Crimea, which, as I said before, had been already done. All the measures which were taken during that time were, of course, taken upon my own responsibility, except in those instances where I had an opportunity of communicating with Lord Aberdeen, or Lord Clarendon, Sir James Graham, or Mr. Herbert, who might at the time have been present.

15373. That army might have met with a great disaster, and it might have been necessary to have undertaken, at a moment's notice, some new expedition, or to have changed completely the operations of the war: were you in a position to have taken upon yourself to have done that without consulting the Cabinet?—Of course, if anything had been required to be done within 24 hours, I should have taken the responsibility upon myself. If such an event had occurred as the honourable gentleman has referred to, and had it admitted of two or three days' delay, I should have written or telegraphed to the whole of my colleagues, and requested their attendance in town.

15374. Did you communicate to all your colleagues who were not present in town, as well as to those who were present in town, the despatches which you received from the seat of war?—No. I have already said that, with the exception of that time, I invariably communicated them to all the members of the Cabinet; during that time, I communicated the despatches to those members of the Cabinet who were in town.

15375. Then the members of the Cabinet who were not in town during that period which you have mentioned, namely, from August to October, were unacquainted

unacquainted with what was going on in the Crimea, except from what they might ascertain, either privately or from the public prints?—They were acquainted by me afterwards. At the first Cabinet Council which was held, I think all those of my colleagues who had not seen the despatches, requested me to put in circulation the whole of those which had come in the intervening period; and I did so.

15376. But that was after the first meeting of the Cabinet, in the middle of October?—Yes.

15377. Previously to that time those members of the Government had no knowledge whatever of what was going on in the Crimea, except what they might have obtained from sources not purely official?—I cannot say what information they obtained; they were not kept informed by me; that is all that I can answer.

15378. You never sent them any despatches?—No, not into the country.

15379. After that period, were the Cabinet Councils regularly summoned?—I really forget.

15380. No very long interval took place between the meetings of the Cabinet?—No very long interval; I cannot say what interval.

15381. Colonel *Lindsay.*] At what time in October did the Ministers re-assemble?—I have said I cannot recollect; but it must have been, I should imagine, the middle of October.

15382. When did the news arrive in the country of the battle of Alma?—The news of the battle of Alma arrived on the 27th of September, I think; that is to say, by telegraph.

15383. During the whole of August and September there were no operations proceeding which would require the immediate attendance of all the Cabinet Ministers?—No.

15384. Mr. *Layard.*] At what date did the landing in the Crimea take place?—On the 14th of September.

15385. Do you consider that an important operation?—Of course it was extremely important as regards its future results. What I imagine to be meant by "operation," and what, I think, is generally understood by a military operation, is something which entails fighting.

15386. On what date was the battle of the Alma?—The 20th of September.

15387. That was an operation which included fighting?—The period to which the question applied, as I understood, was, from the time of the prorogation of Parliament, up to the date when I stated that the news of the battle of Alma arrived, which, to the best of my recollection, was the 27th of September.

15388. At what time did the embarkation take place?—The embarkation took place on the 7th or 8th of September; I do not recollect the exact day.

15389. At the period of the embarkation and the landing, was the port of Sebastopol blocked up by the sinking of a part of the Russian fleet?—No.

15390. Then the Russian fleet might have come out of the harbour, and there might have been a naval battle during the time of the transit of the troops from Varna to Old Fort?—Yes; I wish there had been.

15391. Still, supposing there had been, I think it would have been advisable that the Government should have been in a position to have taken some steps upon such an event. Do you think it desirable that there should have been a Cabinet Council held then?—The Government would have had to have taken no steps unless, as was highly improbable, a great misfortune had occurred.

15392. It has been stated in the House of Commons, by a member of the Government, that he found fault with the conduct of the war, and made representations upon that subject—I mean Lord John Russell. Were those representations ever communicated to you?—No further than I explained in the speech which I felt it my duty to address to the House of Lords, on the 1st of February. I think I fully explained everything then, and I should rather not be called upon for anything in addition. I believe I stated candidly and fairly the whole case; at any rate, Lord John Russell had an opportunity, and took the opportunity, of replying to me on a subsequent day. I have nothing to add upon that subject to what I said in my place in Parliament.

15393. Is it the case that Lord John Russell never objected to the conduct of the war on account of members of the Government not being present in

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London to see to a proper state of affairs?—I never understood that he did; and inasmuch as Lord John Russell himself was absent, I presume it was not likely that he would have made the complaint.

15394. Do you not think that, considering the way in which our army was placed upon a coast with our communications completely open, and with the great naval and mercantile resources of this country, that army should have been supplied, immediately after the first wants were ascertained, with fresh or preserved meats, and other things, which might have obviated the necessity of keeping that army chiefly supplied with salt provisions?—Of course that was most important; but I do not think it is fair to say that the army has been chiefly supplied with salt provisions. The army was not only chiefly, but almost entirely, supplied with fresh provisions until about the period of the battle of Inkermann; subsequently to that the use of salt meat became more extensive. I have been told since I gave evidence yesterday, or the day before, that I have considerably understated the extent to which fresh meat was supplied at the very worst period. I am inclined still to adhere to my opinion, but I am quite certain that I have in that case, as in almost every other, represented to the Committee the very worst, and I do not believe that, under any circumstances (and that for a very short period indeed), the army was ever supplied with fresh meat less than twice a week; that period was very short, and, I think, even then not to the extent of the whole of the army. I believe that, speaking generally, and during the winter, the army was supplied three times a week, or rather every other day, and that it has been latterly supplied considerably more with fresh meat.

15395. With regard to that subject, there appears to be a considerable discrepancy in the evidence which has been placed before the Committee, and therefore we cannot quite come to a conclusion now. Those officers who had the command have stated to the Committee that such was not the case; Mr. Commissary-general Filder writes that they were supplied every other day; I presume that upon that point it is undecided. I merely ask you, supposing that fresh meat was not given more than, perhaps, once or twice in the week, whether, with all our maritime resources, fresh meat could not have been given every day in the week if proper precautions had been taken?—To say every day in the week, looking to the position of the army, is, I think, carrying the point rather far; but I think certainly, barring accidents by storms lasting six or seven days, which is not unfrequently the case in those seas, that, generally speaking, an army situated as that is, should be supplied with a larger proportion of fresh meat than of salt.

15396. You are aware that the head of a large firm at Liverpool offered to victual the army entirely upon fresh and preserved meats?—Since I have left office I have heard of such a proposal having been made; it was never made to me.

15397. Do you think that the plan which he proposed, that is to say, of having not more than four vessels running backwards and forwards with proper depôts at the Black Sea, would have effected what he states he could have effected at the time when he proposed to contract with the Government for feeding the troops?—Of course these are questions which it is extremely difficult for me to answer; it must be matter of opinion; but my impression is, that any such arrangement would necessarily entail a very considerable amount of preparation; that the formation of depôts of live animals must be a matter of very considerable time; and when I give that answer, I give it not without some authority, because having had to go very minutely with Colonel M'Murdo into all the preparations which he was ordered to make for the constitution of the land transport corps, where the ordinary supply of animals of that description would be very much less than the supply of animals for food (I mean, ultimately less), he told me that the only plan by which he could ensure the success of his corps was by forming depôts of animals along the coasts of the Black Sea; that he quite gave up as impracticable the hope of supplying with transport animals the army from distant parts to any sufficient extent, and he said that, of course, it would be a matter of time; that they must be brought from the interior; that he should have to form his depôts. He gave me all the details, which I went into very carefully with him; and, judging from the time which he told me it would require to ensure the number of transport animals that he wanted for the army, I think it would require a longer

a longer time to secure such a sufficiency of bullocks and sheep as would be required for the food of the army to ensure certainty of supply.

15398. Are you aware that last spring I urged upon Mr. Commissary-general Filder, and upon others, the necessity of having depôts at Sinope under any circumstances?—I was not aware of it until you informed me of your having done so upon the occasion when you were kind enough to call upon me at the War Department in the middle of December; then you gave me that information; but I was not previously aware of it.

15399. Do you think that, with regard to our army, and with regard to the supplies of our army during the recent operations, the numerous improvements of modern days have been sufficiently applied to the public service?—"Sufficiently" is a difficult term to answer; they have been applied in a great many instances.

15400. I mean with regard to the clothing of the troops, and with regard to the supplying of the troops?—With regard to the clothing of the troops, I am not aware of any point in which modern science has failed to be applied.

15401. With regard to waterproof clothing, has anything of the kind been supplied to the troops?—Certainly, to a very large extent.

15402. When?—I should think early in November, or before; I think a certain quantity of waterproof clothing was ordered in August, but I will not be quite certain; as regards the sentinels, certainly; in August 6,000 overcoats, not great-coats, but coats to go over them, with hoods, were ordered by me, upon the French pattern.

15403. Of what materials?—Of cloth, but waterproof.

15404. If it has been stated by Sir Charles Trevelyan that it is not advisable to supply the wants of an army until those wants are felt, do you think that a sound doctrine to go upon in the management of a campaign?—Certainly not.

15405. When these troops were sent out, I understand you, none of these modern appliances were given to them; it was only when the necessity arose that they were furnished to them?—No, I cannot say that. In the very instance which I have given, which is only one, I have stated that 6,000 watch-coats were ordered in the month of August; it was never contemplated that the necessity for those could arise, inasmuch as they were to go over the great-coats, until the winter came; the soldiers would be very sorry to wear their great-coats in the summer, I apprehend.

15406. Still they might have been wanted for the general clothing of the troops?—They were fitted for an emergency, and we did not wait until the want was felt.

15407. Still, as far as you are aware, with the exception of an emergency, the troops were clothed just as they were very many years ago?—Indeed they were not; very considerable alterations were made in many instances. If the Commander-in-chief is called before this Committee, he will be able to state more accurately than I can all that was done with regard to the clothing of the army, because, as I stated yesterday, the clothing of the army has always been, with the exception of extra warm clothing and such things, under the management of the Commander-in-chief; but the whole question as stated by Dr. Smith was most carefully considered; and alterations in the clothing of the army were then made; that they were not in entire accordance with Dr. Smith's opinion I readily admit; Dr. Smith's opinions may be right, or Lord Hardinge's opinion may be right; but that that subject was considered, and that alterations were made, is an undoubted fact.

15408. Did you ever make any remonstrance or representation upon the mode of promotion in the army?—Are you speaking of ordinary promotion in the lower ranks?

15409. Both among the regimental officers and in the ranks; did you ever propose any alteration yourself?—No. The only observation which I ever recollect making upon that subject to Lord Hardinge was this —— These are, I think, hardly matters to be gone into; still I wish not to avoid answering any question.

15410. Lord *Seymour.*] Was that officially stated?—No.

The Committee-room was cleared.

After a short time, the examination was resumed.

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15411. Mr. *Layard.*] I will ask your Grace whether you ever made any remonstrance or representation to Lord Hardinge upon the subject of appointments in the Crimean army, as different from promotions; I mean appointments in the staff, or to command, or in other departments?—I never made any official remonstrance to Lord Hardinge upon any question affecting any appointment. I have discussed upon some occasions privately with him the appointment of different officers, and have expressed my opinion; but of course I consider that if, in the first instance, I made objections to the appointment of an officer, and subsequently waived those objections in consequence of the answers which were given by Lord Hardinge, those objections were as if they had never been made. I cannot consider them as any longer objections, having been over-ruled.

15412. You stated yesterday that a great number of communications to different heads of departments were made verbally, in consequence of the pressure of business upon you?—Yes.

15413. Still you considered those verbal communications in the light of official communications?—Certainly, generally speaking; a verbal communication is not necessarily private because it is verbal.

15414. Do you consider these verbal communications with Lord Hardinge in the light of strictly private communications, or as public communications?—It would depend entirely upon their character; some are private, some are public; they are all, of course, relating to public affairs; but it would entirely depend upon their character. In the position in which I was with Lord Hardinge, there were great advantages in my speaking to him in a way in which I should not have done if we had been at arms' length with one another, and upon the strictest and most rigid official terms.

15415. Did you make any verbal communication of an official nature against any person appointed to the aamy, either in the staff, or in any other capacity, which appointment was not explained away by the explanation which Lord Hardinge gave you?—No.

15416. Were any appointments made of persons whom you thought objectionable, and against whom you remonstrated, and who, notwithstanding these remonstrances, were kept in the places to which they were appointed?—Most certainly not; in my position as Secretary of State I should never have tolerated such a thing; I should either have required that my opinion was abided by, or have resigned my office.

15417. Then, in your opinion, the appointments to the staff, and other departments of the army, were such as were most conducive to the good of the public service?—That was my opinion at the time, or I should not have sanctioned them.

15418. Is it still your opinion?—I may have altered my opinion in some respects by experience.

15419. At any rate you never protested against any of the appointments at the time?—I never protested finally. As I said before, there were instances in which I said to Lord Hardinge, "I do not think that such will be a good appointment, for such and such reasons:" we discussed it together. Lord Hardinge stated his reasons why he believed it would be a good appointment, and why my objections were not valid, and if I saw reasons to withdraw my objections, I incurred thereby, of course, the responsibility of having sanctioned it.

15420. In your opinion, is the manner in which those appointments are made conducive to the good of the public service?—I have already said that I think it would be better that in the appointment of officers to which the sanction of the Secretary of State is required, those officers should be recommended to the Queen by the Secretary of State, rather than by the Commander-in-chief; if the opinion of a responsible Minister is to be required at all, I think there is an anomaly in the Commander-in-chief obtaining his sanction, and then recommending to the Queen; it places the Commander-in-chief in that respect in somewhat of an anomalous position, as if *pro hâc vice* he was a responsible Minister; that is my own individual opinion; that is an alteration which I said, in an answer to Lord Seymour, I thought desirable.

15421. Your answer now appears to me still to involve the same difficulty which was pointed out to you yesterday; we cannot come to the limitation of the respective responsibilities: in the case to which I refer, either through the negligence

negligence of the Quartermaster-general, or of the Adjutant-general, supposing such to have existed, some calamity might have fallen upon the army; such being the case, were you, or the Commander-in-chief, the responsible Minister for the appointment?—In the case of the Quartermaster-general I had nothing to do with it; he was appointed by Lord Raglan upon the spot, because he stood in succession to one who had previously held the appointment; in the case of the first Quartermaster-general, he was appointed by the Commander-in-chief, he having previously submitted the appointment for my sanction.

15422. Still you would have been by the public considered the responsible person for any great disaster which might have happened?—Yes; and I think, upon the whole, rightly so; because although, of course, the Commander-in-chief is much more competent to form an opinion as to the capability of an officer, and as to his fitness for the appointment, yet if it is considered desirable in this country to have a civil Secretary of State to control the general affairs of the army, you cannot relieve him from the proper responsibility for every act which is done under him; it is the inevitable consequence.

15423. Do you think that the mode of appointments to the staff is such as to conduce to the good of the public service?—No; my opinion is, that the whole staff system of the amry in this country is erroneous.

15424. When you were Minister-at-War, did you make any remonstrance or representation specially upon the subject of the staff, not directed against individuals, but as directed against the system at the Horse Guards, or any other department of the public service?—No. I, in a conversation with Lord Hardinge, expressed that opinion; but, inasmuch as it would require a very considerable time to make the alteration which I considred necessary, I certainly never had any official communication with him upon the subject; my belief is, that you ought to have a staff apart from the army, as is the case in continental armies, and that without that you will never get rid of the evils now referred to.

15425. General *Peel.*] Would an appointment made by Lord Raglan in the Crimea, for instance that of the Quartermaster-general, be subject to the approval of Lord Hardinge and of yourself through Lord Hardinge, before it became an appointment?—Yes; the appointment is made subject to approval from home.

15426. Mr. *Layard.*] When you came to the War Office after the separation, were there inventions submitted in the Ordnance to a committee merely of military men, without there being any infusion of men of science into that committee?—They had the power of calling in men of science; but I do not think, as the committee was formerly constituted, any men of science were absolutely on it.

15427. Did you suggest some improvement, and alter that?—Yes; I stated yesterday that I made a very material alteration.

15428. Was that a permanent alteration, or only a temporary alteration?—A permanent alteration.

15429. And that, to the best of your knowledge, exists to the present day in the Ordnance?—Unless altered by my successor. It had been arranged before I left the office; it had hardly come into operation.

15430. You stated yesterday that there were three officers in command appointed without your being consulted; did you ever make any representation against the appointment of Lord Lucan?—I told Lord Hardinge that he had omitted to consult me upon the subject.

15431. But you did not make any remonstrance against Lord Lucan on account of his merits as a commanding officer?—No.

15432. You stated yesterday that you had obtained from competent witnesses an account of the state of the French hospitals at Constantinople: may I ask you who those witnesses were?—I rather think I used the term in the singular number, "witness."

15433. Who was that witness?—I must take upon myself the responsibility of breaking a half promise made to him, as at that time he expressed a desire that I should not mention his name. I think he, being a public officer, would not now object. It was Captain Webster, the Queen's Messenger, who, upon two occasions during the time he was at Constantinople, visited both our hospitals, and the French hospitals; and when I heard of his being here, I sent for him, and examined him very carefully with regard to both. So far as I

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recollect the answer to which the honourable gentleman refers, he was the individual to whom I was alluding.

15434. Did you ever speak to Mr. Sydney Osborne, Mr. Stafford, or Mr. Macdonald, upon the subject of the French hospitals?—I had a very long conversation with Mr. Sydney Osborne two conversations of, I think, four or five hours long; but I never had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Stafford or Mr. Macdonald since they came home.

15435. Did the account given you by Mr. Sydney Osborne, as to the effective state of the French hospitals, agree with that given you by Captain Webster? —I do not think that Mr. Osborne went into any great detail with reference to the French hospitals. My object, of course, was to ascertain from him the defects of the English hospitals, and, therefore, his references to the French hospitals were more casual than minute; they were referred to as points upon which the French arrangements were superior to ours, and so on.

15436. I merely ask you the question, because it has been stated by the three gentlemen whose names I have just mentioned, that those hospitals were in a much superior state to our hospitals?—So far as Mr. Osborne ever referred to them in communication with me, he spoke of their superiority certainly.

15437. Lord *Seymour.*] You spoke yesterday, or the day before, in reference to the smallest number of troops that were ever in the Crimea. You were asked the question with reference to a statement made by the Duke of Cambridge, and you said at the time that you were not quite certain of the number; have you since considered that point?—Yes; I stated yesterday, in answer to a question put by the Honourable Member for Aylesbury, that it was impossible for me, from memory, to give any accurate statement as to the numbers of the army at any particular period, inasmuch as I had received the state of the army with each mail which came from the Crimea, and that therefore, speaking from memory, I was very liable to error. I was asked especially with reference to a statement which had been made by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, as to the number of bayonets immediately after the battle of Inkermann. I made it my duty last night to go very carefully through the whole of the statements which are in my possession, and I am now able to give a more accurate reply to the questions which were then put to me. I find that I considerably understated the numbers in my answer, and the same would appear to have been done by the Duke of Cambridge. I think the question was put, in the first instance, as to whether I concurred in the evidence which was given by His Royal Highness; in the second instance, I was asked whether I believed that that was the lowest number which had ever existed, and I stated that I thought not, for that illness having greatly increased subsequently to that date, lower numbers were to be found. I have the numbers of the army at a date very near to that referred to by His Royal Highness, namely, on the 17th of November. I was not able to procure any of the states of an earlier period. On the 17th of November, which is a very few days afterwards, there were under arms, efficient of course, deducting all sick, both absent and present, both those sick in camp and in hospital, 19,805; of bâtmen, those on command and others of all descriptions, 4,647; and of officers and non-commissioned officers, 2,192; making a total of effectives, 26,644, deducting all the sick.

15438. Mr. *Bramston.*] Are those cavalry and artillery?—Yes; it embraces every man effective, officers and non-commissioned officers.

15439. Mr. *Layard.*] Can you state the number immediately after the battle; on the 6th of November, for instance?—No; I am not able to refer to any state earlier than the 17th of November.

15440. Why not?—It is a pure accident; my brother kindly undertook to put the whole of my private papers in order for me, and they are in his possession; I was not able last night to get any anterior to the 17th of November; but I have the whole from the 17th of November to the day when I quitted office.

15441. But the returns were regularly made to you?—Yes, every time.

15442. Were not there reinforcements received between those dates?—No, not to any material amount; and therefore the number is likely to be as nearly as possible the same; I give the earliest date which I have after the battle of Inkermann, and the variation between the day after the battle and the 17th must be very slight indeed.

15443. You

15443. You stated, I think, that there had been then no augmentation?—I think six companies of the 46th arrived; that, of course, was very small in number; part of a regiment.

15444. No others?—I think not so early as the 17th of November; however I would not undertake to say positively. If the Committee wish to have further facts, the Horse Guards is the proper place to apply to for these statistics, and there they can be given perfectly accurately; but inasmuch as I was asked a question which I was not able to answer upon the spot with entire accuracy, I thought it my duty to correct my answer as far as I could.

15445. I asked your Grace the further question, to what was the army reduced when it was at its lowest state; are you able also to supply that?—Yes; I have looked through all the returns; and I find that the lowest number between the two periods of the 17th of November and when I quitted office, was on the 19th January; it was then very much lower than it had been a very short time before, for it was in the middle of January that sickness began to extend itself so very formidably. I find that on the 19th of January there were under arms 14,092 men; (of bayonets, strictly speaking, there were 13,212, and that I find to be the lowest number of bayonets on record in the returns which I have); bâtmen, &c., 3,272; on command, 2,432; artillery and engineers, 3,004, making the total rank and file, 22,800; but to those must be added the officers, 1,164, and the non-commissioned officers, 2,116, making a total effective force of all arms on the 19th of January of 26,080, and that I find to be the lowest, as represented in any of the states in my possession.

15446. Those, I presume, were the returns sent to you from the War Office?—No; they were returns sent from the camp; they were sent to me by Lord Raglan, in private letters, every day on which a messenger left, the state on the morning previously. As great doubts were expressed whether, on behalf of the Government of which I was a member, an accurate statement was made in the House of Commons as to the state of the army at that time, I have thought it necessary to give another date, and that is the 23d of December, which was about the time when that statement was made. This gives a fair representation, therefore, of the strength of the army at that time, namely, at Christmas. There were on the 23d December under arms, 18,587; bâtmen, &c., 2,101; on command, 2,896; artillery and engineers, 2,865; total rank and file, 26,449, adding officers, 1,028, and non-commissioned officers, 2,444; the grand total, 29,921, being a considerable number in excess even of the number which was at that time stated in the House of Commons.

15447. I suppose we shall be able to obtain returns of the number of men actually sent out up to those different dates from the Horse Guards?—Yes.

15448. Lord *Seymour.*] You have referred to the staff in the Continental armies; does your Grace think that improvements might be made in our army from the military organisation of the French?—Yes; I have reason to believe that a considerable advantage might be obtained by an examination of the French system, and a careful adaptation of those parts which are found to be applicable to our own.

15449. Did you endeavour to obtain such information while you were in office, or did you order any inquiry upon that subject?—I did. I sent over to Paris, with the consent of the Emperor of the French and of his Government, a general officer, a Commissariat officer, and an officer of engineers, forming a commission to examine the whole of the French system in all its details; it was in order to ascertain the official part of the system as carried on at Paris. I at the same time informed Lord Raglan of what I had done, and desired him to communicate with the Commander of the French forces there, and to appoint three or more officers, acting under him, to make the same examination as to the practice of the French system upon the spot. The report of the three officers whom I have first named, has been, within my knowledge, delivered to my successor a considerable time ago: whether any report has been made from the Crimea, I have no means of knowing.

Jovis, 26° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Sir John Hanmer.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Bramston.
General Peel.	Mr. Layard.
Colonel Lindsay.	Sir John Pakington.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *Richard Potter*, called in; and Examined.

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15450. *Chairman.*] YOU wish, do you not, to make some communication to the Committee in consequence of some statement which you have seen in the newspaper?—Yes. I wish to state that the letter which is described in the "Times" of to-day, as having been written by Messrs. Price & Company, was not written by them.

15451. It was not so stated yesterday; it is a mistake of the reporter for the newspaper; the official statement is correct; and that says that a statement came, saying that they had heard from Messrs. Price & Company; the letter was not attributed to Messrs. Price & Company?—There is one or two material errors in that statement. Perhaps the Committee will allow me to state the real facts concerning those wooden huts.

15452. Will you do so shortly?—On the 2d of November I applied to Sir Charles Trevelyan to know what department of the Government was the proper one to whom to make a proposal for hutting the army before Sebastopol, and Sir Charles Trevelyan recommended me to write to Mr. Roberts, the Secretary of the Duke of Newcastle. I wrote to Mr. Roberts on the 3d of November, stating that there was an establishment at Gloucester, in which wooden houses had been made and shipped to Australia, and proposing that houses of a similar construction, but specially adapted to the purpose, should be sent out to Lord Raglan's army. I received no reply to this communication until the 14th of November, when I had a letter from Major-general Yorke from the Horse Guards, saying that the plan had been submitted to Lord Hardinge, and that it had been lost, and asking me to send another. I wrote to Major-general Yorke, telling him that another should be prepared with an estimate, and that I would come up to London the next day to see him, and bring it with me. Another plan and estimate were accordingly prepared, and I called upon Major-general Yorke at the Horse Guards; that was on the 15th; I received the letter on the 14th; and I called on the 15th with a duplicate of the same plan. Major-general Yorke sent me to Colonel Tulloch, to whom he said Lord Hardinge had referred the subject. I saw Colonel Tulloch, who, to some extent, altered the plans. I was with him for a considerable time; he objected to some of the parts of the construction, and altered the plan, and requested me to give an estimate of the altered plan, and I did so, and I left with Colonel Tulloch my address. The same evening (I was remaining in London) I received a letter from Colonel Tulloch, stating that an engineer officer would be consulted by the Government, and that I must come the next day at two o'clock. I came the next day, and I found Sir Frederick Smith, to whom I understood the subject had been referred. Sir Frederick Smith altered the plans again very materially, and requested me to give him an estimate both as to price and time of delivery. I told him that it seemed to be a case of great emergency; there were many individuals in the establishment at Gloucester who had had great experience in those

those sorts of erections; and I thought we could produce a building, perhaps, in some respects better adapted for the facilities of carriage and lightness than his plan, but based upon his ideas, and if he could give me an order to commence the next day, I would go down to Gloucester, and return and bring him a plan. Sir Frederick Smith hesitated a little, and then said that he would see the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Hardinge, and Mr. Sidney Herbert, and if I did not hear from him, we were to go on with the work. The next day I went down to Gloucester, and consulted the foreman and men accustomed to those kinds of erections, and they produced a detailed sketch, which was materially the same as Sir Frederick Smith's, but somewhat different in the form of the roof, being rather lighter, and more adapted for carriage. I saw Sir Frederick Smith the next day, which was the 17th, with Colonel Tulloch, and one or two clerks of the Ordnance, and a very long discussion took place for many hours. I wrote out an estimate both as to the time and the price, but nothing was settled. There seemed to be some difficulty in taking any responsibility, or giving a positive order, although the work was then going on at Gloucester upon the verbal order which I received from Sir Frederick Smith; but it was intimated to me, that we should make 500, of the 1,000 required by Government, to be delivered in the course of 10 days. The next day, the 18th, an inspector was sent by Sir Frederick Smith to Gloucester, the houses having been commenced on the morning of the 17th, and having upwards of 500 people engaged upon them, night and day, since that time, and the inspector disapproved of the form of the roof, and of the materials.

15453. Do you know the name of that inspector?—Mr. Fabian; he objected to the materials which were being used, yellow pine and spruce, a very much lighter wood than the Christiana deals, which are always used by the Board of Ordnance; and the form of the roof he also objected to, a form which had been adopted from considerable experience in those sort of erections, and because the packages were much easier of carriage, and much less liable to breakage on board ship, and over roads to the camp; and he stopped the works.

15454. That was on the 19th?—It was on the 18th that he stopped the works; I remained in London during that time; he came up that evening from Gloucester, and I saw him on Sunday, the 19th, in London, when he told me what he had done, and gave me a general notion of the sort of report that he should make to Sir Frederick Smith. I told him that I thought in a case of great emergency of this kind, where the whole of the work was to be done in 10 days, it was a serious responsibility to delay the construction of those huts, unless they were palpably ill adapted for the purpose, and I wrote to Sir Frederick Smith, giving the letter to Mr. Fabian, and stating that any alterations required should be made, and also giving an estimate of some additions to the weight of the houses which Mr. Fabian recommended. Mr. Fabian left London for Portsmouth that evening, and I wrote to Sir Frederick Smith that I would take upon myself the responsibility, having offered to make all the alterations that were required, to order the works to recommence on Monday morning, which I did, at the same time requesting the people at Gloucester not to stop, unless they received orders from me. On Monday morning a telegraphic message was received from Sir Frederick Smith, desiring them to stop; that was Monday the 20th; that telegraphic despatch was re-telegraphed to me in London, and I telegraphed to them not to stop. I saw Sir Frederick Smith that afternoon, at Colonel Tulloch's office, at Whitehall, and had a good deal of conversation with him, and I endeavoured to persuade him that the deals which he required were considerably heavier and less well adapted for the purpose than the spruce and yellow pine, and were preferred by many practical engineers for such work, the other being 20 per cent. heavier; that the form of roof was one which had been adopted by experienced practical men; that I was quite sure it was more adapted for the purpose than the one which he recommended; I then went with him to the Board of Ordnance, and at his dictation I wrote out another tender, proposing to make 300 of those huts on the plan that I had suggested, and the other 200 upon his plan, and this tender I left at the Board of Ordnance. On Tuesday morning, the 21st, Sir Frederick Smith having returned to Portsmouth on the Monday evening, telegraphed to Gloucester to say that the Board of Ordnance had not accepted the tender. This was telegraphed to me in London, and I immediately went to Colonel Tulloch, and Colonel Tulloch, who was extremely desirous throughout

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to get over all those difficulties and obstructions, was good enough to put into writing a short statement of the case, in order to submit it to the Duke of Newcastle. This was on the 21st of November. The Duke of Newcastle sent a message, which Colonel Tulloch delivered to me, to state that I need be under no apprehension, that the Board of Ordnance should accept the tender for the 300 houses on our plan of roof, and his recommendation was that the other 200 also should be proceeded with; in the meantime, on receiving at Gloucester this telegraph from Sir Frederick Smith, the works were, of course, stopped. On the same evening, later in the evening of the 21st, a telegraph was received at Gloucester, from Sir Frederick Smith, to proceed with the 300 huts. I then left for Paris; and perhaps the Committee will allow me to mention that, though quite correct in the official report, the "Times" makes the Duke of Newcastle state that he gave me a letter to the Emperor; that is not so. I applied to him for a letter to the French Government, and I received a letter from Mr. Roberts, stating that it was unusual to give a letter of introduction of that kind, and declining it very politely. The day after Sir Frederick Smith himself gave me a letter to Monsieur Mocquard in Paris. I also received one from Mr. Brunel, through whose friend in Paris indeed the affair was introduced to the Emperor himself. I merely state that in explanation to the statement in the "Times." I left for Paris on the 23d, and I wrote to Sir Frederick Smith the day I left for Paris, stating that I understood now that we were to make 300 houses upon the Gloucester form of roof, and 200 houses on the Portsmouth form of roof. I also left Colonel Tulloch some lithographed designs of the houses, which were very necessary for the engineers and soldiers in the Crimea, as a guide for their erection; and I advised Sir Frederick Smith of this, and that the stone was still up, and strongly recommending him to have 500 or 600 more printed. On the 25th a letter was sent from Gloucester to the Clerk of the Ordnance, to state that the 300 were making on the Gloucester plan, and 200 on the Portsmouth plan. No orders in the meantime had been received to send those huts forward, but the trains that had been prepared had been put off for want of orders. On the 26th of November Sir Frederick Smith telegraphed to Gloucester, to detain the huts till further orders, there being a misunderstanding on the subject of the carriage between himself and the railway company.

15455. The huts were then made, were they?—They were rapidly making; they were not made, but they were in rapid process of making.

15456. When you say that they were detained, they were to be transported somewhere, were they not?—They were to be sent from Gloucester to Southampton; trains of them had to be formed at Gloucester. Of course a large quantity of those things require some arrangement in shipping them. You could not have 500 huts collected together in one place; as they were made, they should have been forwarded, and it was a very serious obstruction. No orders were received for those immense masses of packages for days or for a week; no definite order being given as to when they should go; but on the 26th of November Sir Frederick Smith telegraphed to retain the huts till further orders, there being then a train waiting ready to receive them. This difficulty was one arising from the carriage with the Great Western Company, about the price of the carriage. On the 29th of November the first order was given to load those huts; the order was given to load 530 tons of them immediately. A good deal of telegraphing and correspondence took place between the 29th of November and the 6th or 7th of December, and about the 5th or 6th of December a difficulty arose as to the form of those 200 huts, which we understood were (for no definite order was given as to how they were to be made) to be made on the Portsmouth plan of roof. It was not till the 7th of December that this question as to the form of roof was finally settled; this applies to the 200 huts that were to be made upon the Portsmouth plan. No answers were given as to whether we were to send them on the one plan or the other. The whole of that time there was nothing definitely known; there was a sort of responsibility which at Gloucester they were taking upon themselves. The 7th of December was the date at which final orders were given as to the form of roof of the 200 huts.

15457. Mr. *Layard.*] How was it decided then?—We sent 100 of one kind, and 100 of another kind; in point of fact, three kinds were sent out, and a very long correspondence and telegraphing took place; and there were 300 of the Gloucester

Gloucester plan, 100 of a sort of a modification of that plan, and another 100 upon the Portsmouth plan. There were three plans for the 500 huts, but there was a great want of anything definite in the orders.

15458. *Chairman.*] When was the contract finished?—I think that contract was finished about the 10th or the 11th.

15459. They were all despatched by you at that time, were they not?—Yes; there was no delay whatever; the Duke of Newcastle is mistaken in saying that there was any delay from break of gauge; there was no delay from break of gauge; at Basingstoke the work was uncommonly well done; the goods were transhipped there as fast as they were received, but there was delay in shipping them at Southamption.

15460. Whatever delay occurred happened in consequence of what took place between you and the Ordnance?—Undoubtedly.

15461. Mr. *Layard.*] Will you state what happened in Paris?—I do not know that I could state that. I had an interview with the Emperor, and the huts were ordered by him on the Gloucester plan. I do not know that I could very well state what passed without asking permission.

15462. As the Duke of Newcastle has referred to it, did any delay take place in ordering the huts at Paris?—None whatever; it was done immediately; the contract was made by the Minister of War; every suggestion offered was immediately adopted, and sappers and miners were sent to Gloucester by the Emperor to work with the men, and to go out with those huts to the Crimea; and every possible arrangement was made to expedite, facilitate and economise the work.

15463. At what date did you go to Paris?—On the 23d of November, and the contract was signed on the 2d of December. I think there were 1,850 huts supplied to the French Government, and they were completed in five weeks.

15464. *Chairman.*] When did you begin that contract; when the English contract was finished?—About the 12th of December.

15465. Mr. *Layard.*] Had they three varieties of huts?—No; they had two varieties of huts, one for the officers, and one for the soldiers, but they were simply modifications of the same plan; they were a little lower.

15466. Did the fact of there being a diversity of plans increase the expense?—Yes; the Portsmouth plan was more expensive; there was more wood in it.

15467. *Chairman.*] They were heavier, were they not?—Yes; they were made of the same materials, for I refused to make them of Christiana deals.

15468. Mr. *Layard.*] Is not Christiana deals a very rare article in the English market?—Very rare; there are a very few used in any buildings.

15469. Consequently if the Ordnance, in constructing any wooden buildings, insisted upon having Christiana deals, that would lead to delay, trouble, and unnecessary expense?—It would lead to one of two things, either to enormous expense, or as, practically, always happens, to their getting another article.

15470. *Chairman.*] So that we should pay for an inferior article?—Certainly. Christiana deals are in very small quantities imported into England; as to the first quality of Christiana deals, which is the usual specification of the Ordnance, they certainly are not used for anything of this kind; they are very much heavier than yellow pine and spruce; no doubt they are a very beautiful wood, but they are extremely expensive.

15471. Mr. *Layard.*] Is it not what the French would call a wood of luxury, to be used for ornamenting private houses?—Yes; they are used in the construction of gentlemen's houses, where expense is not so much an object.

15472. Captain *Gladstone.*] It is much more durable, is it not?—I should doubt whether it is, for rough work, for huts, that had to stand the weather.

15473. *Chairman.*] Is it not more durable than American spruce?—For some purposes it may be; it is more valuable, there is no doubt.

15474. Mr. *Layard.*] Had you anything to do with the Aldershott huts?—No.

15475. Were the tenders made for Christiana deals?—The Board of Ordnance required tenders in Christiana deals, and they certainly were informed, to my knowledge, that that quantity of Christiana deals did not exist in all the ports of England, and that they could not be furnished; but they insisted upon the tenders being made in Christiana deals, and there are very few in the Aldershott huts.

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15476. Mr. *Drummond.*] Were any nails sent out?—Yes, a box was sent out with each house. I believe that the story about the nails applied to the houses that were sent from Trieste.

15477. Mr. *Layard.*] Were any of those huts constructed with real Christiana deals that had been sent out from the Government?—I can only say, that I do not believe that there were first quality Christiana deals used in any of them; I do not know.

15478. Did the country pay for Christiana deals?—That I cannot answer.

15479. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated, did you not, that you declined doing the work with Christiana deals?—Yes.

15480. Can you state whether any huts were sent out by any other persons?—Yes; some were sent from Portsmouth at the same time with the 500 huts which we furnished; there were 500 that were ordered from Portsmouth.

15481. *Chairman.*] Were they made in the Government Works, or by private contractors?—They were ultimately made, partly in Portsmouth and partly in London, I believe; but the contractor at Portsmouth was a private individual.

15482. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you send out anybody to see to the delivery of the huts or the building of them up?—No; but I begged Sir Frederick Smith that he would either allow us to send out carpenters, or that he would send soldiers to Gloucester to be instructed. I made the same proposal as I made in Paris, which was accepted there, but declined here.

15483. Your recommendations were not attended to?—No.

15484. Under whose charge were those huts sent out?—I think they were sent out under the charge of Captain Kean, an officer of engineers.

15485. Had you, or your foreman, or anybody connected with your establishment, any interviews with people here who had the charge of taking out and putting up those huts?—Yes. Captain Kean came down to Gloucester, and was there for two or three days; and there was an inspector, the same Mr. Fabian, who came to Gloucester, and remained there during the time the huts were being made.

15486. Did he go out to the Crimea?—No.

15487. Who was Captain Kean?—He was a captain in the army.

15488. Did he go out to the Crimea?—Yes; I have seen his name as having been at Balaklava.

15489. You instructed him sufficiently to enable him to direct the putting up of the huts?—I cannot answer that question; I do not know. There were no practical men like the French sappers and miners, who themselves were employed for the purpose, in putting them up and taking them down. The sappers and miners sent by the Emperor to Gloucester were a small but well-selected troop; many of them were old carpenters, and they became extremely skilful and clever in putting them up.

15490. Do you think that it would have been advisable for the Government to have done the same thing?—Beyond all doubt.

15491. *Chairman.*] It was your recommendation that we should do the same thing?—Yes.

15492. Mr. *Layard.*] Have you got that recommendation in writing?—No; it was verbal.

15493. To whom was it made?—To Sir Frederick Smith verbally.

15494. Have you had any report sent to you since the huts reached the Crimea?—I have seen reports in the papers. I have no doubt that the Government have had reports. I may say that I have no doubt that the form of roof is infinitely better adapted for the purpose than the Portsmouth form of roof, and the French Government immediately adopted it. I was informed in Paris by an officer of the French army there, that it was a form of roof which they universally adopted in Algeria as standing the unequal climate.

15495. You have no information yourself that you can give to the Committee as to the comparative success of the different huts that were sent out there?—I have had information from officers, but they all beg that I will not publish it.

15496. Can you state the general impression which you have derived from such communications?—I have received letters from one or two officers, who state that the hut that was sent from Gloucester was in all respects the better of the two.

15497. You stated that the first offer was made on the 2d of November?—I wrote to Sir Charles Trevelyan on the 2d of November, asking him (as I knew him) what department was the proper department to apply to, and the letter, with

with the plan and estimate, was sent to Mr. Roberts, the private secretary of the Duke of Newcastle, on the 3d.

15498. Before that, you had made no communication whatever to the Government, or to any department of the Government?—I think I wrote to Admiral Berkeley on the 1st of November. The idea occurred to me about the end of October, on reading that the army would want hutting; no regular communication took place.

15499. If it has been stated to the Committee that you made a communication in August, that is incorrect?—Yes.

15500. General *Peel.*] And therefore this statement, that "In August last Price & Co. were applied to by the Duke of Newcastle to supply plans, specications, and tenders for huts in the Crimea, and that so early in August their plans, &c., were sent to the Duke of Newcastle, but for several months no communication was made to Price & Co.," is not true?—No.

15501. Then that "they then called on the Duke, and he informed them that the plans were with the Secretary-at-War, Mr. Sidney Herbert," is not true?—No.

15502. That "Price & Co. at once went to the Secretary-at-War to urge the importance of orders being given; he directed them to go to the Ordnance Office," is not true?—No.

15503. "There they went, but, lo and behold, the plans, &c., were all lost;" that is not true?—It is not true as it is put there, but this is true: that I received a letter from Major-general Yorke on the 14th, stating that the plans and estimates had been lost.

15504. Did you then send one?—I sent one on the 3d.

15505. You have talked about having gone to the Board of Ordnance; I suppose you mean to the Ordnance Office?—Yes; in Pall-mall.

15506. You stated that you had a communication with Colonel Tulloch, and one or two clerks of the Ordnance, and Sir Frederick Smith?—I said that I went to the Ordnance Office with Sir Frederick Smith, in an office where there were several clerks, and, at his dictation, I wrote out a tender for those huts in the two forms, the Gloucester form and the Portsmouth form, the Portsmouth form requiring more materials, and being a more expensive form to construct.

15507. Then that tender you submitted, on that occasion, to the clerks of the Ordnance?—I left it on the table.

15508. You are aware that the clerks of the Ordnance would have no authority to accept your tender without a communication with the Board of Ordnance?—In fact I did not know with whom I was dealing, and I could not make out whether it was the Duke of Newcastle or the Board of Ordnance; I know now more than I did then.

15509. I have a list of the Board of Ordnance before me, which consists of the Master-general, the clerk of the Ordnance, and the principal storekeeper; there are Mr. Monsell, Sir Thomas Hastings, Lord Raglan, and Sir Hew Ross; did you see either of those?—No.

15510. Therefore the gentlemen with whom you communicated there had no power to accept your tender?—I suppose not.

15511. In what capacity was Sir Frederick Smith; was he the engineer officer to whom you have referred?—Colonel Tulloch wrote to me the same day that I first saw him, to say that I must come the next, to see an engineer whom Lord Hardinge sent for, and when I came into Colonel Tulloch's office, in Whitehall, I found Sir Frederick Smith there; I did not know him personally or officially: but he immediately took the matter into his own hands, and all communications were with him. I do not know what authority he had received; he was not apparently able to give any answer, as to whether the tender should be accepted or not; he was sometimes in communication with the Duke of Newcastle, and sometimes with Mr. Sidney Herbert, and sometimes with Lord Hardinge.

15512. Had you had any previous dealings with the Board of Ordnance, and did you know the manner in which the business is conducted there?—Never.

15513. You are not aware that when a tender is submitted to the Board of Ordnance, they always refer it either to an engineer officer, or to some proper officer?—I had never had any transaction with any Government department before.

15514. All the information which you have given to the Committee to-day might have been derived at once from you, without having recourse to any anonymous

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anonymous letter?—I should have been ready to give any information if I had been asked for it.

15515. Do you know by whom this letter was communicated?—I know nothing about it.

15516. Mr. *Drummond.*] What was the difficulty that you found in getting your money after you had completed your contract?—It arose from the confusion about the plans; the tender for the Gloucester plan was at a certain price for 300 huts; and the tender for 200 huts was at a certain price; but during the five or six days when those telegraphic messages were flying about between Gloucester and Portsmouth, and letters also, it ended in this alteration, that the 200 houses were split into two; 100 in one form, and 100 in another. The difficulty arose from a doubt as to what sum should be allowed for them; whether they should allow the price which I had asked for them, or a less price, or what price; and another difficulty also arose about the rate of carriage due to the railway company.

15517. You drew your bills upon the Treasury?—The first instalment was paid by a bill drawn upon the Treasury, but the second instalment was paid to me personally at the Pay-office, upon a letter which I received from the Board of Ordnance.

15518. How long were you kept waiting for the money after you ought to have received it?—The first instalment was paid on the 20th of December; and the second instalment, I think, was paid about the time that this Committee was appointed; and the third instalment, about which there was a dispute, was paid about the middle of February, I think.

15519. Who got that business settled for you at last?—Mr. Hayter.

15520. Do you know what steps he took for that purpose?—I only know by hearsay; I do not know anything positive; I know that he went to the Board of Ordnance about it once or twice.

15521. And getting no redress, did he go to any other office after that?—I do not know; I only speak from what was told me; there was a difficulty, and it was relieved by his interference.

15522. Mr. Hayter went from office to office, did he not, until he obtained for you your money?—I cannot say that, but I believe so.

15523. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated that on the 17th of November, you saw Colonel Tulloch, and you discussed with him the plan and estimate for your huts?—The first interview that I had with Colonel Tulloch was on the 15th.

15524. But you afterwards saw him again on the 17th, when you said you had a lengthened discussion?—Yes, with Sir Frederick Smith; at that time Sir Frederick Smith had taken the affair into his hands.

15525. What was the price of your huts, as you stated it on the 17th?—£. 25 per hut.

15526. Will you state what was the weight of that hut?—The weight of the hut was 48 cwt. I think; 2 tons 8 cwt.

15527. You have stated that on the 18th, Mr. Fabian, the Inspector, came down there?—Yes.

15528. And he disapproved both of the plan and the materials?—Yes, and stopped the work.

15529. And he suggested some alterations?—Yes.

15530. On the 20th you were stopped again, and you were told that the tender was not accepted on the 21st?—Yes; on the 21st a telegraph came to Gloucester that the Ordnance Board did not accept the tender.

15531. Was that the tender at 25 *l.* per hut, or had there been any alteration?—I made three tenders; I first of all brought one with me, which I gave to Sir Frederick Smith, on the first day that I saw him, the 17th; that was, I suppose, mislaid; and I made another the same afternoon; then I made a third with him personally, at the Ordnance Office, on the 20th; I cannot tell, but I suppose it was that last tender which the Board of Ordnance declined to accept.

15532. Had you raised your price in the meantime?—No; on the Sunday, I wrote to Sir Frederick Smith, repeating the tender for the 300 houses on the Gloucester plan, and saying that the additions that Mr. Fabian recommended would come to, I think, 2 *l.* 10 *s.* a hut more; that was rather less than the materials, but I wished to be quite safe; it was for 200 huts on the Portsmouth plan.

15533. What

15533. What was the addition of the weight made by the alterations that the Ordnance Office required?—Four or five cwt.

15534. They added to the weight, they added to the expense, but did they add to the amount of accommodation?—No.

15535. What experience had you had in building of those huts, that led you to consider that your plan was more applicable to the huts than the Ordnance plan?—The establishment at Gloucester belongs to Mr. Eassie, and Mr. Eassie has been in the habit, for many years, of shipping very large quantities of houses, doors, and all sorts of wooden materials, put together or packed, of course, in a form to save freight, for the freight to Australia is a very serious item, for the use of the diggers; he has a large establishment there, and foremen who have gained very great experience in those sort of erections; and it was my wish to utilise this experience for the wants of the army; it was not my establishment; it was Mr. Eassie's. It was a very large establishment, and could turn out a great quantity of work in a very short time, as they had seasoned materials on hand; I thought it would be well adapted to construct huts for the army.

15536. How many men did one of your huts accommodate?—The English Government, I believe, proposed to put 20 men into one hut; the French Government proposed to put into the same sized hut 26, and in the Thuilleries gardens, where sample huts were erected, a troop of men were ordered in by the Emperor, and 26 men were accommodated easily.

15537. Were any of it huts built to afford accommodation for stores?—Any of them could be used for that purpose, and I believe they were used for hospitals and for storehouses; it was a simple form of hut, 28 feet long by 16 feet wide, and about 11 feet or 12 feet high in the roof, and could be used for any purpose.

15538. As to Christiana deals, is it the fact, that Christiana deals were, in former years, more used in the market here than they have been of late years; are you aware of that?—I should not have said that; there is a certain demand for Christiana deals for expensive work, but the form of Ordnance specification is the old form that they have always had, for the last 100 years. Christiana deals are still used, but not for Ordnance works so much.

15539. Mr. *Layard.*] You state that it was at the end of October your attention was first called to the subject of huts for the Crimea?—Yes.

15540. On what grounds did you think that they would be wanted there?—It appeared to me that the army would have to winter in the Crimea. From reading the accounts in the "Times," it appeared to me, when we heard of the account of the failure of the attack of the 17th of October, that the army would have to winter there, and that they would require better protection than tents.

15541. Were you ever told at the Ordnance Office that your communications were not quite regular?—The Ordnance Office never answered any letter; I never had any communications with them; all the communications that I had were with Sir Frederick Smith, and chiefly by telegraph.

15542. You presumed that he represented the Ordnance Office, did you not?—Of course, now I know more about it than I did then; but never having had any transactions with the Government before, it appeared to me that there was a great confusion of jurisdiction. I applied to Sir Frederick Smith, because he put himself in communication with me; I did not know whether he was the proper person or not.

15543. You thought that he was acting for the Ordnance?—I thought he was acting in this business, because Lord Hardinge had given him the work to do.

15544. Who is Colonel Tulloch?—His office is in Whitehall-yard; had it not been for him and the Duke of Newcastle, I do not think that those huts would have been sent.

15545. Did you ever see the Duke of Newcastle himself?—No; but he sent me a message, upon the faith of which the huts were made. I should have been unwilling to take the responsibility of making them, and having them thrown on my hands, had it not been for a verbal message that the Duke sent, that the Board of Ordnance should accept the tender.

15546. By whom was your contract finally signed?—We never had any written contract.

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15547. Have you had none at all, to this day?—No.

15548. Had you no written communication at all, from any department, authorising you to make those huts?—Nothing; we had telegraphs.

15549. Have you had any written document authorising you to make those huts?—No.

15550. Supposing Mr. Hayter had been unable, by his influence, to obtain this money for you, what could you have done?—I should have brought an action against the Government for goods sold and delivered.

15551. Could you have done that?—I do not know; I should have tried it.

15552. Were the prices of the French huts and of the English huts the same?—No. The Emperor himself, and Marshal Vaillant, and the officers of engineers, although they retained the form of the huts, and the main principles of the construction, very much lessened the weight, and they made them even more simple; all those additions which Mr. Fabian had put in were struck out at once, and considerable economy was effected; but particularly as to the weight. The object was to economise the labour of the camp, and everything was done to effect that.

15553. *Chairman.*] And to lessen the price?—Yes.

15554. Mr. *Layard.*] The French huts were much cheaper and lighter than ours?—Yes, they were cheaper; there was less material in them.

15555. Were they as serviceable?—Yes, they were; they were a little lower; and there was not so much cubic space in the soldiers' huts, and that I believe was done in order that the heavy winds at Balaklava should not blow them down.

15556. They were much easier to take up to the front, were they not?—Yes; they were much lighter.

15557. Supposing the number of men to move those huts had been small on our side, the lighter the huts were the better?—Yes; most undoubtedly.

15558. Did you send out any huts for horses?—No.

15559. Mr. *Bramston.*] You stated, did you not, that Captain Kean came down to take charge of those huts?—Yes.

15560. You described him as a military man?—Yes; he was an engineer officer.

15561. And therefore he was a competent person to superintend the erection of those huts when they got out there?—I suppose so.

Deputy Commissary-general *John William Smith*, called in; and Examined.

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15562. Lord *Seymour.*] WHAT office do you hold in the Commissariat?—I am Deputy Commissary-general.

15563. How long have you been in the service?—Upwards of 33 years.

15564 You were sent last March (1854) from Corfu to Constantinople, were you not?—I was.

15565. You arrived at Constantinople about the 12th of March?—On the 12th of March.

15566. On your arrival there, you were provided with instructions, I think, to make preparations, or at least to make inquiries preparatory to the arrival of a military force there?—Yes; and those instructions are before the Committee, I believe.

15567. You were furnished with assistants, were you not?—Yes; I took one officer and two clerks with me, and I met another officer at Smyrna on my way out, who was sent direct from England.

15568. Had you ever been yourself at Constantinople or in Turkey before?—Never.

15569. You did not know the language?—I did not.

15570. Among the assistants that you took, were any of them acquainted with the language?—They were not acquainted with the Turkish language; but the two clerks that I took with me from the Ionian Islands spoke very fluently Greek and Italian.

15571. Were they persons who had been in your employ?—Yes; both those I took with me had been a considerable time in the public service.

15572. When you arrived at Constantinople, did you not, as you could not speak the language yourself, seek an interpreter?—I did. With the permission of

of the Committee, I will give a brief outline of the proceedings I adopted, on first arriving at Constantinople. I was furnished by Sir Charles Trevelyan with credentials to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on whom I waited the day I arrived, though it was Sunday. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe received me exceedingly well, and promised every co-operation that it was in his power to afford towards the objects which I had in view. The first thing he did was to apply to the Turkish Government for a competent officer who understood English to assist me in forming arrangements, or in acquiring information with a view to those arrangements; but after this officer had been with me for two days, I found him utterly destitute of sufficient intelligence to be of any service to me.

15573. Mr. *Layard.*] Who was that officer?—An officer belonging to the Turkish army. I reported this immediately to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and he then put Mr. Etienne Pisane in communication with me, the first dragoman of the embassy. I went with him to the Seraskier Pasha, the Minister for War, and had two very long consultations with him as to the means by which the English army could be fed in Turkey. The information I derived from him was considered generally of a very satisfactory nature. I communicated on two or three occasions with Sir John Burgoyne, and derived much valuable information from him. I was also put in communication by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe with Mr. Black, an eminent English merchant there, and after a few days of very earnest inquiry, I drew up a report, addressed to the Commissary-general, a duplicate of which was sent direct to the Treasury. If the Committee wish, I have a copy of the report, and can read it; it shows my views with regard to the resources of the country.

15574. Will you be so good as to let me look at it?—(*The same was handed to the Honourable Member.*)

15575. Lord *Seymour.*] Did you obtain an interpreter?—I did not attach an interpreter to myself personally, because I did not feel an immediate want of one. I was in direct intercourse with the Turkish Government, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was kind enough always to place an interpreter of his own at my disposal, which I liked better than engaging a person on the spot.

15576. Was it a part of your instructions to consider the subject of land transport?—It was.

15577. Did you report upon it?—Yes.

15578. Was it a part of your instructions to provide barracks for the troops?—It was not, but I did so; at least I assisted in doing so.

15579. You considered it necessary to make an application for barracks?—I considered it absolutely necessary that a locality should be fixed upon for the troops on their arrival. I received no indication whatever as to the place where the troops were likely to be quartered, but on hearing that a force was coming up in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, I went to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and suggested to him the propriety of applying for barracks at Scutari. He did so, and obtained them.

15580. When was that?—It was in March. No, I think it was in the beginning of April.

15581. When you obtained those barracks, did you visit them?—I did.

15582. Will you state to the Committee in what condition you found them at that time?—In very good condition.

15583. Were they clean?—They were more cleanly than the Turkish buildings generally are. I visited the barracks on two occasions, and I also went and took the barracks over from the Seraskier Pasha himself, that is, I took them in charge. I was accompanied by a young engineer officer who was there; we together took over the barracks, and made arrangements at the same time with regard to the hospital.

15584. You gave over the barracks into the charge of the engineer officer?—Not precisely so. The Seraskier undertook to retain possession of the barracks until a part of our force arrived, to whom they could be handed over.

15585. You went through all parts of the barracks yourself at that time?—Almost every part of the barracks I visited.

15586. Did you see any reason why those barracks should not be maintained in a clean condition, and adapted for English troops?—I did not.

15587. If they were to be afterwards appropriated as an hospital, did you see anything

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anything in the construction of the buildings that rendered them very inapplicable to such a purpose?—I did not, certainly. I did not, however, examine them with sufficient minuteness to be able to enter into all those points of detail.

15588. Commissary-general Filder came out shortly after, did he not?—He arrived about the 21st of April; before that, all the arrangements and responsibility of the Commissariat devolved upon me.

15589. Had the troops arrived at Gallipoli before the arrival of Commissary-general Filder?—They had. The instruction I received as to Gallipoli was that a regiment of the line and two companies of sappers and miners were very shortly expected to arrive there, and I immediately went down to Gallipoli, and made the best arrangements I could with regard to the resources of the country. A Turkish council, consisting of two pashas, a general officer, with a secretary, cabooly effendi, and an interpreter, who spoke both English and Turkish, provided by the Turkish Government, went down with me in the same steamer; a supply of tents was also sent down by the Turkish Government, to meet the wants of the force on arriving there, and a company of Turkish troops were sent down to assist in the first arrangements.

15590. Did you send down those tents?—No, they were sent down by the Turkish Government; they were Turkish tents; on my arrival there, I met Mr. Calvert, the Consul of the Dardanelles, who was desired by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to go there and assist me in making the necessary arrangements, and as he happened to be on the spot and could speak Turkish, I of course preferred his interpretation to that of the man who was specifically appointed by the Turkish Government to assist in that part of the business. I entered into contracts for different supplies there, and saw no reason whatever to doubt that those contracts would work in a comparatively satisfactory manner.

15591. You entered into the contracts required for the army?—Yes; for provisions, fuel, and other supplies required for the force that was coming.

15592. Did you enter into contracts with merchants at Constantinople?—No, not with reference to Gallipoli.

15593. With whom did you enter into contracts at Gallipoli?—With persons who were recommended to me by the Turkish council and Mr. Calvert.

15594. This was your first trial of the contract system in Turkey?—Yes.

15595. While the troops were at Gallipoli, did you find that first trial of the contract system to answer?—Yes, it did much better than one had reason to expect; there were difficulties as to the means of transport, but they were not of an insuperable nature, and they were overcome by the exertions of Assistant Commissary-general Turner, an officer I sent down there. I think it is fair to state, that if there had been anything radically wrong as to the Commissariat arrangements, any carelessness or want of ability or exertion on their part, it would have been visited very heavily on them by Sir George Brown, who commanded there, but who, instead of adopting such a course, really eulogised the exertions of the officers.

15596. It has been stated to the Committee by Sir Charles Trevelyan, that with regard to the contract for transport, you wrote to him thus: "The contract for transport is only of a temporary nature, until waggons, horses, and other pack animals, can be collected by means of the Turkish Government." Therefore, at Gallipoli you contracted for transport?—Yes, I did.

15597. Was it found successful in that respect, or is the report that we have heard in this country correct, namely, that when the troops landed they had great difficulty in getting their baggage and things conveyed up to the encampment?—There were, as I mentioned before, several difficulties to contend with in the case of this transport; it was a perfectly new service for the Turks, who had the charge of the arabas, to be engaged in, and it was found very difficult to keep those men up to a proper state of things; but I did not trust altogether to the assurances of this council; I saw myself, in the neighbourhood of Gallipoli, a number of arabas, which I thought would be sufficient to meet the wants of the force I was directed to provide for; that force was a very limited one, only one regiment of the line, and two companies of sappers and miners; subsequently it was increased to a very considerable force, and then difficulties began. The Turkish council being overwhelmed with applications, both from the French and from ourselves, found it difficult to collect, in such a place as that, the necessary means of transport required for sending

sending an army into the interior of a country like Turkey; this was just after the conclusion of a very severe winter, when the roads were much cut up, so that it became a work of very great difficulty to provide for all the wants of such a force.

15598. Had you, very shortly after that, to make arrangements for the troops at Scutari?—I had.

15599. At that time, I suppose, Commissary-general Filder was there?—He was not; I made the arrangements before his arrival.

15600. Did you contract with persons at Constantinople to supply everything that was required for the troops at Scutari?—I did; as far as I was able to do so.

15601. As regards the supply to the troops at Scutari, were you satisfied with the contract system in that instance?—I was perfectly so. I do not mean to say that some irregularities did not take place; but it must be quite evident, even to persons who have not been out of England, that to send a force of soldiers into a strange country, it would be impossible to ensure a perfectly satisfactory state of things. Supplies will sometimes by accident be probably of an inferior quality; the meat, for instance, could not be otherwise, because there is very little provision made for cattle in Turkey in winter. After the conclusion of the long winter, and the drain that had taken place at Constantinople upon its cattle resources for the use of the French and English navies, it could not be reasonably expected that meat should be of a superior quality; and I have no doubt that some little dissatisfaction arose; the arrangements with regard to the issues at Scutari were not complete, and could not be immediately made so.

15602. What meat did you supply the troops with; was it beef or mutton?—Beef five days in the week, and mutton two days.

15603. Was the beef of inferior quality?—The beef was, of course, compared with English, American, or Australian beef, of inferior quality, but it was the very best that the country afforded; the stipulation that I made was, that it should be as good meat as the Ambassador had on his table every day.

15604. Whom had you under you to inspect the meat, and see that it was of good quality?—I placed an officer at Scutari; Assistant Commissary-general Strickland was the first officer I placed there, and he acted under my directions, and I was very much satisfied with him.

15605. Were you satisfied with the contractors for the beef?—Yes; I was, generally speaking.

15606. Was it the same with regard to the mutton?—Yes, it was the same contractor that supplied it.

15607. It has been stated in this Committee as to the first difficulties which arose even at Scutari by General Sir De Lacy Evans, in answer to Question 669, that there was only one small store for the issue of forage to 2,000 or 3,000 horses, and there was delay and difficulty in consequence?—Yes, I believe there was; it was an imperfection that was not exactly foreseen; but it was remedied very shortly after. It did not occur during the period of my immediate responsibility, but afterwards I knew that it was so, and it was remedied directly it was brought to the knowledge of the Commissary-general.

15608. With regard to forage, had you entered into contracts at that time for it?—Yes, I had; I had entered into arrangements rather with Hussein Bey, who is a sort of Lord Mayor in Constantinople, and the head of the great corporations there; he is the man through whom all the supplies to the Turkish Government were furnished, and I was referred to him by the Seraskier Pasha.

15609. Did he provide hay or chopped straw?—Chopped straw; no hay could be got.

15610. You intended to continue the supply of chopped straw?—Certainly; I never contemplated any other description of forage, that being the forage of the country.

15611. Did you state that in your report?—I did specifically.

15612. That the cavalry and artillery horses must look to be provided with chopped straw?—Certainly; I said in my report that that was the only forage used even in the stables of the Ambassador.

15613. With regard to the quantity of that forage, you expected to find no difficulty?—None whatever; there was an ample supply of it.

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15614. After that, the troops were removed to Varna, were they not?—Yes.

15615. You remained at Constantinople?—Yes, always. I never was either at Varna or in the Crimea.

15616. While you were at Constantinople, the troops being at Varna, what were your duties at the time?—My duties were to act upon all orders that Commissary-general Filder sent down for such supplies as they could not obtain on the spot, and to superintend all other arrangements on the spot.

15617. Did you, in consequence, establish any stores at Constantinople?—Yes.

15618. Where were they?—There were two very extensive granaries on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, immediately opposite the Sultan's palaces. Those were, through the intervention of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, handed over to the Commissariat. I also got the use of a large magazine in the Turkish dock-yard, and I thought, with this extent of magazine accommodation, the thing was complete, in addition to what storage room existed under the barracks at Scutari. Very extensive store accommodation under the barracks at Scutari did exist for wet stores of every description.

15619. Will you state what sort of stores you chiefly collected with a view to supply the army at this time?—We collected a supply of forage, salt meat, biscuit, and rum; the latter articles were sent out from England and stored at Constantinople. Those magazines which I speak of may not have been seen by those witnesses who have created an impression that they did not exist. There were two extensive granaries; one of them was at least two miles from Scutari; the other about two miles and a half; and the extensive range of store accommodation under the barracks could not be very well seen unless a person made it his business to go there for the express purpose.

15620. In those stores you had a large provision of salt meat?—It was a sufficient provision at the time in case of any failure on the part of the contractors to deliver fresh meat.

15621. Was there a large provision of rum?—There was a provision of rum also.

15622. Had you at this time handed over to you, or did you have any of that class of stores called Quartermaster-general's stores?—There were some.

15623. Did you take charge of them also?—Yes, we did.

15624. Had you any officer under the Quartermaster-general, who was responsible for their care, and who knew what was in store?—No, not at first; there was no officer of the Quartermaster-general's department left at Scutari, when the army went to Varna.

15625. Then those stores were intrusted to you without any person under the Quartermaster-general to look after them?—They were at first.

15626. Had you books there in which you had an account of all these stores so given over to you?—Yes; there was a very able officer, Assistant Commissary-general Potgieter, who was appointed to act under me at Scutari; I was in Pera, and this officer carried on the duties under me at Scutari. He kept a regular account of the Quartermaster-general's stores.

15627. You had to issue, as I understand, not only Commissariat stores, but also the Quartermaster-general's stores?—Yes, we had to issue Quartermaster-general's stores also.

15628. And to keep an account of them as well?—Yes.

15629. That added considerably to the duties of your office?—Yes, it did very much so.

15630. The Committee have heard much respecting the inconvenience that arose from the forms and vouchers required by the Commissariat; when you were at Constantinople, having the chief charge of the stores, was it soon brought to your notice that there was an inconvenience in regard to the forms?—No, I cannot say that I ever heard any particular complaints as to inconvenience arising out of the observance of those forms.

15631. You never heard from any officers high in command that they found a difficulty in complying with the forms of the Commissariat?—I certainly did not.

15632. The forms and vouchers are set out in the Book of Instructions, are they not?—Yes; in the case of the Quartermaster-general's stores, a very simple form of requisition and receipt were adopted.

15633. With

15633. With a view of having that check upon the issue of stores, could you suggest any more simple form than the one that is in use?—I really could not.

15634. Will you state when they applied to you for supplies for a regiment at Scutari, who had to sign, for instance, the form?—For provisions, or for a supply of Quartermaster-general's stores?

15635. For a supply of provisions?—For a supply of the usual ration, the form is, in my opinion, as simple as could be adopted with reference to the peculiar circumstances under which the ration is supplied to the British soldier. I may, perhaps, explain that the system of stoppages for rations causes a great deal of complexity in the accounts, and renders a very particular form necessary; the form is of some use, certainly; it is signed not only by the commanding officer of the regiment, under the responsibility of the quartermaster, but it is signed also by the paymaster, who has to account for the stoppages; therefore, it is necessary that the number of rations issued should tally with the number of stoppages which the paymaster brings to account, and it is useful in that respect; but I think that the stoppages for rations are a source of very great inconvenience to the army generally.

15636. *Chairman.*] You state that, under the responsibility of the quartermaster, the commanding officer makes a requisition; what is the meaning of that phrase?—The quartermaster prepares a return according to the strength of the regiment, and submits it to the commanding officer for his signature.

15637. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Surely the commanding officer is responsible for what he signs?—Certainly; generally responsible.

15638. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated, did you not, that there are two signatures required before an application is valid?—Yes.

15639. The one being that of the paymaster?—Yes.

15640. And the other that of the commanding officer?—Yes.

15641. The paymaster's signature is required only with reference to the stoppages?—Yes; that is to confirm the actual strength for which the rations are demanded.

15642. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the Commissariat itself; but it is part of that system in the army, of having stoppages on the one hand, whilst there are allowances on the other?—Yes.

15643. *Chairman.*] Supposing a regiment was in the field, and divided, and the paymaster was absent, and they could not obtain his signature, what would occur then?—Then, if the Commissariat officer who is charged with supplying that regiment were an officer of ordinary sagacity, he would adopt the very simplest form imaginable, a manuscript one.

15644. Colonel *Lindsay.*] In the absence of the paymaster, would not another officer perform the duties of the paymaster?—There is always either a paymaster, or a committee of paymastership, with every regiment, and it comes to the same thing; there is no practical difficulty as to the paymaster. I may add also, that the quartermaster has to sign a receipt for the provisions on their being delivered; it is his duty to receive them, and sign a receipt for them.

15645. Lord *Seymour.*] When the regiment arrived, therefore, at Scutari, it was necessary for the service that they should have a great number of those printed forms?—Yes.

15646. Who supplies them?—It is a Commissariat form, and, therefore, that department is bound to supply the forms necessary for the purpose.

15647. While the troops were at Scutari, did you supply them with coffee?—Not at first; coffee did not form part of the ration of the troops until the month of July, at Varna; but coffee was sent out in a raw state, for the purpose of being sold to the troops at cost price.

15648. Was it so sold to the troops at cost price?—It was, to a certain extent; I cannot say how far, but some of it was.

15649. Sir *J. Pakington.*] That was before July, was it not?—Yes.

15650. Lord *Seymour.*] In July, as I understand, it was served out as a ration?—Yes; it was served out as a ration in July.

15651. As it was served out as a ration, had you any store of it at Constantinople?—Yes, I had.

15652. Was it a large store?—Not a very large store; I made purchases to add to the quantity necessary; I bought it at Constantinople.

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15653. *Chairman.*] Was it an additional ration, or a substitution for another ration?—It was an additional ration.

15654. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Before July, did you find that it was very much purchased by the soldiers at cost price?—I cannot say whether it was purchased very much or not; it was, to some extent.

15655. Colonel *Lindsay.*] What had they in lieu of coffee at Scutari?—Nothing.

15656. What had they for breakfast?—They found their own breakfasts out of their surplus pay; it was not supplied by the Commissariat, except on sale.

15657. General *Peel.*] Coffee is an extra issue altogether, is it not?—Quite so.

15658. Lord *Seymour.*] When the troops were at Varna, in July, coffee became the regular ration, did it not?—Coffee and sugar became the regular ration.

15659. You bought those articles at Constantinople?—Yes; under the orders of the Commissary-general.

15660. A large quantity of coffee was also sent out from England, was there not?—Yes; a supply of coffee to meet the demands of the men, under the system of purchase, was sent out, but it was insufficient to constitute a ration for the whole army, and I made extensive purchases under the authority of the Commissary-general at Constantinople.

15661. He being at Varna?—Yes.

15662. Did he require you to buy the coffee, and to send it in its green state?—He did not specifically say so, but that was the usual course.

15663. Did he afterwards tell you to make any alteration?—He did not.

15664. Then while the troops were in the neighbourhood of Varna, did you hear that there was any objection on the part of the military to the coffee in that state?—I recollect hearing of a few isolated cases of complaint with regard to the issue of coffee; nothing of a serious nature.

15665. But your superior officer in the Commissariat did not bring it to your notice?—He did not; the Commissariat were never required to issue coffee in any other than a green state; if they had been, I fancy they would have done so; the ration of coffee was recommended by a Board of officers, of whom the Commissary-general was one; it consisted, I think, of some generals and high officers on it, with the Commissary-general, but no recommendation emanated, that I know of, from that Board, that the coffee should be issued in a roasted state, and the proceedings of that Board were confirmed by Lord Raglan, when it became a part of the regulations of the army from that date.

15666. It has been stated that in July you received orders from Varna to make preparations, and to purchase materials for the siege train?—I did, what I believed to be a siege train at the time; there was a certain amount of materials of a description which led me to suppose that they were for a siege train. I did not know that they were for that specific purpose till afterwards.

15667. There was a very large supply of materials?—Yes, there was a very large supply of timber, and tools, and other materials for a siege train.

15668. Was it within the ordinary duties of the Commissariat department to provide such things?—It is a part of the Commissariat duty to make purchases of that description for the Ordnance department in the Colonies; but it does not form a part of the Commissariat duty to see those things collected, packed, and shipped, which was an addition to our ordinary duty with respect to such matters.

15669. At the time that the army was at Varna, were you also engaged in procuring land transport for that army?—I was to this extent engaged, that I paid for all animals that were bought under the directions of Lord Raglan. Captain Nolan was sent out almost at the same time that I was by the Duke of Newcastle to purchase horses in general for the army, principally for the remounts of cavalry; but it was understood at the same time that if he met with horses that would answer for the Commissariat transport, he would purchase them, and we might have the refuse of those that were not wanted for the cavalry. His brother was also sent out with him, and Mr. Wilkinson, the veterinary surgeon of the 2d Life Guards. Mr. Wilkinson purchased very extensively, and I paid for the animals upon his certificate.

15670. Were you told also to provide animals to convey the siege train?—No;

No; the purchase of animals was not with regard to any specific object, but generally for the army.

15671. From your experience in the Commissariat, should you say that the siege train would depend for its moving upon the horses of the artillery or upon the horses provided by the Commissariat?—That would depend upon circumstances; if they went to a country where there was an abundance of animals they would depend upon the Commissariat, but otherwise they would depend upon their own resources, and what they might derive from England.

15672. In short, you mean they must be moved by the artillery if the Commissariat could not move them?—Certainly.

15673. Do you mean, it would be expected that the horses that were trained for field artillery should be taken and used for a heavy train of siege artillery?—No, I should think not: the Commissariat up to a very recent period has been the department on which the duty devolves of providing transport generally for the army, and I consider that even moving a siege train comes within the designation of transport, such as the Commissariat should furnish, if it could not be furnished better from any other source.

15674. In the same way that it supplies animals for the conveyance of the ambulance?—Precisely.

15675. Colonel *Lindsay*.] If the Commissariat were aware that a siege train was about to be made use of, their duty would be to provide an increased number of animals?—I think so; it would not be necessary that they should volunteer it, but if application were made to that department by the Ordnance, they would, of course, immediately attend to it; it would be a part of their duty to do so.

15676. Lord *Seymour*.] At the end of July, or in August, you were aware, I suppose, that the army was to be moved?—In August I was.

15677. Were you required to make any additional provision on that account?—I was.

15678. But were you told that the army was going to the Crimea then?—No; not until the provision was in a very forward state of preparation.

15679. You were told to provide for the army moving somewhere?—Yes.

15680. What provision did you make on that occasion?—I acted upon the orders of the Commissary-general, specific orders; my duties were of a sectional character; it was not competent to me to anticipate anything; and those orders I executed to the best of my ability.

15681. Did you provide any amount of cattle at that time?—The Commissary-general himself entered into a contract for live cattle, to be delivered in Bulgaria, wherever they might be required, to the extent of 10,000 head.

15682. When the army got into the Crimea, were you called upon to make provision for its supply from Constantinople?—I was, in the same manner that I was on its arrival at Varna; and on its leaving that place I acted upon specific orders.

15683. Were any of your specific orders to send cattle to the Crimea?—Not immediately.

15684. When did you receive orders to send cattle from Constantinople?—The first orders I received to send cattle from Constantinople were shortly after the hurricane of the 14th of November, and not till then. There was a surplus of cattle at Varna, over and above what was necessary for the troops there; and cattle and sheep were also procurable at Eupatoria; therefore it became unnecessary to make demands, I presume, upon me until those sources had failed to a considerable extent.

15685. After the storm of the 14th, you were called upon to supply cattle from Constantinople?—Yes.

15686. Had you any difficulty in obtaining them at Constantinople?—No; there were cattle in reserve at Constantinople, to be applied to any purpose that might be necessary.

15687. You had sufficient cattle to send?—Yes; I had sufficient cattle to send to meet the wants of the service.

15688. Was a requisition made to you to send them every fortnight, or in what way?—No; I was merely to send, as vessels were sent for the cattle. I may state that the first vessel sent for the cattle was the "Tonning;" it was shortly after the hurricane; I forget the precise date when she came down.

15689. When did she arrive at Constantinople?—I cannot speak of the date, but

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but she had a short passage, a couple of days. When she arrived at Constantinople it was ascertained that she had sustained severe injury in the hurricane, and it was necessary to put her under repair; I immediately applied to Admiral Boxer to facilitate this matter as much as he could. I think a period of 18 days elapsed while she was under repair; the repairs were completed on a Friday, when the captain said he was ready to go, but he had no water. I asked him whether he had applied to Admiral Boxer; and he said he had repeatedly; and he was told that the water tank was otherwise engaged. I pressed upon Admiral Boxer the necessity of expediting the despatch of this vessel, both in writing and through the medium of messengers, but a delay from noon on Friday till noon on Monday took place entirely for want of water, which could not be supplied in any way than by the assistance of Admiral Boxer and the tank vessel.

15690. The vessel had been there already 18 days?—Yes; but the captain said it was impossible to put the water into the tanks until some repairs to the screw had been effected; he did not wish to get too deep in the water.

15691. He could not put the water in till the screw had been repaired?—No.

15692. Then three days more were lost on account of the water?—Three more days were entirely and unnecessarily lost in getting the water on board of her at a critical juncture, when the fresh meat was most urgently wanted for the troops.

15693. *Chairman.*] Was there no other vessel to be found as a substitute?—No; almost every vessel was more or less damaged by the hurricane; it crippled the resources of the Commissariat very greatly indeed. A steamer, called the "Albatross," attached particularly to our department, was very seriously injured, and we were obliged to put her into the Turkish dockyard, so that a great delay took place.

15694. Are the Committee to understand that when this application was made, and a vessel was sent to obtain cattle, 21 days elapsed before any cattle could be sent back?—Yes, a delay of that duration took place.

15695. And three of those days were unnecessarily lost?—Yes; I consider three of those days were lost unnecessarily. If proper vigilance had been used on the part of the naval authorities, it might have been prevented.

15696. Did you report it?—Yes, to the Commissary-general.

15697. Lord *Seymour.*] Which was the next vessel that came?—I think it was the "Albatross."

15698. Was she delayed?—Yes, she was delayed in consequence of the damage she had sustained.

15699. How long was that vessel delayed?—Somewhere about three weeks.

15700. During the time the "Tonning" was delayed, was the "Albatross" also delayed?—Yes; about the same period.

15701. There was no other vessel to supply the place of those two ships taken up?—No.

15702. The troops were kept without fresh meat, so far as you knew, being at Constantinople, on account of the crippled state of those two vessels?—Yes; they were without fresh meat, owing to the crippled state of those two vessels; that is the general cause why they were not better supplied with fresh meat after the hurricane.

15703. Can you state to the Committee what quantity of fresh meat was sent to Balaklava during the two months of November and December?—I cannot; I have no official record with me; for anything I may have to refer to, I am indebted to Sir Charles Trevelyan. I came away in a very debilitated state of health from Constantinople, and did not bring any official records.

15704. Can you obtain here from the Commissariat department the returns of the quantity of live stock sent from Constantinople to Balaklava, during the months of November, December, and January?—I think it is possible; I will make inquiry.

15705. Were you called upon when the troops were in the Crimea to furnish roasted coffee to them from Constantinople?—Never.

15706. If you had been called upon to furnish roasted coffee to the troops, should you have had any difficulty in obtaining it?—Yes; I apprehend very considerable difficulty would have arisen. I could not have got any one person to undertake such a supply as that, and it would have been necessary

to

to have divided the coffee about Constantinople in sections, so that for want of proper supervision over those things great difficulties would have arisen; there was also a difficulty with regard to proper packages for it, and the delay would have been so great that it would have resulted in failure, I am afraid.

15707. When those transports came backwards and forwards, was there any officer of the navy on board each?—There was not; there were very few instances in which a naval officer was on board the transports.

15708. Is it not usual to place a naval officer on board the transports?—It has not been usual since the war broke out with Russia; it was the custom previously in former wars to have an agent on board every transport, and I think it is very desirable that such should be the case.

15709. An agent, first of all, is a check upon any delay on the part of the captain; and then he is, to a certain extent, able to answer respecting the stores?—Certainly.

15710. By not having an agent, all those inconveniences arose to the public?—This was one cause of the inconveniences referred to.

15711. Are you aware, with regard to those transports, whose duty it is to land the goods from a transport when she arrives in a harbour; is that a part of the Commissariat duty, or a part of the transport duty?—In places where the boats of the country can be obtained, it is the duty of the Commissariat to do so, and it was done so at Constantinople; it is also the duty of the vessels to assist with their boats, when required.

15712. At Constantinople, when a vessel came in with Commissariat stores, they were consigned to you, were they not?—Yes; if they were not intended for Varna or the Crimea.

15713. Had you with them a bill of lading?—Generally speaking, I had; sometimes the bill of lading did not reach me, but I never found any practical difficulty from it; we were always able to obtain one from the master of the vessel.

15714. You always knew what you were to take charge of from a vessel before it was landed?—Certainly.

15715. Then you think there could be no loss to the public in that way?—I do not think that there could be.

15716. With respect to those transports, are you aware whether or not the captains of those transports ever took goods on their own account and sold them?—I have heard of very trifling instances in which they did so; a few cabin stores; nothing beyond that.

15717. If any delay arose in the transport service at Balaklava, you do not think that that was owing to the captains of the transports waiting there, in order to make a profit of their own cargo?—I cannot answer that question specifically; it may have been so.

15718. When the "Prince" arrived at Constantinople, was she consigned to you?—Some of the articles on board were consigned to me.

15719. *Chairman.*] Had you a bill of lading sent to you of what she contained?—To the best of my recollection, I had at the time.

15720. Was any demand made upon the captain of that transport for the medical stores that were on board of her?—Yes, there was.

15721. What answer did he make?—That those stores were so placed in the vessel that they could not be got at without very considerable delay, and the removal of a large portion of heavy cargo.

15722. Did you take steps to ascertain whether that was accurate or not?—No; I did not consider that any part of my duty, but that it rested with Admiral Boxer; it was his duty to see that every difficulty with respect to her was removed. She was a naval transport, and we could not be supposed to go on board the vessels and make a minute inspection of any difficulties that might be said to exist; the captain might have refused to admit us.

15723. If there were any goods that were consigned to you, you did not want them?—I am not aware that any goods for the Commissariat specifically were on board; there were medical stores on board, and clothing.

15724. You stated, did you not, that a certain portion of the cargo was consigned to you?—A certain portion of the cargo was consigned to the Commissariat.

15725. Of that portion that was so consigned to the Commissariat, did you want

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want none at Constantinople?—Certainly some of it was wanted for the medical department there.

15726. And that it was impossible to land according to the statement of the captain?—That was so.

15727. You did not consider it a part of your duty to see whether he stated correctly what he did state?—I did not.

15728. Lord *Seymour*.] Did you ask him for his cargo-book?—I did not.

15729. You do not know whether he had one or not?—No, I do not. I may state that a consignment of 60,000 sovereigns came out for the Commissariat by that vessel; and although I had no specific orders with regard to the disposal of this money, I took upon myself the responsibility of landing it on the Sunday morning at Constantinople, and by that means saved it. Three days afterwards, I had a very urgent demand made upon me for 50,000 *l.* in gold, and 3,000 *l.* in silver, which arrived safely in another vessel.

15730. Was there not at that time a very great want of medical stores at Scutari?—I believe so.

15731. Then the same urgency that induced you to see to the landing of the gold did not suggest itself, or exist, in the case of the medical stores?—I understood that the medical stores were so placed that we could not get at them, whereas the money was perfectly convenient.

15732. You did not consider it a part of your duty to see whether that was so or not?—I did not. I considered it to be the duty of the naval authority.

15733. You considered the captain to be perfectly acquainted with the place where the cargo was stored?—Yes.

15734. Captain *Gladstone*.] The greater part of her cargo was for the Crimea, was it not?—Yes.

15735. Mr. *Layard*.] Did you call upon Admiral Boxer to ascertain the fact?—No, I did not; but I believe, though I only know it from hearsay, that Admiral Boxer made similar inquiries himself.

15736. *Chairman*.] Do you know what the result of that inquiry was?—I do not know; it was considered undesirable to detain the vessel until bulk could be so broken that those stores could be got at, because the vessel had the 46th Regiment on board, and it was very necessary that they should get up as soon as possible.

15737. Lord *Seymour*.] With regard to other stores that were required in the Crimea, for instance rice, had you a large supply of rice at Constantinople?—Yes, I had a sufficient supply to meet the demands that were likely to be made on me for rice.

15738. Did you forward it?—I did, as it was demanded.

15739. There would have been no difficulty if applications had been made to you in procuring rice?—Certainly not. I believe there was never any deficiency of rice at Balaklava. I believe there was always a supply, not only of rice, but of all other articles necessary for the troops at Balaklava.

15740. With regard to vegetables, an application was made to you to purchase them, was there not?—Yes; to purchase and forward with the least possible delay about 150 tons of vegetables, and the "Harbinger" was sent down for that express purpose to Constantinople.

15741. Did you forward them?—Yes, I did, as soon as I could. I should have had them all shipped in three days had it not been owing to the improper position which the ship took up, and from which I could not get her removed, also from the excessively bad weather that occurred just about the same time; it took, I think, about six days to load her—five days, and she was a day making other preparations for departure.

15742. *Chairman*.] Whose fault was it that she took up an improper position?—In the first place, the captain's; and in the second place, I consider it was Admiral Boxer's fault that she was not removed. I made repeated application to Admiral Boxer to get her removed; she was lying far out in the stream, which was running at least five miles an hour, with a heavy gale blowing down from the northward; the reply I got was, that he did not consider it was an improper position; that her anchors were overlaid by those of some other vessel, and it would be a matter of great difficulty to remove her. I considered myself that those excuses were of a frivolous nature, because there were some of Her Majesty's ships lying in the Bosphorus at the time whose crews might have been most advantageously occupied in getting her anchors

anchors up and clearing her, and bringing her into the Golden Horn, where she could have been loaded with much greater facility.

15743. Admiral Boxer had power to employ them, had he not?—Yes.

15744. Mr. *Layard.*] Was not there a regular English harbour-master at Constantinople?—Yes; but he had no control over the naval transports; he was not allowed to interfere with them.

15745. Was he acquainted with the country or the place?—I do not think he was to any extent; besides, his duties were confined to the commercial shipping, and they were of a very extensive character; he was not called upon to interfere in this matter.

15746. Captain *Gladstone.*] By whom was he appointed?—I rather think he was an officer under the British consulate.

15747. Mr. *Layard.*] Was that Mr. Silly?—Yes.

15748. Lord *Seymour.*] Were you called upon at any other time for vegetables except upon that single occasion?—I was never called upon to provide them except on that occasion, because consignments of potatoes arrived from Trieste by the Austrian Lloyd's steamers. I had great difficulty in getting them transhipped to vessels for the Crimea.

15749. *Chairman.*] If you had received further orders for vegetables, could you have bought them?—Yes, I could, almost to any extent.

15750. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to cattle, could you always from Constantinople have supplied sufficient for the army in the Crimea if the vessels had gone regularly backwards and forwards?—I think so; we had a large depôt of cattle in Constantinople, or the immediate vicinity, that is as near as it could be; there were as many as 4,000 head, and there were also about 2,000 head at the Smyrna depôt, which the Commissary-general himself made before he arrived at Constantinople.

15751. Do you mean to say that through that winter, when the troops were living, to their great discomfort, suffering as they were from sickness, upon salt meat, you had 4,000 head of cattle applicable to their food?—Yes, 4,000 head; but it must be remembered that these cattle were of a very small and inferior description; they had fallen away very much during the winter season, for the last winter was very severe.

15752. *Chairman.*] Still they would have been fresh meat?—Yes, under any circumstances.

15753. Lord *Seymour.*] Under what system were they placed?—They were farmed out, but they were placed under the supervision of an officer of the Commissariat, with a subordinate, to see that they were properly attended to; and the reports that I had from him and his assistant were that they saw no reason to complain of the treatment the cattle received.

15754. *Chairman.*] If you had received a requisition for them, you could have sent them?—Yes, supposing that I had had the means of transport.

15755. Had you the means of transport within reach of the authorities there?—There were not means to a sufficient extent; not till the commencement of December, and then the vessels began to run regularly with cattle.

15756. Captain *Gladstone.*] If you had received a requisition you could not have attended to it, for want of vessels?—I do not know; the weather was very boisterous; on one occasion every head of cattle shipped on board the "Albatross" died, in consequence of the inclemency of the weather going up.

15757. Mr. *Layard.*] Were those ships fitted up expressly for the purpose of conveying cattle?—Yes, they were.

15758. From what cause did they die, then?—From the excessively boisterous weather.

15759. *Chairman.*] What was the "Albatross;" was she a sailing ship or a steamer?—A steamer that had been employed in the cattle trade at home.

15760. Mr. *Layard.*] Were the beasts knocked to pieces by the motion of the vessel?—I fancy so.

15761. Did you make an application for any additional transport?—Yes, I did, to Admiral Boxer; but he said that he had not any at his disposal.

15762. Lord *Seymour.*] At this time the Committee have been given to understand there were seven vessels given up solely to the Commissariat at the end of November?—Yes, there were some at that time, and they ran with tolerable regularity after they were rendered efficient.

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15763. From Constantinople?—Yes, with the exception of the delays that occurred in coaling and watering them.

15764. At what time do you consider you had the most difficulty in sending fresh meat to the Crimea?—Immediately after the hurricane.

15765. That was the worst time?—Yes.

16766. In December that difficulty had been, in some degree, got over?—Yes; and we had nothing but the delays of coaling and watering the vessels and the boisterous state of the elements to contend with.

15767. With regard to coaling, as you were anxious to send off those vessels as fast as you could, did you look into the system of coaling them?—Yes.

15768. What did you think of it?—I thought it very imperfect, and badly carried out. I frequently have gone personally on board steamers to facilitate the coaling them and watering them. I have not only purchased water when I could do it, but paid for labourers to facilitate the coaling of the vessels, though it was no part of my duty to do so.

15769. Have you seen the coaling at Malta?—Yes, I have, and it is managed there with admirable facility. I may say that all the arrangements that emanated from Malta were of the most admirable description, and that a better man than Admiral Stewart never could be found in any part of the world; everything that he did in connexion with our department was of a most satisfactory and able description.

15770. If you had been called upon to provide a system of coaling at Constantinople, such as there was at Malta, should you have found it impracticable to do it?—Certainly. At Malta very great facilities exist; the harbour is very contracted and easy to be traversed, and smooth in all weathers; but it is quite the contrary at Constantinople. Then they have a better description of people to deal with; the Maltese are better than the Turks.

15771. The first difficulty was the nature of the coast there; the harbour, in fact?—Yes.

15772. The next difficulty was that the people were not so apt to this business?—No; they require a great many holidays; and the Turkish people generally are apathetic.

15773. Mr. *Layard.*] You are speaking of the Christians now, are you not, when you speak of holidays?—And the Turks too; the Turks, I think, require some holidays.

15774. Lord *Seymour.*] Would it not have been possible to have obtained some men from Malta to have assisted in the coaling at Constantinople?—Yes; I think there was a want of system as to coaling vessels there, which was a serious detriment to the public service.

15775. Was the arrangement as to watering a defective one?—Yes; the means of watering were not sufficiently extensive.

15776. But under a better system they might have been easily improved?—Yes.

15777. Were you ever called upon to furnish any supplies to the hospitals at Scutari?—I was.

15778. When was that?—According to the Commissariat regulations, it is the duty of the Commissariat to enter into contracts for the supply of hospital provisions and medical comforts. Such contracts were entered into by me; and, according to the reports I received from the medical officers, they were conducted generally in a satisfactory manner. The contracts embraced a supply of fresh meat, bread, vegetables, milk, eggs, fowls, and articles of this description.

15779. As you were called upon to supply them, did you hear any complaints from the hospitals, that you had failed in furnishing the supply?—No, not those embraced in the contract; I never heard of any important failure.

15780. All that you were called upon to provide, you found no difficulty in providing?—No, not the ordinary supplies of the hospitals.

15781. But with regard to medical comforts, was there any difficulty in providing them?—No, not so far as the contract extended; but it did not extend to all the articles that come under the denomination of medical comforts; they could not be procured in such a market as Constantinople of a suitable quality; for instance, preserved meats and soups, arrowroot and port wine; those things could not be got to the necessary extent nor of the proper quality for hospital use.

15782. In

15782. In your stores you had no preserved meats, I believe?—Yes, a small quantity, not a very great supply; they were surplus stores handed over by the transports.

15783. You did not lay in a supply of them?—No, I did not; I was never required to do so.

15784. Captain *Gladstone.*] What was the system of watering at Constantinople?—It was by means of a tank boat.

15785. Was she a steamer, or was she towed by other boats?—She was a tank vessel.

15786. Was there only one at Constantinople?—I believe there was only one belonging to the navy.

15787. Were all the English vessels watered by means of that vessel?—Not all; there was another tank boat, but she was a steam tank boat, and used exclusively, and very extensively, for the mercantile shipping; so much so, that her services were in greater demand than she could meet.

15788. Was it represented to Admiral Boxer that there was an insufficiency of steam vessels, and that they were frequently delayed for want of a better means of watering them?—I think it was; I am not sure that I brought the question specifically under his notice, that one was insufficient; but the delays in watering the vessels were most frequently and most earnestly brought under his particular attention.

15789. Were the vessels never watered from boats?—Yes, when the weather admitted of it; most of the vessels are fitted with tanks, and it requires an engine to fill those tanks from a boat alongside, so that the ordinary means of watering vessels would not apply to vessels so constructed.

15790. With regard to coaling, how were the vessels coaled generally?—By means of a lighter; sometimes they were brought alongside the wharves, but very seldom; chiefly by lighter, or by a collier being brought alongside.

15791. Latterly, before you left, was the coaling done more rapidly?—I did not see much improvement.

15792. Mr. *Layard.*] In your report, dated the 19th March, and which appears to be a sketch of what you thought it was desirable should be done, in order to prepare for the arrival of the army in Turkey, you first begin by stating that it is necessary to have some person who is acquainted with the languages and the resources of the country?—Yes.

15793. Was any such person ever sent out to you?—Never sent out from England; I depended upon the country to procure one.

15794. This report was sent to England, was it not?—It was.

15795. Who was supplied to you from the country?—I have already stated that an officer of the Turkish army was attached to me for two days.

15796. I am speaking now of a person in the character of an interpreter, to assist you in the discharge of your duties?—I had no one attached to me for that particular purpose at first.

15797. Do not you think that it would have been very desirable that your suggestion should have been carried out, and that some person, well acquainted with the country and its resources, I mean an Englishman, or of an Anglo-Levantine family, should have been attached to you?—I should have been very glad indeed of the assistance of such a person; but I must say, that I found no practical difficulty for want of a special interpreter. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was kind enough to let me have the services of his interpreter, whenever I had any intercourse with the Turkish Government, or any great contract or piece of business to transact with any particular individual. Mr. Etienne Pisani, his chief dragoman, he sent to me; and I must beg to say, that I derived very valuable assistance from him during the whole time I was in Constantinople; I considered that he rendered very eminent services to the public. Then Mr. Chabert was also placed at my disposal; and, occasionally, Mr. Simmons, of the embassy.

15798. All those gentlemen were gentlemen attached to the embassy, and had duties to perform of their own?—Yes.

15799. Was it not desirable, in accordance with your suggestion, that somebody should have been attached to you who was acquainted with the resources of the country and the languages?—Yes, it was; but I procured a person of

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that description on the recommendation of the embassy afterwards, who was constantly attached to me, and followed me; he was an Armenian.

15800. What was his name?—His name was Paul Kricorian.

15801. There was no Englishman attached to you?—No.

15802. You stated in the report that a proposal was made for the formation of a kind of commission, consisting of French, Turkish, and English; was that ever formed?—It was.

15803. Did it work well?—It worked tolerably well. The Commission comprised the Seraskier Pasha, and all the heads of the different departments in Constantinople. I attended this Commission, in conjunction with a representative from the French Government. The chief object of it was to ascertain what resources the country would afford and what plan of operation it was necessary to adopt to make those resources available.

15804. The Commission was not formed to procure necessaries?—No; merely to assist in enforcing compliance with our requirements.

15805. You state that it was understood that the British troops would in all probability disembark near Gallipoli, at the head of the Dardanelles, and move onward to Adrianople?—Yes.

15806. Were any instructions given to you to that effect?—Not at that time; it was merely a surmise at that time.

15807. At any other time, were there any instructions given that led you to believe that the army was to march after they landed at Gallipoli into the interior?—No; nor subsequently.

15808. Then this suggestion of yours, that means of transport should be procured at Gallipoli, merely refers to what you thought might possibly take place?—Yes; precisely so.

15809. You recommend in this same report, that a large central depôt should be established at Constantinople, not only for salt meat and rum, but for fresh provisions, and for the produce of the country; were any depôts ever established?—They were to as great an extent as the circumstances of the army required; and I think, as far as I have been able to judge from what has taken place, there has never been any material want of supplies as far as water carriage could convey them; the difficulties arose after they arrived at Balaklava. The question as to the inadequacy of the depôts is met, I think, by the fact, that the supplies did exist at Balaklava, almost without any important exception.

15810. *Chairman.*] Does not fresh meat convey itself?—It conveys itself on land, certainly.

15811. Then how can you say that a difficulty would have arisen from conveying fresh meat from Balaklava to the camp?—I did not say that with respect to fresh meat; that would convey itself as a matter of course.

15812. Mr. *Layard.*] You consider that there were sufficient depôts at Constantinople to answer all purposes?—Yes; in conjunction with the supplies in course of delivery by contract, and the supplies on their way out from England, I think that the arrangements made as to those supplies were of the most prudent description; it was far better that they should be detached, and be in a state so that they could be easily made use of, than be crammed into large storehouses, to be operated upon as demands might require.

15813. If there had been some order and regularity, there would never have been any want of proper supplies at the depôts at Constantinople?—I think there was no such want.

15814. With regard to bread, you give an account in the report of the price and abundance of it, and the quality?—Yes.

15815. Are you acquainted with the way in which the French distribute bread to the troops?—To some extent; I have no practical knowledge; I have heard that they issue flour, and that the troops bake it themselves.

15816. The French have regular bakehouses, have they not, forming a part of the military department?—Yes; they have where they are stationed for any length of time, but not in ordinary movements, I think, so far as I was able to judge, though I had very little time to look into the system.

15817. They distribute bread three or four times a week, do they not?—Yes, I believe so.

15818. Could we have supplied our troops with bread in the same way?—Not in the Crimea.

15819. Why not?—For want of adequate preparations.

15820. If that adequate preparation had been made, bread could have been served out?—Yes; it must be remembered that it was only on the 8th of November, when the winter had set in with severity, that it was known to any of the heads of departments that the army was likely to winter in the Crimea; there was then an immense amount of preparation necessary, as every person must know, to enable an army to winter in a place like the Crimea, and that preparation had to be made all at once; the demands were excessive, and that state of things was followed by the hurricane of the 14th of November, when not only was a very large amount of supplies lost, but vessels which ought to have brought up others were very seriously crippled; and a state of things thus arose which, I think, will go a long way to explain the difficulties in which our unfortunate soldiers were placed.

15821. *Chairman.*] You mean to say, that up to the 8th of November you were not informed of the likelihood that the army would have to winter in the Crimea?—I did not know till the 10th of November that they were likely to winter in the Crimea; it was only, I believe, on the 8th that that measure was decided on in the Crimea.

15822. You were not ordered to provide any means for the army to winter in the Crimea until that time?—Not to winter in the Crimea.

15823. Mr. *Layard.*] The army must have wintered somewhere?—Yes, but it was very uncertain where; the general impression was, that they would winter in the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

15824. *Chairman.*] But where it wintered it would want to eat?—Yes.

15825. Were you informed of the necessity of providing food for the army during the winter?—I was prepared with supplies; with forage corn, and chopped straw, and with live cattle, which I have already described as being in the neighbourhood of Constantinople; and the stream of supplies coming out from England, in addition to those that we had provided there, were considered sufficient for the winter consumption of the troops.

15826. Mr. *Layard.*] You state in this report, that cattle and sheep can be procured in abundance by giving timely notice, so that they can be brought in from the country; therefore you think, that at no time the army ought to have been in want of fresh meat, supposing proper means had been there to transport it to the camp?—That report applies specifically to Constantinople.

15827. The difficulties arose from the want of power to transport the meat from Constantinople to the Crimea; but so far as Constantinople was concerned, you might have collected any amount of cattle there?—I think we might have collected them, but it would have been improper to have retained a larger collection of cattle in that neighbourhood than we had.

15828. But from Asia Minor you might have obtained them, might you not?—Yes, I think that country afforded great facilities.

15829. Was any attempt made to form a depôt at Sinope or elsewhere?—Not until very recently.

15830. At what time was the first depôt established there?—I think either the latter end of December or the beginning of January; but it must be stated that depôts existed in other places which must be made use of before others were established.

15831. Do you know whether the French made any contract with our consul at Samsoun with regard to a supply of cattle?—I am not aware that they did.

15832. We never made any contract there?—Not for cattle; but for forage corn to a very large extent; in the month of July, I think, a large quantity of forage corn was supplied from Samsoun through the intervention of the vice-consul there.

15833. Where was it brought to?—To Varna.

15834. You had no difficulty in procuring it?—No; I never had any difficulty in procuring forage corn to any extent; there was never a deficiency of forage corn wherever it was wanted, excepting in the camp.

15835. Your suggestion in this report, which I take to be the most important document that you have furnished, is that "barley and chopped straw are the invariable

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invariable food of Turkish horses, and they seem to thrive admirably upon this kind of forage," and you have just stated that they could be procured to any extent?—Yes, during the time that the cavalry and artillery horses were at Constantinople, they were fed exclusively upon chopped straw and barley, and I believe they were in very fair condition.

15836. Do you know the relative prices of fresh and salt meat; suppose you had had to supply the army with fresh meat from Constantinople, or with salt or preserved meats, could you give any idea of the relative expense of the three?—The fresh meat would have been the cheapest, the salt meat next, and the preserved meat next; I do not know exactly the price of the latter, but it is excessive with regard to the others.

15837. The cheapest operation would have been the supply of fresh meat?—Yes.

15838. Are you aware that the health of troops very much depends upon the supply of fresh meat?—It does of course.

15839. You think that, both with regard to economy and health, fresh meat continually supplied would have been by far the best?—I do certainly; but at the same time I must state, that the presence of salt meat was absolutely necessary to provide for any failure of fresh meat; for, notwithstanding every exertion which I believe to have been made on the part of the Commissariat, they did unavoidably fail, and then the salt meat was necessary to be brought into use as a substitute.

15840. It has been stated that fresh meat has a double advantage: first, it is more healthy; and secondly, it transports itself?—Yes.

15841. That does not apply to salt meat?—No.

15842. Therefore it would have been as easy to provide fresh meat as salt, if proper provision had been made for its transport?—It would be easy if you had all the appliances to carry such an arrangement into effect.

15843. Whose fault was it that those appliances were not to be had?—I have already stated that we had great difficulty to contend with in consequence of the damage the vessels sustained during the hurricane. Between the period of the hurricane and the period when the vessels were brought into an efficient state, I believe, was the time when the troops had to subsist almost exclusively on salt meat.

15844. Up to the hurricane, on the 14th of November, is it your opinion that the troops were not in want of any necessaries?—I do not think that they were, to any important extent.

15845. *Chairman.*] It is your opinion that they ought not to have been?—They ought not to have been.

15846. Mr. *Layard.*] The next suggestion in the report is as to firewood. You give it as your opinion that a stock of firewood ought to be laid in; was that suggestion ever attended to?—It was.

15847. Where was this stock of firewood laid in?—I entered into contracts for a winter supply of 20,000 checkees of firewood (which would answer to about 4,000 or 5,000 tons) at Constantinople, and also a very large supply of charcoal.

15848. At what time were those contracts entered into?—Rather late; somewhere about the month of August or the beginning of September; I cannot speak precisely as to the date.

15849. Was that in anticipation of a winter campaign?—I brought the matter under the notice of the Commissary-general myself, and suggested to him, that if a winter supply of fuel was necessary, provision should be made for it at once, as the winter was approaching, when it would be much dearer and more difficult of transport. I received instructions from him to prepare at Scutari a depôt of firewood and charcoal, sufficient for the winter consumption of the army.

15850. A depôt was made?—Yes; as fast as it could be.

15851. Did that depôt ever furnish firewood or charcoal to the army in the Crimea?—It did.

15852. When did it commence that supply?—The first consignment of charcoal, I think, took place about the end of November. As near as I can recollect no application was made to me before for it.

15853. Was charcoal ever sent back from the Crimea?—Yes.

15854. Under what circumstances?—A supply of charcoal was demanded from

from Admiral Boxer. I do not know who wrote to him, but it was not done through the intervention of the Commissariat; and he sent up a considerable supply by the "Himalaya," which was never landed there, but was brought back again, and it ultimately came to me at Constantinople.

15855. Was that particular charcoal sent back again to the Crimea?—No; that particular charcoal was used on the spot, at Scutari.

15856. *Chairman.*] Did you ever hear why it was sent back?—I did not. I understood generally that they had no convenience for landing it there.

15857. You sent it from Constantinople to Balaklava, and when it got to Balaklava, it was sent back again to you?—Admiral Boxer sent this consignment up to Balaklava; it came back, and I took it from him.

15858. Mr. *Layard.*] Were any supplies of forage, food, wood, and charcoal sent afterwards to the Crimea regularly?—Not regularly, but as regularly as they could be. I tried to procure the services of native vessels to send supplies of charcoal and wood to the Crimea, but I found it utterly impossible to do so; the masters of those vessels were so frightened at what occurred during the hurricane, that they would not engage themselves.

15859. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What store of fire-wood had you at Constantinople?—I cannot say the precise quantity we had there, but it was in course of delivery by the contractors, and was at convenient stations. The "Jason" was sent on one occasion to a place where there was a supply.

15860. By means of contracts, did you succeed in collecting a sufficient store of fire-wood to have supplied the army in the Crimea for any considerable part of the winter?—Yes; it might have been supplied if the means of transport had existed to a sufficient extent; I mean sea transport to Balaklava.

15861. Taking the facts as they occurred, and the transport as you got it, what quantity of fire-wood did you send to the Crimea?—I cannot say the precise quantity.

15862. Was it enough to supply the army for any length of time?—No, it was not; but it was more than they had the means of conveying from Balaklava to the camp.

15863. Even what you did send never reached the camp?—I cannot say it did; some of it may have reached the camp. I am unacquainted with the manner in which it was disposed of after it reached Balaklava.

15864. Did you hear that they were unable to convey it?—Yes; and I heard that they were in great distress for want of fire-wood in the camp.

15865. Can you judge, supposing that the fire-wood had been there, and that it had been conveyed to the camp, how long it would have supplied the army?—It would have supplied the army throughout the winter.

15866. Do you mean what you sent?—No, what I had contracted for.

15867. For how long would it have supplied the army?—I cannot exactly answer that question.

15868. Captain *Gladstone.*] Were you able to send all that was asked for?—No; I was not able to send all that was necessary.

15869. Why were you not able to do so?—Because I could not get sufficient means of transport.

15870. Did you make application for further means of transport?—Yes, repeatedly; and I was told that there were no further means of transport available, and no vessels unemployed.

15871. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you ever send those requisitions or applications home?—No; I sent home representations as to the want of transport, and the difficulty under which I laboured as to the want of system.

15872. To whom did you send those representations?—I sent some to the Commissary-general, and others to Sir Charles Trevelyan, as the Secretary to the Treasury; I can read a letter on that subject.

15873. *Chairman.*] Are you aware of the fact, that at the very time of which you are speaking, vessels lay at Balaklava doing nothing?—I have reason to believe that some were there doing nothing.

15874. Yet you received an answer that no vessel was available?—Yes, I did, from Admiral Boxer.

15875. Captain *Gladstone.*] Did you make it known to Commissary-general Filder that there were no means of conveying the fuel he wrote for?—Yes; I kept him constantly informed of all the difficulties I had to contend with.

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15876. General *Peel.*] I believe it is not usual for the Commissariat to supply fuel for the army?—Not in the field.

15877. *Chairman.*] But you were called upon then to supply it?—Yes.

15878. General *Peel.*] Upon what requisition was that?—Upon a requisition made to me by the Commissary-general.

15879. Was it by Lord Raglan's desire?—I fancy it must have been.

15880. *Chairman.*] That was the requisition upon which you acted?—Yes; and I acted upon it to the best of my ability.

15881. You were ready to send the fuel if transport had been furnished?—Yes.

15882. So that all the difficulties did not lie with the Commissariat, and did not arise from the Commissariat not being accustomed to supply the army with fuel?—Certainly not. I was prepared to supply forage and wood at Constantinople to any extent which the wants of the service required. I think there would be no difficulty in procuring wood; there is a place at Ismidt, which is both easy of access, and possesses great facilities for shipping fire-wood. If I could not have got it at Constantinople, I could have got it there with great facility.

15883. Your failure to supply the army with fuel arose out of the want of transport to be supplied to you?—Yes, entirely out of the want of sufficient transport.

15884. Mr. *Layard.*] The same remarks would apply to the barley and chopped straw; you might, with proper means of transport, have supplied the army with abundance of fodder?—Yes; the army was supplied with barley and chopped straw.

15885. But it has been stated that for a month the troops were obliged to depend upon the French for chopped straw?—I think there must be some exaggeration in that statement. There is a memorandum, which I have seen, from the Commissary-general, in which he states that, with the exception of the first few days succeeding the hurricane of the 14th of November, there was always an abundant supply of chopped straw in the harbour of Balaklava; that was up to the 19th of January.

15886. It is the fact that, if proper means of transport had been furnished, barley and chopped straw would have been supplied regularly?—Certainly; there was an abundance of barley on all occasions.

15887. *Chairman.*] At Balaklava?—Yes.

15888. Mr. *Layard.*] Will you be good enough to read those communications from Commissary-general Filder?—Those only contain specimens of the difficulties which I had to contend with as to the transport. I am not in possession of my own records; I was obliged, by the regulations of the service, to leave them behind, and I am indebted to Sir Charles Trevelyan for the present references. The first is a demi-official letter, which I wrote to the Commissary-general, on the 23d of November last. I do not mean to say that that is the first report which I made to him of the deficiencies of the transport system at Constantinople, but it is the first that I have in my possession now; it was marked at the time "Confidential," but I have not the slightest objection to make a public document of it: "Everything connected with the shipping arrangements for the Commissariat is thrown upon me, instead of being performed by the naval authorities, like it is at Malta, according to the Commissariat regulations:" that is in the case of the sea transport. "Whatever I ask is regarded as a bore, or granted as a favour; and all the arrangements of one day, which have occupied great time, and caused me immense trouble, may be altered the next, as is frequently the case. Admiral Boxer, in short, is a confused man, and has but little control over the shipmasters, who entertain neither respect for, nor fear of him." I am sorry to be obliged to read this.

15889. *Chairman.*] You are doing your duty?—"I am continually running "here, there, and everywhere, seeing personally to the coaling of steamers and "other shipping arrangements, otherwise much more delay and inconvenience "would be occasioned, and this work may be said to be altogether of an "extraneous nature. I have spoken to the Admiral about getting the 'Tonning' "repaired expeditiously, and he has promised to do so, like he does with every-"thing else. I should not be surprised if this vessel is not ready for at least a fortnight." It turns out that she was detained longer than that. "Under

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all these circumstances, you will perceive the difficulty in which I am placed. I will do everything which human nature can effect to overcome difficulties, but I cannot ensure success; and I hope you will explain matters to Lord Raglan, when things may go wrong in this way. Admiral Boxer has not received instructions to place any steam transport at my disposal; he says he has none available."

15890. Mr. *Layard.*] From whom ought he to have received instructions?—From Lord Raglan. I was informed by the Commissary-general that Lord Raglan had instructed him to place some steam transports at my disposal immediately after the occurrence of the hurricane, and he said he had none. "He says he has none available, and that he cannot give me any more sailing transports for hay and stores. The 'Arabia' is loading with charcoal and timber, but I have no one to see to the shipment. It is impossible that matters can go on in this way much longer; they must come either to a dead lock, or be thrown into irretrievable confusion."

15891. Ought there to have been anybody to superintend the shipments?—Yes.

15892. Who ought to have furnished men to superintend the shipments?—That want was one of a departmental nature.

15893. Was your staff sufficient and efficient?—Not sufficient for the duties which it had to perform.

15894. Did you represent that fact?—Yes, repeatedly, to the Commissary-general.

15895. Was any notice taken of it?—Yes; and I had reinforcements as far as the means at his disposal would admit of.

15896. Then the cause of the mischief was not out there, but at home?—The department certainly was, before the occurrence of this war, cut down to a scale scarcely sufficient for the duties required to be performed by it in a time of peace. There ought to have been an organised subordinate establishment.

15897. Then it was not Admiral Boxer's duty?—Not in this particular case.

15898. *Chairman.*] In that letter you straightforwardly told the truth?—Yes, certainly.

15899. Mr. *Layard.*] Will you be good enough to read your letter to Sir Charles Trevelyan, or any letters which you think bear upon the state of things there, and which show that you attempted to get them put right?—My own Official Letter Book at Constantinople teems with applications to Admiral Boxer; and I wish it was here to show the importunities I made to him to meet the wants of the service—importunities which he characterised as a bore.

15900. These letters being in London, I presume they were transmitted by Commissary-general Filder to Sir Charles Trevelyan?—No, I transmitted them to Sir Charles Trevelyan.

15901. Were all the circumstances that you pointed out to Commissary-general Filder also brought to the notice of the department in England?—I do not say all; but the leading specimens.

15902. At any rate these were?—Yes; these were. Here is one that I wrote on the 5th of December to Sir Charles Trevelyan. These difficulties were becoming of such an important nature that I felt very much oppressed by them, and I gave vent to my feelings.

15903. Is that a demi-official letter?—Yes; it is dated Constantinople, 5th December 1854, addressed to Sir Charles Trevelyan: "The difficulties connected with shipping arrangements here are increasing so fast that I venture to enclose, for your information, copies of two official letters, which I have very recently had occasion to address to Mr. Filder on the subject. I also beg to forward a copy of a report made to me by Mr. Potgieter, respecting a failure of almost daily occurrence:" (He was the officer in charge of the depôt at Scutari.) "In this instance the aggravation is excessive, the weather having been so bad as to render communication all but impracticable. The difficulties to which I refer should be known at home, otherwise we may be blamed. They could be avoided, to a very great extent, by the most ordinary management. The 'Rockcliff,' with supplies of biscuit and salt meat for the army in the Crimea, had not sailed yesterday, the 4th December, when the wind was

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fair; to-day it is foul." Here is an official letter enclosed, dated "Commissariat, Pera, 1st December 1854. Sir,—I beg to hand you the accompanying communication, connected with the shipment of potatoes at Trieste for the British army in Turkey, together with a memorandum, by which you will perceive that none of these potatoes are required for the establishment at Scutari. They have, accordingly, been distributed as follows; namely, 15 casks on board Her Majesty's ship 'Valorous,' 25 casks on board the transport steamer 'Sydney,' and 10 casks on board the sailing transport 'Palmerston.' I applied several times to Rear-Admiral Boxer for steam transports for these potatoes; but there has been infinite disappointment and difficulty in the matter; so much so, that the expenses of transhipment have been greatly multiplied, and the potatoes kept for days together in lighters, exposed to the inclemency of the weather. They have been taken from one steamer to another almost *ad infinitum*, and the last 10 casks have been put on board a sailing transport. When these will arrive, or whether they will be fit for use when they do, I am quite at a loss to imagine. The expenses of transhipment will be duly reported when the account is presented."

15904. I suppose the potatoes at length came almost to a fabulous price?—They must have done so; those that were sent from Trieste must have cost a very large sum of money; I cannot say how much. This is the next official letter, and which called forth a letter from Lord Raglan to Admiral Boxer, which Sir Charles Trevelyan put in the other day; he did not read this letter of mine, which called forth that production. It is dated the 2d December, from myself to Commissary-general Filder: "I do myself the honour to enclose copies of two letters, addressed by me to Rear-Admiral Boxer, respecting the ship 'Rockcliff.' No answer has been returned to either of them, and the vessel still remains here, notwithstanding that a fair wind has been blowing for several days. The ship is, I understand, in such a position as to require the assistance of a steamer before she can be cleared; and the master has been simply referred to me by Rear-Admiral Boxer to extricate the vessel, a naval transport, from this difficulty; our hired tug has, however, been unavailable for this service, and is, moreover, not powerful enough for it. The 'Harpy,' and other Admiralty steamers could, I imagine, have been employed for the purpose. In furtherance of your urgent demands for forage corn, I applied to-day for a small vessel, with barley, to be towed up to Balaklava; but the verbal answer given by Rear-Admiral Boxer to Mr. Potgieter was, that no steamer was available. The 'Wrangler' left this evening for the Crimea, without anything in tow, and could not have been much impeded by a small vessel with a fair wind; while the master of this vessel could not be trusted without a convoy; and I hope that if a scarcity of forage corn should arise, the responsibility may not be considered to rest with me. The weather has been so excessively unfavourable as to render it impossible to get any other barley vessels ready; those which were ready to go with cargoes on board before the late shipwrecks at Balaklava now refuse to proceed, let the terms of charter be what they may."

15905. I presume, if you had done what might have been done before the storm at Balaklava, you might have got the proper means of transport in that country?—No, I could not have got proper means of transport in that country; they were ready to go before the hurricane, but after that, none of them would go. I must state that I did my utmost to get the vessels towed up. The Commissary-general applied the screw so as to lead me to suppose that there was less there than really did exist; it was a laudable motive on his part, but I did not know it; it was intended to stimulate me and my officers to further exertions at Constantinople, and that made me so urgent with Admiral Boxer. But there never was, notwithstanding the difficulties of transport, a deficiency of forage corn at Balaklava to any extent that the army required.

15906. You attribute, do you not, the great delay, and the great difficulties that occurred, mainly to Admiral Boxer?—There were very great difficulties, and very great delay; but he had an incomplete staff to assist him at Constantinople; a great deal devolved upon him personally, and his duties were excessive. It is, I think, no disparagement to him to say, that he has not the administrative genius necessary for conducting such complicated and difficult duties as devolved upon him there. He is an excellent sailor and a brave man, and everything

everything that could be wished as a sailor, but he has not the administrative genius which Admiral Stewart had.

15907. When did you first write any letter complaining of this state of things; at what date?—I cannot recollect the precise date, but it occurred as the difficulties occurred.

15908. When did you first write a letter, either to Sir Charles Trevelyan or to Commissary-general Filder, which implied that you had considerable doubt whether Admiral Boxer was competent to fulfil the duties imposed upon him?—Perhaps the Committee will permit me to read the remainder of this letter; it is not complete without: "When steamers are appointed to tow vessels with Commissariat supplies, the preparation of these vessels is generally left with this department, and for want of sufficient notice, or the carelessness of masters, opportunities are sometimes missed. I submit that all these movements should be solely managed by the Naval department, and that a sufficient staff of naval officers be immediately appointed for the purpose. I cannot, without cordial and effective co-operation of the kind, carry on the duties here under the present most critical circumstances. I have been accused by Rear-Admiral Boxer, of 'boring him with importunities,' and desired peremptorily not to communicate with him otherwise than in writing—a state of things which, as the vital interests of the public service are concerned, I beg to request may he laid before the Commander of the Forces, if you should deem it proper."

15909. Can you tell the Committee when you first wrote a letter of that character; how early was it?—I cannot recollect the first time; I apprised Commissary-general Filder of every failure on the part of the naval administration at Constantinople as it occurred.

15910. Had you reason to believe that as soon as the month of August?—Not so early as that.

15911. Or September?—I cannot be certain whether it was September or not.

15912. Are you certain that you believed it in October?—Yes.

15913. In the beginning of October?—Perhaps it was.

15914. Can you state, according to your belief, whether in the beginning of November the Commissary-general or the Treasury at home had some notion of your opinion of the way in which things were managed at Constantinople?—Yes; I am pretty certain as to the fact that the Treasury at home, and the Commissary-general at the Crimea, were aware of very great difficulties existing as to the transport.

15915. When did Admiral Boxer leave Constantinople, having a new appointment at Balaklava?—In January.

15916. Up to that time he remained there in that position?—Yes; while the complaints with regard to the want of a proper system of administration in the case of transports were almost of daily occurrence.

15917. Could not the transports have been anchored in such parts of the Bosphorus as to have secured them from the wind; a little way up?—That is a question which I could not exactly answer, not being a professional man; I think it is very possible they might; not all, perhaps, but those that were most urgently wanted.

15918. Have you known many transports detained at Constantinople with provisions on board for the troops?—Yes.

15919. Can you mention any cases?—Yes; the case of the "Arabia," a vessel loaded with deals for the construction of magazines at Balaklava, and also with charcoal. This vessel was loaded with every possible despatch by the Commissariat, and she was lying waiting for a fair wind, there being no vessel to tow her. I went, finding the wind fair, and desired the master to get under weigh; he attempted it, and a steamer was sent by Admiral Boxer, but he could not get the anchor up, and this was not done until the next morning, when the wind had died away. I think that if anything like zeal or proper attention to the interests of the service had existed as to such matters, the crew of a frigate that was lying within hail, the "Dauntless," might have been used to get this vessel under weigh with very great advantage.

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15920. Supposing you had had unlimited power, what would you have done?—I should have gone to the frigate immediately, and demanded the assistance of the captain and crew to get this vessel off when the wind was fair.

15921. How many days was she detained in consequence of that change of wind?—Not very long; the wind was light, but the detention might have been attended with much more serious consequences.

15922. Do you know of instances of vessels laden with winter clothing having been detained there, some containing boots and shoes?—I cannot immediately remember any instances, but there was great difficulty in getting transport for the winter clothing. I was desired, after the hurricane, to expend, if necessary, 50,000 *l.* in the purchase of warm clothing at Constantinople, and Major Wetherall, of the Quartermaster-general's staff, was sent down by Lord Raglan to co-operate with me. I placed, in conjunction with him, an officer of ability to carry out the necessary arrangements. I went first to the Turkish Government to get all the assistance we could from them; and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe very considerately sent his interpreter to assist in the same object. This clothing was purchased, so far as Constantinople would admit of, by Major Wetherall and the Commissariat officer, but great difficulties existed as to the transport of the clothing to Balaklava; there were great detentions. I cannot specify any particular instance in which the blame could be laid upon Admiral Boxer; the responsibility rested with him, but I could not blame him.

15923. How long was the winter clothing detained before it was sent to Balaklava?—I cannot say; it was sent by instalments.

15924. Do you know that the boots and shoes were sent backwards and forwards?—I recollect hearing of it.

15925. Referring again to your report, I see amongst the various suggestions which you made, was one regarding the land transport; you say, "Some light carts of a portable nature, that could be drawn by the animals of the country, would have been a most desirable acquisition if sent from home, and I hope it is not yet too late to think of getting them out. If a few hundred of the fine Spanish mules could have been sent from Gibraltar, they would have been an invaluable addition to the transport of the country." Were those suggestions ever attended to?—Not precisely; carts were ordered from Malta, but none were sent from England.

15926. Were any carts ordered corresponding with the description which you have given here?—Not that I am aware of.

15927. Your suggestion, I conceive, has reference to carts suited to the beasts of the country?—Not precisely so; I contemplated that these carts should be drawn by mules sent from Spain.

15928. No; you say, "Some light carts of a portable nature, that could be drawn by the animals of the country"?—Yes, exactly.

15929. Would it have been advisable to have had some such carts?—Yes, exceedingly desirable; it was absolutely necessary that they should have some; but none such were sent out from England.

15930. Do you agree with the doctrine which Sir Charles Trevelyan has laid down, that the country itself should furnish the means of transport?—I do, as far as practicable.

15931. Do you think that Turkey is a country likely to furnish such transport as a British army would require?—No; I think that Turkey, as was proved by experience, could not furnish as much as was required, but it was supposed to be able to do so at the time. I had the assurance of the Turkish Government, and all the heads of the departments supposed to be acquainted with the resources of the country, that abundant means of transport could be provided; but, nevertheless, I recommended that those carts and mules should be sent out to fill up any failures that might occur.

15932. Your next suggestion is, that "Boats of almost every size and construction can be had at a reasonable rate of charge for inland water transport; some are wholly and some partially decked; I allude not only to the capital, but to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and I include the necessary hands for working them." Was that opinion borne out?—Yes; it was to a great extent borne out, until the requirements of boats and men became so great as to exceed the means which they had for complying with our demands. The French had

had a very large establishment at Constantinople; and the Turks themselves had a great deal to do with those boats and men, so that we found a difficulty in getting a sufficient number subsequently.

15933. Was there at any time such a want of native boats as would have warranted the keeping of the sick on board a vessel for the want of the means of moving them to the shore?—I think not.

15934. Was any application made to you from the hospital authorities, to get the boats of the country to move the sick and wounded?—Yes; and I believe they were furnished to the extent required of us, but the arrangements for landing the sick more immediately devolved upon Admiral Boxer; he never made an application to me for men and boats for the sick.

15935. Are you aware that the sick were frequently detained on board ship for want of the means of landing?—I did not know that; they were frequently detained for want of accommodation on shore, and in consequence of the boisterous state of the weather.

15936. Had you any voice in the selection of the hospital?—I had; when the Seraskier handed the barracks over to me, I said, "I have now to ask you for the use of the military hospital in the rear of the barrack;" and he said, "You shall have it; but you do not anticipate any great amount of sick to arrive, and, therefore, the upper part will do in the meantime. If the sick should increase so as to require the use of the whole building, you shall have it, and you shall have anything that we can give."

15937. So far as the Turkish Government was concerned, you found no obstacle?—On the contrary, I found a hearty concurrence in yielding to our wants, so far as they could do it; but of course the Committee are aware that they are perfectly ignorant of English forms of procedure, and a great deal of disappointment occurred; but they promised, and seemed inclined to bestow everything on us that they could afford.

15938. Then it depended more upon the want of requisitions on our part to them, than the want of good-will on their part?—We made requisitions, so far as we could consistently, upon the Turkish Government, and they complied with those requisitions, I think, as far as they were capable of doing it; they had a very large army of their own to provide for.

15939. But the French had much larger hospital accommodation, and in better places than we had?—Yes, they had.

15940. You state here, that you obtained information through General Tylden; at that time was he in any command there?—General Tylden was the senior officer at that particular time, but his position was rather indefinite; he was sent first to co-operate with the Admiral, but afterwards he became commanding engineer there, and he afforded me every assistance in his power.

15941. Did he send you down to Gallipoli?—No; I went down in consequence of orders received from home.

15942. If it has been stated to the Committee that the information obtained by the officers in command at Constantinople of the intention of sending troops from England to Gallipoli was derived from you, was that the case?—It was at first.

15943. You communicated your orders for supplying provisions, which gave the military an idea that Gallipoli was the place to be occupied?—Yes.

15944. So far as you are aware, those military officers had no orders from England at the time to that effect?—Not at that time. I went to Gallipoli immediately upon the receipt of the information that troops would arrive there.

15945. Yet the officers in command there had no information of the kind?—No; General Tylden's position was an anomalous one there; he was considered more under the orders of the Admiral than he was as a military officer.

15946. It has been stated that the huts that were first sent up to the Crimea could not be put up for want of nails; was that the case?—I cannot say. I can inform the Committee that, after the occurrence of the disaster of the 14th of November, a very large demand was made upon me for tools and materials to hut the troops, a demand so extensive that I was obliged to divide it into three portions. I assigned one to Constantinople, as far as I considered the means of that capital would admit of it; I assigned another to Malta, and

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the third to Corfu; and I sent urgent letters to the Generals commanding at Corfu and Malta, requesting that they would forward those supplies, that I might meet the demand. To show the extent of the demand for tools and materials to hut the troops, one of the items was for about 1,000,000 feet of plank at Constantinople.

15947. Will you read the letter, if you please?—I have not the one referring to the timber; it was a separate letter; but I will read the letter in which I was desired to purchase in Constantinople the other supplies. The demand made upon me in connexion with those supplies was of an enormous description; this is only one of a very great many demands for Quartermaster-general's stores. It is from Commissary-general Filder, dated the 12th of November, before the hurricane, but immediately subsequent to their ascertaining that the troops would winter in the Crimea.

15948. With regard to the nails, was there any delay in consequence of there not being nails in the Crimea?—There may have been; it was not officially called to my notice. I cannot give any instance. I have heard the report. This is the letter: "Adverting to the Quartermaster-general's letter of the 8th instant, recently transmitted to you to act upon, I now forward to you an amended list, showing the exact numbers of the materials and tools which will have to be purchased by you for the work of hutting the troops; and I beg to inform you, that application has been made for an engineer officer, whose duty it will be to select and approve of the several articles." "List of tools and materials required for hutting the troops, as requested by the Quartermaster-general's department. Masons' tools: trowels, 2,000; hammers, 2,000; levels, 400; picks, 2,000; spalling hammers, 200; points and chisels, 3,000. Carpenters' tools: hand saws, 1,400; cross-cut saws, 100; pit saws, 20; hammers, 1,500; spike gimlets, 1,500; brad awls, 1,500; mortice chisels, 500; bevels, 350; bench screws, 100; squares of sizes, 350." These are only a few specimens of this particular demand.

15949. Was the order executed?—Yes; but it of course occupied a considerable time to purchase, collect, and ship all those articles. During all this time the winter was progressing with severity, and the great misfortunes in question happened to the troops.

15950. Can you tell the Committee what was the state of the Turkish Custom-house at Constantinople?—It was wretched in the extreme.

15951. Did any delay take place for want of any person to see the things passed through the Custom-house?—It was unnecessary, so far as the public stores were concerned; the Custom-house was evaded entirely as to all public stores.

15952. Did not all the stores go to the Custom-house that were intended for different officers?—Many of them found their way into the Custom-house, and they could not be got at.

15953. Was any person appointed to look after such things in the Custom-house?—I am not aware.

15954. Did the French have any person so employed?—I am not aware that they had.

15955. Owing to this state of things, many things were lost or destroyed?—A great number of very grievous delays took place as to the delivery of those things, owing to the wretched mismanagement of the Turkish Custom-house, in regard to small supplies for individual officers.

15956. On a vessel arriving there with Commissariat stores, how did you ascertain the nature of her contents?—Either I had a bill of lading sent to me direct, or I procured one from the master.

15957. Had you only a bill of lading which contained a general specification of the contents?—Yes.

15958. Supposing you wanted any particular article from the ship, to whom did you apply?—To the captain.

15959. Did you suppose that he had a knowledge of the situation of all the things in his vessel?—I fancy he had; he must have had a cargo book, and he ought to have been acquainted with the stowage generally; in some instances, I think, there must have been a great deal of confusion as to those supplies.

15960. Did you ever see a cargo-book?—Yes.

15961. Had

15961. Had you any difficulties in ascertaining the position of certain stores on board?—No; I cannot adduce any particular instance of that kind.

15962. You do not think that the supercargo was absolutely necessary on board the ship?—I do not think he was.

15963. *Chairman.*] Did not this difficulty arise in the case of the "Prince"?—It did; at least it was stated so.

15964. Mr. *Layard.*] Had you always an abundant supply of rice at Constantinople?—Yes; the country afforded a good supply.

15965. Rice is almost the chief food, is it not, of the inhabitants of that country?—Yes.

15966. There would have been no difficulty in supplying the troops with rice?—No; and I am not aware that any did exist, unless it was shortly after the hurricane.

15967. Is it your impression that the troops were always supplied with rice?—Yes; so far as water-carriage was concerned.

15968. According to your idea, did the troops have it?—I believe there were instances in which they were without it, in consequence of the want of land transport.

15969. *Chairman.*] Was not the want of that land transport attributable to the Commissariat?—The Commissariat were responsible, certainly, for the land transport; but the circumstances connected with the question may be of such a nature as to relieve the department of that responsibility to a great extent.

15970. That is to say, necessity created the want, and it was not a lâches on the part of the Commissariat to perform their duty?—I think not.

15971. Mr. *Layard.*] Had you the charge of the baggage animals at Varna?—No.

15972. When they came to Constantinople, had you the charge then?—They were under my general superintendence. An officer was told off for that particular duty, who brought them round; he drove them round by land.

15973. Why did they come to Constantinople, and not go straight to Balaklava?—It was understood at the time that they were not immediately required in the Crimea.

15974. At what date was that?—I cannot recollect the date.

15975. Or the month?—It may have been about the end of September, or the beginning of October.

15976. Not later than that?—I think not.

15977. At that time you did not think that they wanted transport?—It seemed not. An order was given that the surplus transport animals were to be brought round to Constantinople.

15978. You have stated, have you not, to the Committee that the hospital ought never to have been in want of actual necessaries and medical comforts, to a certain extent, and that they could have obtained supplies from the bazaars in Constantinople?—I cannot answer that question very directly, because the purveyors were authorised to make purchases themselves in the market, and I was not informed of the full extent of the hospital wants; but so far as the contract that I had entered into was concerned, the articles were supplied to the full extent, I believe.

15979. Putting aside the duties and power of individuals, suppose that they had had the power of supplying themselves, could they have done so from the bazaars?—I do not know whether they could to the full extent.

15980. Bedding, for instance?—I think not.

15981. Not what they call Yourghans?—I think not; a great part of that was bought up after the loss of the clothing of the troops.

15982. The hospital was in a bad state long previous to that?—I think previously to that, they perhaps might have got all the supplies that they wanted from the bazaars of Constantinople.

15983. And they might have made preparations for receiving 5,000 or 6,000 men?—Yes, I think so.

15984. They might have got large supplies of rice?—Yes.

15985. And vegetables?—Yes; they always were forthcoming in a sufficient quantity.

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15986. Might they have obtained a supply of medicine, opium and rhubarb, for instance?—Yes; there was no difficulty as to the purchase of those things. The way in which the medical department was supplied with funds for carrying on the duties was this: an estimate was sent in by the purveyor, through the military secretary, for the warrant of the General commanding in chief; this warrant was directed to me, and the purveyor as War-office accountant was furnished from time to time with money to the extent authorised by the warrant. Some delays occurred in granting this warrant, but I never allowed a mere informality to prevent me from impresting sums to him, as he might require them for the public service. There never was any want of funds. I have heard that point discussed as to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe having been authorised to supply funds for hospital purposes, but there never was any want of funds. I gave the medical officer and the purveyor to understand that I was prepared to answer all demands that might be made, to any extent, for hospital purposes.

15987. Captain *Gladstone.*] Is there not an objection to rice for the troops, in consequence of the boiling that it requires, the length of time it takes, and the difficulty of obtaining fuel?—I never heard of such an objection as that; It may exist to some extent.

15988. You are not aware that rice requires longer boiling than any other kind of food?—It may, but the preparation of rice in China is done with very great facility, and with very little fuel indeed.

15989. You stated that on one occasion you applied to Admiral Boxer for a steam vessel or tug, to tow a small vessel, laden with barley, to Balaklava; can you mention any other occasion when you applied to him for assistance of that kind, which he refused, when there were vessels available in the harbour?—I cannot specify any particular instance; but I am perfectly right in stating the fact generally; I was going to say hundreds, but I will confine myself to a dozen instances in which I applied for vessels to be towed by steamers, and I did not succeed in getting it done.

15990. I mean when there were vessels which you believed were available?—Yes; it was either done by mistake or from carelessness. I cannot immediately specify any other cases. I was not in direct communication with the Treasury, being a subordinate officer at Constantinople, and my official communications were addressed to the Commissary-general; but I sent, demi-officially, to Sir Charles Trevelyan copies, giving a few specimens of what was going forward: it was the Commissary-general's duty to have apprised the home authorities.

15991. Are you able to state any other occasions on which you applied to Admiral Boxer for vessels, which he did not furnish, when you believed that there were vessels that were available?—I cannot name particular instances, but there were a great number of those instances. I found peculiar difficulties in removing vessels from one part of the Bosphorus to the other, for want of steam-tugs; I hired them whenever I could get them, but they were insufficient to meet the public service; and when I applied to Admiral Boxer, I found great difficulties and delays in getting anything done.

15992. Do you believe that on many of those occasions he might have assisted you, but he did not?—Yes, I believe he might when he did not do so. This is a letter dated the 10th of November, addressed to Sir Charles Trevelyan: "I will take care that every possible assistance shall be afforded to Miss Nightingale, who is now exercising her charitable offices at Scutari with very good effect. Mr. Delane has written to me on the subject of the fund which has been subscribed towards this object, and I have promised both him and his correspondents here that nothing shall be wanting on my part in the shape of proper co-operation; I told him also that no restriction was put upon the public expenditure which might be recommended by the medical department as necessary for the sick and wounded." There is another letter, dated the 15th of November.

15993. *Chairman.*] What is the object of these letters?—I merely read them to illustrate the co-operation that I was prepared to afford to the medical authorities at Scutari on the part of the Commissariat, and to show that nothing was wanting on our part to meet the urgent and great wants of that establishment.

15994. We

15994. We can take that from your statement?—There is another point as to the "Jason." Sir Charles Trevelyan was questioned particularly about that; but he was not aware of the precise facts of the case; and it is a very important point. The "Jason" was sent down for the conveyance of those transport animals, a delay of about three weeks occurred from the time of her arrival till the animals were shipped, and a great part of that delay arose out of the defectiveness of her screw, which was only ascertained on arriving at Constantinople; but a further delay then occurred for want of water and coal.

15995. Captain *Gladstone.*] Do you mean unnecessary delay?—I think it might have been avoided by proper management.

15996. Do you recollect the day that she arrived at Balaklava?—There were two occasions on which the "Jason" was sent for baggage animals. On the first she arrived at Constantinople, I think, about the latter end of November, and she reached Balaklava on or about the 16th or 17th of December. I wish to make one observation as to the constitution of the Commissariat. Sir Charles Trevelyan was asked some questions about it, and he seemed to think that the system was perfect. I entertain a little difference of opinion with him upon that point. The Commissariat is the only non-purchasing branch of the army which has no regular system of retirement. I think that a system of retirement should be extended to the Commissariat, in the same manner as to other branches of the public service. It would not only provide for old officers, who hang on otherwise as long as they can, but it would, probably, put the department into a greater state of efficiency, by bringing forward younger men. I do not attribute any want of zeal or ability to the older men, but I simply refer to that as a cause of complaint on the part of our department.

15997. Lord *Seymour.*] There is a very large amount of money paid for retiring allowances for the Commissariat?—For half-pay only. When an officer is put on half-pay, he is liable to be called into active service again.

15998. Is not the half-pay also applicable to an officer's final retirement?—No; an officer cannot claim to retire at any particular time; not after a certain number of years' service.

15999. If he does, he receives payment from that half-pay fund?—Yes, he receives half-pay, but he is in a worse position.

16000. Is he worse off than an officer in the artillery?—Decidedly; an officer in the artillery can claim to retire when he likes after completing a certain term of service; but a Commissariat officer may be used till he dies at his desk; even medical officers can claim to retire, and theirs is a department analogous to ours.

16001. Mr. *Layard.*] Have you any suggestions to make to the Committee as to the working of the Commissariat in Turkey?—No; I think the Commissariat regulations are as simple and complete as they could be made with reference to our present political system. Of course the Committee are aware that there are officers in England responsible to Parliament for the estimates of certain departments; and while those divisions of responsibility exist, it is necessary that regulations should be formed both to meet them and to keep up a check upon individual officers; and I think that while regulations are required, none could be made of a more simple form, as to the present circumstances of the case, than those applicable to the Commissariat. They reflect great credit upon Sir Charles Trevelyan and Mr. Petrie for bringing them to their present state of simplicity; and as a proof of the excellence of the system, the Commissioners of Audit have extended it to all the offices whose accounts are audited by them.

16002. Have you ever had any difficulties from the complexity of the forms?—I never had any practical difficulty that could not be overcome. (*A Report, dated 19th March, was handed in.*)

Veneris, 27° die Aprilis, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Sir John Hanmer.	Mr. Layard.
Mr. Drummond.	Captain Gladstone.
General Peel.	Mr. Bramston.
Sir John Pakington.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain *Sidney Colpoys Dacres*, R. N., called in; and Examined.

Captain *S. C. Dacres*, R. N.

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16003. Mr. *Layard.*] YOU are in the Royal Navy, are you not?—Yes.

16004. Will you state to the Committee what vessel you commanded?—I commanded "Sanspareil."

16005. In what operations were you engaged?—I was engaged from the 25th of June up to the 17th of November.

16006. In what part of the world?—At Varna; and during the whole of the landing of the army, and at Balaklava for about 10 days.

16007. Captain *Gladstone.*] At what period was that?—I went to Balaklava on the 26th of October, and left it on the 17th of November.

16008. Mr. *Layard.*] You were present at the embarkation at Varna, were you not?—Yes, the whole time.

16009. In your opinion, were sufficient provisions made in the way of boats, and other means of embarking the troops on that occasion?—It would have been better to have had more, certainly.

16010. In what particular branch of the service were we deficient?—In the large boats for horses.

16011. In your opinion, could such boats have been procured at Constantinople, or elsewhere?—Sir Edmund Lyons showed that a great number could be procured, when he went down and brought so many up.

16012. He went down personally, and brought boats up, did he not?—He not only went down and brought boats up, but he superintended the getting them towed up; an immense number; and he hoisted up a great number in his own ship.

16013. When was that?—It was about a week before we went.

16014. A week before the troops were embarked?—Yes, which was about the 2d of September.

16015. Up to that period, no proper provision had been made for embarking the army to go the Crimea?—Yes: certain boats had been fitted; all the carpenters were up from the line-of-battle ships to fit them, but we always had calculated that there was a supply to be obtained from Constantinople, which was not equal to the demand even at the last.

16016. In your opinion, larger provision ought to have been made for embarking the troops at Varna?—I think it would have been much better if there had been.

16017. Supposing we had had to embark the troops a month earlier, could we have done it?—No, certainly not.

16018. Did you see the boats that the French had for embarking their troops? Yes.

16019. Were they more numerous and better adapted for the purpose than ours?—They were a great deal more numerous; I should not say they would be better adapted for bad weather than our own.

16020. Did you cross over with the fleet to Old Fort?—Yes.

16021. Lord *Seymour.*] When you state that better arrangements might have

have been made, do you mean that time was lost in embarking?—No, certainly not; there was no delay whatever in embarking.

16022. Did the want of sufficient means lead to any accident?—I think the want of means showed more in their disembarkation than it did there.

16023. But did it appear at the embarkation?—No, certainly not.

16024. With regard to the embarkation, neither from accidents to men, nor horses, nor from loss of time, was there any great deficiency?—No, certainly not; there was no loss of life, either during the embarkation or the disembarkation; it was done entirely under my own orders; during the whole of it only one horse was lost.

16025. Mr. *Layard.*] You embarked, of course, at your ease; you were not before an enemy?—Yes.

16026. In disembarking you might have had to disembark before an enemy on a hostile coast?—Yes.

16027. My question applies to the actual means provided for the embarkation and disembarkation of the troops?—I should say, exactly what I thought then, and say now, that I do not consider that there was quite a sufficient number of boats for that purpose.

16028. Supposing the army had been called upon to embark a month earlier, had we then the means of embarking and disembarking?—No, I think not.

16029. You personally superintended the disembarkation of the troops, did you not?—Yes.

16030. Was the want then felt of large flat-bottomed boats for disembarking the artillery and cavalry?—The fact was that the boats were not so well fitted as they might have been for the purpose they were used for; and that in heavy swells, with a great deal of surf, a great number of the boats were destroyed, and, of course, there became then a want of more boats, which we had not got.

16031. Did the English use any of the French boats in disembarking?—Very few, and more out of compliment to the French for having sent them there, than for any other reason.

16032. You think that we could have disembarked with our own?—Certainly.

16033. Could we have disembarked in as short a space of time, or would the time have been prolonged in consequence of proper provision not having been made?—I do not think that the time was prolonged for want of boats, but the boats were broken up the last day very much; and if we had had very bad weather we should have lost a great number more.

16034. After the disembarkation were you engaged in bringing on board the ships the wounded and sick?—Yes, it was under my orders; and likewise I personally superintended the whole of it for three days.

16035. The sailors brought down a greater number of wounded after the battle of the Alma, did they not?—I think you might say the sailors, assisted by the waggons of the country, but the sailors cleared the waggons of the country.

16036. The sailors did all that duty?—Yes.

16037. *Chairman.*] From whence did they bring them; did they bring the soldiers from the field?—Yes, from the field, which was four miles off.

16038. Mr. *Layard.*] You went up to the field the day after the battle, did you not?—Yes, with the ship's company; to offer our services to bring them down at daylight.

16039. You were on the field with me the same evening, were you not?—Yes, the night before.

16040. Supposing there had not been the sailors to bring down the wounded, what would have happened?—I do not know at all; I cannot say what arrangements the army would have made on the subject; we were there, and only too glad to help them; I do not know what the routine of their service for that is; I know there was no ambulance.

16041. Did you see any means that were furnished by the army for moving down the wounded?—Nothing but the country carts.

16042. Did not the navy provide some hammocks?—Admiral Dundas ordered stretchers to be made, which were landed.

16043. Were not a large number of wounded brought down on hammocks suspended between oars?—Yes, by Sir Edmund Lyons' order, whose idea it was.

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16044. You stated that you brought down the wounded from the field; did you actually take the wounded off the field, or from the regimental hospitals?—From the hospitals which were on the field, close to head-quarters, which were pitched close to the battery.

16045. What was called the regimental hospital was placed where the men fell, many of them, was it not?—Yes, a great number; the Guards in particular.

16046. There was no distance to take them from where they fell to the regimental hospital?—No.

16047. Not many yards?—I do not think it was; I know where one of their hospitals was just across the river.

16048. Did you see the French bringing down their wounded?—Yes, the night before.

16049. Did they bring them down easily by means provided from home to move the wounded?—They were all in that night.

16050. Were they moved by means which had been sent to the Crimea?—Yes; a great part by mules, that are fitted to carry two persons.

16051. Whilst the French had the means themselves of bringing down their wounded, our army had no means, except that which it obtained from the sailors, to bring down their wounded?—And the country carts that I saw; I do not know what they might have had; I only saw those I have mentioned.

16052. Did you see any of the wounded brought down in carts?—Yes.

16053. Will you describe how they were placed in the carts?—There were three or four at the bottom of the cart very closely packed.

16054. Was that a humane or proper way to move the wounded?—Under the circumstances, I should think they were only too glad to get them down at any time.

16055. Was it a humane way of moving the wounded?—It would have been much better if there had been better means. I cannot say as to the humanity; I know that it was the only wish to do the best in their power for them.

16056. Did not some of the captains in the navy go up and down the road, and have some of those wounded men taken care of?—I know that a great number of the navy did all that they could to relieve them; and I believe the army used the best means they had for alleviating the sufferings of those poor men as soon as they could.

16057. Were a proper means given to the army to do so?—I never saw any; as I said before, I saw nothing but the country carts, and stretchers and hammocks brought from the fleet.

16058. Were there not four or five men placed in those carts, the carts having no springs?—Yes.

16059. Were they not frequently placed like sacks, one above the other?—No, I do not think that was the case. I think when the cholera people came down they were more crowded than the wounded were. I never saw the wounded incommoded by pressure, but the cholera people lay very close together.

16060. Did you see the cholera patients in that state?—Yes; I saw men taken out dead from amongst two or three.

16061. Did you see any officers of the army, either medical or otherwise, accompanying those convoys?—I saw several surgeons and some regimental officers down on the beach.

16062. Not all?—I cannot say. I did not know one regiment from another. I only know that there were officers there, and a great number of medical men came down, several, but they had not many to spare; there were medical men there who spoke to me on the beach, and they were very anxious about the care of the men, as they ought to have been.

16063. The men were then conveyed on board ship?—Yes.

16064. Was proper provision made for that purpose?—It differed in different ships; some ships had the thwarts of the boats all planked over, and others had not, but every care was taken of the men, I can declare, as to putting the men into the boats. I do not know what happened on board ship.

16065. Was there any ship specially fitted up for the reception of the wounded?—Certainly not; not that I know of.

16066. Are you acquainted with the case of the "Kangaroo"?—I heard of it.

16067. You

16067. You did not go on board of her?—No; I put three women on board the same night, and they did not like staying, and I immediately took them back again.

16068. On what grounds did they object to stay?—On account of the immense number of people on board of her.

16069. Do you remember signals of distress flying in the morning?—No, I was on shore. I heard of it.

16070. To the best of your belief there was no vessel, either belonging to the navy or a transport, especially fitted up as an hospital ship?—No, not to my knowledge; there might have been, but I never heard of it.

16071. When did they first begin to bring down the cholera patients?—On the second or third day after the Alma; the second, I think. I was on shore till late in the morning, pitching tents to cover them.

16072. The cholera patients were first brought down at Old Fort, were they not?—There were cholera patients always. In the passage a great number died of cholera, particularly on board of the "Andes," I think.

16073. Are you aware whether any of the wounded were left on the field the second night; I do not mean in the hospitals?—I do not know.

16074. *Chairman.*] You stated that that night the French had all their wounded brought down; what night do you mean?—The night of the action.

16075. How late was it before we had all our wounded down?—Not for two days.

16076. Mr. *Layard.*] We did not get ours down till the third day?—I think it was the third.

16077. General *Peel.*] Do you know the comparative numbers of the wounded as between the French and English?—Only from the usual documents.

16078. Were there many more wounded of the English?—A great many more, I should think.

16079. Mr. *Layard.*] After you had superintended the embarkation and disembarkation of the wounded, did you go round to Balaklava?—Yes.

16080. Did you go into the harbour at once?—Not with the ship; I was in there the next day, but not the first day; the second day I went in.

16081. When did the ship go in?—We took down the guns for the batteries. I took down 36 32-pounders.

16082. Do you remember when the "Sanspareil" first went in; at what date?—I do not know; it was before the expedition to Yalta, at the beginning of September.

16083. Did you at that time take the command of the harbour?—No; Sir Edmund Lyons was there in the "Agamemnon."

16084. When did you first take the command of Balaklava Harbour?—On the 27th of October.

16085. Did you take the command of the harbour when the "Agamemnon" left?—No.

16086. Between the leaving of the "Agamemnon" and the time that you took the command, who had charge of the harbour?—Captain Tatham.

16087. What vessel was he in?—In the "Simoom." I was sent down with orders to see every vessel out of Balaklava Harbour, and to embark every store on the 26th of the month.

16088. Was that the day after the action at Balaklava?—Yes, when the orders were to evacuate the harbour, and when I got there there were not three vessels in the harbour.

16089. At what time did the vessels return to the harbour?—The day that I arrived there I went in and got the vessels in as fast as I possibly could, and continued to do so the whole time that I was there.

16090. Your orders were not to evacuate the harbour, but to bring the ships back to the harbour?—I had orders the day after the Balaklava charge to evacuate the harbour, and the same evening I had contrary orders to go into the harbour and take charge there.

16091. After that you had brought all the vessels in?—Yes. I dare say there were 60 or 70 sail outside, and when I got there I had great difficulty in getting the ship in.

16092. From whom did you receive those orders?—From Admiral Dundas.

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16093. After that time you brought the vessels into the harbour?—As fast as we could; we cleared some, and took out others.

16094. After that were you responsible for the state of the harbour?—Yes, I think so.

16095. In what condition was the harbour at that time?—You have heard that corpses were swimming about; I never saw any.

16096. *Chairman.*] That has not been stated before the Committee?—I am glad to hear it.

16097. You never saw corpses floating about?—No; on the day of the gale there were several corpses, but they were buried instantly, as fast as the boats could go.

16098. What was the state of the harbour with regard to the offal and bodies of animals?—I recollect two instances of two bullocks that died on the platform made for landing them, and I had them towed out to sea; and I recollect another instance of one being killed by some merchant seamen, and I made them burn the offal and bury the rest of it.

16099. You say that the accounts given to the Committee are most inaccurate?—Most decidedly; I do not think it is inaccurate about the hay floating about, or the rum; there was every sort of thing floating about. I was so ill on the 10th of November that I could but just move about; on the 17th I was hoisted out of the ship; I never gave in but one day, the 10th, and I consider myself perfectly responsible for everything to the 17th.

16100. Mr. *Layard.*] Was the way in which the ships were placed in the harbour satisfactory?—Yes; satisfactory in this way, though there is a great diversity of opinion amongst the very best sailors as to which is the best way; of course, my notion is, that there ought to be a passage left for ships to come in and out, and Sir Edmund Lyons had left it exactly in the same way, and I thought, of course, I could not be doing very wrong in agreeing with him, and my own judgment led me to agree with him.

16101. The result is, that you were perfectly satisfied that that was the best arrangement?—I was perfectly satisfied. The Committee have heard that the ships were all moored with their heads across the harbour; all the ships beyond a certain point were moored the contrary way, with their heads out, and those ships suffered the most, and every one broke adrift.

16102. Whose fault was that?—It was in consequence of the badness of the ground; the "Sanspareil" dragged three anchors. After the gale on the 12th a great number of ships broke adrift, and I went and consulted the captains of the merchantmen as to which way they wished to lie, and those outside wished to lie with their heads out, and they were moored accordingly.

16103. I think you say, in consequence of the vessels not being anchored as Sir Edmund Lyons had ordered, they suffered at the time of the gale in consequence?—No, certainly not.

16104. You never had any difficulty on the part of the captains of the transports as to anchoring?—Not the slightest; I have never received more assistance from any men in my life than I did from the captains of transports.

16105. Who was there to superintend the anchoring of the vessels?—The master of the "Sanspareil."

16106. Was Captain Heath responsible?—He was on shore making the batteries where Sir Colin Campbell was, and Captain Powell was making one that was called the Sanspareil battery.

16107. Were you in Balaklava at the time of the storm?—Yes.

16108. Were any remonstrances made by the captains of the "Prince," and other vessels, as to being compelled to lie outside the harbour?—The captain of the "Resolute" came to me, and said that he could not lie outside; that was before the gale; I should think about the 12th of the month; I think the day after the gale which was on the 12th; then we had a lull on the 13th, and the 14th was the worst gale.

16109. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was the complaint on the part of the captain of the "Resolute" made after it had begun to blow?—Yes, but not the worst breeze.

16110. But after they found themselves on a lee shore?—Yes.

16111. Mr. *Layard.*] What was the reason why the "Resolute" was not brought into the harbour?—There were provisioning vessels coming in as fast as they could, and I said to the captain of the "Resolute," "If you will take my

advice

advice, you will not remain there an hour; go to sea and you will be quite safe."

16112. Then if any accident happened to that ship it was in consequence of his not having taken your advice?—I do not know that; I had nothing to do with the transport, and there would have been danger in getting the ship under sail.

16113. Why did he not come into the harbour?—The harbour was excessively crowded; there was one tug, and you could not properly anchor the ships outside; there was a strong southerly wind and a sea.

16114. Ought there to have been more than one tug?—There were three, but two were disabled by the immense work that they had done.

16115. Do you think it was advisable that for such an expedition only three vessels of that size should have been sent out?—Every vessel was bought that was for sale at Constantinople.

16116. Could not they have been procured in England for that purpose?—It is a long way to take vessels from England for that purpose.

16117. But the expedition was planned two months before it took place, and I presume therefore vessels might have been obtained from England?—Tugs were bought by Sir Edmund Lyons, I think.

16118. Did not he buy those tugs on his own responsibility?—I do not know.

16119. Did he never state that to you?—Yes, he did.

16120. That he went to Constantinople and bought two tugs on his own responsibility?—I do not know that he said that; I recollect the whole of the correspondence about it. I have seen it, and I know that there was a great deal of correspondence about buying them, and at last they were bought by Sir Edmund Lyons.

16121. Was it right that we should have been dependent upon Constantinople for steam tugs?—They were very small vessels, that were the best for that purpose, and they would not have been very good to bring across the Atlantic; I do not believe that they ever thought of the tugs till Sir Edmund Lyons proposed it; that is my own view.

16122. And yet we have a large number of vessels connected with our transport service?—Yes, we have; we have a great number of steamers likewise, which would not have been applicable for that service.

16123. Was the harbour so full at the time of the gale that vessels which were anchored outside could not have been brought in?—The best proof of the crowded state of the harbour, and of the way in which the vessels inside suffered, is this: that Admiral Dundas's particular wish, and it was very often expressed, was to clear those ships as fast as possible outside, and send them away altogether, considering that sailing transports were not the ships to be employed there.

16124. Did you hear that Captain Christie had endeavoured to get the "Prince" in?—I think she arrived on the 10th of the month, and he said, "Here is the 'Prince;' she is to come into the harbour." I said, "Can she come in?" And from her great length I thought it dangerous to bring her in. I never heard anything more about her till I found that she was lost; and she had no more business to anchor there outside than she had to fly.

16125. Where ought she to have anchored?—She should have remained at sea; she had lost two anchors, and she anchored there with only a stream anchor.

16126. Do you think that her loss was mainly attributable to her being anchored with only one anchor?—Yes; having lost two anchors she ought not to have remained there.

16127. Did you ever make representations as to the dangerous nature of that anchorage?—Yes, repeatedly, to Admiral Dundas and Sir Edmund Lyons, and to every person that I spoke to; and in proof of that, when I left, with orders to go down off Balaklava, I told Admiral Dundas that I would not venture to anchor my own ship there; and he was anxious never to have any ships anchored there.

16128. Why were ships anchored there?—They came down with provisions; and they were so short a time clearing them that they would have cleared any of them in decent weather in a short time, when they were surprised by this hurricane; and they were lost, as my opinion is, by the downright act of God.

16129. Had not many of those vessels been anchored for a long time there?

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—The "Resolute" and the "Progress" were the two that had gone out; the other one was the "Prince," and that had not come in.

16130. Had not a large number of vessels been anchored there for a considerable time?—No; a great number had come down from Eupatoria with provisions, with sheep and bullocks; the "Rip Van Winkle," and others, came from Eupatoria, to take the wounded from Inkermann.

16131. *Chairman.*] You state that the "Prince" arrived on the 10th of the month?—Yes; off Balaklava, I think, on the 10th.

16132. Did she not arrive with the 46th regiment on board?—Yes; but she went to Kamiesch, and she landed the 46th there.

16133. Mr. *Layard.*] Did she not send them round in a small vessel?—No; she went to Kamiesch, and they were landed there.

16134. She had no difficulty in getting into Kamiesch Harbour?—None.

16135. You state that many of the vessels were anchored outside, because the ships inside could not make room for them?—Yes.

16136. Why was that?—The difficulty in clearing the harbour was, that ships came there without any ballast at all, ships laden with hay and bread; and they came there completely filled; and then it took a length of time for those ships to get ballast in, and get them to sea.

16137. Was that the only reason why they could not be cleared?—I think they were cleared as fast as they could possibly be with the means at our disposal.

16138. Were the means at your disposal sufficient to clear the ships that came there?—No, certainly not; the men were worked uncommonly hard.

16139. Ought there to have been a greater number of men at your disposal?—Yes; but there were no means to get men; we had only 400 men in the men-of-war off the Katchka, and that was hardly enough to manage them.

16140. Could not a band of men have been procured from Constantinople to land the things?—They procured people from Malta, and they were always refusing to work, and striking every now and then.

19141. When was that?—The Commissariat had a large number of men from Malta.

16142. When was that?—I do not know; I know they were at Balaklava when I was there, and did occasionally a good deal of work.

16143. Were those men especially sent there to disembark the cargoes?—To belong to the Commissariat department; to work as labourers, I believe.

16144. How many were there?—I should not think there were more than 40 or 50.

16145. Was that number at all calculated to supply the want?—Certainly not; nothing like it.

16146. Were any wharves erected?—Three.

16147. What kind of wharves were they?—One was built of the flats that we had landed the cavalry on, and it was appropriated for landing cattle; they were placed against the shelving beach, and the vessels went alongside these rafts, and the cattle went from them on to them, and landed perfectly well until they were destroyed by the ships running against them; there was a good place called the Ordnance Wharf, and there was another place up the harbour where we had landed the guns and the ammunition.

16148. Was there a sufficiency of wharfage?—Certainly not; but if anybody had supposed that we were going to stay there all that time, a great many of those things would have been remedied; I do not think that there were 10 men in the army that did not expect to take Sebastopol.

16149. When were you informed that you were to stay there?—I was told on the 27th of October that we were not to remain there.

16150. That was after the affair of Balaklava?—Yes.

16151. After the ships returned on the 26th of October, or at any other time, was there any intention of leaving Balaklava?—Yes; on three occasions I had notes from Sir Colin Campbell to say that he did not think he could hold possession of Balaklava, and I must be prepared to take care of myself, and we must leave the harbour; I have a note from him now in my pocket.

16152. In what state was the town of Balaklava?—Nothing could be worse, after the weather got bad.

16153. Before you left nothing could be worse than the state of Balaklava?—Nothing, I think.

16154. To your knowledge was any attempt made to put things right?—The Turks had nearly possession of it, and nearly every house in the upper part was filled with dying or dead Turks.

16155. Yet Balaklava was the basis of our operations?—Yes; but the Turks had taken possession of it, and they had their hospitals there; and when I went round with Admiral Slade to every house, they were all occupied by dead and dying Turks.

16156. In what condition were the Turks?—Wretched.

16157. Was any provision made for them?—I did not see any.

16158. Were they properly fed?—Yes, they were; I took care to ask at every place; Admiral Slade was the interpreter, and he said that they did not complain of not having enough to eat.

16159. Under whose care were they?—Their own people; we fed them, I believe.

16160. Did we send for them there?—They were stationed, of course, by Lord Raglan, wherever he chose.

16161. You say that the condition of the Turks was most wretched; in what way do you mean?—I think from the want of every hospital comfort in the world, and their habits; they all were in those wretched hovels in Balaklava.

16162. Did a large number die?—An immense number.

16163. Did you ever see one of them illtreated?—Never in my life; I have heard the soldiers jeering at them, but I never saw a man struck; I would not have allowed that.

16164. They were jeered at?—Yes; they used to jeer at them; I did not think it of much importance, but I should not have liked it.

16165. They treated them in an insulting manner?—The soldiers never forgave them after the Balaklava business.

16166. Did you see that affair?—No; I came two days afterwards.

16167. You stated that you went to Yalta early in September?—Yes.

16168. At that time what coals had you on board?—I think we had 14 tons; I am not quite certain; I had very little; there were no coals there at all.

16169. Did you make any remonstrance about the utter want of coals?—It was not my place to do so; coals were short everywhere.

16170. From what did that arise?—I think from bad weather not allowing them to leave the Bosphorus.

16171. Was there bad weather then?—I think there was never nice weather for crossing; it was at that time that those Egyptian ships were lost.

16172. When were they lost?—I think at the end of October.

16173. We are now speaking of the end of September; how was it that there were no coals for the shipping at that time?—I do not know that there were none.

16174. Ought there not to have been a supply out there?—Yes.

16175. Was it right to leave a large steam fleet, at such a time, on an enemy's coast, without a proper supply of coals?—I know that Admiral Dundas was more nervous about it than anybody else; he was most anxious in writing about it, and very soon afterwards three vessels came up.

16176. Was it right that you should have been left with only 14 tons on board?—Certainly not; I did not like it.

16177. *Chairman.*] Whose duty was it to supply the coals?—I do not know at all; we only looked to the Admiral on those points; he would write to the authorities at Malta and Constantinople, and they would be sent up from thence.

16178. Mr. *Layard.*] How many tons did you consume a day?—About 36 tons a day.

16179. Then you had not a day's supply of coal on board?—No.

16180. Supposing by any chance the fleet had been called upon to engage in active operations, could it have done so?—Admiral Dundas took care to keep the towing steamers, the paddlewheel steamers, always complete enough for the purpose of towing the line-of-battle ships.

16181. Still if they had had to fight, you would not have been sufficiently coaled?—No. At that crisis we certainly only had 14 tons; in coming from Yalta, when we started, we had perhaps 70 or 80 tons.

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16182. But as the fleet was a steam fleet to a great extent, ought there not to have been a proper provision to keep the fleet supplied with coals?—Certainly.

16183. It was necessary to put them in a state of proper efficiency, was it not?—Yes; at that time they were unfortunately short of them.

16184. That was just at the time of the commencement of the operations, was it not?—Yes, we had been constantly under steam all the way from Varna.

16185. If the Russians had not blocked up their own harbour, the fleet might have come out and attacked you?—This was after all that.

16186. But, supposing they had not done that; they might have come out and attacked you?—That would have been a different phase altogether of the circumstances.

16187. When the troops left Varna, there was no idea that the Russians would sink those ships in the mouth of the harbour?—No; and I do think it is a very great pity they did so. There were immense depôts of coal at Constantinople and Malta, and why they did not come across the Black Sea I do not know; three vessels arrived, and we filled up with coals.

16188. The Committee wish to know why they were not at the place where they were wanted?—When I returned to Yalta the coals were there for me.

16189. That was afterwards?—Yes; there were times when they were short of coals.

16190. Did you ever see the burial-grounds at Balaklava?—Very often.

16191. It has been stated that the place chosen for that purpose was exceedingly badly chosen; is that your opinion?—Now that it is pointed out to me, I think it was; at that time, I should have only thought that it was the only place where they had any chance of burying the people, on account of the rock; you could not bury them on the sides; it was all limestone rock; and they buried them in a valley, which in bad weather was a swamp.

16192. Could not they have been buried a quarter of a mile northward of it, in the low grounds there, where the vineyards were?—They were further then from the troops than they were anywhere else; if you brought them nearer the ships, you took them further from the troops; to bury them where they did, it was a distance from the town of a quarter of a mile.

16193. Had you never experienced any inconvenience from the bad smell?—Not in the ships. I did as I passed.

16194. There was a very bad effluvium?—Yes.

16195. They could not be buried very deep, since when you dug a grave the water came in?—I never saw an open grave.

16196. With regard to Captain Christie, were any complaints made to you about him?—Never in my life.

16197. Did he discharge his duties properly?—He was outside the harbour, and I was inside, so that I hardly ever saw him.

16198. Had you any opportunity of visiting the ships in which the sick and wounded were placed to be forwarded to Constantinople?—No; both after Alma and Inkermann I superintended taking them on board. I put every wounded man on board at Balaklava after the battle of Inkermann, as I had at the Alma.

16199. Had previous preparations been made for bringing down the sick and wounded, and placing them on board ship?—The ambulance carts had been landed, and then the men came down in them, assisted very much by the French mules and the country carts; all the ambulance carts were there then.

16200. Was there a sufficient supply?—I think not; it took a long while to come down.

16201. Did you ever see a convoy of sick and wounded coming down?—Often. I went to the boats, and I stood at the bow of the boats, and saw them put in myself.

16202. In what state were the sick and wounded?—I never saw more attention paid to people. Their own people came down with them to Balaklava; their own soldiers brought them down, and there were surgeons on the wharf seeing every man put in, and there were people giving them drink and everything else, very different from what it had been after the Alma.

16203. You

16203. You did not think that there was any neglect in the way in which they were placed on board the ships?—I think there was exactly the same want, as to nothing being fitted on board the transports. Where there are 1,600 wounded, it is a very difficult thing to find fittings necessary for putting them on board all the ships.

16204. Were the transports fitted up for the reception of the wounded?—There were two fitted up for the reception of the wounded, but the ships were not prepared for them; there were beds for the sick in two ships; but when you have 1,600, and a vessel holds 220, of course an immense number went without.

16205. When you say that they had beds, and they were not fitted, will you explain that?—They were laid on the deck on a bed.

16206. What was the bed?—A palliasse some of the first ships had, I think; The first was called the "Edendale," and another the "Arabia"; they were the two.

16207. How many could those vessels accommodate?—I think they carried about 200 on the average.

16208. That makes 400?—Yes.

16209. Was that a proper provision to make for an army of such numbers as were engaged in those operations?—I do not know. I should have had large steamers fitted up previously with bedsteads.

16210. Not even those two ships were previously fitted up?—No.

16211. Did you ever see a ship with sick and wounded on board which had not been fitted up at all; which had not beds?—I never was on board any ship but the "Andes," and she was not fitted up.

16212. In what state were the sick and wounded in her?—They were lying on the deck.

16213. Were they in a very bad state?—I think they were; a great number of them were very badly wounded.

16214. But was the accommodation very bad for them?—It was very bad; it was like putting them down in this room.

16215. They were laid on the bare deck?—Yes.

16216. Did you ever make any representation on the subject?—No; I proposed doing something after the battle of Inkermann, but that was rather late.

16217. Did you ever visit the hospital at Balaklava?—I was in it once.

16218. In what state was it?—Evidently it had been very nice; but I think it was destroyed by the order to embark everybody after the Balaklava charge; I was there three times, I think.

16219. Were you ever at Eupatoria?—Never, but just casually.

16220. Did you ever see a large quantity of provisions there?—No; I did at Old Fort; a convoy of flour I saw there.

16221. What became of it?—It was sent off to all the ships; the "Leander" was left behind to take it in.

16222. Was it all taken away?—Every bit of it.

16223. Was it served out to the ships?—Yes.

16224. You did not give any of it to the soldiers?—No; it was served out to the ships, as part of the rations.

16225. You never saw any vegetables, or onions, piled up at Eupatoria?—No.

16226. Were you ever in Kamiesch Bay?—No.

16227. Can you give any account of the state of the Marine Brigade on shore?—They suffered a good deal; I was never there but once, but I had 200 sick sent down in three days.

16228. My question referred to the seamen?—I saw a great deal of them; I had 200 of them under my own orders.

16229. How much did they suffer in comparison with the army?—They did not suffer anything near so much.

16230. To what do you attribute the circumstance of their having suffered less?—From their being the pick of the whole British nation; and next, from the captains taking immense trouble about clothing them, and their provisions coming to them as regularly as possible.

16231. They were properly clothed and fed?—I think so.

16232. They therefore suffered much less than the army?—Yes; they had

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no trench work, no night work; they had much lighter business to do, and they were able to take care of themselves much better than the soldiers, who were constantly at work; I think they were the finest men that England ever sent out.

16233. Did you ever visit the camp?—Yes; I had a brother there, and I often went.

16234. With regard to the different arrangements, how was the Naval Brigade situated, as compared with the army; were their tents better fitted up?—I think they are a great deal handier; sailors are naturally so.

16235. They are taken from the same class of men, are they not?—Yes; but their lives are very different; the one you provide for and the other provides for himself, and he must use his intelligence every hour of his life.

16236. Can you describe to the Committee the Naval Brigade Camp, and the way in which they managed their cooking?—Yes, their cooking was very comfortably done; but you must bear in mind that every want was supplied; there was not a thing that the captains would not have sent to Constantinople to get for them, which it was impossible to do for a regiment; we had none of us more than about 150.

16237. But they had constructed, I think, little fire-places and ovens?—Yes. I think they had pillaged more plank than anybody else, and had covered themselves in.

16238. What plank had they been able to pillage?—I do not know. They got it. I know the people in the two batteries that I spoke of were entirely covered in.

16239. Was that planking that had been sent out for the soldiers' huts?—No, I think not. I think it was taken from houses out of the village of Kadekoi.

16240. They had managed to get up the planks and to build houses?—Not to the hill; these men were where Sir Colin Campbell was, those of the "Sans-pareil," just above the church. I think these men more intelligent; and it was very easy to look after 100, but very difficult to look after 700 or 800; they had an immense number of officers with them, much more in proportion than the soldiers had, and I think that the officers of the navy mix more with the men than the officers of the army do.

16241. Do you attribute that more to the system?—Yes.

16242. Colonel *Lindsay.*] From the system they are generally more handy, are they not?—Yes, they must be; and every hour of their lives their intelligence must be called into play more than the soldiers.

16243. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you see the planking for the huts arrive?—No. I brought up from Yalta myself a good deal of planking for the army. I brought nearly every piece that was there.

16244. You could not get more?—No. I might have got round spars.

16245. Do you think, if depôts had been made at Sinope or elsewhere, you might have had a continual supply by sending transports backwards and forwards for the army?—It has been done since.

16246. Could it have been done then?—Yes, I think so.

16247. Mr. *Drummond.*] A witness before this Committee, was asked whether the harbour at Balaklava was in a very filthy state, and his answer was, "Very filthy; frightfully filthy; so much so that the water, which ought to have been of a dark colour like the rest of the Euxine, was a sort of bright green mixed with grey, and stunk like a drain; in fact the harbour was a great cess-pool, a great sewer"?—I was not there then, that is all that I know; I left on the 17th of November.

16248. Lord *Seymour.*] But you were there on the 28th of October?—Yes, I was; I went in on that day.

16249. Mr. *Drummond.*] You were asked concerning Captain Christie; do you know him?—Yes, quite well.

16250. It has been stated that he is an old gentleman upwards of 70?—That is not true.

16251. I believe his age is 57?—Yes; he may be 55 or 56.

16252. Do you know where he was on the 14th November, at the time of the storm?—Yes; he was outside in the "Melbourne."

16253. Did he send to you for leave to let the "Prince" go into the harbour?—He spoke to me himself; he said, "We want to get the 'Prince' in," and I said,

said, "Will you get her in to-night?" and he said, "Certainly not, blowing as it is;" and he turned to the captain of the "Prince," who confirmed the same thing.

16254. If blame has been imputed to him because the "Prince" did not go into the harbour, that is not deserved?—No.

16255. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was she not too large to go into Balaklava harbour?—She might have gone in, but not without a tug, and I would not have taken her in without it had been a very fine day and not blowing at all.

16256. *Chairman.*] Captain Kellock states, in answer to Question 5162: "Had you any opportunity of examining the state of the harbour of Balaklava when you were there" (that was on the 28th October.)?—"I had daily opportunities. What did you think of it?—It was in a most beastly state." "In what respect?—There was offal thrown overboard by the ships; there were the entrails of animals, and everything that was likely to contaminate and render the air putrid; added to which, there were not sufficient pains taken in burying the dead. I had occasion to bury some of my own crew there, and I paid for the graves myself, to the soldiers, half-a-crown each to dig them much deeper than was the usual custom. The stench was intolerable." Does that agree with your experience?—Decidedly not. On the 28th there was nobody in the harbour; the vessels had been cleared.

16257. He says, "I left Balaklava on the 28th October."—That was when they all went out. I was not there then; I came there on the 27th.

16258. Did you find the harbour in the condition in which he left it?—Yes.

16259. Is his description of the harbour accurate, according to your experience?—Certainly not.

16260. Lord *Seymour.*] Might it not have happened that a ship to windward could not have cleared the harbour?—No, not at all. I do not believe one word about those things floating about at all.

16261. *Chairman.*] After that he was asked this question: "Could that offal have been removed from the harbour?" And he says: "As easily as possible." He is then asked: "How would you have done it?—I should have made a requisition to the commanders of Her Majesty's ships there, to send working parties, and with 100 men I could have cleared out that harbour and made the quay as it ought to be, and cleansed the town, in seven days."—I could not have done it.

16262. Captain *Gladstone.*] You state that the harbour was not in a very bad state?—No.

16263. Mr. *Layard.*] Did not Sir Edmund Lyons make a representation to Lord Raglan upon the state of the harbour?—He could hardly have done that, for he himself had then the charge of the harbour.

16264. Was not the shore of the harbour covered with this offal?—When Sir Edmund Lyons was there, a boat belonging to a merchant ship took whatever there was of floating filth out to sea, by his own arrangement.

16265. Captain *Gladstone.*] There is no tide there?—No; I have no doubt that latterly, when there were no workmen, things did get into this state; but it could not have been about the 28th October, for there were no vessels there.

16266. You state that during the time that you were in command there, the harbour never was in a filthy state?—There was always a collection of pieces of wood and scum close in upon the beach, but not at all out towards the ships; the only instances that I recollect were two dead bullocks, and one that was killed on the beach.

16267. Dead animals were never allowed to remain there?—Certainly not.

16268. *Chairman.*] Captain Kelloch is asked, by Question 5174, "Inside the harbour, were there any regulations with regard to the anchorage?" and his answer is, "Decidedly not." He is then asked, "Were the vessels so anchored that there would have been considerable difficulty in getting them out?—You could easily get a steamer out, because it does not matter which end presents itself at the entrance of the harbour; but it would be very awkward to warp out a sailing ship"?—He would have found it very awkward to get the "Himalaya," stern foremost, out, which he is recommending there; he could no more have done that than have flown.

16269. He was asked whether anybody attended to the ships when they

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anchored, and he said, "No"?—Captain Heath had the charge of that harbour from the hour that we took possession of it till Sir Edmund Lyons came out; afterwards the master of the "Sanspareil" always superintended it for the 20 days that we were there; and afterwards Captain Powell took it.

16270. Captain *Gladstone*.] Did the master of the "Sanspareil" berth the ships?—Yes, he told them where to go, and saw where they were placed.

16271. Lord *Seymour*.] You had nothing to do with the transports?—No.

16272. What was your exact power in the harbour?—To assist in clearing the vessels as much as I could, and to assist everybody if they wanted men; I had a general authority over the harbour, and I could have moved every vessel that I liked.

16273. What authority within the harbour had the officer who had the general command of the transports?—None.

16274. When he wished any transport to come in he applied to you, did he not?—Certainly.

16275. You were absolute in that respect?—Certainly.

16276. He had the general supervision of the transports under you when they were in the harbour?—Yes; and if I had wanted to have anything to do with the transports, I should have applied to Captain Christie.

16277. With regard to anchoring the transports in the harbour, did you communicate with Captain Christie?—It was in this way: the Commissariat all the time I was there were wanting vessels in very much; and they used to write a letter, saying, "We want in such and such ships;" and if we could get them in they were got in. Captain Christie would say, "I want such and such a vessel in," and if it could be done it was got in.

16278. Did you order vessels out of the harbour?—Certainly, always. I never left any one in the harbour an hour if I could help it.

16279. Why did you not let the vessels stay in the harbour?—Because the harbour was so overcrowded, and we were always exposed to an attack from the enemy, who could have burnt the whole of them.

16280. Up to the time that you left, on the 17th November, you were always fearful of such an attack; that the shipping might be in danger?—Yes, always. I think the Committee have heard in evidence, as late as the 12th of this month, that the ships all had their steam up ready to go out in the middle of the night.

16281. You ordered the vessels to go outside the harbour, and it rested with Captain Christie and the Commissariat to get them in?—Yes.

16282. When you sent them outside, it rested with them whether the vessels should stay outside the harbour?—Certainly; they were towed out afterwards. I would never have left a vessel that she could not be towed out far enough to get a good offing. I should have been answerable if I had left them at anchor there.

16283. Then you towed them out of the harbour?—Yes.

16284. When a vessel was towed out of the harbour, you towed her just as far as they considered to be safe?—Yes; on all occasions I gave positive orders that they were to be towed so that they should have an offing from the shore.

16285. Having the general supervision of the harbour, had you power over any class of boats, as harbour boats?—We had four of our own boats.

16286. With regard to transports, when they brought goods there, who undertook the landing of the things?—The people of the "Sanspareil;" that was my own ship; working parties were told off every morning; there was never a fatigue party from the army the whole time I was there; our people were constantly employed clearing every vessel that came in, and the transport people were likewise employed in their own vessels.

16287. Had you boats enough to meet the requisitions made upon you in that respect?—Yes, while we were there.

16288. No difficulty arose as to landing the Commissariat goods?—Never; there was never any want of anything up at the army the whole time we were there; that was in the harbour.

16289. If difficulties arose, they did not arise from the want of boats?—I do not think that they ever arose from that.

16290. Captain *Gladstone*.] Had you as many boats as you had men for them?—There were a great many transport boats that landed a great number of things, and five or six very large boats had been sent out from Malta.

16291. *Chairman*.]

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16291. *Chairman.*] At Question 12167, the captain of the Andes, Captain John Muir, is asked, "When did you sail from Balaklava with the wounded?" and he says, "We sailed on the 11th November;" were you there then?—Yes.

16292. Then he is asked, at Question 12194, "Did you consider the state of Balaklava Harbour satisfactory at that time?—No, it was very unsatisfactory the first time; the second time it was better." "When you arrived there did anyone come on board the ship and give directions?—No, we were allowed to anchor where we best could, at first." "For how long did that state of things exist?—Until such time as I went the last time; that was the first time that I saw any improvement." "When was that, what was the date of it?—In February." At the time that you were there, had every ship that entered a person from your ship on board, to direct the mode of her anchoring?—The master of the "Sanspareil" was appointed for that very purpose; and if the "Andes" came in without him, I knew nothing about it. I know this, that whether I ordered it or not, she did get a proper berth; she was lying close alongside my own ship all the time that she remained there, lying broadside to us, inside of us.

16293. Then that statement is contrary to your experience?—Yes, it is; he might have gone in there without a person to put him where he was; but that was against the orders of the port, and I mean to say that he got a capital berth; he was anchored close alongside me, and there he lay; he got his coals out of a vessel called the "Cottenham," by my people coaling him.

16294. Captain *Gladstone.*] The harbour is so small that if any vessel had been improperly berthed you must have seen it?—Yes; we must have moved her for our own safety.

16295. Lord *Seymour.*] You were responsible, were you not, for the mode in which the vessels were anchored?—Yes; I considered myself responsible for anything that happened at this time in the harbour of Balaklava.

16296. Some of the witnesses have stated that they considered they ought not to have anchored athwart the stream, while others say that they think it a very good plan?—If you ask six sailors, three will go one way and three the other. It is not a question of danger; it is a question of knowledge.

16297. You had not only the superintendence of the shipping, but of the wharves in the harbour, had you not?—Yes, I did take it upon me. I do not think that I ought to have done so; but I always interfered when I saw anything going wrong. When they were piling up shot so as to break them, there was a governor there, and a person belonging to the Quartermaster-general's department.

16298. Who was the governor?—A colonel of the army, who was ill all the time I was there; he had the charge, and I saw him occasionally.

16299. Had he no deputy?—He had somebody belonging to the Quartermaster-general's department, Major Hamilton.

16300. The Committee have heard that the wharves were very much blocked up, making it very inconvenient to land goods at them?—It was so. If there were 30 or 40 boats, they could not all land; they wanted an extended pier, which it was not likely would be built when the place was expected to be taken.

16301. The reason that you give for making no permanent arrangements is, that your occupation there was a temporary one?—Yes; and I think that is the best way of accounting for our having no road.

16302. Had you occasion to coal at Constantinople at all?—Never. I have coaled in the Bosphorus.

16303. Where?—At Bukdere, and at Beikos Bay.

16304. Were there any good arrangements there for coaling?—Those that we made ourselves.

16305. What time did it take you to coal?—We got in about nine tons an hour.

16306. How long was the vessel detained there?—About two days, taking in 230 tons.

16307. In what time could you have taken them in at Malta?—The coaling at Malta is quite a sight. At other places you hoist it out of a merchant vessel that comes alongside, and you hoist it up yourself. At Malta it is put into open barges ready to receive it, and it is thrown on board by gangs of, perhaps, 200 or

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200 or 300 men, who are paid three different rates; they get so much for a certain time, so much for extra time, and so much for rapid work.

16308. Considering the number of vessels that had to proceed to Constantinople or the neighbourhood, would it not have been desirable that some improved system should have been introduced?—I think that the great error was in coaling so much in the current; the ships lay too much in the Golden Horn, and the boats could not lie alongside of them. I do not think that there was any fault in the arrangements.

16309. Captain *Gladstone.*] Have they the means of coaling vessels more expeditiously at Constantinople than you were coaled?—I know that there was a great want of large boats; a great many boats had been taken away by us that had been used for coaling for the expedition.

16310. Some witnesses stated that there was a great delay in coaling steamers, because they could not throw the coals in with facility?—There was a length of time in getting it alongside, from the colliers, the ships lay so far out; from the crowded state of the harbour, they lay nearly over at the Scutari side; and by the time you had got a large laden barge over there, it took an immense time.

16311. Lord *Seymour.*] Did you see the French harbour at Kamiesch?—No.

16312. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You stated, did you not, that you think that the anchorage off Balaklava is a very dangerous anchorage when the wind is southerly?—I think at all times it is.

16313. You also stated that you thought that the terrible losses that occurred on the 12th November must be considered as the direct act of God?—Yes.

16314. Humanly speaking, is it your opinion that a considerable portion of those losses might have been averted if the ships had gone to sea?—Certainly; if they had kept under weigh, not a ship would have been lost; I think so, as far as my opinion goes.

16315. That is your opinion, although you consider their loss to have been the act of God?—I mean by the act of God, the tremendous violence of that one gale; they had ridden out several.

16316. You think, do you not, that by the exercise of human prudence, if those ships had gone to sea they might have been saved?—They could not have gone in that gale.

16317. Not after the furious gale of the 12th began?—Not even after the swell began.

16318. Does that apply to steam ships?—No; we know that three steam ships went on the night of the 13th, one or two.

16319. Were not several of the ships that were lost on the 14th steam ships?—Only one, and that was the "Prince."

16320. Might not the "Prince" have been saved by going to sea?—Certainly.

16321. Did not the gale begin, though it varied in violence, on the 11th or 12th?—As far back as the 9th; it had blown even from the 4th.

16322. After it had begun blowing from the south, were there not ample opportunities even for sailing ships to go to sea?—I do not think that I should have liked to have lifted an anchor in a ship there.

16323. Could not it have been done during the lull on the 13th?—No, the swell in would have taken her on the rocks; no one could have supposed that the gale would have been so violent as it was.

16324. Was not any gale dangerous upon that shore?—Yes.

16325. Was it prudent, then, for sailing ships to be ordered to anchor off that coast?—I think not.

16326. Do you know why they did anchor there?—I think they were vessels coming down from Eupatoria with cattle; but nothing but steamers and other vessels anchored there, for the purpose of coming in with provisions, and if they anchored when they first went out they never moved from there.

16327. Are you aware whether, in answer to any remonstrances about the danger of the anchorage, the captains of any of the transports were ordered to anchor there?—No; the "Resolute" was the only one that I ever heard of; I know that the captain of that ship remonstrated about lying there.

16328. Your advice to the captain of the "Resolute" was to go to sea, was it not?—Certainly.

16329. Are

16329. Are you aware whether any orders were given to him which counteracted your advice to go to sea?—Certainly not.

16330. He did not attend to your advice, and his ship was lost?—Yes; it was only advice, it was not an order. I think that there was a very divided opinion about the danger of the anchorage; a great many thought that it would never blow home, and a great number of very good sailors always said to me, "You are wrong, it will not blow home."

16331. It is not within your knowledge, whether or not Captain Christie gave orders to the captains of those transports to anchor off that coast in that state of the weather?—No.

16332. You spoke about the reception of the wounded, after the battle of the Alma, on board your ship and other ships?—Yes.

16333. Did you see the most of what occurred at that time?—I saw all the beach part of it; I superintended it myself; I was ordered by Sir Edmund Lyons to superintend the getting down of those men.

16334. Are you aware whether, after the battle of the Alma, in order to attend to the wounded, surgeons from the men-of-war were landed?—Yes; my own were landed; I reported myself to the Quartermaster-general.

16335. Did they perform amputations, and other operations, on the shore?—Yes.

16336. If your surgeons had not been so landed, would not it have been necessary to bring the wounded men on board before they could have had amputations performed?—That would depend upon the general; if he chose them to remain where they were; and he did stay two days.

16337. Is it within your knowledge whether or not the surgeons of the army had gone on with the army, so that there were not remaining a sufficient number of surgeons to take care of the wounded?—It is within my own knowledge that the army had not marched.

16338. Then why was it necessary for the surgeons of the navy to be landed? Because there were so many wounded, and the sooner you could get them dressed the better.

16339. At the time that the surgeons of the navy were landed to assist the wounded, was the army still there, and were the army surgeons attending to the wounded, so far as their numbers admitted?—Yes.

16340. Mr. *Layard.*] Were the services of the naval surgeons ever refused by the army?—At first they were refused; but afterwards they were accepted. I do not mean that they said "No" to the Admiral, but they said "No" to me; they said they did not want them; but that was immediately rectified, and they were accepted.

16341. After the Alma, did not some assistant surgeons go up, and were they not sent away, and not allowed to do anything?—I do not know; I think not. I know that my own were there two days.

16342. Did not Admiral Lyons make his signal the night before, or two days before the storm, for other vessels to leave the anchorage?—No; Captain Jones, of the "Firebrand," who I saw yesterday, told me that he made a signal to Admiral Lyons, for permission to get under weigh; and he said, "I am going to weigh," and four or five vessels then weighed; Captain Jones told me this yesterday.

16343. They had permission to weigh, and go to sea if they chose?—Yes; but no sailing vessel could have gone.

16344. Was there a sufficiency of transport during the time you were at Balaklava, between Constantinople and the army; I mean water transport?—Yes; I should think so. I think there was never anything at all equal to the transport.

16345. Therefore, if it has been stated that the reason why the army was not sufficiently supplied with provisions was, because there was not a sufficiency of water transport, that is not quite correct?—I should think not; decidedly not; I should think exactly the contrary; there was more transport than they could have employed.

16346. With regard to the use made of them, were they applied with any order or regularity to the service?—I had very little to do with it; I think they remained a long while away sometimes; but I cannot give an opinion; I do not know myself.

16347. Captain *Gladstone.*] Before it came on to blow hard, on the 14th,

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were there steamers available that could have towed out any of the sailing vessels?—Nothing in the world would have done it, there was such a tremendous swell on.

16348. My question referred to the time before it came on to blow so hard?—It had blown for some days.

16349. If all the vessels in the harbour had been better moored, do you think that less injury would have been done to them?—I think that the great cause was the "Avon" coming in during the height of the gale, and she broke many of them adrift.

16350. *Chairman.*] When you were there Captain Kelloch of the "Himalaya" was there, was he not?—No; I never saw him but once in my life. I believe he was there outside.

16351. He was asked "When you arrived outside Balaklava, did anyone come on board you to determine the place of your anchorage?" and his answer was, "Never." He is then asked, "Were all the vessels that anchored there, to your knowledge, allowed to anchor as they chose?—Yes." "Inside the harbour were there any regulations with regard to the anchorage?—Decidedly not"?—He was never inside of it by his own evidence. He tells some story about the reception he was to meet with; but he went and anchored at Varna, and nearly lost his ship from never letting go his second anchor. With regard to the coaling at Balaklava, there never was such a thing took place at Balaklava; there were never any colliers there, except three which put in from stress of weather, and they were immediately to go round to Kamiesch.

16352. Mr. *Layard.*] But ought there not to have been vessels there to coal?—The men-of-war all lay at Kamiesch and the Katscha, and it would have been rather out of the way to have brought them to Balaklava.

16353. But there were steam transports?—Yes; but they were always going to Constantinople, and they coaled themselves there.

16354. How was the coaling carried on at Constantinople?—I believe it was very bad; I have heard that it was so.

16355. Captain *Gladstone.*] You only know that in your own case, when you took in coals?—No.

Captain *Alexander Milne*, R.N., called in; and Examined.

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16356. Mr. *Layard.*] WILL you state to the Committee what office you hold in the Admiralty?—I am one of the members of the Board of Admiralty.

16357. Was the transport under your particular direction from the first?—The Transport department, properly speaking, is under the Comptroller of the Victualling and Transport service, which is one of the subdivisions of the Admiralty at Somerset House.

16358. Will you state to the Committee exactly how the Transport service has been managed in the Admiralty since the time that the expedition to the Crimea commenced?—When the first communication was made from the Duke of Newcastle to the Admiralty to prepare means for sending out a large number of troops, at the same time a communication was made to the Comptroller of the Victualling in reference to supplying the Commissariat provisions for the whole of that army. The date was the 9th of February 1854. Finding, from the large amount of duties that the Comptroller of Victualling and Transport had to perform, it was quite obvious to me that Mr. Grant would be unable to undertake the transport duties, as I was the superintending Lord of that department, I took upon myself the responsibility of making the proper arrangements with regard to the conveyance of the troops, stores, and horses to be sent from this country. The first communication which was received, was from the Duke of Newcastle upon the 9th of February. There was another on the 17th and on the 24th. In the month of February we were called upon to send out 509 officers, 10,933 men, 272 women, 12 children, 1,598 horses; the camp equipage, with that number of troops, would be 750 tons, baggage about 850 tons, Ordnance stores, 909 tons; army provisions, 1,088 tons. The means taken for this was to address letters to the whole of the steam companies in England, requesting them to afford the means of steam communication for the purpose of sending out troops. We wrote to the Australian Company, the

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the Australian Pacific Company, the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the General Screw Company, the Royal Mail Company, the North American Company, the African Company, the Ocean Steam Navigation, the St. Petersburgh and North of Europe General Steam Navigation Company, the Antwerp Steam Company, the Glasgow and Philadelphia Steam Company, the Dundee and Perth Steam Company, the London, Leith, and Glasgow Company, the Edinburgh and New York Line, the Cork Screw Company. We received an offer of one vessel, the "Victoria," from the Australian Company, which was then in England; they likewise offered us the "Adelaide," then at Sydney, a vessel called the "Sydney," expected daily in London, and the "Australian," which might be expected at the beginning of May. We were offered, by the General Screw Company, the "Golden Fleece," and we were also offered the "Jason," the "Prince," and the "Harbinger," which would not be ready till between April and June. The Peninsular and Oriental Company placed at the disposal of the Government the "Himalaya," the "Ripon," and the "Manilla;" the "Himalaya" was not then in England. The North American Company had no vessel in England at the time, but they expected one in the course of the next week. From the Australian Company we had nothing. The Royal Mail Company had nothing then in England. The African Company had nothing; we got no answer from the Ocean Steam Navigation Company. The St. Petersburgh Company expected two vessels in a very short time, but they were only adapted for the conveyance of cattle. The North of Europe Company offered us the "Royal Victoria," and the "City of Norwich," but they were then at Hamburgh. We had no answer from the General Screw Company, nor from the Antwerp Steam Company, nor from the Glasgow and Philadelphia. The Dundee and Perth could only give us one vessel of 638 tons, but it was employed in trade; the London and Leith had three, but they were also employed in trade, and they could not be given under four weeks. We had no answer from the Edinburgh and New York, nor from the Cork Steam Company. We also advertised at Lloyd's on the 10th of February for the hire of steamers for conveyance of troops to Malta at so much per head; that is to say, we were to pay so much per head for the troops landed; the owners to provide water-casks, and to victual the troops at the usual rates, and the only offer we got was, the "Sovereign" of 606 tons, "Nicolai the First," 776 tons, both cattle vessels, and the "Great Britain," when she arrived from Australia. Those were the only offers we received. As soon as some of the above vessels arrived in England, of which the "Himalaya" was one, we communicated with the companies to whom they belonged, and we obtained the "Himalaya" when ready. She arrived about the 15th of February, and she was ready to embark troops on the 28th of February.

16359. Will you state to the Committee the general result of your communications; how many transports were obtained, the number of troops that went out, and how they were conveyed to Malta?—Twelve vessels sailed between the 23d of February and the 20th of March, containing 339 officers, 9,804 men, 248 women, 20 children, and 53 horses.

16360. Then the requisition that was sent to you by the Government was complied with fully?—Yes.

16361. With regard to the office, do you consider that you were the responsible person for the whole Transport service at that time?—I consider myself responsible under the Board of Admiralty.

16362. You mentioned Mr. Grant at the Victualling department as having some share in the Transport department; how far did that extend?—I took it from his hands. I took his responsibility upon myself, because his duties became so laborious with regard to the victualling of the fleet, and also providing the whole of the Commissariat stores for that army, that it was quite impossible that he could carry on the transport duties.

16363. Before that time it was his duty to attend to the Transport service?—Yes.

16364. You, as a Lord of the Admiralty, could take, upon your own responsibility, those duties upon yourself?—Certainly.

16365. What has Mr. Grant had to do with the expedition since then?—He has had to supply the whole of the provisions, both for the navy and the army.

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16366. Therefore he is a gentleman who ought to be called before the Committee?—Yes.

16367. He has had nothing to do with the transport since you undertook it —No.

16368. From that time you were personally responsible for it?—Yes.

16369. Will you mention how long that responsibility continued? — It continued till the appointment of the Transport Board, in the month of February 1855.

16370. In what way did you take up these transports?—We communicated with the companies, and told them that we immediately wanted the steamers to be placed at the service of the Government; and, with regard to their remuneration, that we should arbitrate upon the question of payment hereafter, under a clause of the Contract for Packets; some of those vessels being at this time employed in the packet service, all except two; the "Orinoco," the "Ripon," the "Cambia," the "Niagara," and the "Himalaya," were all.

16371. *Chairman.*] That clause to which you refer gives the Government power, does it not, to take up vessels belonging to those companies?—It does.

16372. And under that clause you acted?—Yes.

16373. Mr. *Layard.*] With regard to other ships, how did you take them up?—By private offer. The first offered to us, by brokers in the City, was the "Tonning;" she was offered by Messrs. Lachlans, at a certain price per month; she was a vessel of 988 tons; 795 tons new measure; 988 tons old measure.

16374. Captain *Gladstone.*] Generally speaking, does the tonnage include room for the engines?—The register does not include the engine-room; the gross tonnage does include the engine-room; she was a cattle steamer running to Hamburgh.

16375. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When you speak of tonnage, you usually speak of registered tonnage?—Yes. This vessel was taken up at the time by the month; she was offered at 1,800 *l.* per month, for four months certain; that vessel was accepted by the Admiralty. The second vessel offered was a vessel called the "City of London," also a Hamburgh boat for passengers as well as for cattle; that vessel was 1,116 tons and 420 horse power; she was offered at the rate of 600 *l.* per week, which the brokers declined to reduce, and we were compelled to take at that rate, the Government finding coal in both cases, because the owners said it was quite impossible for them to provide coal for a service which they did not know.

16376. *Chairman.*] Did that go to diminish the sum for hiring them?—No; that was the offer at the time; the third vessel that was offered, and which was the first taken upon tonnage, was a vessel called the "Victoria," belonging to the Australian Company. The Australian Royal Mail Company, in answer to a communication which was addressed to them, replied, that the only steamer at their disposal to tender for conveying the troops was the "Victoria," but that they should not be in a position to make a formal tender of her sooner than Monday. The vessel was then ordered to be inspected by the Deptford surveying officers, and she was reported capable of carrying 560 troops, with the proportion of officers, and stowage below for baggage and camp equipage for that number of men. The Board, however, declined the offer of the ship at that time. The company state, in reply to a subsequent letter (for at this time we were very hardly pressed to send out troops, and we were very anxious to get as many steamers as we could), on the 24th of February, from the Comptroller of the Victualling and Transport Services, "The 'Victoria' is now in Soames' dry dock, Blackwall, for inspection, and she will be ready to put to sea in a fortnight; terms to be 2*l.* 10*s.* per month, on 1,878 tons; or if these terms are not quite agreeable to Her Majesty's Government, the company are willing to have the amount paid by arbitration." And the Minute made upon that ship, and communicated to the company, was, "That the claim for chartering is so far in excess of the rate contemplated by their Lordships, and the estimated value of the service placed at so high a figure, that their Lordships decline entering into any agreement on such terms, but will be ready to consider a reasonable offer." This was the first ship chartered upon tonnage. The company was written to again (as they would make no further offer), to know whether they were prepared to charter the ship at a more reasonable rate

rate for four months, to which they gave no answer; and I think, so far as I can now recollect that, there was a personal communication, and that they declined to reduce their terms; under these circumstances there was no alternative but to charter the ship upon the terms that were offered to the Admiralty.

16377. Mr. *Layard.*] In your opinion were those ships taken up on the most advantageous terms?—I think so.

16378. Can you compare the way in which they were taken up by the Government with the manner in which they would have been taken up by private companies?—I do not think that it is a fair mode of comparison; here the steamers were taken up specially for the conveyance of troops, and they not only carried out with them the camp equipage and baggage, but we filled up the ship with any stores that we had; a very large quantity of ammunition went out with all these steamers.

16379. It has been stated that vessels were taken up without any regard to price; was that so?—Not at all; no such thing. I have mentioned this case of the "Victoria," and I will also mention another case, which was the second one upon which the question of tonnage arose; it was a vessel called the "Melbourne;" and upon those two cases the market price of the day for steamers became fixed.

16380. Sir *J. Hanmer.*] You never went to arbitration?—No; the party who offered this ship was a gentleman connected with the City, Mr. Russell; and he stated that he "came to offer the steamship 'Melbourne';" he stated that he knew Government was in want of steam vessels for the conveyance of troops, and that he intended to have sold the "Melbourne," but had recalled the papers, with the view of assisting Government; he stated he was willing to charter the ship, but in so doing he expected he ought not to be a loser by the transaction. That in selling the vessel he could have realized a considerable profit, and he could not allow the ship to be chartered under 50 *s.* per ton per month; this was objected to as a very high rate, and that 40 *s.* on the gross measurement ought to be taken, as it was a most liberal payment; to this Mr. R. objected, as also to 45 *s.*; he said he had no wish to retain the ship on his hands, that the bill of sale was signed by himself, and he only withdrew the sale with the view of assisting Government, and he certainly could not be expected to be a loser by the transaction when he came forward to assist Government on the present emergency.

16381. *Chairman.*] The former ship was offered at the rate of 40 *s.*?—No, 50 *s.* Finding Mr. Russell would not accept the lower terms, I was compelled to accept the ship on Mr. Russell's own terms.

16382. Mr. *Layard.*] On the whole, you think that the Government made as good arrangements as could be made under the circumstances?—I think so, and that it was not possible to make any other arrangements.

16383. Did you at that time completely fulfil all the demands that were made upon you by the Government?—Certainly. I am not aware of anything that was left out as to the conveyance of the troops.

16384. You took out troops, stores, artillery, and all the necessary appurtenances of an army of 10,000 men?—Yes. The greatest difficulty we had to contend with was in the conveyance of horses; there was an enormous number of them, and to get steamers to do it was impossible.

16385. Captain *Gladstone.*] In every case, before any steam-vessel was taken, was she properly surveyed?—In every case there was full inquiry, and an inspection of the machinery as well as of the ship itself.

16386. Mr. *Layard.*] There has been some question in the Committee, with regard to the way in which ships were taken up, as to measurement and tonnage. Will you explain to the Committee how those vessels were taken up; whether they were taken up in the manner in which vessels are usually taken in the present day?—With regard to sailing ships, the tender is always made and ships accepted upon the whole tonnage new measurement. In regard to steam vessels, they were also chartered upon the whole, or gross tonnage new measurement. If we had attempted to deal with the question in any other way, that is by chartering vessels on the whole tonnage, minus engine room, we must have fixed a special price and a varying one for every ship; and as that appeared to be the most injudicious way of dealing with the question, we told every shipowner that their offers of steamers must be based on the gross

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tonnage; and then we adopted one clear principle in the whole of the transactions we had.

16387. In your opinion that was the most effectual and best way?—Decidedly.

16388. You took out troops as well as stores?—Yes.

16389. Who superintended the embarkation of the troops?—The embarkation of the troops depended upon the port where the embarkation took place; if at Southampton, it was superintended by the naval agent for the packet service, and Captain Dacres is the present agent; if at Liverpool, it was under the superintendence of Commander Bevis, who is agent for transports there; if at Dublin, it was superintended by the agents for transports there; if at Cork, the same; and if at Portsmouth, the admiral superintendent of the port.

16390. In all cases the embarkation of the troops was superintended by an Admiralty agent?—Yes.

16391. Was it the same with regard to stores?—Yes.

16392. If it has been stated to the Committee that there was neglect and oversight as to the embarkation of stores at different places, who are the responsible persons for that state of things?—I may perhaps explain before going further, that the mode in which stores are sent abroad is in two ways. Stores, whenever we have an opportunity of doing so, are always sent out in freight ships, that is to say, stores are embarked and conveyed to the place of destination and landed, and the ship is then discharged, and there is an end of the transaction. In a case of that sort the interest of the owner of the ship is the interest of the Government, because he cannot get paid for his freight until the receipts are received by the department in London, which are transmitted to the Admiralty for payment, and he therefore hastens the delivery of the stores.

16393. At the same time the pay is running on?—No, he is not paid; he is only paid for freight caused not by the ship and time; he is merely paid for conveying the stores to their destination.

16394. *Chairman.*] He is paid for the job?—Yes; and he cannot get paid till the receipts are produced in London. It is so much per ton upon the stores. The other way is where there is a transport paid by time; as in the case of sending out horses we could not make any arrangements to land them and discharge the ship, because we were unacquainted with what services would be performed in the Black Sea. There we are obliged to charter the vessel by the month, and then the delivery of the stores is committed to the master of the ship, who for the time being becomes the storekeeper.

16395. Mr. *Layard.*] Are the Committee to understand you, that, with the exception of horses, all your stores were sent out according to the first plan?—A great many, and a great quantity of provisions; but not all.

16396. Up to what time was that done?—It varied throughout.

16397. Then if vessels had been detained the captain did not profit by the detention?—If he is detained beyond 40 days in the whole, then he comes upon demurrage.

16398. Will you state what vessels were taken up on the first plan, and which upon the second?—I can furnish every vessel that was freighted, and I can give all those that were taken upon time, and not by job.

16399. Will you be so good as to give the Committee the number and names?—I have a list here altogether of 90 vessels that were taken up by time.

16400. How many were taken up by the job, do you suppose?—That depends upon the quantity; we have been sending out at the rate of 2,500 tons of provisions per month.

16401. May I ask you whether have you at any time paid demurrage upon any vessels that were taken up by the job?—I am not aware of any; there were some upon vessels that were taken up at Malta for the conveyance of coal from that island to the Crimea; but I have not seen any claim with regard to Constantinople.

16402. No claim has been made upon the Admiralty for demurrage on account of vessels taken up in England by the job?—There may have been without my knowledge.

16403. Could there have been without your knowledge?—Yes.

16404. How could that happen?—Because those accounts would go into office independent of me altogether.

16405. Though

16405. Though you are at the head of the transport service, yet the accounts would go into a different department?—They would go into the account department; I only take charge of working the details of the arrangements in England of that department which is called the Victualling and Transport department, and which has been separated since the Transport Board was created.

16406. But before the period of the Transport Board, who had the settlement of the accounts?—The Comptroller of Victualling and Accountant-general.

16407. But the Committee wish to ascertain whether demurrage was charged or paid by you; are we to inquire of the Comptroller of Victualling?—Yes.

16408. How was the embarkation of the horses managed?—The first matter we had to arrange was with regard to the artillery and the embarkation of all the horses, guns and ammunition. Sir Hew Ross came to me with a detailed return of artillery horses that had to go out. I asked him to divide that by three, which gave 63 horses, with a proportion of guns and ammunition. We found that we could get no ship that could conveniently take 63 horses with the men, guns, waggons, ammunition, provisions and forage, for I considered it decidedly advantageous for the public service, that the guns should not be separated from the horses or men, or the men from their *materiel*. I laid it down as a rule, that every ship which embarked artillery should be complete in itself. Sir Hew Ross divided the battery into four, and that gave two officers, 50 men, 52 horses, three guns, with waggons and *materiel*, and that was the principle upon which throughout this expedition the whole of the artillery has been sent from this country, so that every ship that left England went in itself complete as a division of a battery; and if that ship arrived at a place where service was to be performed, the horses and military could be landed and formed at once. To carry out that service, there were 18 ships taken up for the artillery, consisting of 42 officers, 1,090 men, 19 women, 961 horses, 124 ammunition waggons, and 24 guns.

16409. Some evidence has been given to this Committee as to the embarkation of horses; who had the superintendence of that?—They were embarked in the basin at Woolwich dockyard; the ships went into the dockyard basin, and the horses were hoisted on board from the quay.

16410. Was there no cavalry at that time at all?—No, not at that time.

16411. When did the first embarkation of cavalry take place?—On the 17th of April.

16412. Was that cavalry attached to the original body of 10,000 men?—Yes; under a requisition of the 15th of March, from the Horse Guards.

16413. How was that cavalry embarked; under whose superintendence?—The horses at Liverpool were embarked under the superintendence of Captain Bevis, and those from Portsmouth, Woolwich, Southampton, and Deptford under the superintendence of the agents there.

16414. When that cavalry was to be sent out, what arrangements were made by the Admiralty to fit up vessels to carry the horses of the cavalry and artillery?—The ships were fitted under an established regulation that had been drawn up about 15 years ago; there was a contract at Deptford by a party there for fitting all our troop and horse ships, and the specification was in his hands, and whenever the ships were taken up they went to Deptford, to be fitted there by the contractor. Artillery officers from Woolwich came to see the fittings, and recommended one or two alterations, and those were carried out; some cavalry officers also came down to see them, and recommended some further alterations, and the whole of those fittings were approved of.

16415. With regard to Liverpool, how was that done?—They were fitted under Commander Bevis, and Commander Boyd and two carpenters, who were sent down specially from Deptford, and who had been employed in fitting the ships in the river. There was also a foreman of shipwrights from one of the dockyards to check the work performed.

16416. Were no objections made to the way in which the ships were fitted up for the horses at Liverpool?—I believe not.

16417. Are you aware of the different modes adopted in fitting up vessels for horses; there is one called the Hull plan, for instance?—The Hull plan was considered at the time by the officers at Deptford, and it was not thought expedient to adopt it.

16418. Do you know whether that plan has been adopted by persons who are in the habit of sending horses for sale to the Continent?—I should say it

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was convenient for a short voyage, but where you have a voyage to Constantinople, where you must take a large quantity of water, it is not desirable to carry that plan out; you could not stow the water, unless you reduce the number of horses to such an extent as to be able to convey water for them. The Hull plan, I believe, is that the horses are not to be between stalls, and that they are to stand upon shingle, and, to do so with safety, there cannot be water casks under the shingle.

16419. But by the Hull plan fewer horses are taken than by the plan adopted by the Admiralty?—I think the Hull plan takes two horses where we take three.

16420. Were the relative merits of the plans well discussed and considered by the Admiralty?—Yes, they were.

16421. And they decided that the Hull plan was not the best?—They decided that the original plan which had been improved upon should be carried out.

16422. It has been stated that the mode adopted by the Admiralty was an unadvisable one; that there was not a proper division between the horses, but merely a bar, and that when they slipped down in heavy weather, they got mingled together; was that the case?—I believe there was never an expedition which left this country with such a large number of horses where the accidents or deaths had been so few. I believe that, out of 5,248 horses sent out, the average loss was under three per cent.

16423. Does that include any losses which might have taken place in the Black Sea?—No, it does not; it merely refers to sending the horses from England to Constantinople.

16424. Did you ever receive any reports as to the loss of horses in vessels in the Black Sea?—I called for one, from having seen in the returns that in one or two ships going from Varna to the Crimea a large loss took place; the report received was this, that owing to the former's fittings having been taken down, and from the officers having placed three horses where two only would have originally stood, and from too slight fittings having been put up for the horses, which were placed on the upper deck, which gave way, and when it came on to blow a gale the towing hawsers parted, the ships got broadside on to the sea, and this was the cause of the loss.

16425. You did not think that anything that might have happened then was owing to the fittings not having been properly put up at first?—Certainly not.

16426. Will you furnish that report to the Committee?—Certainly. I may say that as soon as the ships had sailed, so anxious was I that the fittings should be complete in every respect, and that hereafter, in case of any mistake, that everything should be corrected, that I sent this printed form to every ship that carried out horses, requesting suggestions and improvements, and upon that the new specifications have been since corrected.

16427. Upon the whole, you think that the plan adopted by the Government has been justified by the result?—I think so, decidedly.

16428. With regard to medicines, or stores of a like description, can you explain to the Committee what process would have to be gone through to ship such stores?—First, I will state what was adopted by ourselves with regard to the Naval department. When this service began in the East, we had no establishment whatever at Constantinople, and we appointed a storekeeper, with clerks, to establish a depôt of provision and stores for the fleet. We then ordered that a monthly return should come home to us of all that was in store. We subsequently ordered that it should be a fourteen days' return, and that return has been kept up since the 14th June. When we chartered a vessel to convey provisions, we communicated immediately to our storekeeper at Constantinople, that such a vessel was coming. The fourteen days' return that we then received contained a list of the quantity remaining in store, the ships that had arrived and delivered cargo since the last return, thus giving what was then in store, and including in it the ships expected from England, according to the advices sent out; that is for the Naval department.

16429. Those are, strictly speaking, naval stores?—Yes; nothing else. With regard to the other departments, the Admiralty alone provide the ship. If the Board of Ordnance sends us a requisition for medicines, we advertise for freight; or if we have a transport going and loading, they are appropriated to that ship; and we acquaint the Board of Ordnance that such and such stores,

stores, that had been requested to be forwarded to the East, may be shipped in such and such a ship; and we know nothing more of the transaction till we get the receipt of the Board of Ordnance, that the whole of the stores have been delivered.

16430. It has been stated to the Committee, by Dr. Andrew Smith and others, that a great deal of the blame that has been thrown upon them, for there not being sufficient medical stores in the East, may have arisen from their not having been sent from England; that he forwarded them to the place where they should have been placed on board ship, but after that he lost sight of them?—We do not know Dr. Andrew Smith; we only receive our requisition from the Board of Ordnance, "medicines being part of the Ordnance stores."

16431. Therefore, Dr. Smith, to the best of your belief, must apply to the Board of Ordnance, and then the Board of Ordnance applies to you?—Yes; on the 21st of February there was a requisition for 40 tons of medicines, to go to the East; that is all we know of it, and we apportioned it to certain ships.

16432. Those stores are then given over to an agent of yours by the Ordnance?—No; we acquaint the Ordnance that they are to be shipped in such and such a vessel; the Ordnance then send them down to that vessel, and they are put on board under the superintendence of their own shipper; they have a shipping agent attached to Woolwich Arsenal, and they have a stevedore, or a party to stow the cargo.

16433. *Chairman.*] I suppose your officer tells them whither they are to go in ship?—Yes; and the captain of the transport is answerable. We used to have a stower of cargo belonging to the Admiralty; but it was then found that if any damage took place, the accusation was, that the Admiralty's stevedore had stowed them wrong, and, therefore, the responsibility was not with the master of the vessel; since that the master of the vessel, as the stower of the cargo, is answerable for it, so long as it is on board ship.

16434. He knows where each portion of the cargo lies?—He ought to do so.

16435. Mr. *Layard.*] The responsibility of the Admiralty ceases when the name of the ship has been given to the Ordnance?—Yes, it does. There is a general supervision of all vessels loading at Deptford, under the captain-superintendent, and the shipping officers of that yard. The master attendant goes on board to see that all things are going right.

16436. Do they take any responsibility on themselves by that?—No; because that would take it from the master of the vessel.

16437. Then the Committee are clearly to understand that the persons who are responsible for any deficiency in carrying out the stores, are the agents of the Ordnance and the captains of the vessels?—Yes.

16438. Can you state whether a shipping book was kept, or a cargo book?—I believe not generally, for this reason, that it is not like the cargo of a merchant vessel, where there is a great variety of articles to be consigned to a very great number of different people. There is a bill of lading, and every barge that goes alongside with stores, gets a receipt for it. Those are kept in the office, and before the ship sails, those items are recorded in a bill of lading given to the master.

16439. The Admiralty have nothing to do with the receipt of stores at the place of delivery?—No; the captain of the vessel should send us a certificate home, to let us know what is doing. We do not act upon that certificate, only upon the certificate of the department to whom the stores belong, before the Admiralty make any payment.

16440. You do not take any responsibility upon yourself as to the delivery of stores?—None.

16441. Do you know anything about the shipment of those medicines; in what vessels were they shipped?—Those medicines were shipped in a vessel called the "Wrights," a sailing vessel.

16442. How long was she detained here after the medical comforts had been shipped on board of her?—She was detained for about five weeks; she did not sail till the 5th of April.

16443. Did she take out all the medical stores?—She took 40 tons.

16444. What time did the bulk of the army sail?—In March.

16445. The bulk of the army sailed in March, but the medical stores and

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comforts did not sail till a month afterwards?—Not till the 5th of April; there was great delay in getting her loaded. This vessel in which the medicines were shipped was not a transport, but a freight ship, to discharge her cargo at her destination, and then we had nothing more to do with her.

16446. Why was she detained so long?—I believe, so far as I recollect, that there was some difficulty as to making up the cargo for her; we could not get sufficient.

16447. Were you ever urged by the Medical department, or any other, to expedite the sending out of those medical stores?—I do not recollect now, but I see nothing marked "Urgent" here in the requisition.

16448. You were merely left to take the common course?—Yes; when a thing is marked "Urgent" we send it by steam as hastily as we can.

16449. You had no knowledge that those medical stores were required immediately?—No; we sent them in the first ship that was going.

16450. When those stores are sent out, consisting of all kinds of stores, does any Admiralty agent accompany the ship?—None.

16451. No supercargo of any kind?—None; the master of the ship is the supercargo and storekeeper for the time being.

16452. He is responsible for the delivery and care of those stores, is he not?—Quite so.

16453. At what time did you receive an application for any fresh transports for troops; the army was increased after a certain date, was it not?—There was a requisition of the 15th of March to send out 15 regiments, with artillery horses.

16454. What steps were taken upon that?—For artillery horses we again advertised, and fitted the ships at Deptford as before; with regard to sending out the infantry, we employed those steamers that had gone to Malta and had returned, and then chartered several more for the same purpose.

16455. How many did you charter in consequence of the fresh demands made?—I cannot give the Committee correct information without reference to other documents.

16456. Were those vessels taken up on the same terms as the previous vessels had been?—Yes.

16457. Was there sufficient transport at the time that you received the fresh demands from the Government?—There was great difficulty in getting together steamers to meet the emergency, owing to the want of steamers.

16458. *Chairman.*] Did you get them together?—Yes.

16459. Mr. *Layard.*] Have all the requirements of the Government, in fact, been fulfilled?—I believe so. I will mention what the services were for March. I said before what the services for February were, and the services for March were 556 officers and 14,418 men.

16460. *Chairman.*] Including the former 10,000?—No, fresh men; there were besides 453 women, 415 children, 1,145 horses, 62 waggons, 22 guns, camp equipage about 600 tons, baggage 800 tons, Ordnance stores 1,600 tons, army provisions 1,440 tons.

16461. Mr. *Layard.*] Were you informed at that time that these transports would be required to go to Malta or to Constantinople?—They were consigned to Malta.

16462. When were you first called upon to send transports to the East or to the Dardanelles?—The whole of the troops had gone to Malta, and it was from thence that they were to go to the East.

16463. But the vessels were chartered in England; were they not chartered for the East?—I think not; they were taken up to convey the troops to Malta and taken on; they were taken by the time.

16464. When had you the first notice from the Government that those vessels would be required to proceed to the East?—I cannot exactly answer that question without a reference to documents.

16465. Can you state about what time it was?—I think about the month of June; I think there were two regiments sent on from Malta to Gallipoli.

16466. Who at Malta had the power of re-chartering those vessels?—They were not re-chartered there, but if it had been required, Admiral Houston Stewart.

16467. In the charter-party in London I presume a power was inserted to continue the employment of those vessels, and Admiral Stewart had power to continue them?—Yes.

16468. Can

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16468. Can you state when you first took up vessels in London for the service of the East?—In February 1854; but there was a third service which began in May.

16469. When vessels are consigned to a certain place in any numbers, is it necessary to have there an Admiralty agent to superintend the different matters connected with those vessels?—Yes, it is.

16470. Such being the case, and these vessels going to the East, did you consider it necessary to appoint an Admiralty agent there?—Captain Christie was appointed.

16471. To what place?—In command of the whole transport in the Black Sea.

16472. He was in command of the transport afloat?—Yes.

16473. I mean a stationary agent?—That agent was sent up; when a regiment was ordered to Gallipoli, there was an agent sent up by Admiral Houson Stewart.

16474. Who was he?—I forget.

16475. Did he continue at Constantinople as Admiralty agent?—No; he remained at Gallipoli for a certain time, and then went on to Constantinople.

16476. Did he remain there as agent for the transports?—I think not; he returned to Malta.

16477. Who was sent to Constantinople?—Admiral Boxer.

16478. Who sent him to Constantinople?—He was sent by the First Lord of the Admiralty, who generally appoints Admirals.

16479. Had you any voice in the selection of Admiral Boxer?—No.

16480. Can you state why he was selected?—From being a man of great experience.

16481. In naval matters?—Yes; experience during the late war.

16482. *Chairman.*] You mean the French war, do you not?—Yes; he had had a great deal of experience as to the transport service at Tarragona; he was an officer who had served with great distinction in Syria, and had laid down all the buoys for stationing the ships in the attack at Acre; he had been subsequently agent for transports, and harbour-master at Quebec.

16483. Mr. *Layard.*] He was a most gallant officer, no doubt?—He was a gallant and hard-working man.

16484. *Chairman.*] What was his age?—I think about 68 or 69.

16485. Mr. *Layard.*] He is an active man in his habits, is he not?—I believe so; he was when I knew him in the West Indies.

16486. *Chairman.*] How long ago was that?—In 1839-40.

16487. Mr. *Layard.*] Had he any acquaintance with the land part of the administration of the transport service?—I do not know.

16488. Has he fulfilled his duties to your satisfaction?—I have seen no public complaints against him.

16489. No complaints have been sent to the Admiralty against him?—None whatever.

16490. *Chairman.*] Not by any department?—I am not aware of any; I have asked the question, and I have found nothing.

16491. Mr. *Layard.*] Why was Admiral Boxer removed from Constantinople?—I do not know exactly; he was removed by the First Lord.

16492. Does the First Lord of the Admiralty make those appointments, and remove officers without consulting the Board?—He does; he mentions the circumstance that he has removed, for instance, Admiral Boxer, from the Bosphorus to Balaklava.

16493. Is he bound to state his reasons?—No; he said that the report was that he had not given satisfaction.

16494. The First Lord did state that?—Yes.

16495. That was the ground on which he was sent to Balaklava?—I presume so.

16496. *Chairman.*] The First Lord learned that fact without your knowledge?—Without my knowledge; he may have had some communication that I was not aware of.

16497. So that a complaint might have been made against Admiral Boxer without your knowledge?—I think if any official document had been sent I should have seen it; it would have been laid before the Board.

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16498. Mr. *Layard.*] Are the appointments solely in the hands of the First Lord; is he responsible alone for all appointments?—Yes; but he consults with the members of the Board.

16499. Is he personally responsible for appointments?—Yes.

16500. Captain *Gladstone.*] In appointing an Admiral would he consult with the other members of the Board?—Not always; he generally mentions the subject.

16501. Lord *Seymour.*] He can, if he chooses, appoint on his own responsibility, and he may consult the Board as to appointments?—Yes, certainly.

16502. In reference to the appointment of Admiral Boxer, are you aware whether or not the First Naval Lord was consulted?—I believe he was consulted.

16503. Mr. *Layard.*] You do not know that as a fact?—No.

16504. With regard to Captain Christie, how was his appointment made?—His appointment was made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, who appoints all captains to ships.

16505. In that appointment did he consult the Naval Board?—Yes.

16506. Was that appointment approved of?—Yes; so far that I may mention that he consulted me on the subject.

16507. You approved of the appointment?—I did.

16508. Have there been any complaints against Captain Christie, of which you are cognisant?—I am not aware of any, except with regard to the complaint as to the "Prince" and the "Resolute."

16509. By whom were those complaints made?—They were made in consequence of an investigation that we ordered as to the causes of the loss of the "Prince," by Sir Edmund Lyons.

16510. In consequence of Sir Edmund Lyons's Report, what was done with regard to Captain Christie?—We have ordered Captain Christie to be tried by a court martial.

16511. In consequence of Sir Edmund Lyons's Report upon the loss of the "Prince?"—Yes.

16512. Had any official reports come to the Admiralty from the captains of transports previously?—I do not recollect of any.

16513. Captain *Gladstone.*] That court martial has not taken place?—No.

16514. Mr. *Layard.*] He has been removed from his post, has he not?—Yes.

16515. Who has been substituted?—Captain Heath.

16516. Did you receive regularly from Admiral Boxer reports upon the state of things at Constantinople, with regard to the transports?—We received periodical reports as to the arrival and sailing of the vessels; but we have received very little information with regard to the details of the duties.

16517. Was Admiral Boxer bound to supply you with information upon those subjects?—Yes, if anything particular happened.

16518. *Chairman.*] Would those reports convey to you a knowledge of the time for which the ships were detained?—Yes; the periodical returns would give how long ships were in harbour.

16519. So that a vessel which might arrive at Constantinople might be kept many weeks, without your knowing of it?—We should know it by his returns; we have fortnightly returns from every officer, giving, in detail, where his ship is, and how she is employed; and we should know by Admiral Boxer's return that that vessel was at Constantinople, and how she was employed.

16520. That is, by comparison of one return with another, you learn that yourself?—Yes.

16521. It is a conclusion drawn by yourself, and not one suggested by him?—It is drawn by us from the returns sent to the Admiralty.

16522. Mr. *Layard.*] Did he ever inform you that remonstrances had been made to him on account of the detention of vessels there, in consequence of the want of proper transport for supplies to the army?—Never.

16523. Did you never hear that there was a want of sufficient transport at Constantinople?—Never.

16524. If such a representation had been made to you, could that want of transport have been remedied?—Certainly.

16525. To any extent?—They have always had a sufficient amount of steam transport for any service that could be required; so much so, that we have always

always thought it was necessary to recal transports to commence other operations that were required here.

16526. *Chairman.*] The Admiralty did not know this fact, that there had been a great need of transport animals, and that a vessel which was sent from Balaklava to Constantinople, to bring them, was unnecessarily delayed?—No; but before I could pronounce an opinion upon the detention of that vessel, which I saw mentioned in the evidence, I should like to see the requisition which went to Admiral Boxer. My impression is, that if he had been informed that it was of a pressing nature, and that the ship was immediately to return with mules, he certainly never would have detained her.

16527. Supposing he had detained her, and that it had been stated to him that it was a pressing emergency, what would have been the consequence to Admiral Boxer?—I think he would have been blamable. The Honourable Chairman, I presume, alludes to the case of the "Jason;" I see by the returns that she arrived at Constantinople on the 28th of November, and she left Balaklava on the 12th of November for Varna; from Varna she went to Bourghas: from thence she went to Kamiesch with the 6th Dragoon Guards, and she arrived at Constantinople on the 28th of November, and sailed from Constantinople for Balaklava on the 14th of December, having on board four officers, 123 men, 256 horses; Government stores, about 700 tons; 225 stoves, and 620 shells. If there had been that great emergency, and it had been pointed out to Admiral Boxer, I presume that he never would have detained her even to put 700 tons of stores into her.

16528. Mr. *Layard.*] So far as the Admiralty is concerned, you have never had a representation from Admiral Boxer that there was a want of transport there?—Never.

16529. You think that there was at all times an abundance of transport to do all that was necessary?—So much so that, as far back as the 5th of June, I requested Sir James Graham to have a letter sent to the Duke of Newcastle, requesting authority to recal transports to England, provided the military service there, of which we were unaware, could have allowed them to be spared.

16530. In consequence of that was the amount of transport diminished?—No, it was not; but some vessels were sent home.

16531. Was it increased?—Yes, it was; and it has been increasing, more especially as to steam-vessels.

16532. In your opinion, was there an abundance of transport out there to supply all the wants of the army?—That I cannot give a decided opinion upon; I do not know what the wants of the army were; a great number of steam-vessels were specially appropriated for the service of the army.

16533. *Chairman.*] Were certain steamers specially appointed for the service of the Commissariat?—Specially; with strict orders that those vessels were not to be interfered with, but to be entirely under the Commissary-general, to do with them as he liked; and they were so, and they never have been interfered with, that I am aware of; we should have been quite prepared to have placed at the disposal of the Commissary-general a greater number of vessels, if any requisition had ever been made.

16534. Captain *Gladstone.*] You never received any requisition?—No.

16535. Mr. *Layard.*] If any requisition had been made to Admiral Boxer, and he did not forward it to you, the person to be blamed would be Admiral Boxer?—Certainly.

16536. *Chairman.*] Ought that requisition to have been sent to Admiral Boxer, or to the Admiralty direct?—It should have gone to the Commander-in-chief. All requisitions ought to have come from Commissary-general Filder to the War department here, and that department would then have made the application.

16537. General *Peel.*] Supposing, in the case of the "Jason," an application had been made at Constantinople to Admiral Boxer to furnish another transport, would he have had power to furnish that transport without applying home?—Certainly.

16538. *Chairman.*] You suppose that he had the power from the fact of his having vessels at his command?—I do not know what vessels were lying there then; there might have been vessels lying there, and there might have been some not coaled and not ready for sea.

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16539. Mr. *Layard.*] Are you aware of the nature of the preparations that were made at Constantinople for coaling vessels?—No, except generally. I know generally that lighters were ordered to be purchased and prepared for coaling the ships.

16540. Were orders given from the Admiralty which would have authorised Admiral Boxer to have made every necessary preparation to keep the vessel properly coaled?—Certainly.

16541. If there was a deficiency of coals, he is the person to be blamed?—Not for the coals; the Admiralty would be to blame if we had not kept the store of coal up at Constantinople.

16542. Have you heard Captain Dacre's evidence?—Yes.

16543. He states that at the beginning of September he had only 14 tons on board, and that there was a great want of coals in the fleet; was that the case?—I never heard of it. The quantity of coal sent out to Constantinople from the 1st of February 1854 to the 23d of April this year, has been 111,446 tons, and 4,176 tons of patent fuel. We have sent out in the same time, 69,123 tons of coal, and 3,529 tons of patent fuel to Malta, from whence supplies of coal have been constantly forwarded on to Constantinople. As Admiral Boxer informed Admiral Stewart at Malta as to the state of the stores at Constantinople, so he kept sending on coal from that island.

16544. Captain *Gladstone.*] Have you ever heard that the supply of coal at Constantinople was deficient?—No.

16545. Mr. *Layard.*] Supposing there was a deficiency of coal at the seat of war, who was responsible for that want?—The Admiralty, if no store at Constantinople. The Commander-in-chief in the Black Sea would send an order to Admiral Boxer to send on coal to the Black Sea.

16546. Do you think it was a right thing that at such a time as the middle of September the "Sanspareil" should only have had 14 tons of coal on board, without having power to get more?—Certainly not; but I suspect that at that time the enormous demand of the steam transports and the navy together might have been so immense, that the store at Constantinople may have been suddenly reduced.

16547. Was any attempt ever made to obtain coals from Heraclea?—Yes; arrangements were made early in the summer of last year to work coals at Kosly, and there are now 8,000 tons of coal ready for embarkation. There were about 300 tons of Heraclea coal at Constantinople then; but vessels could not obtain coal at the mines in the winter months without great risk, in consequence of its being an open roadstead.

16548. Were any vessels appointed to the special duty of bringing the colliers to be in attendance on the ships of war?—I presume there was; the colliers were to be ordered on from Constantinople.

16549. Was it not necessary, whilst the fleet was carrying on operations, that it should be attended by coalships?—That is a matter of detail which ought to have been arranged in the Black Sea, and for which I am not responsible. It has been found impossible to deal with those questions from this country without causing confusion there, and it is much better to place confidence in your Commander-in-chief, and the senior officers at the outports, than to attempt to give peculiar or local orders that might influence all that was going on.

16550. With regard to steam-tugs, you heard the evidence of Captain Dacres as to the circumstance that Sir Edmund Lyons bought two on his own responsibility?—I rather think that Sir Edmund Lyons had a private communication from the first Lord of the Admiralty, giving him a *carte blanche* to purchase what was necessary, but the Commander-in-Chief has full authority to act for the Admiralty.

16551. But he was not in command of the fleet then?—It might have been done through Admiral Dundas. Sir Edmund Lyons was sent down by Admiral Dundas to Constantinople, with reference to the building of flat-bottomed boats, and obtaining anything and everything that might be required.

16552. Was it not necessary to have sent out tugs with the fleet?—It was necessary, and two were sent, small ships of war; but considering the large number of steam transports constantly passing from Malta to Constantinople having orders to tow vessels, it was not considered so necessary to send out special tugs for that purpose.

16553. Were

16553. Were any ships fitted up in England for the sick?—None till last January, when an officer came to me, who had been in the Black Sea, and said that he did not think sufficient care had been taken with regard to fitting up ships for the sick; and upon that I immediately ordered a ship to be fitted out at Southampton, specially for that purpose.

16554. It was, then, in your department to fit up ships of that kind?—Yes; on a requisition from the military authorities.

16555. Had you no requisition for fitting up ships for the sick till the period you have mentioned?—None; orders were sent out as far back as October, desiring two or three steamers to be specially fitted up for that purpose.

16556. But considering that the expedition went out in the spring of last year, would not that have been the proper period to prepare for the sick and wounded?—Had a requisition been made I certainly should have taken steps to have had hospital ships fitted up.

16557. Were no representations made to the Admiralty on that subject?—None that I am aware of.

16558. *Chairman.*] You did not consider it a part of your duty to suggest such a thing?—No. I thought of it, I must acknowledge, and I thought it odd that a requisition was not made.

16559. You did not state to anybody that you thought it odd, did you?—No; because I presumed that everything would be done that was considered necessary in the Black Sea. I think that means existed in the Black Sea.

16560. Has your experience confirmed that presumption that everything has been suggested that ought to have been suggested?—Certainly; I believe so, in so far as the navy is concerned.

16561. Has your experience confirmed that presumption?—I think that those hospital ships ought to have been fitted up at an earlier date.

16562. You give a specific instance instead of a general answer?—Yes.

16563. Mr. *Layard.*] What was the date of the construction of the Transport Board?—Some time in February. I think about the end of February or the beginning of March 1855.

16564. Are you on that Board?—I am, and I am not; that is to say, it is placed in the same position as the principal officers now in Somerset House; there are five principal offices there; the Storekeeper-general of the Navy, the Accountant-general of the Navy, the Comptroller of Victualling of the Navy, the Medical Department, and the Director of Works. Each of those departments is superintended by a member of the Board, and the individuals of those Boards are responsible for their own accounts, but a superintending Lord goes there from day to day to deal with questions that the superintendents of those separate departments have not the power to do.

16565. *Chairman.*] Then why was the change made?—Because I believe they thought that I had spent too much money, or something of that sort, and it was too much power to be in the hands of any one man.

16566. Mr. *Layard.*] Have you now anything to do with the Transport Board?—From being the superintending Lord of that Board, as a connecting link with the Admiralty.

16567. You now only exercise a controlling power over that Board?—That is all; they carry on now the whole detail of the duties.

16568. And they are responsible for their discharge?—Yes; whenever they are in difficulty, and want advice, I am ready to give it to them; but I do not consider myself answerable for the ships that they take up, or for the fitting, or embarkation, or the detail arrangements.

16569. You have had considerable experience; can you state whether you think a Board works better than the head of a department?—I carried on the whole of this service, from the first embarkation, for upwards of one year; and I must say, it is rather too heavy an undertaking for any one individual. I endeavoured to carry through that service, to the best of my ability. I believe there was some feeling, not of dissatisfaction, but some feeling that it was not done sufficiently quick to meet the emergencies of the case; and, therefore, it was put into the hands of the Board.

16570. *Chairman.*] Do you think that a Board works more quickly than an individual?—I do not.

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16571. Mr. *Layard.*] Suppose you had not double duties imposed upon you, first, as Lord of the Admiralty, and, next, as head of the transport department, could you have discharged the duties of that department most fully?—I should have required some assistance; it is impossible for one individual to go into the minute detail that is necessary.

16572. One head, whose time was entirely devoted to the transport duty, in your opinion, would be better than a Board?—I believe that one individual, to arrange the embarkations, and keeping in view the arrangements to be made for ships proceeding to different quarters, is better than three people doing it. I believe that is the system that has been pursued by the Transport Board. The chairman takes the appropriation of the shipping, another party takes the embarkation of the stores, and a third takes the surveys of the ships.

16573. You have just mentioned, that a large number of persons connected with the Admiralty, the heads of departments, are in Somerset House?—Yes.

16574. The transactions of the Board are carried on at Whitehall, are they not?—Yes.

16575. Do you think that is an advisable state of things?—Most decidedly not; and it is a great pity that the consolidation of Whitehall and Somerset House departments did not take place years ago. I found myself the greatest inconvenience, that while the business of the departments, their books, accounts, and correspondence, was carried on at Somerset House, I had to go backwards and forwards from Whitehall to Somerset House everyday, and I think that it is an impediment to the discharge of the public service.

16576. Have any representations been made on that subject?—It has been talked of to get a building at Whitehall large enough, and to bring the departments there; but when the Committee consider that one-half of Somerset House is occupied by those five departments, they will see how difficult it would be to construct any building at Whitehall of that size.

16577. Do you think that it would tend a great deal to the advancement of the public service if all the departments were collected under one roof?—Yes; there cannot be a doubt of it.

16578. Lord *Seymour.*] That has been universally admitted by all the authorities at the Admiralty for many years, has it not?—Yes; in fact Sir James Graham began in 1830 by doing away with the Navy Board, and as I said to him when he first came into office lately, that I hoped his last act would be the consolidation of the departments at Whitehall.

16579. Even if all the residences at the Admiralty were removed, and it was made entirely official, for official purposes, there would not be space enough?—No; if you built two Whitehalls, you would not get sufficient space.

16580. *Chairman.*] Was any complaint made of the way in which the duties of that office were performed, excepting that it was too costly?—I am not aware; my own feeling was that I tried to discharge the duties to the best of my ability, and conscientiously I feel that the service was performed as quickly as it possibly could be; still there was some feeling, as expressed by the Duke of Newcastle in his speech in the House, at which I felt a little annoyed, for though he gave me personally very great credit, yet he said that the one department that had most eminently failed, was the Transport department at home; I must say that I am not prepared to admit that.

16581. Mr. *Layard.*] You at all times answered to every requisition that was made upon you, that you were ready to furnish any amount of transport that was required in the East?—When we could get it; it was very difficult in November to send out so large an amount as 15,000 tons of stores; so much so, that we advertised in Liverpool and in London, and though I sent engineers down to every principal port in England, and even to Glasgow, we could not get steamers at the moment to send out the troops; and I was obliged to order the agent for the transports to go into the Thames, and board every steamer, and come and report to me, and let me know what they were; in that way I got some small colliers to take out the huts to the army.

16582. That was a sudden requisition?—Yes.

16583. No requisition had been made to you before that to take out warm clothing?—There might have been.

16584. *Chairman.*] You were not informed that there would be a necessity for such a service?—I am not aware of it.

16585. Mr.

16585. Mr. *Layard.*] You were taken by surprise, were you not?—Those demands were variable from time to time.

16586. But you stated that in the month of November there was a demand for 15,000 tons?—Yes.

16587. General *Peel.*] Was not a good deal of that in consequence of the storm?—No; it was owing to the army taking up its position in the Crimea. The loss of the "Prince" was of a limited extent as compared to anything of that kind.

16588. Mr. *Layard.*] A good deal has been said with regard to the forms; what is your opinion as to the forms to be observed at the Admiralty?—I do not think that there is any superfluity of forms, because I see nothing that checks the service. I have seen a great deal of it, having been seven years at the Admiralty. I have gone into the mode of correspondence, and into all matters of detail, and I do not think that there is anything in the forms that is a hindrance to the public service.

16589. If it has been stated by some of the captains of transports, that the transport regulations upon which they had acted recently were the regulations that were printed many years ago, I believe as late as the end of the last century, is that the case?—I am not aware of that; I forget the exact dates when the instructions were issued.

16590. Under what regulations do the agents for transport, and the transport captains act now?—I think it is a book of 1843 or 1845; I am not quite certain.

16591. If it has been stated that the captains of the transports were ordered to act under regulations which were framed during the last war, when the transports were of a different nature to what they are now, that statement is not quite accurate?—I do not think so.

16592. It has been stated that by an old regulation the captains are obliged to bring back and place in store the casks from which the provisions have been discharged, and which they cannot land; is that the case?—Yes, as there is a debtor and creditor account with the master of transports for all stores.

16593. Does that give rise to any inconvenience?—I do not know of any; if there had been any complaint of that nature, it would have been immediately remedied by the agent abroad, for instance, at Malta; a transport returning there, having those materials on board, if not proceeding to England, would land them, and they would be taken in charge, and a receipt given to the master for them. The same regulation is in existence as to Her Majesty's service.

16594. They must be landed at the place where there is an authorised agent to receive them?—Yes.

16595. Otherwise they must be kept on board, however worthless they may be?—They are of value to a certain extent.

16596. Is not that an inconvenience?—I am not aware of it, unless it interferes with other stores.

16597. Captain *Gladstone.*] If the public service had required the space, would the captain have been required to discharge them?—On producing an order from a superior officer.

16598. Mr. *Layard.*] It has been stated that it is possible that the captains of transports took out stores of their own, on private speculation, to the East?—If so, it was in direct violation of the charter-party. I heard of it in November, and I immediately issued a very strong order to all the outports, cautioning the agents there that such a practice was reported to be in existence, and ordering them to take measures to prevent anything of the kind, but no case was brought before me.

16599. The Government bought some ships, did they not?—Yes; the "Himalaya" and the "Prince," and they bought two other vessels at Blackwall, and also two at Liverpool.

16600. With regard to the "Prince," was the whole of the crew and officers left on board when she was purchased by the Government?—The vessel was a new vessel entirely; the company to which she belonged was requested to provide a commander and crew for her.

16601. Did the company do so?—Yes.

16602. What was the name of the commander?—Goodall, I think.

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16603. Were any representations made to you, or to the Board of Admiralty, on the subject of Captain Goodall?—At the time that the "Prince" was prepared for the service, the company was requested to be very careful to provide a steady person to command that ship, one in whom they would have perfect confidence themselves. When the ship returned from service in the Baltic, where she was sent out with French troops, I was absent from town, and when I returned I heard that a complaint had been made, and the question had been gone into by Captain Richards, and another member of the Board had seen the chairman of the company, Mr. Ellice, and I believe the result was that Mr. Ellice, the chairman, said, All we can say is, that this officer is a person in whom we have the greatest confidence, and we should place him in command of our best ship, in the same way that we have recommended him to you for the "Prince."

16604. At the time the company sold the "Prince," did you require all their other vessels?—Several were chartered; it was a company which I believe was winding up its affairs.

16605. Mr. *Layard.*] Were any instances brought to your notice of Captain Goodall having failed in the discharge of his duties as a seaman?—I am not aware, having been absent, but my impression is that a little feeling had arisen between the agent and Captain Goodall; when the "Prince" sailed for the Black Sea, a very experienced officer was appointed as agent, who had just returned from China, and he wrote from some port in Greece, where they went in in a gale of wind, to Captain Richards, to say that nothing could have been better or more seamanlike than the conduct of Captain Goodall during the time that he was with him.

16606. You heard no complaint of him after he left this country?—None.

16607. The Board was satisfied that he was a good seaman?—Yes; especially after getting this letter from Commander Baynton.

16608. Having heard the evidence of Captain Dacres, as to the "Prince" having remained at single anchor and not going to sea, supposing that Captain Goodall had been spared, would not you have instituted inquiries into his conduct on that occasion?—Certainly.

16609. Do not you think that it was a question whether he had discharged his duty well?—I think that the hurricane had more or less taken captains of ships by surprise, and that they were unable to get away.

16610. *Chairman.*] Is not it the general practice in the service to bring everybody to a court-martial who loses his ship?—Yes, but we could not have brought Captain Goodall to a court-martial.

16611. You would have instituted an inquiry?—Yes.

16612. Applying the rule of a court-martial to an inquiry does not necessarily imply blame, but you would have thought an inquiry necessary?—Quite so; there would have been an investigation.

16613. Mr. *Bramston.*] This vessel being a Government vessel, what was the reason for applying to the company to appoint a captain, and to provide a crew?—From the great pressure upon the Admiralty at that time for manning the Baltic Fleet we were quite unable to procure seamen for that service, to be under martial law.

16614. Lord *Seymour.*] What was the mode of receiving tenders for transports; were they sent in as sealed tenders?—They were, by public advertisement, to be brought in on a certain day, at one o'clock, put into a box, brought into the comptroller's of victualling room, and opened by him and a gentleman from the Contract Office, and the chief clerk.

16615. Who was present at that time?—The comptroller of victualling, a gentleman from the Contract Office, and the chief clerk of the department; the superintending Lord sometimes may have been unable, from pressure of business, to get there in time.

16616. Commonly speaking, you, as well as those other officers, were always present?—Yes.

16617. A complaint has been made to this Committee by Mr. Mackay, of Liverpool, as to his tender being rejected because, he said, it was five minutes too late?—Certainly; if he had been a minute too late it would have been rejected.

16618. You consider it necessary, for the honest administration of the public service,

service, that the time should be fixed?—Yes, certainly. The tender box is brought in exactly at one o'clock, and if he had been a half minute late, his tender would not have been received. It would have been an act of injustice to others, assuming that that tender had been the lowest and been received, if it had been taken in.

16619. If you had received that tender, and it had been found to have been the lowest tender, and it had been accepted, all the other persons would have had a right to complain?—Most assuredly.

16620. During one whole year, the transport was under your control, was it not?—Yes.

16621. Can you state what amount of expenditure was incurred in that time under your authority?—The estimates for that time, I think, amounted to 3,000,000 *l.*

16622. Considering that large amount of expenditure, do you think it advisable or not that when the transport service system has grown so large, it should be placed under more than one person?—Yes, I think it should; and more especially on that point; it has given me great anxiety. Though the amount looks large in the gross, yet it is made up of small items, which, when dealt with separately, do not appear to bring much responsibility.

16623. One of the statements made to the Committee with regard to the discharge of empty casks was, that the rule is that the casks must be delivered up to some Admiralty authority?—That depends upon what they are. I may say in regard to the naval service, that I found that to be the rule in existence in 1849 or 1850 as to Her Majesty's ships, and I thought it so absurd to bring home from the Pacific or South America empty casks, that I gave an order that with the exception of rum, bread, and water, which are valuable for staves, that the salt meat and other such casks should be used as fuel.

16624. In sending out this large quantity of casks to the Crimea, many of them were of that kind, were they not, that they were not worth bringing back again?—Probably they were.

16625. Was not fuel very much wanted in the Crimea?—Yes, I believe so.

16626. Was not it considered proper to allow those transports to discharge those empty casks there, and to receive some acknowledgment for them from some proper authority?—I admit that the question has escaped me with regard to that particular point. If I had reflected upon it, and thought that all those casks were to be brought home, I should have given an order at once to appropriate them as most useful for the service; but I think the question might have been dealt with out there, upon the ground of public utility, and also knowing that the regulation in Her Majesty's service is that only valuable casks should be brought to England.

16627. If a representation had been made to the highest authority of the Admiralty out there, arrangements of that kind might have been adopted?—No doubt of it.

16628. Many complaints have been made as to the system of coaling at Constantinople; was that subject ever brought to the notice of the Admiralty?—I recollect Admiral Boxer writing home to say that he found great difficulty in getting a proper amount of labour, and that the parties that were employed in coaling were not active people, and sometimes they did not adhere to what they were employed upon. But the great difficulty has been the current and the exposed situation of the anchorage of the vessels; this has caused a great difficulty in the speedy coaling the ships.

16629. You heard what Captain Dacres said as to the system of coaling?—Yes.

16630. And that there was great inconvenience found in coaling in that stream?—Yes.

16631. Had that point ever been brought to your notice by Admiral Boxer?—I am not aware that it had particularly; but it is a matter of detail, which the Admiral in command of that place should deal with, without reference to the Admiralty.

16632. It was a thing that he had full power to deal with without sending home to you?—Yes, certainly.

16633. Was there any means of coaling at Balaklava?—No; I believe that the coaling there was entirely carried on by colliers; colliers were sent down from

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from the depôt at Constantinople, and they went alongside the vessels, and from the hold they were taken out.

16634. That was the only way?—I believe so.

16635. This Committee has been informed that after the storm of the 14th of November there was very great difficulty as to finding transports, especially to convey fresh meat to the Crimea, and that the reason why the troops suffered in health was, because fresh meat was not brought from Constantinople?—Had the Commissariat out there requested more vessels to be attached to their department it would have been done.

16636. But they state that they did so, and that Admiral Boxer stated that no vessels could be furnished; in that case would it have been brought in any way to the knowledge of the Admiralty?—I never heard of the circumstance before.

16637. If the Commissariat had had such complaints to make, ought they not to have represented them to the Commander-in-chief, and was it not his duty to send home, through the War Office, to the authorities here upon the subject?—Decidedly.

16638. No such information was brought to the knowledge of the Board of Admiralty?—I never heard of that. If the Commissary-general had represented it to the Commander-in-chief on the station, he would have given such orders as the circumstances of the case required. Early in December an order went out to the Commander-in-chief, in the Black Sea, to organise a system of communication between Balaklava and Constantinople, first; then that he was to organise a system of communication between Constantinople and Malta; and, thirdly, he was to appropriate to the Commissariat department any further number of steamers, if they were required for the public service.

16639. Captain *Gladstone*.] If the Commander-in-chief had not had those vessels, he would, naturally, have reported it to the Admiralty?—Yes; and we should have sent more out.

16640. Lord *Seymour*.] It was stated by Mr. Clay, a witness, that when the "Emperor" was fitted out, she was fitted out with horse-boxes first, by Mr. Wigram?—Yes.

16641. Mr. Wigram is a person who contracts with the Admiralty to fit up vessels, is he not?—No. When we took up so many sailing transports, for the purpose of conveying horses to the East, the great difficulty was how were we to get them fitted. We had only one contractor, and to have entered into another new contract then would have been utterly impossible, and I requested Mr. Wigram to call upon me at the Admiralty, and I said, "We have a large number of vessels required to be hastily fitted for the service; what assistance can you give us in fitting them up, and what charge will you make?" He said, "I will meet you in a fair spirit, and charge you the cost price for materials, and 15 per cent. to cover incidental expenses." I said, "That appears a large sum; will you reduce it to 10 per cent?" He said, "If I did that I should be a loser by the transaction." My answer was, "If you say that, I have no alternative but to ask you to undertake the fitting of the ships." The same terms were agreed to by Mr. Green and Mr. Mare.

16642. In this case Mr. Wigram fitted out the ship according to the Admiralty system, did he not?—It was not the Admiralty system, for this reason, that it was horse-boxes to be fitted on deck for a special service. We had no specification for horse-boxes to be fitted upon deck, but those fittings were marked out in my own presence by the agent of the transport, keeping as nearly as he could to the specification of what was fitted up between decks.

16643. Then afterwards Mr. Clay had some conversation with you on the subject, had he not?—I forget; some one came to me about it.

16644. After some discussion with him, all the houses put up by Mr. Wigram were knocked down, and they were rebuilt in another fashion, were they not?—I am not aware of that fact. I think not. I think the only difference which existed was with reference to the dividing bar between the horses being six inches too low.

16645. At Question 3142, Mr. Clay stated, that the "Emperor" was so built that she could at once have taken the horses in the mode in which they are taken at Hull; and he says afterwards, "Mr. Wigram's houses were very soon knocked down, and we rebuilt them in our own fashion"?—I am not prepared to

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to give a definite answer to that; the party that we should speak to is Lieutenant Wentworth, the superintendent agent for transport, at Deptford. I may say, that that vessel was one of those taken up specially for the conveyance of Lord Raglan and his staff; and she took out the horses of Sir De Lacy Evans, and I think the Duke of Cambridge's, and being a steamer, there was no occasion to have the fittings that you have in a sailing ship.

16646. He gives another instance at Question 2853: he says there, "When the 17th Regiment of Light Dragoons embarked at Portsmouth I believe they had about 250 horses, and when they landed at Varna they had lost 25 troopers and two chargers;" and he states, "In the same regiment, on board a transport, called the 'Pride of the Ocean,' there were 60 horses, and six of them died in the Bay of Biscay." He was then asked, "To what do you attribute that quantity of death?" and his answer is, "To the improper mode of shipping the horses." Can you give any explanation as to that case?—I should like the Committee to examine the officer at Woolwich connected with the whole embarkation of horses and artillery, Captain Riddel, who is thoroughly acquainted with the whole detail of fitting up all the ships. The 17th Lancers were embarked in the "Pride of the Ocean," the "Ganges," "Blundel," the "Edmondsbury," and the "Evelina," and they were embarked at Deptford, and the loss of horses out of 83, in the "Pride of the Ocean," was six; the loss in the "Ganges," out of 62, was eight; the loss in the "Edmondsbury" was the same; in the "Blundel" six, and in the "Evelina" one. I beg to say, with reference to the death of the horses, that out of 1,970 horses that went out, sent out in sailing ships, there were 62 deaths, only 10 by casualties in the ship; the others were all by internal inflammation, and by the glanders.

16647. You had under you, not only the transport, but the whole of the victualling?—Yes; the whole of the victualling of the navy, and the army, at present.

16648. Having under you the whole victualling of the navy, you have had also brought under you the victualling of the army?—Yes; we received requisitions from the War department to send out large quantities of provisions for the army; salt meat, biscuit, rum, tea, and sugar; those were the principal items.

16649. During the whole time, you were, in fact, supplying the army with all those things?—Entirely; and at this moment we are sending out, every month, one million and a quarter pounds of biscuit, and 50,000 gallons of rum, besides a proportion of salt meat and sugar, every month, to the amount of 2,500 tons.

16650. You could have supplied the army also with preserved vegetables?—We have done so.

16651. When was that done?—I think, probably, the comptroller of victualling will be able to tell the Committee exactly; as far back as December, a requisition was made for a supply, but it could not be furnished until January.

16652. Have you supplied them largely?—Yes; we have supplied the quantity demanded by the War department.

16653. You might have done it earlier, might you not, if you had been called upon to do so?—Yes.

16654. Do you now supply vessels with any preserved meats?—That has been abandoned.

16655. Since you found that one person supplied bad meats, you have given up the whole system?—After a Committee had sat upon the question, we found the whole matter so unsatisfactory, that we have never again mooted the question, except to a very small extent for medical comforts. The difficulty is not with regard to preserved meats for a small number of men, but when you have to provide for a large number of men for one or more years, it then assumes a very large question; and though we employed the best preserver of meats, Mr. Hogarth, of Aberdeen, we had a large condemnation of his meat at Bermuda, amounting to 1,700 lbs.; but I must say, in justice to him, that it was nearly three years old. Conscientiously, I feel that the introduction of preserved meats would be a benefit to the service; but I also feel that the difficulty of getting good meats, and its keeping good for two to three years, operates against their introduction. I should like to read one or two letters, with

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regard to the landing of the sick at Scutari, from Admiral Boxer, in answer to a question from Lord Raglan; and another with regard to the state of the harbour of Balaklava from Sir Edmund Lyons, and another as to a question which has been raised with regard to a vessel loaded with boots. A letter was addressed to Sir Edmund Lyons upon the subject of the harbour of Balaklava, early in December 1854, and his answer to the Board was this: "Sir,—I beg that you will assure the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I am deeply impressed with the value and importance of their observations and commands relating to the harbour of Balaklava, as set forth in your letter to my predecessor, No. 861, of the 18th ultimo. 2. Their Lordships are, no doubt, aware that most of what is regrettable inside the harbour arises from the want of means for transporting cargoes from the ships to the camp; what happened outside the harbour, on the 14th November, is another matter, and their Lordships may rely upon my doing all in my power to give effect to their order for inquiry with regard to these melancholy events. 3. But to revert to the inside of the harbour, the responsibility for the first three weeks rests with me, for I had the superintendence, and all I will say of myself is, that I naturally did my best to promote the success of an object that I had much at heart; but of my assistants, I may say, that no man ever had a more able one than I had in Captain Mends, for the details of landing the cargoes, or a more efficient one than I had in Captain Heath, for all the duties relating to the ingress, berthing and egress of the shipping. The roads were then in good order, and the horses and mules, though never sufficient in number, were in fair condition; and although we had the heaviest part of the work to perform in landing the siege train, all went on smoothly and expeditiously. I do not say this with any view of claiming credit for it, but simply to show that so long as the roads were in good order, and the means of transport forthcoming, it was plain sailing. But it was far otherwise with those who succeeded me, for they had to contend with the difficulties occasioned by the roads being quagmires, and by the failure of means of transport, to say nothing of the sad effects of the hurricane of the 14th November. Still the navy have always been able to land provisions, clothing, ammunition, indeed all the requirements of the army, faster than they could be carried off to the camp; and often when the officers of the Commissariat department, in their laudable anxiety to get things forward, have overrated their means of conveyance, things have been re-shipped for the double purpose of security and of making room on the quays. 4. Thanks, in a great measure, to the zeal and foresight of Rear-Admiral Stewart, boats were not wanting, and their Lordships may be sure that the best use was made of them by Captains Dacres and Heath, and Commander Powell, whose conduct has won for them the admiration of the army, and the good-will of all. Nor have the seamen been less remarkable than usual for their resources, and their enlivening and hearty assistance in landing horses and mules, and transporting guns, &c. 5. I observe that it is alleged, that quantities of hay and firewood were allowed to float about the harbour, when both were in much request, and I freely admit that it must have appeared so to passers-by; but the truth is, that the hay had already become so saturated with salt water that the animals would not eat even the innermost parts of the trusses; and as for the wood, it was only fit for firewood, and it was considered that the best means of preventing its being pilfered, was to let it float out of reach of the strand until means could be taken for collecting and distributing it. 6. That mistakes may have been made on all sides, I am far from denying, but Rear-Admiral Boxer will find, on his arrival to take the direction of affairs in the harbour, that all are now doing their best to profit by the experience of the past, and he will certainly have all the support that Lord Raglan and I can give him, and he will have delivered to him by Captain Heath the Harbour Regulations, which have been made from time to time by that officer, with my concurrence. 7. I have the honour to enclose a copy of those regulations, which will show their Lordships that these important matters are not neglected; for it is not only on paper that these regulations exist; on the contrary, the admirable way in which they are carried out under the supervision of Captain Heath, and with the assistance of Commander Powell, is universally remarked and acknowledged."

16656. In making arrangements for the conveyance of goods, does the vessel carrying the goods to Balaklava, for instance, undertake to land them?—Yes, it is in the charter-party. The charter-party embraces this, that the men and boats are at the service of the Government. In a freight ship the rule is to deliver into a boat alongside. The rule with regard to a transport is, that the boats and crew are supplied in landing.

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Lunæ, 30° die Aprilis, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	General Peel.
Lord Seymour.	Mr. Drummond.
Sir John Hanmer.	Mr. Layard.
Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Pakington.
Captain Gladstone.	Colonel Lindsay.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain *Alexander Milne*, R. N., called in; and further Examined.

16657. Lord *Seymour*.] IN the Estimates presented to The House, there was an abstract of the Transport Service, not complete for the year, but for a great portion of the year; can you now give in an abstract complete up to the close of the financial year?—Yes, from the 9th of February to the 27th of April; that date was the commencement of the requisitions from the War department to send out troops. In my evidence on Friday, I may remark that the only items of the Transport service I gave were for the months of March and April; it might have been continued through May and June to December, but I will read the general abstract, if the Committee wish.

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16658. Does it contain the amount of the service performed in the course of that year by the Transport department under your superintendence?—It does.

16659. I want to ascertain the whole amount?—This is the largest amount of vessels that have been employed.

16660. Will you state the amount of steam transport and the amount of sailing transport?—At present 113 steam vessels, 103 sailing ships.

16661. During that year what has been the smallest number of steam vessels employed, in any month, since you began?—The smallest number was employed in February and March last year.

16662. That was what you stated to the Committee?—Yes; and it has gone on gradually increasing, more especially after the month of October 1854.

16663. *Chairman*.] Have you any abstract of each month's amount of transport?—I have it not here; but I can give an abstract, for every month, of the number of steam vessels, and the number of sailing vessels.

16664. Lord *Seymour*.] Will you give the number of sailing vessels that are now employed?—On the 27th of April, there were 103, with a tonnage of 90,958 tons, and, with steam vessels, employing officers and men to the amount of about 9,500.

16665. That number is employed for the whole of that transport service?—Yes.

16666. Are you including the whole of the service, or are there, in addition, any vessels taken up temporarily, that is, for the voyage only?—It includes those only that are chartered vessels; there are others, in addition, of which

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I am getting a return, of vessels employed merely for the purpose of the voyage, to carry stores to their destination, and to be discharged at the end of the voyage.

16667. What means had you, in the department of the Admiralty which was employed for that service in February 1854, of meeting those demands upon you; what was the force of your office?—At that time we had not a transport in the service. The duties were performed, as I said before, by the Comptroller of the Victualling and Transport services; he had under him a chief clerk and four other clerks; therefore the office actually consisted of five clerks.

16668. Having to meet the large demands which you had expected, what course did you take to adapt your office to its duties?—At once an increase of 10 clerks was made to the establishment, by selecting those gentlemen from other offices, who had had experience of the department, and placing them as leading clerks of the Transport department.

16669. Were those persons put on permanently?—No; the third class clerks were made acting second, and the second class clerks were made acting first, filling up the requirements of that office by temporary clerks, so that, if peace should happen to have taken place, you could have reduced the office to what it was originally at the commencement of the war. I may say that, in consequence of the enormous pressure of the undertaking, the office now consists of upwards of 40 clerks, and this has created, to a certain extent, difficulties in carrying on so very large a service, by being obliged to bring into that office gentlemen well inclined and well intentioned, but who are strangers to the duties to be performed.

16670. Are the Committee to understand you, that it has been so arranged, that in case of peace, and no further pressure upon the Transport department, there would be no permanent charge upon the public?—None whatever.

16671. It has been stated that the transports were chartered, and that a bargain was made upon the builders' tonnage; will you state whether that was the fact or not?—The first steamers that were chartered were not chartered upon the tonnage at all. At the commencement of this war I consulted several gentlemen connected with trade, upon what principle merchants were in the habit of chartering steamers, and the answer was, that it depended entirely upon the trade upon which the vessel was to be employed; that they send down to inspect the vessel, making payment for her according to her fitness for the service for which she was wanted; the principle of chartering by tonnage was not adopted in the merchant service; and when the Admiralty advertised for steamers, their first offers were upon the principle of a payment per month, without reference to the tonnage; upon that principle the "Tonning" and the "City of London" were both chartered, the one a vessel of 986 tons, and the other 1,116 tons, the former was taken at 1,800 *l.* per month, and the other at 600 *l.* per week.

16672. The two first were taken without reference to tonnage?—Yes.

16673. Having afterwards taken others upon the principle of tonnage, was it found a cheaper way, or did you improve your mode of taking them up afterwards?—The arrangement was unsatisfactory when we came to deal with a large number of steamers, we found it impossible to have a specific bargain for each vessel.

16674. Was it a better bargain for the public in those individual instances, or not?—It was.

16675. You found difficulties in continuing that mode of taking them up?—Yes.

16676. When you came to adopt the system of tonnage, is it correct to say that you adopted the builder's tonnage?—It is not.

16677. If it has been stated so, that is an error?—Yes. The principle which the Admiralty adopted was to charter vessels upon what is called the gross tonnage; that is, the whole tonnage of the ship, which in many instances has been called by individuals the builder's tonnage; but builder's tonnage, properly speaking, is the gross tonnage of the ship upon the old law of 1834 and 1835, which became obsolete on the introduction of the new law of measurement; but a new law will come into operation to-morrow.

16678. In fact, the builder's tonnage is now never heard of?—It is not.

16679. Having stated the tonnage upon which you proceeded, will you just state

state again the price of the charter?—In the case of the "Tonning," the first ship chartered, the price was 1,800*l.* per month; upon that principle the chartering of the "Tonning," upon the gross tonnage, was 37*s.* 6*d.* per ton; the "City of London," upon the gross tonnage, was 42*s.* 9*d.*; the next vessel that was employed was offered in answer to the advertisements, or to a communication by the Admiralty, which was the "Victoria," of 1,877 tons gross; she was offered to us, as I stated to the Committee on Friday last, at 50*s.* a ton.

16680. Was 50*s.* a ton the price?—It was the market price of the day, because in consequence of the demand which was then arising for steam-vessels the owners refused to allow their ships to be chartered at a lower rate; we declined the "Victoria" at that price, and we told the owners that we considered the amount of remuneration which they asked was exorbitant; the parties refused to lower, and we were compelled, in consequence of the necessity of sending troops out, to charter the ship at that rate.

16681. Did you afterwards generally pay 50*s.* per ton?—We did.

16682. Comparing that with the price paid by persons in the trade generally, what sort of bargain did the public make?—The sum paid was at a very high rate; but while we were paying this price to the shipowners generally throughout last summer, other parties were paying 60*s.*, and as far as up to 62*s.* 6*d.* I have the charter-parties of vessels which paid that amount.

16683. You think now, with your experience of the working of the department, that an excessive price has not been paid?—I consider that it is a very high rate of remuneration; but I am quite sure of this, that we could not get it at a cheaper rate. I think, in justice to those parties, I ought to say, that when this high rate was paid, in the months of February, March, and April, in consequence of the pressure for steamers having subsided, a circular was addressed by my authority to the whole of the shipowners who had chartered vessels to the Government, stating that the markets had fallen, the Admiralty considered that they had a fair claim to a reduction of the rate, and they did reduce it to 40*s.*

16684. When did that take place?—In the month of July.

16685. Do you mean that after that you generally took vessels up at 40*s.*?—We took a few; two or three; but the markets again rose, and 50*s.* became the market price for large steamers.

16686. Captain *Gladstone.*] From what date?—About the month of August.

16687. Lord *Seymour.*] It has been stated that you should have included the coal in the price, so that the owners should have supplied it?—It was perfectly impossible to have done it; if the owner had asked me where he was to send the coal, I could not have told him, and to have asked him to do it for any special locality, whether it was the east coast of the Black Sea or the Bosphorus, it was impossible; the only thing that the Government could do was to make a large depôt of coals at Gibraltar, Malta, and Constantinople, and from Constantinople it would be sent on to whatever locality the exigencies of the war required.

16688. When you took up those vessels you had to alter their fittings, both for troops and for the horses, had you not?—Yes.

16689. It has been stated to the Committee, I think by Mr. Mackay, that the Government paid a price that was excessive at Liverpool for the fittings?—I mentioned on Friday that when we came to fit the transports for the service in the East we had only one contractor for fitting ships, and that it was quite impossible for him to carry out the fittings upon so many ships as were urgently required at the same moment, and to have advertised for another contractor against our own contractor was impossible. I therefore requested one of the principal shipowners in the Thames, Mr. Wigram, to call upon me with reference to fitting ships, and I asked him whether he would come forward, under the emergency, and assist the Government, and if so, at what rate he would undertake to put up the necessary fittings; he said he would meet the Government fairly in the transaction; he would charge us the cost price of the material, and he would charge 15*l.* per cent. to cover his profit, taxes, incidental expenses and other little items that would occur. I told him that I considered 15*l.* per cent. was high, and I thought he might reduce it with consistency to 10*l.* He said that it was impossible to do so, and that,

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properly speaking, he ought to charge 20 *l.* per cent. It was under those circumstances that our arrangement was made with a builder in the Thames that he was to charge the cost price of the materials, and 15 *l.* per cent. to cover profit, taxes, and incidental expenses. The same terms were agreed to by other builders in the Thames, and were made known to the shipowners at Liverpool, but whether they were aware of it at the time or not I do not know, but when they found that such was the case they held a public meeting and came to the determination that the Admiralty regulation was so clear that they could not consistently charge more than that regulation established.

16690. With regard to the fitting at Liverpool, what was paid in that case; was any difference made at Liverpool?—The payments, when the accounts came to be analysed and made up, were much higher, which was owing to a general strike of the whole of the shipwrights at Liverpool; they were called upon, in consequence of the pressure of the war, and the necessity of sending out the horses, to work night and day, and that raised the price of the fittings at Liverpool higher considerably than those in the Thames.

16691. Was that only on one occasion, or was the price always paid at Liverpool the same?—Only on that one occasion; it was only at that period, embracing a period of two months, that that transaction took place.

16692. Did you charter any vessels that had been previously employed by the Government on the postal service, and were under contract for the postal service?—Yes, both from the North America and the West Indies, and the Peninsula and Oriental Steam Packet Company; but whilst we chartered those vessels the mails were still continued by smaller vessels, which were substituted for them, so that the postal communication was kept up during the whole period until the month of November, when we were obliged to stop the mail service and to withdraw the other vessels.

16693. Are the Committee to understand that those fine steamers were already paid by the Government for the postal service?—Only for the service performed; they were paid for the mails being carried, and if they did not carry them they did not get paid.

16694. Then they continued to carry the mails by smaller vessels, but they received the same payment as if they had carried them in the larger vessels?—Yes, certainly; at the same time it was a loss to the owner, because he lost his advantage by the carriage of passengers.

16695. It has been stated that, considering the large amount expended for transport during the last year has been above 3,000,000 *l.*, it would have been more economical to have purchased those vessels at once; is that so?—There is no doubt that it would have been more economical to have purchased the vessels at once, but if we had done so we should have been in this position, that we should not have had the means of manning them, or appointing officers to them.

16696. Why should you not have had the means of manning them?—Because we had the greatest difficulty last year to man both the Baltic and the Black Sea fleets.

16697. If the people to whom the vessels belonged could man them, why could not the Admiralty do so?—Because the owners of these vessels paid much higher wages than Government; there was another reason, which was because every one of those establishments from which we should have taken those vessels, brought to our aid dockyards of their own; and if we had brought them into our dockyards we should have failed entirely.

16698. With regard to manning those vessels, would you have been able, if you had bought the vessels, to have manned them as the owners did from whom you took them?—We should have failed to man them as ships of war; we could not have got men in Her Majesty's service to have manned them.

16699. You must have manned them upon the same principle as the mercantile community manned them?—Yes.

16700. *Chairman.*] Was there any objection to your doing that?—It is objectionable to a certain extent to have a ship of war, belonging to Government, manned by private individuals; it is an anomaly.

16701. Lord *Seymour.*] Could you have manned them as you used to man the old transports?—We might have done so; but then we should have never been able to carry on the service in our own ports; we should never have been able to bring any of those ships to Portsmouth or Plymouth, or the dockyards, where

where they have been so overdone by work that they have worked night and day.

16702. Has this question ever been considered at the Admiralty?—Yes, the Board considered it.

16703. And they thought, upon the whole, that it was not desirable?—That it was more advisable to charter vessels than to purchase them.

16704. *Chairman.*] Have you any idea of what the saving would have been?—Not exactly.

16705. Lord *Seymour.*] Was this question referred to any naval committee by the Board?—No; it was considered by the Board individually on several occasions; it was very much considered, both by Sir James Graham and the Board, whilst the troops were going out.

16706. Mr. *Layard.*] Did the objection apply equally to the officers and the men?—Equally to both.

16707. There would have been an objection to keep on in the employment of the Government, officers taken up by private companies?—Yes; I think that those private individuals could not have neglected their own trade; and they would naturally have employed other vessels, and have put the captains, who had been constantly in their employ, into their own vessels.

16708. If the Government had offered a kind of local rank, as it were, to those officers, they would have been glad to have offered, would they not?—I have no doubt they would, if continued on the same rate of pay as in their own service.

16709. What was the objection to doing so?—I think it was inconvenient to have an anomaly of that sort.

16710. *Chairman.*] Did not that anomaly exist in the case of the "Prince"?—In that one vessel it did, but it was in a limited way.

16711. Then the difficulty did not exist in the case of the "Prince"?—No; I may say that we have another vessel manned upon the same principle; but we are forced into it.

16712. Mr. *Layard.*] When a private company employ officers of that kind, they seek for the best men, do they not?—No doubt.

16713. That would be the best system to act upon, even with regard to the public transport service, would it not?—Certainly.

16714. General *Peel.*] Would those captains be superior to the officers in our own service?—No, certainly not; but they are very much better paid.

16715. Mr. *Layard.*] But have you not got officers in the Royal service?—We are very short of officers.

16716. In default of officers in Her Majesty's service, could not you have employed others?—Yes; and we have been compelled in the junior grades of the service to give notice to all those companies that we were willing to take officers into the service, as in the former war; but when you are suddenly called upon to send out two fleets to sea, there is great difficulty in getting officers from a peace establishment.

16717. Captain *Gladstone.*] When you stated that it would have been cheaper to have bought vessels out and out, did you take into consideration the probable rise in price from the demand for so many?—The whole subject was well considered at the time.

16718. Lord *Seymour.*] Are the Committee to understand that if you had had to hire men for the transport service, it would have interfered with your hiring men for the naval service?—It was bidding against each other to a certain extent. To those that we have hired we have been obliged to pay the rate of wages charged in the merchant service, and there is an unpleasant comparison between their pay and the pay of our own men, for it is much higher.

16719. And there is much less discipline, is there not?—There is no martial law.

16720. When you prepared those transports, and fitted them out, can you state at about how much per ton the cost of fitting them out was?—It varies with different ships; it is almost impossible to do that.

16721. *Chairman.*] Will you state whether the civilians employed by the Government are better paid by the Government than they are by their own owners?—No, they are paid the same; that is, we pay in those vessels that we have asked the owners to man, what they would pay themselves.

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16722. Lord *Seymour*.] Did you fit those transports with proper boats for landing the troops and horses?—Yes, so far as we could do it. We ordered flat boats to be built, so that every horse-ship should carry one of those boats with it to land the horses, and also the artillery.

16723. Was one boat for a ship sufficient for the purpose?—They had their own boats besides; we could not make them carry more than one boat, except in the case of steamers, and in some of those we put in two.

16724. Did you obtain further boats at Malta or at Constantinople for this purpose?—A large number were built at Malta, and also large pontoons to land the troops in, and a considerable number were also constructed at Constantinople.

16725. With regard to the conveyance of troops, is it usual at the Admiralty to receive a document when the troops have been conveyed to any port, showing how the service had been performed?—There was no return till the year 1851; and at that time I thought it expedient, in consequence of a complaint respecting a ship that went to St. Helena, that some return should be made by the senior or commanding military officer; and this return (*producing the same*) was established in 1851, which, I believe, has worked both satisfactorily to the Horse Guards and to ourselves. (*The Paper referred to was handed in*).

Vide Appendix.

16726. *Chairman*.] When you charter a vessel for the transport service do the owners undertake to feed the troops, and to provide water for them?—Not always, but very often they do; and it has been done largely in the present war, because we found it impossible, what with making provision for the navy, and with making provision for the Commissariat, and the army, to make arrangements for supplying the ships at Liverpool, and at Southampton, and in the Thames; and therefore the owners were requested to provide provisions and water for the troops.

16727. After the arrival of every transport so despatched to the Crimea have you received a document of that sort subsequently to her arrival?—I think we have.

16728. Have you had any complaints?—I think we have had complaints of two ships, the one called the "Kangaroo," and the other, as to which there was some slight complaint, was a vessel called the "Trent;" but, generally speaking, I may say I never read anything more satisfactory than have been the returns which have been made with regard to the services performed.

16729. Would that document apply to the ships conveying the sick troops from Balaklava to Scutari?—No.

16730. Lord *Seymour*.] When you have received a complaint, after giving that means of making a complaint to the commanding officers who go with the troops, what course does the Admiralty take?—The moment there is any complaint of anything whatever we desire an inquiry to be made, and inflict a fine upon the shipowner.

16731. Have you power to inflict a fine upon the owner of a ship for any irregularity or any insufficiency of provisions and stores?—Yes, we have; there have been several cases within these 18 months where complaints have been made of the officers' mess, in which we refused to pay the money.

16732. *Chairman*.] Is that power acquired by the Admiralty in consequence of the charter-party?—Yes; they have power to inflict a penalty for any neglect.

16733. Lord *Seymour*.] What are your sailing orders to those captains of transports, or are there any?—The sailing orders were rather cautiously drawn up; I may read one to a steamer which has caused a good deal of observation with reference to the delivery of stores. These (*producing the same*) were given to the commander of the "Robert Lowe," and they are dated 31st of October 1854, "The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, having appropriated the 'Robert Lowe' steamer for the conveyance of detachments named in the margin, consisting of 12 officers, and passengers, and 673 men, together with a quantity of Ordnance, medical, and other stores, to the East; you are hereby required and directed, as soon as the vessel is in all respects ready for sea, and the stores are on board, to proceed with all possible despatch to Portsmouth, where you are to receive on board the above-mentioned detachments and passengers; having so done you are to make the best of your way to Constantinople,

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stantinople, reporting your arrival to the military authorities at that place, and follow such directions as you receive from them, as to the landing of the troops, passengers, and stores; and having so done, you are to place yourself under the orders of the Rear-admiral Superintendent in the Bosphorus, and follow the instructions you may receive from him as to your future proceedings. You are at liberty, on your voyage out, to call at Malta for the purpose of coaling, should it be found necessary." The object of furnishing those instructions which were given to all vessels going to the East, was that on reporting to the military authorities they should exercise a certain amount of control and check, so that no stores should be taken to Varna, or Crimea, intended for Constantinople or Scutari; then by reporting to the Admiral Superintendent in the Bosphorus, we considered that we again exercised another check; but in some cases, unfortunately, this has been overlooked, and the vessels have gone on with stores on board.

16734. Do those orders place the captains of the transports completely under the authority of the Rear-admiral in the Bosphorus?—Certainly.

16735. Then, supposing on a transport arriving in the Bosphorus it had been required by the Commander of the Forces to have that transport placed at his disposal, had he authority again over the Rear-admiral to obtain it?—If the services of that vessel were required, he would make a requisition in writing to the Rear-admiral who is in command, for the service of either this or any other vessel that he might require.

16736. Had the Rear-admiral again instructions to place any vessel under the orders of the Commander-in-chief that he required?—Quite so.

16737. *Chairman.*] Has he the power to refuse?—Certainly. For instance, in this case the "Robert Lowe" was full of troops; she had on board 12 officers and 673 men.

16738. So that the Rear-admiral may say to the Commander-in-chief, "Your demand for that ship cannot be complied with, and I say so upon my own responsibility"?—Certainly; upon hearing of the necessity of some further check being required upon the delivery of stores at Scutari, this order was issued on the 2d of December, and immediately that a vessel was chartered the master was given these instructions, which bound him to seeing to the stowage of the cargo; but he is obliged to report himself at Deptford, to receive his instructions: "Admiralty, 185–. The ship under your charge having been chartered, by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, for the conveyance to ————, your strict attention is hereby called to the duty you have to perform in regard, not only to the proper and careful distribution of the cargo entrusted to your charge, but also in regard to its proper stowage, observing that you will be held responsible for the safe-custody of each and every article placed on board, so as to ensure the speedy and safe delivery of the same, according to its address, at the port to which the cargo may be consigned. For this purpose you are enjoined to be constantly on board your ship while loading, so that you may be enabled to attend to this particular part of your duty; and you are to see that a list of the stores, in the proper order of their delivery, and the place where they are stowed, and to whom consigned, be correctly entered in a book, which you will be required to keep for this purpose, which book you are to allow the Naval, Military, and Commissariat authorities to inspect, whether it be at home or abroad, who may visit the ship for the purpose of making inquiry in regard to the cargo generally, or in regard to any particular article that the said authorities, or any one of them, may have reason to suppose is on board. You are, on no account whatever, to allow any private goods or stores to be embarked in the ship, either on your own account or by other parties, observing, that if it should hereafter appear that you have disobeyed this order, a very heavy mulct will be inflicted on the ship. In whatever port you may be at anchor, you are, on your arrival, and before leaving such port, to report yourself to the Naval, Military, and Commissariat authorities, so that they may be made acquainted with the nature of the cargo on board. And you are likewise to report to the Naval or other authorities, from day to day, what stores remain in the ship, observing that any neglect in regard to the duties assigned to you in this matter, will be visited by their Lordships' severe displeasure. The sailing orders for the ship's proceeding on their voyage will be hereafter transmitted to you in due course. The receipt of these orders is to be acknowledged." That

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was sent in consequence of hearing that vessels had not delivered their cargoes.

16739. Was not it in consequence of the loss of the "Prince"?—No, I do not think it was in consequence of that particularly; it was in consequence of hearing complaints that the masters of vessels had passed Constantinople, and had gone on to the Crimea without having landed their stores.

16740. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was that order addressed to all the captains?—Yes, directly the vessel was chartered.

16741. Lord *Seymour.*] How have those complaints come to the knowledge of the Admiralty?—I think the case of the "Prince" was one, and the "Robert Lowe," I think, was the other. I think the "Manilla" was the third.

16742. Who made the complaints?—I do not recollect at this moment.

16743. *Chairman.*] Did anybody in authority make those complaints?—I am not sure whether it was not the Duke of Newcastle, the Minister-of-War; I think it was.

16744. You did not hear from your Rear-admiral out there?—No.

16745. Lord *Seymour.*] I believe it was not the practice to give the captain any drawing of the hull, so that he might know where the goods were stowed?—No.

16746. As to the conveyance of stores, I wish to ask you some questions. The Commissioners who were appointed some few months back to inquire into the transport of stores to the East, conclude their report by several recommendations. The first is, "That the usual permission in the charter-party to employ lumpers in unloading the ship, be so far qualified as to ensure a portion of the crew being present, and that no transport or hired vessel be considered on 'pay' until the master, chief or second officer, and a porportion of the crew who are to go to sea in the vessel have joined;" that, I suppose, by its being a suggestion of the Commission, had not been the practice of the Admiralty?—The practice of the Admiralty always had been that the master and the mates should be present, but it is not the practice of the Admiralty nor of the trade to have the crew; my own opinion is that it will fail.

16747. Will you state why it will fail?—Because no ship in the river Thames ever receives her crew until the evening before she sails, and no ship ever goes into dock but what lands her crew the very day she arrives; the vessels are loaded and cleared entirely by lumpers, a particular class of people employed in the river.

16748. And you suppose that sailors are a class that will not easily give up their old customs?—Yes; and in proof of that I may say, that during the last year the crews of several transports, after being on board, deserted the next morning. I recollect one vessel having no less than three crews.

16749. It is recommended in the report that the master, the chief or second officer, at least, should be present; you state, do you not, that that is the invariable practice?—That is the practice. The master of the ship reports himself, and receives his orders from the Master-attendant, and the instructions upon that point to the yards are these: (this is the 39th Article of the Instructions to the Master-attendant in the Victualling-yard), "You shall duly attend to the landing of all stores for foreign, home, or other service, and to their proper stowage for their safety and preservation. When ships or other vessels are discharging stores, you are to take care that they are, without delay, properly disposed of, so that they may not be damaged by lying about on the wharf or in any unfit situations." The master-attendant at Deptford, where the ships are loaded, was called upon to explain how that Article of the instructions was carried out, and this is his answer to the communication (it is dated the 24th April 1855).

16750. *Chairman.*] Do you assume that that letter refers to the past?—Yes; it refers to the carrying out of those instructions of 1846, and I infer naturally that it refers to the past: "I beg leave to report that when a ship arrives at Deptford to load for foreign, home, or other service, the master on reporting himself to the master-attendant, is directed to apply to the storekeeper for information respecting the nature of the stores to be shipped. The master then states what articles he would wish to have sent alongside first, which as the owners of the vessels are wholly responsible for the safe delivery of the cargo, is not objected to, except the master-attendant should consider that the arrangement of the master of the vessel would render any of the stores to be shipped

shipped liable to injury in the passage. The master-attendant then appoints proper craft for conveying the stores from the yard to the ship, and such gear is lent for the purpose of hoisting in heavy weights as may be necessary. The vessels alongside of the wharf or in the 'tier,' are occasionally visited by the master-attendants, in order, so far as is practicable, to see that everything is conducted in a proper manner, but does not interfere with the stowing of the cargo, except anything should appear to be wrong. It was formerly the practice to stow the cargo under the superintendence of a stevedore attached to the yard, which relieved the owners of nearly all the responsibility for the safe delivery of the cargo; whatever was damaged was always set down to the bad stowage of the Government stevedore, for which reason the practice was discontinued, and the whole responsibility now rests on the owners, which any undue interference of the master-attendant or any Government officer would relieve them from. I have &c. (signed) *E. J. P. Pearn*, Master-Attendant. 24th April. Transmitted, remarking that I fully concur in the observations of the master-attendant, tending, as they do, towards the benefit of the service."

16751. Lord *Seymour*.] You are of opinion, are you not, that a Government stevedore on the part of the Admiralty is not desirable?—I think it is objectionable.

16752. How came it then, that the "Robert Lowe" and the "Prince" were so stowed that the persons in command, the master, or chief or second officer, who arrived with the vessel, did not know where the cargo was placed?—Because we understood afterwards, though we were not made acquainted with it by the owner, that on the vessel arriving at Portsmouth the master and mate were changed without our knowledge.

16753. Was there any report made to the Admiralty of that change?—None.

16754. Should it not have been reported to the Admiralty?—Yes.

16755. Who was to blame for not reporting it?—The owners of the ship were to blame, because they were the only persons cognisant of it.

16756. *Chairman*.] Was not the "Prince" at that time a Government ship?—She was; but I was speaking of the "Robert Lowe."

16757. Lord *Seymour*.] Take the first, the "Robert Lowe;" what change took place in her that led to the officers not knowing where the goods were?—There was a change in the master and mate of that vessel at Portsmouth without the knowledge of the Admiralty.

16758. Now you state that the blame attached to the owner of the vessel for not having acquainted the Admiralty with the circumstance?—Yes.

16759. Was there any Admiralty authority at Portsmouth who visited that vessel when she came there, who might have reported the circumstance?—Yes, had he been made acquainted with it.

16760. *Chairman*.] Was not it his duty to have known of it?—He could not know of it if he had not been informed by the owner; the ship was never in the harbour, but at Spithead.

16761. Captain *Gladstone*.] It would have been the duty of the captain to have explained to his successor the manner in which his vessel was stowed?—Yes.

16762. Sir *J. Pakington*.] Are you aware of the reasons why those changes were made?—No.

16763. Has the owner been called upon for an explanation of the reason?—I think so.

16764. Do not you know what explanation he gave?—I do not remember now. I think it was only generally that he was dissatisfied with them.

16765. *Chairman*.] Is he not bound by the charter-party to have a captain who knows well the cargo he has on board?—Yes.

16766. That is a case, is it not, of having broken the charter-party, and if so, has he been punished for that dereliction of duty?—No.

16767. Why not?—I am not aware of any particular reason for it; he found that the captain of this vessel was not the description of person that he wished, and that a better person was required.

16768. Why has he not been punished?—I am not aware that we have the power of punishing him. I do not know that it is an infringement of the charter-party, the owner changing his captain.

16769. You were asked whether he is not bound by the charter-party to have

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a captain at the port of arrival in command of the ship, who can give an account of the ship?—Yes.

16770. Having broken the charter-party, is he not answerable to the Admiralty for having so broken it?—Yes, certainly, it may be looked upon as that; but here is a man who is just going to leave England, with whom he is not satisfied, and he changes him. The new captain ought to have made himself acquainted, by inquiries into the circumstances of the stowage of the cargo, and become answerable.

16771. You see that through the want of a captain who did know how the cargo was stowed, great evils followed?—Yes.

16772. Therefore it was the duty of the Admiralty to have taken some notice of that breach of the charter-party; are not the Admiralty answerable for the consequences?—The owners are answerable for the non-delivery of the cargo.

16773. Are not the Admiralty answerable for not having taken notice of the dereliction on the part of the owners?—Certainly, but we must first get the evidence that those stores had not been delivered; we cannot punish the owner of this ship, for we have no power to say that they have not delivered the cargo.

16774. Captain *Gladstone.*] You have not received that evidence yet?—No.

16775. Lord *Seymour.*] Will you state the circumstances with regard to the "Prince"?—I am not aware of any change in the "Prince." I was absent from London at the time when she left the country, but I am not aware of any particular change that took place in the officers of that ship.

16776. Do you think that the statement made by those persons who reported on the stowage is wrong; I will read you the words, "Whereas, owing to the changes which took place among the officers and men of the 'Robert Lowe' and the 'Prince' previous to sailing, it appears doubtful whether any one on board knew accurately where the stores intended for Scutari were placed"?—I am not aware of any change that took place.

16777. Are you aware how it happened that the officers of the "Prince" did not know when they arrived at Scutari where the stores were placed?—I think they must have known.

16778. *Chairman.*] Are you aware that they were asked to land the medical stores, and that the answer they gave was, that they did not know where they were; has the Admiralty been made acquainted with that fact?—I am not aware of any public letter to that effect.

16779. At the present moment, so far as you are concerned, the Admiralty is in absolute ignorance as to that fact having happened?—Perfectly, except through this report; at least, I say it reservedly, I cannot recollect every letter.

16780. Lord *Seymour.*] The next recommendation is this; it is as to the cargo-book: "The cargo-book to be very carefully and accurately kept, made out in duplicate, and a sketch of the ship's hold appended, showing the exact position in which the stores are placed, and that whenever practicable a memorandum should be inserted in the bill of lading, showing in what part of the vessel the stores were likely to be found"?—The other day I stated that a cargo-book generally with regard to Government ships was not so necessary as it was for merchant ships, which take on board a large amount of cargo belonging to many individuals, and that the parties who loaded the Government ship only consisted of the Board of Ordnance and the Admiralty; but in the previous order, which I read to the Committee, of December, it was pointed out to the captains of vessels that they were to keep such a cargo-book, and I think this recommendation, so far as it goes, may be of great use; but in many instances, for instance, where the cargo is nothing but salt meat, it is of little use; but in the case of a mixed cargo, there is no doubt that it would be of value.

16781. But Ordnance stores mean a great variety of things, clothing, and artillery stores, and a variety of weapons; all those may be in packages, and they may not be known to the captain, unless he has such a book?—Quite so.

16782. It is also recommended in the report that the cargo-book should be "shown to the Superintendent of Transports, and consignee at any port where cargo is to be discharged"?—It would follow that they should produce it with their sailing orders.

16783. According

16783. According to your recommendation in December, would that have been the course?—Yes, it would; there is another order desiring them to produce their bills of lading with the sailing orders, which was an order made at the same time.

16784. If such a system had been adopted when the "Prince" was lost, why had the Admiralty no means of telling what was lost in her?—Because we only acquaint the Ordnance that such an amount of tonnage is placed at their disposal; we do not know what they put on board; their requisition merely makes a demand for a certain quantity of heavy goods, and a certain quantity of light; what they are we do not know; but last summer we wrote to the Board of Ordnance with the view of affording every assistance in their power, and requested when they made those requisitions, that they would give us a little insight into what they were.

16785. Could the Board of Ordnance at once tell, when a vessel was lost, what was lost in her?—They ought to do, because the master of the vessel on the receipt of the stores on board would give a receipt to the Ordnance officers, which would be transmitted to the Board of Ordnance.

16786. Do you believe that they did so?—That I cannot say.

16787. Captain *Gladstone.*] If they had been naval stores the Admiralty could have furnished an account?—Yes.

16788. Lord *Seymour.*] The next recommendation of this Commission is, "That a discipline clause be enacted extending to the masters, officers, and seamen of transports." What is your opinion, having had considerable experience in the transport service, with regard to that clause?—I may say that the clause which was recommended is now under consideration, in connexion with the Board of Trade. I think it is very difficult to introduce any different system of discipline coming in between the merchant service and a ship of war, between martial law and the regulations.

16789. Can you introduce that difference without an Act of Parliament?—Certainly not.

16790. Lord *Seymour.*] You are first considering the propriety before applying to Parliament, are you not?—Yes; the first thing is, whether it is desirable; the next thing is, upon what principle is it to be adopted, and then to go to Parliament.

16791. But you see a great many difficulties in the consideration of that question?—I think there are.

16792. The next recommendation of this Commission is, "That the requisitions for freight from the different departments of Government having been lodged in the proper quarter duly considered, and vessels appropriated, such appropriation should not be changed unless under the most pressing emergency"?—That never has been so, and that has been one of those difficulties under which we have laboured in sending stores to the East. When we have appropriated a ship to convey a certain quantity of stores, a pressing and urgent demand has come in to request that they may be sent out at the very first opportunity, and in consequence of this pressing demand we have been obliged at times to make an alteration in the original consignment, and to send out those stores that were more urgently wanted; that has been the case, and in carrying out a large service like this, we must more or less give way to these things.

16793. When you have altered the appropriation, and thereby perhaps postponed very important stores that it was desirable to send out, did you let the department that sent those stores know, so that they might be aware of what had happened?—I presume so; personally, not by me; but it is the natural course of the service immediately to acquaint the proper department with it.

16794. Whose business was it, supposing you postponed conveying the clothing that the Ordnance had sent, in order to put in something which the Admiralty considered more important, to let the Ordnance know of that?—The chief clerk of the department would immediately transmit a letter to the Board of Ordnance to acquaint them of it.

16795. Did it happen that on two or three occasions he did not do that?—I am not aware of that; in a large service like this one cannot recollect everything.

16796. Did it not happen in the case of those large cylinders?—It was one

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of the cases where we were compelled to make a change in the "Robert Lowe;' some of the stores were at the time altered as to their destination.

16797. That was a case where the department that sent out the stores ought to have been made acquainted with the change?—Certainly.

16798. The next recommendation is that, "Whenever there is a sufficient quantity of stores from one department to fill a vessel, she should be taken up exclusively for the use of that department"?—I think that is a very doubtful recommendation, for I should be very sorry to send out a shipload of gunpowder entirely as a store, for if that one ship was lost the whole of your material would be gone. Generally speaking, I think that a properly assorted and mixed cargo is preferable to a whole cargo for carrying on warlike operations.

16799. You have some doubt as to the propriety of that recommendation?—No doubt, at times it may be carried out; but generally speaking, when they send a vessel of 2,000 tons loaded with one cargo, if she is lost the whole of your material is gone; I think it should be left to the discretion of the shippers.

16800. The next recommendation is, "That on the departure of a transport or storeship from England, the consignee should be written to by post as well as by ship, enclosing counterparts of bill of lading, so that he may take measures for the reception of the stores on the vessel's arrival, reporting immediately and direct to the department from which the stores were sent, in the event of the non-delivery of any portion of the articles named in the bill of lading"?—With regard to our own department of the navy, that is invariably the custom; we get a receipt by return of post, giving us the whole detail of the receipt of the cargo. I suspect from what I saw in the evidence, with reference to the Commissariat, as to what originally was the custom, that that custom has been given up, and that no such report is now received from the consignee abroad.

16801. As I understand you, in regard to any stores sent out to a naval authority, you would invariably get a receipt?—Yes.

16802. Would you write to them?—Yes; they are always written to by post, and I believe that is the custom of the Board of Ordnance and of the Commissariat department. The Commissariat department write to the Admiralty to say that they want such and such a quantity of provisions sent to Constantinople, and whenever they are shipped the Admiralty acquaint the Treasury, or the Commissariat department, that those stores have been shipped, and that the ship will sail on such and such a day. Then the Commissariat department in London writes to the consignee that such and such stores have been shipped for Constantinople in such a ship, but I suspect they get no receipt that those stores have been received, but we do.

16803. Do the Admiralty get it in every case?—Yes, in every case. I will give the Committee an instance: I hold in my hand a return from Constantinople, dated the 15th of April, detailing what remains in store and afloat on the 2d of April; "Provisions for the Naval service," then the next line is, "Since issued for the use of the fleet and steamers;" and then a note if ships arrive between the interval of the last return and the next return; then a list of the ships expected from England, according to the information received; in this instance there appears to have been no less than three vessels with various cargoes.

16804. How often do you get that?—Every 14 days, and if the Commissariat department in London was to receive a return, the same as this, every 14 days, or every month, giving what they have in store, and what they have received since the last return, and what is on the sea and on the way to Constantinople, they would be able to tell exactly what we can; namely, every article that we have in store at Constantinople.

16805. With regard to the last recommendation in the report, "That on shipping stores from any department, the several parts of every article, such as iron bedsteads, &c., be tied together." This refers to a statement which has been made in evidence here, that some wooden beds were sent in one vessel and that the legs were sent in another, and that they never met; was that the fact?—I cannot say; it is not in my power to give the Committee any information. I certainly think that it would be expedient that the legs should always accompany the beds themselves.

16806. When the Ordnance sent out stores, is it the practice of the Admiralty

ralty to make over the vessel entirely?—Certainly; the vessel is made over entirely, or a portion of it. When a vessel is made over entirely, the same as we have done when shipping battering train, and all the materiel connected with it, we give them the vessel entirely, and she goes to Woolwich from Deptford, and they load her, and we know nothing at all about it, except that an officer of the navy visits the ship, either every day, or every other day, to see that the work is going on properly.

16807. Then having made over a vessel to the Ordnance in that manner, when is the vessel redelivered to the Admiralty authority?—The Ordnance acquaint us when the vessel is filled, and then we give sailing orders to the master to proceed. If she is a freight vessel, merely to carry out the stores to her destination and then be discharged, the interest of the owner is there the interest of the Government, because he cannot get paid for the freight until he produces a receipt from the consignee that he has received the stores; that comes to the Board of Ordnance, and the Board of Ordnance sends it to the Admiralty, and on that receipt payment is made.

16808. What is the practice of the Ordnance as to stowing a vessel; do they employ a stevedore?—They have two; they have an officer of the navy, who is the shipping master connected with Woolwich arsenal, and a stevedore for stowing the cargo. I believe the reason that a stevedore is employed, is owing to the peculiar nature of the various articles shipped by the Board of Ordnance, and they have a man specially acquainted with their own detail.

16809. In that case would arise the objection you have stated, namely, that the captain would not conceive himself so responsible for the stores which were not packed under his superintendence?—It is quite true; still it is considered objectionable to stow articles, such as gunpowder, shells, muskets, and the numerous minutiæ of Ordnance stores by a stranger.

16810. That applies to the case when you make over a vessel entirely, but what happens when there is only required a certain portion of stowage?—Then the Board of Ordnance are acquainted that in pursuance of their requisition of such a date, such and such a vessel has been appropriated at Deptford for the purpose of receiving their stores, and then they send their shipping master and their stevedore from Woolwich, to communicate with the captain-superintendent at Deptford dockyard, and it is arranged between them with reference to the stowage of the cargo on board.

16811. The Committee have been informed that latterly the medical department has had vessels made over to it in the same way?—Yes; they have at their special request. The difficulty we had was to make up a whole cargo for any vessel; but when the medical department came to send out 600 or 700 or 800 tons of medicines, separate vessels were appropriated to them. I think they have had since December or the middle of November, no less than five steamers for medical stores.

16812. When a vessel is made over to the medical department, where is she sent to be loaded?—On their own requisition we have allowed them, instead of having them loaded at Deptford, to proceed into the London Docks to be loaded by parties appropriated by themselves under the superintendence, I believe, of the army packers, who have been largely employed by the Government in sending out warm clothing and other materials to the East.

16813. With regard to transports it has been stated that they have been very often detained before they have been sent out from this country, and I have heard of a vessel being detained in Dublin for forty-five days; I think the ?—There was a vessel said to have been detained forty-five days in Ireland, but I beg to say it is no such thing; it is a total mistake. I sent a letter immediately to the agents of transports at Dublin, it had reference to a statement made publicly, that a transport vessel lay in Dublin for thirty-five days to take in sixty-two men and thirty-five horses, and this is the answer to it: "I have the honour to state that that statement is entirely unfounded, no such embarkation having taken place, and consequently no such detention of any vessel." That is from the agent of transport at Dublin.

16814. The Committee have been informed that the transports have been delayed at other places at great cost to the public, and they have been informed that the "Simla" was delayed at Constantinople?—Yes, she was delayed at Constantinople.

 16815. What

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16815. What did the public pay during the time of the detention of that vessel?—Nothing.

16816. It was no loss to the public during that time?—She was detained there in consequence of defects, and whenever a vessel breaks down from defects her pay entirely ceases from that time.

16817. That is part of the agreement by the charter-party?—Yes; we only pay for the ship during her efficiency.

16818. Vessels were detained at Balaklava for a long time, and if so, were they not detained at the cost of the public?—Certainly; but they were not detained in consequence of any defect in the ship itself.

16819. But they were detained by the authorities at Balaklava?—In consequence of not being able to clear the vessels of their cargoes. I may instance the vessels sent out from here with huts; many of them lay there for 30 and 40 days, and they could not land their cargoes; that has been a great detriment, and I will say a great cause of expense to the public service. We have sent out vessels in three months, I think between the 1st of December and the 1st of March, containing no less than 35,000 tons of stores into Balaklava Harbour, and they had not the means of putting them away. I wrote out about it myself, to try and hasten the delivery of those cargoes, but I failed.

16820. Then while the troops were suffering on the one side for want of those cargoes, the public here were paying enormously on the other, for the detention of the vessels at Balaklava?—Yes; a steamer that does nothing is rather an expensive plaything; it is a terrible expense, and they are detained for weeks in that harbour, as there are no places in which to place their cargoes.

16821. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you consider that if large steamers out there, such as you have described, were towing vessels, that was a proper mode of employing them?—Certainly not; at the same time, if a steamer is going the same way it is natural that she should take one or two vessels in tow, which was the case.

16822. If a steamer like the "Arabia" had been employed to tow vessels in the Bosphorus, and for no other purpose, would that have been a proper mode of employing that vessel?—It would be the proper mode of employing her, because the only additional expense would be the expense of coal. If she was lying idle, as she was, she might just as well be employed in towing; it would not be very expensive, because the only additional expense of that vessel would be the expense of coal for the time being.

16823. *Chairman.*] But a much smaller vessel could have performed the service, and more economically?—Quite so, because the consumption of coal would be less.

16824. Therefore the employment of that vessel was an uneconomical proceeding?—That is impossible for me to say, because the vessels had been detained in the Black Sea for military services, of which I am not a judge. The instructions sent to the Black Sea have been, when the service admitted of it, to send those vessels to England; and they have been repeated every month. There has been no disinclination on the part of the Admiralty to reduce the expense, and send vessels home. The orders sent out were the 13th of June, the 22d of July, and the 8th of August; then after the 8th of August came the military service, with regard to the Crimea; and orders were sent again in November, and so on every month.

16825. During the whole time the army has been in the Crimea have you ever received any statement from the authorities there that they were in want of a supply of transport?—None; never.

16826. If any mischief has arisen to the army from the want of transport, it is not upon the Admiralty that we are to throw the blame?—Certainly not.

16827. Lord *Seymour.*] Admiral Boxer was the person in the Bosphorus who had the chief command, was he not?—Yes.

16828. From what date?—I think his appointment took place in May 1854.

16829. Up to what time did he continue there?—Up to the 28th January 1855.

16830. Was he sent there as an Admiral is sent to a station?—He was sent out as Admiral Superintending in the Bosphorus, which more resembles the appointment of an Admiral Superintendent in a dockyard than an Admiral afloat.

16831. Will you state to the Committee what staff he had to assist him in his duties?—Admiral Boxer was sent out, and he had his flag lieutenant, his secretary,

secretary, and clerks, and he had an officer appointed with regard to carrying on his store duties; he had a commander of the navy, appointed specially to assist him, who had been for three years before employed in the Turkish service, to give instruction in the gun exercise, and that officer was specially appointed to him to afford a ready communication between him and the Turkish authorities there, and we considered at the Admiralty that he would be of the greatest use to him; he remained there for some time, and was subsequently allowed to go to the trenches, which, I think, was to be regretted, as the Admiral lost the services of his right-hand man.

16832. Who sent him?—He allowed him to go himself.

16833. He lost the man most fitted to communicate with the authorities at Constantinople, because he sent him away to the trenches?—Yes; being a good gunnery officer he thought that his services might be more useful in the Crimea than at Constantinople; it was Commander Borlase.

16834. Mr. *Layard.*] He had been for many years in Turkey, had he not?—About three years.

16835. He was perfectly acquainted with Turkey and the language too, was he not?—I believe so, from report.

16836. Lord *Seymour.*] Did you hear at the Admiralty very soon that this captain had been sent away to the trenches?—Yes.

16837. As he had been specially appointed to assist Admiral Boxer, and seemed the fittest man of all his staff to do so, did the Admiralty take any notice of it?—Yes, they found fault, and desired him immediately to return.

16838. Did Admiral Boxer get him back?—Yes, he came back for a short time to Constantinople.

16839. Mr. *Layard.*] Was he sent back again to the Crimea?—No, he was promoted, and another was appointed in his stead.

16840. Where is he now?—At Constantinople.

16841. Captain *Gladstone.*] Is he employed?—Yes; he is employed. He has been promoted.

16842. Lord *Seymour.*] Did the Admiralty ever hear from Admiral Boxer that he had not a sufficient staff to perform his duties?—Yes; he complained of want of assistance.

16843. How soon did he complain?—I think he complained in the month of August or September.

16844. *Chairman.*] Was that after he had got rid of Captain Borlase?—I believe it was.

16845. His want was created by his own conduct?—To a certain extent, but what he particularly alluded to as to the assistance was a want of labour?—He was empowered to hire as many men as he required for carrying on the public service.

16846. Lord *Seymour.*] You say that he sent him away in August. The trenches were not open till October?—It must have been October that Commander Borlase went to the Crimea.

16847. You heard as soon as August, at any rate, that Admiral Boxer had not a sufficient staff; what course did the Admiralty take?—They sent out a steam vessel to be attached to him, the "Harpy," to afford him assistance.

16848. *Chairman.*] If I understand you, it was not a staff that he wanted, but he wanted labour?—Yes, he wanted a ship to be attached to him.

16849. Had he not power to employ labour there?—Yes, I believe so; here is a letter which refers to the subject of coaling; a subject which has been mentioned; I will read this letter from Admiral Boxer: "Harpy, at Constantinople, 22d January 1855. Sir,—In compliance with the directions of the Commander-in-chief to furnish you with all the useful local information in my power, I beg to give you the same under the following heads: Coaling Her Majesty's ships and transports.—On my arrival from England, in the month of May last, to form the naval establishment, there were no resources of any kind, for this or any other service. I at once applied to Her Majesty's Ambassador to procure me an eligible spot for a coal depôt (above Tophana, since granted to the French), but my request could not then be complied with. A second request was made: since that time I have succeeded in obtaining from the Turkish Government, through Her Majesty's Ambassador, a store at Stenia, capable of containing between 4,000 or 5,000 tons, now nearly full; a store in the naval arsenal, 7,000 tons; and I have hired two stores, 1,900 tons. These, with

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with two hired by Mr. Mowbray, 2,400 tons, make together storage for near 16,000 tons of coal. The 'Caduceus' transport, dismasted, holding 1,000 tons, is retained as a depôt till her stores arrive from England. The storekeeper has on hand 13,000 tons, and more can be purchased if necessary; nearly 100,000 tons are either on the way out from England, or ready for shipment; colliers are now in the Dardanelles wind-bound. The quantity of fuel supplied to Her Majesty's ships and transports, since the 1st May last, amounts to near 60,000 tons. Our means of coaling are as follows: two lighters carrying each 40 tons; four lighters from Malta, each 30 tons; four smaller craft, averaging 15 tons; whenever practicable, colliers are placed alongside ships requiring fuel immediately they come into the Golden Horn; colliers are sent to Beicos when required. The great obstacles to coaling have been the want of labour, which will now be obviated by their Lordships having ordered the crews of Her Majesty's ships to be employed on extra wages; and of the 'Melampus' receiving ship, on her arrival. The uncertain state of the weather, at this time of the year, is also a source of great difficulty in the Golden Horn, but not in the arsenal."

16850. Lord *Seymour.*] The crews of ships being ordered to be employed in the East in coaling, when was that order given?—That is an order that he might have given himself whenever he liked.

16851. When did the Admiralty give it?—He must have received that order probably about the beginning of January last.

16852. Do you mean that this plan, which would have afforded a great facility, and prevented great delay in the coaling of steamers, had not been adopted, although Admiral Boxer had full power to adopt it; why did he not adopt it?—For this reason: that probably no vessels of war were lying there, but if they had been he had the power, under the instructions, of employing the crews of those ships, upon a scale of extra pay for any extra service that they may be employed upon.

16853. But his letter seems to refer to his not having power to employ them?—He had that power whenever he liked; and any commander-in-chief, any admiral or captain has that power.

16854. Had it been brought to the knowledge of the Admiralty that considerable delayed had taken place in the autumn in coaling steamers at Constantinople?—I am not aware of it.

16855. It does not occur to you that you have heard of any complaints of this kind?—No.

16856. With regard to the transport across the Black Sea, it has been stated to the Committee that a vessel was sent from Balaklava to purchase boots and shoes at Constantinople, and that the vessel was carrying at the time a cargo of boots and shoes, which it took backwards and forwards; have you the means of saying whether that was or was not the case?—I cut that article out of the "Times" myself, and I recommended the Board to send it out to Admiral Lyons, to ask the question whether it was really true that a statement of that description was well founded; and this is the answer of Sir Edmund Lyons, which is a report on "Chaos at Balaklava." "'Royal Albert,' off Sebastopol, 24 February 1855. Sir,—In compliance with the directions contained in your letter of the 2d instant, No. 136, calling for a report on an extract from the 'Times,' headed the 'Chaos at Balaklava,' be pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the enclosed report from the principal agent of transports, who is the only person to whom I can refer on this subject, and I have every reason to believe with him that no such extraordinary oversight ever occurred as the one alleged, relative to the vessel laden with boots and shoes; indeed it is only reasonable to suppose, that if such a glaring instance of mismanagement had really happened, an anonymous correspondent to a newspaper would hardly have scrupled to give both the name of the vessel and the period at which the circumstance took place. I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, *E. C. Lyons.*" The report of the principal agent of transports is as follows: "Orient, Balaklava, 22d February 1855.—Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your order of the 16th instant, desiring me to report upon an extract from the 'Times' newspaper of the 23d January, headed 'Chaos at Balaklava,' that a vessel loaded with boots and shoes (having no bill of lading) was sent from Balaklava, with an agent from Lord Raglan, to Constantinople, for the purpose of purchasing such articles at

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that place. And in reply I beg leave to inform you, that no vessel under my orders has ever arrived at this port loaded with the stores described, neither have I ever ordered any vessel to Constantinople, for the special purpose of procuring boots and shoes at that place; and I have not received a request at any time from Lord Raglan, or any military authority, to afford a passage to Lord Raglan's agents on such a mission. And after inquiry, I cannot learn that any vessel has arrived at this port, or sailed from it, under the circumstances described. With regard to transports discharging cargoes at Balaklava, I beg to acquaint you, that since I have been at this port I have always instructed the masters to wait upon the various departments to which their cargoes were consigned or applied. And an active agent of transports, Lieutenant Wylde, has invariably had the superintendence of the disembarkation of stores afloat, and an agent, generally a commander of the Royal Navy, has been employed on shore, to see that the boats are active in landing the stores at the right places; Commander Steane is at present performing this service. No transport has left this port without my written orders, and if any have left with stores on board, it has been with my full knowledge and under circumstances which in the exercise of my judgment I considered best for the execution of the public service, and of which the military authorities were acquainted. I purpose to establish, as you recommend, a boarding officer to examine all vessels leaving this port, and to insert in a book what stores or cargo they have on board, without causing any unnecessary delay."

16857. *Chairman.*] Does that letter contain a statement that no vessel left with boots and shoes on board?—It does. "In reply, I beg leave to inform you, that no vessel under my orders has ever arrived at this port laden with these stores described; neither have I ever ordered any vessel to Constantinople for the purpose of procuring boots and shoes at that place; and I have not received a request at any time from Lord Raglan, or any military authority, to afford a passage to Lord Raglan's agents on such a mission."

16858. Mr. *Layard.*] When the word "loaded" or "laden" is used, is it inferred that the whole cargo consisted of boots or shoes?—I should not say so; decidedly the larger proportion, but not the entire cargo.

16859. Lord *Seymour.*] The letter goes on to say that no vessel was sent from Balaklava to purchase boots and shoes?—Certainly, with his knowledge, unless they had taken up any private vessel which was not a transport.

16860. You mean that Lord Raglan might have sent down and taken up some vessel without communicating with the Government authorities?—Yes; but I do not think it at all likely.

16861. Could the military authorities, if they had wished to have a vessel for hospital purposes, have written to Rear-admiral Boxer, and had he authority to place such a vessel at their disposal?—Certainly.

16862. If they wanted such a vessel, by writing to him he had authority to grant it to them?—By writing to the Commander-in-chief in the Black Sea, or to Admiral Boxer, but principally to the Commander-in-chief, orders would have been immediately given. No steps were taken here for the purpose, because I was not aware what service was going to be performed; but when the service to the Crimea was apparent, then it would have been the natural consequence to have made some arrangements with reference to that subject.

16863. Were there vessels in the Black Sea or the Bosphorus which were applicable to such a purpose?—Yes, there were three or four.

16864. Captain *Gladstone.*] The Duke of Newcastle stated that he applied to the Admiralty early in the autumn for steam-vessels to be fitted up for the purpose of conveying the sick from Balaklava to Scutari, but that considerable delay took place before they were fitted up; can you explain the reasons for that?—No, I cannot. I was absent in September; but I know that orders were sent out by Sir James Graham to the Commander-in-chief in October, desiring several vessels to be fitted; that was a demi-official communication.

16865. Lord *Seymour.*] Were those vessels to be fitted up at Constantinople?—They were to be fitted up by the fleet wherever the circumstances would admit.

16866. The fleet would have had no difficulty in doing it?—None.

16867. What time after the order had arrived should you have thought a reasonable time for vessels to be so fitted up?—I should say that it would take about 10 days to fit up a vessel, from that to a fortnight; but it becomes a very

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very disputable point as to what is the best and the most advantageous way to fit up a steam-vessel to carry the wounded and sick. I may say now, in the Mediterranean they have made a very large number of cots, considering that the most easy way of providing for the sick, whereas a number of other vessels have been fitted up with standing bed-places for the purpose.

16868. But then, as the Committee have been given to understand, vessels went from Balaklava to Scutari without being fitted up in either one way or the other?—I am not aware what steps they took upon that point.

16869. *Chairman.*] Why, are you not aware what is the course of the service as regards vessels going from Balaklava to Scutari, that you did not learn anything about them?—The whole of that service is under the Commander-in-chief and Admiral Boxer in the Black Sea, and if we had attempted to interfere in the details of that service out there, we should have got into endless confusion. The Commander-in-chief is, I may say, the eyes and the hands of the Admiralty to fulfil those orders that we may send out, and to fill up any vacuum, or any oversight on our part, and to deal with all questions relative to that public service as circumstances may require; he has full power.

16870. In the fifth instruction it is whether there has been any cause of complaint as to the provisions or medical comforts, either as regards quality or quantity, or any inattention in their issue, and whether the troops have been properly supplied with good water, and if complaints of that nature have occurred in the transit from Balaklava to Scutari, the person responsible is the Commander-in-chief, is he not?—He is, and the principal agent of transports.

16871. Not the Admiralty?—No.

16872. Lord *Seymour.*] As regards the transports from England to the Crimea, you take the responsibility of that, do you not?—Yes.

16873. With regard to the actual transport in the Black Sea the Admiral there is responsible, is he not?—Yes.

16874. He is in the place of the Admiralty?—Yes; the Commander-in-chief would deal with the question by giving such orders as the circumstances of the case would require.

16875. *Chairman.*] Supposing that the army was unsupplied, whom should we come upon as the person responsible, the Admiral or the Commander-in-chief?—I should come on the principal agent for transport, whose principal duty is to attend them, and nothing more.

16876. Then the person answerable would be Admiral Boxer?—Certainly.

16877. Lord *Seymour.*] But you must see first what orders have been given?—Yes; you must know the whole of the circumstances before you can give an answer to a direct question.

16878. *Chairman.*] Supposing a ship left Balaklava, carrying sick, and she was destined to Scutari, and on the passage the soldiers suffered dreadfully, in consequence of the want of medical stores, and water, and medical comforts, on board, who would be the person answerable for that?—I beg to say, that no such vessel should have left Balaklava Harbour without a naval, military, and medical inspection.

16879. Supposing such a thing did occur, who would be answerable?—They all are to blame.

16880. Whom are we to come upon as responsible for the duty of providing that ship?—A ship is provided by the naval agent, or the superintendent of transports, and reported to the military authorities, and the military authorities send an officer, a medical man, to inspect the ship, and to see that everything is on board.

16881. You would say, that if the Committee have heard that the soldiers were transported from Balaklava to Scutari in vessels so unprovided with comforts, that they suffered great hardships, that that was impossible?—I should say so.

16882. As the thing has occurred, it is proved to be possible, and the Committee want to know upon whom they are to call as responsible for it?—I should call, first of all, upon the superintendent agent of transport, and have an investigation into all the circumstances of the case, who the authorities were that inspected the ship, and reported her fit.

16883. So that no ship can leave Balaklava without being reported upon to the Commander-in-chief?—That is the course whenever a ship is appropriated for invalids. I will read this letter, which refers not only to Balaklava, but it applies

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applies to Constantinople, from Admiral Boxer, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated the 4th of January 1855. I believe it is in answer to a question that was put, or written instructions given, as to the care of invalids. It is written from the "Harpy," at Constantinople. "In reply to your letter of the 22d ultimo, relative to the passage of invalids in transports or steam-vessels, I beg to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that whenever invalids have been embarked on board vessels at Constantinople, fitted with standing berths, for passage to Malta or England, they have invariably been furnished with beds and blankets, and every vessel has been inspected by both the naval and military authorities to see that they were supplied with the necessary articles. 2dly. When invalids have been embarked who can sleep in hammocks, three blankets have been furnished without a bed. 3rdly. I may mention that the opinion of the medical officers is always taken with regard to the number of sick the vessels can carry; and the "Sultana" sailing transport, a ship of nearly 800 tons, which sailed a few days ago, only took 200 invalids, and these proportions have been greatly reduced for steam-vessels."

16884. Do not you see that that letter only refers to the transport of the sick from Constantinople to Malta?—Yes; but I read it to show the principle, that before a vessel is appropriated to invalids there is a military inspection, both by the military officer and the medical officer.

16885. Do you mean to state that that ought to have occurred with regard to every vessel leaving Balaklava?—Certainly.

16886. And if a vessel did leave Balaklava, upon every occasion a report was presented to the Commander-in-chief previously to her leaving?—It ought to have been.

16887. If it were not the case, and that ship left without such report having been presented, who is answerable?—I should call upon the Naval department out there.

16888. Supposing a report has been presented to the Commander-in-chief, and he fancies that all is right, and gives his permission to the vessel to sail, and upon her voyage these horrors occur, who is then answerable?—The principal agent of transports.

16889. Captain *Gladstone.*] What time would it take to fit up a vessel with standing bed places?—About 10 days.

16890. Lord *Seymour.*] It has been stated to this Committee that a number of sick were coming away from Constantinople to Malta, or coming home, but that they had no bedding, and I think it was Mr. Macdonald who provided bedding for them, because Admiral Boxer, it was said, would not provide it; do you know anything of that case?—Nothing whatever. I have just read his letter, in which he states that this provision had been made.

16891. You know nothing of such a case?—No.

16892. If there was a case in which invalids were allowed to sail from Constantinople without proper bedding, the fault of that would rest upon the Rear-admiral Superintendent?—Certainly.

16893. I will read to you the answer to Question 6098; "No adequate preparations had been made on board the vessels used as hospital ships for their comfortable conveyance?—None whatever; they were put on board and laid upon the deck, sick and wounded; and in some instances at first without even medicines, and frequently without bed utensils, or the means of personal cleanliness, and in the majority of cases the stench on the passage became intolerable." That was from Balaklava to Scutari; at the Admiralty have you never heard of the sufferings of the sick and wounded in their passage from Balaklava to Scutari?—I cannot answer that question directly, but I will inquire whether there was such a letter. I have heard of it, of course.

16894. Has it not been brought to the knowledge of the Admiralty officially?—I am not aware that it has.

16895. *Chairman.*] I will read to you one or two more observations that have been made to this Committee by Mr. Macdonald: he is asked, "When they were at last landed, in what manner were they landed, and what conveniences were provided to remove them to the hospitals?—It not unfrequently happened that the men were five hours; I have known cases in which the time was longer from the time when they were disembarked from the side of the ship to the time when they were laid in their beds; I think I am safe in

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saying that four hours was the average of the time consumed in the operation during the first period after my arrival"?—I should like to read a letter in answer to that; it is a letter in answer to a communication which it appears had been addressed by Lord Raglan to Admiral Boxer, apparently upon that point, and this is Admiral Boxer's answer: it is dated, "Harpy," at Constantinople, 16th January 1855. "My Lord,—I yesterday had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 12th instant; it was with the greatest surprise I learnt that representations had been made to your Excellency that the naval arrangements for landing the sick had not been so prompt as is required to preserve the men from suffering and exposure. So far from this being the case, I have personally superintended the landing of a large portion of those received, and have sent my flag lieutenant and the agent of transports, to see that every kind attention was paid to them, when I could not myself be on the spot. I can assure your Excellency that I fully enter into your feelings on this subject, and having interested myself so much in attending to the comfort of the sick and wounded, even in matters beyond my line of duty, such as contracting for and supplying bedsteads, demanding medical officers from Malta and England, and various other services, it has occasioned me disappointment that my exertions have been considered so unsuccessful. During the whole time I have been here, I have heard no complaint of the arrangements for landing the sick, and it has been highly satisfactory to know, that not a single accident has occurred in the performance of this delicate and important duty. I have the honour to enclose your Excellency copies of some questions I put to the officers who have superintended the landing of the sick, and of the replies to the same, which must convince your Excellency that if suffering and exposure have been caused, it has not arisen from want of naval assistance, but from other causes. I have the honour to be, my Lord, your Excellency's most obedient humble servant, (signed) *Edward Boxer*, Rear-admiral Superintendent." These are the questions which the Rear-admiral put: "Questions addressed by Rear-Admiral Boxer to Lieutenant Keatley, Agent for Transports, and Lieutenant George B. Goolden, Flag Lieutenant, and those officers' replies." The first question is, "Have sufficient boats been in attendance to land the sick?" and Lieutenant Keatley's answer is, "Generally more than could be used with advantage, and the sick always landed faster than they were taken away."

16896. Mr. *Layard.*] At what date was that given in?—The 16th of January is the date of Admiral Boxer's letter to Lord Raglan.

16897. The questions and answers are not dated?—No; this is speaking generally; it speaks of all the time. The second question is, "Had more boats been employed would the sick have been detained at the landing-place?" Lieutenant Keatley's reply is, "Yes; it constantly happens that the sick were detained either in the boats or on the wharf for an hour, and even more, for want of people to convey them to the hospital. The greatest inconvenience has arisen from a want of arrangement in getting the stretchers down from the hospital. I have frequently had to take the sailors to bring them down." That is Lieutenant Keatley. The next question is, "After the troops had been landed from the boats, have you ever known them detained and exposed at the landing place?" Lieutenant Keatley's reply is, "Yes, and have frequently remonstrated about it, and reported the same to you." The next question is "To offer general remarks on the mode pursued for landing the sick by the naval authorities;" and Lieutenant Keatley's answer is, "When the sick arrive the men-of-war and transport boats are employed to land them together, with one or two steam-tugs, according to the state of the weather and current. When the steamers cannot land at the wharf, the boats are obliged to be towed and land inside. There have sometimes been too many boats, and I have had to send some away to prevent confusion. It has happened on some occasions, after we began to land the sick, the weather has become unfavourable; but as the ships were so crowded, it has been thought best to continue the landing, as the sick would suffer less in the transit than being left on board, with the chance of the weather being so bad that they might not be landed for days. In the case of the wounded, they were never, if possible, landed, but when the weather was favourable, and the water smooth, in order that it might be done with the least possible suffering. Of the vast number landed wounded and sick, I am aware of but one trivial accident occurring; that was occasioned by a

ladder

ladder breaking; one man fell into the steamer, but he pitched on two sailors, which broke his fall, and consequently he was uninjured. The above statement I have the honour to submit to you. (Signed) *J. Keatley*, Agent for Transports."

16898. *Chairman.*] At Question 6115, this question was put to Mr. Macdonald: "They were put on board in the Crimea in that state, and sent down, almost without necessary covering, to Constantinople?—Most certainly." "Had they blankets?—Most of the men clung to their blankets; at that period, sometimes, but very rarely, the men would complain, and it was very rarely that they did complain of anything, but when they did, perhaps a man had lost his blanket." "Does this description of yours, with respect to the condition in which those men came down to Constantinople, apply to the majority of the cases that arrived from the Crimea?—The majority." "Did you observe the state of the clothing and necessaries with which those sick and wounded arrived at Constantinople?—The men often arrived without their shoes; they were either like those which one sometimes sees on the feet of beggars in this country, or they were sometimes without shoes at all; and their shirts had either been cast away, in utter disgust at their filthiness, or torn in shreds, or covered with dirt, and they were swarming with vermin; their trousers were all torn about the legs, and torn in every direction; their coats were ragged, where they retained them, and sometimes they came down without coats at all, and sometimes without great coats; some men who appeared in great coats wore those of their comrades who had died on the way down." From all this, it would appear that there was no preparation made on board the vessels for the reception of the sick?—It is not the province of the Naval department to furnish clothing to the soldiers.

16899. But it is to furnish them with bedding?—Yes; we were in the habit, with regard to the service of sending out troops, to furnish only two blankets to a man. With reference to providing a hospital ship, we never had any requisition to do that specially; but at the same time, if that service was to be prepared, on the embarkation of the troops for the Crimea I think that hospital ships ought to have been specially fitted at that time for them.

16900. You are not aware that Dr. Andrew Smith early in the year stated that it would be requisite for the comfort of the troops to have hospital ships?—I never heard of it.

16901. Not till this moment?—Never.

16902. If you did not hear of it, and if he did make that statement, whose duty was it to inform you of it?—There ought to have been a requisition made from the War department for proper hospital ships to be appointed. When the embarkation to the Crimea took place, it naturally would have been the duty of the Commander-in-chief of the army out there to have communicated with the Naval department, to have made the arrangement there. No doubt the difficulties with regard to bedding were chiefly owing to the want of a store for those articles in Balaklava Harbour.

16903. Sir *J. Pakington.*] No doubt the suggestion to which the Chairman has alluded as coming from Dr. Andrew Smith, was made to the War department; are you clear that no application was ever made at the Admiralty from the War department in consequence of that suggestion?—I am not aware of it.

16904. *Chairman.*] You never heard of it?—No.

16905. Colonel *Lindsay.*] You stated that it would have been the duty of the Commander-in-chief to make the requisition; would it have been his duty, or would it have been the duty of the War department?—Out there it would have been the duty of the Commander-in-chief.

16906. Lord *Seymour.*] In regard to the wharves at Scutari, if they were insufficient was it the duty of the Admiralty to report it, and to obtain their reparation?—It was one of the questions, I think, that was raised by the Admiral for some explanation, and I think this is the letter which specially refers to wharves; it is dated the 25th of January 1855. "Sir,—In conclusion of my letter, No. 14, of the 22d instant, relative to the duties of the port at Constantinople, I beg to offer the following remarks with regard to the landing of sick at Scutari. 2. Early in last year I called the attention of Lord Raglan to the importance of having proper wharves erected on suitable sites for the embarkation and landing of troops. General Tylden, the commanding officer of Royal Engineers, was directed with me to fix on sites for the purpose.

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Having done so, the Royal Engineer department then commenced lengthening the wharves decided on, but the new work was unfortunately washed away by the gale of the 14th of November, with three of the boats fitted for landing the sick, except part of the one at Scutari, which is now in northerly winds a very good wharf for landing the sick, and the other two partially so; but in strong southerly winds the steamers employed in landing the sick cannot get alongside the principal landing-place, and there is then the greatest difficulty in landing them in boats, nor would it be prudent to do so in such weather; and I am of opinion that they cannot be improved at this season of the year, except by sinking a vessel loaded with stones to the southward. The only landing-place which is safe in southerly winds is that at Scutari, between two and three miles from the hospital, which is a great objection."

16907. It seems that the whole summer and the fine weather of the autumn had been allowed to pass over without any step being taken to construct a wharf at Scutari?—Yes; and it was early in 1854 that the attention of Lord Raglan was called to proper wharves being erected at suitable sites, and General Tylden was directed to fix on sites for this purpose.

16908. Are the Committee to understand that the wharf was only being constructed when the gale of the 14th of November came on?—Yes, when it washed it away.

16909. They had been from spring to November constructing this small wharf?—It appears so.

16910. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Was it washed away?—Yes; it was partly constructed, and destroyed by the gale of the 14th of November.

16911. Lord *Seymour.*] It was not finished?—I should think not.

16912. *Chairman.*] Though the suggestion had been made early in the spring of that year?—Quite so.

16913. Sir *J. Pakington.*] If it had been finished properly, it would not have been washed away?—Perhaps not.

16914. Lord *Seymour.*] The harbour of Balaklava, the Committee have been told, has been at different times under various authorities; first of all Sir Edmund Lyons had authority there?—Yes; he went there on the day after Balaklava was taken, on the 27th or 28th September.

16915. Who was put in authority directly after that?—Captain Heath. Captain Mends, being the Captain of Sir Edmund Lyons' ship, and therefore present with Sir Edmund Lyons, you may say that Sir Edmund Lyons and Captain Mends at that time carried on the duties of Balaklava harbour.

16916. Sir Edmund Lyons was generally responsible, and he had Captain Mends to assist him?—Yes.

16917. When did Captain Heath come there?—I cannot exactly give the date.

16918. Will you give the date in your answer to show for what time Captain Heath was then responsible?—Yes, I will; there is no document in office which gives it.

16919. Then Captain Dacres came there, did he not?—Yes.

16920. Will you state for what time Captain Dacres was responsible?—I will supply that.

16921. Then I understand Captain Power came there?—Yes.

16922. Will you put in what time he was there also?—I will. There is no document to define the exact dates.

16923. Then finally Admiral Boxer was sent there?—Yes; and he arrived there on the 29th January.

16924. Will you state to the Committee whether any instructions were issued as to the harbour at Balaklava by any of those earlier persons who were in authority there, and what they were?—There were established regulations for the port laid down after the harbour was taken possession of; those were afterwards, I think, increased by Captain Heath, and within the last few days we have received the established code of regulations, which have been further increased by Admiral Boxer.

Vide Appendix.

16925. When was the Admiralty acquainted with the first regulation made for the management of that harbour?—In the month of December.

16926. Did those regulations appear to the Admiralty to have been satisfactory?—They did appear satisfactory.

16927. That harbour had been under those regulations for some months?—It had.

16928. Have

16928. Have you a copy of those regulations?—Not just now. I have got the subsequent regulations, and I will furnish them. Capt. *A. Milne*, R. N.

16929. You stated, did you not, that Admiral Boxer has now made some improvements in those regulations?—Yes. 30 April 1855.

16930. The circumstance of his making improved regulations shows that, in his opinion, the former ones were not sufficient?—It is in the little matters of detail which were required to be amended.

16931. *Chairman.*] Admiral Boxer was transferred from Scutari to Balaklava, was he not?—Yes.

16932. Was he promoted?—It was a change of command.

16933. Then I suppose it was that Admiral Boxer performed his duties so well at Scutari, that you were satisfied to send him to Balaklava?—Admiral Boxer is a very zealous man in the discharge of his duties.

16934. Had he performed his duties so well at Scutari, that you were led to send him to Balaklava?—I am not aware under what circumstances the First Lord transferred him.

16935. The First Lord is the proper person to apply to, I presume?—Yes, he is.

16936. Lord *Seymour.*] It has been stated to this Committee that there was a detention of transports in Balaklava; and you stated, did you not, that that detention depended upon the want of storehouses there?—Yes.

16937. The storehouses were not under the same authority that the harbour was?—No.

16938. They were under military authority, were they not?—Yes.

16939. But the want of storehouses, or the insufficiency of them, led to the detention of vessels in the harbour?—Certainly.

16940. Can you suppose that 40 or 50 transports were, with several thousand men on board, kept in that small harbour with no current in it, without making the harbour very filthy?—Certainly not; there must be always a certain state of the harbour from that very circumstance of a number of vessels lying there, and the number of people on board, more especially in a harbour having no current through it.

16941. Even if precautions were used, and if means were taken to cleanse the surface of the harbour?—Quite so.

16942. *Chairman.*] There is no tide in the Black Sea, is there?—Scarcely any; only depending on the winds.

16943. Lord *Seymour.*] Can you give the Committee a monthly return of the transports in the Black Sea, showing how they were employed?—Yes, I can do so.

16944. Can you give in a monthly return for the months of November and December?—Yes. I have here a return of the disposition of the steam and sailing transports in the Black Sea on the 28th of October, the 8th of November, the 18th of November, the 8th of December, and the 18th of December 1854. It takes in all the vessels in the Black Sea.—(*The same were handed in.*) *Vide* Appendix.

16945. It was stated by his Grace the Duke of Newcastle that he considered, as Minister of War, that the whole of the Transport department ought to be placed under his superintendence and control. As one of the Lords of the Admiralty, having had the transport department under you, what is your opinion upon that question?—I do not concur in that opinion. I do not see how it would work if the transport department was specially placed under the Minister of War and independent of the Admiralty. New departments or appointments would have to be made abroad, representing the War department, for transport duties, as it would never work if the War department was to give orders to the naval authorities independent of that Board.

16946. *Chairman.*] Could not that be avoided if the War department corresponded directly with the Admiralty?—Yes, but causing a double correspondence both from England and to England; and it would be an anomaly to find the Minister for War giving orders to naval authorities abroad, and the Admiralty ignorant of it.

16947. Why should they be ignorant?—Because it would not be possible to keep the Admiralty informed on all details of the transport service; and yet the naval commander abroad would be constantly appealed to for assistance.

16948. Lord *Seymour.*] Are the Committee to understand that your objection

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is, that if there was a direct correspondence with the naval authorities at Malta and Constantinople, then those authorities would have a divided responsibility?—Yes.

16949. They would be responsible on the one hand to the Minister of War, and responsible on the other hand to the Admiralty?—Yes.

16950. Instead of one set of correspondence, there would be a double set?—Yes.

16951. In regard to provisions issued at Deptford for the army, the Minister at War would have either to correspond through the Admiralty, or if it was directly under him he must correspond with the Captain-superintendent at Deptford for the supply of all those provisions?—Quite so.

16952. Then again the Captain-superintendent at Deptford would be responsible on the one hand to the Minister for War, and on the other hand to the Admiralty?—He would be directly under the Admiralty as a naval officer, and also under the Secretary for War, and I think there would be a clashing of interests.

16953. In that case, there would not only be a double responsibility as to authority, but a double responsibility as to expenditure?—Yes.

16954. That would very much complicate the accounts, as well as the authority, would it not?—Yes, to a certain extent that would be the case, because now in our supply of provisions for the army service we get our requisition from the War department to the Admiralty, and next the Admiralty, acting upon the requisition, gives orders to the Captain-superintendent at Deptford to make the supplies, and the War department is then acquainted.

16955. And you keep the accounts and raise the money?—Yes, and raise the money value against the War and Commissariat departments.

16956. The Captain-superintendent at Deptford is only responsible to you?—Yes.

16957. Captain *Gladstone.*] Would there not be inconvenience in the Admiralty having to apply to the War department to send out naval transport stores?—Yes; and instead of the War department having to apply to the Admiralty, the Admiralty would have to apply to the War department upon that naval subject.

16958. Lord *Seymour.*] Instead of simplifying matters, you think it would rather complicate them?—Yes.

16959. You have said something about taking up ships for bringing home invalids; what arrangements were made for bringing home invalids, on the part of the Admiralty; suppose, for instance, a vessel came in with invalids at Portsmouth?—Immediately a vessel arrives it is announced by telegraph, and an immediate communication is made to the Horse Guards, to acquaint them that such and such a vessel has arrived at Portsmouth, requesting to know what is their intention as to the disposal of the men; and that becomes a material question.

16960. Have the military authorities any depôt at Portsmouth for the reception of their wounded?—They have, very limited; but the general wish of the Horse Guards has been, that we should send all the invalids and sick to Chatham, on the Medway.

16961. Is Chatham a convenient place for those large steamers?—Certainly not.

16962. Can you send them there?—Many vessels cannot go there.

16963. So that the Horse Guards wish you to send invalided soldiers to a place where a vessel can hardly take them?—It is so; we have been obliged to acquaint the military authorities that it was impossible that those vessels could proceed in accordance with their wishes, therefore the invalids must be landed at Portsmouth, and placed at their disposal.

16964. Are all the invalids that are landed at Portsmouth sent by railway to Chatham?—Yes, they are.

16965. *Chairman.*] Can you give the Committee any information respecting the cases where invalids have been detained at Portsmouth an unnecessary length of time?—I am not aware of any unnecessary detention, so far as I have been aware; we have always dealt with the question by the electric telegraph instead of by letter.

16966. When you receive by telegraph information that a vessel has arrived with wounded at Portsmouth, what course do you take?—I send the telegraph down to the Horse Guards directly.

16967. Then having sent to the Horse Guards, you consider the Admiralty is no more responsible?—We wait their instructions, and upon that we give orders; in sending the telegraph we tell them that it will be inconvenient that this vessel should proceed to Chatham in consequence of her size; there is a case to-day; a telegraph that came last night, announcing the arrival of the "Victoria" at Southampton; she has been damaged, and is defective, and the telegraph came last night, and the first thing this morning I sent down to the Horse Guards to say that this vessel could not proceed from Southampton, being defective, and requesting that they would provide instructions to the Admiralty as to the disposal of the sick, the vessel having been ordered into Southampton.

16968. Are you not aware that cases have occurred of the detention at Southampton and Portsmouth of the sick brought from the Crimea?—I am not aware of any unnecessary detention.

16969. Nor that the public mind has been very much shocked and horrified by the condition and sufferings of the men?—Yes; in the first instance, on the vessels having arrived at Portsmouth; but I am not aware of any peculiar circumstance that caused the special detention of a vessel.

16970. If any detention occurred beyond what was actually requisite, who was responsible for that?—The Admiral-superintendent; the Admiralty in the first instance, and the Superintendent at Portsmouth. I think one case was that of a ship which could not get into the harbour, on account of the tide, till high water, and therefore was detained all one afternoon there and the succeeding night.

16971. Lord *Seymour*.] What is your system with regard to your own invalid sailors?—When a vessel arrives with them, all those cases that are hospital cases are immediately sent direct to the naval hospital close by. There is a naval hospital at Plymouth, and one at Portsmouth, and one at Chatham, and a marine infirmary at Woolwich; and the moment a ship comes in with invalids, all hospital cases are immediately sent to their own hospitals, and those cases that are not hospital cases are sent to the Admiral's flag-ship, their papers are sent to London, and they may remain on board, or go on shore until the pay-ticket is returned.

16972. What is the mode of disposing of them afterwards, when they leave the hospital; have they some pension?—Yes, they have.

16973. How do they get that pension?—I may say the custom formerly was, that every man should find his way to London to attend the Pension Board, at Somerset House, in the best way he could. Having been in charge of that department as far back as 1849, 1850, I was struck with the great inconvenience to a number of people, especially consumptive patients, finding their way up from the outposts to the central depôt in London, and on my representation the Board altered the whole system; and there is now, twice a month, a survey held at each naval hospital, the first and last Wednesdays in the month, at Plymouth, at Portsmouth, and at Chatham, at Woolwich, and in London; and a man may make his appearance at any one of those. There is a printed form of questions to be put, on inspection, by the medical authorities, and upon this document coming to London, the man has his pension remitted to him; and that has been one of those alterations which has proved of the utmost advantage to the naval service, and prevented a good deal of suffering; and the men have expressed their great satisfaction at such an arrangement, which has been so convenient to them.

16974. Have you had any reports of the condition of the Naval Brigade that was employed ashore before Sebastopol?—Yes, periodical returns, by the mail, from Captain Lushington, who has the command of that brigade on the heights.

16975. Can you state what was the largest number on shore during the months of November and December?—I think altogether there were nearly 3,000 men.

16976. How were those men fed during that time?—They got their supplies from Balaklava.

16977. Were they fed by the Commissariat?—No, they were fed by the Navy.

16978. As the Committee have heard that the Commissariat had great difficulty in feeding the troops, had the navy any difficulty in feeding the sailors?—I am not aware of it; I never heard of any difficulty.

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16979. What distance was the camp where the sailors were from Balaklava? —About six miles.

16980. Do you know how they were fed; did you hear of that?— They were fed upon the naval victualling, the same as on board ship. There was a depôt of provisions in the harbour at Balaklava, and they used to come down every day, or every other day, with their officers, and take them up.

16981. So far as the Board of Admiralty are concerned, they have not heard of any difficulties with regard to the feeding of the Naval Brigade?—No; they have had no complaints.

16982. How were the sailors clothed?—They got what they required from their own ships. The men purchase their own clothing, and there is always a supply of certain articles of clothing on board ship, and a man can get it at fixed prices; and the price is set against his growing wages; but we sent out a large quantity of warm clothing, and issued it gratuitously to all the seamen serving in the trenches.

16983. At what time was it sent out?—In the month of December, at the same time as the huts and the warm clothing for the soldiers were sent out.

16984. It was not sent out till December?—No; as there was to be a gratuitous issue generally, we thought it fair that we should give them some little addition to what they had of their own.

16985. The Victualling department was under you?—Yes.

16986. What were the number of persons that were employed before you began?—There are about 36 clerks employed in that department in time of peace.

16987. You not only supplied victualling for the navy, but for the army? —Yes.

16988. To what have you increased your establishment?—I think it has been increased by 13.

16989. Can you state the amount of the victualling and stores sent from England for the use of the army?—I can give the Committee a detailed account; the whole amount has been 42,000 tons of provisions and fodder, supplied by us from the Naval department for the use of the army.

16990. Can you state at what cost?—I can supply that answer.

16991. With regard to the abstract of the transport service, I want it to show, first of all, the amount of steam that has been employed during the whole year for the service, and the amount of sailing vessels; then I want it to show, in a separate column, the amount that has been applied to the purposes of the French Government, and the amount that has been placed at the disposal of the Turkish and Sardinian Governments, and also to show the amount that was lent to the French Government for the conveyance of troops to the Baltic?—I can read to the Committee this short abstract. It will give the whole number of troops embarked, both English, French, Turkish, and Sardinian; the number of British troops which have been sent from England, from Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu to the East is 2,646 officers, 67,134 men, 7,464 horses. Up to the 27th April, from the 9th February, the quantity of provisions sent out for the use of the army amounted to 42,000 tons stores and provisions; for the use of the navy, 25,930 tons; stores for the Army and Ordnance department, 27,238 tons; naval stores, 4,285 tons. The provisions sent to the Crimea and Constantinople from Malta was 8,687 tons; that was the whole of the English service. I will supply this in a more complete form.

Vide Appendix.

16992. In speaking of chartering vessels, you stated that the general system was to charter upon the gross tonnage?—Yes, upon the gross tonnage, new measurement, as specified in the Return which has been presented to Parliament in No. 141. There are two exceptions to that case; there were two vessels chartered inadvertently, and the parties, in stating the measurement, stated builder's measurement; I understood by that that the builder's measurement was builder's measurement upon the new tonnage; but the parties who tendered the vessels insisted that they meant builder's tonnage, old measurement, which gave an increase of tonnage to those two vessels. An objection was made to payment upon that principle, but on submitting the case to the solicitor of the Admiralty, he said that he considered that the owners had a fair right to the payment, and the matter was compromised; but, admitting the

the large tonnage that was laid down upon this principle, it was inadvertence at the time, on the first commencement of the war, and I think it right to explain this.

16993. Mr. *Drummond.*] Upon the subject of fitting up transports for carrying cavalry horses, have you heard, or would it have been reported to you, if any horses had died, in consequence of being placed too close to the engine?—What we received was the general return of the deaths of the horses, and the causes from which those deaths took place; and if such had taken place, I think I should have heard of it; I am not aware that any statement has been made that that was the cause.

16994. Has it not been stated that several horses went mad, and were obliged to be shot?—Yes.

16995. How was that brought on?—I believe from some internal disarrangement.

16996. There has been a good deal said about Admiral Boxer; is not he reckoned, not only by you, but in the service generally, as a very meritorious officer?—There is no more able, hardworking, or meritorious officer than he is; he has had very great experience in all matters connected with the naval and transport service.

16997. Has he not raised himself to his present situation entirely by his own merit?—He has.

16998. He has not obtained his present position in consequence of being related to any peer?—Not that I am aware.

16999. Did he not rise from before the mast?—His first rating, was as able seaman; but that does not imply that he was an able seaman before the mast when that took place; he entered as a gentleman, having received a liberal education for his early years.

17000. But he has risen from that situation to his present position entirely by his own merits?—Entirely.

17001. And by no Parliamentary corruption?—No.

17002. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Was not he, for a long time, harbour-master at Quebec?—Yes.

17003. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Where were the various stores that were sent out to the army shipped?—They were principally shipped in the river; but very often, when a large vessel was chartered at Liverpool, in order to prevent that vessel going out partially empty, we were obliged to send stores from London to Liverpool, to put them on board.

17004. I presume, in case of heavy stores, such as Ordnance stores, it was necessary to ship in the river?—Yes.

17005. With respect to the lighter stores, such as clothing for the army, and things of that sort, will you state whether a good deal of very valuable time might not have been saved if they had been shipped at Southampton or at Plymouth?—That has always been the case when there was a ship fitting at Southampton; we never brought her round to carry light stores; they were always sent by railway to that port, much to the annoyance of the Board of Ordnance, who had to pay for it; and even to Liverpool, Southampton, and Portsmouth.

17006. I understand you, then, that when a vessel was actually at Southampton, she was not brought round to the river to be laden?—No.

17007. Might not time have been saved if vessels had been sent round in good time to receive their cargoes at Southampton or Plymouth?—That would only add to the expenses.

17008-9. That is not my question; I am contemplating the case of sending out stores which might have been conveyed by railway, and the receipt of which in the Crimea was of the most pressing importance; and I ask you whether time might not have been saved if the vessel to convey such stores had been sent round to Southampton or to Plymouth, to wait for those stores while they were being prepared, so as to save the time which would otherwise be consumed in the voyage round?—I do not see that you would gain by that, because while the vessels were preparing in some little details with regard to the engines in the river, they were actually loading at the same time.

17010. Do you remember the case of the "Fire Fly"?—Yes; she had a battering train, if I mistake not, and was loaded at the Woolwich arsenal by the Ordnance.

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17011. You are not aware whether any great delay arose in her case in consequence of having to make the passage round?—I rather think the "Fire Fly" was one of those vessels that assisted to take a portion of the battering train and heavy guns, and was overloaded and had to put into Plymouth to land some of her cargo.

Sir *Charles E. Trevelyan*, K.C.B.; called in, and further Examined.

Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K.C.B.

17012. Mr. *Layard.*] ON referring to your evidence, there is a Question of mine, Question 14,238; "I was talking about preparations made, not what was obtained, when the wants were found out, but the preparations that were made to meet them?" and your answer to that is, "Yes; but in the proper sense it is only as the wants are found out that they are provided for"?—Yes.

17013. I then repeated these words of yours: "Is this maxim one of yours also, that wants should not be supplied till they are found out;" and you say in explanation, "That they should not be supplied till there is a reasonable expectation of them;" are those questions and answers correctly given?—Yes.

17014. You stated, "But in the proper sense it is only as the wants are found out that they are provided for"?—Yes; but I explained in my answer to the next question what I really meant. The questions were put to me, very closely, one upon another, and I had not always, at the moment, an opportunity of explaining what I really meant; but in my second answer I did explain it.

17015. *Chairman.*] I find in the "Times" of Saturday, April the 28th, a statement, that "Sir Charles Trevelyan has forwarded the following communication to the Committee," and then there follows a communication; did you ever forward any such communication to the Committee?—Yes; through Lord Seymour.

17016. Did you supply this to the "Times"?—Yes; may I be allowed to say in my defence, that I felt very keenly the imputation implied in the question put by the Honourable Member for Aylesbury to the Duke of Newcastle, because it went directly to impugn my fitness for the duties on which I had been employed for 15 years. For 15 long years I laboured incessantly at those duties, and devoted myself entirely to them; and I certainly felt it as a great grievance that my management should be impugned on the most vital point of all, which is the exercise of reasonable foresight; and I also supposed, that, as the evidence given before the Committee was published in all the papers, from day to day, there could be no objection to my sending a copy of this statement to the "Times," having already given the original to Lord Seymour be to submitted to the Committee.

17017. Then the only misconception, for it is nothing more, that you supposed to have arisen was, that the Honourable Member for Aylesbury quoted your first answer and did not quite your second?—I conceived that he attributed to me as a principle, a rule of action which had never belonged to me, and which I never acted upon; and I appeal to the whole of my management of the Commissariat up to the 22d of December as proving that I did exercise reasonable foresight; and if the answer to the first question appears to bear the interpretation given to it by the Honourable Member for Aylesbury, I submit to the Committee that my answer to the subsequent question contains a satisfactory explanation of what I really meant. I was going on to give that explanation, but I was stopped by a second question.

17018. Mr. *Layard.*] Were you aware of what decision the Committee had come to in consequence of any communication that Lord Seymour had made to them?—Knowing it to be the practice of Parliamentary Committees to receive statements in explanation, I took it for granted that it had been received.

17019. Then, taking for granted that your statement had been received here in a public committtee, it would have been communicated to those persons of the press who are present here to take down that which passes in the Committee, therefore it would have been unnecessary for you to make this communication to the "Times"?—My object was, to convey to the public a correct representation of what I really said.

17020. I quoted

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17020. I quoted your very words?—But the explanation furnished by me was not also quoted.

17021. The Committee received your communication, and it was decided that your answer should be framed, although it was not exactly as you stated, according to the explanation you had given, therefore your evidence would have been conformable to what you stated in that letter?—If I have committed an irregularity unconsciously, I make my submission to the Committee, and I regret that I have done so.

17022. Mr. *Layard.*] Has any reflection been made upon you in the public press?—I conceive that a very severe reflection was made upon my entire management of the Commissariat for 15 years, in imputing it to me that I had acted as a rule never to provide for wants till they were felt.

17023. I asked you whether you had been attacked in the public press for that question of mine, or for your answer?—The question itself was an attack of the severest kind.

17024. My question was, whether you had been attacked in the public press for that question and answer?—Not that I am aware of, in the public press, but the next day I heard of it from a number of persons, and almost everybody who spoke to me mentioned it to me.

17025. *Chairman.*] You say, "I beg distinctly to deny that I made any such statement;" that assumes that a statement was put into your mouth?—I do not admit that those words properly bear that interpretation; it certainly was not the meaning which I intended to give them; it was not the meaning which I intended to express. I beg that reference may be made to my whole statement, which was cut in half by Mr. Layard's second question.

17026. To have said that you made no such statement was to impute to the Honourable Member words that he never uttered?—I did not intend any such imputation. I may mention that I entertained no doubt that the Committee would receive my explanation, but I had some doubt whether it would appear in public; and it turns out that it would not have appeared in public otherwise than by my communicating it to the "Times."

17027. The Committee are about to report almost immediately your evidence, and in that report it would have been contained?—I, of course, do not mean any reflection upon the Committee; but I mean to say that, after that question conveying that grave imputation had been read by hundreds of thousands of persons whose good opinion I greatly value, it was of great importance to make an immediate refutation of it.

17028. I cannot help thinking that it would have been better if you had made it accurately. The statement you made was, that you never made any such statement. The correct statement would have been that you did make such a statement, but gave a different explanation of it afterwards.

[*The Questions and Answers referred to are* 15404, *in the Duke of Newcastle's Evidence,* 14238 *to* 14241, *in Sir Charles Trevelyan's Evidence.*]

Captain *George Harris Tallan*, called in; and Examined.

Captain *G. H. Tallan.*

17029. Mr. *Layard.*] WHAT vessel did you command?—The "Sea Nymph."

17030. When did you leave England?—On the 1st of August.

17031. What did you take to the East?—Provisions.

17032. Was she a steam vessel?—A paddle steamer.

17033. What was her tonnage?—Seven hundred and three tons.

17034. By whom was she taken up?—By the Government.

17035. To what company did she belong to?—The Belfast and Liverpool Company.

17036. Can you state what provisions you had on board?—Beef, pork, and bread.

17037. Had you nothing else?—No.

17038. No other cargo?—No.

17039. Did you completely fill your vessel?—Yes.

17040. To what place did you go?—I was sent to Varna last, calling at Gibraltar, Malta, and Constantinople for coals.

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17041. At what time did you arrive at Constantinople?—I arrived at Constantinople about the 21st of August.

17042. Had you any difficulty in obtaining coals there?—No; I only required a few to go to Varna.

17043. When you got there what became of the provisions?—I discharged 600 bags of bread into some of the naval ships, and I kept the remainder on board until our arrival at Kalamita Bay.

17044. You accompanied the expedition in its passage across the Black Sea?—Yes; I towed two vessels across.

17045. Where did you ultimately land the provisions?—At Kalamita Bay.

17046. When the troops landed?—Yes, after they landed.

17047. What became of the vessel then?—We received some coals and then went down to Constantinople.

17048. For what purpose?—I do not know.

17049. To whom were you sent?—To the principal transport agent.

17050. Who was that?—Admiral Boxer.

17051. Had you any communications with him?—Yes.

17052. What did he do with you?—It was not decided at first; we took in return stores to England, which were afterwards taken out of the ship again.

17053. How long did you remain in Constantinople?—I should think upwards of 20 days.

17054. Were you idle then?—No; I was employed in towing vessels backwards and forwards, that had got on the shoals in the Bosphorus, and I was towing them off; I did not tow any up the Bosphorus, but I towed them off the shoals, and then towed to Scutari; one had the wounded on board, and the other had stores.

17055. At what date were you detained 20 days at Constantinople?—I left Kalamita Bay on the 19th of September, and arrived at Constantinople on the 21st.

17056. In those 20 days you were only employed in towing two ships off the shoals?—I was employed at Constantinople till the 20th of October.

17057. That was nearly a month?—Yes; more than 20 days.

17058. During that time were you doing anything else?—I think that lasted about nine days, those two ships; the rest of the time I was taking in a cargo of coals.

17059. What were the names of those two vessels?—The "Bombay" and the "Courier;" the "Bombay" was a London ship, and the other was a Liverpool ship; the "Bombay" came with invalids from the Crimea.

17060. Did you go on board of her?—No; I was alongside of her; I was on board a few minutes, to speak to the Captain about his hawsers.

17061. Where did she get ashore?—On the Englishman's Shoal.

17062. She got on shore coming down, did she not?—Yes.

17063. Did she land the invalids?—No.

17064. Were they kept on board till she got off?—Yes.

17065. How many days was she aground?—Two days.

17066. Did you see the state of the invalids?—No, I saw some on deck; they could move about; the men were able to walk about.

17067. You do not know what officers were on board?—Not at all; I was not below.

17068. What was the name of the other ship?—The "Courier," of Liverpool.

17069. Where did she come from?—I do not know; I think she was bound from Varna.

17070. What had she on board?—Only stores; and she had a few invalids, who were sent away; and it took six days to get her off; her invalids were sent up to Constantinople the first or second night; she had, I believe, 150 men.

17071. You say you took stores on board?—Yes; I took a cargo of charcoal after that.

17072. You took no other cargo but charcoal?—No.

17073. What became of that charcoal?—I landed it in Balaklava.

17074. At what time was that?—I discharged it somewhere about between the 3d of November and the 8th.

17075. After that what were you employed in doing?—I was sent to Eupatoria then.

17076. For what purpose?—To tow the "Dunbar" to Varna.

17077. Did

17077. Did you land at Eupatoria?—Yes.

17078. What did you find there; were there any provisions there, any vegetables?—Yes; I got some for my own ship.

17079. Was there an abundance of vegetables there?—Yes, and very cheap.

17080. What kind of vegetables did you see there?—Onions and beans.

17081. Did you make any attempt to take any of those vegetables to the camp at Balaklava?—No.

17082. Do you know whether any were taken?—I am not aware whether any were taken from Eupatoria. I heard of some small country ships taking some from there to Balaklava for sale.

17083. You did not hear of any of those vegetables being taken by the military authorities for the troops?—No.

17084. Did you tow that vessel to Varna?—No.

17085. What became of you then?—The gale commenced just after that, and the weather was uncertain, and we were afraid to tow her; and I got off on the 14th of November.

17086. Where did you go?—I got out of it at the heart of the gale, and afterwards I went into Balaklava.

17087. How long did you remain there?—I returned to Eupatoria after that.

17088. How long did you remain there?—Only one day; after that I went to Constantinople.

17089. Had you on board, at any time, any other cargo besides what you have described?—Yes, I had various cargoes at different times; I had at that time 24 barrels of boots and shoes, which I received on the 22d of August at Constantinople.

17090. Who put them on board your ship?—I received them from Lieutenant Keatley; he was Admiral Boxer's flag lieutenant.

17091. What became of that cargo of boots and shoes?—My orders were to discharge them to the authorities at Varna.

17092. Did you do so?—No; I could not get anybody to take charge of them.

17093. *Chairman.*] Were you not directed to give them to some particular officer?—No; I think I was told, generally, that either the Commissariat department or the Quartermaster-general's department would take them.

17094. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you apply to both departments?—Yes, but they would not take them, because they had not received any papers from Constantinople relative to them.

17095. Did they say that they would not take them on that account?—Yes; and I retained them on board ship till the 8th November.

17096. How many times had you been into the harbour at Balaklava?—Twice.

17097. To whom did you make those offers?—To the officers of the Commissary-general and the Quartermaster-general's department.

17098. Did you ever make an offer of them to Commissary-general Filder?—Yes.

17099. What did he say?—That he had not received the papers relative to them. I suppose he meant an account of them.

17100. *Chairman.*] Did you not take a paper with them?—No, I got no written order with them.

17101. Captain *Gladstone.*] Did not Commissary-general Smith, at Constantinople, put them on board, or give you a document connected with them?—They were sent on board in a Government boat, but there was no paper given to me. I refused to take them on board until I got an order, and Lieutenant Keatley wrote me an order on a slip of paper in pencil to take them on board.

16102. *Chairman.*] Did you show that piece of paper when you got to Balaklava?—No, that was my own order.

17103. You took them to Varna, did you not?—Yes.

17104. Did you offer them there to the Commissariat, and to the Quartermaster-general's department?—Yes.

17105. When you went there, had you that piece of paper?—Yes; but it merely ordered me to take them on board, and to take them to Varna; the order was to take them on board.

17106. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When you got to Varna, with whom did you communicate?

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communicate?—With both the officers of Commissary-general and the Quartermaster-general.

17107. Did you do so in writing, or personally?—Personally.

17108. What were the names of the officers with whom you communicated?—I do not know the names of any of the officers in the Quartermaster's-general's department.

17109. Did you personally communicate with the officers at the head of the Commissariat department?—I communicated personally with them.

17110. Did you also communicate personally with the Quartermaster-general at Varna?—No; I did not know him; but I went to his office, and I saw some officers there.

17111. What did you say?—That I had on board the vessel, 24 casks of boots and shoes for the army.

17112. They refused to take them?—Yes.

17113. What was the period of your first arrival at Balaklava with those boots and shoes?—On the 23d of October.

17114. Whom did you see about them there?—I went to the Commissary-general's department again, and I was referred from that office to the Quartermaster-general's department.

17115. With whom did you communicate?—With some of the officers in both departments.

17116. And they were again refused?—Yes.

17117. On the 23d of October?—Yes.

17118. *Chairman.*] Did you take them to Eupatoria?—Yes.

17119. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Were they then taken from you?—No.

17120. Did you then communicate with both departments?—Yes.

17121. That is the third time?—Yes.

17122. What happened next?—I went to Constantinople and took in a cargo in Constantinople, and then returned to Balaklava.

17123. When did you arrive in Balaklava then?—About October 23d, and I discharged those boots and shoes on the 8th of November, after I brought the cargo there.

17124. Who received them?—I landed them myself, and put them into store without anybody's leave; I put them in a store that one of the deputies of the Quartermaster-general's department showed me.

17125. Did you before you landed them communicate again personally with these same departments?—Yes, I did.

17126. Did they again refuse them?—They would not take them.

17127. In consequence of the third refusal you put them on shore?—Yes, and I got a receipt from the Deputy Quartermaster-general's storekeeper.

17128. Captain *Gladstone.*] When you returned to Constantinople after the authorities at Balaklava refused them, did you make known to either the agent of transport, or to any other authority, that they had refused to receive them?—I did; I applied to the Admiralty department, and then to the Commissariat department.

17129. Lord *Seymour.*] Who was Lieutenant Keatley, that gave you those boots?—He is the Lieutenant of Transport, at Constantinople, under Admiral Boxer.

17130. He gave you those boots and shoes, to take to Varna?—Yes.

17131. You came back with them, and stayed a month at Constantinople?—Yes.

17132. Having been refused at Varna by every one to receive them?—Yes.

17133. Did you tell Lieutenant Keatley that you had been so refused?—Yes.

17134. What did he say?—He said that they were off his hands; that he had obeyed his orders in putting them on board the ship; it was done expressly because the fire at Varna had consumed some boots and shoes belonging to the army.

17135. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You always stated that they were boots and shoes?—I never opened them; they were given to me as boots and shoes, and I reported them as such. Certainly, one of the commanders of one of Her Majesty's ships wanted to take them; but I had not power to give them to him.

17136. Where was that?—At Baltschik.

17137. Mr. *Layard.*] Had you ever any other cargo on board, in the same way as this?—No.

17138. How

17138. How long did you remain out in the East?—Until the 15th of March. I sailed from Constantinople on that date.

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17139. How were you employed between those periods?—Altogether in cargo; going backwards and forwards. I was sometimes handed over to the Turkish Government.

17140. Was your vessel coaled at Constantinople?—Yes; and it was rather slow.

17141. *Chairman.*] As compared with Gibraltar and Malta, was it slow?—Yes; but the same facilities are not there.

17142. Were you ever on board any ships carrying sick and wounded?—Yes.

17143. In what state were they?—They were not very comfortable.

17144. Were they very uncomfortable?—Yes, I should say they were.

17145. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you ever carry any sick and wounded yourself?—Officers I have.

17146. You never carried any men?—No.

Captain Henry Hillyar, R. N., called in; and Examined.

Captain *H. Hillyar*, R. N.

17147. Mr. *Layard.*] You were with the Naval Brigade, were you not?—I was.

17148. At what time did you join the Naval Brigade?—In the beginning of October.

17149. You were then commander on board the "Agamemnon," were you not?—Yes.

17150. And you joined in October?—Yes, early; between the 5th and 6th.

17151. When did you leave the Crimea?—On the 24th of February.

17152. During the whole of that time did you serve with the Naval Brigade?—Yes.

17153. Can you state to the Committee in what condition the Naval Brigade was, as to health?—I should consider it in a very healthy state, considering the number of men that we had.

17154. Do you know how many men you lost by death when you were there, and by sickness?—I should think not more than 30.

17155. Of what number did the Naval Brigade consist?—At one time it consisted of 1,400 strong.

17156. How many men were generally in the hospital from illness?—The sick list used to alter sometimes in the beginning; when the cholera was there, and the diarrhœa, there used to be from 40 to 60.

17157. Did you ever have an opportunity of comparing the condition of the Naval Brigade with the condition of the troops?—Yes; I thought that we were always much better off than the troops, both with regard to the sick, and provisions.

17158. How were you supplied with provisions?—We got all, in fact, of our provisions from the "Diamond," the store-ship. Latterly they gave us a transport, No. 88, I think the "Huntingdon."

17159. They gave you a transport on purpose to keep provisions in?—Yes, an old transport that had been dismasted in the gale.

17160. How did you bring the provisions up?—When we arrived first there the Commissariat supplied us with some araba carts, but they would not stand much work, and then we had some mule carts; however, the roads became impassable, and we had to take entirely to our own resources, and to carry them up by the men.

17161. How far were you from Balaklava?—At first six miles and a half, latterly about five miles and a half.

17162. Did the men perform the duty of bringing up the provisions?—Latterly entirely.

17163. Had you any fresh provisions or vegetables during that time?—The first three months, or two months and a half, we had only two days' fresh provisions; certainly not more than three days.

17164. Had they always salt provisions?—Yes.

17165. Had they no preserved provisions?—No; except the sick.

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17166. Did the salt provisions consist of pork?—Chiefly; and beef also, alternately.

17167. Did you do any night-work in the trenches?—There was always a party stationed with the guns during the night in the batteries.

17168. Do you recollect how many men were stationed in the batteries at night?—When the firing began at first we used to cease firing at night, and leave nobody there in fine weather; but latterly we always sent down, I suppose, certainly 40 men to each attack, that is, 80 men every night.

17169. Upon the average, how many hours were your men in bed out of the 24?—They had, generally, three nights in and one out.

17170. Do you know how many nights in, and how many nights out, the troops had?—I think, on the average, two in and one out.

17171. Therefore you were less worked than the troops?—Certainly.

17172. Do you think that you were better fed than the troops?—We were better fed, and more regularly fed; our men always had their provisions cooked by regularly established cooks in messes.

17173. Were the cooks established by the messes?—No; they were established by the officers. Some of the ships had a system of making two cooks for the whole ship's company; others made a cook for each tent, who was responsible for the victuals being cooked, and when the men returned from the trenches, they always found their supper or dinner cooked for them.

17174. To what do you attribute the great amount of mortality amongst the troops as compared with the seamen?—I consider that the Naval Brigade were all picked men; I suppose the finest specimens of seamen that we had in the ships; and then again they had their victuals regularly, and properly cooked, and were not so hard-worked.

17175. Captain *Gladstone.*] Were they better clothed?—I think so, certainly.

17176. *Chairman.*] Were the sailors employed in digging in the trenches?—We always supplied working parties where they were required.

17177. Were you so frequently employed as the soldiers?—Not quite as often as that. We had, besides our own battery-work, always the work of dragging the guns up and carrying shot and shell, and shifting the powder about.

17178. Has the Naval Brigade had as hard manual labour to perform as the soldiers?—They certainly have had that.

17179. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Did your men do duty in the trenches with the same regularity as the soldiers?—No, it is quite a different thing; the sailors worked in the batteries.

17180. General *Peel.*] How were the duties in that brigade regulated; did they furnish a daily proportion of men according to the strength of their brigade?—We furnished men every day to man our own guns; but they were entirely confined to our own batteries.

17181. Sir *J. Pakington.*] How were your men lodged?—In tents.

17182. Did they suffer much from cold?—They suffered a good deal from cold.

17183. Were they warmly clad?—Yes.

17184. Mr. *Layard.*] The Naval Brigade were employed in dragging up guns?—Yes.

17185. Was that very hard work?—Yes.

17186. Captain *Gladstone.*] Were they Ordnance tents that they had?—All of them.

17187. Were they the same as the army had?—Precisely the same.

17188. Lord *Seymour.*] Were they good tents?—Some were good, and some were worn tents that had been used by the army at Varna.

17189. As to the food of the sailors, had they cocoa or coffee?—Never coffee, tea principally, as the cocoa took the men too much time to boil.

17190. Had you any difficulty in getting it up?—None.

17191. Captain *Gladstone.*] Had they lime juice?—Yes, a regular allowance.

17192. Lord *Seymour.*] Was there much scurvy among the sailors?—A good deal at first.

17193. After a few months living on salt provisions?—Yes.

17194. After that were they better off in that respect?—After that we got a most liberal supply of fresh provisions; Sir Edmund Lyons gave us a great quantity of oranges.

17195. When

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17195. When did that liberal supply of fresh provisons begin?—I may say directly Sir Edmund Lyons was Commander-in-chief.

17196. When was that?—In January, I think.

17197. From that time you had plenty of fresh provisions?—From that time we were liberally supplied with fresh provisions and vegetables.

17198. Captain *Gladstone.*] It has been stated that a portion of the Naval Brigade was hutted before the army; that they got possession of the wood and covered themselves in?—That idea is quite fallacious; it was only two or three officers who were fortunate enough to dig holes in the ground and cover themselves in as well as they could; none of the seamen were hutted at all.

17199. They never suffered from the want of clothing?—They suffered from the want of boots, and then we were supplied from the army.

17200. Lord *Seymour.*] When did they want boots?—Latterly, in the cold weather.

17201. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What do you mean by latterly?—In January.

17202. Not of last year?—No.

Martis, 1° die Maii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Sir John Hanmer.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Pakington.	Mr. Drummond.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant-General Sir *John Burgoyne*, called in; and Examined.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir *J. Burgoyne.*

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17203. *Chairman.*] WILL you be good enough to state to the Committee the position that you held in the army before Sebastopol?—I was Lieutenant-general on the staff.

17204. Did you have the command of the engineers?—No; there was a distinct commanding engineer, but as I had been always an engineer, Lord Raglan gave me the principal direction of all the engineering operations.

17205. So that all the engineering operations before Sebastopol were under you, while you were there?—I consider that all the leading measures were, but the details were conducted by the commanding engineer.

17206. You arrived before Sebastopol with the army, did you not?—Yes, I landed with the army.

17207. Had you been there before?—Not in the Crimea; I had been in Turkey; I had been at Varna and at Shumla before.

17208. When the army arrived before Sebastopol, to you, I suppose, was confided the formation of all the approaches to the town?—Yes.

17209. You determined the amount of the trenches to be dug by the English army?—I did.

17210. Can you state to the Committee the grounds upon which your calculation was founded; I am not talking of strategical, but with regard to the force in your hands to make the trenches; how you apportioned the work to be done to the men who had to do it?—We occupied two ridges, and the intention was to raise batteries against the works that the enemy had in front of those ridges, and to endeavour to silence their batteries and prepare the way for an assault.

17211. I want to know the work that was to be done, and the men there were to do it; will you be so good as to state whether the work which you apportioned to the men was not deemed excessive by many of the generals

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there, and whether they did not complain of the excess of the work?—I have no doubt of the fact, as we never could get anything like the quantity of work done that we wished for; constantly the applications that we made for working parties were refused, because the army was not strong enough.

17212. So that the work which you undertook to do, was greater than the force which you had to do it with?—Certainly; the extent of the attack was much greater than the force we had, to do it with rapidity.

17213. Before the bad weather set in had you any consultation about the communication with Balaklava?—No, none at all.

17214. There was no provision made on your part, at least for the breaking up of the road and the communication between the camp and the harbour?—Before the operations of the siege began the communications were very good, and for a very considerable time afterwards; in short, till the month of November they were very good.

17215. Was not the road a mere track?—Yes; it was a mere track across the country.

17216. Was not it plain that the moment the bad weather set in that track would become a mud hole instead of a track?—It was quite certain that that would be the case; but we were in hopes that we should not have been detained before the place during the winter or in very bad weather.

17217. It was your expectation that you would soon be in possession of the town?—I was in hopes, before we arrived there, that we should have taken it at once, but directly I saw it I altered my opinion.

17218. When you altered your opinion as to the time of taking the town did your mind direct itself to the communications with Balaklava?—No, I was still in hopes that we should take the place before the bad weather really came on.

17219. How soon did you become aware that you would not take the town before the bad weather really came on?—After the cessation of the first fire I began to consider so; in the middle of October.

17220. How long after that was it that the bad weather began?—Not till about the middle of November, to the best of my recollection.

17221. Between that time and the middle of November was your attention directed to the communications with the harbour?—No, I did not see any possibility of altering them; our forces were too small.

17222. Supposing you had diverted a small portion of the force from making the trenches to making the road, do not you think that the road might have been made?—It would have required a very large force to make that road; it was seven or eight miles, and it would have been over a very bad soil, a muddy clay, and over a very steep hill; and to construct such a road, for it was not the repair of a road, but an absolutely new construction, would have required very enormous means of men, horses, and carts.

17223. Had you not lying there a large quantity of limestone?—There was a great deal about there.

17224. Would not that have contributed to making the road?—Very much; that was the only favourable circumstance that there was.

17225. How long would it have taken 1,000 men to have made that road?—I cannot exactly say; I did make a calculation at one time of what would be the means required to make that road, and it came to something very considerable indeed. I think 1,000 men would not have done it (I am speaking off-hand) in two or three months; it required a great quantity of means to do it, tools, carts, and horses.

17226. Had you not tools?—Not that particular description of tools.

17227. What description of tools would you have required?—Road-makers' hammers; we had sledge-hammers, certainly, and I think pickaxes, to a certain extent available; but we had not exactly the peculiar class of tools in large quantities necessary for making the road.

17228. You think that you saved labour by allowing the road to go to ruin, and not attempting to make it?—I think we could have done better if we could have got more means of transport; more animals, with forage for them.

17229. Do you think that it conduced to the comfort and efficiency of the army by leaving the road to go to ruin?—No, it would have been better to make the road; but I did not see the practicability of it in any way.

17230. You

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17230. You thought that you were in a position in which you could not make a road?—In which we could not better ourselves in that respect: we had no means, nor men enough to preserve the trenches.

17231. You had metal there, and men's arms, had you not?—We had not the men; that was the difficulty. The men were so much engaged in the trenches, that they could scarcely do that duty.

17232. Would it not have been advisable to have withdrawn them from the trenches, and have made the road?—You could not have done that; you must have abandoned the trenches.

17233. Would that not have been advisable?—No; I think you would have been in a much worse position then.

17234. What would have happened?—The Russians would have come out and advanced. We were taking up a position in front, and occupying ground in the rear of our camp, out of shot; and if we had allowed them to advance, or to restrict us within a narrower compass, we should have had our camp under cannonade.

17235. Did the making of the trenches prevent their advance?—Very much so; we occupied the ground in the front.

17236. But not till the trench was made?—No; but we made the trenches very early.

17237. You consider that it was for the advantage of the army to continue making the trenches, and not to make the road?—I think so.

17238. Notwithstanding all the horrors that followed the non-making of the road?—Yes; I do not think that those horrors that followed were so much dependent upon that road as is generally imagined.

17239. If the Commissariat say that they could not supply the men with food, and the horses with fodder, in consequence of there not being a road, you think that they exaggerate the mischief?—The supply would have been better; but the supply was not so very deficient as is generally supposed. There was a great part of the army that was never deficient at all, and with regard to those that were in want, it was only occasionally half a ration; it was not at all a general starvation, or generally a very distressing want of provisions. Many portions of the army never were without their entire rations.

17240. If it has been stated to this Committee that a great part of the sufferings of the army arose from the want of that road, you think that a mistake has arisen?—No; I think that the road certainly would have been of very great advantage, and of course the supplies would have been brought up very much better than they were, but the cattle all died off, and that road itself hardly would have served us.

17241. What was the cause of the cattle dying?—The inclemency of the weather and the want of care. I think there must have been a great want of care on the part of the individuals who had the charge of them.

17242. You think, then, that if they had taken more care of the animals, they might have been saved?—I think so, if they had been under a better organisation.

17243. Whose duty was it to look to the organisation?—Everybody generally looks to the organisation of their own corps, their own service; and I imagine that each department had to look to the organisation of its own.

17244. Take the Commissariat horses, for instance; do you think that they in a great measure suffered from the want of care on the part of the persons who were entrusted to them?—Precisely.

17245. Do you think that the horses would have been better off under cover?—A great deal better off; the weather had a great effect upon them.

17246. Do you suppose that the road had not anything, or that the want of it had not something, to do with their not being under cover?—The road would not have assisted that much.

17247. Would it not have assisted the bringing up of materials to make cover for the horses?—It would, to make huts, but those materials for the huts did not come till very late, and when they came out, I think that most of the animals were gone. With regard to the care of the horses, I consider that it is a national defect on the part of the British that they do not take care of their horses as other troops do; they have not the feeling for the horse; they do it according to regulations, according to order, but they have not the feeling

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in themselves to take care of their animals. You never see them give a kind word to them; it would do no good, but it shows the feeling.

17248. Do you know when it was that the materials to make the huts arrived in the harbour of Balaklava?—No; I do not recollect exactly.

17249. You say that they arrived there late?—Yes; they arrived, I think, late, after the roads got into a very bad state.

17250. That is the very question that I want to come to; was it not the state of the road which prevented those materials getting up to the camp?—It would have assisted, but I do not think that it would have materially affected the animals, they were so low at that time. I think the huts came out very late.

17251. I was referring to the wood which was brought from Constantinople?—It was a very small quantity; I do not think you could have got that up to have done any good to cover those masses of horses.

17252. You think that no real benefit to the horses could have accrued from anything that was brought from Constantinople?—From anything that was brought from Constantinople I do not think that any good would accrue from it. The best course was taken very late, and that was, removing the horses to Balaklava; it was much easier to cover them there and feed them, and as the work commenced there, it was an excellent measure to take them down there, bringing them back always at night.

17253. Had you any complaints about the tools employed?—We had no complaints at all; the first complaint that I was aware of was from seeing it in a newspaper.

17254. So that if mischief arose from want of tools it was never communicated to you?—No; there were complaints occasionally, I believe; the quantity of tools sent out was very large; there were 10,000 pickaxes and shovels, before the month of October; I do not think there was any very serious deficiency in the quantity of tools.

17255. The question referred to the quality?—With regard to the quality, when I found those complaints made, I went up to one of the depôts, and I looked at the tools; and the first thing that struck me was that the tools were of the old Peninsular pattern; a very large kind, and much the best pattern for use for men in England, in robust health, and good workmen, but not so convenient as the small pattern that was made afterwards for the army; it struck me then that those tools must have been of very old standing, and probably came from Malta, from the depôt there. I asked about the quality of the tools, having heard those complaints made; and I found that the sappers, who were good workmen, and skilled in the use of tools, said that they certainly might be of a better description; they did not make any great complaint of them, but that they might be of a better description, as to the mode in which the steel was put on the tool. I wrote home immediately about it, to have some inquiry made into it.

17256. Are you aware that a Committee was appointed to inspect the tools at Chobham?—No, I am not.

17257. You do not know what that Commission did?—No; I know occasionally there has been a little complaint of the tools, but it has always been inquired into, and orders had been given to remedy them.

17258. You found that the complaints about the tools had been also exaggerated?—I think so; I think it must have been. I cannot conceive that the tools that got into the hands of those people who complained of them so much, could have been so very bad, when every one that I could look at, though capable of improvement, was not at all of that very inferior description.

17259. Did your experience of the tools at all verify this description, that the bill-hooks turned in cutting wood, and that they were of no use at all?—Not at all; what I saw were not so, and the complaints made to me by the sappers did not answer that description; they did not last quite as long as they would if they had been welded and put together properly.

17260. According to your experience, the soldiers did not suffer from the inefficiency of their tools?—So far as I observed, they did not.

17261. Was that the case with regard to the sappers and miners?—They did not suffer; they had tools enough, and if they wore out a little earlier than they ought to have done, they ought to have reported it.

17262. The badness of the tool did not enhance the labour of the men?—Not at all, so far as my observation went; but tools, when they get into the hands

hands of those who do not know how to use them, are very often misapplied and damaged prematurely.

17263. It does not require, I suppose, a skilled workman to prevent the turning of the edge of a bill-hook?—They may cut against a stone or against a knot of wood, when it is partly injured. I have seen them use pickaxes, for at last we were reduced for fuel, to the roots of the brushwood, which are very tough. I saw the men of the line very frequently taking a pickaxe and driving it under the root of a tree, and then, because they could not bear it up, perhaps they got under a bit of rock, they put their whole weight upon the other end of the pickaxe; and a pickaxe will not stand that pressure, and the consequence was, that the tool broke.

17264. You state that the knots of wood turned the edge; does your experience of cutting tools bear out that expression, that a good axe has its edge turned because it comes to a knot?—I should conceive that if a bill-hook were rather out of order, I may be wrong in that, but I should conceive that a knot might have that effect. I should not persevere in that as far as the knot goes, but I think a good tool ought to cut through a knot if properly used.

17265. But the general opinion that you form is, that there was not that complaint to be made of the Ordnance tools that was made?—So far as my observation goes, I cannot understand how such an extent of complaint could be justified.

17266. You think that there was some ground for complaint?—Yes, evidently the tools could be better, a part of them; but the principle on which you get the tools is as good as can be. The Board of Ordnance have a specification made very carefully, and they have patterns made, and then they put it up to competition among the respectable manufacturers, and they take the lowest tender; and when the tools are supplied they are compared by the storekeeper with the pattern and specification received; accordingly, therefore, if the storekeeper does his duty, they ought to be good articles. The present storekeeper is a very able and zealous man, and they must be good now.

17267. You think that they must be good now?—Yes, of late years; I think so. I think an inquiry was made recently; the tools were examined at the Tower, and found to be very good.

17268. On whose responsibility were the tools furnished to the army; you say that some of them came from Malta, and were of the old pattern?—Yes.

17269. Whose duty was it to see to the quantity and quality of those tools?—The storekeeper, decidedly; but the principle on which they have acted when they have had improved tools has been this: there is always a question about how far the old ones shall be laid on one side, or be condemned altogether; those who have to use the tools are naturally desirous of having new ones, and the storekeeper, who has to study economy, endeavours to preserve the old ones, and perhaps both rather exceed what they ought to do; but the storekeeper generally wishes to retain them as long as he can, and he keeps them as serviceable tools, the intention being to work them off first, and then to go upon the new patterns.

17270. Mr. *Layard.*] Were the tools that were sent out with the expedition in 1828 to Portugal all condemned and sent back to England?—I do not remember that; it is a matter of record if it was so. I was out in Portugal, but I do not remember it.

17271. Were any complaints made as to the tools at Gallipoli, or at Varna?—I do not remember that. I was not aware of it.

17272. General *Peel.*] Your knowledge would only extend to the tools furnished to the engineering department?—Yes.

17273. *Chairman.*] Was there no complaint made of those tools?—The tools for the pioneers are not furnished by the Ordnance at all.

17274. Mr. *Layard.*] Were any complaints made of any of the tools, to your knowledge?—No.

17275. General *Peel.*] What was the extent of the siege operations that were undertaken by the English army on arriving before Sebastopol; what was the length of the lines altogether?—The extent that was defined was from the ravine that runs up from the Great Creek in the harbour to Inkermann; that was undertaken by the British; about three miles.

17276. What number of men were required daily to carry on those works,

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and to act as covering parties?—The covering party was fixed at 2,000 men in the trenches constantly; the working party, of course, varies according to circumstances, but generally larger in the night than in the daytime.

17277. How was that regulated; was the number of men employed in the trenches regulated by a requisition from you to the General Commanding-in-chief, for a certain number of men for working parties, or was the strength of those parties regulated by the daily state of the army?—The engineers made their demand, and then the Adjutant-general generally reduced it; sometimes he could give them none at all.

17278. It was a kind of mixed working, was it not?—Yes; it was a mixed consideration; first of all the engineers made their requisitions for a number of men, and that afterwards was reduced to a certain degree by the Adjutant-general; it was sometimes reduced in an enormous degree.

17279. *Chairman.*] You stated, did you not, the work to be done, and the Adjutant-general told you the force that he had to do it?—Precisely.

17280. General *Peel.*] Was the covering party always of the same fixed number, or did it increase according to the number of the men who were working?—It was calculated to be always 1,000 men, but afterwards it was reduced, in consequence of the weakness of the army. I was asked whether it would be proper to reduce it; and I said, I thought not, as regarded the security of the trenches; but under the circumstances, if I were Lord Raglan, I said, I would reduce it and take the chance, but it would require additional caution on their part.

17281. When the army landed in the Crimea it was without any knowledge of the number of the Russian forces in the country, was it not?—So far as I know it was.

17282. But it must always have been evident that, sooner or later, the Russian army must receive great reinforcements?—That we could not tell; we naturally supposed that they would receive great reinforcements.

17283. It was, therefore, necessary to take advantage of the impression made by the victory of the Alma to commence siege operations as soon as possible, and to use every means available for that purpose?—Certainly.

17284. Would it have been advisable to have diverted any large portion of the working parties to make roads instead of carrying on the siege?—I think not.

17285. *Chairman.*] You stated, did you not, that you formed the opinion that you were to remain before Sebastopol after the failure of the first attack by the batteries; that was about the middle of October; will you state whether at that time it would not have been advisable to have applied a large body of troops to making the road?—At that time the army was gradually diminishing in force, and we got worse and worse with regard to the means to do any kind of work.

17286. General *Peel.*] What use would the road have been if the trenches had been abandoned?—To supply the camp.

17287. But the army would have been then liable to an attack any moment from the whole Russian force, and from the garrison of Sebastopol?—Not more than it was, whether it had the road or not; if we had abandoned the trenches I think that would have been a very dangerous measure.

17288. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you ever make any representations, either to the authorities at home or in the Crimea, that you were furnished with too small a number of men to carry on the siege?—No, certainly not.

17289. Was it within the scope of your duties to make those representations?—I felt it needless to do so; I knew that every effort was made to send out troops to make the force as large as possible.

17290. You never made any representations, from your knowledge, of the state of affairs out there?—I made no specific representation to that effect; I was constantly applying for men, for working parties, to the Adjutant-general, and he told me that they could not be afforded, not having sufficient strength.

17291. Upon receiving such an answer to your application did you not make a representation to head quarters?—I was in constant communication with head quarters; certainly I had communications with Lord Raglan frequently about

about it; I said, "What can we do to carry on the siege; we cannot get men for working parties."

17292. With regard to your position there, although to a certain extent directing the siege operations, you were not really the chief engineer there?—No, I was not; I may be said to have occupied the position of a Lieutenant-general commanding a division, who has Majors-general and Brigadiers commanding brigades under him; so that though the engineers was a separate command, in all details, the supreme direction of the leading points was with me; it was done under my advice.

17293. *Chairman.*] Had you not the command of all the field?—Yes, certainly.

17294. Did you not plan them?—Not in detail; only generally.

17295. Mr. *Layard.*] Will you state exactly what was your position there?—Yes; Lieutenant-general on the Staff.

17296. Without any definite command?—Yes, without any definite command, except what Lord Raglan gave me.

17297. Supposing anything had gone wrong, who do you consider the responsible person for it?—If it had gone wrong in any of the details, I should have considered the commanding engineer, and all the officers of engineers under him, responsible; but if there was anything wrong in the general designs, I think that the fault ought to have been laid upon me. The commanding engineer was first General Tylden, and afterwards Colonel Alexander; both of them died, and after that Captain Gordon was appointed.

17298. Were they under your direct orders?—They certainly were completely under my direct orders.

17299. That is to say, you had the command entirely of the engineers?—Yes, of the engineering operations; I do not like to say of the engineers, because the details were not with me; they did not report to me.

17300. Looking at the ordinary operations of the siege, was your position such as that which is usually assigned to the officer of engineers commanding the siege of a town?—No; it was different from what is usually assigned to the commanding engineer. If I had not been in the country at all, General Tylden, Colonel Alexander, and Captain Gordon would have taken a more complete direction, and would have been in more direct communication with Lord Raglan.

17301. You were in the Peninsula, were you not?—Yes.

17302. You undertook there more than one siege, did you not?—Yes, several.

17303. Was your position there that of engineering officer, having the conduct of the siege, similar to your position in the army in the Crimea?—Not at all.

17304. For what reason was the usual plan departed from?—The usual plan was departed from, I believe, as a compliment to me, thinking that I could be of service in giving general advice for the operations that might be directed against Sebastopol.

17305. Surely if you were supposed to be a competent person, would not the course have been to have put you in direct command?—I think not; I think it was better as it was; those officers took the command of all the details, and did the duty in a way in which I could hardly have done it; but they had beforehand my advice.

17306. Do you think that there was no clashing of authority in consequence of the anomalous position which you held in the army?—Not at all, as regards the engineers; they all worked very zealously under me, and we had no disagreement.

17307. My question was with regard to the siege operations?—I do not see any disadvantage arising, unless from my own imperfections.

17308. If you were sent out in the character of adviser, of course your advice might be accepted or rejected at the option of those who were actually in official position?—No; I do not think they could have ventured to have objected.

17309. *Chairman.*] You were, in fact, in command?—Yes; not only from my position in the country, but my position in the corps; I was at the head of the Engineers' Department, therefore they could not have objected.

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17310. Were you not, in fact, in command; and were not the siege operations entirely under your control?—They were entirely.

17311. Mr. *Layard.*] You have no reason to complain that your advice was not carried out, and that consequently a responsibility has been thrown upon you which you did not deserve, or upon any other grounds?—None at all; every officer acted very zealously under me, and they did not seem to disapprove of any advice that I offered.

17312. I mean with regard to those to whom you were empowered to give advice?—They were bound to obey my orders.

17313. *Chairman.*] The only person to whom you gave advice was the Commander-in-chief, was it not?—Yes; but I think in the General Orders it was specified that the commanding engineer was to act under the direction of Sir John Burgoyne for the siege operations.

17314. Mr. *Layard.*] You consider yourself, in fact, the responsible person?—I do.

17315. Did the French commence works on the heights as soon as they arrived; not the trench works, but the works along the heights overlooking the valley?—They commenced very early.

17316. Can you explain to the Committee, with regard to the works commenced by the French, what position they held?—Only generally along the heights that were above the plain of the Tchernaya.

17317. Between the Woronzoff road and the rear of the French?—Yes; between the Woronzoff road and the heights above Balaklava.

17318. Then the French force was rather inferior to the English, was it not?—I think it was at first, but they gradually and rapidly got up, and ours diminished.

17319. Above the plain of the Tchernaya there was one division of the French, under General Bosquet, was there not?—I do not think there was at first; I do not recollect where he was stationed at first; he afterwards extended out to the telegraph.

17320. Sir *J. Pakington.*] The English position was above the plain of the Tchernaya, was it not; and the French position was nearer the sea than the plain of the Tchernaya, was it not?—I call the whole of it the plain of the Tchernaya, up to the front of Balaklava; the river takes a sweep round.

17321. Mr. *Layard.*] The French occupied the position from the junction of the Woronzoff road to the heights, and to the Balaklava road, did they not?—Yes, beyond the Balaklava road to the Monastery; those were the points which they began to fortify.

17322. How many roads were there when we came round to the south of Sebastopol, from Balaklava?—I think the Woronzoff road; that and the one to Inkermann were the only made roads.

17323. Was the Woronzoff road sufficiently made to warrant us in believing that it would not be injured when the bad weather came on?—It was better than any other; it was really a partly made road.

17324. Was it such a road as would have stood the winter?—It was such a road as I expected would have lasted in a great measure during the winter; it would have required repair.

17325. Was it very extensively made use of, even before it was partly commanded by the enemy?—The first movement that the French made up upon the heights was by the road.

17326. The question had reference to taking up provisions and stores to the British camp; was it used extensively for that purpose?—I do not think it was; it was occasionally made use of.

17327. It was not the main communication?—No, not for the British.

17328. Would it have been prudent to have relied entirely upon that road, in taking up our position on the heights?—No; latterly we could not use it.

17329. I mean before the enemy attacked us?—The roads were all of them good, before the enemy prevented us using the lower part of that road; and it was only after that, by the time the roads began to be bad, that we could not use that road on account of the enemy.

17330. Was not that road always outside the British lines?—Yes, at all times.

17331. General *Peel.*] Are the Committee to understand your opinion to be this, that you considered that the road would be perfectly good, and perfectly available,

available, as long as you were likely to require it?—Yes, that was my first impression.

17332. Mr. *Layard.*] When did we first commence the trenches?—I think we commenced on the 10th of October.

17333. What was the date of our arriving before Sebastopol?—We arrived at Balaklava on the 27th of September.

17334. From that date to the 10th of October no ground was broken?—No.

17335. What were the troops during that time occupied in doing?—Moving up to the camp and getting the tents; they altered their position from Balaklava up to the ground by degrees, one division after another.

17336. Can you state when they first had the tents?—No, I do not recollect.

17337. Had they all tents before the 10th of October?—I doubt whether they had; I do not recollect.

17338. *Chairman.*] On the 10th of October you state that they broke ground?—Yes.

17339. What was the army doing between the 27th of September and the 10th of October; could not they have been employed in making a road?—They had no idea of wanting it at that time; they were on the move, preparing to go up to the camp; the troops were in expectation to move towards the front, and they did move, I think, on the 30th of September, part to the front.

17340. It was because you had no idea that you would want it that you did not direct your attention to the road?—Certainly; that was the first idea, nor had we any idea that we had power to make such a road as that of that great extent.

17341. General *Peel.*] At that time they had not the means of making the road?—No.

17342. *Chairman.*] Are the Committee to understand that you had no tools up to the 10th of October?—I cannot recollect the period when they were landed, but from the moment of our being at Balaklava we got ships in with the stores and the battering train, and landed them by degrees, and by the 10th of October we had sufficient to begin with.

17343. The moment you got to Balaklava there began to be a supply of tools?—Yes; we then began to get the ships in, and to have the battering train, getting them on shore by degrees.

17344. The want of tools was not the cause of your not making the road?—Yes; for the first few days that would have been the cause.

17345. But you did not think of making the road?—We did not.

17346. That was the real reason why the road was not made?—We could not have done it, if we had thought of it.

17347. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to this road, was this track used for bringing up all the heavy guns for the siege?—Yes.

17348. Did not that heavy work very soon prove that the road would be reduced to an inefficient state?—No, not during the fine weather.

17349. But after the 25th of October you found that you would not be able to leave the front of Sebastopol, or very early in November?—From the very commencement.

17350. And that you would have to winter there?—No.

17351. The Committee were informed by the Duke of Cambridge, that on or about the 8th of November it was known, generally believed, and stated to the Commissariat, that they would have to provide for the army during the winter before Sebastopol; were you aware of that?—No.

17352. You being there, were not aware by the 8th of November that it was believed that the army would have to winter before Sebastopol?—No, I was not; not even then. I had some little apprehension of it myself; but in the course of conversation with the French General of Engineers, when we talked about the operations, I was mentioning some that I thought would be advisable, and he said, "That will keep us all through the winter;" and I denied that in the first place.

17353. *Chairman.*] When did the failure of the first attack take place; was not it the 27th of October?—About the 27th of October; it was by degrees; we did not leave off all at once.

17354. You stated before, did you not, that you had become aware that you could not take Sebastopol directly?—Yes.

 17355. Then,

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17355. Then, at that time, did not you entertain a suspicion that you would be there during some bad weather?—Yes, decidedly.

17356. Then the moment that the bad weather came, did you not anticipate that the road would fail?—Certainly.

17357. Notwithstanding that anticipation, you did not direct your attention to the road for the purpose of mending it, for the reasons which you have already given?—Yes.

17358. Your answer being, that you thought that you had not power sufficient to make the road?—That we had not the force for it.

17359. Lord *Seymour.*] In the examination before the Committee, the other day, this question was asked: "When did Commissary-general Filder first know that he must prepare for wintering in the Crimea"? and Sir Charles Trevelyan, who had before him Commissary-general Filder's letter, replied: "On the 8th of November Commissary-general Filder was aware that they would have to winter there." Now, Commissary-general Filder was at the head-quarters of Lord Raglan, was he not?—Yes.

17360. You were also there, were you not?—Yes.

17361. Yet you were not aware, at that time, that that was to be the case?—No; but I apprehend what was communicated to Commissary-general Filder was this: "You had better be ready for it, because it is possible we may winter here;" without at all asserting that it would be the case, they would probably say, "You must look forward; we may be here for the whole of the winter."

17362. As he was required to be ready, was not it also desirable that other persons should be ready too?—Yes, certainly, everybody that had to make provision.

17363. One important provision for wintering there, was the making of this road, as we understand?—Yes; it would have been very desirable to make it if we could have done so.

17364. Was there any consultation at head-quarters respecting the means that should be adopted with regard to this road?—No; we knew that it was impossible to make it with our means; we had no means.

17365. Was there any consultation at head-quarters as to the propriety of doing something in regard to the road?—There was not any consultation at head-quarters to which I was a party.

17366. If Lord Raglan found his own forces insufficient to make a road, might it not have been possible to have sent home for men at least to make the road, although not to join as troops?—The question of sending for civilians to do the work never entered my mind, because if you could possibly have got troops, it was a bad measure.

17367. But, as you have stated, you did not apply for any troops, because you did not consider it possible to get them?—I had nothing to do with that; Lord Raglan was always acquainted with the deficiency.

17368. It was stated that an application was not made, because it was considered impossible to get further troops; was not that so?—I do not know; I suppose that it was so, as far as I know.

17369. If they could not get troops for the purpose of the road, at least the navvies who had been employed so often in England for such purposes, would have been useful?—Yes, they would; I think it would have been a better measure than the railway.

17370. If, for instance, early in November, some 1,500 navvies had been sent out, that would have been a great assistance towards putting that road in good condition?—If with carts, horses, and tools, I think it would have been a good measure.

17371. Then, as I understand, unfortunately it was not thought of?—No.

17372. You have stated, in connexion with that road, that you did not consider that the death and loss of the horses of the Commissariat which travelled upon it, were attributable to the bad state of that road?—The bad state of the road increased the amount of work, which was, of course, a detriment to those animals.

17373. The Committee have been told that the road was of so adhesive a nature, and so full of holes, that the horses very often stuck in it, and could not struggle through; was that a fair description of it?—As to a great part of it, it was.

17374. You

17374. You have stated that one advantage at least was gained by removing the horses of the Commissariat to Balaklava?—Yes.

17375. By which they were better provided for?—Yes.

17376. Will you state about when that plan was adopted?—It was adopted by degrees. I think the Artillery were the first to adopt it and the Engineers. With regard to the preservation of those animals, the engineers had a small number of mules given them, when they landed, to carry their entrenching tools to their divisions—Chapman's and Gordon's. They had, each of them, 10 or 11 mules given them, and some bullock carts; those mules they have preserved to this day, all through the winter, and they have rendered them a very great deal of service; by taking a great deal of care of them, paying attention to them and not overworking them, they not only preserved the mules, but they preserved the drivers. It was a small body, and therefore easily managed in that way; and if everybody had adopted the same plan and had paid the same attention to this matter, I imagine that more men and animals would have been saved.

17377. Very soon after you got to Sebastopol you found the animals of the Commissariat overworked and destroyed in consequence, and wanting shelter?—Yes; I do not know the particulars of it, but so I apprehend.

17378. On their arrival, had not Lord Raglan full authority, if he had so wished, to appoint any officers as a committee to inquire into this matter, and to report to him the best mode of providing for the care of all those beasts of burden?—Certainly he had.

17379. The mode in which they were kept was a very insufficient and bad mode, was it not?—So it appeared afterwards. They wanted organisation and regulation altogether.

17380. If that organisation was wanted, the Commander-in-Chief had power to institute such an organisation, had he not?—He had power to do it; I do not know whether he had means to do it. It would have been a very troublesome and difficult matter to settle under those circumstances, everything being worked to its full amount; it was difficult to establish any system altogether.

17381. You were in the Peninsular war, were you not?—Yes.

17382. Did not the Duke of Wellington frequently organise bodies?—He did in quiet times. He took the advantage of quiet times to organise them from the experience which he had of the defects that existed before.

17383. Did not that show that the Commander-in-Chief at the head of the army might with great advantage organise what was required for the service of that army?—Not in the midst of the difficulty; I think it is very difficult. The Duke of Wellington submitted to great inconveniences at times; and afterwards when they got to a quiet period, and when there was time for it, he then organised matters to prevent the inconveniences occurring again; but during the moment of distress and difficulty, it is very difficult to enter upon a new organisation.

17384. Have they not since organised a land transport system?—Yes, they have; there is an officer just gone out, Colonel McMurdo, to organise it.

17385. What has been done under the dire necessity that afterwards arose might have been done at first, when the difficulties first commenced, might it not?—I think not; to commence a new organisation in the midst of all the difficulties there, would have been very difficult.

17386. Did they not commence even in more difficult times, and after a great deal of these sufferings had occurred?—No: it is only now working at present, after the difficulties are nearly over.

17387. How do you mean, when you say the difficulties are nearly over now?—The difficulties are over, because the transport works much more easily now that the weather is better; there is not the same want of forage for the animals at Balaklava; the country was in a fair state when I left, and the great difficulties were nearly over at that time.

17388. You do not think that the first commencement of the difficulties was the time to have attempted to provide against their increase?—I think it would have been time to have commenced by the departments themselves, but it would have been very difficult for Lord Raglan to have undertaken it; he could only call the attention of the parties who had it under their authority, and he, no doubt, did so.

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17389. Could he have written home and have requested the Government, or the military authorities at home, to send him out a person qualified to organise the transport department?—Yes; he might have done it if he had thought it advisable; he might have found officers there without sending them from home; but I think they could not have commenced it during the time that the greatest difficulties existed.

17390. General *Peel.*] This duty of making the road falls within the Quartermaster-general's department, does it not?—Yes, it is his strict duty; but the Quartermaster-general always, in any species of works, gets all the assistance from the engineer that the engineer can afford him.

17391. But the responsibility was his?—Yes.

17392. Mr. *Layard.*] If you had thought that the want of a road would have impeded the siege operations, you would have applied to the Quartermaster-general?—Certainly; and I should have consulted with him.

17393. Did you ever make any representations to him on the absence of a road?—No; because I saw the difficulties of making it.

17394. Nevertheless, you never thought it necessary to make any remonstrance or representation to him upon the subject?—I would not have remonstrated about a thing which I knew he could not do. I was in constant communication with him.

17395. Could the Turkish troops have been at that time employed?—They were employed latterly, but they failed completely; they did very little; they got extremely sickly; they were not adapted to work, and not adapted to the climate, and I fancy that they were not very well taken care of; it seemed to be a complete failure their coming there at all; they were very discontented.

17396. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When did you first find that the bad state of the road caused serious inconvenience to the army?—It was manifest that the road began to be bad.

17397. But when was that?—When the rains began; and the hill was an inconvenience even when the road was good; and in proportion as the rain fell it got worse, and the inconvenience became greater.

17398. Is it within your recollection what was the date at which the inconvenience of the bad road began to be felt by the army?—I do not think that I can fix it at any precise day.

17399. Do you remember whether that inconvenience commenced shortly after the battle of Inkermann?—I do not remember; I think it was some little time after.

17400. *Chairman.*] Was not the inconvenience in full operation after the 14th of November?—I think it must have been about that time.

17401. Sir *J. Pakington.*] From that time, as the winter advanced, the state of the road became worse and worse, did it not?—Yes, as the winter came on.

17402. Till at last it was not available for the purposes of a road?—No; it was only available for pack-saddles, not for wheels.

17403. Was it at last available for pack-saddles, or was not it in a state that horses with packs fell dead on the spot?—Yes, if they were not taken care of; but some that were in good order worked at it constantly; the officers' own horses did.

17404. When the road arrived at the state which I am describing, did not it, in fact, constitute one of the greatest difficulties that the army sustained?—It constituted a great difficulty.

17405. Was not it the cause of great suffering and great privation to the army?—I am not aware; there must have been some delay in getting up the provisions and warm clothing in consequence.

17406. There was delay in consequence, as the Committee understand, of the wretched state of that road, in taking up every supply which the army stood in need of?—Yes.

17407. Did it not become the most serious evil that the army could suffer from?—Yes; it was a very serious evil.

17408. Under those circumstances, would it not have been worth while at any cost, or at any temporary sacrifice, to have improved the state of that road, so as to increase the supplies of the army?—Certainly it would, if you had had the means.

17409. Had you not the power of employing Turks to do it?—We had Turks there, and they were employed; but as I say, they failed completely, and did very little work.

17410. Would not it have been worth while, to remedy so great an evil, to have employed our own troops?—We had none to spare; we could not afford to guard the trenches scarcely.

17411. Would it not have been possible to have sent for hired labourers from some other parts of the surrounding coast?—I think not. I think they would not have been available like the Turks; the Turks are generally very obedient and good people, but they failed; and I think nobody else would have succeeded.

17412. If a telegraph had been sent home to send out navvies, would not they have arrived in time to put that road in order, sooner than the railway will be completed?—I should think it would have been a better measure than the railway, and a quicker one.

17413. Bad as it was, I understand you to say, you think, as matters stood in December, that it was impossible to remedy them?—I think it was impossible to remedy them then; it was always available for pack-horses when the mules and horses were in a tolerable condition, and the officers' baggage animals; they worked it all through the winter; those mules that I have mentioned to the Committee, belonging to the engineers, worked it all through the winter.

17414. I believe they were not in a tolerable condition?—No; the transport animals got worse and worse every day.

17415. Therefore they could not perform the journey?—No.

17416. *Chairman.*] Their condition, according to you, was produced by want of care?—Yes; I think partly so; if the care that might have been paid to them, had been paid under a good organisation, I think a good deal of the difficulty would have been removed.

17417. Who was answerable for the bad organisation?—The whole of our military institutions for the field are notoriously insufficient.

17418. So that the evil arose from the institutions, not from the men who worked them?—Partly from the men; I do not think that the English troops are sufficiently careful of the animals; not so much so as other people are; and partly from the want of organisation.

17419. You suppose that the greater part of the miseries of the men arose from their own inability?—I cannot say that; I think that they do certainly suffer from that, because it is very difficult to superintend the management of those animals so completely as to insure the best attention being paid to them.

17420. Had the men anything to do with preventing the making of the road?—Nothing.

17421. Had the men anything to do with the insufficient supply of men before Sebastopol?—Nothing in the world.

17422. Had the men anything to do with the want of a supply of fodder and forage?—Nothing.

17423. Or food to the army?—Nothing.

17424. Captain *Gladstone.*] You stated before that a small number of mules were allotted to the engineers for carrying the tools, that great care was taken of them, and that they continued in a good state through the winter; are you aware whether or not they were kept under cover?—No, they were not.

17425. Were any of the artillery or engineers' horses kept under cover?—No, not till they got down to Balaklava; those that were sent down to Balaklava by degrees got under cover.

17426. Colonel *Lindsay.*] With regard to wintering in the Crimea, after the failure of the first fire, about the 27th of October, Lord Raglan consulted you, as an engineer, did he not, as to what would be the next step to take for the reduction of the place?—He did not formally consult me, but I was constantly in communication with him, and I believe was very much in his confidence.

17427. He advised with you?—Yes, certainly.

17428. Without entering into the general character of the advice that you gave him, may the Committee conclude that a part of it was that heavier ordnance would be necessary?—No; I do not recollect any necessity for heavier ordnance; we had very heavy ordnance in the first attack.

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17429. What were the steps that you recommended after the failure of the first fire?—The next step that was taken was to increase our batteries, to make them more powerful, to get up more guns, to get up more ammunition, and then to open again with increased fire.

17430. It was not the calibre of the guns so much as the number?—We contemplated getting new guns, and probably of an increased calibre.

17431. Was the reason why you did not look upon it as certain that you must stay there all the winter, that you expected a successful result from the employment of the increased number of ordnance that you would have hereafter in battery?—We then did not contemplate staying there the whole winter; we were in hopes that the increased number might succeed.

17432. Was there an increased number to be employed as soon as you could get them placed in position?—Yes.

17433. How soon was that to be?—It was a very long time; it is now only that they have opened.

17434. Did you anticipate that that would have been done more rapidly?—Yes; I anticipated that it would have been done more rapidly than it was; in fact I had some doubt about it; I thought it was very likely that we should have to remain there all the winter.

17435. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When did you think that?—Every day the proceedings seemed to be more arduous; we were forced to do something; and the next step we could take was to increase the batteries, particularly as that was the opinion of the French, and to open fire.

17436. How soon did you form that opinion, that the army would have to stay there during the winter?—I cannot say any precise moment; it came to me from time to time, and strengthened the impression.

17437. Was that in October?—I think not before November.

17438. When you formed that opinion, did you communicate with Lord Raglan?—I dare say I did, in conversation.

17439. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Did not the weak state of the army, the state of the weather, and the roads, have an important effect in delaying the opening of those batteries till 14 days ago, compelling you to stay there the whole winter?—Yes; that was a great reason for it, certainly.

17440. If it had not been for those three reasons, could not your batteries have been opened sooner?—Certainly.

17441. With regard to the road, do you mean to state, that it was impossible, from the time that you arrived at Balaklava to the time that you broke ground, on the 10th of October, to have employed the soldiers in hardening the road, or in making it?—I do not think you could have done it; they were expecting to move up to the camp every day, and they were in movement.

17442. You consider that there was not a possibility, even at that time, to have employed the soldiers in making that road?—There was a physical possibility of doing it, but it would not have been judicious.

17443. *Chairman.*] Did you ever think of it?—I never thought of it.

17444. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Even if it had occurred to you, it would not have been your business to represent it?—No; but I think I should have been very culpable, if the thing had occurred to me, if I had not mentioned it to the Quartermaster-general; I was in communication with him every day.

17445. After you broke ground before Sebastopol, considering the number of men in the army, was it possible to employ the soldiers in repairing that road?—Certainly not without abandoning our works; we had not workmen for the trenches.

17446. If you had employed the soldiers in making that road, must you not have taken them off from duties of great importance?—We could not have kept the trenches, I think.

17447. Am I right in saying that the employment of the soldiers in making that road, after it was broken up, was entirely an affair of military policy, and subject to the general arrangements of the campaign?—The thing appeared to me impracticable; there were no men to spare for it.

17448. Mr. *Layard.*] You stated that there was a want of means; was there a want of pecuniary means of any kind?—I do not think there was a want of pecuniary means to do anything. Lord Raglan always told me that he would not spare expense for anything.

17449. So

17449. So far as the country was concerned, it was willing to go to any expense whatever?—Yes, I believe so; Lord Raglan always assumed that.

17450. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated, did you not, that the whole of our military institutions for the field were insufficient?—Yes; inefficient rather than insufficient.

17451. That has been your impression for some time?—Yes; a long time.

17452. Do you mean that we undertook this war, and this attack in the Crimea, with the knowledge on your part that the whole of our military institutions were inefficient for the troops in the field?—Certainly.

17453. Can you explain what you mean by the whole of our military institutions for the troops in the field being inefficient?—The Commissariat in particular; I was wrong in saying the whole; the artillery are very efficient and very good; the engineers want field equipment, and they want more sappers; the sappers are a most valuable corps.

17454. You consider the artillery very efficient?—Very efficient.

17455. The engineers you consider want more sappers?—Yes, more sappers; there is a want of field equipments, and a want of more officers also; there is a great want of officers.

17456. You mean that it is too small a corps?—Yes, for the field, and for all our colonial necessities.

17457. It was too small a corps for such a great undertaking?—Yes.

17458. It is not that our military institutions are defective, but that they are not on a sufficiently large scale?—Yes, that part is.

17459. *Chairman.*] Had you an insufficiency of engineers there?—We had an insufficiency; we wanted more officers for a great many purposes.

17460. You had an insufficiency of engineers, and an insufficiency of sappers, and your field equipment was not complete?—Yes; yet the body of sappers was larger than we ever had in the field anywhere before; till the latter end of the Peninsular war we had no sappers at all; they came at the end of the year 1813.

17461. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to military organisation in that respect, the English army was more fully provided than it ever had been?—Yes; now they are more fully provided than they ever were before.

17462. You spoke of the artillery and the engineers; will you state the next point?—I cannot say there is any inefficiency in the infantry; that is perfect, I think.

17463. With regard to the staff, what is your opinion?—The staff, I think, is very good.

17464. Is that perfect?—It is rather difficult to answer off-hand about the staff. I think the staff are very good, and that there is a good selection of them, and a good principle of selection.

17465. *Chairman.*] Will you state upon what principle the selection was?—Selection by the choice of the general officer in command.

17466. When the principle of selection is adopted, there is some rule adopted which governs the selection; I want to know what that rule is which you say is a good one?—It is done by the choice of the general officer in command.

17467. What you meant by saying that the principle of selection was good, was placing it in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

17468. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Is not the General Commanding-in-Chief in constant communication with all the officers of the army, and is he not generally aware of what their qualities are?—I presume he is.

17469. Mr. *Layard.*] Has the Commander-in-Chief any communication whatever with the regimental officers?—Does the Honourable Member mean the Commander-in-Chief in England?

17470. Yes?—I presume he has.

17471. You have been asked whether there is a communication with all the officers in the army; is not the communication almost entirely limited to the officers of the Guards in London?—I cannot tell what the communication is with the Commander-in-Chief.

17472. Lord *Seymour.*] You were stating generally in what points you considered our military system inefficient; will you now state whether you considered our cavalry efficient?—I am rather averse to giving an opinion upon a question which cavalry officers better understand.

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17473. I wish to know whether, when you spoke of our military institutions being inefficient, the cavalry was one of those institutions that was in your mind?—I may just mention, that I think a corps of very light cavalry would be a very great advantage; still lighter than anything that we have.

17474. Then you are not satisfied exactly with the organisation of our cavalry force?—I think it might be improved, as I have stated.

17475. There is another branch, namely, the Commissariat, which you also said you were not satisfied with?—As to the Commissariat, I think it is very imperfectly organised.

17476. Having had several months' experience of the Commissariat in the field, you give your opinion that it is imperfectly organised?—I think so.

17477. Can you state generally upon what points you want it improved; would you give it a more military organisation?—Yes; I would give it a more military organisation; and I would divide the business of it. I think it is overworked with a great quantity of business; and I would put it under different departments. I would give it perhaps the same head, but it requires a great deal of consideration to propose an organisation.

17478. You are not satisfied with the Commissariat organisation as at present existing?—I think it is capable of great improvement.

17479. Is there any one other institution which you have not mentioned, besides those which occurred to you when you stated that the military institutions of this country were wholly inefficient in the field?—I do not know of any other.

17480. Did you include the transport when you spoke of the Commissariat?—Yes; I conceive the transport to be a part of the Commissariat.

17481. You mean the land transport, do you not?—Yes.

17482. You have stated to this Committee that you were not aware that the tools used by the troops were in a bad state?—No.

17483. I would refer you to a number of officers who have given evidence before this Committee. General Evans was asked, at Question 821, "Had you, during the time that you were either at Scutari or at Varna, any complaints with regard to the tools that were served out to the army?—Yes." "Was any Board of officers desired to sit upon that matter?—Yes, there were Boards; the regimental tools were considered very deficient, and very bad." That is General Evans's evidence. I will now read to you General Bentinck's evidence. He was asked, at Question 1944, "Were the tools with which they were supplied good and efficient?—No, I think not; they are not in sufficient quantity, and not of a good material; we had a Board upon them at Scutari, before we started, and the Board unanimously condemned them all; they were of very inferior quality." That is another general officer. The Duke of Cambridge was also asked, at Question 4113: "Was your Royal Highness satisfied with the tools supplied for working in the trenches?—They were very bad indeed; nothing could be worse, particularly the bill-hooks; they were shocking, and quite useless; that was the great difficulty in getting any wood cut; we had nothing to cut it with." I will refer you also to Captain Shakspeare's evidence, an artillery officer, at Question 4739: "Can you describe what their character was, as to their fitness and efficiency?—I do not think that they were of good quality." "Was it necessary to have a Board of officers to sit upon that subject?—I was myself the president of a Board, at Yenna Bazaar, to report upon the intrenching tools of the troops; and I think we condemned them all, with the exception of the pickaxes; that included spades, axes, and especially bill-hooks." I will now read to you the evidence of Captain Wrottesley, of the Engineers. He states, in answer to Question 1787: "The tools supplied by the Ordnance were good, with the exception, I think, of some of the cutting tools. We found, especially, the bill-hooks were very bad; the steel was tempered too hard." Serjeant Dawson, at Question 5568, was asked this question: "Did you find yourself, or did you hear from others, any complaint with regard to the badness of the tools?—Yes. Our tools generally were very bad, particularly the bills that we had served out to each regiment. We had the trouble of carrying them, and they were of no effect; they would not cut a piece of wood; pieces snapped out three inches long, right along the edge of the bill. After it had been used

three

three times, we had not a bill that was worth twopence, I should say, for use. How were the pickaxes?—The pickaxes were generally bad." Having read this evidence of general officers, of captains, and serjeants upon the subject of the tools, do you think that the whole of these statements can be without any foundation?—I do not think it is without any foundation, but each particular case must rest upon itself. I really do not know how they may have been; the pioneers' tools may have been some particular tools that they got of a bad quality, but I do not think the whole of the tools furnished to the troops could have been of that bad nature. As I said before, the sappers, who understand the use of the tools, complained of them; they said that they could be better, but they did not complain of them to the extent that those officers do.

17484. Then you think that it was from ignorance that those officers made the complaints?—No, I do not; I think it is a mistake from some accidental circumstance; that they may have alluded to the pioneers' tools, with which we had nothing to do.

17485. They allude to pickaxes and they allude to bill-hooks?—I should like each case to have been particularly inquired into, and I doubt whether there was an engineer officer upon those committees of officers. I think if there had been we should have had reports upon it.

17486. General Bentinck said that they had a commission at Scutari which condemned them all, not only the quality but the quantity; you do not think, even when they had this inquiry appointed, that it was conclusive upon the subject?—It is different from my observation. I do not know how it happened.

17487. You found them good, as far as you examined them?—Good, but they were capable of improvement; but not so bad as they are described.

17488. You stated that they are supplied in different ways; some portion of the tools are supplied by the Ordnance, and some are not. Will you state to the Committee what class of tools are supplied by the Ordnance, and what class of tools are supplied by any other authority?—The pioneers' tools are very small in quantity; perhaps it is hardly worth mentioning, but they are not supplied by the Ordnance, but by the colonels of regiments; they were, at least, and I believe they still are.

17489. How many pioneers are there to a regiment?—I do not know exactly; it is a small number; I know that the pioneers' tools have been found bad sometimes, and it has been supposed to have been the fault of the Ordnance.

17490. Do you mean that the pioneers' tools are supplied in the way the clothing used to be supplied?—I believe so, under the same system.

17491. What constitutes pioneers' tools, do you know?—No, I do not; it is a small quantity of tools that every regiment has.

17492. Do you believe bill-hooks to be pioneers' tools?—They should be part of them, but they are a small quantity.

17493. *Chairman.*] I suppose they are the same kind of tools; there are spades, pickaxes, and bill-hooks?—Yes, and hatchets.

17494. Lord *Seymour.*] How are the great mass of the tools supplied?—I believe they are provided by the Ordnance.

17495. They are provided under a system of contract, are they not?—Yes.

17496. You, having been at the Ordnance, are perfectly aware of that system, are you not?—Yes, I am aware that that is the system.

17497. That system is a system of tender, is it not?—Yes.

17498. Taking the lowest tender?—Yes, and employing respectable manufacturers; they would not take anybody, I believe.

17499. Then there is a Committee appointed to try the different articles sent in?—No, I think not; that rests with the storekeeper.

17500. Then it rests entirely with the storekeeper whether or not the tools shall be admitted or rejected?—Yes; if he has any doubt about it, or any question arises, then a Committee is appointed by the Board of Ordnance always to inquire into it; the storekeeper who receives the stores sees that they are according to the specification and pattern.

17501. Who is the storekeeper?—Mr. Stacey, at present.

17502. He receives the whole quantity of tools supplied for the use of the army?—Yes, at the Tower. I think they are all received at the Tower; some may be received at Woolwich.

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17503. Then it rests entirely upon him whether or not they shall be received or rejected?—I believe so, in the first instance.

17504. The Board of Ordnance, unless there is a complaint, are not cognisant of anything respecting them?—No, unless there is a complaint. I believe it is the usual course with all stores, in all the departments.

17505. You stated that many of those tools came, you believe, from Malta? —Yes, some of the tools in the Crimea came from Malta, that had been in store for years probably.

17506. The goods in store under the Ordnance are subject to periodical examination, are they not?—I do not know what the rules of the storekeeper are. I dare say he examines them, if there is any doubt about their deterioration.

17507. Are you not aware what the Ordnance system is; is it not that Ordnance stores generally are gone over at certain periods, to see what are fit to be kept in store, and what are to be got rid of, under the name of old stores?—When they are once admitted as servicable stores, I am not aware of any other examination afterwards, unless there is any doubt about their deterioration. I do not know what the rules of the storekeeper are; storekeepers naturally keep as many stores as they can to save expense; they keep them perhaps a little exceeding what we should like; we wish to condemn more.

17508. Does it turn out to be economical to keep useless and inefficient stores for the purpose of saving the purchase of new?—Certainly not; but the question is, whether they are inefficient or not.

17509. Are the Committee to understand you to say that they do not have so close an examination of those stores as you think it is desirable they should have?—No; I suspect probably that when they first put them in store they have a thorough examination of them; after that, they do not examine them, unless they suspect any deterioration; it is a great expense to examine a large quantity of stores.

17510. *Chairman.*] You say that a certain portion of tools were sent from Malta to the Crimea; supposing some of those tools turned out to be bad, who is responsible for it?—The storekeeper at Malta.

17511. So that if the intrenching tools that came from Malta were bad, we ought to blame the storekeeper at Malta?—I think so.

17512. Are you aware that a Commission did sit at Scutari on the subject of the tools?—I am not.

17513. You do not know that there was a Commission?—No.

17514. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you frequently go down to Balaklava?—Frequently.

17515. At an early part of the siege?—Yes; at all times.

17516. Do you remember a part of the road at Kadekoi that was in a bad state, owing to a spring in the middle of the road?—Yes; I recollect two or three places very bad in consequence of springs.

17517. Was any attempt made to fill up those springs, or to alter the course of the water?—I am not aware that there was.

17518. Was not a bit of the road near Balaklava in such a state as frequently to impede the passage of traffic?—Nearer to Balaklava, at Kadekoi; there was a little watercourse by Kadekoi, and it was very bad; it got bad at last.

17519. Could not that little place have been filled up by a dozen men with a few stones?—It could have been very much improved.

17520. Who ought to have seen to the doing of that bit of work, for instance? —It is in the Quartermaster-general's department, that branch of labour; but those little jobs are generally done by the troops in the neighbourhood; they usually do them themselves.

17521. Do not you think that it ought to have been done?—I think that everything of that kind ought to have been done.

17522. Under whose general supervision were such matters?—The Quartermaster-general's supervision.

17523. You stated, did you not, that there was no want of large pieces of ordnance at the commencement of the siege?—It was the number chiefly; we had

had some that were rather inferior, the 24-pounders, and it was proposed in any increase rather to augment with a larger calibre.

17524. Had we any mortars calculated for such a siege and bombardment as that of Sebastopol?—Yes; some very good 10-inch mortars and 13-inch mortars latterly.

17525. When we opened the fire had we any 13-inch mortars?—I think not, but only 10-inch mortars; but they are very fine.

17526. They were not equal to the mortars employed against us, were they?—The Russians had very few mortars indeed; we suffered very little from their mortar firing.

17527. *Chairman.*] When you made your first attack you state that you had an insufficient number of men; that being the case, why, when that attack failed, did you propose to increase the area of your works?—We only proposed to increase the number of our batteries; that is a small part of the whole of the works; the trenches, the parallels, and the approaches are the more considerable ones.

17528. You did not very much increase the labour of the men?—Not very greatly; and we had this advantage as to the increased number of the guns; we knew that it would be so laborious to bring them up that it would take a very considerable time, more than was necessary to construct the batteries; so far as working parties went, and engineering operations, we were sure to have the batteries ready before the guns and ammunition were ready.

17529. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Were you consulted with regard to the expedition to the Crimea, before it was resolved upon?—I was so far consulted that I was sent into the country to make reports, and those reports were in the first instance acted upon.

17530. Were you out with the army?—I was out before the army came out.

17531. Will you state whether, after the raising of the siege of Silistria, you were consulted as to the proposed attack on Sebastopol?—No.

17532. When you heard that the attack on Sebastopol was resolved upon, did you offer any opinion on the subject?—Not officially; certainly not.

17533. Were you of opinion that the strength and resources of the British army at that time, were adequate to such an attack?—That depended so much upon the force of the enemy, I do not know that I apprehended what the resources were; but it was always understood, with the military resources which Russia possessed, that the force that they would have there would be very considerable.

17534. Are the Committee to understand, from that answer, that you thought it probable their force would be so considerable as to make it very doubtful whether the strength and resources of the British army were sufficient to cope with them?—Yes; the British and French combined.

17535. *Chairman.*] You thought the allied forces taken to the Crimea were not sufficient?—I would rather not give an opinion upon that, if I can avoid it. I did not regulate the operation, therefore I do not wish to say that it was or was not right.

17536. Sir *J. Pakington.*] At that time, as I understand you, there was no knowledge whatever, on the part of any of the authorities with the British army, of the strength either of the Russian forces or of the fortress of Sebastopol?—I believe there was not; I had no knowledge of it.

17537. *Chairman.*] I will recur now to the question with regard to the selection of the staff. You stated that the principle of the selection was good; will you be kind enough to tell the Committee what that principle is?—It is at the choice of the general officer; there is a great variety of staff; the Adjutant-general's staff, the Quartermaster-general's staff, and the personal staff of the General, and a different consideration is required for the selection of each.

17538. You stated, when talking of the institutions of the army, that you thought the staff excellent, and the principle of its selection excellent; to what staff did that answer allude?—To all; the Adjutant-general's, the Quartermaster-general's, and the personal staff of the General.

17539. We will begin with the General's personal staff; upon what principle is that selection made?—That is made by the General himself.

17540. What is the principle of selection?—The choice by the General himself;

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himself; and he naturally will take for his personal staff the officers whom he thinks most competent to do the duties and to assist him.

17541. Then the principle to which you alluded was giving it to the General to select his own staff?—Yes, certainly.

17542. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When you were asked just now as to the opinion you had expressed with regard to the military institutions of the country, you gave a favourable opinion as to the condition of the cavalry?—Yes, so far as I could perceive, their condition is very good.

17543. Are you of opinion that the equipment of the cavalry, generally, is heavier than is convenient for field service?—I cannot give an opinion upon that; I do not know how far the weight of the equipments is necessary.

17544. Have you formed any opinion whether it would promote the efficiency of the English army in the field, if we had cavalry of a lighter description attached to the army?—I am quite of that opinion, that a certain proportion of a very light body of cavalry, very much of the description that I see has been recommended in the papers lately, would be most serviceable, and it would save the heavy cavalry from a great deal of distressing work to which they are hardly equal.

17545. Are you aware whether any idea has been entertained of providing such a force of light cavalry?—I am not aware.

17546. *Chairman.*] The general staff of the army is appointed at home, is it not?—The general staff of the army is appointed at home; the staff of the Quartermaster-general and of the Adjutant-general are appointed at home.

17547. In fact they are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief here?—Yes, by the Commander-in-Chief.

17548. You approve of that principle, do you not?—Yes.

17549. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you select your own staff?—I did.

17550. Were you at Gallipoli?—Yes; two or three times.

17551. Were you there, for the first time, before any part of the army arrived there?—Yes, I was.

17552. What preparations were then made for the operations of the army in the Chersonese?—It was not known that the army was going there the first time that I left Gallipoli.

17553. I mean when it was known that the army was going there?—That was after I left it; I do not know what preparations were made after that.

17554. It was decided to occupy that ground upon your recommendation, was it not?—Yes.

17555. You do not know what preparation was made at Gallipoli to enable the troops that we sent out there to take up the lines?—I do not know at all.

17556. Were you at Varna during the time of the troops being encamped there?—I was there for a very short time, just before they moved to the Crimea.

17557. Were you there at the time of the raising of the siege of Silistria?—I do not recollect; I arrived there about the 26th of August.

17558. You were not there previously?—I was there previously, before the army went out there at all.

17559. You do not happen to know whether, when you were at Varna, supposing it had been necessary to advance into the interior, our army was in a condition to make such advance?—No, I do not.

17560. Had you the superintendence of the siege train which was sent out from England?—No; I had nothing to do with the siege train, only with the engineers' stores.

17561. Did you give orders for some siege train?—I had nothing to do with it.

17562. Then it was not upon any recommendation of yours that the siege train was selected?—No.

17563. You are, of course, acquainted with artillery?—Yes, a little.

17564. Do you know whether the siege train which was sent out was intended for operations in Bulgaria, or for the operations in the Crimea against Sebastopol?—I imagine that that siege train was for general service, whatever it might be; that it did not contemplate any one particular operation.

17565. That is to say, the siege train might have been required to advance upon Silistria, or upon any place on the Danube?—Yes.

17566. Was

17566. Was that siege train supplied with any means of transport horses?—I do not know. I think not.

17567. Supposing it had been necessary to have moved that siege train, how would that operation have been effected?—They contemplated, probably, getting horses of the country. It depends very much upon circumstances. For instance, at Balaklava, at the time when we got before Sebastopol, the field artillery required very little movement at all, and their horses were applied to get the siege train up.

17568. Do you think it was advisable to be dependent entirely upon the horses of the field artillery for the use of siege artillery?—Providing horses from England would have been a very serious undertaking. Taking an army in the field, it is not an uncommon calculation to say that you should have one horse to every two men; for instance, taking an army of 10,000 men, you ought to have 5,000 horses for cavalry, artillery, transport, and everything else

17569. Was that calculation carried out in the Crimea?—Certainly not; the army taken out was about 25,000 men; if you had made that calculation you must have embarked 12,000 horses from England, which would have been an enormous affair; it must depend a great deal upon the country.

17570. I think the shot, shell, and ammunition were also carried up by horses belonging to the field artillery and baggage horses?—Yes, entirely.

17571. Do you think it was advisable to depend entirely upon such means of transporting to the front the ammunition and guns?—Yes, I do not think we could have done otherwise.

17572. You say it would have been somewhat difficult to get the means of transport from England; was it a question of expense?—It would, of course, have been a very enormous expense, and would have required a great many horses, when the country horses would have perfectly answered.

17573. Do you think it was advisable to depend upon the country horses for moving siege artillery?—If you had plenty of them.

17574. Even large guns?—Yes.

17575. Was any harness sent out with the siege artillery?—I do not know.

17576. Were any reports made to you upon the state of the fuses during the siege?—None at all; I had nothing to do with it.

17577. With regard to the platforms, had you anything to do with them?—Yes.

17578. Was any report made to you with regard to the platforms?—There was one description of platform which was generally condemned by the artillery and the engineers.

17579. What platform was that?—It was called the improved Madras platform.

17580. Had any representation been made upon the subject before the platforms left England?—No; they had succeeded very well at Woolwich, but when we came to try them on that rocky ground, and under the circumstances, they were found to fail.

17581. Were they found to fail on account of deficiency of principle in their construction, or on account of the materials used?—The materials and the construction were very good; but the principle was not found to stand that rough work to which we had to apply them in the Crimea. Those platforms were made by the artillery.

17582. In England?—Yes; they were beautifully made; they were very good in every other respect.

17583. Upon the question of the fuses, is that entirely within the department of the artillery?—Entirely.

17584. Are not representations made to the officer who has the conduct of the siege, in case the fuses should be so bad as seriously to impede the operations?—They could not be said to impede the operations; they had not the effect perhaps which they should have had; but the Russian fuses were very bad too.

17585. You are aware that our fuses were bad?—I have since heard complaints made of the fuses, but I have some doubts whether the old ones or the new ones were bad or inefficient.

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17586. Had you ever an opportunity of examining the French encampments?—I have been through them very often; I have never examined them very particularly.

17587. Did you see large sawing pits and other appliances where the artillery was?—No, I did not observe them, but I dare say they were very good.

17588. Did you see anything of the kind in our army?—No; we could easily have made a sawing pit; we carried pit saws, and we could very easily have made one.

17589. Did we ever do so in the Crimea?—Yes; they sawed up timber which they had cut down, to make planks, and put it upon trestles, which answered every purpose; it was very easily done.

17590. You stated that the Turks were very badly taken care of, and that it was a pity they were sent for; whose fault was it that they were so badly taken care of?—I do not know; I do not know who had charge of them; I suppose it was their own; I do not know who was responsible for it.

17591. Whose business was it to prepare plans of our operations, and of the ground upon which we were encamped?—As to the ground upon which we were encamped it was the Quartermaster-general's business, but as respects the operations of the siege it would be the engineers' business.

17592. Were any plans prepared out there and sent to this country?—No; they were commenced, but it was a very laborious operation, and the officers were so much engaged in other things, and being encamped on a wet ground, that it was extremely difficult to follow it up; but still it always did progress, and we made sketches and sent them home; that was all we could do.

17593. Then the deficiency arose from the want of a sufficient number of persons to do the work?—Certainly; if we had had more officers and engineers we should have done a good deal more in that way.

17594. Did you ever see the French tent in which the plan of the siege was kept?—Yes; it was very good.

17595. Do you think it advisable to have anything of the kind in our army?—Certainly; General Jones has at this moment a little drawing place, where he has put some officers for that purpose.

17596. That was established by General Jones?—Yes.

17597. Previously to his arrival there nothing of the kind existed?—No.

17598. Are you acquainted with the plans of fortification which have been put forward and advocated by a gentleman of the name of Fergusson?—Perfectly.

17599. Do not his theories of a fortification correspond with the plan adopted by the Russians before Sebastopol?—Not at all; not in any way whatever.

17600. In what do they differ?—The plan pursued by the Russians is the plan which has been pursued for hundreds of years, namely, making ordinary field-works of earth along the surface of the ground, having no other material to make the works of, and a very inferior description of work it is, as compared with masonry works.

17601. That is still your opinion?—Decidedly.

17602. But yet those works appear to have been so efficient, that they have resisted all attempts to take them?—Yes; because they have a great army behind them, and they have 300 or 400 pieces of cannon behind them; that is the difficulty; the works themselves are of a very inferior description.

17603. Do not the earth-works round what is called the Malakoff Tower wear the character of being rather more than field-works?—No, not at all.

17604. Are they not tiers of earth-works?—No; I do not recollect any tiers; if there were any tiers, they would be more disadvantageous to them.

17605. I mean tiers one above the other?—Yes.

17606. Colonel *Lindsay.*] With regard to the question whether the Russian works were like Mr. Fergusson's fortifications, were they flanking works; that description of fortification which has flanks?—No; I think they were imperfect in that respect; I think they were imperfectly designed.

17607. They were not circular works like Mr. Fergusson's?—No, they just followed the ground.

17608. General

17608. General *Peel.*] Was any requisition made to you out there to furnish maps for any of the departments at home?—No; we should have concluded that it was part of our business to make the maps as well as we could; and we sent home a portion as we could get them out.

17609. Mr. *Drummond.*] Is not Balaklava a little dirty fishing village?—It is a very bad village.

17610. There are not any good buildings in it, are there?—No; you cannot call any of them good.

17611. There has been some insinuation thrown out against Lord Raglan for having his name written up on the largest of those buildings; do you know what was the reason of his name being written upon it?—He retained possession at his disposition, and it was chiefly used for officers that were sick or wounded; they were always allowed to go in there, and it was used for any purpose to which it could be applied beneficially for the army.

17612. Do you know that Lord Raglan took possession of it in order to protect the property of the Russian governor's wife?—Yes. I understood that he was anxious to do that; there was a very interesting family of the Russian governor there when we first went in, and I believe Lord Raglan was anxious to protect that family if he could.

17613. I believe he lent it to Sir De Lacy Evans at one time, when he was sick?—Yes; he lent it to different sick officers.

17614. Was it at all fit for a hospital or a store?—It might have been converted into a hospital or into a store.

17615. Was not the roof taken off very soon and used for firewood?—I never heard of it.

17616. Of course you have been in Lord Raglan's head quarters very often?—I lived there.

17617. Then you know what sort of a place it was, I suppose?—It was a barn, but there was a good roof, and there were good walls, and good windows and doors.

17618. He had only two rooms for his own use, had he?—He had only one, and a very poor one.

17619. And the rest of the staff the same; Colonel Steele, and so on?—The rest of the staff were in the house.

17620. Colonel Steele, the military secretary, had only one room?—He had not one; he slept in his office.

17621. Lord *Seymour.*] When did you join the army?—On the 26th of August, I think, at Varna.

17622. You had previously been out to Constantinople to view the site for the troops at Gallipoli, had you not?—I had.

17623. Had you recommended Gallipoli as a position to take up?—When I left England I went through Paris; I found that there was a wish to assist the Turks against what was expected to be a very overwhelming force of the Russians coming down, but there was a doubt expressed whether it would not be very dangerous, whether the retreat would not be cut off, because the Russian advance would naturally be by Adrianople; at Adrianople they would be nearer Gallipoli than Constantinople, and if they went down there the troops at Constantinople would be cut off.

17624. On that account you recommended Gallipoli?—Yes; finding it a very good defensive position at Gallipoli, I recommended to hold that as a security, and you could take any measures then that you pleased.

17625. When did you come home?—About the end of March, or the beginning of April.

17626. In about the middle of August you were again requested to go there to advise Lord Raglan?—Yes, to join the army.

17627. The position in the Crimea having been decided upon?—That I do not know; when I got there I found that the preparations were going on for it.

17628. Then you accompanied the army. Were you consulted in any way, or did you give any opinion as to the policy of the flank movement, which we have heard so much of, from the north to the south of Sebastopol?—Yes, I believe I recommended it; and Lord Raglan sent me to Marshal St. Arnaud to explain what the proposition was.

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17629. From your subsequent experience, you are still of opinion that that was a judicious movement?—Decidedly.

17630. When did you leave the army?—I left the army on the 20th of March.

17631. Then you were with it during the whole of the severe weather?—I was with it the whole winter.

17632. You frequently visited the trenches, I suppose?—Frequently.

17633. And you saw a great deal of the troops?—Yes.

17634. Did the troops appear to you to be suffering very much from overwork at that time, during the winter?—They were certainly suffering very much from different things, particularly the overwork; that was the worst part of it.

17635. Did they appear to you to be suffering also from want of food?—They appeared to be suffering, but the food, I believe, was not very deficient; that is, as far as the regular ration goes; they could get nothing in addition to that.

17636. Did it come to your knowledge, being there with officers, and seeing so much of the troops, whether or not they were sufficiently fed?—I did not hear so much complaint of the feeding as of the hard work, and the deficiency of fuel; that was the great thing.

17637. Did you hear much complaint of the want of clothing?—No, excepting that being constantly wet, there was a great desire to get any warm clothing they could; but the principal part was with respect to the feet, as to which there was a difficulty.

17638. This Committee has been told that the troops were even with straw wrapped round them for want of trousers; did you see troops in that ragged condition as regards their clothing?—Yes, I saw many to whom it might have been desirable to give more.

17639. Then you did see them in a state very insufficiently clothed?—Yes.

17640. Particularly as to their shoes?—Yes; the feet were the principal thing.

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APPENDIX.

Appendix, No. 1.

LETTERS in reference to Appendix, No. 13. (Page 726, of Second Report.) Appendix, No. 1.

Sir, 13, St. James's-place, 29 March 1855.

I SEND you a copy of Lord Raglan's letter; also the copy of one which Mr. Ward had written to Lord de Ros. With reference to the one Lord de Ros wrote to Lord Raglan, I feel confident I returned it to Lord Raglan along with my reply; it was a private communication, and I never feel justified in retaining a document of that nature.

A copy of my reply to Lord Raglan is herewith forwarded.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Andrew Smith.*

To the Chairman of the Committee on Army before Sebastopol.

LETTERS from Lord *De Ros* to General *Peel*, a Member of the Committee.

My dear Peel, Strangford, County Down, 25 March.

IN the proceedings of your Committee, I have lately noticed several allusions to the age and supposed incompetence of the late Mr. Ward, the purveyor. It is but justice to the memory of that zealous and respectable old man, to state some facts respecting him with which I was myself concerned.

The blundering and confusion which has been so notorious in the conveyance of stores to Turkey, was one of the first difficulties with which I had to grapple on arrival as Quartermaster-general at Scutari early in May. The want of invoices and supercargoes, and the heedless, hasty way that the stores of my own, of the medical, and of other departments, had been huddled on board the vessels at home, rendered it most difficult to separate and distinguish them in disembarkation.

I observed, and it was also remarked by officers of my staff, that no one was more efficient, or worked harder, and with more energy and zeal in this confused scene, than old Ward and a young lad (his nephew, I believe), whom he had to assist him. The uncle was 70 and the lad 17, but they appeared to us, two as useful officers as could be found in their calling, and indefatigable in their labours. It was about six weeks after this first acquaintance, that Mr. Ward came to me in great distress, saying he was to be superseded and sent home, on account of his advanced age. I went at once to Lord Raglan (to whom I had before mentioned Ward's and his nephew's exertions), and begged him to prevent what seemed so unjust a requital for them. He readily took the matter up, and Mr. Ward's recal was in consequence of Lord Raglan's representation cancelled, and he remained in the active exercise of his duties till he was, I believe, carried off by the fatal fever of the country.

* * * * * * *

Very truly yours,
(signed) *De Ros.*

My dear Peel, Strangford, County Down, 29 March 1855.

I RETURN you your paper* with many thanks. I do not know why Dr. Smith objected to producing my letter to Lord Raglan in favour of Mr. Ward. It is quite indifferent to me who sees it, for it was written as a justification of a man I considered ill used at the time.

I had

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* The evidence of Dr. Smith, with reference to Mr. Ward. *Vide* 9390, &c.

Appendix, No. 1.

I had no previous knowledge of Mr. Ward, or interest in him, beyond what was created by my personal observation of the zeal and energy with which he discharged his duties while I was at Scutari, and of which, as Quartermaster-general, I had the means of judging.

It may be said I had no official concern in the Purveyor's duties; but on our first arrival I found it often necessary to interfere in matters not strictly within my department, in order to drive forward the general service and organisation of the army.

It is quite possible that after we moved to Varna Mr. Ward's health may after a time have rendered him less efficient; but I well recollect that when he wrote his appeal to me, referring to what I had seen of his conduct while I was at Scutari, he declared he was then as well as he ever had been in his life, and he was not a man whose word I should doubt.

I have not any objection (quite the contrary) to your laying before the Committee the letter I wrote you a few days ago about Mr. Ward's affair.

Believe me, &c.
(signed) *De Ros.*

Appendix, No. 2.

Appendix, No. 2.

COPIES of a LETTER addressed by Deputy Assistant Commissary-general *Cookesley* to Commissary-general *Filder*, and of one addressed by Commissary-general *Filder* to Field Marshal Lord *Raglan*, complaining of certain Statements made by the Earl of *Lucan* in his Evidence before the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol.

Head Quarters before Sebastopol,
29 March 1855.

Sir,

HAVING observed in the daily papers of the 16th instant the following passage in the Evidence of the Earl of Lucan before the Committee of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Army in the Crimea, at the House of Commons, I think it only due to myself to make a few observations upon it. The passage I allude to is this:

"In reference to the horses, his Commissariat difficulties began at Kullalee. He found he had as his Commissaries very young officers. When at Kullalee the horses got always 12 lbs. of barley, and 16 lbs. of chopped straw; there was no hay whatever. The Commissary was changed. He presumed that Commissary-general Filder did not change him on any representation of his; quite the contrary. He complained to Commissary-general Filder that he ought not to attach these Commissaries. He asked to have men fit to superintend the forage, and such Commissariat officers as had been given to the other divisions. He complained that the Commissaries supplied to him were inexperienced; that he considered himself entitled to an Assistant Commissary, like other divisions—men of experience, and whose representations would receive attention. The Commissaries attached to his division, to the best of his recollection, were two young gentlemen who had just come from the Treasury; one was a Mr. Murray, a son of the Bishop of Rochester, and Mr. Cookesley was the other, and they were totally inexperienced."

I must observe, sir, in the first place, that I never was attached to the cavalry at all during the campaign. I was appointed by you to the charge of the head-quarters, which duty I commenced on the 4th of May 1854, the very day on which Lord Lucan states he arrived at Scutari, and in the discharge of which I have continued ever since. Lord Lucan and his staff were rationed and their horses foraged by me on their arrival at Scutari, and up to the time they went to Kullalee. I myself was never at Kullalee but once, and then for about 15 minutes. Subsequently I rationed Lord Lucan and his staff at Varna for upwards of a month, and I am not aware that on any single occasion at either place they did not receive the full amount of their rations. The only time I had anything at all to do in connexion with the cavalry was my providing for the 4th Dragoon Guards for one day only, in the month of July, at Varna.

How Lord Lucan discovered that I had just come from the Treasury, "and was totally inexperienced," I am not aware, as I was ordered up to join the army under Lord Raglan from Malta, where I had had 12 months' longer experience of my duties than the generality of officers attached to other staffs of the army at that time; and I never had the honour of exchanging a single word, in any way whatever, with his Lordship, nor am I aware that I am personally known to him.

I trust that my natural care for my professional reputation will plead my excuse for troubling you with this matter, as I cannot but feel that a statement of this sort regarding me being gone forth to the world by an officer of his Lordship's rank and standing in the army, must have an injurious effect upon a young officer like myself, who has nothing but his own zealous exertions to look forward to for success in his profession.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Augustus F. Cookesley*, D. A. C. G.

Commissary-general Filder, C. B.
Balaklava.

(True copy).
(signed) J. Routh, A. C. G.

(D. 999).

Appendix, No. 2.

My Lord, Balaklava, 29 March 1855.

The mail which arrived this day from England brings the evidence given by Lieutenant-general the Earl of Lucan before the Committee of the House of Commons on the 15th instant; from which, I perceive it to have been stated by his Lordship, that the authorities of the French army in the Crimea had complained to him that they experienced a deficiency of forage, in consequence of the neglect of the British Commissariat to return 30 days' fodder, which had been lent to it; upon which I would beg to observe, that his Lordship has been misinformed on the subject, as I have never received any assistance from the French administration, excepting on one occasion, when the arrival of my own supplies from Constantinople having been retarded by a long continuance of contrary winds, I obtained the loan of a vessel laden with chopped straw (unpressed), containing less than one day's issue for the British army, and which was repaid in kind shortly afterwards.

I have hitherto abstained from noticing the many incorrect statements, as reported in the newspapers, that have been made before the Committee respecting the Commissariat, by parties who are imperfectly informed on the subjects on which they have been questioned, as not requiring immediate attention; but the evidence of Lord Lucan in the particular before mentioned appears to me to call for early refutation, and I accordingly have the honour respectfully to request that your Lordship would be pleased to submit this letter to the Secretary of State for War, with a view to its being laid before the Committee of the House of Commons.

I have, &c.

Field Marshal Lord Raglan, G. C. B. &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

War Department, 27 April 1855. *Frederick Peel.*

Appendix, No. 3.

PAPERS delivered in by Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K. C. B.

CORRESPONDENCE relating to the Issue of Coffee as part of the Field Ration during the last Caffre War.

Appendix, No. 3.

No. 1.

Commissary-General *Miller*, C.B., to Sir *C. Trevelyan.*

Broughallan, 13 February 1855.

I hasten to answer your letter of yesterday, just received. I recollect perfectly that during the late Caffre War the troops were supplied with coffee unroasted, and no question or observation ever reached me relative to its being supplied in that state, from which I conclude that it was so preferred; besides its being well known that coffee loses so much by being roasted long before being used. I procured them a quantity of chocolate, thinking, that as it required only one application of the fire, it would be preferred to the coffee, but it was not.

At nearly all places on the frontier of the Cape fuel is a scarce article, and bad; the troops got it, but with much difficulty and trouble.

No. 2.

Commissary-General Sir *G. Maclean* to Sir *C. Trevelyan.*

Paris, 14 February 1855.

Your letter of the 12th instant only reached me yesterday at 7 P.M., consequently too late to reply to by that evening's post, which closes at 6.30 P.M. I therefore avail myself of the mail of this morning, which leaves at 11.30 A.M.

The coffee issued to the troops at the Cape during the Caffre War, was in its natural state, the men roasting and grinding it themselves from time to time as required, in small quantities, by which means it was always fresh, the flavour preserved, and not liable to adulteration as when ground. No wish was ever expressed, that I am aware of, that it should be supplied in any other state.

In the French service coffee is usually issued unroasted, but in consequence of the scarcity of fuel in the Crimea, it has, as an exceptional case, been furnished to them roasted by their Commissariat.

Appendix, No. 3.

A small roaster and coffee-mill is supplied and carried by the soldier, the fruits of their 25 years' experience of campaigning in Algeria.

I purpose going to the War Office this morning to ascertain the period when the alteration took place, and any other particulars, and will forward the information by this morning's mail if possible.

No. 3.

Commissary-General Sir *G. Maclean* to Sir *C. Trevelyan.*

Paris, 14 February 1855.

I REGRET it was not in my power to obtain from M. Boileau, Chef de Bureau des Subsistances, the detailed information promised in my note of this morning in time for the post at half-past 11 A.M., and that it differs in some respects from what I first stated, our information having been derived from M. Darricaux, the Director-in-chief of the administrative service in the War Office, who touched upon the subject incidentally in a general conversation we had with him on topics connected with our mission two days ago.

The following is the correct result, as stated by M. Boileau:

1. The coffee is purchased here, and forwarded to the Commissariat in its natural state.

2. On its arrival it is roasted in the magazines, under the superintendence of the Commissariat, by soldiers, a few of whom are furnished for the purpose and paid for their labour.

3. It is then issued in this state, and ground by the men themselves in the camp as it is wanted, with the small portable mills supplied by the Government, in the proportion of one mill to thirty men, and carried by them.

These portable mills have only been in use since 1853, the invention being borrowed from the natives of Algeria. Previously in Algeria, where the issue of coffee and sugar originated in lieu of spirits, it had been ground in their flour-mills, and issued ground, which was not found to answer so well as the present mode.

I may also mention that the issue of moist sugar has been discontinued, and the very best loaf-sugar supplied, without any diminution in the quantity.

No. 4.

Deputy Assistant Commissary-General *Hedley* to Sir *C. Trevelyan.*

London, 13 February 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note requesting me to give you any information in my power regarding the issue of coffee to the troops in the field, during the last war at the Cape of Good Hope.

In all the camps and outposts, and upon all occasions when on service during the war, extending over a period of two years and eight months, the coffee was received from the contractor, and issued to the troops by the Commissariat, in the raw or unroasted state. The method employed by the men to roast and reduce it to powder was as follows:—The three days' ration (three-quarters of an ounce being the daily ration per man) was roasted in a frying-pan on the camp fires, and the berry was then pounded between two stones, one round and smooth, as the pestle, and a flat hard stone acting as the mortar. These stones the men generally carried in the company's waggon on the march, the occupants of each tent mostly having a couple of frying-pans and one of these beaters, and joining their rations in one common stock.

My own experience tells me that the fresh roasted coffee is much more nutritious than that which is long kept either roasted whole or ground; nor do I think that large quantities of either of the latter could be conveyed any distance without great loss, the first being exceedingly brittle and easily pounded from various causes in transporting it; and the only way to keep the latter any length of time fresh, is to carry it in well sewn leather bags.

My service at the Cape was as follows: I was for 11 months in charge of a large depôt at Port Retief, formed to supply the First Division. I then had charge of the brigade commanded by Major-general Somerset, as Commander-in-chief of the First Division, but under the immediate command of Colonel George Buller. With this brigade I remained four months in the Waterkloof, and then proceeded in charge of the head-quarter camp of Sir George Cathcart across the Kie against Kreli. On the return of this patrol, which was out six weeks, I returned to the Waterkloof, and had charge of the Rifle Brigade and levies stationed there; and on the expedition marching against the Basuto chief Mosesh, I was again placed in the head-quarter camp, and then removed to the charge of the Cavalry Brigade under Colonel Napier, until after the battle of the Berea, when I remained in the rear to collect the stores at the various depôts formed on the line of march, over an extent of 400 miles. After performing this service, I was stationed at Eland's Port until the close of the war.

No. 5.

Deputy Assistant Commissary-General *Robinson* to Sir *C. Trevelyan.*

Westminster, 15 February 1855.

In reply to your inquiries, I beg to state that during the last Caffre War the coffee issued to the troops was invariably unroasted. The Commissariat contracted for it in its green state, and it was so handed over, with the other component parts of the field ration, by the Commissariat officer, to the quartermaster of the regiment, for issue every three days to the troops, in the proportion of three-quarters of an ounce per man per diem.

During my experience of field service at the Cape of Good Hope, I never heard of any complaint from the officers or men of the coffee being issued green, nor did I ever hear a wish expressed that it should be supplied to them either roasted or ground.

The roasting of it appeared an easy occupation, and even an amusement to the men, when sitting over their camp fire after a day's march, who managed it either by means of a frying-pan, or lid of a camp-kettle, full of berries, being held over the fire, and kept stirred to prevent their burning. When sufficiently roasted, the coffee was pounded between stones, mixed with a little water to secure consistency, and formed into balls, which were carried for next morning's use, and, when mixed with boiling water, soon made a good can of coffee.

Precarious as was the nature of the duties of the troops, I never heard a complaint that the men went without their panikin of coffee.

The natives of the country, when travelling, and the Hottentot and Fingoe soldiers, always prefer this plan, as they say if coffee roasted or ground were carried about, it lost its flavour.

Having had some little experience in travelling at the Cape and in Caffraria, alone and with troops, and having at first tried carrying ground coffee for my own use, I do not hesitate to say that when fuel-wood can be obtained sufficient to light a fire, green coffee is a much more acceptable article for issue as part of a soldier's ration, than when either ground or roasted.

No. 6.

Extract from a Letter from a Military Officer employed during the last Caffre War.

16 February 1855.

The coffee in berry (unroasted) used to be served out to each man every third day, and they usually roasted enough for the day's consumption.

My servant (a 43d soldier) used to tell me it was better to carry it unroasted, because if roasted it was apt to crumble, and some would be wasted; whereas in its raw state, wet from rain even would not injure it. But at the Cape there was abundance of fuel, wood or cow-dung; and as we marched nearly every day and all day, the roasted berry would be apt, as I said before, to crumble and waste.

At the Cape the men used to put the berry on a tin plate, and hold it on the fire; it was soon ready to be ground, which they did with two stones.

If our little Cape army had been sent to the Crimea, there would not have been such helplessness amongst them.

PAPERS relative to Commissariat Officers.

COPY of a Minute of the Treasury Board, dated the 7th May 1841.

My Lords having adverted to the deficiency in the possession of the necessary acquirements which is occasionally exhibited by candidates for clerkships upon the establishment of the Commissariat, it appears to their Lordships to be desirable that the candidates who may be nominated for such appointments should be made acquainted with the nature of the examination they are required to pass before they can be admitted into the Commissariat department; and they are therefore pleased to desire that every candidate, upon his nomination for such appointment, may be apprised that it is required that he shall give satisfactory proof that he is well and practically acquainted with the arithmetical rules of

Practice,
Interest,
Rule of Three, and
Vulgar Fractions,

and that he is acquainted with the principles of book-keeping by double entry.

That he should write a fair and legible hand, and be capable of composing in English grammatically and correctly.

Appendix, No. 3.

These preliminary qualifications are indispensable, and it is also to be clearly understood that a clerk, after having passed such examination, and having been admitted provisionally into the department, is required to make himself practically acquainted with the system of book-keeping by double entry, with exchange operations, and with one at least of the modern continental languages; and that his advancement to the rank of a commissioned officer will depend upon the testimony which the chief officer under whom he may be serving may be enabled to give to this Board, with respect to his progress in these acquirements, and his character generally as a member of the department.

Memorandum by Sir *C. E. Trevelyan* on the Training of Commissariat Officers for Active Service.

Both in peace and war the officers of the Commissariat have to provide the same articles, money and food, and as far as possible, in the same manner, viz., through the agency of contractors, so as to avoid the necessity of having recourse to foraging parties, and every form of military exaction, by which the feelings of the people are irritated, and the morale of the army injured.

The persons with whom a commissariat officer has to transact business are the same in war as in peace, the soldiers and the contractors; and he should be familiar with the habits and wants of the one, and the character and means of the other.

He should make himself acquainted, during peace, with the resources of the country, without a full acquaintance with which it is impossible that proper arrangements can be made to meet the necessities of war, or even to provide for the economical supply of the army during peace.—*See* Articles 91 and 372 of the Commissariat Regulations.

He should be well acquainted with the regulations of the department, which have been carefully revised and simplified, so as to make them applicable to a state of war as well as a state of peace. The accounts are rendered in every respect in the same manner during war as during peace; and the mode in which money is raised, and contracts for supplies are formed, is substantially the same in both cases (a greater degree of discretion being allowed to the commissariat officer to enable him to meet the unexpected emergencies of war), and his proceedings are reported in the same manner.

So far as there is a difference between the mode of transacting the business of the department in war and peace, the commissariat officers have been prepared for it by articles in their instructions, 91 to 101, 108, 109, 123, 133, 375 to 385; and Returns applicable to Field Service, 536 and Appendix. Care has also been taken to place the officers of the department in possession of the best statements that could be obtained of the Commissariat experience of the last war, by means of treatises which have been prepared for that purpose by Sir J. Bisset, who was in charge of the department for about a year during the most active period of the Peninsular war, and Sir R. Routh, who held an important charge in the Commissariat during the Peninsular war, and was afterwards for 16 years Commissary-general in Canada, including the period of both insurrections.

Besides the regulations of their own department, it is necessary that commissariat officers should be well acquainted with the various Royal warrants and other documents under which the military, ordnance, and some portion of the naval expenditure is carried on, in order that they may satisfactorily execute the services they are constantly called upon to render to those departments, and may be able to enforce the check they are required to exercise over unauthorised military expenditure of every kind. Articles 8, 88, 530 (p. 179.)

The military and ordnance regulations with which the officers of the Commissariat are required to make themselves acquainted contemplate a state of war as well as a state of peace.

In order to meet the serious emergencies of war, and to keep in check the heavy expenditure arising from them, the Treasury should have at its disposal able and trustworthy men of business for all the more important posts, and it is therefore indispensably necessary that we should have full previous experience of our agents, in order that we may know how far each can be trusted, what officers are possessed of the sagacity, prudence, and moral courage which qualify for the higher and more responsible charges, and who are possessed of the activity and executive ability which fit them for the practical duties connected with the supply of the troops in the field. This most important object is at present fully attained, for the senior officers of the department have been tried and proved under so many different circumstances of peace and war, in many different parts of the world, that no doubt remains as to the manner in which they would acquit themselves in any situation in which they might be placed; and the same remark applies to some of the younger officers, who have had more than usual opportunities of showing the qualifications they possess.

The

The consequence of bringing together a large number of untrained persons, unacquainted with the regulations and practice of the service, unknown to their superior officers, and unaccustomed to act together, was seen in the waste and profusion which characterized the commencement of the Peninsular war; it was also seen on a smaller scale in the Canada insurrections and the Caffre war, when it became necessary to employ a large number of inexperienced persons in subordinate, although, in many cases, important situations. It is also seen in the disposition which young men, on their first admission to the department, frequently show to neglect their duties, and sometimes to make free with the public money. The habit which the trained officers of the department have of dealing with the public money in a variety of ways, as if it were any other commodity with which they have to do in the course of their business, is only acquired by degrees, and some experience is requisite to convince young men that the checks provided by the regulations of the department are such that if they misappropriate any of the money entrusted to them, they will be inevitably detected in a very short time.

It must also be remembered that when officers have to be taken on a sudden from other professions, the persons who offer themselves are generally the least worthy and able members of those professions. Those who have been successful remain int heir own business, while only those who have been unsuccessful from any cause seek a new profession.

The least efficient of all the departments of the Indian Government is the Commissariat, which is mainly owing to the Indian commissariat officers being taken from the army without any previous experience. The business of the Commissariat is one which requires for its successful performance the experience of a life, and the devotion of the faculties more than most other professions. It is concerned with important and various objects; it brings the officers of the department into close connexion with many different kinds of persons, both in and out of the public service (the respectful deference due to the commanding officer in laying before him representations relating to unauthorised expenditure, and the caution required in dealing with sharp men of business of all sorts, who are striving to forward their own interests at the expense of the public, are instances in point); it is the subject of a detailed system of regulations extending to those of several other departments of the public service; and the difficulty, trust, and responsibility, especially in time of expected or actual war, are such as to call for the exercise of the highest mental and moral qualities.

The officers of the department have had, within the last few years, large experience of field service. There are few colonies in which operations of some sort have not been carried on, or preparations made against foreign war or domestic insurrection; and in some colonies these events have repeatedly occurred within the above-mentioned period. The following detail will show to what an extent the officers of the department have been employed of late years in this manner; and it must be remembered that the operations in the Canada insurrections and the Caffre wars, and the preparations against insurrection in Ireland and England in 1848, were on a large scale, and required the employment of a considerable number of officers:

Canada	1837	Insurrection.
	1839	Insurrection.
	1846	Preparations at Fort Garry.
	1849	Aggressions of Indians on Lake Superior.
Cape	1835	Caffre War.
	1846	- ditto.
	1848	Insurrection on the Orange River.
	1849	Anti-convict Disturbances.*
Gambia	1849	Expedition against the King of Keening.
Hong Kong	1847	Movement of troops to Canton.
Ionian Islands	1848	Insurrection at Cephalonia.
New Zealand	1845	Hostilities with Natives.
Syria	1840	Expedition in aid of the Turkish Government.
Windward and Leeward Islands	1841	Occupation of Pirara.
Ireland	1848	Preparations in every part of Ireland against an apprehended outbreak.
Liverpool and Manchester	„	Preparations against apprehended Chartist disturbances.

Besides preparations against apprehended hostilities which have been made at different times during the same period at Malta, Mauritius, &c.

Treasury, 16 May 1850. *C. E. Trevelyan.*

* To which may now be added the Caffre war, which commenced in January 1851, and ended in December 1852.

Appendix, No. 3.

NUMBER of Officers of each Rank on Full Pay, and Established Clerks at each of the Stations Abroad, on the 1st February 1854, just before the Appointment of a Commissariat Establishment for Turkey and for the Home Service.

STATIONS.	Commissaries-General.	Deputy Commissaries-General.	Assistants Commissary-General.	Deputy-Assistants Commissary-General.	Commissariat Clerks.	Totals.
Bahamas	-	-	-	2	-	2
Bermuda	-	1	1	3	1	6
Canada	-	1	5	9	3	18
Cape of Good Hope	1	1	5	18	2	27
Gambia	-	-	1	1	-	2
Gibraltar	-	1	1	3	-	5
Gold Coast	-	-	-	3	-	3
Great Britain	—	—	—	—	—	—
Honduras	-	-	-	2	-	2
Hong-Kong	-	1	-	3	-	4
Ionian Islands	-	-	1	4	-	5
Ireland	—	—	—	—	—	—
Jamaica	-	1	1	4	1	7
Malta	1	-	2	1	1	5
Mauritius	-	1	1	2	-	4
Newfoundland	-	-	1	1	-	2
New South Wales	-	-	2	4	-	6
New Zealand	-	-	1	3	-	4
Nova Scotia	-	1	4	4	3	12
St. Helena	-	-	1	1	-	2
Sierra Leone	-	-	1	3	-	4
South Australia	-	-	1	1	-	2
Van Diemen's Land	-	2	6	2	-	10
Western Australia	-	1	1	5	-	7
West Indies	-	1	8	13	-	22
Employed under the Board of Works in Ireland	-	1	1	5	-	7
On leave at Home	-	-	3	7	-	10
Totals	2	13	48	104	11	178

25 Permanent Clerks were appointed in 1854.

COMMISSARIAT Storekeepers and Issuers in *Canada, Nova Scotia,* &c.

No. 1.

LIST of Storekeepers and Issuers in *Canada* and *Nova Scotia;* Services, &c.; and probable fitness for Service in *Turkey.*

CANADA.

	Name.	Pay per diem.	Remarks.
		s. *d.*	
Storekeeper -	Joseph Fox - -	7 –	Originally a labourer. Transferred from Storekeeper-general's Department in September 1820. Service upwards of 33 years.
„	Charles Lymes -	7 –	Same remark.
Assistant Storekeeper.	James Christie - -	4 2	Joined the Department April 1838.—16 years' service.
„	James Colston - -	4 2	„ July 1839.—15 „
„	John F. R. Comer -	4 2	„ June 1831.—23 „
„	Thomas E. Dickinson	4 8	„ June 1825.—29 „
„	Thomas Donally -	4 8	„ Nov. 1828.—25 „
„	Robert Kirby - -	4 4	„ May 1837.—17 „
„	Peter Lenee - -	4 4	„ Aug. 1829.—24 „
„	Michael Tessier -	4 4	„ Feb. 1817.—37 „
„	Thomas Turnbull -	4 8	„ Nov. 1837.—16 „
„	Thomas Trumble -	4 –	„ Nov. 1838.—15 „
„	Thomas Powell -	2 6	Age 29 years. Joined Jan. 1854.
„	George Grant - -	4 2	Joined March 1845.— 9 years' service.
„	George Mattheson -	4 2	„ Aug. 1842.—14 „
Issuer - -	Peter Schouter -	2 6	„ May 1847.— 7 „
„ - - -	J. B. Tracey - -	2 6	„ Feb. 1848.— 6 „

NOVA SCOTIA.

Storekeeper -	None.	—	—
Assistant Storekeeper.	John Devlin - -	4 –	Joined June 1846.— 8 years' service.
„	Uriah Poultney -	4 –	„ Mar. 1839.—15 „
„	Thomas Short - -	4 –	„ Nov. 1847, from Ireland, 6 ½ years' service.
Issuer - -	John Devlin - -	2 6	Joined Oct. 1849.—4 ½ years' service.

No. 2.

Treasury Minute.

Read May 9, 1854.

Write to the Commissariat officers in charge at Gibraltar, Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Cape of Good Hope, that if there are any unmarried assistant-storekeepers or Commissariat issuers in their respective commands, who unite habits of activity with experience of departmental duties to such a degree as to render it probable that their services will be

Appendix, No. 3.

useful with the army in Turkey, my Lords desire that it be proposed to them to be appointed to that service, with such additional pay as may be hereafter determined by the Treasury; and in case they should accept the offer, desire that passage may be provided for them by the earliest opportunity, either direct to Constantinople, or by way of England, as circumstances may require.

Transmit a copy of this Minute to Commissary-general Filder for his information.

No. 3.

Deputy Commissary-general *Robinson* to Sir *C. Trevelyan*, K. C. B.

Montreal, 1 June 1854.

In answer to your letter, No. 953, of the 10th ultimo, I have the honour to state, for the information of the Treasury Board, that there is only one unmarried man among the assistant storekeepers and issuers of the department in this command; and he is too much advanced in life to enter on a new service.

Statement showing the Numbers, Ranks, Names, and Date of joining the Army in the East of the several Commissariat Officers and Subordinates, from the Commencement of the War until the close of the Year 1854.

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
1	Commissary-general -	Wm. Filder, C. B. -	April 15, 1854.	
4	Deputy Commissaries-general.	Thomas Stickney -	April 12, 1854	Returned to England, Invalided.
		T. W. Ramsay -	April 14, 1854	Since promoted to Commissary-general.
		George Adams -	April 22, 1854	From Board of Works, Ireland.
		E. A. F. Cowan -	June 14, 1854	Returned to England, Invalided.
12	Assistant - Commissaries-general.	John W. Smith -	March 12, 1854	Since promoted to Deputy Commissary-general. Returned Invalided.
		Philip Turner -	- ditto.	
		E. Strickland -	April 12, 1854	Returned Invalided: now in charge of the Department at the Piræus.
		F. E. Knowles -	April 14, 1854	Returned Invalided.
		M. W. Darling -	April 22, 1854.	
		Alex. Edwards -	May 7, 1854.	
		L. Routh - -	- ditto.	
		E. J. McMahon -	June 25, 1854.	
		H. Clarke - -	July 22, 1854.	
		W. H. Drake -	July 25, 1854	Since promoted to Deputy Commissary-general.
		F. S. Carpenter -	Aug. 1, 1854.	
		W. S. Archer -	Nov. 20, 1854.	
35	Deputy - Assistant Commissaries - general.	Charles Palmer -	March 12, 1854.	
		Robert Cumming -	March 24, 1854	From Board of Works, Ireland. Since promoted to Assistant Commissary-general.
		J. H. Thompson -	March 31, 1854.	
		H. Bartlett - -	- ditto.	
		C. Potgieter - -	April 8, 1854	Since promoted to Assistant Commissary-general.
		C. B. Smith - -	April 11, 1854.	

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
	Deputy - Assistant Commissaries - general—*continued.*	J. D. Willan -	April 14, 1854	From Board of Works, Ireland.—Since promoted to Assistant Commissary-general.
		Thos. Gem - -	- ditto -	Ditto - ditto.
		C. E. Probyn -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		F. E. Watt - -	- ditto -	From the Royal Mint.—Since promoted to Assistant Commissary-general.
		John F. Rogers -	April 22, 1854	From Board of Works, Ireland.
		H. J. Brownrigg -	April , 1854.	
		J. A. F. Mitchell -	- ditto.	
		V. W. C. Hawkins	May 7, 1854 -	Since promoted to Assistant Commissary-general.
		E. B. de Fonblanque	- ditto -	Ditto.
		A. W. Downes -	- ditto.	
		P. Rolleston - -	May 25, 1854.	
		A. C. Crookshank	- ditto.	
		B. J. Montanaro -	May 28, 1854.	
		R. C. Uniacke -	June 8, 1854 -	From Board of Works, Ireland.—Since promoted to Assistant Commissary-general.
		John Murray -	- ditto.	
		J. A. C. Sutherland	- ditto.	
		C. O. Swain -	- ditto.	
		R. M. Gardiner -	June 14, 1854	Since promoted to Assistant Commissary-general.
		Jas. Bailey - -	June 29, 1854.	
		Jas. W. Murray -	- ditto.	
		E. L. Ward - -	July 5, 1854.	
		T. Williams - -	July 22, 1854.	
		J. W. Woodley -	- ditto -	Returned Invalided.
		G. J. Webb - -	Not reported: From Malta July 24, 1854.	
		W. J. T. Power -	Aug. 1, 1854	Since promoted to Assistant Commissary-general.
		Joseph Marsh -	Nov. 27, 1854.	
		Robert Booth -	Nov. 18, 1854.	
		R. G. D. Selby -	Nov. 16, 1854.	
		A. W. Turner -	Dec. 24, 1854.	
19	Acting Deputy-Assistant Commissaries-general.	S. A. Blackwood -	April 8, 1854	Appointed from Treasury.
		Jas. S. Slade -	April 14, 1854	From Commissariat Department, Treasury.
		Herbert Murray -	April 22, 1854	From Treasury.
		E. J. Banon - -	Aug. 1, 1854 -	From Irish Constabulary.—Returned Invalided.
		C. J. de Gernon -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		C. Brew - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		G. du Bourdieu -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		T. C. Anderson -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		J. F. Studdert -	Aug. 3, 1854 -	Ditto.
		W. P. Coppinger -	Not reported: appointed July 29, 1854.	Ditto.

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
	Acting Deputy Assistant Commissaries-general—*continued.*	V. Goold - -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 2, 1854.	From Irish Constabulary.
		W. Fosbery - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. S. Watkins -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 3, 1854.	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		H. Bindon - -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 8, 1854.	Ditto.
		T. P. Carr - -	Oct. 18, 1854	Ditto.
		R. J. Ramsbottom	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		W. H. Hemsworth	- ditto -	Ditto.
		H. B. Thornhill -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		G. Trouton - -	- ditto -	Irish Revenue Police.—Dead.
12	Commissariat Clerks -	John B. Barlee -	April 14, 1854.	
		J. L. Fletcher -	April 22, 1854	Returned Invalided.
		J. Staniforth -	- ditto.	
		A. T. Cookesley -	- ditto -	Since promoted to Deputy-Assistant Commissary-general.
		Alex. Clerk - -	May 9, 1854.	
		G. H. Telfer -	May 25, 1854.	
		F. C. Colquhoun -	June 8, 1854	Ditto.
		W. U. Green -	June 29, 1854.	
		C. M. Seele - -	July 5, 1854.	
		F. S. Monk - -	Dec. 1, 1854.	
		G. R. Primrose -	Dec. 24, 1854	Ditto.
		A. S. Baynes -	Not reported: appointed June 8, 1854.	Engaged at Malta.
6	Acting Commissariat Clerks.	W. B. Roberts -	April 12, 1854	From Audit Office.
	Bookkeeper -	F. W. Weldon -	- ditto -	From Board of Works, Ireland.
	Storekeeper -	H. C. Harrison -	April 14, 1854	Stationery Office.
		R. Hankins, junr. -	May 9, 1854	Queen's Remembrancer's Office.
		A. W. Le Maitre -	June 8, 1854	Paymaster-General's Office.—Returned Invalided.
		Geo. Baker - -	Not reported: appointed July 26, 1854.	From Audit Office.
2	Assistant Clerks -	Thomas Furey -	June 29, 1854	Board of Works, Ireland.—Dead.
		Randal Stewart -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
35	Temporary Clerks -	Sharash Alpian -	April 27, 1854	Appointed by Commissary-general Filder.
		F. Innes - -	Not reported: appointed April 14, 1854.	Engaged at Malta.
		F. Casolani - -	Not reported: appointed April 15, 1854.	Ditto.—Since appointed Commissariat Clerk.
		A. Lazarus - -	May 1, 1854	Appointed by Commissary-general Filder.

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
	Temporary Clerks—*continued.*	J. F. Manning -	May 9, 1854	From Board of Works, Ireland.—Since appointed Commissariat Clerk.
		H. C. Lewis - -	- ditto -	Since appointed Commissariat Clerk.
		F. W. Callaghan -	- ditto.	
		H. Newsome -	May 21, 1854	Appointed by Commissary-general Filder.—Resigned.
		C. E. Johnson -	May 24, 1854	Ditto.—Taken prisoner.
		L. Willmer - -	May 26, 1854	Ditto.—Reduced.
		Richd. Barker -	June 8, 1854	Sons of British Consuls in the Levant, and appointed in this country on account of their knowledge of Eastern languages.
		J. P. Wilkinson -	- ditto -	
		E. F. O. Greenwood	June 12, 1854	From Ionian Islands.
		E. F. Greenwood -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		P. Cacopardo -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		T. M. Broughton -	June 25, 1854	Ditto.
		A. R. Thompson -	July 17, 1854	Selected in this country on account of his knowledge of the Russian language.—Since appointed Commissariat Clerk.
		Angelo Schiadan -	July 21, 1854	Appointed by Commissary-general Filder.
		W. F. G. Servantes	July 25, 1854	Since appointed Commissariat Clerk.
		Raffaele Gerundi -	Aug. 8, 1854	Appointed from Malta.
		W. H. Blades -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 28, 1854.	From Stationery Office.
		R. E. Hunter -	- ditto -	From Emigration Office.
		F. Ramsden - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		W. Fryer - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		George Chew -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		R. Price - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		R. S. Hurst - -	Not reported: appointed Sept. 23, 1854.	From Registrar-general's Office.
		E. Courtney -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		R. Stanes - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		A. C. Ryland -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. Simcott - -	Nov. 9, 1854	Appointed by Commissary-general Filder.
		W. Routh - -	Nov. 27, 1854	Ditto.
		C. Hale - -	Dec. 22, 1854	From Registrar-general's Office.
		T. W. C. Huxham	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. F. Seymour -	- ditto -	Ditto.
2	Temporary Junior Clerks.	G. H. Thompson -	Aug. 3, 1854	From Stationery Office.—Appointed to work copying-machine. Reduced.
		G. F. Lambert -	- ditto -	Ditto - ditto.
44	Interpreters - -	Vassili Berri -	April 1, 1854	Engaged by Commissary-general Filder.—Dismissed.
		Edward Nani -	April 15, 1854	Engaged at Malta. — Resigned.

(*continued*)

Appendix, No. 3.

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
	Interpreters—*continued.*	P. Savolon - -	April 19, 1854	Engaged by Commissary-general Filder.
		Theo. Prighieri -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Seyd Ali Bey -	- ditto	Ditto.—Resigned.
		J. Phillips - -	April 24, 1854	Ditto.
		Gregory Jacob -	April 25, 1854	Ditto.
		Cricore Haram -	April 26, 1854	Ditto.
		D'Arteri Burghos -	April 27, 1854	Ditto.
		E. Duckworth -	May 1, 1854	Ditto.
		A. Della Rocca -	May 16, 1854	Ditto.
		J. Carapet - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		O. D. Garabet -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Reuben Atternos -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		N. Nubarian -	June 7, 1854	Ditto.
		G. Menasyan -	June 12, 1854	Ditto.
		V. Manfredi -	June 14, 1854	Ditto.—Resigned.
		P. Daivise - -	June 16, 1854	Ditto.
		C. Daivise - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		A. Boozo - -	June 17, 1854	Ditto.—Resigned.
		T. David - -	June 19, 1854	Ditto.
		G. Prestopino -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. Calavasse - -	June 22, 1854	Ditto.
		Jos. Krymicki -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		A. Konopacki -	June 23, 1854	Ditto.
		P. Hollos - -	June 30, 1854	Ditto.—Discharged.
		C. Duckworth -	July 8, 1854	Ditto.
		D. Lambinos -	July 10, 1854	Ditto.—Resigned.
		J. Bogomil - -	July 11, 1854	Ditto.
		Ovans Mahram -	July 19, 1854	Ditto.—Resigned.
		M. Stocktovinski -	July 24, 1854	Ditto.
		G. Venturi - -	July 29, 1854	Ditto.
		N. D. Pathopoulos	Aug. 4, 1854	Ditto.
		G. B. Therese -	Aug 12, 1854	Ditto.
		L. Neweth - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		C. A. Lange -	Aug. 16, 1854	Ditto.
		F. Cristick - -	Aug. 17, 1854	Ditto.—Resigned.
		G. Sassov - -	Aug. 25, 1854	Ditto.
		— Volonski - -	Aug. 29, 1854	Ditto.
		F. Mayer - -	Aug. 30, 1854	Ditto.—Dismissed.
		Nich. Melinguse -	Nov. 13, 1854	Ditto.
		Antonio Tyan -	Nov. 15, 1854	Ditto.
		S. Dinarthin -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Paul Childe - -	Nov. 29, 1854	Ditto.
10	Storekeepers - -	Nicholas Podesta -	April 15, 1854	Engaged at Malta. — Resigned.
		Eman. Garcin -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Henry Clinton -	Not reported: appointed April 10, 1854.	From Irish Constabulary.

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
	Storekeepers—*cont*^{d}. -	G. Warren - -	Not reported: appointed April 21, 1854.	Dead.
		John Power - -	May 8, 1854	From Irish Constabulary.—Resigned.
		Charles Hayes -	May 9, 1854	From Irish Constabulary.
		Saml. Boyd - -	- ditto -	Serjeant, Royal Artillery.
		C. E. Mallain -	May 19, 1854	Engaged by Commissary-general Filder.
		R. Gerundi - -	Aug. 8, 1854	Engaged at Malta.
		T. Moorhead -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 30, 1854.	From Customs.
129	Assistant Storekeepers, Conductors, Issuers, &c.	Saml. S. Jevers -	May 9, 1854	Ireland.
		John Podesta -	May 25, 1854	Engaged by Commissary-general Filder.—Resigned.
		Richd. Biancardi -	June 1, 1854	Ditto.
		Cæsar Venzi -	- ditto -	Engaged by Commissary-general Filder.
		Peter Evans - -	June 8, 1854	Ditto.—Resigned.
		Thos. Brown -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Nicholas Young -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Henry Holt - -	June 10, 1854	Ditto.
		W. Cruikshank -	June 15, 1854	Ditto.
		L. F. Rapp - -	June 24, 1854	Recommended by Sir Richard Mayne.
		J. Dalton - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		W. Stuckey - -	- ditto -	Metropolitan Police.—Dead.
		D. W. Harley -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		W. Mear - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		E. Deggan - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		F. Bright - -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		J. Schechan - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. J. Dunne - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		R. Fernsby - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		W. Dodsworth -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		A. Pike - -	- ditto -	Metropolitan Police.
		R. Osborne - -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		John Dunne -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Patrick Cunningham	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Charles Gee - -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned.
		Jas. Mossman -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		D. Mc Naughton -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Charles Horne -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Geo. Pyle - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		William Bass -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Discharged.
		Gustavus Brough -	July 29, 1854	Engaged by Commissary-general Filder.—Discharged.

(*continued*)

Appendix, No. 3.

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
	Assistant Storekeepers, Conductors, Issuers, &c.—*continued.*	John Devlin -	Not reported: appointed July 1, 1854.	Formerly Commissariat Issuer, Nova Scotia. — Returned Invalided.
		Thos. Sykes - -	Not reported: appointed July 4, 1854.	Ditto, West Indies.
		Thos. Maunsell -	Not reported: appointed July 6, 1854.	Irish Constabulary.—Dead.
		Thos. Gildea -	Not reported: appointed July 10, 1854.	Ditto.—Dead.
		Richard Ronayne -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		John Roch - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Andrew Minihan -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Thos. Talbot -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		W. H. Mainwaring	- ditto -	Metropolitan Police.—Discharged.
		Alex. Manson -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		C. E. Harford -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Joseph Cox - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		William Wakeford	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Joseph Smyth -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		John Sims - -	Not reported: appointed July 17, 1854.	Ditto.—Resigned.
		Edward Pearce -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		Ralph Rolls - -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Resigned.
		James Holt - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. G. Murray -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		J. Macdonald -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		William Bruce -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		E. Mc Pherson -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		W. H. Pocock -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		Thos. K. Clarke -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Stephen Roots -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Jos. Forde - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Wm. Stack - -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 1, 1854.	Irish Constabulary.
		M. Hanly - - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Nicholas Carden -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Stephen Hedges -	- ditto -	Metropolitan Police.
		J. W. Elliott -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		Thos. Buchanan -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Saml. Corydon -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		F. H. Kingston -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Edward Pierson -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Alex. Allen Gilmore	- ditto -	Ditto.
		James Simms -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		H. A. Dore - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Ab. Augs. Hunter -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Joseph Cue - -	- ditto -	Irish Constabulary.
		W. G. Moran -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		James Vickers -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Taken prisoner.
		A. M'Clelland -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
	Assistant Storekeepers, Conductors, Issuers, &c.—*continued.*	Jas. Hobsin - -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 1, 1854.	Irish Constabulary.—Returned Invalided.
		Martin Meagher -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		John Reily - -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		James Miller -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 4, 1854.	Ditto.
		Patrick Naish -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 5, 1854.	Ditto.
		Thos. Hutchinson -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Patrick Duffy -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. Mc Carthy -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Taken prisoner.
		Thos. Vaughan -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 7, 1854.	Ditto.
		Frederick Spiller -	- ditto -	Formerly Commissariat Issuer, Cape of Good Hope.
		Daniel Mc Mahon -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 8, 1854.	Irish Constabulary.
		James Irwin -	- ditto -	Ordnance.
		Henry Smith -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		John O'Shea -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Daniel Pellatt -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		James Row - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Thos. Huddleston -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 9, 1854.	Liverpool Police.
		Patrick Walsh -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Jonathan Bell -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Hugh Mc Arthur -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Dead.
		Wm. Wilkinson -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Robert Gilchrist -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Thos. Clarke -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Saml. Lewis - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		John Conway -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		James Callander -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		John Wainwright -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 22, 1854.	Metropolitan Police.
		John Coales - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Michael Fannell -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		Thos. Newry -	- ditto -	Ditto
		Robt. Walker -	- ditto -	Ditto.—Returned Invalided.
		Richd. Werritt -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Solomon Allies -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		George Cook -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Richard Loft -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Henry Rhodes -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		A. F. Norman -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 30, 1854.	Customs.
		F. G. Reed - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. M. Padmore -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Jas. Brown - -	- ditto -	Ditto.

Appendix, No. 3.

No.	Rank.	Names.	Date of Joining.	Observations.
	Assistant Storekeepers, Conductors, Issuers, &c.—*continued.*	G. L. Durling -	Not reported: appointed Aug. 30 1854.	Customs.
		T. J. Lane - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		J. Benson - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		T. J. Andrews -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		James Tandy -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Thos. Boyce -	Not reported: appointed Dec. 18, 1854.	Ditto.
		George Brooks -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Thos. Hetherington	- ditto -	Ditto.
		William Mellon -	- ditto -	Metropolitan Police.
		Henry Clarke -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		George Townsend -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		William Billingsby	- ditto -	Ditto.
		Thos. Robinson -	Not reported: appointed Dec. 19, 1854.	Customs.
		Henry Reynolds -	Not reported	From Greece.
1	Printer - - -	Geo. Patterson -	Not reported: embarked April 5, 1854.	Recommended by Stationery Office.
4	To work the Hydraulic Press.	Jas. Matley - -	- ditto.	
		Geo. Marsden -	- ditto.	
		Jas. Brennan -	- ditto.	
		Michael Boulton -	- ditto.	
1	Office-keeper - -	Charles Routley -	Not reported: appointed Mar. 10, 1854.	From Stationery Office.
4	Messengers - -	John Nicolls -	May 1, 1854	Engaged by Commissary-general Filder.
		Carlo Gerada -	June 1, 1854	Ditto.
		— Manak - -	- ditto -	Ditto.
		— Minass - -	- ditto -	Ditto.

RECAPITULATION.

1 Commissary-general.
4 Deputy Commissaries-general.
12 Assistant Commissaries-general.
35 Deputy Assistant Commissaries-general.
19 Acting Deputy Assistant Commissaries-general.
12 Commissariat Clerks.
6 Acting Commissariat Clerks.
2 Assistant Clerks.
35 Temporary Clerks.
2 Temporary Junior Clerks.
44 Interpreters.
10 Storekeepers.
129 Assistant Storekeepers, Conductors, Issuers, &c.
1 Printer.
4 To work the Hydraulic Press.
1 Office-keeper.
4 Messengers.

Total - - 321

This statement does not include the military officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates who were employed from time to time in aid of the Commissariat, nor the large, but varying, number of natives of the country engaged in connexion with the Land Transport.

PART of the CORRESPONDENCE relating to the COMMISSARIAT ESTABLISHMENT attached to the ARMY in the EAST.

No. 1.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 31 March 1854.

WRITE to Commissary-general Filder that he has been apprised, from time to time, of the officers and other persons nominated by the Board to serve under his orders, as head of the Commissariat Department attached to the army under Lord Raglan's command, according to the general detail noted in the margin.*

My Lords are aware that the course of the service on which that army may be engaged may require that further assistance should be placed at Mr. Filder's disposal; and they will not fail, as opportunities offer, to make the requisite additions to his establishment, either from the officers and clerks of the department, who can be withdrawn from other stations, or from the class of persons in Government employ, whose general acquaintance with public business may afford presumptive proof of their capability to undertake the duties of the Commissariat, or from the best selections which can be made of temporary clerks.

The Commissariat officers appointed for this service will be entitled to the extra war pay allowed by the regulations, from the date of their respectively landing in the Turkish dominions.

No. 2.

Commissary-general *Filder* to Sir *C. Trevelyan*, K. C. B.

Commissariat, Malta, 15 April 1854.

I BEG to refer to your letter, No. 66, of the 3d instant, communicating to me the number of Commissariat officers, Treasury clerks, and subordinates, who had been appointed by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to serve with the expeditionary army under the command of Lord Raglan.

I deem it proper respectfully to represent to their Lordships that, to enable me to place the Commissariat on a footing adequate to the wants of an army of that force in the field, and to provide also for the depôts at Constantinople and Gallipoli, and for the account branch of the department, an establishment of not less than 54 officers and clerks of Treasury appointment will, on the lowest scale, be requisite, exclusive of subordinates.

No. 3.

Commissary-general *Filder* to Sir *C. Trevelyan*, K. C. B.

Commissariat, Constantinople, 5 June 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, with reference to my letter of April 15, that the calls upon the department to provide for the various services which are daily arising in relation to the equipment of the army and other duties, are so great, that the number of 54 officers and established clerks therein demanded will be inadequate to meet them.

This would have been the case had the strength of the army remained as contemplated at the time I addressed you on this subject; but I observe by the public papers that further augmentations of the force are still going on.

I would request, therefore, that assistance may continue to be sent to me until such time as I shall report that I have a sufficient establishment, and that it is equal to the efficient discharge of the duties it is called upon to perform.

I enclose herewith a copy of the return of the Commissariat Department ordered to join this army, which was transmitted by you to the Duke of Newcastle, to which I have added the distribution of the several officers and clerks included therein.

* 3 Deputy Commissaries-general, 5 Assistant Commissaries-general, 15 Deputy Assistant Commissaries-general, 3 Acting Deputy Assistant Commissaries-general, 5 Treasury Clerks, 1 Bookkeeper, 2 Clerks, 1 Clerk and Storekeeper, 3 Temporary Clerks, 3 Storekeepers, 1 Assistant Storekeeper, 1 Printer, 1 Office-keeper and Messenger:—Total, 44.

Appendix, No. 3.

Enclosure in No, 3.

RETURN of Commissariat Officers and Others, attached to the Expeditionary Force under the Command of his Excellency General Lord *Raglan*, G.C.B.

RANK.	NAME.	WHERE AND HOW EMPLOYED.
Commissary-general - -	William Filder.	
Deputy Commissary-general	Thomas W. Ramsay -	Superintending officer at Scutari, now at Varna.
Ditto - - -	Thomas Stickney - -	Examination and compilation of accounts, bills of exchange, tenders, &c.
Ditto - - -	George Adams - -	Superintending officer, general duties.
Ditto - - -	John W. Smith - -	In charge of local duties, contracts, purchases, &c.
Assistant Commissary-general.	Philip Turner - -	Gallipoli.
Ditto - - -	Alexander Edwards -	In charge of Division (Second).
Ditto - - -	Leonce Routh - -	Correspondence, and general duties.
Ditto - - -	Francis E. Knowles -	Returned to England, on sick leave.
Ditto - - -	Montague W. Darling -	In charge of Light Division.
Ditto - - -	Edward Strickland - -	In charge of First Division.
Deputy-Assistant-Commissary-general.	E. B. de Fonblanque -	Broussa, purchasing horses.
Ditto - - -	J. Douglas Willan - -	Cash payments, Pera.
Ditto - - -	F. L. Watt - - -	Attached to the Commander of the Forces, for examination of accounts, &c., previous to warrant.
Ditto - - -	Robert Cumming - -	In charge of Brigade of Cavalry.
Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General.	V. W. C. Hawkins - -	Purchases connected with baggage animals, &c., now at Varna.
Ditto - - -	Thomas Gem - - -	Shumla, Devna, and Varna.
Ditto - - -	C. F. Potgieter - -	In charge of depôt at Scutari, transport duties, and Quartermaster-general's stores.
Ditto - - -	Henry Bartlett - -	Gallipoli.
Ditto - - -	A. C. Crookshank - -	Koolali; in charge of cavalry and artillery.
Ditto - - -	John F. Rogers - -	Registry of papers, &c., and general duties, Commissary-general's office.
Ditto - - -	Charles Palmer - -	Military chest.
Ditto - - -	Charles B. Smith - -	From Gallipoli, ordered to Varna.
Ditto - - -	Philip Rolleston - -	Just arrived (under orders for Varna); will be attached to the next division that moves.
Ditto - - -	Charles E. Probyn - -	Brigade of Second Division.
Ditto - - -	J. H. Thompson - -	First Brigade Light Division.
Ditto - - -	James A. F. Mitchell -	Gallipoli.
Ditto - - -	Arthur W. Downes - -	In charge of duties connected with the equipment of baggage animals, and purchases and issues to departments in Pera.
Ditto - - -	H. J. Brownrigg - -	Camp Bouliar.
Acting Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General.	S. A. Blackwood - -	Brigade First Division.

RANK.	NAME.	WHERE AND HOW EMPLOYED.
Acting Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General.	J. S. Slade - - -	Depôt at Scutari.
Ditto - - -	H. H. Murray - -	Koolali.
Commissariat Clerk - -	A. C. Cookesley - -	Head-quarter Staff.
Ditto - - -	John B. Barber - -	Second Brigade Light Division.
Ditto - - -	John S. Fletcher - -	Cash payments of Pera.
Ditto - - -	John Staniforth - -	Gallipoli.
Ditto - - -	Alexander Clerk - -	With Head-quarter Staff, but ordered to depôt at Scutari, and will be attached to the next division that moves.
Ditto - - -	George H. Jelfer - -	Depôt, Scutari.
Acting Commissariat Clerk	W. B. Roberts - -	Examination and compilation of accounts.
Ditto - - -	A. S. Baynes - -	Attached to troop of horse artillery with Deputy-Assistant Commissary-general Cumming.
Ditto - - -	R. Hawkins - - -	Depôt, Scutari.
Book-keeper - - -	F. W. Weldon - -	Book-keeper's duties.
Stationery Storekeeper and Clerk.	H. C. Harrison - -	In charge of stationery for the army.
Temporary Clerk - -	J. F. Manning - -	Dislocated shoulder. Sick.
Ditto - - -	E. F. O. Greenwood -	Gallipoli.
Ditto - - -	F. W. Callaghan - -	General duties. Commissary-general's Office.
Ditto - - -	H. C. Lewis - - -	Ditto. Temporarily attached to depôt at Scutari.
Ditto - - -	E. F. Greenwood - -	Gallipoli.
Ditto - - -	P. Cacopardo - - -	Local duties, Pera.

[Being 49 persons in the rank of temporary clerk and upwards.]

Commissariat, Constantinople, 5 June 1854.

No. 4.

Commissary-General *Filder* to Sir C. *Trevelyan*, K. C. B.

Head-quarters, Varna, 24 August 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that not having, in the present state of the department under my orders, a sufficient number of Commissarat officers effective and fit for duty to attach to brigades, I have been constrained to apply to the Commander of the Forces to grant me the assistance of three military officers for service in the Commissariat, to which his Lordship has consented.

Under this arrangement, Captain Rhodes, 94th regiment, has been appointed from the 23d instant to do duty with the Commissariat, with the pay of 8 *s.* per day. Captain Rhodes, besides being otherwise qualified to be useful to the department, speaks the Turkish language fluently.

I enclose a return, showing the present state of the department as regards the commissioned officers and those subordinates who have been sent out from England. Besides those who are included in this return as sick and off duty, or dead, or resigned, there have been several casualties of the same nature amongst the storekeepers and interpreters who came from Corfu or Malta, or who have been appointed in Turkey. Of the officers also, many of those who appear in the return as effective, have passed through a severe illness.

Appendix, No. 3.

In a former report I stated that the officers selected from the Irish constabulary force seemed well suited for service in the Commissariat with this army, but I have since had reason somewhat to modify my opinion in this respect. It appears to me, that few gentlemen having any other profession or means of livelihood, will remain in a department, the harassing and incessant duties of which cause, in this country, so much sickness and mortality.

It will be seen by the return now transmitted, that of the six officers of the Irish constabulary force who were sent out from England, two have died, one has resigned on the plea of ill-health, one has not yet recovered from a severe attack of cholera, and two only are fit for duty.

It appears to me, that the most effective assistance that could be afforded to me would be, by appointing for service with this army, some of the temporary clerks employed in the colonies, chiefly the sons of officers of the Commissariat, or of the army and navy, who have already acquired a knowledge of Commissariat business, and who are most anxious to obtain a permanent footing in the department.

Such a measure might, no doubt, create an establishment of officers and clerks for whom there would be no adequate employment after the war; but this consideration, their Lordships might be of opinion should, under the circumstances, be made to give way to the pressing necessity for having an efficient department with this army.

Enclosure in No. 4.

RETURN of COMMISSARIAT OFFICERS and others, attached to the Expeditionary Force under the command of General Lord *Raglan*, G. C. B.*

RANK.	NAME.	REMARKS.
Commissary-general - -	Filder.	
Deputy Commissary-general -	Ramsay.	
Ditto - - - -	Stickney.	
Ditto - - - -	Adams.	
Ditto - - - -	Cowan - - -	Sick leave to England.
Ditto - - - -	Smith.	
Assistant Commissary-general -	Drake.	
Ditto - - - -	Turner.	
Ditto - - - -	Edwards - -	Unfit for field duty.
Ditto - - - -	Routh.	
Ditto - - - -	Carpenter.	
Ditto - - - -	Clarke - - -	Has been on the sick list ever since his arrival, and performed no duty.
Ditto - - - -	McMahon	
Ditto - - - -	Darling.	
Ditto - - - -	Strickland.	
Ditto - - - -	De Fonblanque.	
Ditto - - - -	Willan.	
Ditto - - - -	Uniacke.	
Ditto - - - -	Gardiner - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Watt - - -	On sick leave to England, but doing office duty at Pera.
Ditto - - - -	Power.	

* This Return is confined to the officers and others sent from England, and does not include the numerous persons appointed by the Commissary-general on the spot.

RANK.	NAME.	REMARKS.
Deputy-Assistant Commissary-general.	Williams.	
Ditto - - - -	Cumming.	
Ditto - - - -	Montanero.	
Ditto - - - -	Hawkins.	
Ditto - - - -	Gem - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Potgieter - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Bartlett.	
Ditto - - - -	Crookshank - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Rogers - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Woodley.	
Ditto - - - -	Palmer.	
Ditto - - - -	Swain - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Smith - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Rolleston.	
Ditto - - - -	Thompson.	
Ditto - - - -	Ward - - -	Sick ever since arrival, but does duty occasionally at Pera.
Ditto - - - -	Mitchell - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Downes.	
Ditto - - - -	Brownrigg.	
Ditto - - - -	J. Murray - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Sutherland.	
Ditto - - - -	Bailey.	
Acting Deputy-Assistant Commissary-general.	Blackwood.	
Ditto - - - -	Slade.	
Ditto - - - -	H. H. Murray.	
Ditto - - - -	Cooksley.	
Ditto, from Irish Constabulary.	Banon.	
Ditto - - - -	De Gernon.	
Ditto - - - -	Brew - - -	Sick in hospital.
Ditto - - - -	Du Bourdieu - -	Dead.
Ditto - - - -	Anderson - -	Dead.
Ditto - - - -	Studdert - - -	Resigned.
Commissariat Clerk - -	Colquhoun.	
Ditto - - - -	Barlee - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Fletcher - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Staniforth.	
Ditto - - - -	Clerk.	
Ditto - - - -	Telfer - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Green.	
Ditto - - - -	Seel.	
Acting Commissariat Clerk -	Roberts.	
Ditto - - - -	Hankins.	

 (*continued*)

RANK.	NAME.	REMARKS.
Acting Commissariat Clerk - -	Baines.	
Ditto - - - -	Le Maitre - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Thompson - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Lewis - - -	Sick in hospital.
Assistant Clerk - - -	Furey - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Stewart - - -	Sick, and has tendered his resignation.
Storekeepers and Assistant Storekeepers from England.	Hayes - - -	Resigned.
Ditto - - - -	Power - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Sykes.	
Ditto - - - -	Gildea - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Maunsell.	
Ditto - - - -	Rock.	
Ditto - - - -	Miniehan.	
Ditto - - - -	Talbot.	
Ditto - - - -	Mainwaring.	
Ditto - - - -	Manson - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Harford - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Cox.	
Ditto - - - -	Wakeford.	
Ditto - - - -	Smyth.	
Ditto - - - -	Bass.	
Ditto - - - -	Davelin - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Rolls - - -	Resigned.
Ditto - - - -	Sims - - -	Resigned.
Ditto - - - -	Bruce.	
Ditto - - - -	Holt - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	McPherson.	
Ditto - - - -	Pocock.	
Ditto - - - -	Clark - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Forde.	
Ditto - - - -	McDonald.	
Ditto - - - -	Pearce - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Murray.	
Ditto - - - -	Roots - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Rapp.	
Ditto - - - -	Dalton - - -	Sick, to England.
Ditto - - - -	Stuckey - - -	Dead.
Ditto - - - -	Harley - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Mear - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Diggan.	
Ditto - - - -	Bright.	
Ditto - - - -	Sheehan - - -	Sick in hospital.
Ditto - - - -	J. J. Dunn.	
Ditto - - - -	Fermsly.	
Ditto - - - -	Dodsworth.	
Ditto - - - -	Pike.	
Ditto - - - -	Osborne - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	J. Dunn.	

RANK.	NAME.	REMARKS.
Storekeepers and Assistant Storekeepers from England.	Cunningham.	
Ditto - - - -	Gee - - -	Returned to England.
Ditto - - - -	Mossman - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	McNaughton.	
Ditto - - - -	Horne - - -	Sick.
Ditto - - - -	Pyle - - -	Sick.

Commissary-General's Office, Varna,
23 August 1854.

SUMMARY.

Officers and Clerks - 69

Total absent from duty 26 (viz., 2 dead, 22 sick, 1 resigned, 1 unfit for field duty).

43

Storekeepers, &c. - - 48

Total absent from duty 22 (viz., 1 dead, 17 sick, 3 resigned, 1 returned to England).

26

TREASURY MINUTE on the above

Read September 8, 1854.

Write to Commissary-general Filder, with reference to his letter dated 24th ultimo, that my Lords will not withhold their sanction to the appointment, made at his suggestion by his Lordship the Commander of the Forces, of three military officers for service in the Commissariat in Turkey, during such time as their assistance may be found useful and necessary.

State that my Lords have not been unmindful of the importance of adding to the strength of his establishment, both in officers and in the subordinate classes, that due provision might be made not only for the increasing duties which devolve upon him, but also for the sickness which unhappily has prevailed to so great an extent among the members of the department.

In the absence of a sufficient number of trained Commissariat officers, it occurred to this Board that the officers of the Irish Constabulary, from the nature of their duties, belonged to a class more likely than any other to render effective aid to the Commissariat, and my Lords are unwilling to abandon this view of the case, notwithstanding that Mr. Filder was so soon deprived, by sickness and death, of the services of four out of the six of those officers first sent to Turkey.

The other measure to which Mr. Filder alludes—that of appointing for service in Turkey some of the temporary clerks employed in the colonies—is open to the objection that, supposing them to possess the requisite qualifications, they are too few in number to meet the emergency, as is evidenced by the paucity of the applications for service on the African coast, the vacancies there being generally filled up from that class; and that a considerable time must necessarily elapse before even those few could be recalled and despatched to the East.

The enclosed list will show the appointments made by this Board for Commissariat service in Turkey since the statement transmitted in his (Mr. Filder's) letter was compiled, to which are to be added the persons engaged on the spot to serve in subordinate offices in the department. It is intended to reinforce Mr. Filder's establishment still further, from time to time, by several experienced officers who are expected from the colonies; and considering that the greater number of these at present under his orders are well versed in their duties, and that the selection of others, on whom acting rank has been conferred,

Appendix, No. 3.

was very carefully made in the anticipation that they would speedily acquire the necessary experience, my Lords confidently trust that the means will not be wanting of undertaking and successfully fulfilling all the arduous duties which have to be performed by the Commissariat attached to the army under Lord Raglan's command.

Transmit copies of the papers, and of the foregoing minute, to Colonel Mundy, to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle.

No. 5.

Commissary-general *Filder* to Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K. C. B.

Head-quarters, Varna, 3 September 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that in consequence of a large proportion of the chargers and bât animals of the army being left at Varna, as well as all the invalids and convalescents, whilst the Commissariat establishment of the several divisions to which they belong have embarked with the troops, I have been under the necessity of applying, in the present state of the department, for the assistance of five, instead of three, military officers, as reported in my letter of the 24th August (No. 290), and the undermentioned have, in consequence, been temporarily attached to the Commissariat:

Lieutenant Falkner (30th Foot), from 9th August, at 9 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem.
Lieutenant Sayer (23d Foot), from 30th August, at 9 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem.
Ensign Gordon (14th Foot), from 1st September, at 9 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem.
Ensign M'Guiniss, from 2d September, at 8 *s.* per diem.

The three first of these officers are attached to brigades, and receive a higher rate of pay, as being accountants, in conformity with the General Order, of which extract is annexed.

Other military officers, who are not accountants, and merely doing duty with the department, under Commissariat officers, receive 8 *s.* per diem.

Enclosure in No. 5.

GENERAL ORDER.

Adjutant-General's Office, Head-Quarters, Varna,
(Extract.) 1 September 1854.

THE pay of military officers attached to the Commissariat department as public accountants, will be 9 *s.* 6 *d.* a day.

(signed) *J. B. B. Estcourt*,
Adjutant-general.

No. 6.

Commissary-General *Filder* to Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K. C. B.

Head-Quarters, Varna, 29 August 1854.

I HAVE the honour to request that you would represent to the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury that the services of a few clerks are urgently required for the Commissariat with this army.

In addition to the usual offices of business at Head-quarters and the principal stations, the Commissariat officers in charge of divisions of Infantry and brigades of Cavalry have now cash transactions of so large an amount and complicated a nature, that unless they are provided with clerks who are good accountants, their own attention being necessarily occupied in supplying the troops, their accounts will fall into irretrievable confusion.

Ten clerks of this class will be required; those who have held temporary appointments in the Commissariat, in the colonies, or clerks brought up in banking-houses, would be the most useful.

Newly-appointed established clerks unaccustomed to business of any kind, would be useless for the purpose in view.

TREASURY MINUTE on the above.

Read 19 September 1854.

AT the recommendation of the secretary of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission, my Lords are pleased to approve of the following gentlemen being employed as temporary clerks, in the Commissariat, in Turkey, with pay at the rate of 7 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem, from this date inclusively, and the allowances given to persons of this class when in the field:

Mr. Edward Courtney, Mr. Robert Stanes, Mr. Ashley Cooper Ryland, and Mr. Robert Samuel Hurst, from the 23d instant inclusively.

Write to them the usual letters of appointment, and desire that they will be prepared to embark in a few days in the "Faith" steamer for Constantinople, and on their arrival they will report themselves to Acting Deputy Commissary-general Smith, or the senior Commissariat officer.

Write to the Secretary to the Admiralty, and request that he will move the Lords Commissioners to direct that passages to Turkey may be provided, by an early opportunity, for the four temporary clerks in the Commissariat department, whose names are noted in the margin.

Write to Commissary-general Filder, apprising him of the appointment of the above four temporary clerks, who will proceed to Turkey by a steamer which is expected to leave the river in the course of a few days, and will complete the number (10) of this class applied for by his letter, No. 299, dated 29th August last.

Transmit to him a statement of their qualifications, furnished by the secretary of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, in whose office they have been employed, from which it may confidently be expected that they will render useful service.

State with reference to his letter, No. 315, dated 3d instant, that if Mr. Filder finds that the five military officers, for whose assistance he had applied to the Commander of the Forces, before the arrival in Turkey of all the officers and clerks sent out by this Board, are necessary for the execution of the particular duties assigned to them, my Lords will not object to their being continued in such employment as long as their services are required.

No. 7.

EXTRACTS from Letters from Commissary-General *Filder* to Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K.C.B.

Constantinople, 23 June 1854,
(Being the day on which he embarked for Varna.)

I HAVE at present, I think, as many subordinates as I require, although, until I have formed my cattle depôts and the transport establishment, I can scarcely speak positively on this point.

At Sea, 14 September 1854.

I HAVE now more than enough people of one sort or another, but not enough of the right sort. I would rather have one well-trained Commissariat officer than 10 police officers. When this affair is over I will reduce and put in order the establishment of the department.

Balaklava, 28 September 1854.

I DO not recollect to have said anything, either in my private or official letters, from which it could be inferred that I wanted the third batch of police officers, notified in your letter, No. 367. I do not know what to do with them: having no knowledge of Commissariat business they cannot act singly, and the Commissariat officers, to whom I have attached a few of them, have requested me to take them back again, saying that they would rather be without their assistance. In these circumstances I employ them chiefly with the transport. Some, perhaps, may turn out worth retaining; but be so good as to let me know how I can get rid of the remainder, when I come to make reductions.

Before Sebastopol, 2 November 1854.

I AT one time thought I had too many assistant storekeepers, but what with deaths, sickness, insubordination, drunkenness and theft, and two taken prisoners, the reduction of numbers is great. The officers, under whom they are serving, speak well of those who came out from the Custom-house. Those from Woolwich are also good, but two of them are dead.

Appendix, No. 3.

LETTERS from Mr. *Filder*, 28th February 1855, and Lord *Raglan*, relative to the Supply of Fresh Meat.

Before Sevastopol,
25 February 1855.

The return transmitted by Sir Richard England of the number of cattle received by the 3d Division is incorrectly summed up; the number should be 118 head, which, with 30 head that had not reached the division at the date of Sir R. England's report, and another lot of 30 from the "Cormorant," which appear, owing probably to the miscarriage of the order, not to have been taken away, will account nearly for the difference between the two statements.

When the sick are as numerous as they are in the 3d Division, and that they receive full rations of fresh meat two days in three, it can only be done by depriving the rest of the troops of their proportion.

Every effort is being made to increase the supply of fresh meat; but the service at this season of the year is liable to many interruptions.

In stating that fresh meat might be provided three, if not four, days a week, the Commissary-general excepted the occurrence of casualties, which, however, have been numerous. On one occasion, owing to the severity of the weather, a whole cargo of cattle perished: frequent obstructions also arise to the service from the occupation of Balaklava Harbour as our shipping port: recently, when five cattle vessels, which had discharged their cargoes, were ready to proceed to sea, the wind blew from the south during three days successively with so much violence that they could not get out. On the 4th day it blew a gale from the north, and no ship was allowed to move from its moorings; on the 5th, it was found that the southerly wind had brought so many vessels to the narrow entrance of the harbour, that not one could get either in or out; and it was not till the 6th day that the cattle vessels could proceed to their destination.

It is to be observed, moreover, that whilst the sick of this army are so numerous, the providing them with full rations of fresh meat daily, or even two days in three, would alone, without the occurrence of the casualties above adverted to, go far to account for the rest of the troops not receiving the quantity which the Commissary-general had considered might probably be supplied.

With respect to vegetables, large quantities have been issued; all the regiments applying for them are allowed to have as many as they choose, or have the means of taking away.

(signed) *William Filder*, C.G.

Balaklava, 28 February 1855.

In transmitting to the Commissary-general the accompanying papers from Sir Richard England, showing a discrepancy between the former statement of the issue of fresh meat to the 3d Division and that reported by the Commissary in charge to the latter, the Commander of the Forces requests that it may be ascertained what really was provided in the time stated. Lord Raglan would anxiously press upon Mr. Filder the necessity of taking the most active measures to secure abundant supplies of fresh meat for the troops to be issued regularly. Mr. Filder will recollect that many weeks have elapsed since he told Lord Raglan that he expected to be able to provide fresh meat to the troops three, if not four times a week.

Is there any chance of his being able to realise that expectation?

The Commander of the Forces desires to know whether vegetables are regularly issued to the men.

(signed) *Raglan.*

COMMISSARIAT CORRESPONDENCE relating to the SUPPLY of the ARMY subsequently to its leaving *Varna*, referred to in the Answer to *Q.* 14221. Appendix, No. 3.

(No. 307.)

Sir, Head Quarters, Varna, 2 September 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that a proportion of the mules belonging to the Ambulance corps having been transferred to the Commissariat, and Commissary-General Wild having also forwarded to me 41 mules from Malta, no further purchase of animals in Spain will, I am of opinion, be requisite at present.

This may be a proper occasion for bringing under their Lordships' notice the number of bât animals which have been purchased for the service of this army and their appropriation.

The absence, from sickness, of some of the Commissariat officers, who have been employed in procuring or paying for these animals, prevents me from submitting an exact account, but the numbers purchased, and the appropriation of the same, have been nearly as under:—

Purchased - - - -	- -	- -	5,288
Appropriation:—			
Regimental establishment or baggage animals -	842		
Ditto - - - for carrying water bags -	134		
		976	
Reserve ammunition - - - - - -	- -	1,203	
Sundry services, mounting conductors, interpreters, &c.	- -	98	
Commissariat transport - - - - - -	- -	3,011	5,288

To the Commissariat transport are to be added 71 mules received from Malta, and 250 from Barcelona (50 of the 300 received from the latter place having been given over to the artillery), and 50 received from the Ambulance, making in all 3,381.

This is a greater number for Commissariat transport of this description than I should have considered necessary for the more limited scene of operations to which the army is now about to proceed; but although the animals are numerous, their cost has been comparatively trifling, the larger proportion of them having been purchased at a price not exceeding 4 *l.* 10 *s.*, and the average price of the whole, excluding the Spanish and Maltese mules from the calculation, may be taken at 7 *l.* Two months' hire, had they been hired, would have amounted to as much as their cost.

The ammunition animals will, in the first instance, accompany the army to the Crimea, and the regimental baggage animals will be removed as soon as transports can be spared for the purpose. A proportion of Commissariat transport, consisting exclusively of carts and draught animals, will be embarked on board one of our cattle vessels, and such part of the remainder as I consider necessary will follow; but that proportion of the animals which I deem to be in excess of what will be required in the Crimea, I shall endeavour to place out in the villages in the neighbourhood of Varna, under the responsibility of the Aghas, and the supervision of a Commissariat officer. The cost of their keep will in this manner be trifling.

The desertion of many of the drivers, also, who have hitherto been faithful to us, but who are afraid to embark for an enemy's country, renders such a measure the more necessary.

In conclusion I would beg to observe, that this part of the Commissariat Transport Establishment has been organised on the same principle as the Commissariat Transport in

Appendix, No. 3.

the Peninsula was at the close of the war, when it was in its highest state of efficiency, with the exception that, having found it impracticable to provide hired animals, as in the Peninsula, I have been under the necessity of substituting animals the property of Government, which are less efficient.

I have, &c.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K.C.B. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.
&c. &c. &c.

(No. 316.)

Head Quarters, Varna,
4 September 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, a statement of the stores remaining in the commissariat magazines and in ships afloat, on the 31st ultimo, as nearly as it has been practicable to ascertain these particulars.

Owing to the confusion arising from the embarkation of the army at Varna, and the number of transactions that are going on, it has not been possible in the present weak state of the department, either to close the books, or to take the remains of magazine by survey; they are therefore not included in this statement; but since the principal storehouses were burnt down, the quantity of supplies on shore at this place at any one time has been inconsiderable, and if included, would not materially affect the present Return.

Since the statement was made up, I have returned to the navy 370 bags of biscuit, part of 1,000 bags with which they were to have assisted me in consequence of the loss occasioned by the late conflagration, and I have lent them besides 1,000 bags for completing the transports with provisions.

The quantity of biscuit shown in the statement is greater than I should have considered it necessary to carry on with the army; and I had directed one of the steam transports, chiefly laden with that article, to proceed to Constantinople to be unladen there, and then to be given over to the navy, but the naval authorities have detained her here for the purpose of towing sailing transports.

Although I have no means of forming an estimate of the additional supply that will be necessary, I think it probable that the quantity of rum which will be required for the service of this army will be greater than that shown by the Return transmitted with my letter of the 9th ultimo. The men employed in the trenches will no doubt receive a larger ration than the present reduced one of this article, and it will probably be found necessary to increase the allowance to the whole of the army when the cold weather sets in.

I would suggest, therefore, that a further supply of rum beyond that shown by the estimate above mentioned to be requisite, should be forwarded to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K. C. B. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 19 September 1854.

TRANSMIT copies of this letter and of the statement to Colonel Mundy, to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle, and acquaint him for the information of his Grace, that my Lords have already taken measures for consigning a further supply of rum from this country for the service of the army in Turkey.

STATEMENT

STATEMENT of Commissariat Stores and Articles of Extra Diet remaining in Magazine and Afloat on 31st August 1854.

DISTRIBUTION.	Pounds of											Forage, Pounds of				Sperm Candles, Lbs.	Pounds of		Gallons of			REMARKS.
	Flour.	Meal (Rye).	Biscuit.	Salt Beef.	Salt Pork.	Sugar.	Rice.	Coffee.	Tea.	Chocolate.	Scotch Barley.	Oats.	Barley.	Hay.	Bran.		Preserved Potatoes.	Dried Potatoes.	Rum.	Porter.	Ale.	
Gallipoli	19,830	–	8,747	–	1,294	–	9,265	11,124	–	510	–	–	18,770	–	518	–	–	–	565	472	158	—
Constantinople	–	–	3,790	31,500	15,900	102,200	11,000	76,000	–	–	–	–	*299,806	48,776	1,000	597	13,620	7,440	–	9,270½	540	* Exclusive of 4,500,000 now delivering under contract.
Devna	107,800	†1,600	62,000	–	–	2,272	772	3,953	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	† Not for issue to the army.
Varna, afloat and to be landed	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1,200,000	—								
Total	127,630	1,600	74,537	31,500	17,194	104,472	21,037	91,077	–	510	–	–	1,518,576	48,776	1,518	597	13,620	7,440	565	9,742	6 8	
Afloat, and to accompany the Army:																						
Hope	–	–	133,900	55,276	39,680	32,400	56,800	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5,520	–	–	Steam transports.
Sovereign	–	–	11,200	137,500	45,400	46,600	100,189	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Albatross	–	–	2,240	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	19,200	–	–	2,070	–	–	–	–	–	Cattle vessels, ditto.
Cormorant	–	–	1,800	41,040	34,560	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	18	–	–	
Wild Wave	–	–	249,984	–	–	–	–	11,200	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5,590	–	–	Transports.
Bride	–	–	305,215	73,264	67,520	19,000	–	42,000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6,624	–	–	
Sir George Pollock	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	71,880	–	–	–	3,147	722,754	1,863	260	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Lady Valiant	–	–	33,824	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	387,118	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Industry	–	–	400,176	–	–	111,440	2,828	5,000	15,029	–	10,043	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	Steam transports.
Cottingham	–	–	550,928	–	–	38,556	33,576	–	–	–	21,274	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Sea Nymph	–	–	267,680	41,040	43,200	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Guiseppe, P.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	560,000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	Freight vessels.
Sextus	–	–	239,600	100,016	99,840	24,326	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	11,476	–	–	
Orestes	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	724,080	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Total	–	–	2,196,547	448,136	330,200	272,322	193,393	130,080	15,029	–	31,317	3,147	2,413,152	1,863	260	2,070	–	–	29,228	–	–	55,000 gallons of porter on board the Jane Cockerell.

Head Quarters, Varna,
8 September 1854.

William Filder, c. c.

Appendix, No. 3.

Sir, Downing-street, 7 September 1854.

Having laid before the Duke of Newcastle your letter of the 28th ultimo, and its enclosures (herewith returned), I am directed to request you will state to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, that his Grace observes by their Lordships' Minute of the 25th ultimo, a copy of which is enclosed in your letter, that a much larger supply of pork than of beef has been ordered by their Lordships for the use of the army in Turkey.

As his Grace has been given to understand that salt pork has been found to be unwholesome for the troops in the climate of Turkey, I am to request that you will move their Lordships to inform his Grace whether they have any information to show that there is any truth in that report.

I am, &c.
(signed) *E. C. Mundy.*

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

Commissariat.

Treasury Minute, dated 8 September 1854.

Request that Col. Mundy, with reference to this letter, will state to the Duke of Newcastle that there is no information in this office showing that salt pork has been found to be unwholesome for the troops in the climate of Turkey, and the requisitions of Commissary-general Filder for salt meat, the last of which is dated the 9th ult., being in the proportion of two-thirds of pork to one-third of beef, it may safely be concluded that he had no reason to suppose that salt pork was deleterious.

Salt pork is in general preferred by the troops, and more of it is issued than salt beef, with the approval of the officers in command, at the stations in the West Indies and the Mediterranean, where, however, it forms but a small part of the soldiers' animal diet.

The information which has reached the Duke of Newcastle may, perhaps, have reference to the case of a continuous issue of salt meat for a length of time during the summer months; but under any circumstances, my Lords will not fail to call Commissary-general Filder's attention to his Grace's observations on the subject, and they will desire him to furnish a report thereon, after having consulted the Commander of the Forces.

Transmit to Commissary-general Filder copies of this letter and of the minute thereon, and write to him accordingly.

No. 332.)

Head Quarters, Balaklava,
30 September 1854.

Sir,

I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, and with reference to your letter of 11th instant, that having consulted the Commander of the Forces on the subject, his Lordship is of opinion that salt pork constitutes a preferable ration for the troops in this country than salt beef; he has indeed on some occasions desired that the meat ration of soldiers embarked on board ship should consist exclusively of salt pork.

E. 1,987.
20,047—8/9.

I have also consulted the principal medical officers, and they are of opinion that there is nothing deleterious in the use of salt pork in this climate, and consider it to be in every respect a better ration for the troops than salt beef. It makes a better mess when mixed with vegetables, whilst salt beef is ill suited for the use of an army in the field, for, unless soaked a long time in water, it is scarcely eatable.

I have, &c.
(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.

Commissariat.

Treasury Minute, dated 20 October 1854.

Write to Col. Mundy, referring to his letter dated 7th ult., and the letter of this Board dated the 9th September, relative to the supply for the use of the army under Lord Raglan's command of a larger proportion of salt pork than salt beef, and transmit, to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle, copy of a report from Commissary-general Filder, dated 30th ult., on this subject.

(No. 325.)

Head Quarter Camp, Alma River,
22 September.

Sir,

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that the army effected its disembarkation in the Crimea on the 14th instant. In all its subsequent movements, the troops, notwithstanding our inadequate means of transport, have experienced no deficiency of supplies, excepting as regards forage corn, which has been occasionally wanting, but not to an extent to cause any serious inconvenience.

The

Appendix, No. 3.

The Tartar part of the population seems well disposed towards us, but those of Russian origin have fled, apprehensive, I imagine, as to the treatment they might receive from the allied army; but no doubt, on hearing that we pay for all supplies brought in by either race, they will gain confidence and also come forward.

The part of the country through which we have hitherto passed produces hay in abundance, and, I suppose, large quantities of forage corn, although not visible, the harvest having been gathered in; but these supplies cannot be made available by us to any extent, as the Cossack cavalry close upon our rear as fast as we advance. The country is also favourable for pasturing cattle, and the troops have been almost exclusively supplied with fresh meat from herds bought or captured in the immediate vicinity of the army.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 10 October 1854.

TRANSMIT a copy of this letter to Col. Mundy, for the information of the Duke of Newcastle.

(No. 335.)

Head Quarters, Balaklava,
2 October 1854.

Sir,

ADVERTING to your letter, No. 364, by which you advise me of the shipment, with other supplies, of 39,988 lbs. preserved potatoes, I have the honour to acquaint you that there is no demand for this article by the troops; on the contrary, considerable quantities of it have been returned into store by the regiments after having been issued to them.

E. 1,993.
20,205,
20,237—12/9.

I have found it wholly impracticable to frame an estimate of the probable consumption of supplies not forming part of the fixed ration, and the drawing of which in unlimited quantities is optional with the troops; but I would beg to suggest that, in future, no articles of this description should be sent from England for the use of this army, excepting upon requisitions which will be, from time to time, submitted by me, according as I find there is likely to arise a demand for them.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(No. 355.)

Commissariat, Balaklava,
Crimea, 8 October 1854.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter of 22d ultimo, I have to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that throughout the whole of the movements of the army, up to the present time, the troops have never been without their rations. Some irregularities may have occasionally occurred in the deliveries, owing to the lateness of the hour at which the troops arrived on the ground for the night, or to the unavoidable confusion arising from so large a force moving together; but the provisions have always been present with the army. There has, however, been the same exception with respect to forage for the cavalry as mentioned in my former report; nevertheless, rations of corn have seldom been wanting, although they may have been irregularly issued.

Up to the present time the meat ration has consisted of a large proportion of fresh meat, obtained from the country, but the communication with the interior being for the most part closed or difficult, this source of supply is nearly exhausted, and we have to look, in future, to the cattle we can bring from the depôt at Varna. The Commissariat vessels have hitherto been employed in conveying transport animals, but they will now be employed exclusively in bringing over cattle, which will, I trust, enable me to supply the troops with fresh meat on alternate days.

In like manner, also, the forage of the country within the limited space to which we are confined is nearly exhausted, but the opportune arrival of the ships from England laden with the hay, of which a large proportion may be appropriated to present use, will, I anticipate, prevent any serious inconvenience being experienced from this cause.

It had been my intention to transmit, for the information of their Lordships, a statement of the Commissariat supplies on hand on 30th ult., but the Navy, in their desire to despatch the vessels in which they were laden on other services, have taken out the stores and distributed them amongst other transports, and I have as yet been unable to obtain a correct statement of the quantities remaining, but I believe them to be ample.

The depôt at Varna is to be broken up, and the Commissariat transport animals in excess of the number required for the service of the army in the Crimea have been ordered over-

Appendix, No. 3.

D. 511. E. 2,139.

land to Constantinople, there to remain lest their services should hereafter again be required. I enclose copy of a memorandum which was submitted by me to Lord Raglan on this subject, and of his Lordship's decision thereon.

During the late movements considerable losses of Commissariat stores have occurred. Whenever an araba laden with ammunition broke down, it was deemed expedient by the military authorities, in consequence of the limited supply on shore, to place the ammunition on the provision waggons, and to leave the provisions on the ground. Many of our own waggons, during a forced march, which for the baggage of some of the divisions lasted 30 hours, and owing to the confusion also arising from three armies moving on one narrow line of communication, likewise broke down, or the animals became exhausted by fatigue. The supplies on these occasions were necessarily abandoned, and there was not always a Commissariat officer or subordinate present to take cognizance of these losses, particularly during the night.

In consequence of these circumstances, the accountants concerned will not, I fear, in all cases be able to produce satisfactory vouchers of their provision accounts, but although the quantities of stores thus lost may be somewhat considerable, the money value is, I apprehend, inconsiderable.

With respect to the cash accounts of the department, although those of the division Commissariat officers are in arrear, this is owing to the officers being separated from their papers, no baggage or baggage animals having been permitted to accompany the expedition in the first instance, or to land; but I feel assured that whenever this impediment is removed their accounts will be promptly rendered.

I have, &c.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C.G.

(E. 2,139.)

Balaklava, Crimea, 5 October 1854.

MEMORANDUMS.

6 October 1854.

IT being impossible to say what may be the next operation, and there being no reason to suppose that the war is near its termination, it appears to me that the most prudent course will be to send the Commissariat horses and mules in excess of our present wants from Varna to Constantinople by land, and have them kept in that neighbourhood upon such rations of forage as animals doing nothing may seem to require.

I think the buffaloes should not be sold.

They might either be left at Varna or sent into Rumelia, travelling towards Constantinople at a slow rate.

(signed) *Raglan.*

THE Commissary-general solicits instructions respecting the disposal of the Commissariat transport animals still remaining at Varna.

The number he now has with the army, with some few more of the most efficient of the animals that might be brought from Varna, would, he is of opinion, be adequate to the transport service of this army, should its operations be confined within a limited sphere, as at present. If any greater number were to be brought over than would suffice for this object they would only add to the difficulty of feeding the horses and baggage animals already in the Crimea.

There would in that case remain between 2,000 and 3,000 animals in excess of any present want, and to be disposed of.

As the depôt at Varna is about to be broken up, and the military withdrawn, there appears to be no other mode of disposing of such excess than either by sale or by sending the animals to Constantinople, if possible, overland, there to remain in depôt in case they should be wanted for any future service. If the former course were to be adopted the animals would fetch little or nothing, even if only a small proportion of them were to be sold, the original cost of those purchased in Bulgaria not having exceeded 4 *l.* 10 *s.* upon the average, and, if the latter, a great number of them are not worth the cost of their maintenance during the winter.

On the other hand, if the operations of the army should hereafter be on a more extended scale in this country, a considerable proportion of the 2,000 or 3,000 animals which would be in excess under the foregoing supposition would require to be brought over from Varna.

Instructions also are solicited with respect to the disposal of the buffaloes remaining at Varna.

Major

Appendix, No. 3.

Major Adye has stated that they will not be required here for the artillery service.

They might be sold probably at Varna, but would fetch little, whilst at Constantinople animals of this description are much more valuable. If to be sent to the latter place, it would be necessary that a transport should be appropriated for their conveyance, as they could not travel that distance overland.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Lord Raglan, G.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 24 October 1854.

TRANSMIT copies of this letter, and of its enclosure, to Colonel Mundy, to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle.

(No. 373.)

Commissariat, Balaklava,
22 October 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to lay before you, for the approval of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the accompanying copy of a general order issued by the Commander of the Forces, authorising the ration of biscuit to be increased, from 15th instant, to 1½ pound per man daily whilst the troops are employed in the siege operations before Sebastopol.

G. O. No. 2, 15 Oct. 1854.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

GENERAL ORDERS.

(No. 2.)

Head Quarters, Sevastopol,
15 October 1854.

THE ration of biscuit whilst the troops are employed in the present laborious operations will be one pound and one-third per man daily, commencing this day.

This extra allowance is not to be issued to civil servants or followers of the army.

(signed) *J. B. B. Estcourt*, A. G.

(True copy.)
S. Routh, A. C. G.

(No. 375.)

Commissariat, Crimea,
Balaklava, 22 October 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, copy of a communication made to me by command of Lord Raglan, directing me to provision a Turkish brigade of infantry, which lately arrived from Constantinople, and is now serving with the British army in the Crimea.

E. 2,218.

A detachment of troops of the same nation had been previously transferred from the French army, with which it had arrived in the Crimea, to the British, and has been rationed by the Commissariat. These forces together amount to 5,924 men, and with further reinforcements daily expected from Batoum and elsewhere, this auxiliary corps will consist of 10,000 men.

Lord Raglan has informed me that he is authorised by the Secretary of State for War to take into pay and to provision, if necessary, that number of Turkish troops. It is his Lordship's intention, however, that they should at present be rationed only by the Commissariat.

I have, &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Appendix, No. 3.

(E. 2,218.)

Camp, Heighlabone, Sevastopol,
15 October 1854.

Sir,

I AM directed by General Airey to inform you that it is Lord Raglan's wish that you should provision the Turkish brigade lately arrived from Constantinople.

I have, &c.,
(signed) *W. Morris,*
Capt. and D. A. Q. M. G.

The Commissary-general,
Balaklava.

(True copy.)

(signed) *S. Routh,* A. C. G.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 7 November 1854.

TRANSMIT copies of this letter and of its enclosure to Colonel Mundy, to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle.

(No. 379.)

Commissariat, Crimea,
Balaklava, 23 October 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to bring to the notice of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury that, under the uncertainty which exists as to the future operations and position of this army, I am unable to estimate the length of time during which it may be necessary to provision the troops with biscuit sent from England, or to make any arrangements for providing for them otherwise. It will be some time indeed after I am in possession of the requisite information before all the preparatory measures for entering upon another mode of supplying the troops can be completed.

I would suggest, therefore, that the shipment from England of 1,000,000 pounds of biscuit per month should be continued for the present, or until such time as I may notify that consignments of this article are no longer necessary.

With regard to forage, also, it is wholly impracticable, as I have already reported, to procure either hay or straw in the country we now occupy. Pressed hay could alone be brought from a distance; and it appears, from the reports of Deputy Commissary-general Smith, to be improbable that the contractors at Constantinople will be able to deliver, under the agreement reported in my letter of 25th July last, a sufficient quantity of hay of good quality to meet the consumption of the troops in the Crimea. I would recommend, therefore, that shipments of this article from England be also continued till the future position of the army, and the practicability of making other arrangements for its supply, are known.

B. 215.

I have, &c.
(signed) *William Filder,* C. G.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K. C. B.,
&c. &c. &c.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 7 November 1854.

WRITE to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and request that he will state to the Lords Commissioners that Commissary-general Filder has reported, under date the 23d ultimo, that in the uncertainty which exists as to the future operations and position of the army in the Crimea, it is important that he should continue to be supplied with biscuit from this country at the rate of 1,000,000 pounds per month until he can notify that consignments of this article are no longer necessary, and accordingly request that directions may be given for providing and shipping biscuit to the above extent, and for consigning it as usual to the Commissary-general in the Crimea, with instructions to the masters of the vessels to call for orders on the senior Commissariat officer at Constantinople.

In the same Report Mr. Filder represents that he is for the present dependent on supplies of pressed hay from a distance, and the Secretary will therefore move the Lords Commissioners to direct that a quantity, equal to that conveyed by the "Belgravia," may be shipped with as little delay as possible, to be followed by further shipments to a like extent, at intervals not exceeding 14 days, until the local resources may become available, of which due notice will be given to the Lords Commissioners.

Acquaint Commissary-general Filder with the above direction with reference to this letter.

Transmit copies of Commissary-general Filder's letters, No. 373, dated 22d ultimo, and No. 379, dated 23d ultimo, with a copy of the foregoing minute, to Colonel Mundy, to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle.

(No. 397.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 8 November 1854.

It being probable that this army will remain in the Crimea during the ensuing winter, I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that in such event it will be dependent upon supplies sent from England for its subsistence, with the exception of fresh meat (which may be procured from the neighbouring countries to an extent which would render it necessary to provide salt meat from England only for an issue on every alternate day) and of forage corn.

Considering the casualties to which the conveyance of supplies by sea, from England to Constantinople, and thence across the Black Sea, during the winter season, must be liable, the present state of the Commissariat supplies of this army is not, I am of opinion, satisfactory, there being no reserve of any kind. It would be desirable, consequently, that a depôt of all the different articles should be formed at Constantinople with all practicable despatch.

The quantity of biscuit which has latterly been sent from England would have sufficed in some degree towards this object, besides meeting the current consumption, but the extra allowance of this article, which has been given to the troops in consideration of their continuous labours in the trenches, and the number of seamen and marines which have been landed and rationed by the Commissariat, together with the Turkish troops, now amounting to upwards of 8,000 men, for whom I have had to provide without any such previous notice being given to me as would enable me to obtain supplies of a quality suitable to their use from Constantinople, has prevented the accumulation of any surplus. The provision of this article from England should be calculated at one million and a quarter of pounds per month, instead of one million, as stated in my letter of the 23d October.

B. 379

With respect to hay, also; had the army wintered at Constantinople or its vicinity, it might have been supplied with the forage of the country, and it would have been necessary only to forward from England, as a measure of precaution, such a quantity of hay as would provide against the possibility of a scarcity; but if the army is to winter in the Crimea, it will be necessary that it should be entirely supplied with hay from England, as it would not be possible to convey by sea straw or hay loose in sufficient quantities for its consumption; and the hay which has been delivered under contract at Constantinople, and is now being pressed there, will last but for a short time.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Commissariat.

Treasury Minute, dated 28 November 1854.

Read a letter from Commissary-general Filder, dated Balaklava, 8th instant, in which he states that in the event of the army remaining in the Crimea during the ensuing winter, it will be dependent upon supplies sent from England for its subsistence, with the exception of fresh meat, on alternate days, and of forage corn; and he recommends that a depôt of all the different articles should be formed at Constantinople with all practicable despatch.

In this letter Mr. Filder makes special allusion only to two articles, biscuit and hay. He requests that the provision of biscuit from England may be calculated at one million and a quarter of pounds per month, instead of one million, as requested by his letter, dated 23d October last; and in regard to hay he states generally the grounds upon which he considers that it should be entirely supplied from England, but he does not state the quantities which he is likely to require, nor does he specify, even approximately, the number of rations upon which such a calculation might be based.

It is necessary, in order to arrive at a right understanding of the steps which ought to be taken for forwarding further supplies to the East, that the measures already adopted for this object, of which Mr. Filder was not aware at the date of his letter, now under consideration, should be reviewed.

On the 6th instant the Board of Admiralty was requested to take early steps for providing and shipping the following quantities, calculated to be sufficient for three months' supply for 40,000 men, viz.:—

Coffee. Sugar. Rice.

	Lbs.
Coffee	225,000
Sugar	394,000
Rice	450,000

And for shipping similar quantities in the proportion of one-third at intervals of a month between each shipment.

It appears, therefore, that further supplies of these articles need not be immediately ordered.

On the 7th instant application was make to the Board of Admiralty for the shipment for army service in the Crimea of biscuit to the extent of one million of pounds per month, and in consequence of Mr. Filder's present recommendation it would seem to be proper that that quantity should be increased to one million and a quarter of pounds until further reports are received from the Commissary-general.

Biscuit.

According to the best estimate which can be made in this office, after taking into account the

Salt Meat.

pendix, No. 3.

its.

the salt meat ordered to be shipped for army service in Turkey from this country, and from Gibraltar and the Mediterranean stations, there does not appear to be an urgent demand for a fresh supply, and this view is corroborated by a remark of the Commissary-general on a report from his sub-accountant, regarding supplies in general, forwarded to this Board by a letter dated the 2d instant, to the effect, that he does not at present require any more salt meat in the Crimea, showing that the quantities subsequently arriving will therefore form part of the depôt at Constantinople.

Under these circumstances it will probably be sufficient to request the Board of Admiralty to be prepared to ship for Constantinople, in January next, 600,000 pounds of salt meat for army service, and similar quantities in February and March, subject to such modifications as may appear to be proper, after further reports shall have been received from the Commissary-general.

On the 17th instant, the Board of Admiralty was requested to cause to be shipped in the usual manner, for the use of Lord Raglan's army, 40,000 gallons of rum in the present month, and a like quantity in each of the two following months, and it will probably be sufficient to apprise that Board, that further advices may show the necessity of continuing similar monthly shipments for a further period of at least three months.

Hay is an article, respecting which, Mr. Filder has experienced the disappointment of finding that the supplies contracted for at Constantinople were of an inferior quality, and not fit for issue, and therefore, with a small exception, they could not be received. On finding that this was the case, active steps were taken for sending forward supplies from England. The "Belgravia" sailed on the 8th instant, having on Board upwards of 400,000 pounds. There are in the Admiralty storehouses a further quantity of from 1,500,000 pounds to 2,000,000 pounds, all of which it is expected will be shipped in the course of the next two months; and arrangements are being made by the naval department for despatching at least 750,000 pounds by steam or sailing vessels before the middle of next month. It would seem to be desirable that the quantity to be shipped within that period should be increased to 1,000,000 pounds, and that the remainder should be sent forward as soon as possible afterwards.

If it should be necessary to keep up this supply, purchases will have to be made by the Commissariat Department in time to prevent interruption of the shipments at short intervals.

Transmit to Commissary-general Filder, with reference to his letter, No. 397, dated the 8th instant, regarding the supplies for which he depends upon consignments from this country, a copy of the foregoing Minute, and state, that while my Lords make every allowance for the arduous nature of his present duties, and the numerous calls upon his attention, preventing him from furnishing accurate returns of his various supplies, it is nevertheless indispensable that he should give the best estimate which he can prepare of the quantities of the several articles which he is of opinion ought to be sent from England, founded upon the nearest approximate statement of his remains in store, to which should be added the quantities the shipment of which has been notified, and also those the shipment of which has been ordered, according to advices in his possession at the date of making his requisition.

Desire that he will accordingly report in that form to what extent further shipments beyond those alluded to in the enclosed Minute ought, in his opinion, to be made from this country to Constantinople, and at what periods.

Transmit a copy of the foregoing Minute, and also a copy of Commissary-general Filder's letter, No. 397, to Colonel Mundy, to be laid before the Duke of Newcastle, and state that if his Grace should approve of the arrangements for forwarding supplies to the army in the East as they are detailed in the Minute, he will probably deem it right to direct that the communications to the Lords of the Admiralty regarding the increase from one million to one million and a quarter of pounds in the monthly shipments of biscuit now being made, the urgency of the Commissary-general's demands for hay, and the probability that further quantities of salt meat and rum will be required early in the next year, should be addressed to that Board from the War Department.

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 8 November 1854.

I BEG to bring under the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury the expediency of now sanctioning the construction of a floating steam mill and bakery for the service of this army, as formerly contemplated.

In my letter of the 30th May (No. 100) I stated it to be my opinion that in the then circumstances of the army, and until I should have had an opportunity of ascertaining that the mill power of the country to which we were about to proceed was inadequate to our wants, I could not recommend that the construction of the mill and bakery should be proceeded with. There was at that time, moreover, every probability that the army would move ultimately towards the Danube, a circumstance which would have put us out of communication with such an establishment.

As events, however, turned out, the mill and bakery would have been accessible to us throughout the past campaign, and of the utmost use, as well as a source of economy, by affording the means of supplying the army with cheap bread or biscuit, in lieu of biscuit sent at a great expense from England.

Whilst

Whilst the troops were at Varna and its neighbourhood, although the mill power of the country was sufficient for our purposes, the only wheat that could be obtained in Bulgaria was of inferior quality, and the millstones being of a soft description, gave out a fine grit, which became mixed with the flour.

The bread was consequently of a quality not such as it would have been desirable to issue to the troops had it been possible to procure better.

It would be advisable, I am of opinion, in order to meet the consumption of this army, that there should be two vessels, one for making bread or biscuit by machinery, and the other a screw steam vessel of about 80-horse power, to be employed in collecting wheat and manufacturing flour.

Lord Raglan has instructed me to say, that he is now desirous that the construction of the mill and bakery should be proceeded with, and the vessels sent out to this country with all practicable despatch.

I have, &c.
(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 28 November 1854.

TRANSMIT a copy of this letter to the Secretary to the Admiralty, and request that he will state to the Lords Commissioners, that the Duke of Newcastle having sanctioned the immediate construction of a floating mill and bakery in the manner represented by Commissary-general Filder and approved by Lord Raglan, my Lords request that the Lords Commissioners will give directions for the purchase of two suitable vessels fitted with auxiliary screw power, and state that Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Julyan has been instructed to make arrangements for procuring the requisite machinery and apparatus for the mill and bakery, and to co-operate with the officers of the Admiralty in fitting them in the respective vessels.

Add, that the whole of the expenses connected with these arrangements will be defrayed from the grant for the extraordinary expenses of the war.

Transmit a copy of this letter and minute to Colonel Mundy, for the information of the Duke of Newcastle.

(No. 400.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 11 November 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that the Maltese drivers attached to the Commissariat Transport Service of this army prove to be unable to stand the wet and cold to which the army in its present position is exposed. Several of them have died or returned home sick, and nearly all the remainder claim the fulfilment of that condition of the agreement they made with Commissary-general Wild, which entitles them to their discharge after two months' service. The Turkish drivers, in like manner, are unable to resist the wet and cold to which they are exposed, and it has been necessary to send many of them back to Constantinople on account of sickness.

In these circumstances, and it not being practicable to procure hired transport, I would recommend that a corps of 350 drivers be raised for the Commissariat Transport Service to replace the Maltese and Turkish drivers.

The men best suited to the service would, I am of opinion, be found in the south of Ireland; they should be unmarried men, between the age of 18 and 30. The pay of 2*s.* 6*d.* a day with a free ration of provisions, which we now give to the Maltese drivers, would probably be an adequate inducement to men of the class I have mentioned to engage in the service, so that the expense attending this measure would, with the exception of the cost of their passage out, but little exceed that which is at present incurred.

It would be necessary that for every 20 drivers one steady man should be selected, with a somewhat higher rate of pay, as a sub-superintendent to accompany the transport when worked by detachments, and that for every 50 men a superintendent of a higher class should be appointed.

As it would be desirable that the men should be dressed with some degree of uniformity, I would recommend that they be provided each with a plain short frock coat, double-breasted, and made of good stout grey or blue cloth, with trowsers of an uniform colour, and a forage cap.

I have, &c.
(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.

EXTRACT from Mr. *Filder's* Letter, dated 13 November 1854.

IF practicable, it would be desirable that it should be a condition of the engagement entered into with the Irish drivers, that when not required for the transport service, they should make themselves useful. We are often in great want of labourers, and we might not perhaps at the time require their services as drivers.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 1 December 1854.

TRANSMIT to Commissary-general Hewetson a copy of this letter, and an extract of Commissary-general Filder's letter dated 13th ult.; and with reference to the instructions given to him on the 28th ult.,* desire that he will in all respects be guided by Mr. Filder's wishes, as expressed in these papers, in the engagement of the drivers required for the commissariat service with Lord Raglan's army.

Acquaint Commissary-general Filder.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 28 November 1854.

WRITE to Commissary-general Hewetson that it having been determined, with the concurrence of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, to engage 350 persons to act as drivers with the transport establishment attached to the army serving under the command of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, and there being reason to suppose that persons of the description required may be readily obtained in Ireland, my Lords desire that he will proceed immediately to Dublin, and take the necessary steps for this purpose, after communicating with Sir Duncan M'Gregor, the inspector-general of the constabulary force, who will be instructed by the Lord Lieutenant to give him all the assistance in his power. The pay which will be allowed to each driver will be 2*s.* 6*d.* a day from the date of his engagement, to be paid monthly, with a free passage and free ration.

Each person will be furnished, free of cost, with an outfit of warm clothing, consisting of one fur cap, one pea-jacket, one pair of stout trousers, two flannel shirts, three pairs of worsted socks, one pair of stout boots, one neck-comforter, two pairs of gloves.

For each hundred drivers one person is to be selected as superintendent, with the superior rate of pay of 5*s.* a day; and for each 50 drivers one as sub-superintendent at 3*s.* 6*d.* a day, their allowances being in other respects as above described.

None but young, active, hardy men who have been accustomed to the care of horses should be engaged, and they should be examined in the usual manner by a military surgeon as to the state of their health.

The persons engaged should be embarked for the Crimea in separate detachments, under the charge of their superintendents, as arrangements can be made; and if barrack accommodation should be required at Cork or Waterford, or elsewhere, for the successive detachments until they can be embarked, Commissary-general Hewetson will make the necessary application for this purpose to the General commanding, to whom a communication will be made on the subject.

Considering the emergent nature of the service and the uncertainty which exists as to the places where the supplies of warm clothing will be required, my Lords are of opinion that Commissary-general Hewetson should also be entrusted with the duty of procuring the clothing from wholesale establishments accustomed to deal in such articles, taking care that it is of the most substantial description, and not unnecessarily expensive; and directions will be given for the payment of the bills after they have been duly examined and certified by Commissary-general Hewetson.

Write

---

* These instructions (which are shown in the next paper) were issued previously to the arrival of Mr. Filder's official application, immediately upon the receipt of the following private note from him:—
"Nov. 8th, 5 p.m. I have not time to write officially on the subject; indeed, the mail bags have already gone off. I have only now received intimation that we are to prepare for hutting the army. Our Maltese muleteers will never stand the winter work of this climate; indeed, they already want to return to Malta; and, by the terms of their agreement, we are bound to send them back at the end of two months' service.
"If you could enlist about 350 hardy Irish drivers from the south of Ireland, and send them out here with all despatch, it will be the only means, I am of opinion, of keeping our transport establishment efficient; or in any state at all. Let them bring plenty of warm clothing.
"Everything will depend upon the efficiency of our transport."

Write to the Secretary for Ireland that it having been determined, with the concurrence of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, to engage 350 men to act as drivers with the transport establishment serving under the command of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, Commissary-general Hewetson has been directed to proceed immediately to Ireland, to take the necessary steps for this purpose; and request that Sir John Young will move the Lord Lieutenant to instruct the General commanding the troops in Ireland and the Inspector-general of the Constabulary Force to give every practicable assistance to the Commissary-general in the discharge of this important duty. Appendix, No. 3.

Transmit a copy of this Minute to Commissary-general Filder for his information.

Transmit a copy to Colonel Mundy for the information of the Duke of Newcastle.

(No. 409.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 13 November 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, an estimate of the provisions required for the use of this army for a period of three months, made out according to the form prescribed by the Commissariat regulations. F., page 127.

Although there is a sufficient supply of coffee in store, I would beg to suggest that, during the present season, and in consideration of the scarcity of fuel wood, roasted coffee should continue to be sent out from England as requested in my letter of 18th October, and the unroasted coffee in depôt be reserved for consumption during the summer. B. 370.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Enclosure in No. 409.

(F., page 127.)

ESTIMATE of PROVISIONS, &c. required from *England* for the use of the ARMY in the EAST, for Three Months, from 1 November 1854.

Number and Description of Troops.	Number of Rations Daily.	RATION.	REMARKS.
Cavalry - - - - 2,325 Infantry - - - - 29,018 Artillery and Engineers - 3,617 Staff and Departments - 1,366 Turkish Infantry - - 6,599 Commissariat Transport - 2,379 TOTAL - - - 45,304	36,500 full rations. 2,400 ditto, except rum. 6,600 Turkish Infantry. 10,679 rations of forage.	1 lb. biscuit. 1 lb. salt meat. $\frac{1}{32}$ gallon of rum. 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. sugar. 1 oz. coffee. 2 oz. rice. Forage, 10 lbs. hay. For Turkish Infantry: 1 lb. biscuit. 5 oz. rice.	Estimated daily, to provi against casualties. 3,427 Commissariat tran port animals at Scutari n included for hay.

	Biscuit.	Salt Meat.	Rum.	Sugar.	Coffee.	Rice.	Hay.	REMARKS.
	Lbs.	*Lbs.*	*Gallons.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	
For numbers as above - -	4,186,000	3,578,800	104,938	391,432	223,675	637,100	6,900,000	Consignments " Choice," " Rocklif " True Briton," " C lumbia," and " B gravia," from Londo " Franz Alois," " A rora G," and " Bo bab," from Malta, a vised but not tak into account.
Deduct—								
Remains in store and afloat -	1,395,668	1,324,275	42,735	191,132	218,291	138,636	1,079,686	
Consignments arrived but not received into charge:								
" Il Malti," transhipped from " Ercole," from Corfu - -	- -	331,968	—	—	—	—	—	
" Lion," from London - -	528,080	94,016	7,312	- -	39,534	50,000	—	
TOTAL to be deducted - -	1,923,748	1,750,259	50,047	191,132	257,825	188,636	1,079,686	
Net Quantity required -	2,262,252	1,828,541	54,891	200,300	- -	448,464	5,820,314	

Commissariat, Crimea, Balaklava, 13 November 1854.

William Filder, C. G.

Appendix, No. 3.

COMMISSARIAT.

Treasury Minute, dated 5 December 1854.

WRITE to Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Julyan that a further quantity of hay being required for the Commissariat service in the Crimea, my Lords authorise him to enter into a contract for the delivery of 1,200 tons at Manchester, at the rate of 75 tons per week, to commence three weeks after the engagement is made, and 100 tons per week after the expiration of five weeks from such date, at a rate dependent upon the inquiries which he will make as to the current market prices, but not exceeding 7*l.* 15*s.* per ton of hay, properly pressed, in bales of from four to five cwt., and delivered into store at Liverpool.

Mr. Julyan will, after having entered into the contract, suggest the means which appear to him the best and most suitable for ascertaining that the hay is of proper quality.

It is desirable that this service should be executed with as little delay as possible, and after having made the preliminary arrangements he will proceed to Manchester and thence to Liverpool, and settle with Commander Bevis for the hire either of the magazines occupied temporarily by the Admiralty, or of other convenient magazines, for the deposit of the hay until vessels are appointed to receive it.

(D. 596.)

MEMORANDUM.

Balaklava, 15 November 1854.

THE Commissary-general had the honour yesterday of personally reporting to the Commander of the Forces the loss of three vessels laden with commissariat supplies, one of which contained hay for about 20 days' consumption, nearly all the forage in store or afloat. Since then two more commissariat vessels have been lost, and the fate of two others was doubtful at a late hour last night.

In these circumstances the Commissary-general would suggest that a fast steamer be immediately despatched to Constantinople with instructions to the Admiral Superintendent there to furnish, without delay, steam transport for the conveyance of the supplies that the commissariat officer may have to forward to the Crimea. It would be desirable that the principal agent of transport should be directed to communicate to the Commissary-general the name of the steamer that may be appointed to this service, in order that he may forward instructions to the commissariat officer at Constantinople by the same opportunity.

The Commissary-general feels it his duty to represent to the Commander of the Forces that these losses have placed this army in a critical position with respect to its supply of provisions and forage. Other vessels may possibly arrive with provisions in sufficient time to prevent any deficiency of food for the troops, but the loss of forage appears to be irreparable, as only pressed hay, of which none can be obtained in Turkey, can be conveyed in sufficient quantities to meet the consumption of this army.

The loss of forage corn has also been very great, so as to preclude the possibility of increasing the allowance of that article in lieu of the deficiency of hay.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

General Lord Raglan, G.C.B.

(No. 419.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 18 November 1854.

IT is with much regret that I have to report to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that since I addressed you on the 8th instant, respecting the state of the supplies of this army, seven of the vessels laden with provisions and forage for the commissariat have been wrecked whilst at anchor off Balaklava Harbour, during a hurricane which occurred on the 14th instant.

B. 397.

I enclose a return of the vessels and supplies lost on this occasion.

Subsequent arrivals of provisions from England have relieved me of any present anxiety with respect to the food of the troops, but the hay lost was all, with a trifling exception, that we had on hand for the service of the army, either on shore or afloat, and was equal to about 20 days' consumption, the issues being at present confined, owing to the scarcity of forage, to the horses of the artillery and cavalry, officers' chargers and commissariat transport animals, and it might have been expected to last till the arrival from England of the "Belgravia," laden with the hay advised by your letter of 12th October. The great loss we have sustained of forage corn precludes the possibility of increasing the ration of that article as a substitute for the deficiency of hay.

E. 2314.

As it will be impracticable I am of opinion to convey forage by sea in an unpressed state in sufficient quantities to meet the consumption of this army, I am apprehensive that this loss and consequent deficiency of food for the animals will be attended with the worst results, especially with respect to those belonging to the commissariat transport establishment, upon which the supply of the army depends, several of them having already died, although hitherto well fed, from exposure to wet and cold.

The

The "Prince" steamer recently arrived from England was also lost on this occasion with the whole of her valuable cargo, with the exception of 60,000 *l.* in gold, which had been landed at Constantinople. Besides a large supply of warm clothing, of which the army stands in the utmost need, she had various stores on board for the commissariat, all of which will require to be replaced at an early period according to the invoice which must be on record, I presume, at one of the Ordnance offices in London, with the exception of 50 pistols for the use of commissariat conductors, which I do not consider necessary to be provided.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

RETURN of COMMISSARIAT SUPPLIES Lost on board Vessels Wrecked off *Balaklava* Harbour during the gale of the 14th November 1854.

Name of Vessel.	Biscuit.	Salt Meat.	Live Cattle.	Sheep.	Rum.	Rice.	Coffee.	Forage Corn.	Hay.
	Lbs.	*Lbs.*	*No.*	*No.*	*Gal.* about	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*
Wild Wave	249,984	-	-	-	3,217	-	11,200	—	—
Progress	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63,300	800,000
Wanderer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	856,360	—
Il Malti	74,880	-	-	-	4,783	73,986	-	196,512	—
Peltoma	109,760	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Rip Van Winkle	-	-	157	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kenilworth	-	-	-	645	—	—	—	—	—
TOTALS	359,744	74,880	157	645	8,000	73,986	11,200	1,116,172	800,000

Balaklava, Crimea, 18 November 1854.

William Filder, C. G.

(No. 433.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 27 November 1854.

THE issue of rice to this army as forming part of the ration having only been a temporary measure, it ceased to be supplied to the troops from 15th instant.

It had been my intention to propose to Lord Raglan that this extra allowance should be continued whilst the army occupied its present position, and the siege of Sebastopol was going on; but in consequence of the death, from exposure to the wet and cold, of many of the transport animals, and of the breaking down of the arabas and mule carts owing to the almost impassable state of the roads, I am unable, whilst the interior of the country is closed to us, to provide conveyance for more than for the articles composing the fixed ration.

I would suggest, therefore, that the shipments of rice advised by your letter of the 6th instant, should be discontinued for the present, as the quantity in depôt at Constantinople and on the way from England will be sufficient for a considerable time for the issues to the Turkish troops, who will continue to receive rice as part of their regular ration. E. 2703.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, K. C. B. &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(No. 432.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 27 November 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, with reference to the last paragraph of your letter, No. 443, of 9th instant, by which you inform me that directions had been given to ship from England every 14 days a quantity of hay equal to that conveyed by the "Belgravia," viz., 400,000 lbs., that the issues of hay to this army, when confined to the horses of the artillery and cavalry, officers' chargers and transport animals, amount to 1,300,000 lbs. per month. E. 2706.

As the ship "Progress," which was lost in the late hurricane, brought out a consignment from England of nearly 900,000 lbs. of hay, two vessels per month would nevertheless convey the requisite supply.

In estimating the consumption of this army at 1,300,000 lbs. hay per month, I have excluded baggage animals of every description from the calculation, as it may be possible, although

Appendix, No. 3.

although attended with much inconvenience and expense, to bring to the Crimea from Turkey a supply of chopped straw for them, sufficient for a diminished ration whilst they are not working.

B. 409.

The estimate transmitted with my letter of 13th instant will show the quantity of hay which would be required for all the animals of the army.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C.G.

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 12 December 1854.

WRITE to the Secretary of the Ordnance, and request that he will state to the Board that Commissary-general Filder has represented that all the stores which were provided by the Ordnance for the Commissariat, and lost in the wreck of the "Prince" steamer, require to be replaced at an early period, with the exception of 50 pistols, for the use of commissariat conductors, which are not now wanted; and the Secretary will move the Board to direct that the remaining commissariat stores, according to the invoice of the shipment made on board the "Prince," may be supplied as requested by the Commissary-general.

Acquaint Commissary-general Filder with the above direction, with reference to the last paragraph of his letter, dated 18th ultimo.

State that my Lords are glad to observe that the arrival of provisions from England subsequently to the heavy losses sustained during the hurricane of the 14th ultimo had relieved him from anxiety with respect to the food of the troops.

Further state that the shipment of the various supplies from England, the preparation of which has been notified to him, including hay and rice, will be continued until he is in a position to state that he can rely upon local resources for any of the articles.

In regard to hay, observe that every effort will be made to expedite the shipments from hence, but of course Mr. Filder will continue to draw as much sulla or clover from Malta as may be required and can be had, through the agency of Commissary-general Wild, in addition to the hay and chopped straw which may be procurable in Constantinople and its neighbourhood.

With respect to rice, state, with reference to his letter of the 27th ult., that the arrangements for shipping the quantity of which he has been advised having been completed, must now go forward, and any not required for immediate use may be kept in depôt at Constantinople.

(No. 423.)

Commissariat, Crimea,
Balaklava, 21 November 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to lay before you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the undermentioned general orders issued by the Commander of the Forces, viz.,

14 Nov. 1854. General after order of 14th November, authorising the payment of a pecuniary allowance to the Turkish troops employed in repairing the roads between Balaklava and the lines, and those doing duty in the trenches.

G. O., 15 Nov. 1854. General order of 15th November, authorising the issue of working pay to the troops employed as working parties in the trenches.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C.G.

GENERAL AFTER ORDER.

Head Quarters before Sebastopol, 14 November 1854.

THE roads in the neighbourhood of the encampment of the troops, and especially that between Balaklava and the lines, having become so bad as to render it impossible to convey provisions to the troops, it is necessary that immediate steps be taken to repair them. For that purpose the Turkish troops at Balaklava are at this moment most available; they will therefore be so employed, and will receive a pecuniary allowance of 3 *d.* per diem, under a captain, who will receive 1 *s.* per diem, provided the stipulated quantity of work is accomplished, otherwise not, to be determined by the superintending officer.

The Turkish troops employed in the trenches will receive 3 *d.* by day and 4 *d.* by night, under the same conditions in respect to exertion as is mentioned above.

By order,

(signed) *T. B. B. Estcourt*, Adj.-Gen.

GENERAL

GENERAL ORDER.

Head Quarters before Sebastopol, 15 November 1854.

No. 1. THE Commander of the Forces has been pleased to authorise the issue of working-pay to the troops to be henceforward employed as working parties in the trenches, according to the following rates:

	By Day.	By Night.
Non-commissioned officers as overseers, one for every	*s. d.*	*s. d.*
20 men - - - - - - - - -	1 –	1 –
Rank and file - - - - - - - - -	– 8	– 10

Provided the amount of work required is done, and the officer of engineers in charge shall report that the men have properly exerted themselves.

Although it has not been usual to issue this gratuity at sieges, the Commander of the Forces is induced to avail himself of the authority which would appear to be given in Article 57, under the head of "Duties in Camp," page 275 of Her Majesty's Regulations, to view the present as an exceptional case, in consideration of the length of the siege operations before Sebastopol, the constant labour the men have been called upon to perform, the inclemency of the weather, and the cheerfulness and goodwill they have manifested in discharge of their duty.

The gratuity may either be paid when the men come off duty or placed to their credit, as they may prefer.

By order,
(signed) *T. B. B. Estcourt*, Adj.-Gen.

(True copies.)
(signed) *R. Routh*, A. C. G.

(26,451.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 22 November 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that I deem it to be of essential importance that 30 fourgons or covered waggons, and 20 open waggons of the kind known in the Artillery service as of the Flanders pattern, with four horses each, should be added without delay to the Commissariat Transport Establishment of this army, the uncovered open Maltese carts now belonging to it being wholly unsuited to many special services for which carriage conveyance is required.

The fourgons and open waggons used by the French Army of the East are found to be extremely serviceable; one of the fourgons, or a model of one, might be obtained as a pattern, on application to the French Government, although I am not aware whether a model equally good might not be found in some of the Artillery establishments in England, or that some improvement might not be made on the French fourgon.

The fourgons should be on springs, and capable of carrying one ton weight.

I would recommend that the horses should be stout serviceable ones, standing 15-3, but in no case below 15-2.

I would propose that the establishment of superintendents and drivers should consist of—

2 Superintendents.
8 Sub ditto, and
100 Drivers, being two for each fourgon or open waggon.

It would be desirable that some spare springs should be sent out from England with the fourgons.

I have, &c.
(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

(26,456.)

Sir, Balaklava, 28 November 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that the wooden axles of the Maltese mule carts belonging to the Commissariat transport establishment of this army, break when they come to be severely tried on bad roads, such as we now have in this country.

As these carts are extremely useful for many purposes, and constitute an important part of our transport establishment, it is necessary that they should be kept effective. I have to request, therefore, that two hundred and twenty (220) of them, according to a pattern which Commissary-general Wild will forward from Malta, may be made in England, with iron axles, and sent out to this country as soon as possible to replace those of which the axles have broken, and others which may shortly be expected to become inefficient from the same cause.

Appendix, No. 3.

Having no sides to them, the cost of their conveyance from England by sea will be inconsiderable.

I take this occasion to suggest that these carts, as well as any other stores intended for the Commissariat, may be forwarded in vessels wholly laden, or chiefly so, with Commissariat supplies.

The articles, such as magazine implements, &c., which have been sent out in vessels laden for the most part with stores for other services, have, in some instances, been taken back to England in the same vessels, and brought again to this country before they have been delivered; and in other cases where the vessels have remained with the army, it has been three or four months before they have been received by the Commissariat.

I have, &c.
(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K. C. B.,
&c. &c. &c.

(26,456.)

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 12 December 1854.

WRITE to the Secretary to the Admiralty that my Lords have received a communication from Commissary-general Filder, suggesting that stores intended for the Commissariat of the British army serving in the East, may be forwarded in vessels wholly or chiefly laden with Commissariat supplies, and stating that the articles, such as the magazine implements, &c., which have been sent out in vessels laden for the most part with stores for other services, have, in some instances, been taken back to England in the same vessels, and brought out again to the Crimea before they have been delivered; and that in other cases, where the vessels have remained with the army, it has been three or four months before they have been received by the Commissariat.

My Lords are aware of the difficulties under which the service connected with the transport of stores for the use of the several departments of the army in the East is at present conducted, and of the necessity which must often exist for adopting arrangements of a less satisfactory kind than would be had recourse to under ordinary conditions; but they have deemed it right to make the Lords of the Admiralty acquainted with the Commissary-general's wishes, in order that they may be attended to as far as circumstances will permit.

Transmit a copy of this Minute to Commissary-general Filder for his information.

(26,456. 26,451.)

COMMISSARIAT.

TREASURY MINUTE, dated 22 December 1854.

WRITE to Mr. Hammond and request that he will state to the Earl of Clarendon, that Commissary-general Filder having made a requisition for 30 fourgons or covered waggons, and 20 open waggons, for the service of the British army in the East, and having suggested that the model of those in use in the French army in the East might with advantage be consulted, my Lords request that application may be made to the French Government for one fourgon and one open waggon of the kinds now in use with the French army in the Crimea, and that they may be transmitted with as little delay as possible to London, and be delivered to Commissary-general Sir R. Routh, who has been entrusted by the Duke of Newcastle with the arrangements for complying with Commissary-general Filder's requisition.

Transmit copies of Commissary-general Filder's letters, dated 22d and 28th November, to Sir R. Routh, and state that my Lords, having communicated on the subject with the Duke of Newcastle, are pleased to entrust to him the important duty of making the necessary arrangements for complying with Commissary-general Filder's requisition.

State that the Earl of Clarendon has been requested to procure from the French Government one fourgon and one open waggon of the kinds now in use with the French army in the Crimea, and to cause them to be transmitted with as little delay as possible to London, to be delivered to him (Sir R. Routh), in order that their construction may be carefully examined previously to the model of those intended for the British army in the East being finally determined upon.

As the Royal Carriage Department at Woolwich is already fully occupied, my Lords are of opinion that the agency of one of the large contractors for the manufacture of the waggons used by Messrs. Pickford & Co., Chaplin & Horne, and other carriers, may with advantage be had recourse to on this occasion.

As regards the establishment of drivers and horses, Sir R. Routh will make every necessary inquiry, and submit the result for the decision of the Duke of Newcastle.

The model of the Maltese mule cart will be delivered to Sir R. Routh as soon as it has been received from Com.-gen. Wild; and Sir R. Routh will take the necessary steps for having 220 similar carts made with iron axles.

In

In the execution of the duty which has thus been entrusted to him, Sir R. Routh is authorised, if he thinks proper, to avail himself of the assistance of Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Julyan, who has acquired useful mechanical experience in services performed by him under the directions of the Royal Mint, and of this Board.

Write to Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Julyan, that the mechanical experience which he has acquired in services rendered by him, under the directions of the Royal Mint and of this Board, has suggested to my Lords that he may be able to afford useful assistance to Sir R. Routh in the execution of the duty which has been entrusted to him of providing waggons for the army in the East, and my Lords desire that he will place himself at the disposal of Sir R. Routh accordingly.

Transmit a copy of this Minute to Commissary-general Filder, for his information.

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 13 December 1854.

I BEG to bring to your notice certain matters of detail relating to the transport carriages and equipments for which I made application in my letters of the 22d November and 28th November.

It would be desirable that the bars on the flooring of the Maltese carts should be made of oak or elm, whichever may be considered best suited to resist the friction of heavy packages, and that at the end of the shafts a plate of iron should be fixed, with a ring in front, to which to attach the leading harness, as per accompanying sketch.

That the harness should be the same as that sent out from England for the use of the Commissariat Transport Establishment at Gibraltar, with 120 sets of single leading harness in addition.

That the fourgons or bread waggons of the French pattern should be compared with the bread waggons sent out to the Commissariat at Gibraltar, and the best selected, the object being to combine strength with lightness.

That the baggage waggons sent out to Gibraltar should in like manner, and with the same view, be compared with the waggons of the Flanders pattern used by the Royal Artillery.

In connexion with this subject, I would recommend that rum should not be sent out to this country in any larger packages than hogsheads; puncheons being too heavy for the mule carts on bad roads.

As it is not to be expected that in the ensuing campaign, whether it takes place in the Crimea or any other part of the Emperor of Russia's dominions, the transport of the country can be relied upon as in a friendly country, of which the resources are placed at our disposal by the local government, it becomes necessary to increase in proportion the establishment of public transport, and I consider the number of carriages and animals for which I have made application in my letters above mentioned to be indispensable.

The whole question of the transport service is indeed one of the greatest importance. The transport now employed with this army being public transport, it requires a degree of superintendence which would not be necessary if it were hired transport, and to which nothing, I am of opinion, will be adequate, but an organisation approaching, as nearly as may be suitable to the difference of circumstances, to military discipline.

The Maltese and Turkish drivers have undergone recently a degree of exposure to severe weather of a very unusual kind, under which many natives of northern climates have sunk; the past season may not therefore be considered as affording a proof of their being unfit for the service in this respect under ordinary circumstances; but they are not capable, when proceeding singly or without an English conductor, as must often unavoidably be the case, of protecting the public property from the depredations of the soldiers, or of giving such information as would lead to its recovery, and the losses we have experienced from this cause in equipments, and even in animals, have been considerable.

A consideration of these circumstances leads me to the conclusion that only natives of the united kingdom will, as a body, be suitable for the service of an establishment of public transport with an English army; but it would be requisite, I am of opinion, when serving abroad, that they should be subject to a strict discipline.

I have, &c.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Sir, Foreign Office, 27 December 1854.

I AM directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, enclosing drawings of the military fourgon and open carriage in use with the French army in the Crimea, which have been procured at the request of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, from the French Government, for the use of Her Majesty's Commissary-general; and I am to request that you will lay Lord Cowley's despatch before the Duke of Newcastle for such directions as his Grace may think proper to give upon it.

Colonel Mundy, &c. &c. &c.

Appendix, No. 3.

My Lord, Paris, 24 December 1854.

I HAVE made application as directed by your Lordship's despatch, No. 1,279, of the 22d instant, to the Minister of War, for a fourgon and open carriage of the kinds used by the French army in the East. Marshal Vaillant has informed me that he has not one of either, of which he can dispose, but he sent me the drawings of them, of which I enclose tracings. He stated at the same time that he could not recommend the carriages in question; that they had not been found to answer in the Crimea, and that the French Government were now causing 30 or 40 others of a lighter make to be constructed at Malta, as he believed, from an English model.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Cowley.*

Sir, Commissariat, Malta, 20 December 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, copy of the order of the Lieutenant-general Commanding to provide 50 carts and harness for the use of Lord Raglan's army; and to report that I have procured them by agreement, approved by the Lieutenant-general, according to the accompanying statement, and at 13*s.* 6*d.* less than was paid for the generality of each cart and set of harness of the same description purchased on a former occasion.

Having, as stated in my letter, No. 1,298, of the 12th instant, purchased a cart with iron axles, and a set of harness, to replace those forwarded to England, they are added to this statement.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. J. Wild,* C. G.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K. C. B.,
&c. &c. &c.

MEMORANDUM.

Military Secretary's Office, Valetta,
24 November 1854.

THE Lieutenant-general Commanding being impressed with the expediency of sending a further supply of carts and harness for the use of Lord Raglan's army, the Commissary-general will be pleased to provide, with as little delay as possible, 50 carts and harness, the same as previously forwarded for the use of the Commissariat.

By Command.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington,*
Major, Assistant Military Secretary.

The Commissary-general, &c. &c.,
Malta.

STATEMENT of CARTS and HARNESS purchased by Commissary-General *Wild* for the use of Lord *Raglan*'s Army.

NUMBER OF ARTICLES.	PRICE.	OF WHOM PURCHASED.
	£. *s.* *d.*	
40 sets harness - - - - -	2 – –	C. Gascicelli & Brother.
10 - ditto - - - - -	,,	Brothers Baldacchino.
1 - ditto - - - - -	,,	C. Gascicelli & Brother.
10 carts - - - - - -	5 15 –	Paolo Salissa. / Michelino Cefai.
10 carts - - - - - -	,,	Paolo Rotin. / Francisco Baltista.
12 carts - - - - - -	,,	Paolo Salissa. / Paolo Vella.
9 carts - - - - - -	5 15 –	Michele Cicia.
9 carts - - - - - -	,,	Giuseppe Di Pattista.
1 cart (with iron axle) - - -	7 15 –	Paolo Salissa.

All delivered at the Commissariat Office at Malta before the 2d December, with the exception of the 1 car and harness delivered subsequently.

(No. 446.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 3 December 1854.

I CONTINUE, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, my report respecting the supplies of this army.

Up to a very recent period the troops have been abundantly supplied with provisions of excellent quality, having had extra allowances of all the more essential articles of diet, viz., of biscuit, fresh meat, rum, and rice, but latterly, owing to a continuance of bad weather, many of our transport animals, exposed without shelter to the wet and cold, have, in common with the horses of the artillery and cavalry, died, and the roads having become from the same cause impassable for wheeled carriages, and nearly so for pack animals when loaded, a portion of the troops have experienced a deficiency of meat, and in a less degree of rum.

In anticipation that bad roads might, as the winter approached, impede the transport of supplies, I had made every exertion to form a depôt in advance on the elevated ground occupied by the troops, and had made some progress in effecting this; but a series of untoward events beyond my control prevented me from carrying out this object to the extent I had contemplated.

At one time Balaklava being considered untenable, was ordered to be evacuated, which caused the removal of all our supplies; shortly afterwards occurred the battle of Inkermann, when the troops having expended all the ammunition in camp, the whole of our disposable transport was occupied two or three days in carrying up further supplies of it; and subsequently occurred the hurricane of the 14th ultimo, when not only many of the ships at anchor outside the harbour were lost, but most of those in the harbour were damaged, which again interrupted the landing of stores.

Amongst the vessels seriously damaged was the most efficient of our cattle vessels, which, by lessening my means of importing live cattle, has rendered it necessary to convey to the camp a larger proportion of salt meat at the time that our transport animals are dying and the roads have become impassable.

I have now obtained from the Navy the temporary use of other steam-vessels capable of carrying cattle, and have also sent to Constantinople to bring up a portion of our transport animals which are in depôt there. I hope by these means to re-establish the service of the supply of the troops in its former state of efficiency, although the storms to which we are exposed at this season of the year, and which render all operations by sea so uncertain, leave grounds for apprehension and anxiety on the subject. A larger proportion of salt meat has, under these circumstances, been consumed by the troops than had been intended; but in the estimate recently sent home by me, I have made provision for casualties of this nature.

Having learnt that large reinforcements are about to be sent to this army from England, I request that the supplies for which I have made requisitions may be increased in proportion.

I have, &c.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(No. 460.)

Sir, Balaklava, 11 December 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the accompanying copy of a general order issued by the Commander of the Forces respecting the issue, free of all charge, to the troops of the vegetables recently purchased for their use, and I beg to be informed whether this indulgence is intended to extend to the preserved potatoes of which the price is given in the schedule annexed to Treasury Minute of 14th March last.

G. O., No. 2. 10 Dec. 1854.

E. 39.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

EXTRACT from General Orders, dated Head Quarters before Sebastopol, 10 December 1854.

"No. 2.—Field Marshal Lord Raglan has the satisfaction of announcing to the army that the vegetables that have been sent for their use are to be issued free of all charge, according to the instructions he has received from the War Office."

(True extract.)

(signed) *S. Routh*, A. C. G.

Appendix, No. 3.

Sir, War Department, 4 January 1855.

I AM directed by the Duke of Newcastle to acquaint you, that considering the importance of the use of vegetables as a portion of the diet of the troops in the Crimea, his Grace approves of the preserved potatoes alluded to in your letter of the 11th ultimo being issued, with other vegetables, free of all charge.

I am, &c.

Commissary-general Filder.

(No. 468.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 13 December 1854.

B. 446.

THE state of affairs with respect to the supply of the troops, I regret to have to inform you, continues as reported in my letter of the 3d instant, the roads being still impassable, and the steam-vessel which was sent to Constantinople to bring up additional transport animals having been delayed there for repairs, although none were stated to be necessary before she left the fleet.

Had she returned with the animals in the time in which the voyage is usually performed, or the Admiral Superintendent at Constantinople been able to substitute another vessel for her, seeing the urgency of the service, no deficiencies of provisions would have occurred in the issues to the army.

I may mention in proof of the state of the roads, and that it is not the Commissariat transport alone that is unable to contend against it, that a waggon of the Royal Artillery with 10 horses was unable to reach the camp, having a load of only 1,400 lbs. of forage corn.

The necessity of converting draught mules into pack mules to meet this condition of the roads has diminished our transport power by two-thirds, besides the losses by death from exposure and fatigue, and the animals, moreover, now take two days to do what they before performed in one.

A proportion of the troops of some of the divisions have latterly been marched down to the depôt at Balaklava for their biscuit; but this having been found too much for them, in addition to other duties they are called upon to perform, a few of the cavalry horses have this day been employed in conveying it up to the camp.

Notwithstanding the difficulties with which we have to contend, the only deficiency in the rations of provisions of importance that has occurred has been in the article of meat; but the division that has suffered most in this respect has received, on the whole, during the period in which it has taken place, an average ration of half a pound of meat per man per diem.

I may add, that whilst the road from the English camp to Balaklava is impassable for carriages, that from the French camp to the Chersonesus continues practicable.

I have, &c.

Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(No. 1302.)

Sir, Commissariat, Malta, 18 December 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, copy of the Order of the Lieutenant-general commanding to provide sulla and straw, from time to time, for shipment for the service of the army in the East.

I have up to the present period made agreements, approved by the Lieutenant-general, according to the annexed statement, for 500,000 lbs. of dry sulla, the cost of which will be 4 *l.* 7 *s.* 9 *d.* per ton, and for 100,000 lbs. of straw, the cost of which will be 2 *l.* 18 *s.* 8 *d.* per ton, including the pressing.

These purchases will, I trust, meet the approval of their Lordships. There is no doubt that they could not have been so economically made had public advertisements been resorted to, for the effect would have been to raise the price generally throughout the island.

I am doubtful how far I may be enabled to procure further quantities of sulla and straw, but apprehend that little more will be obtainable except at an advance of price.

I have, &c.

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K. C. B., &c. &c. &c., Treasury Chambers. (signed) *H. J. Wild*, C. G.

MEMORANDUM.

Military Secretary's Office, Valetta,
14 November 1854.

SUPPLIES of forage being particularly required with the army in the Crimea, the Commissary-general will be pleased to provide a sufficient quantity of sulla and straw, in a pressed state, for immediate shipment, and continue to procure supplies from time to time, communicating with the Rear-admiral Superintendent as to the means of forwarding it to the army in the field.

By Command,
(signed) *J. L. H. F. Pocklington*,
Major Assisting Military Secretary.

The Commissary-General,
&c. &c. &c.,
Malta.

(True copy.)
George Horne, A. C. G.

STATEMENT of DRY SULLA and STRAW purchased by Agreement for the Service of the Army in the East.

DATE.	PARTIES WHO SUPPLY.	ARTICLE SUPPLIED.	PRICE.
1854:		SULLA.	
Nov. - 15	Michele Borg - -	50,000 lbs.	2 ¼ *d.* per 6 ½ lbs.
„ - 28	Ditto - - - -	50,000 „	2 ½ *d.* - ditto.
Dec. - 1	P. Eynand & Co. - -	50,000 „	3 *s.* 6 ½ *d.* per 100 lbs.
„ - 5	Ditto - - - -	50,000 „	Ditto - ditto.
„ - 12	Michele Borg - -	50,000 „	At 2 ¼ *d.* per 6 ½ lbs.
„ - 16	P. Eynand & Co. - -	100,000 „	3 *s.* 9 *d.* per 100 lbs.
„ - „	Michele Borg - -	100,000 „	2 ⅜ *d.* per 6 ½ lbs.
„ - 18	R Duckworth & Co. -	50,000 „	3 *s.* 9 *d.* per 100 lbs.
	SULLA, TOTAL - -	500,000 lbs.	
		STRAW.	
Nov. - 27	Michele Borg - -	40,000 lbs.	1 *d.* per } 6 ½ lbs.
„ - „	Ditto - - -	60,000 „	1 ¼ *d.* per }
	STRAW, TOTAL - -	100,000 lbs.	

Note.—The pressing will cost 1 *s.* 2 *d.* per 100 lbs., including the rope used for the purpose.

(D. 661.)

My Lord, Balaklava, 6 December 1855.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of 5th instant, respecting the deficiencies that have occurred in the rations of the troops, and inquiring whether my arrangements were such as would ensure a regular supply of provisions for the future.

The enclosed extract of a Report which I have recently addressed to the Lords of the Treasury on this subject will, I trust, convey to your Lordship the information desired. B. 446 [page 2

In addition, however, to what I have there stated, I would beg to submit to your Lordship's consideration other circumstances arising out of the occupation of Balaklava, as our shipping port and the depôt for our supplies, which impede the Commissariat service and expose our arrangements to irregularity.

Whenever the wind blows with violence from the south, our cattle vessels cannot get out of the harbour, in consequence of its narrow entrance; and when it blows from any westerly point they cannot take in cargo at Eupatoria. The vessels have recently experienced obstructions from both these causes, which, by preventing the arrival of live cattle, has created an additional demand upon our transport for the conveyance of salt meat to the camp.

Another impediment is, that we have no suitable magazines for the stores of so large an army, and as the supplies cannot be exposed on the quay to the wet and in the mud, they can for the most part only be landed as the transport from the divisions arrives, which requires a combination of arrangements with respect to boats, &c. very liable to fail, and to cause unavoidable delays in the issues.

With regard to the deficiency of 1,732 lbs. hay to the heavy cavalry, on the 3d instant, I would observe that the regiments send a portion of their horses into Balaklava for their

Appendix, No. 3.

forage, and I have already mentioned to Lord Lucan that they do not come provided with sufficient means for carrying out their proper ration when they might draw it, for there was no deficiency on the 3d instant.

The representations which have been made respecting the artillery waggons of the Light Division having been sent to Balaklava for hay without being loaded, and which have been referred to me, relate, with one exception, to a period before we had in any degree recovered from the loss we had sustained of 21 days' supply of that article by a hurricane. The batteries in question refused to receive wet hay with, in the first instance, a portion of dry, and subsequently without any of the latter, whilst other batteries accepted it in that state.

The Commissariat officers attached to divisions have not, I am of opinion, shown any want of zeal or exertion under the present trying circumstances, many of them being in the saddle all night, or until a very late hour in the night, endeavouring to bring in supplies, the arrival of which has been prevented by the impassable state of the road.

In conclusion, I would beg to observe that the arrival of the additional transport animals from Constantinople, which are waiting there ready to be embarked, would put an end in great measure, if not entirely, to the difficulties arising out of the state of the roads.* They might have been here some days ago, but the "Jason," which was sent expressly for them on the 25th ultimo, is, I learn, in dock undergoing repairs.

I have, &c.

General Lord Raglan, G.C.B. (signed) *William Filder*, C.G.

(D. 688.)

Sir, Balaklava, 14 December 1854.

THE inquiries which it was necessary to institute into the cause of the deficiencies in the issues of forage to Captain Morris' battery of artillery during the nine days included in the period between the 23d November and the 1st December, as represented in a letter from that officer, transmitted in one from Lieutenant-colonel Dacres, have caused a delay in answering your letter of the 4th instant.

I have now the honour to report, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, that these deficiencies relate to a period shortly after the hurricane of 14th November, on which occasion nearly all the hay in the possession of the Commissariat was lost; a small quantity of it, however, was recovered, wet, and issued in the first instance with a portion of dry hay, and subsequently without any of the latter; but Captain Morris' battery refused to receive it in that state, whilst other batteries accepted it. There was only one of the days included in the period mentioned on which no forage was offered to Captain Morris' battery, viz. the 1st December, when, although there was a vessel laden with chopped straw in the harbour, it was found impossible to land it in time.

Lieutenant-colonel Dacres would appear not to be aware that a ship containing nearly all the hay in the possession of the Commissariat (amounting to 20 days' supply) having been ordered out of the harbour of Balaklava, was lost, with many other Commissariat vessels, in the hurricane of 14th ultimo. Such a loss, in a country where no forage is to be obtained, must necessarily cause a deficiency, for which the Commissariat cannot be considered in any degree responsible.

I would observe, however, that the deficiencies in the issues of hay to this particular battery up to the period of the hurricane have been trifling. From 28th September, when the army arrived at Balaklava, to the 22d November, when the effect of the loss of hay by the hurricane was felt, there have only been five days, viz. from 11th to 15th October, on which it has not received a full ration; and on those days 6 lbs. or 8 lbs. per horse, per diem, of English hay was issued to it.

In pursuance of the orders of the Commander of the Forces, communicated to me by your letter of the 24th October, I sent to every place in the Black Sea where it was likely that hay could be procured, but at only one of them could any be obtained, and there only a small quantity. Of chopped straw we have a depôt at Constantinople, from which place it can most readily be shipped, and there is at all times a supply of this article at Balaklava; but it is not possible, by any means of transport available with this army, to convey from a distance by sea forage (either hay or straw) in an unpressed state, in sufficient quantities to meet its consumption. A vessel of 600 tons will not contain more than 50 tons of unpressed hay; nor, if it were possible to convey them, could sufficient quantities of forage in an unpressed state be issued for the vast number of animals belonging to this army from one depôt, where the Commissariat is not provided with the requisite magazines and sheds on shore for its reception; and it can consequently only be issued in proportion as it is landed from the ships.

I have to add, that from a few days after the date of your letter of the 24th October up to the period of the hurricane, and from 2d December up to the present time, all the horses of the artillery have received full rations of pressed hay.

I have, &c.

The Quartermaster-General. (signed) *William Filder*, C.G.

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* In the interval so many of the transport animals with the army had become inefficient, or had died from fatigue and exposure, that when the vessel did arrive the reinforcement did little to remove our difficulties.—*W Filder.*

(D. 698.)

Sir, Balaklava, 18 December 1854.

I BEG to acquaint you that the interruption caused by the sudden withdrawal of the means of landing supplies is at all times attended with very serious consequences, and, under existing circumstances, should not on any account be done without a previous reference to, or communication with, this department.

From the want of sufficient magazines the army are entirely dependent on being furnished daily with some article or another from the shipping; and yesterday the appropriation of the long-boat of the "Lady Valiant" to another service caused a serious interruption to the supply of barley; and one of the regiments of cavalry, after waiting for it the greater part of the day, was obliged to return to camp without any. This will probably be attributed to the want of arrangement or otherwise of the Commissariat, and will no doubt be the cause of serious complaint; and when called upon for explanation by the Commander of the Forces, the real cause of the deficiency must be stated.

I have, &c.

Captain Christie, R. N. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(726.)

MEMORANDUM submitted by the Commissary-general.

Balaklava, 4 January 1855.

THE Commissary-general deems it his duty to bring to the notice of the Commander of the Forces the obstructions which the state of the road along the quay at Balaklava causes to the forwarding of supplies to the camp, and which have now reached such a point that there is reason to apprehend that, unless the road is speedily mended, the service must come to a stand. 723. 728

The road is in many parts impassable, and everywhere many inches deep in mud, so that the soldiers and civilian drivers who attend with animals to be loaded have to wait, owing to the want of all the necessary accommodation for the quick despatch of supplies, several hours standing in the wet and cold up to their knees in mud.

To this, more than to any other single cause, may be attributed, I am of opinion, the great mortality and sickness that have taken place amongst the Commissariat storekeepers and labourers employed on the wharf, and it is to be supposed that it must have occasioned a proportionate sickness amongst the soldiers.

The suffering they experience from this cause is also, no doubt, the motive of the many desertions that take place amongst the Commissariat labourers, who seize every opportunity of a foreign vessel leaving the harbour to hide themselves on board and abscond. E. 3514.

Field Marshal Lord Raglan, G. C. B., &c. &c. &c. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(758.)

My dear Sir, Balaklava, 17 January 1855.

I AM sorry that Lord Raglan should have determined upon relinquishing the chopped straw without ordering a communication to be made to me on the subject, as I am apprehensive that we may, in consequence, experience a deficiency of forage. 739. 782.

Immediately after the hurricane of 14th November, when we lost all our hay, General Canrobert offered us three vessels of chopped straw, and I accepted the assistance, but did not remove the vessels from Kamiesch Bay, hoping that I should be able to carry on the service without availing myself of it until the arrival of the regular consignments of hay from England; for as yet we have never been without a supply of chopped straw in Balaklava Harbour. But the continued prevalence of contrary winds lately made me uneasy, and about two weeks ago I sent to order the vessels round from Kamiesch Bay to Balaklava; when I received a letter from the Intendant-general, saying, that affairs were very much changed since the straw was first offered to me, and that the French army now required forage, but that nevertheless he would give me two vessels instead of three. Thereupon I immediately wrote to Sir Edward Lyons to request he would order them to be towed round as soon as the weather permitted. It is to this last offer, I presume, that General Canrobert must allude, for I accepted the first offer in writing, and it took place two months ago; and with respect to the second offer, there has been no other delay than that caused by the weather; indeed I think that, after having accepted in writing the three vessels, they should have been considered mine.

It is indispensable, and very urgent, that one vessel, at least, if not both of them, should be recovered without delay, or we shall be deficient of forage.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Lieut.-Colonel Steele, Military Secretary, &c. &c. &c.

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ppendix, No. 3.

(B. 32.)

EXTRACT of a LETTER from Commissary-General *William Filder* to the Under-Secretary of State, War Department, dated Balaklava, 19th January 1855.

AND with regard to the statement that the laundry of the hospital at Scutari is choked up with chopped straw, whilst the horses are said to be starving in the Crimea, I have called upon the Commissariat officer at Constantinople for an explanation of the first part of the allegation; and with respect to the latter part, I have the honour to state that at no time, from a few days subsequent to the hurricane, have we ever been without two or three vessels in the harbour of Balaklava laden with chopped straw. So uniformly has this been the case, that I have not found it necessary, until now that a long continuance of contrary winds has retarded the arrival of further supplies from Constantinople, to avail myself of the offer which General Canrobert made of three vessels of chopped straw, which he placed at our disposal immediately after the loss of all our forage by that event. Previous to the hurricane we had always a large supply of English hay on hand.

That there should be any deficiency in the issues of forage whilst there is a supply in the harbour, arises from the circumstance that, either on account of the state of the weather or from some other unexpected occurrence, a sufficient quantity for the issues of the day cannot be landed. There are no suitable magazines on shore in which the forage can be stored, and it cannot be left without shelter in the mud and the rain. A large proportion of the hay or straw also, in the absence of pressed hay from England, being unpressed, it adds very much to the difficulty of landing and issuing it in sufficient quantities, for which service, indeed, we are almost wholly dependent upon the boats of the navy.

As soon as it became obvious that we should be obliged to winter in our present position, I sent to Constantinople for deals and artificers, for the purpose of erecting sheds, which are now in course of construction.

COPY of a MEMORANDUM submitted to the Commander of the Forces.

No such deficiencies in the rations of provisions as here stated have taken place, as will be shown by returns and documents which I shall have the honour of submitting to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle and the Commander of the Forces.

That there have been deficiencies is not to be denied, and they are to be regretted; but the statements which have appeared in regard to them are, as respects a large proportion of the army, wholly unfounded, the 1st, 2d, and Cavalry Divisions having experienced no deficiencies whatever, or very trifling ones, and in other cases they are greatly exaggerated. In proof of this I would quote the instance of the 3d Division, the principal medical officer of which, Dr. Pine, having stated that the sickness of the troops was owing to a deficiency of food, an investigation took place, when it was found that during a period selected by himself the quantities deficient had in 21 days amounted to $1\frac{3}{4}$ day's rations of meat (of which one day's supply was lost by the troops), and one day's rations of all other articles for the whole of the division. Dr. Pine then retracted or qualified his assertion, and stated that the sickness was caused by the irregular hours at which the issues were made, but the irregularity in the arrival of supplies at the camp is owing to circumstances beyond the control of the Commissariat. With the crowded state of the harbour of Balaklava, the confined space for landing supplies and loading and despatching the transport, and with roads in which the animals tumble into deep holes at every few paces, it is quite impossible to ensure regularity in this respect.

Another cause of misapprehension on this subject is the habit which prevails with some corps of multiplying or repeating the same deficiency. The supplies which arrive at a late hour in the camp, more particularly salt meat, are, on the first occasion of its occurring, issued early the following morning to make good the deficiency of the preceding day, and so on successively; so that whilst there has only been a deficiency on the first day, and the troops on each succeeding day may have received the full ration, a deficiency is returned as having taken place on each day. This has occurred particularly with the siege train.

An additional cause of misapprehension is, that the returns sent in by the general officers commanding divisions are compiled from regimental reports, which are in some cases made out early in the day, and are consequently at variance with the actual issues.

With respect to forage I would observe, that with the exception of a few days after the hurricane (that is, from about the 21st to 30th November), we have never been without a supply of hay or straw at Balaklava; but the state of the weather, the appropriation of the men-of-war's boats (upon which we are dependent) to the landing of guns and ammunition and embarkation of sick and wounded, or other circumstances, have occasionally prevented a sufficient quantity from being brought on shore; and in some instances the cavalry have declined receiving chopped straw when landed. The brigade of light cavalry also experienced a deficiency, the most important one that has occurred, when it was stationed in front, the roads having been at that time wholly impassable for carts, and the distance having been considered by the military authorities to be too great for the horses to be sent to Balaklava to bring up their own forage.

In

In proof that the death of horses has been owing to exposure, and, in the case of the transport animals, to great fatigue in addition, it may be stated, that all horses of this army which are under shelter are almost without exception in good condition, although they have received no greater allowance of food than other horses.

Balaklava, 27 January 1855. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

First Division, Camp before Sevastopol,
Sir, 9 December 1854.

I AM at a loss to understand the tenor of the communication to yourself from Mr. Commissary-general Filder, of the 7th instant, herewith returned*, as the 1st Division has not upon any occasion been without its full daily ration of meat since its arrival in this camp; and I gladly take advantage of this opportunity of calling your attention to the zeal and energy displayed by Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Rolleston, in charge of the Commissariat of the 1st Division, in provisioning the troops with so much regularity, under circumstances of (lately) extraordinary difficulty. The morning states of the division will show that the reception of the full ration of meat on the 4th instant was duly certified.

I have, &c.
The Adjutant-general of the Forces, (signed) *H. F. Lockyer*, Colonel,
Head Quarters. Commanding the 1st Division.

Dear Sir Charles, Balaklava, 8 January 1855.

I ENCLOSE the copy of a letter from the Duke of Cambridge in favour of Mr. Rolleston, as the principal officer in charge of the division commanded by His Royal Highness, and Messrs. Murray and Blackwood as his assistants.

It has been received, I fear, too late to be of use to Mr. Rolleston on the occasion of the annual promotion, otherwise, I think, his singular success in provisioning his division under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, coupled with the recommendation of His Royal Highness, might have been considered sufficient reason for conferring upon him special reward. It is very desirable that he should be advanced, for he is rather old for his present standing in the department, but not too old for an Assistant.

There has been one other division which has been nearly as well supplied as Mr. Rolleston's, but not quite, and that is Mr. Power's. It is something to have been more successful than Mr. Power; not that I attribute any blame to the latter for being only second best.

12th January.—I meant to have sent the foregoing by the last mail; but I received the Duke of Cambridge's letter just as the post was going out, and I sent one copy of it in a hurried manner to Mr. Roberts, thinking that the War Department would be in full operation, and that the letter might yet possibly be in time to be of use to Mr. Rolleston. I could not get a second copy made before the mail closed.

Yours, &c.
Sir Charles Trevelyan, K.C.B., (signed) *William Filder.*
&c. &c. &c.

(E. 3245.)

My dear Mr. Filder, Constantinople, 29 December 1854.

As I am sorry to say the state of my health obliges me for a period to leave the army on sick leave, I hope you will permit me, before I go, to recommend to your favourable notice the Commissary of the First Division, Mr. Rolleston. I have never met with a more zealous, active, and intelligent officer, or one who has performed his duties, and most arduous ones they are, in a more satisfactory manner. Whilst other divisions have, I believe, frequently been short of provisions from the difficulty of getting them up, the First Division has never wanted for anything, not even for a day. Such excellent management merits special notice, and I am too happy to have it in my power to name it to you with great satisfaction.

His two deputies, Mr. Blackwood and Mr. Murray, are zealous, hard working, and good commissariat officers.

I beg, &c.
To Commissary-General Filder, (signed) GEORGE.
&c. &c. &c.

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* This was a report received from the Adjutant-general, that the First Division had been without meat for 7th instant.—*W. Filder.*

Appendix, No. 3.

(876/55.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 19 January 1855.

No. 30.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for the information of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, copy of a correspondence which has taken place between the Quartermaster-general of this army and myself respecting the state of the commissariat transport.

I would beg to add, in further explanation, that at the time the vessel alluded to in the correspondence (the "Jason") was sent to Constantinople to bring up more transport animals, the deficiency of 279 horses, as shown in the report of Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Smith, the officer in charge of the transport, had not taken place, nor could so unprecedented a loss have been anticipated by me. The number of effective animals with the army before this deficiency took place, and including those to be brought by the "Jason," would have amounted to 962, which is quite sufficient for carrying to the camp the daily rations of provisions, and for the new service of conveying fuel, and is as many as can, in addition to the vast number of animals for which rations are already drawn, be provided for in the Crimea, seeing that a considerable porportion of unpressed forage has to be brought from a distance by sea, and that a vessel of 600 tons can only convey 50 tons of hay or straw in that state.

On learning this deficiency, however, I immediately made the application adverted to in my letter of 16th instant for other vessels to bring up more animals.

A great proportion of the horses lost will, I have no doubt, be recovered by the aid of the military authorities, although the circumstance of there being three different armies on the spot will add, I fear, somewhat to the difficulty of accomplishing this object.

With respect to provisions for the troops, it is my intention shortly to lay before his Grace returns which I trust will show that the anonymous accounts which have appeared in the English newspapers of the privations undergone by this army with respect to food are greatly exaggerated, if not, as regards a large proportion of the army, wholly unfounded; and that of six divisions, of which (including the cavalry) it is composed, three of them, that is, the First, Second, and Cavalry Divisions, and I believe a fourth (the Light), have experienced up to this time no deficiency of provisions whatever, or very trifling ones; that as regards a fifth (the Third Division), the quantity of provisions deficient in 21 days, included in the period during which the greatest difficulties have existed, has amounted to 1 ¾ day's rations of meat, and one day's rations of the other articles for the whole division, although the deficiencies may have fallen unequally on different regiments, and that there is only one division (the Fourth) which, owing to particular circumstances, has suffered any material want of provisions: the issues to that division, however, have afforded an average ration of nearly a two-thirds full allowance, although there may, of course, have been days when the ration issued was less than that average.

I have, &c.

The Under Secretary of State for War. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(E. 3,136.)

Sir, Head Quarters, 26 December 1854.

YOU are aware that vast quantities of stores of every sort and kind are expediting, and some even already arrived, from England; huts, timber, buffalo robes, provisions, sheep-skin coats, warm clothing of all kinds, et cetera.

All these will require a great extent of storage, issuers, and much departmental arrangement. Lord Raglan is very anxious that all these details should be organised in time, so that there should be no delay in the troops receiving and having the advantage immediately of what Government has so liberally provided.

I request you will be good enough to inform me of what arrangements you propose making in the way of storage, commissariat labourers, commissariat issuers, and transport for the conveyance of the stores alluded to, up to the troops.

I have, &c.

The Commissary-General, &c. &c. &c. (signed) *Richard Airey.*

(D. 721.)

Sir, Balaklava, 30 December 1854.

In reply to your letter of the 26th instant, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, that the Commissariat establishment of officers and subordinates under my orders was only calculated for the ordinary wants of this army, and that, owing to the sickness and mortality that have prevailed to an unprecedented extent amongst the latter, they are now inadequate, without incessant labour and exposure, to the performance of the usual duties of the department.

The harbour of Balaklava, moreover, with the available ground around it, is too confined to admit of the vast amount of business that has to be transacted for the various services of so large an army, without the addition now contemplated, being performed with regularity and despatch.

The commissariat will, however, use every exertion to get through the additional duties adverted to under the difficult circumstances in which we are placed.

I have, &c.

The Quartermaster-General. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(E. 3,317.)

Sir, Head Quarters, 8 January 1855.

I have the honour to acquaint you, that the Commander of the Forces observes that almost half this army is employed in fatigue parties, in carrying up provisions, warm clothing, blankets, planking, and every description of store, which service should properly be performed by the Commissariat department.

His Lordship is aware that you have at various times and recently received a great number of horses, and Lord Raglan requests you will have the goodness to inform me what number of transport animals the Commissariat department is now in possession of, in what manner they are daily employed, and how many are sent up daily to each division.

Lord Raglan also requests to know what steps you have taken to complete the spare ammunition horses of divisions, and the bât horses of regiments, as requested to be done in my letters dated 18th ultimo and 6th December.

I have, &c.

The Commissary-General. (signed) *Richard Airey*,
Q. M. General.

(D. 759.)

Sir, Balaklava, 16 January 1855.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, requesting to be furnished, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, with a statement of the transport at the disposal of the Commissariat, and the means the department possesses of conveying up from Balaklava to the camp the huts, timber, buffalo robes, and other stores expected shortly from England, and informing me also that a great extent of storage would be required for these articles.

I accordingly transmit herewith a return, showing the means of conveyance of every description in possession of the Commissariat, with its appropriation, and a report from Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Smith, the officer in charge of the transport depôt, on the state of the transport service, to which I have added some remarks. This latter document I beg to lay before the Commander of the Forces with the view of bringing under his notice the system of horse lifting which prevails, and the losses we have sustained in consequence.

F. page 145.
E. 3,362.

As the transport service is one of the utmost importance to this army, I may be permitted briefly to advert to the circumstances which have brought it to its present state of inefficiency.

Whilst the roads to the camp were passable, the Commissariat transport was more than sufficient for the wants of the army in its present position; it was not only equal to the conveyance to the camp of all the regulated rations, but of extra rations also. A portion of it was likewise employed daily, from the commencement of the siege, in carrying up stores to the trenches; and in addition to this, 150 mules, with a proportion of carts which had been appropriated for the purpose of forming a depôt of provisions on the high ground at head-quarters, near the camp, as a precautionary measure against bad weather and bad roads, were employed during several days immediately after the battle of Inkermann in

Appendix, No. 3.

carrying up musket ammunition to the camp; but when the roads became impassable, both men and beasts perished in great numbers, owing to the fatigue they underwent in struggling to get through with the supplies, and from exposure to the wet and cold. This, as respects the animals, took place not merely with the small horses of the country, but the finest mules which had been imported from Spain for the transport service, suffered equally.

On perceiving that the transport animals required to be relieved alternately, and before any material casualties had occurred, I made application for a steam transport to be sent to Constantinople to bring up more horses from the depôt there, and applications have been subsequently made by me for other transports for the same purpose; but on every occasion delays have taken place in despatching the vessels from causes beyond my control, and the animals have not arrived in time.

A large importation of horses was, as observed by you, recently received by the Commissariat, but great losses instantly occurred, as explained in the report above mentioned of Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Smith, of which a large proportion was owing to the practice of horse-stealing, to which I have before adverted.

The ordinary transport establishment of an army, however complete and efficient it might be, would be quite inadequate to the conveyance, in addition to the usual supplies, of indefinite quantities of wooden houses, timber, and other various stores enumerated by you. It could only be provided by having recourse to extraordinary measures, and the transport of this country not being available to us, and the roads being impassable for wheeled carriages, it would be necessary to purchase and import pack animals to an amount which could not be collected and transported by sea, particularly at this season of the year, under a period of several months.

The available ground around Balaklava Harbour is moreover already totally inadequate to the vast amount of business that has to be transacted in landing and forwarding guns, ammunition, engineer stores, fascines, and gabions, camp equipage, Quartermaster-general's stores, and commissariat supplies for so large an army; and offers insurmountable obstacles to the use of a much greater number of pack animals than is at present employed. This want of space and wharfage for landing the stores, together with the total absence of suitable magazines, give rise to irregularities and delays in despatching the transport, which are unavoidable.

And with respect to the ample storage which you pointed out in your letter of 26th ultimo, as being necessary to prepare, I would beg to observe, that there are no magazines in Balaklava, the hovels that have been given over to the Commissariat to serve as such, being undeserving of the name, and the most valuable property consequently now lies on the wharf, or in the adjoining yards in the mud, for the want of store-room.

These combined causes give rise to numerous complaints respecting the issue of stores, although the fault lies in most cases, particularly as regards Quartermaster-general's stores, with the parties making them, and is owing to their not being furnished with orders signed according to the form which has been prescribed, not by the Commissariat, but by the military authorities, for the protection of the army, and without the observance of which one regiment might be supplied with necessaries to the detriment of another.

With respect also to the steps which I may have taken for completing the spare ammunition animals and the regimental bât horses, upon which you desire information, I have the honour to state that the steam ship "Jason" was sent to Constantinople on 29th ultimo for horses for these purposes, but has been detained there with sick on board. Application was likewise made by me on 10th instant, for additional means of conveyance for bringing up a further number of transport animals from Constantinople, but it has not yet been complied with.

In conclusion, I would beg to be permitted to observe, that the Commissariat did not foresee, any more than other departments, that the army would be in its present situation, otherwise precautionary measures might have been taken to mitigate some of the evils and inconveniences now experienced. In these circumstances, therefore, it only remains for the Commissariat to make every exertion to meet the difficulties in which the army is placed, and to carry on the service to the best of their ability.

I have, &c.

The Quartermaster-general.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(F. page 146.)

GENERAL RETURN of TRANSPORT employed for the Service of the BRITISH ARMY in the *Crimea*, 16 January 1855.

DISTRIBUTION.	Horses and Mules.			Camels.			Carts.			Arabas.			REMARKS.
	Effective.	Non-effective.	Total.	Effective.	Non-effective.	Total.	Effective.	Non-effective.	Total.	Effective.	Non-effective.	Total.	
Light Division	60	–	60	–	–	–	13	–	13	–	5	5	*Mules.*
First Division (portion in front)	32	–	32	6	–	6	4	–	4	–	–	–	Expected daily from Alicante 200
Highland Brigade, Balaklava	6	–	6	3	–	3	3	–	3	–	3	3	Expected daily from Malta - 50
Second Division	70	–	70	–	–	–	26	–	26	–	9	9	250
Third Division	51	–	51	–	–	–	27	–	27	–	–	–	
Fourth Division	45	–	45	3	–	3	18	–	18	–	–	–	
Siege Train	18	–	18	–	–	–	4	–	4	–	–	–	
Head Quarters	7	–	7	–	–	–	3	–	3	–	–	–	
Naval Brigade	6	–	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Light Cavalry	4	–	4	–	–	–	3	–	3	–	–	–	
Heavy Cavalry	10	–	10	–	–	–	10	–	10	–	–	–	
Hospital purposes	4	–	4	–	–	–	2	–	2	–	–	–	
C. and I. Troops, Horse Artillery	3	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	
Sick Cavalry Depôt	2	–	2	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	
Invalid Depôt, Karani	–	156	156	–	–	–	11	–	11	–	–	–	
General Depôt, Balaklava	15	14	29	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
TOTAL with the Army	333	170	503	12	–	12	125	–	125	1	17	18	
In Reserve at Constantinople	1,071	–	1,071	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
GENERAL TOTAL	1,404	170	1,574	12	–	12	125	–	125	1	17	18	

Effective	333
Ditto – lost, but not known to be so	279
Supposed to be present and effective	612
To be received per "Jason"	350
	962

Transport Office, Balaklava, 16 January 1855.

(signed) *C. Bagot Smith*, D. A. C. G.

Appendix, No. 3.

(E. 3,362.)

D. A. Commissary-General *C. Bagot Smith*, to the Commissary-General.

Transport Office, Balaklava,
Sir, 11 January 1855.

I BEG to submit for your information the enclosed statement of transport under my charge this day, embracing the receipts and issues since my return from Constantinople on 16th December last.

The deficiency of animals, you will perceive, is very great, and it is to the causes which have led thereto that I would beg to advert.

They may be justly attributed, in my opinion—

1st. To the unfitness of the Turks as muleteers. On this point I would observe that, notwithstanding I have adopted every means in my power, and endeavoured to establish a proper chain of responsibility throughout the transport service under my charge, I have failed in accomplishing the end in view, as I find, and have found ever since my arrival in Turkey, that it is utterly impossible to exercise effectual control over the Turkish muleteers, who are so incorrigibly idle, and in all other respects so totally useless, that no satisfactory result can be obtained from their employment.

2d. The severity of the weather of late has increased the natural apathy of the Turks, and has caused the death of a great many animals; but it has been found quite impossible to ascertain either from the "onbashees," (Turkish conductors), or the muleteers, the particulars of such loss; a still greater number have been abandoned *en route* to and from the camp.

The difficulties which exist in loading the daily supplies, owing to the crowded and filthy state of the wharf, prevents most of the animals being despatched until the afternoon, at an hour which does not admit of their reaching their destination until very late at night, or their return to the depôt until near morning on the following day; the delay thus occasioned, the fatigue the men have to undergo, the wretchedness and misery they are subject to from having to stand about all day in the cold wet mud, the distance they are obliged subsequently to travel, over a most difficult country in all weathers, renders them not only still more inefficient from exhaustion, but utterly careless and indifferent to their charge, which they abandon, laden or otherwise, the moment they escape from the surveillance of those placed over them, and either return to their tents or else desert.

The horses suffer equally with the men. Those which are not lost have to remain nearly the whole day without food, and are consequently in a few days completely unserviceable. Such as are abandoned are rarely ever recovered, as it is impossible to obtain correct evidence of the misfortune.

Another reason why so many horses soon become inefficient is, that those which arrived from Constantinople were in very miserable condition,

16 January 1855.

IT was not foreseen that the army would be in its present situation, but as soon as it was perceived that these men could not withstand the cold to which they would be exposed, and that they were in other respects unsuited to the service, I applied for an organised corps of drivers from England, and a portion of the men were ready for embarkation towards the end of December.

The commissariat transport horses have been overworked. No horses could stand being worked daily over nearly impassable roads; but the public bât animals attached to the regiments which were furnished from the commissariat depôt, as well as horses the private property of officers, show that the horses of the country which have not been overworked, are hardier, and retain their condition under adverse circumstances, better than English horses.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

The Commissary-general having referred the annexed Report to me as principal Deputy Commissary-general with this army, and superintending officer, I beg to submit the following remarks:—

Nearly all the available transport animals are at present stationed at Balaklava, and come to the wharf immediately after being fed; it is not necessary, therefore, that they should be fed again before they have done any work. When they were kept at the village of Karani, and came down to Balaklava, they were invariably fed while waiting to be loaded.

Since D. A. C. G. Smith resumed the charge,

condition, and quite unfit for more than one week's hard work in the present season of the year.

3d. A very material point in explanation of our disasters is, the deplorable state of the roads leading to the front. For the last two months they have been almost wholly impassable; they are now so thoroughly out of repair, and beset with so many obstacles, that it is only by the greatest possible exertion on the part of man and horse that the supplies are transported to the camps. In the attempt the men are completely worn out, and the horses are not unfrequently left to die in the mud, from which they are unable to extricate themselves.

4th. Very many horses have been found in the possession of individual soldiers and entire regiments; horse-lifting has become quite a practice here, and, as bearing upon the subject, I beg to enclose for your information a copy of a letter received by me from Lieutenant Nixon, in charge of the horse depôt, and a statement of one of my storekeepers, whom I sent some time ago with sick horses to the depôt at Karani. The recovery of the latter cost me considerable trouble and annoyance.

Repeated instances of complaint against soldiers possessing themselves of commissariat horses have been brought to me; but, beyond admonishing the delinquents, and retaining the horses, I have not had time to enter into the particulars of each case.

The practice has become so general, that a horse left for five minutes in any part of the town without its rider, is sure to disappear.

I am perfectly satisfied that a great many horses which do not belong to them, are in the possession of regiments; and I would submit, that some effectual steps be taken to prevent the continuance of a practice so detrimental to the public interests, and to enforce the return of such horses as may be improperly detained, or the possession of which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for.

It will be found, however, a difficult matter to identify many of the horses as being public property, as the commissariat mark is either overgrown, or has been purposely defaced, and the number of a regiment substituted on another part of the body. Some of the horses which came from Eupatoria were not branded, owing partly to the pressure which existed for their employment in conveying provisions to the front the moment they were disembarked, and the impossibility of afterwards having it done.

In conclusion, I would beg to observe, that, under existing difficulties, it would be quite impossible to maintain an efficient transport establishment sufficient to meet the wants of this army without the aid of an enlisted corps of drivers, properly officered, and governed upon military principles. The men should be furnished with a suitable uniform, otherwise they would not be recognised by those for whom they labour. The absence of an acknowledged uniform in any branch of the service in connexion with the army, gives rise to much inconvenience, and I have found it frequently the case in reference to my superintendents and other subordinate persons, whose authority is often questioned and held in contempt, although they may be in performance of important duties, and thus the public service suffers.

The proportion of drivers should be with horse and mule transport one to every two animals.

I have, &c.

(signed) *C. Bagot Smith*, D. A. C. G.

charge, nearly all the animals have been apportioned to the divisions, and the rule is, that the transport of each division should attend in rotation; but the officers, in their anxiety to get the supplies up to the front, do not always observe it; indeed, the delays which frequently occur, prevents every effort to establish regularity and arrangement. The different articles cannot always be landed in sufficient time and quantity. Ships become jammed in, and cannot be approached. If rum and salt meat are required, they cannot sometimes be got at until lighter articles and biscuit are removed from above them; and many other obstructions and delays occur, which baffle the most anxious and strenuous exertions to overcome them; they are altogether beyond our power of control.

There is another serious obstacle to the landing of the supplies, the want of sufficient boats, on board of steamers especially, and the plea frequently set forth is, that the charter-party only requires the crew of the vessel to deliver the packages alongside. This was not the practice during the last war, when every transport was provided with a sufficient longboat, and all boats could be employed in discharging any vessel. On Sundays, too, the crews often refuse to work, and fatigue parties cannot always be obtained.

The boats of the men-of-war are often engaged in embarking the sick and wounded, and landing ordnance and ammunition, and can only afford limited assistance to the commissariat.

But the greatest of all our obstacles is the totally inadequate space, and the want of magazines in Balaklava for such vast operations, and the badness and impassability of the roads, if roads they can be considered.

(signed) *D. Adams*, D. C. G.

17 January 1855.

Appendix, No. 3.

STATEMENT of Horses Received and Issued by Deputy Assistant Commissary-general *C. Bagot Smith*, since the 16th December 1854, and remaining on the 11th January 1855.

Received from Constantinople	Per "Jason"	250	horses	16 December.
	„ "City of London"	50	„	
	„ "Cormorant"	50	„	
	„ "Albatross"	85	„	
				435
Received from Eupatoria	„ "Tynemouth"	83	„	
	„ "Queen of the South"	7	„	
	„ "Shooting Star"	191	„	
				281
				716
Issued:				
Second Division		26	„	
Sundry persons		12	„	
Died in camp		19	„	
Invalid depôt		56	„	
Not returned by Grenadier Guards, having been issued for conveyance of baggage		20	„	
Not returned by fatigue party of 38th Regiment, having been issued for the conveyance of biscuit to depôt		24	„	
	Issued	157		
	Remaining on 11th January 1855	280		
				437
				279 horses.

Transport Office, Balaklava,
11 January 1855.

(signed) *C. Bagot Smith*,
D. A. C. G.

Sir, Balaklava, 11 January 1855.

I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Commissary-general, that I this morning observed a soldier of the 49th Regiment taking a horse away from the other horses picketed behind the muleteers' tents; on questioning him, he replied that the horse belonged to the 49th Regiment, as their number was marked on his quarter. I looked at his shoulder where the commissariat horses are marked, and found that the stamp had been cut out. The soldier relinquished the horse on my telling him to do so.

I likewise found three horses near the tent of an officer of the drafts encamped near Balaklava; I claimed the horses, as the one nearest me had the commissariat brand cut out from his shoulder. A serjeant of the 41st Regiment told me impertinently that they had been bought by an officer. I told him to refer the officer he named to myself, mentioning my name and regiment. A voice from inside the tent said, "One of the horses belongs to the commissariat, and was brought here, but the other two were bought." A second voice called to the serjeant, saying, "Now, mind you do not let that person take those ponies away." The manners of all being exceedingly offensive, I left the camp without taking the horse acknowledged to belong to the commissariat, and in consequence make the present report, as I find every opposition in my way when I have to claim horses that have often been bought by officers at prices that would only be taken by persons who had obtained possession of them illegally.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Arthur Nixon*, Lieut. Rifle Brigade,
Attached to Commissariat Transport Service.

D. A. C. G. Smith.

About 10 days since I was ordered by Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Charles Bagot Smith to escort 52 sick horses from the transport camp at Balaklava to the invalid transport camp at Karani: the animals broke loose, and got in among the encampment of 18th Royal Irish, and other detachments near Balaklava, and were retained by the soldiers until I had to return and report the circumstance to Deputy Assistant Commissary-general C. B. Smith for an order to the officers to have the horses restored. After some trouble, I recovered the animals, aided by Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Goold, and other storekeepers; I also found four other animals in the encampment belonging to the commissariat.

(signed) *Patrick Naish*, Assistant Storekeeper.

(D. 760.)

Sir, Balaklava, 17 January 1855.

I OMITTED in my letter of yesterday to notice that part of your letter of 8th instant, in which you state that fatigue parties are employed in carrying up provisions, a service which properly should be performed by commissariat transport.

I presume you here allude to the biscuit which is being carried up by soldiers stationed in Balaklava, at the rate of 28 lbs. per man, for the purpose of forming a depôt at head quarters, a distance of little more than three miles. On this point I have the honour to observe to you, that a depôt to a much larger extent than can be effected now that the roads are impassable for carriages was contemplated and in progress of formation by me, by means of commissariat transport, when the necessities of the service required the transport to be taken away, and appropriated to the conveyance of ammunition and siege stores. This object was further impeded by an order having at one time been given to evacuate Balaklava Harbour, when the commissariat supplies were sent away, and the prevalence of violent northerly gales prevented any vessels from re-entering the harbour for some days after the order had been countermanded.

I also omitted to point out, that so far back as the 13th November I reported to you that it was indispensable that the road from Balaklava to the camp should be repaired, and that it was extremely difficult in the then state of the roads to transport the requisite supplies to the front.

(signed) *W. Filder*, C. G.

The Quartermaster-General.

(1,011/55.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 22 January 1845.

No. 40.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, the arrival at Balaklava of the "Trent" steamer, with 237 mules from Alicante and Malta.

Alicante - 1
Malta - 5

23

A cavalry officer, with a number of dismounted dragoons, has been appointed, by order of Lord Raglan, to attend to the cleaning and feeding of these mules, with the understanding that the Spanish muleteers are to be retained in the service, for the purpose of loading and conducting the animals.

This is not the description of military organization which I contemplated in recommending in my former letters that it should be adopted in the case of public transport; but I am of opinion that in the present instance the soldiers are not capable of loading and unloading these mules.

I have, &c.

The Under Secretary of State, War Department. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(1,193/55.)

Sir, Balaklava, 28 January 1855.

No. 58.

REFERRING to your letter of 8th instant, informing me of the desire of the Duke of Newcastle that adequate provision should be made for the landing, storing, and forwarding to the army of the large quantities of stores and supplies consigned to my care, I would beg to observe, that my former reports will have apprised his Grace of the difficulties we experience here with respect to the landing and storing of supplies. With regard to the latter, however, some additional accommodation has been lately acquired by the appropriation of some of the wooden houses received from Malta, which have been found too heavy to be conveyed to the camp. The mules recently arrived from Alicante, as well as all other available public transport, are employed more especially in conveying the wooden houses to the front; but the roads being impassable for wheeled carriages, this will, I fear, be a work of much time and labour.

I have, &c.

The Under Secretary of State for War. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Appendix, No. 3.

No. 57.

(1192/55.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 28 January 1855.

I HAVE now the honour, with reference to my letter No. 30, of 19th instant, to submit to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle returns showing the deficiencies of provisions which have occurred day by day in the rations of the troops, with the several divisions of this army, from 1st December, when they commenced, to the 24th instant, with the exception of the First Division, with respect to which, I have already transmitted the testimony of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, the General commanding it, that none had been experienced by that corps.

It should be borne in mind, in judging of these deficiencies, that the fixed ration of the troops in the Crimea is larger than has ever before been issued to a British army, and that rice has been supplied during part of the period under consideration as an extra allowance in addition. With respect to rum also, it should be observed, that the troops now receive a double ration: so that in cases where it is stated in the returns that half a ration has been deficient, the troops have in fact received the full regular ration, as it was fixed for this army at the commencement of the campaign, the quantity of which it consists being the same, I am informed, as that allowed the seamen and marines serving on board the fleet. The working and covering parties at the trenches receive a third ration of spirits.

It will be seen, from the returns transmitted, that the issues to the Fourth Division, which I had represented in my former report to have received an average ration of two-thirds full allowance for the whole period, have amounted to much more.

I have, &c.

The Under Secretary of State, (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.
War Department.

(E. 4478.)

Sir, Camp, 1st Division, 20 March 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report that, as near as I can recollect, the deficiencies in rations of provisions with the 1st Division, during the months of November and December 1854, and January 1855, as found by Board of officers, myself being one of the members, were as follows:

Coldstream Guards, 18th December.

One day, half gill rum per man short, half a gill short of a double ration.

Scots Fusilier Guards, 12th and 13th January.

Two days' sugar deficient, three-and-a-half ounces per man.

I have, &c.

(signed) *P. Rolleston*, D. A. C. G.

RETURN of RATIONS DEFICIENT in the SECOND DIVISION, EXPEDITIONARY ARMY to the *Crimea*, in the Months of November and December 1854.

FIRST BRIGADE:

30th Regiment	Meat	deficient	460 lbs.
	Sugar	ditto	116 „
	Coffee	ditto	159 „
	Rum	ditto	14 gallons.
55th Regiment	Meat	deficient	805 lbs.
	Sugar	ditto	192 „
	Coffee	ditto	152 „
	Rum	ditto	37 $\frac{13}{32}$ gallons.
62nd Regiment	Meat	deficient	395 lbs.
	Sugar	ditto	122 $\frac{15}{16}$ lbs.
	Coffee	ditto	66 lbs.
	Rum	ditto	31 $\frac{55}{64}$ gallons.
95th Regiment	Rum	deficient	8 $\frac{13}{32}$ gallons.
Staff and Departments		deficient	nil.

SECOND BRIGADE:

41st Regiment - - - - - - -	deficient -	nil.
47th „ - - - - - - -		
49th „ - - - - - - -		
Transport Establishment - - - - -		

ARTILLERY BRIGADE:

Two demi-batteries Royal Artillery - - -	deficient -	nil.
Detachment 4th Light Dragoons - - - -		
Reserve Ammunition - - - - - -		

ABSTRACT OF DEFICIENCIES.

Meat - - - -	total deficiency - - -	1,660 lbs.
Rum - - - -	ditto - - -	91 gallons.
Coffee - - - -	ditto - - -	377 lbs.
Sugar - - - -	ditto - - -	431 lbs.

Average strength of Division - - - - 4,900 men.

Commissariat, Second Division,
Crimea, 26 Jan. 1855.

(signed) *J. H. Thompson*, D. A. C. G.,
Charge of 1st Brigade.

Alexander Gordon, Lieut. Acting D. A. C. G.,
Charge of 2d Brigade.

Francis C. Colquhoun,
Charge of Royal Artillery Brigade.

(signed) *W. Tyrone Power*, A. C. G.,
Charge of 2d Division.

No deficiencies occurred in the issue of commissariat supplies to the Second Division previously to the month of November, and none have occurred since the end of December.

The transport of supplies during the above period was a work of extreme labour, anxiety, and uncertainty, owing to the severity of the weather, the casualties among the horses and mules, the almost universal desertion of the Maltese, Tartars, and Turkish drivers, and the terrible state of the roads, which precluded the use of carts. From the latter cause an entirely new description of transport had to be organised, at a time when everything tended to render the undertaking most difficult. The supplies at the same time had to be kept up, and which, with the exceptions noted in the annexed Return, was accomplished in spite of numerous casualties and losses, which sometimes in one night exceeded the total quantity of the deficiencies noted. The total deficiency with reference to the strength only amounted to one-third of a pound of meat to each man in a period of two months, at the worst season of the year. The other articles are in still smaller proportions.

Fuel and candles have been always procurable at Balaklava, by sending the regimental bât horses for a supply. Hay, since the tempest on the 14th November, has sometimes been deficient; but chopped straw or bran was always procurable in lieu of it. Rice, noted as deficient by Lieutenant-colonel Patullo, was no part of the ration after the 15th November, but it was, nevertheless, frequently issued under instructions from the Commissary-general.

(signed) *W. Tyrone Power*, A. C. G.

I entirely concur in the above statement. The deficiency on the supply of the ration has been very small, and quite unavoidable; and the exertions of the Assistant Commissary-general of the division have been most praiseworthy and remarkable.

(signed) *G. Buller*, M.-General,
Commanding the Second Division.

Appendix, No. 3.

MEMORANDUM.

TOTAL DEFICIENCIES on Issue of RATIONS to THIRD DIVISION from 1st December 1854 to 26th January 1855—Fifty-seven Days.

2 ¾ lbs. Meat to each man	-	-	-	-	To the whole Division.
1 lb. Biscuit „	-	-	-	-	
5 ½ gills Rum „	-	-	-	-	
5 ½ oz. Sugar „	-	-	-	-	
2 oz. Rice „	-	-	-	-	
1 oz. Coffee „	-	-	-	-	

Commissariat, Third Division, Camp before Sebastopol, 26 January 1855. (signed) *H. J. Brownrigg*, D. A. C. G., In Charge of Stores.

Certified,

(signed) *Ed. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G., In Charge Third Division.

THIRD DIVISION.

STATEMENT of RATIONS issued to THIRD DIVISION from 1st to 18th December 1854, showing all Deficiencies—18 Days.

Date.	RATIONS.						REMARKS.
				Groceries.			
	Biscuits.	Meat.	Rum.	Coffee.	Sugar.	Rice.	
1854:							
Dec. 1	1	1	2	1	1	Not forming part of the ration.	Rice did not form a part of the ration at this period, but was issued to make good the half ration of meat.
„ 2	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 3	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 4	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 5	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 6	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 7	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 8	* ½	* ½	1	1	1	1	* Arising from the impassable state of the country, owing to the heavy rains.
„ 9	1	½	1	1	1	1	
„ 10	1	1	none	1	1	Not forming part of the ration.	
„ 11	1	1	1	1	1		
„ 12	1	1	1	1	½		
„ 13	1	1	2	1	½		RECAPITULATION OF DEFICIENCIES.
„ 14	1	1	2	1	½		1 lb. of meat per man; 2 oz. of rice issued in lieu.
„ 15	1	1	2	1	½		
„ 16	1	1	1	1	½		½ lb. of biscuit „ ditto.
„ 17	1	1	1	1	½		4½ gills rum „
„ 18	1	1	1	1	1		4½ oz. sugar „

Commissariat Third Division, Camp before Sebastopol, 25 January 1855. (signed) *H. J. Brownrigg*, D. A. C. G., For D. A. C. G. Woodley, In charge of Stores.

Certified,

(signed) *Edw. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G., In charge of Third Division.

THIRD

Third Division.

STATEMENT of Rations issued to the Third Division, from 1st to 19th December 1854.

DATE.	RATIONS OF				REMARKS.
	Meat.	Biscuit.	Rum.	Groceries.	
December 1	1	1	1	1	Extra rations of rice were issued on the days when there were deficiencies of salted meat.
„ 2	1	1	1	1	
„ 3	1	1	1	1	
„ 4	1	1	1	1	
„ 5	1	1	1	1	
„ 6	1	1	1	1	
„ 7	1	1	1	1	
„ 8	½	½	½	1	
„ 9	½	1	½	1	
„ 10	1	1	none	1	
„ 11	1	1	½	1	
„ 12	1	1	½	1	
„ 13	1	1	1	1 *	* From 13th to 18th, only half rations of sugar could be issued.
„ 14	1	1	1	1	
„ 15	1	1	1	1	
„ 16	1	1	½	1	
„ 17	1	1	½	1	
„ 18	1	1	½	1 *	
„ 19	½	1	none	1	

Commissariat, 25 January 1855. (signed) *Edw. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G.

Third Division.

STATEMENT of Rations issued to Third Division, from 19th December 1854 to 8th January 1855, showing all Deficiencies—21 Days.

DATE.	RATIONS.						REMARKS.
				Groceries.			
	Biscuit.	Meat.	Rum.	Sugar.	Coffee.	Rice.	
1854–5:							
Dec. - 19	1	1	1	1	1	-	
„ - 20	1	¾	1	1	1	1	Rice issued in lieu of meat deficient.
„ - 21	1	1	2	1	1	Rice was not part of the ration during this period.	
„ - 22	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 23	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 24	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 25	1	½ *	2	1	1		* Owing to the loss of cattle by the guard.
„ - 26	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 27	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 28	1	½	2	1	1		
„ - 29	1	½	2	1	¾ †		† 28th Regiment, half ration.
„ - 30	1	1	2	¾	¾		
„ - 31	1	1	2	½	1 ‡		‡ 50th Regiment, no coffee.
Jan. - 1	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 2	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 3	½	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 4	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 5	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 6	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 7	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 8	1	1	2	1	1	1	

Recapitulation of Deficiencies.

1¾ lbs. of meat per man			To the Division.
½ lb.	- biscuit	„	
1 gill	- rum	„	
1 oz.	- sugar	„	
2 oz.	- rice	„	
1 oz.	- coffee.		

Commissariat, Third Division, Camp before Sebastopol, 20 January 1855. (signed) *H. J. Brownrigg*, D. A. C. G., In charge of Stores.

Certified.

(signed) *Edw. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G., In charge Third Division.

The annexed statement received through the General commanding the Division relates to the period of 21 days, more particularly referred to in my letter, No. 30. *W. F.*, C. G.

ppendix, No. 3.

STATEMENT of Deficiencies in the Issue of Provisions to the Third Division, from 19th December 1854 to 8th January 1855, as taken from Morning States, with Commissariat Remarks as to the Cause.

DATE.	PARTICULARS.	COMMISSARIAT REASONS.
1854: Dec. - 19	The 3d Division received all the rations yesterday, with the exception of the full quantity of rum.	This arose from a supply of rum having been lost in transit in the dark, the drivers having lost their way.
„ 20	The 1st Brigade received their rations, with the exception of their entire allowance of rum. The 2d Brigade did not receive their full quantity of meat or rum.	A supply of rum and salt meat was left on the road, owing to the inclemency of the weather and impassable state of the roads. An extra ration of rice was issued on the occasion, to supply deficiencies.
„ 25	The 3d Division received its rations, with the exception of the half ration of meat.	Owing to the loss of cattle by the guard.—*Vide* Report made on the subject by me.
„ 28	The 1st Brigade only received half ration of meat. The 2d Brigade was deficient of the following: 4th Regiment - 240 lbs. meat. 9th „ - 200 „ 28th „ - 254 „ 44th „ - ½ lb. per man.	On this occasion the native drivers attached to the transport depôt positively refused to work, owing to the severity of the weather: thus the full supplies did not arrive from Balaklava in time.
„ 29	The 1st Brigade received only half rations of meat yesterday; and the 2d Brigade was deficient of the following: 4th Regiment - 240 lbs. meat. 9th „ - 190 „ 28th „ - 254 „, 31 lbs. coffee, 55 lbs. sugar. 44th „ - 280 lbs. meat.	Deficient owing to want of transport from Balaklava, arising from the loss of horses, through exposure and bad weather.
„ 30	The 1st Brigade did not receive the following part of their rations yesterday: 1st and 50th Regiments only half ration of coffee, and no rice. 89th Regiment only half rations of sugar and coffee. 53 lbs. meat deficient. 2d Brigade was deficient of the following articles: 28th Regiment - 125 lbs. sugar. 44th „ - 50 lbs. meat.	On this occasion a consignment of groceries was lost in transit: inquiry made, but not recovered. As regards the rice, the general orders establishing it as part of the ration had only been received on that morning; consequently no provision had been made for this supply.
„ 31	The 1st Brigade was deficient of the following yesterday: 1st Regiment - no rice. 30th „ - neither coffee nor rice. 89th „ - short allowance of sugar. The two Brigades were short of the following: 9th Regiment - 7 lbs. sugar. 28th „ - 25 „ 44th „ - 26 ½ „	Deficient from want of transport from Balaklava, and the supply of groceries on the ground being exhausted.

DATE.	PARTICULARS.	COMMISSARIAT REASONS.
1855: Jan. - 4	The 3d Division received their rations yesterday, with the exception of the following: 1st Royals - 50th Regiment } half ration biscuit. 2d Brigade: 4th Regiment - 286 lbs. biscuit. 44th „ - 334 „	A consignment of biscuit intended for this division was carried, by mistake of the cavalry, to another division, the 4th, I believe.
„ 7	The 3d Division received their rations, with the following exception: 89th Regiment - half ration biscuit.	The whole division, without exception, received their full rations this day.

RECAPITULATION of DEFICIENCIES of RATIONS to the THIRD DIVISION, from 19th December 1854 to 8th January 1855.

1 ¾	Rations of meat per man - -	1 ration of rice substituted on one occasion.
– ½	„ of biscuit „ - - -	
1	„ of rum „ - - -	to whole division.
1	„ of coffee „ - - -	
1	„ of sugar „ - - -	
1	„ of rice „ - - -	

Mem.—During the period herein included, the hospitals received fresh meat for 10 days.
The deficiency of one day's supply of meat is not attributable to this department, but to the neglect of the guard, who allowed the cattle to escape.

(signed) *Edw. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G.

(True copy.)

(signed) *S. Routh*, A. C. G.

THIRD DIVISION.

STATEMENT of RATIONS issued from 9th to 24th January 1855.

DATE.	Rations of Meat.	Rations of Biscuit.	Rations of Rum.	Rations of Groceries.	REMARKS.
January 9	1	1	1	1	No deficiencies.
„ *10	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ *11	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 12	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 13	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 14	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 15	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 16	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 17	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 18	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 19	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 20	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 21	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ *22	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 23	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 24	1	1	1	1	- ditto.

Memorandum.—During the whole of this period fresh meat was, with three exceptions,(*) issued daily to the hospitals.
The troops have also had one day's meat in advance, to enable those in the trenches to cook their next day's dinners over night.

Commissariat, 3d Division, Camp, 24 January 1855.

(signed) *Edw. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G.

The Commissary-General, Head-Quarters.

ppendix, No. 3.

Third Division.

STATEMENT of Rations issued to the Third Division from 9th to 26th January 1855. (18 Days.)

DATE.	RATIONS.						REMARKS.
	Biscuit.	Meat.	Rum.	GROCERIES.			
				Coffee.	Sugar.	Rice.	
1855:							
January 9	1	1	2	1	1	1	No deficiencies.
„ 10	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 11	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 12	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 13	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 14	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 15	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 16	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 17	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 18	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 19	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 20	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 21	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 22	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 23	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 24	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 25	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.
„ 26	1	1	2	1	1	1	- ditto.

During the whole of this period fresh meat was, with three exceptions, issued daily to the hospitals.

The troops have also had one day's meat in advance to enable those in the trenches to cook their next day's dinner over-night.

Commissariat, 3d Division,
Camp before Sebastopol, 26 January 1855.

(signed) *H. J. Brownrigg*, D. A. C. G.
In charge of Stores.

Certified.

(signed) *Edw. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G.
In charge 3d Division.

STATEMENT

STATEMENT of Rations issued to the several Regiments and Corps composing the Fourth Division of the Army under the Command of Field Marshal Lord *Raglan*, G.C.B., between the 1st and 31st December 1854.

DATE.	BISCUIT.	MEAT.	COFFEE.	SUGAR.	RUM.	RUM FOR TRENCHES.
Dec. - 1	Full ration	Full ration	Full ration	Full ration	Full ration	The rum for the working and covering parties in the trenches issued in full.
„ - 2	- ditto -	⅔ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 3	- ditto -	½ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 4	¾ lb. -	⅔ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 5	Full ration	⅔ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 6	- ditto -	None -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 7	- ditto -	⅔ ration -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 8	- ditto -	⅔ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 9	- ditto -	½ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 10	- ditto -	½ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 11	- ditto -	½ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	
„ - 12	- ditto -	½ „ -	None -	None -	- ditto -	
„ - 13	- ditto -	Full ration	Full ration	Full ration	- ditto -	
„ - 14	- ditto -	½ ration -	- ditto -	- ditto -	½ ration -	
„ - 15	- ditto -	Full ration	- ditto -	- ditto -	Full ration	
„ - 16	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	None -	
„ - 17	- ditto -	¾ ration -	- ditto -	- ditto -	¾ ration -	
„ - 18	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	⅓ ration -	
„ - 19	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	⅔ „ -	
„ - 20	- ditto -	½ ration -	½ ration -	½ ration -	¾ „ -	
„ - 21	- ditto -	Full ration	Full ration	Full ration	Full ration	
„ - 22	- ditto -	¾ ration -	- ditto -	- ditto -	¾ „ -	
„ - 23	- ditto -	¾ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	¾ „ -	
„ - 24	- ditto -	⅔ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	¼ „ -	
„ - 25	- ditto -	Full ration	- ditto -	- ditto -	Full ration	
„ - 26	- ditto -	⅓ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	¼ „ -	
„ - 27	- ditto -	½ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	¼ „ -	
„ - 28	- ditto -	¾ „ -	- ditto -	- ditto -	⅔ „ -	
„ - 29	- ditto -	Full ration	- ditto -	- ditto -	½ „ -	
„ - 30	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	¼ „ -	
„ - 31	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	- ditto -	Full ration	

This statement shows that the total loss to each man during the 31 days of December has been 4 oz. of biscuit, 9 lbs. of meat, 1 ½ oz. coffee, 2 ½ oz. sugar, and 6 gills of rum.

The battery of artillery attached to this division having transport of their own, brought up their own rations from Balaklava, and have therefore received full rations the whole month.

The 57th Regiment have also had full rations since the 14th of the month, having sent parties to the depôts to carry out the articles deficient, and rendered every assistance to the commissariat in the transport of their own provisions to the camp.

The deficiencies in the issues have been caused by the insufficiency of the transport of the division, so many animals having died from the severity of the weather, and been knocked up in consequence of the impassable state of the roads. Many horses were also lost between Balaklava and the camp, owing to the negligence of the escort, and the insufficient number of men attached to the transport establishment; and on one occasion an escort of the 63d Regiment lost 26 horses laden with biscuit between Balaklava and the camp; and although every effort was made to trace them, neither horses or biscuit were ever found. These horses would have been sufficient to have brought up from Balaklava all the deficiencies shown in this statement.

There are two other reasons why this division has not had the advantages that others have had:—

1st. The regiments composing it landed in the Crimea direct from England, and were not furnished (as other divisions were) with the pack-horses allowed by the Queen's Regulations to regiments serving in the field, and which would have been available for the carriage of supplies from Balaklava to the camp.

2d. The reserve ammunition horses in other divisions were employed in transporting supplies from the depôt to their several camps, whilst in this they were not allowed to be used by the lieutenant-colonel commanding the Royal Artillery.

Commissariat, Fourth Division, before Sebastopol, 26 January 1855.

(signed) *Henry Bartlett*, D. A. C. G.

Certified that the above statement is correct, with regard to the issues to our respective regiments.

(signed) *Alexander Maxwell*, Major, Commanding 46th Regiment.
H. Smythe, Lieut.-Col., Commanding 66th Regiment.
Thomas Shadforth, Lieut.-Col., Commanding 57th Regiment.
O. P. Bourke, Major, 17th, Commanding the Regiment.
John Storn, Col. & Lieut.-Col., Commanding 20th Regiment.
West B. L Sears, Colonel, Commanding 2d Fusileers.
H. Hardinge, Captain, Rifle Brigade.

STATEMENT of the RATIONS issued to the FOURTH DIVISION, before *Sebastopol*, between the 1st and 26th January 1855.

DATE.	BISCUIT.	MEAT.	COFFEE.	SUGAR.	RICE.	RUM.	RUM FOR TRENCHES.	REMARKS.
January 1	Full ration	Full ration	Full ration	Full ration	None	Full ration	Full ration	This statement shows that the total loss to each man during the 26 days has been,— 5 oz. biscuit, 4 oz. meat, 2 oz. sugar, 2 ⅓ gills rum, 1 lb. 10 oz. rice.
„ 2	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 3	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 4	ditto	¾ ration	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 5	ditto	Full ration	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 6	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 7	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 8	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 9	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	½ ration	ditto.	
„ 10	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 11	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	Full ration	Full ration	ditto.	
„ 12	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	¾ ration	ditto.	
„ 13	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	None	ditto	ditto.	
„ 14	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	Full ration	ditto	ditto.	
„ 15	ditto	ditto	ditto	None landed.	ditto	Full ration	ditto.	
„ 16	ditto	ditto	ditto	Full ration	ditto	¾ ration	ditto.	
„ 17	⅔ ration	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	Full ration	ditto.	
„ 18	Full ration	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	⅔ ration	ditto.	
„ 19	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	Full ration	ditto.	
„ 20	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 21	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	None	ditto	ditto.	
„ 22	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 23	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	Full ration	ditto	ditto.	
„ 24	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 25	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
„ 26	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto.	

Commissariat, Fourth Division, before Sebastopol, 26 January 1855.

(signed) *Henry Bartlett*, D. A. C. G.

Certified that the above statement is correct, with regard to the issues to our respective regiments.

(signed) *Alexander Maxwell*, Major, Commanding 46th Regiment.

O. P. Bourke, Major, Commanding 17th Regiment.

H. Hardinge, Captain, Rifle Brigade.

H. Smythe, Lieut.-Col., Commanding 66th Regiment.

John Storn, Col. & Lieut.-Col., Commanding 20th Regiment.

West B. L. Sears, Colonel, Commanding 21st Fusiliers.

Thomas Shadforth, Lieut.-Col., Commanding 57th Regiment.

STATEMENT of the DAILY ISSUES of RATIONS made to the REGIMENTS and CORPS composing the LIGHT DIVISION, between the 1st and 21st January 1855, inclusively.

DATE.	To what Corps Issued.	ARTICLES OF THE RATION.						REMARKS.
		Biscuit.	Fresh Meat.	Sugar.	Coffee.	Rice.	Rum.	
1855: Jan. 1	7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Right Wing 2d Rifles, detachment of Royal Marines, 19th, 77th, 88th, and 90th Regiments, detachment of Ambulance Corps -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	None -	Full.	
„ 2	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full.	
„ 3	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 33d, 19th, 77th, 88th, and 90th Regiments, and Ambulance.
„ 4	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (A).	Full -	To 7th, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 23d, 33d, 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 5	- - „ - -	Full -	*Vide* note (B).	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	To 7th, 23d, of Rifles, 33d and 34th Regiments, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th and Ambulance
„ 6	- - „ - -	Full -	*Vide* note (C).	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (C).	Full.	
„ 7	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 8	- - „ - -	Full -	*Vide* note (D).	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, and Rifles.
							Half -	To 34th, Royal Marines, 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 9	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full.	
„ 10	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (E).	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 11	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (F).	Full -	To 7th, 23d, Rifles.
							Half -	To 33d, 34th, Royal Marines, 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 12	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 13	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 14	- - „ - -	Full -	*Vide* note (G).	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full.	
„ 15	- - „ - -	Ful -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full.	
„ 16	- - „ - -	Full -	*Vide* note (H).	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (H).	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 17	- - „ - -	Full -	*Vide* note (I).	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 18	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (J).	Full.	
„ 19	- - „ - -	Full -	*Vide* note (K).	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (K).	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 20	- - „ - -	Full -	*Vide* note (L).	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (L).	Full -	To 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
							Half -	To 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
„ 21	- - „ - -	Full -	Full -	Full -	Full -	*Vide* note (M).	Full.	

(A) No rice to 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Marines. Full rice to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
(B) Half meat to 33d, 34th, and Royal Marines.
(C) Half meat, and no rice to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
(D) Half meat to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
(E) No rice to 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
(F) No rice to 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, Rifles, and Royal Marines.
(G) Half meat to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
(H) No meat to 90th Regiment, and no sugar to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
(I) Half meat to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
(J) No rice to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
(K) Half meat to 34th, Royal Marines, 77th, 19th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance. No rice to the whole Division.
(L) Half meat, and no rice to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.
(M) No rice to 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, and Ambulance.

I hereby certify that the above statement is correct and true.

Camp, Light Division, before Sebastopol, 23 January 1855.

(signed) *W. Darling*, A. C. G., L. D.

Appendix, No. 3.

STATEMENT of the DEFICIENCIES in the RATIONS of PROVISIONS which have occurred in the HEAVY CAVALRY BRIGADE, consisting of 4th Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, 1st Royal Dragoons, 2d Dragoons, and 6th Enniskillen Dragoons, between 1st December 1854 and date.

— None. —

(signed) *Jas. W. Murray*, D. A. C. G.,
Heavy Cavalry Brigade.

Commissariat,
Camp, Kadekoi, 28 January 1855.

(Countersigned) *James Connolly*,
Brigade Major, Heavy Cavalry Brigade.

STATEMENT of all DEFICIENCIES of PROVISIONS (if any) which may have occurred in the RATIONS of the LIGHT CAVALRY BRIGADE, from the 1st November to the 22d January 1855.

— Nil. —

(signed) *A. Crookshank*, D. A. C. G.,
Light Cavalry Brigade.

Light Cavalry Camp,
Crimea, 25 January 1855.

(signed) *E. G. Shervill*, Colonel,
Commanding Light Cavalry Brigade.

(1490/55.)

No. 71.

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 2 February 1855.

I OMITTED inadvertently to transmit with my letter of the 28th ultimo, No. 57, a return of the deficiencies of provisions to the Light Division during the month of December. I have now the honour to enclose, for the information of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, that document, signed by the Commissariat officer who superintended the issues to the Division during that period.

I have, &c.
(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

The Under-Secretary of State,
War Department.

ISSUES made to the 7th, 9th, 23d, 33d, 77th, and 88th Regiments, the Rifle Brigade, and the Royal Marines, from the 1st to the 31st December, and to the 34th and 90th Regiments, from the 16th to the 31st December 1854.

Date.	To whom Issued.	Biscuit.	Meat.	Sugar.	Coffee.	Rum.	Remarks.
1st	To all the Regiments	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full.	
2d	- - ditto - -	ditto	¾	ditto	ditto	ditto	7th and 33d Regiments complete.
3d	- - ditto - -	ditto	¾	ditto	ditto	ditto	- - - - ditto.
4th	- - ditto - -	ditto	½	ditto	ditto	ditto	- - - - ditto.
5th	- - ditto - -	ditto	¼	ditto	ditto	ditto	- - - - ditto.
6th	23d, 77th, 88th, and Marines.	ditto	¼	ditto	ditto	½	7th, 33d, and Rifle Brigade complete.
7th	- - ditto - -	ditto	½	ditto	ditto	Full	- - - - ditto.
8th	- - ditto - -	ditto	Full	ditto	ditto	ditto.	
9th	To all the Regiments	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	½	7th, 33d, and Rifle Brigade complete.
10th	- - ditto - -	⅓	⅓	ditto	ditto	⅓	- - - - ditto.
11th, 15th	- - ditto - -	Full	Full	ditto	ditto	Full.	
16th	- - ditto - -	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	½	7th Regiment complete.
17th, 18th	- - ditto - -	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	Full.	
19th	- - ditto - -	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	⅓	7th Regiment complete.
20th	- - ditto - -	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	⅓	
21st	- - ditto - -	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	Full.	
22d	- - ditto - -	ditto	¾	ditto	ditto	½	7th and Rifle Brigade complete.
23d	- - ditto - -	ditto	¾	ditto	ditto	½	7th and 88th complete.
24th	- - ditto - -	ditto	Full	ditto	ditto	½	- - - - ditto.
25th	- - ditto - -	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	½	7th, 77th, and 88th complete.
26th	- - ditto - -	ditto	ditto	ditto	ditto	½	- - - - ditto.
27th, 28th	- - ditto - -	ditto	½	ditto	ditto	½	- - - - ditto.
29th, 31st	- - ditto - -	ditto	Full	ditto	ditto	Full.	Except 19th, 34th, and 90th Regiments and Marines, on half rations of rum, *i. e.* ½ gill.

I hereby certify that the above statement is correct and true, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

3d February 1855. (signed) *C. A. S. Baynes*, Light Division.

(Certified.)

(signed) *H. Darling*, A. C. G., L. D.

P. S. The extra ration of rice, temporarily suspended, was not issued again until the 1st December.

Appendix, No. 3.
No. 77
F. D. 103.
C. 57.

(1493/55.)

Sir, Balaklava, 5 February 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit enclosed, for the information of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, with reference to my letter of 28th January, a recapitulation, certified by the Lieutenant-general commanding, of the deficiencies of provisions which have occurred with the Third Division of this army between the 1st December and 26th January, as shown by the Returns which have already been forwarded.

The correctness of the several statements have now been recognised by the military authorities of all the Divisions, excepting the Light, in respect of which no certificate has yet been received by me.

I have, &c.
(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

The Under Secretary of State
for War.

THIRD DIVISION.

STATEMENT of RATIONS issued to THIRD DIVISION from the 1st to 18th December 1854, showing all Deficiencies.—(18 Days.)

DATE.	RATIONS.						REMARKS.
				GROCERIES.			
	Biscuit.	Meat.	Rum.	Coffee.	Sugar.	Rice.	
1854:							
Dec. 1	1	1	2	1	1	Not forming part of the ration.	Rice did not form a part of the ration at this period, but was issued to make good the ½ ration of meat.
„ 2	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 3	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 4	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 5	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 6	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 7	1	1	2	1	1		
„ 8	½*	½*	1	1	1	1	* Arising from the impassable state of the country, owing to the heavy rain.
„ 9	1	½	1	1	1	1	
„ 10	1	1	None	1	1	Not forming part of the ration.	
„ 11	1	1	1	1	1		
„ 12	1	1	1	1	½		
„ 13	1	1	2	1	½		
„ 14	1	1	2	1	½		
„ 15	1	1	2	1	½		
„ 16	1	1	1	1	½		
„ 17	1	1	1	1	½		
„ 18	1	1	1	1	1		

RECAPITULATION OF DEFICIENCIES.

1 lb. of meat per man, 2 oz. rice issued in lieu.
½ lb. biscuit, 2 oz. rice issued in lieu.
4 ½ gills rum.
4 ½ oz. sugar.

Commissariat, Third Division,
Camp before Sevastopol,
25 January 1855.

(signed) *H. S. Brownrigg*, D. A. C. G.,
For D. A. C. G. *Woodley*.

(Certified.)
(signed) *Edward B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G.,
In charge of Third Division.
R. England, Lieutenant-General.

(True copy.)
(signed) *R. Routh*.

Appendix, No. 3.

Third Division.

STATEMENT of Rations issued to Third Division, from 19th December 1854 to 8th January 1855, showing all Deficiencies.—(21 Days.)

DATE.	RATIONS.						REMARKS.
				GROCERIES.			
	Biscuit.	Meat.	Rum.	Sugar.	Coffee.	Rice.	
1854–5.							
Dec. - 19	1	1	1	1	1	—	
„ - 20	1	¾	1	1	1	1	Rice issued in lieu of meat deficient.
„ - 21	1	1	2	1	1	Rice was not part of the ration during this period.	
„ - 22	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 23	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 24	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 25	1	½*	2	1	1		* Owing to the loss of cattle by the guard.
„ - 26	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 27	1	1	2	1	1		
„ - 28	1	½	2	1	1		
„ - 29	1	½	2	1†	¾†		† 28th Regiment ½ ration.
„ - 30	1	1	2	¾	¾		
„ - 31	1	1	2	¾	1‡	¾	‡ 50th Regiment no coffee.
Jan. - 1	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 2	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 3	½	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 4	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 5	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 6	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 7	1	1	2	1	1	1	
„ - 8	1	1	2	1	1	1	

Recapitulation of Deficiencies:

1¾ lbs. meat	per man	- -
½ lb. biscuit	„ - - -	
1 gill rum	„ - - -	
1 oz. sugar	„ - - -	
2 oz. rice	„ - - -	
1 oz. coffee	„ - - -	

To the Division.

Commissariat, Third Division, Camp before Sevastopol, 20 Jan. 1855. (signed) *H. J. Brownrigg*, D. A. C. G., In charge of Stores.

Certified. (signed) *Edward B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G., In charge Third Division.

R. England, Lieutenant-General.

(True copy.) (signed) *R. Routh.*

Third Division.

STATEMENT of Rations issued from the 9th to the 24th January 1855.

DATE.	Rations of Meat.	Rations of Biscuit.	Rations of Rum.	Rations of Groceries.	REMARKS.
January 9	1	1	1	1	No deficiencies.
– *10	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– *11	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 12	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 13	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 14	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 15	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 16	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 17	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 18	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 19	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 20	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 21	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– *22	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 23	1	1	1	1	- ditto.
– 24	1	1	1	1	- ditto.

Memorandum.—During the whole of this period fresh meat was, with three exceptions, (*) issued daily to the hospitals.

The troops have also had one day's meat in advance, to enable those in the trenches to cook their next day's dinners over night.

Commissariat, Third Division, Camp, 24 January 1855. (signed) *Edwd. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G.

(Certified.) *R. England*, Lieutenant-General.

(True copy.) (signed) *R. Routh.*

The Commissary-General, Head Quarters.

(F. page 163.)

MEMORANDUM.

Appendix, No. 3.

TOTAL DEFICIENCIES on ISSUE of RATIONS to THIRD DIVISION, from 1st December 1854 to 26th January 1855—57 Days.

2 ¾ lbs. Meat to each man		
1 lb. Biscuit	„	
5 ½ gills Rum	„	To the whole division.
5 ½ oz. Sugar	„	
2 oz. Rice	„	
1 oz. Coffee	„	

Commissariat, Third Division, Camp before Sevastopol, 26 January 1855.

(signed) *M. S. Brownrigg*, D. A. C. G. in charge of Stores.

(Certified.)

(signed) *G. B. de Fonblanque*, A. C. G., in charge Third Division.

(signed) *R. England*, Lieut.-General.

(True copy.)

(signed) *R. Routh*, A. C. G.

(1984/55.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 19 February 1855. No. 105.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, copy of a memorandum which I submitted to the Commander of the Forces on laying before him returns of the deficiencies which have occurred in the issues of provisions to this army, between 1st December and 26th January, and of which duplicates accompanied my letter to you of 28th ultimo. D. 845.

I would beg to refer also to my reports noted in the margin, in further elucidation of this subject. No. 446, of 3 Dec. No 468, of 13 Dec. No. 30, of 19 Jan.

I have, &c.

The Under Secretary of State, War Department. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

(D. 845.)

MEMORANDUM.

THE Commissary-general has the honour to submit herewith, with reference to his Memorandum of the 27th ultimo, returns showing the deficiencies which have occurred in the issues of provisions to the troops between the 1st December and 26th January.

It will be seen by these documents, that the statements which have appeared respecting a deficient supply of food to this army, are, as regards a large proportion of it, unfounded, and, as regards the remainder, greatly exaggerated.

That the deficiencies have not been greater may, no doubt, be attributed in part to the troops having been marched down to Balaklava during a portion of the period in question to carry up rations. That this measure was had recourse to, was owing to its having been necessary, when the roads became impassable for wheeled carriages, to convert all the draught into pack animals, by which two-thirds of their transport power was lost, a mule being capable of drawing 600 lbs., but of carrying only 200, and also to the country waggons being rendered useless or destroyed in the attempt to drag them through impassable roads. To this may be added the fact of the steam ship "Jason," which was sent to Constantinople for more transport animals, having been absent on that service three weeks. Had she returned within the usual period, it would have been unnecessary for the troops to carry up any portion of their rations, as they ceased to do so shortly after the animals she brought became available, with the exception of a few regiments of the Light Division, which continued to send down men that were off duty to carry up provisions, with the view of forming "Reserve Regimental Depôts." The practice, however, of sending men to Balaklava for rations was very partial and limited. Of the five divisions of infantry, two, the First and Third, never sent any men; the Fourth Division sent them three times; the Second sent parties four times, which amounted in the aggregate to 800 men, and the Light Division only had recourse to this measure between the 11th and 20th December, with the exception above mentioned respecting the regimental reserves. Average strength of the division 4,900 men.

Another circumstance which tended to cause a deficiency in the rations was, that the commissariat transport was employed in conveying the sick from the camp to Balaklava, and was generally detained, at both places, so long as to greatly impede and retard the forwarding of supplies.

And a further cause of deficiency was, that, owing to the state of the roads, the transport occupied two days in performing what it had done, whilst the roads were passable, in one.

Appendix, No. 3.

one. At the same time the losses of animals by death from fatigue and exposure were numerous.

Any one of the foregoing causes would account for a much greater amount of deficiencies than has actually taken place.

It seems to be generally supposed that the French army has brought with it into the Crimea a greater proportion of transport than the English; but that is not the case. The French landed, in the first instance, without any transport at all, with the exception of a part of their ambulance train. The French soldiers carried on their persons six days' rations, which were replenished from time to time at the embouchures of the different rivers that we passed on the march, and for several days after our arrival before Sevastopol they were marched into Balaklava, and carried up their rations on their backs.

With respect to the English army, the means that could be appropriated on board the transports for the conveyance of animals from Varna were necessarily very limited; but we landed in the Crimea with 70 carts equipped with mules, and the troops having secured a number of the waggons of the country, the provisions of the army were conveyed throughout the march by means of this transport, the men carrying on their persons only one day's rations.

Within little more than a fortnight from the time of our landing, I had imported into the Crimea—

216 carts, with 216 Spanish or Maltese mules, capable of conveying each 600 lbs., or	129,000
And 266 pack animals, capable of conveying 200 lbs. each, or	53,000
TOTAL conveyed by means of public transport	182,000
There were at that time, in addition, in the employment of the commissariat 193 hired country waggons, capable of conveying each 700 lbs.	135,100
Equal to the conveyance of	Lbs. 317,300

Which is much more than is required for the British army in respect of commissariat supplies, whilst in its present position.

There would appear to be a misconception also as to the quantity of transport in possession of the French, although what they have is adequate to their wants whilst they are within six miles of their depôt, and is excellent of its kind, being part of the regularly organised transport belonging to their army when in France and Algeria; it is (exclusive of the ambulance corps) very limited in amount, being equal to the conveyance of little more than one day's supply for their force.

The "Corps de Génie" had transport of its own besides.

Admitting that the French have imported into the Crimea all the transport they brought with them from France, and which they had in Bulgaria, it would consist, exclusive of the ambulance train, of 50 4-horse waggons, capable of conveying 2,000 lbs., or Lbs. 100,000
And 400 mules ditto, 200 lbs. each 80,000

TOTAL Lbs. 180,000 for commissariat purposes.

The French had, in addition, some country waggons employed in their service; but they were few in number, about 20 or 30.

The public transport in possession of the commissariat before the animals were destroyed by fatigue in attempting to struggle through impassable roads, and exposure to wet and cold, was therefore equal, positively, in amount to that of the French army, and relatively to the respective forces of the two armies much greater.

The French are therefore no more independent of the transport of the country in which operations may be carried on, than the English, excepting that their soldiers carry six, and sometimes eight days' rations on their persons, whilst ours carry only one day's rations, and not always that. There is indeed no instance on record of an army bringing with it from one country into another its own means of conveyance, so as to be independent of the transport of the country.

If the British army when in Bulgaria had advanced to the Danube, it would have required for its use 5,000 pack animals (that number was actually purchased) and 3,000 waggons, or if all the transport had consisted of pack animals, 14,000 would have been necessary.

It has been ascertained, from the official records at Bucharest, and the testimony of the local authorities, that the Russian army during its recent operations in the Principalities, and on the Danube, had 140,000 waggons of the country in its employment. It is obvious that no nation, not even the British, could find the means of conveying by sea such a mass of transport as that indicated by the smallest of the above figures, or anything approaching to it, concurrently with all the other services for which it would have to provide conveyance during a war.

It

Appendix, No. 3.

It has been stated that a waggon-train had been organised under the Duke of Wellington. With the exception of a few spring waggons for the conveyance of the sick, there was no train organised during the Peninsular war, either at its commencement, or on its termination, nor in the subsequent campaign in Flanders and France.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Commissariat, Balaklava, 16 February 1855.

(True copy.)

(signed) *L. Routh*, A. C. G.

No. 160.

My dear Sir, 23 February.

The number of waggons that I have mentioned as having been employed by the Russians may appear large. My authority for the statement is Colonel Simmons, R. E., who is attached to Omer Pasha, and who had access whilst at Bucharest to the best sources of information, both official and private; it was not as a mere casual remark that he mentioned it, but in answer to my inquiries as to the means of transport the Principalities possessed. I do not suppose that the waggons were all procured in Wallachia; they were no doubt brought by the Russians for the most part from Bessarabia; they were country waggons, in short, and in addition to their own permanent public transport.

The real secret of the hitherto comparative immunity of the French from sickness is, that their men have had five nights in bed, whilst ours have had only one. Since they have taken part of our work off our hands, they seem to have suffered as much as we have; at least they sent into the hospital, as I mentioned in my last letter, 8,000 men in a month.

Yours, &c.

S. Petrie, Esq. (signed) *William Filder.*

Before Sevastopol,
25 February 1855.

The return transmitted by Sir Richard England of the number of cattle received by the 3d Division is incorrectly summed up; the number should be 118 head, which, with 30 head that had not reached the division at the date of Sir R. England's report, and another lot of 30 from the "Cormorant," which appear, owing probably to the miscarriage of the order, not to have been taken away, will account nearly for the difference between the two statements.

When the sick are as numerous as they are in the 3d Division, and they receive full rations of fresh meat two days in three, it can only be done by depriving the rest of the troops of their proportion.

Every effort is being made to increase the supply of fresh meat, but the service at this season of the year is liable to many interruptions.

In stating that fresh meat might be provided three if not four days a week, the Commissary-general excepted the occurrence of casualties, which, however, have been numerous. On one occasion, owing to the severity of the weather, a whole cargo of cattle perished; frequent obstructions also arise to the service from the occupation of Balaklava Harbour as our shipping port; recently, when five cattle vessels which had discharged their cargoes, were ready to proceed to sea, the wind blew from the south during three days successively with so much violence that they could not get out. On the 4th day it blew a gale from the north, and no ship was allowed to move from its moorings; on the 5th, it was found that the southerly wind had brought so many vessels to the narrow entrance of the harbour, that not one could get either in or out; and it was not till the 6th day that the cattle vessels could proceed to their destination.

It is to be observed, moreover, that whilst the sick of this army are so numerous, the providing them with full rations of fresh meat daily, or even two days in three, would alone, without the occurrence of the casualties above adverted

In transmitting to the Commissary-general the accompanying papers from Sir Richard England, showing a discrepancy between the former statement of the issue of fresh meat to the 3d Division and that reported by the commissary in charge to the latter, the Commander of the Forces requests that it may be ascertained what really was provided in the time stated. Lord Raglan would anxiously press upon Mr. Filder the necessity of taking the most active measures to secure abundant supplies of fresh meat for the troops, to be issued regularly. Mr. Filder will recollect that many weeks have elapsed since he told Lord Raglan that he expected to be able to provide fresh meat to the troops three, if not four times a week.

Is there any chance of his being able to realise that expectation?

The Commander of the Forces desires to know whether vegetables are regularly issued to the men.

(signed) *Raglan.*

Appendix, No. 3.

adverted to, go far to account for the rest of the troops not receiving the quantity which the Commissary-general had considered might probably be supplied.

With respect to vegetables, large quantities have been issued; all the regiments applying for them are allowed to have as many as they choose, or have the means of taking away.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Balaklava, 28 February 1855.

(2,494/55.)

Sir, Commissariat, Balaklava, 13 March 1855.

Referring to my letter of the 28th January, No. 57, transmitting returns of the deficiencies which had occurred in the issue of provisions to the troops, between 1st December and 26th January, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that the Commander of the Forces having called for a similar return from the different regiments, a minute was appended to the one sent in by the 21st Regiment, stating that the supplies short issued had been made good at the end of a fortnight. As this was contrary to all the reports I had received as to the practice that had been observed, I called upon the commissariat officer attached to the division with which the 21st Regiment is serving for an explanation on the subject, which he has affixed to the enclosed copy of the minute in question. From this it will be seen that the rations were completed, minus the deficiency noted, day by day; and that although, owing to the nearly impassable state of the roads, they may have arrived too late to be served out, or the meat cooked, on the day for which they were due, they were available, by proper regimental arrangements, in advance for the following day, and so on successively; so that the irregularity in the arrival of the provisions at the camp could only have effect on the first day.

Notwithstanding, however, that in the case of some of the divisions there have been no deficiencies at all, or very trifling ones, and that in others they have been inconsiderable, it may have occurred that the soldiers went into the trenches without their proper allowance of food; but this was owing to the men not having time to cook their meals, the troops having been in many cases 16 hours out of 24 on duty, and every alternate night in the trenches; sometimes, indeed, they have been three nights successively, including those they were on guard, without proper rest; and many of them also having thrown away their camp kettles, the usual regimental arrangement by which men off duty cook for those on, could not be carried out.

The troops, therefore, may have suffered from the want of cooked food without any or very inconsiderable deficiencies in the rations.

I have, &c.

The Under Secretary of State, War Department. (signed) *William Filder.*

The Board having assembled, pursuant to order, dated proceeded to examine and compare the several documents laid before them.

The Board beg respectfully to submit, that an exact correspondence is almost impossible to be shown between the two sets of returns, the result of each being obtained by methods entirely dissimilar.

The returns furnished by regiments consist of the aggregate deficiencies, as daily noted down in the quartermaster's book.

The Commissariat Return is obtained by a system of averages, and can therefore be only approximately correct.

It will be found, however, that the Commissariat Return of the total loss which each man sustained by the deficiency of rations served out to him, is as nearly correct as any such retrospective account can be made to be.

The way to test this is to multiply the average number of men drawing rations in any one regiment by the total loss assigned to each individual, and it will be found that the aggregate deficiencies are in most cases some few pounds less, but in one or two instances are even greater than those noted in the regimental return.

Some examples in figures are annexed to exhibit the method adopted in testing these documents.

(signed) *West*, B. Lieut.-Col. Com. 21st Fusileers.

(signed) *Hy. Bartlett*, D. A. C. G.

(signed) *J. Hamilton*, Major D. A. Q. M. G.

The Board, however, beg to submit, that the loss of rations here shown to have been sustained by each individual soldier, is by no means a correct measure of the privation occasionally, nay frequently, endured from want of sufficient food.

The irregularity of the issue caused a degree of scarcity to be felt, which the comparatively small deficiency alone could never have produced.

First

Appendix, No. 3.

First of all, it must be observed, that after the hurricane in November, the rations ceased to be served out in advance; one day's supply was then lost, and this advance was never until quite recently recovered; consequently the regiments lost the advantage of having always in hand one day's supply.

This circumstance alone deprived the men of all means and leisure for cooking their provisions; they were incessantly on duty in the trenches, and when out of them, on fatigue to Balaklava and head quarters, for the purpose of bringing up their own biscuit and meat; but even under this disadvantage, had the day's supply been served out early in the morning, it might have been made use of; but such early issue never took place; sometimes no meat at all was served out till the evening, long after the night covering party had marched down to the trenches: if, therefore, nothing was left from the previous day, the men went to the trenches, having had nothing but biscuit and rum; this constantly occurred. Again, perhaps ½ lb. or a ¼ lb. would be served out at 12 o'clock noon; this might be cooked and eaten by the men then going to the trenches at 4 p. m.; the other half was served out in the evening, after they had marched off; it would be used the following day, on which, perhaps, a full issue might take place at seven or eight o'clock in the evening, when it would be too late to cook it; or many men who had come off duty at six o'clock in the evening, went again to take the trenches at 4 p. m. the same evening; this constantly and repeatedly occurred: thus it may with truth be affirmed that the men for days and weeks together went down to the trenches with an insufficient meal, and oftentimes with none at all, save a little biscuit and rum.

The actual deficiencies, however, when summed up in the gross, are considerably lessened by the bits and scraps of supplies which were most irregularly thrown in to fill up the void, against which, commanding officers of regiments were continually remonstrating and complaining about; nor were these remonstrances and complaints without foundation; for it must not be forgotten, that the deficiencies in the beginning of the fortnight were frequently made up by supplies served out in the latter part of it; the arrears thus accumulated, if served out, would not be eaten, but be probably thrown away.

Figures do not contradict facts; nor can the daily deficiencies by any ingenuity be explained away.

(signed) *West*, B. Lt.-Col. Com. 21st Fusiliers.

(signed) *J. Hamilton*, Major D. A. Q. M. G.

NOTE.—with reference to the last part of the above statement, I beg to observe, that the daily issues to the division in December and January are shown in the two statements forwarded by me some time back, and that such issues were made between morning and night of each day: the supplies short issued in the beginning of the fortnight were not, therefore, made up by supplies served out in the latter part of it; but if ever such were the case, I do not see why "the arrears thus accumulated" should be thrown away. Why could they not be made available for the next fortnight?

7 March 1855. (signed) *Henry Bartlett*, D. A. C. G.

(999.)

My Lord, Balaklava, 27 March 1855.

THE mail which arrived this day from England brings the evidence given by Lieutenant-general the Earl of Lucan before the Committee of the House of Commons on the 15th instant; from which I perceive it to have been stated by his Lordship, that the authorities of the French army in the East had complained to him that they experienced a deficiency of forage in consequence of the neglect of the British Commissariat to return 30 days' fodder which had been lent to it; upon which I would beg to observe that his Lordship has been misinformed on the subject, as I have never received any assistance from the French administration, excepting on one occasion, when the arrival of my own supplies from Constantinople having been retarded by a continuance of contrary winds, I obtained the loan of a vessel laden with chopped straw (unpressed), containing less than one day's issue to the British army, and which was repaid in kind, shortly afterwards. 962. 1,027.

I have hitherto abstained from noticing the many incorrect statements, as reported in the newspapers, that have been made before the Committee respecting the Commissariat, as not requiring immediate attention; but the evidence of Lord Lucan in the particular before mentioned appears to me to call for early refutation, and I accordingly have the honour respectfully to request that your Lordship would be pleased to submit this letter to the Secretary of State for War, with a view to its being laid before the Committee of the House of Commons.

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Field Marshal Lord Raglan, G. C. B.,
&c. &c. &c.

Appendix, No. 3.

REPORT from Deputy Commissary-General *Smith* to Sir *C. E. Trevelyan*, K.C.B., referred to in Mr. *Smith*'s Evidence.

Sir, Constantinople, 19 March 1854.

SINCE the date of the letter I had the honour of addressing you on the 12th instant, my best exertions have been used to acquire every possible information as to the commissariat resources of this country, as well as to mature plans by which these resources could at a short notice be made available on the arrival of the expected military force.

The difficulties of such an undertaking need not be enlarged upon; an estimate of them may be formed to a certain extent from historical accounts, but its realisation can only be felt after practical observation such as I have had. The intricacies and delays of intercourse with the numerous persons who must be consulted, the diversity of language, the peculiar customs and prejudices of the people, and the unprecedented fluctuations of the markets, are a few of the causes which render operations in this country more difficult than perhaps in any other in the world.

Under these circumstances, the progress I have hitherto made will not, I trust, be thought inconsiderable. His Excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has favoured me with three interviews, and takes a deep interest in the object in view. I have also had communications with others under his Lordship's directions, and was yesterday presented to the Seraskier Pasha, or Minister-at-War and Commander-in-chief of the Turkish army.

The Turkish officer appointed in the early part of the week to assist me was inefficient, although apparently acting with the best intentions, and I regret to say that a good deal of valuable time was lost to me in consequence.

The position to which the matter has been brought is, that the Turkish Government will lend its influence and assistance in providing the necessary supplies of provisions, forage, and means of transport for the British army, controlling the rates of charge so as to avoid, on the one hand, anything like oppression to the inhabitants, and on the other, the extortion to which the markets would otherwise rise in contemplation of such immense demands as will be made upon them.

It was thought at first that the whole arrangement might have been effected through the intervention of the Turkish Government, thus placing it in the light of a general contractor; but, on further consideration, it would seem that whilst it is our intention to pay promptly and equitably for everthing, and thereby establish a favourable impression in the country, such good intentions might be defeated by the misconduct of the persons charged with the execution of the orders of the Porte. In this view of the case Lord Stratford de Redcliffe fully concurs, and it will therefore be necessary that separate contracts should be made with the parties who are to supply meat, bread, fuel, forage, and means of transport, and that free payment to those parties should be secured under commissariat arrangements.

When this point was discussed yesterday at my interview with the Seraskier Pasha, it was suggested that a committee should be immediately formed, combining the English, French, and Turkish authorities; that I should attend on behalf of the English; that competent contractors should be nominated; rates of charge fixed according to specific conditions, and the whole arrangement be ratified by the Seraskier himself, so as to ensure a successful result to the forces, and satisfy the parties that they will be duly paid; the rule here being, not that contractors should give security, but be secured by those who receive the supplies.

This mode of procedure seems to be the one determined on, and will be applicable not only to Constantinople and its vicinity, but to any other part of the Turkish territory where the forces may operate, an officer of competent authority taking the place of the Seraskier when away from the capital; and, as it is understood that the British troops will, in all probability, disembark near Gallipoli, at the head of the Dardanelles, and move onward to Adrianople, the committee will, I believe, after a preliminary meeting here, proceed to the Dardanelles for the purpose of arranging plans. I am invited to go with the committee, but will of course bear in mind that, while everything may be put in preparation as far as possible, I cannot conclude any final arrangement, or authorise the formation of depôts, until the promised instructions shall be given, or the arrival of the troops may justify my acting in this respect under the orders of the General commanding.

The result of the inquiries I have made in various quarters, and the assurances of the Seraskier Pasha, lead to the conclusion that the resources of the country are sufficient for all the demands likely to be made upon them for some considerable time to come. There are deficiencies in the capital, and in specific localities out of it, owing to the almost impassable state of the country; a state of things which may continue a month or so longer. The expense of providing supplies will, of course, be correspondingly increased; but, with a view to counteract any extreme fluctuations, I have submitted the expediency of making the contracts for only one month at a time, so that a revision of prices may be effected with fairness to all parties concerned, the same contractors having the preference, provided they may have given previous satisfaction.

The first principles of operation would thus appear to be established, and it is the concurrent opinion of competent judges that they embrace the most simple and advantageous

tageous mode that could be adopted. In working them out, innumerable difficulties must, of course, be anticipated, such as the want of regularity in delivery, proper quality, and otherwise; difficulties, however, which exist more or less elsewhere, but which, though peculiarly applicable to this place, may no doubt be successfully overcome by patience and perseverance. To meet this state of things our own department will, I trust, be placed upon an efficient footing, particularly with regard to subordinate persons; and although economy is a most important consideration, still I venture to hope that it may not in any way be studied so as to interfere with the efficiency of operation, or the success of the great national object in view.

I am led to believe that the Turkish officers who may be attached to us for the purpose of enforcing the execution of firmans will expect to be paid by the British Government, besides a variety of other persons, such as interpreters and agents. As long as the preliminary arrangements devolve upon me as senior officer present, I will however endeavour to simplify the matter as much as I can, by merging collateral expenses in the several rates of charge for provisions, &c., in order to avoid the great multiplication of such expenses which the peculiar intricacies of agency in this country give rise to.

A central depôt should, I conceive, be established at Constantinople, and I would suggest that it be replenished with supplies, not only as they are brought in from the country, but also with biscuits and salt meat, but particularly biscuit, to an extent much above what appears to have been already contemplated. The distance between Constantinople and the nearest point of disembarkation will be inconsiderable, or easily overcome by the means of transport which the Admiralty can furnish; and let the local resources be what they may, it would I think, be inexpedient to trust too much to them in a state of active warfare. The Turkish Government, will, I am assured, lend good and ample magazines in a convenient place, as there are several unoccupied.

With respect to corn, some fears were entertained that a deficiency might be apprehended. A council was held on this subject last Wednesday, and the result was, I believe, satisfactory, after an order prohibiting exportation had been given. There are good mills at Varna, which is accessible by water carriage, besides others in the capital and its vicinity; and the bazaars exhibit a good supply of bread, varying from one to four different qualities, which I have carefully examined. It is all made with leaven, but wholesome, at least the first two qualities; and it appears to me that the second quality, which answers the description of ration bread at some of our foreign military stations, should be the standard for our troops in this country, although they may find it at first somewhat inferior to the ration bread at home. The price of this description of bread is at present 3 piastres per oke, or, at a rough calculation, about 2 *d.* per lb.* The bread supplied to the Turkish troops in the capital is much inferior, and costs only 2 piastres per oke. I have also seen a specimen of the contract bread for the French navy, which is perhaps a shade better, but still too inferior a great deal for our troops. This has been paid for at the rate of 2 ½ piastres per oke, or 1 ⅝ *d.* per lb., but is now increased to 3 piastres, which is even above the bazaar price. The means of baking seem to be ample, some considerable portion being under the Government. It is the same at Gallipoli, which place I visited on my way here.

* The average price of bread in Great Britain from 1 December 1853 to 28 February 1854, according to the Ordnance statement, was 2·05 *d.* per lb.

Cattle and sheep can, it is said, be procured in abundance, by giving timely notice, so that they can be brought in from the country. They are small and generally thin, but the meat, though bony, is sweet and wholesome. The prices will, I think, be reasonable, especially in the country districts. The contract price for the British and French fleets is about 6 piastres per oke, or 4 *d.* per lb.† Some dissatisfaction has, it is understood, occurred amongst the sub-contractors, owing to disagreement with the general agent, who is a Frenchman; and we may perhaps make a better bargain through the influence of the Turkish Government, when it is known that the contract will be more certain than in the case of the navy, and that prompt payment will be made direct to those who are entitled to it.

† Ordnance contract price of meat in Great Britain, 3·670 *d.* per ¾ lb. or 4·9 *d.* per lb.

Firewood is rather a scarce article, owing partly to the stoppage of supplies from the Black Sea and partly to the prolonged winter; snow having fallen here the day before yesterday six inches deep.

The price is consequently high, but I am led to believe that the Turkish Government would supply some from their own stock to begin with, until importations could take place under their firmans.

Barley and chopped straw are the invariable food of Turkish horses, and they seem to thrive admirably upon this kind of forage. The prices are comparatively reasonable, say about 4 *s.* per bushel for barley. Oats can be had at perhaps a lower rate, but barley is preferred by every one here as being equally nutritious and less heating. Neither hay nor straw for bedding can be had at any price. Dried manure is used for bedding, even in the stables of the Ambassador.

With respect to the means of transport, which is an all-important consideration, I am assured by the Seraskier Pasha that no apprehension of difficulty need be entertained on this head. He said that pack-mules, pack-horses, camels, and bullock waggons should be forthcoming, whenever they were wanted, if a few days' notice were given, and that the charges for their hire or purchase should be the same as those paid by the Turkish Government. The horses are rough, and cannot be very expensive; there are large numbers of them

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them even about the streets of the capital. Mules are more scarce and dearer. The camels seem of a good kind, and would make excellent carriers of baggage; but the bullock waggons, although they answer the purposes of the country in ordinary times, are miserable ricketty-looking vehicles, drawn by two buffaloes, and consequently incapable of bearing very heavy articles, such as arm chests, &c. Some light carts of a portable nature, that could be drawn by the animals of the country, would have been a most desirable acquisition if sent from home, and I hope it is not yet too late to think of getting them out. If a few hundred of the fine Spanish mules could have been sent from Gibraltar, they would have been an invaluable addition to the transport of the country.

Boats of almost every size and construction, can be had at a reasonable rate of charge for inland water transport; some are wholly and some partially decked. I allude not only to the capital, but to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and I include the necessary hands for working them.

Through the favour of Brigadier-general Tylden, who is the senior British military officer and commanding Royal Engineer at Constantinople, I have obtained a good deal of local information as to the state of the country and roads from the Sea of Marmora to Adrianople. It is certainly not of a very encouraging character, but the winter season must be taken into consideration, and the prospect of a change for the better is, I trust, not far distant.

The mode of paying both troops and contractors is a question of very considerable importance, and so great is the difficulty of managing such a matter in this country, where the currency is so varied, and the fluctuations of almost hourly occurrence, that even the merchants who have been a long time established are compelled to employ intermediate agents for the purpose. Piastres are the standard of currency; they go up to 100 in gold coin, and from 10 to 5,000 in paper; paras, 40 to a piastre, constituting the lower denomination. It is impossible, without a good deal more consideration than I have been able to give the subject, to enter into a detail of the currency question in all its very peculiar bearings; but I may remark, that the paper is only current in the capital, and usually at a discount of about 25 per cent. with respect to gold, and about 18 to 20 to silver. The difference between metallic and paper currency is, however, compensated for in large transactions by more favourable prices, and I would venture to suggest that the metallic currency should invariably be the standard of our operations, being the least liable to fluctuations, while it would greatly simplify our accounts and transactions.

The question of paying the troops is not of immediate consequence and will require very mature consideration. My present object is to suggest a mode of paying for supplies and other services, under the contracts which I may be called upon to make before your arrival; and I think the best way of doing so will be to have an office of our own in Constantinople, upon which drafts at three, five, or ten days' sight could be given in favour of the different contractors, who, I understand, would be contented with this mode of settlement. Bills on the Treasury could, I have no doubt, be negotiated by competition for piastres, and all contingencies, such as fluctuations of exchange, would thus be merged in the transactions, and collateral considerations avoided. A shroff agent and interpreter of unquestionable character will be required to assist in these payments. They should, I conceive, be engaged at fixed salaries, and I am led to believe that persons of this description are to be found; but if a temporary arrangement should devolve upon myself, I would, under proper advice, make the best bargain I could with a respectable mercantile house, and I know of none superior to that of Mr. Black, an eminent merchant of 40 years' standing, whose character Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has stated to be of the very highest description, and who, besides being a man of great intelligence, has those about him suitable to act as competent assistants. I have already had several communications with Mr. Black on the recommendation of his Excellency the Ambassador, and have derived a great deal of valuable information from him.

I have thus gone into as much detail as may perhaps be consistent with the nature of this communication. The plan of operation is so much advanced, that I shall be prepared, as far as possible, to enter into the necessary contracts when orders for my doing so may arrive. I am led to believe that these contracts, when made, could be commenced at a notice of about two or three days, during which the troops would of course have to subsist on ship rations, unless the instructions came to hand previously in proper time. But in estimating this part of the case, the dilatory nature of all Turkish forms of action must be considered, with the ignorance which exists as to our manner of transacting business, so as to account for any failure which may take place in our present prospects.

I beg to enclose a form of contract which it is proposed to adopt, with modifications suitable to the articles to be supplied, and I will endeavour to arrange it so that, if possible, one contractor may be found for each separate article.

Assistant Commissary-general Turner and Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Palmer have been most zealous and unremitting in their exertions, and have rendered me very valuable assistance.

I have, &c.

(signed) *John W. Smith*, A. C. G.

STATEMENT of Sums shipped from *England* for the Commissariat Chests at *Malta* and *Constantinople* in 1854; and of Treasury Bills negotiated in *Malta*, *Turkey*, the *Crimea*, and *Spain*, by the Commissariat in the same Year. Appendix, No. 3.

STATEMENT of the Amount of Money shipped from *England* in aid of the Commissariat Chests at *Malta*, and in *Turkey*, during the Year 1854.

TO MALTA.

	In Sovereigns.	In Half Sovereigns.	
	£.	£.	
January 20th - - -	25,000	5,000	
February 20th - - -	40,000	10,000	
April 20th - - -	40,000	10,000	Of these sums remitted to Malta it is supposed that upwards of 100,000*l.* has been caused by expenses connected with the Army in the East.
June 4th - - - -	32,000	8,000	
August 11th - - -	32,000	8,000	
September 4th - - -	32,000	8,000	
December 19th - - -	32,000	8,000	
	233,000	57,000	

Total - - - £. 290,000

TO CONSTANTINOPLE, &c., FOR THE ARMY IN THE EAST.

	Sovereigns.	Half Sovereigns.	Florins.	Shillings.	Sixpences.	British Copper.	Five-Franc Pieces.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
March 20th - - -	90,000	13,000	6,000	4,000	2,000	—	—
May 2d - - - -	90,000	13,000	6,000	4,700	1,300	300	—
June 3d - - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
June 10th - - -	80,000	20,000	—	—	—	—	—
June 29th - - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	20,083
July 12th - - -	- -	- -	- -	5,000	5,000	—	—
July 29th - - -	32,000	8,000	—	—	—	—	—
August 11th - - -	80,000	20,000	—	—	—	—	—
August 17th - - -	- -	- -	12,000	6,000	2,000	—	—
August 31st - - -	80,000	20,000	5,000	3,000	2,000	—	—
September 13th - -	40,000	10,000	—	—	—	—	—
October 11th - - -	40,000	10,000	6,000	3,000	1,000	—	—
	532,000	114,000	35,000	25,700	13,300	300	20,083

Total - - British Coin - - - £. 720,300
French 5-Franc Pieces 20,083

£. 740,383

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AMOUNT of TREASURY BILLS drawn at *Malta* in Payment for Supplies, and in exchange for Specie during the Year 1854.

	£.
Bills drawn for Supplies - - - - -	170,975
Bills exchanged for Specie - - - -	2,663
TOTAL - - - £.	173,638

Of this amount it is supposed that upwards of £. 100,000 of the Bills for Supplies has been caused by Expenditure on account of the Army in the East.

AMOUNT of TREASURY BILLS drawn in *Turkey* and the *Crimea* in Payment for Supplies, in exchange for Specie or Paper Piastres, and for Remittances of Officers and others, during the Year 1854.

	£.
Bills drawn for Supplies - - - - - -	139,685
„ Specie - - - - -	2,413
„ Paper Piastres - - - -	198,800
„ Officers', &c., Remittances - -	31,752
TOTAL - - - £.	371,850

AMOUNT of TREASURY BILLS drawn by *A. C. G. Major*, on a Mission to *Spain* to purchase MULES for the British Army in the East, between April and December 1854.

£. 20,430.

SUMMARY.

	£.	£.
Remittances to Malta - - - - -	290,000	
„ Constantinople - - - -	740,283	
		1,030,383
Bills drawn at Malta - - - - -	173,638	
„ in Turkey and Crimea - - -	371,850	
„ Spain - - - - -	20,430	
		565,918
	£.	1,596,301

Treasury,
3 May 1855.

C. E. Trevelyan.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPER delivered in by *Captain Milne.*

DEMURRAGE CLAIMS.

"Briton," S. V.; Stores to Constantinople.

Appendix, No. 4.

CONTRACT, 18 September 1854.—Mr. Thomas Hill, owner, claims, 1,274 *l.*, at the rate of 60 *s.* per ton per month, for 29 days. Claim not settled; and according to the charter-party, which allows 40 working days, no claim could arise. Mr. Hill affirms he signed the charter under protest; but there is no evidence.

"Helen Mary," Sailing; Stores to the Crimea.

CONTRACT, July 1854.—Claims 233 *l.* 14 *s.* 4 *d.*, for demurrage beyond the 40 working days; and it is feared the claim will have to be admitted, although not yet properly vouched.

"Asia," Sailing, taken up at Malta to carry coals to the Crimea. Was paid at Balaklava, according to the agreement, 5 *l.* per diem for 15 days' demurrage; was kept 12 days longer; claimed 120 *l.*; but was allowed and accepted only 60 *l.* on the 24th instant.

"Rapid," "Margaret Elizabeth" and "Sappho," Colliers taken up at Malta to go to the Crimea. Have been paid by the Paymaster of the "Sans Pareil," freight and demurrage, but the separate amounts for each are not given in his accounts. A calculation has been made, which is inserted in the table below. The "Sappho" has just lodged a claim for 332 *l.* 1 *s.* 6 *d.* additional demurrage.

(signed) *A. H. Bather.*

28 April.

SHIP.	FREIGHT.	DEMURRAGE.	——
Engaged in England.	£. *s.* *d.*	£. *s.* *d.*	
"Briton"	1,270 10 –	1,274 – –*	—
"Helen Mary"	1,604 16 –	233 4 –	—
	Total drawn for.	Presumed to be for Freight.	Presumed to be for Demurrage.
Engaged at Malta.	£. *s.* *d.*	£. *s.* *d.*	£. *s.* *d.*
"Rapid"	416 2 –	326 2 –	90 – –
"Margaret Elizabeth"	620 – –	525 – –	95 – –
"Sappho"	690 4 –	532 – –	158 4 – ⎫
Additional claim lodged in office	– – –	– – –	332 1 6 ⎭

* This is the sum claimed. It is not likely one quarter so much, if anything, will be paid.

Appendix, No. 5.

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPERS delivered in by Captain *A. Milne*, R. N., 30 April 1855.

FORM of REPORT on FREIGHT SHIPS.

REPORT on the Freight Ship_____, as desired by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, on its voyage from_____ to _____ with the Detachments of the_____ Regiments on board, to be filled up and signed by the Commanding Officer of the Troops, when there is no Naval Agent on board, and transmitted, in duplicate, to the Quartermaster-General at the end of the voyage.

SUBJECT.	REPORT.
1st.—State what regiment is embarked, with the numbers of officers and their families, and of men, women, and children.	1st.—
2d.—State place and date of - Embarkation - -	2d.—
2d.—State place and date of - Sailing from England -	
2d.—State place and date of - Arrival and sailing from other ports - -	
2d.—State place and date of - Number of days on the voyage - - -	
3d.—Whether the ship has been properly fitted, kept in a clean state, and the master has discharged his duty to the troops in a proper and satisfactory manner, and afforded every care and attention to the women and children on board.	3d.—
4th.—Whether the conditions of the charterparty have been carried out? for a perusal of which the commanding officer of the troops is authorised to apply to the master whenever he may require it.	4th.—
5th.—Whether there has been any cause of complaint of the provisions, or medical comforts, either as regards quantity or quality, or any inattention in their issue, and whether the troops have been properly supplied with good water.	5th.—
6th—Whether there has been any unnecessary delay in making the passage.	6th.—
7th.—Whether the officers' mess has been properly kept, and satisfactorily provided under the established regulations.	7th.—
8th.—Whether any sickness has been prevalent among the troops or other persons on board, and if so, to what cause it can be attributed.	8th.—
9th.—State names of the owners of the ship and of the master in command.	9th.—

Note.—Should there be any cause of complaint relative to the provisions or other stores, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty hereby authorise the commanding officer of the troops to order a survey to be held on the same by properly qualified officers, at which the master and mate of the ship are always to be requested to be present. And in

in case of any of Her Majesty's ships being met with at sea or at the port of disembarkation, the commanding officer of the troops is requested to submit any cause of complaint to the captain of such ship, or if no ship should be present, to the naval agent, if there is one on the spot, for such investigation as may be considered necessary for the information of the Admiralty.

Appendix, No. 5.

GENERAL REMARKS.

Admiralty, 31 October 1855.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having appropriated the "Robert Lowe" steamer for the conveyance of detachments named in the margin, consisting of 12 officers and passengers, and 673 men, together with a quantity of ordnance, medical, and other stores to the East:

Scots Fusileer Guards.
4th Foot.
28th „
38th „
44th „
Rifle Brigade.

You are hereby required and directed, as soon as the vessel is in all respects ready for sea and the stores are on board, to proceed with all possible despatch to Portsmouth, where you are to receive on board the above-mentioned detachments and passengers; having so done, you are to make the best of your way to Constantinople, reporting your arrival to the military authorities at that place, and follow such directions as you receive from them as to the landing of the troops, passengers, and stores; and, having so done, you are to place yourself under the orders of the Rear-Admiral Superintendent in the Bosphorus, and follow the instructions you may receive from him as to your future proceedings.

You are at liberty on your voyage out to call at Malta for the purpose of coaling, should it be found necessary.

Your particular attention is called to their Lordships' circular on the other side, No. 154, dated the 23d June 1854, three copies of which are enclosed, prohibiting the practice of smoking, except under the restrictions therein mentioned, and containing general precautions to guard against accidents by fire; and you are, in conjunction with the military officer in charge of the troops, and with your own officers of the ship, to adopt the most stringent measures for enforcing obedience to the regulations therein laid down; and you are to report any departure therefrom to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

3.

In the execution of this or any other service on which you may be employed, you will be held responsible that no unnecessary delay takes place in effecting the passage from one port to another, and that every exertion is used in furthering the service for which the ship has been chartered; and in case of meeting with bad weather, and being in the vicinity of safe anchorage, you are to exercise your judgment as to the expediency of putting into such harbour instead of remaining at sea.

In the event of a naval officer being appointed to take charge of the vessel, you are to obey all orders and directions which you may receive from such officer, and to follow his instructions in all respects.

To the Commander of the
"Robert Lowe" Steamer.

Appendix, No. 5.

(Circular, No. 154.)

SMOKING ON BOARD OF TRANSPORTS.

Admiralty, 23 June 1854.

THE Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have to call the special attention of Admiralty agents and masters of transports, and freight ships, as well as the military officers in charge of troops embarked, to the necessity of their Lordships' orders being strictly enforced respecting the smoking of tobacco, which is never on any account to be permitted, except on the upper deck, and then only at reasonable hours; and no lucifer or patent matches are to be allowed on board; and the agents and masters of all ships chartered by the Admiralty are to adopt the most stringent measures to prevent these regulations from being disobeyed; and they are to take care, in the stowage of the holds, that no accumulation of oily or greasy oakum or other combustible materials be allowed, which might cause spontaneous combustion; and they are to warn all persons on board to be most careful of lights, so as to prevent accidents by fire. It is their Lordships' direction that this order be publicly read by the agent, or if there is no agent on board, by the master of the ship, to the crew and troops on their embarkation; and a copy of it is to be hung up in some conspicuous place for general information.

By command of their Lordships,
R. Osborne.

To all Commanders in-chief, Captains, Commanders,
and Commanding Officers of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels.

Admiralty, 11 November 1855.

1st Foot, 1st Batt.
4th "
28th "
38th "
20th "
46th "

THE Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having appropriated the "Brandon" steamer for the conveyance of the detachments of the regiments named in the margin, consisting of six officers and 355 men, with one passenger and a quantity of ordnance stores and medical comforts to the East:

You are hereby required and directed, as soon as the vessel is in all respects ready for sea, and the stores are on board, to proceed with all possible despatch to Portsmouth, where the detachments are to be embarked, and having received them on board, to make the best of your way to Constantinople, reporting your arrival to the military authorities at that place, and following such directions as you may receive from them as to the landing of the troops, passenger, and stores; having so done, you are to place yourself under the orders of the Rear-Admiral Superintendent in the Bosphorus, following such instructions as you may receive from him as to your future proceedings.

You are at liberty to call at Malta on your way out for the purpose of coaling, should the same be found necessary.

3.

Your particular attention is called to their Lordships' circular on the other side, No. 154, dated the 23d June 1854, three copies of which are enclosed, prohibiting the practice of smoking, except under the restrictions therein mentioned, and containing general precautions to guard against accidents by fire; and you are, in conjunction with the military officer in charge of the troops, and with your own officers of the ship, to adopt the most stringent measures for enforcing obedience to the regulations therein laid down; and you are to report any departure therefrom to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

In the execution of this or any other service on which you may be employed, you will be held responsible that no unnecessary delay takes place in effecting the passage from one port to another, and that every exertion is used in furthering the service for which the ship has been chartered; and in case of meeting with bad weather, and being in the vicinity of a safe anchorage, you are to exercise your judgment as to the expediency of putting into such harbour instead of remaining at sea.

In the event of a naval officer being appointed to take charge of the vessel, you are to obey all orders and directions which you may receive from such officer, and to follow his instructions in all respects. Should you meet with any of Her Majesty's sailing transports at sea, you are, if required, to take them in tow, and, as far as practicable, afford any assistance to enable them to reach their destination.

By order of their Lordships,
(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

To the Commander of the "Brandon" Steamer.

(Circular, No. 154.)

SMOKING ON BOARD OF TRANSPORTS.

Admiralty, 23 June 1854.

THE Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have to call the special attention of Admiralty agents and masters of transports, and freight ships, as well as the military officers in charge of troops embarked, to the necessity of their Lordships' orders being strictly enforced respecting the smoking of tobacco, which is never on any account to be permitted, except on the upper deck, and then only at reasonable hours; and no lucifer or patent matches are to be allowed on board; and the agents and masters of all ships chartered by the Admiralty are to adopt the most stringent measures to prevent these regulations from being disobeyed; and they are to take care, in the stowage of the holds, that no accumulation of oily or greasy oakum

oakum or other combustible materials be allowed, which might cause spontaneous combustion; and they are to warn all persons on board to be most careful of lights, so as to prevent accidents by fire. It is their Lordships' direction that this order be publicly read by the agent, or if there is no agent on board, by the master of the ship, to the crew and troops on their embarkation, and a copy of it is to be hung up in some conspicuous place for general information.

By command of their Lordships,
R. Osborne.

To all Commanders-in-chief, Captains, Commanders,
and Commanding Officers of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels.

Admiralty, 2 December 1854.

The ship under your charge having been chartered by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for the conveyance to

your strict attention is hereby called to the duty you have to perform, in regard not only to the proper and careful distribution of the cargo entrusted to your charge, but also in regard to its proper stowage, observing that you will be held responsible for the safe custody of each and every article placed on board, so as to ensure the speedy and safe delivery of the same according to its address at the port to which the cargo may be consigned.

For this purpose you are enjoined to be constantly on board your ship while loading, so that you may be enabled to attend to this particular part of your duty; and you are to see that a list of the stores, in the proper order of their delivery, and the place where they are stowed, and to whom consigned, be correctly entered in a book which you will be required to keep for this purpose, which book you are to allow the naval, military, and commissariat authorities to inspect, whether it be at home or abroad, who may visit the ship for the purpose of making inquiry in regard to the cargo generally, or in regard to any particular article that the said authorities, or any one of them, may have reason to suppose is on board.

You are on no account whatever to allow any private goods or stores to be embarked in the ship, either on your own account or by other parties; observing, that if it should hereafter appear that you have disobeyed this order, a very heavy mulct will be inflicted on the ship.

In whatever port you may be at anchor, you are on arrival, and before leaving such port, to report yourself to the naval, military, and commissariat authorities, so that they may be made acquainted with the nature of the cargo on board; and you are likewise to report to the naval or other authorities, from day to day, what stores remain in the ship, observing that any neglect in regard to the duties assigned to you in this matter will be visited by their Lordships' severe displeasure.

The sailing orders for the ship's proceeding on her voyage will be hereafter transmitted to you in due course.

The receipt of these orders is to be acknowledged.

By command of their Lordships.

To the Master of the

(1,755.)

Admiralty, 3 February 1855.

The Admiral Superintendent at Malta has been directed to give positive orders to every vessel proceeding to the Black Sea, to take special care that all stores on board for Constantinople and Scutari are landed at those places, and not carried on to the Crimea.

By command of their Lordships,

Comptroller of the Victualling.
Storekeeper-general.
Medical Director-general.

(signed) *R. Osborne.*

Reporting Departure from Constantinople.

(No. 22.)

"Harpy," at Constantinople, 28 January 1855.
(Received 7 February 1855).

Sir,

Having this day given up my appointment as superintendent in the Bosphorus to Commodore the Honourable F. W. Grey, it is my intention to proceed this day to assume my duties as senior officer at Balaklava, in the steam transport "Lady Eglinton."

2. I beg to enclose a copy of a letter I have addressed to the Commodore on the duties of the station.

I have, &c.
Edward Boxer,
Rear-Admiral Superintendent.

The Secretary of the Admiralty,
London.

Appendix, No. 5.

Enclosure, No. 22, of 1855.

Sir, "Harpy," at Constantinople, 27 January 1855.

In compliance with the directions of the Commander-in-chief to furnish you with all the local useful information in my power, I beg to give you the same under the following heads:

Coaling Her Majesty's Ships and Transports.

On my arrival from England in the month of May last to form the Naval Establishment, there were no resources of any kind for this or any other service. I at once applied to Her Majesty's Ambassador to procure me an eligible spot for a coal depôt (above Tophana, since granted to the French); but my request could not then be complied with. A second request was made.

Since that period I have succeeded in obtaining from the Turkish Government, through Her Majesty's Ambassador,—

A store at Stenia capable of containing between 4,000 or 5,000 tons, now nearly full; a store in the naval arsenal, 7,000 tons; and I have hired two stores, 1,900 tons; these, with two hired by Mr. Moubray, 2,400 tons, make together storage for near 16,000 tons of coal. The "Caduceus" transport, dismasted, holding 1,000 tons, is retained as a depôt till her stores arrive from England.

The storekeeper has on hand 13,000 tons, and more can be purchased if necessary. Nearly 100,000 tons are either on the way out from England, or ready for shipment. Colliers are now in the Dardanelles, wind bound.

The quantity of fuel supplied to Her Majesty's ships and transports since the 1st May last, amounts to near 60,000 tons.

Our means of coaling are as follows:

Two lighters, carrying each 40 tons; four lighters, from Malta, each 30 tons; four smaller craft, averaging 15 tons. Whenever practicable, colliers are placed alongside ships requiring fuel immediately they come into the Golden Horn. Colliers are sent to Beicos when required.

The great obstacles to coaling have been the want of labour, which will now be obviated by their Lordships having ordered the crews of Her Majesty's ships to be employed on extra wages, and of the "Melampus," receiving ship, on her arrival. The uncertain state of the weather at this time of the year is also a source of great difficulty in the Golden Horn, but not in the arsenal.

The Kosloo and Zungledick coal mines, transferred by the Turkish authorities to Her Majesty's Government during the continuance of the present war, will yield a large supply of coal when the spring is sufficiently advanced to permit shipments to be made. About 13,000 tons are supposed to be now extracted. Mr. Barclay, the engineer in charge of the mines, has lately proceeded to Kosloo with mining apparatus and railway iron, and miners were sent up about three weeks ago by the "Triton." These mines will be of the utmost importance should the war be prolonged.

I have fixed on a site at Heraclia for a depôt, with Mr. Barclay's approval, which can be filled as opportunities offer during the summer, and reserved for winter supply, the anchorage being good.

I have directed Mr. Barclay to inform me if the flat boats used by the French for landing troops will answer for shipping the coals, and if so, they can be made here, which I recommend to your attention, as there are no shipping boats at present.

Watering.

The "Sacka" steam tank was engaged during the summer by Captain Christie, under my directions, to water the transports, at about 4 *l.* per day, and coals. This vessel only gives about 20 tons, and as we could get but six turns a week out of her, and she was frequently under repair, I discharged her on the owners increasing their demand to 9 *l.* per day, having previously obtained a tank from Malta, and fitted a country boat to hold 11 tons, as well as contracted for building another holding about 30 tons.

Our resources now are,

1 tank holding 45 tons.
1 tank holding 30 tons.
1 tank holding 40 tons, will be fitted within a fortnight.

A contract at the rate of 5 *s.* per ton, reduced from 10 *s.* per ton.

Whenever a pressure exists, the Turkish authorities assist me with their water tank.

The small tank was lost during the gale of the 14th November.

I have been for some time negotiating for the purchase of the "Sacka," and I have at length bought her for 4,000 *l.*, subject to approval on survey.

This gives a total of 140 tons of water afloat, an ample supply, in my opinion, for all purposes.

Labourers have hitherto been hired for these tanks, but I had proposed to man them from the "Melampus," both for the sake of economy, as well as to render the service independent of men liable to leave work at a moment's notice.

To

To supply the tanks with water to the very large amount required, two force-pumps have been ordered to the well at our stores on the Seraglio Point; one has been fitted, the other will be finished to-morrow, and I had intended to have built a tank to catch the rain-water from the roofs of the extensive buildings, as well as to fill by means of the force-pumps when unemployed, which I recommend to your particular attention.

The Turkish arsenal also affords a good supply.

The steam tank used to fill at Beicos, and supply the ships coaling at Stenia, and the vessels lying occasionally at Scutari.

Storage of Provisions.

I have obtained from the Turkish Government the stores at the Seraglio Point, with the buildings adjoining, which are now partially fitted. These stores can contain a large quantity of provisions; and Her Majesty's Ambassador, at my request, has made application for the buildings adjoining these stores, which come within the space allotted to Her Majesty's service, by the Board of Officers who recently assembled to apportion the harbour between the various foreign powers, and I am assured my request has been complied with. This will give ample accommodation for navy stores, provisions and coals.

It is worthy of consideration whether it would not be more advisable, particularly at this season of the year, to supply the ships with provisions direct from Malta, by regular steam communication, which would prevent further transhipment.

We have also considerable storage room for stores and provisions in the naval arsenal.

Naval Storekeeper's Department.

Under the direction of Mr. G. H. Moubray, an active, able, and most zealous officer, who, under the great difficulties we have all participated in, has conducted the arduous duties of his department with the utmost regularity, and the greatest confidence can be placed in him. The Admiralty having lately increased his means of carrying on the duties, I apprehend that the work will not press so heavily as heretofore.

Mr. Ford, appointed superintendent of coaling, is an active, zealous person. You will find in the records of the office a confidential order to report on the necessity of retaining his services after the expiration of the year for which he is engaged.

Naval Hospital, Therapia.

Under the charge of Dr. J. Davidson, surgeon, who, with the chaplain, assistant surgeons, and other officers and people belonging to that establishment, are borne for pay on the books of the senior officer's ship in the Bosphorus.

This establishment requires attention. I have stationed the "Cornwall," transport, as a convalescent ship, at Therapia, and have directed the senior officer at Beicos to make a weekly inspection, and report. From the pressure on this establishment, I am of opinion that an executive officer should be appointed to conduct the military duties, the same as in England.

In consequence of the limited accommodation in the hospital, I have applied to Her Majesty's Ambassador for one of the Sultan's kiosks at Therapia, lately occupied by Madame St. Arnaud, to be granted as a hospital, and I have every hope of succeeding*.

Landing Sick at Scutari.

On the arrival of ships from the Crimea with sick or wounded, the two tugs under my orders, the "Crescent," and "Bournabat," have been despatched to land them, accompanied by the boats of such ships of war and transports as might be in port, with the country boats sent for the purpose by the military authorities, under the direction of Lieutenant Keatly, Admiralty agent of transports, who has been unremitting in his exertions in this and every other duty, and who deserves the strongest recommendation I can give him as a most active and intelligent officer, who, with myself and flag lieutenant, have performed all the duties of this important station, requiring our unremitting attention from morning till dark, not even excluding Sundays, my secretary and clerk not having been able to attend a place of worship for the last eight months. No delay has taken place in landing the sick, and I have not heard a murmur of complaint from a single man during the whole period I personally superintended the landing.

The same arrangements have answered for embarking recovered men and invalids for passage to England.

Duties of the Port.

The "Harpy" having been ordered to Varna when the expedition was projected to the Crimea, and subsequently employed as a despatch boat, she has not been of that service to me in towing vessels into the Black Sea, or from the Dardanelles, which I had hoped for; but as she is now, on my application to the late Commander-in-chief, stationed here, she is available for the duties of the Bosphorus; and I would strongly recommend that application be

* 28th. His Excellency informed me last night that it was granted, and it will be for consideration, when occupied, whether the services of the "Cornwall" should be retained.

Appendix, No. 5.

be made to the Commander-in-chief for the "Triton" or "Medina" to be also attached to the port, one to be at the Dardanelles to tow up wind-bound transports, and the other for general service, particularly to convey money and stores to the coal mines at Kosloo, a service requiring regularity.

These two vessels, with three tugs, one solely for hospital service at Scutari, would, in my opinion, perform the duties in an efficient manner. I have been endeavouring to purchase a tug, but without success.

Her Majesty's consul at the Dardanelles has a steam tug at his disposal, which might be available for emergencies, and is offered for sale for 15,000 *l.* I gave Mr. Calvert permission to tow wind-bound transports into the Sea of Marmora, but he having in a few days run up an account of 640 *l.*, principally for coal vessels, and found himself under the necessity (perfectly unwarranted) of towing a ship all the way to Constantinople at an expense of 300 *l.* more, I cancelled the permission, intending to station a small steamer there.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having placed the establishment of the naval storekeeper on an efficient footing, and directed that the crews of Her Majesty's ships shall assist in the duties of the port, your broad pendant also being in an efficient ship of war, I have no doubt that you will be relieved from the overwhelming duties which I have had to perform for so many months without adequate assistance.

Commander Borlase,* appointed by the Admiralty to assist me in the duties, and now to the "Melampus," is directed to superintend the coaling and watering of the transports, and the fitting of the small ships of war as they arrive. These duties are very important, and require constant attention, and until the masters appointed to come here arrive, I strongly advise a master of one of Her Majesty's ships in port being appointed to assist him in their performance.

Several ships of war and transports having got on shore on the Englishman's Shoal, opposite Therapia, Her Majesty's Ambassador called my attention to the subject, he having observed them from his residence, and I applied to the Turkish authorities to fit six buoys to mark the danger. These have already been prepared, and I have directed the master of the London to prepare them for laying down.

I must not omit to mention that, finding my present offices inadequate to my position, and inconveniently situated for carrying on the service, I applied to Her Majesty's Ambassador for suitable offices, near to Tophana, which has been complied with.

In concluding this report, I have much pleasure in informing you that I have received the greatest assistance from Her Majesty's Ambassador, as well as from the Turkish authorities, (who do all in their power) in carrying on the duties of this important station.

I have, &c.

Commodore the Hon. F. W. Grey, &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *Edward Boxer*,
Rear-Admiral Superintendent.

STEAM FACTORY.

I enclose a copy of my letter, No. 7, of the 4th January, on this subject.

REGULATIONS FOR THE HARBOUR OF BALAKLAVA.

(No. 287.)

"Royal Albert," off Sebastopol, 12 April 1855.

Sir, (Received 26 April 1855.)

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a letter from Rear-Admiral Boxer, enclosing copies of the regulations he has established for the harbour of Balaklava, and of the instructions he has given to Captain C. B. Hamilton, of the "Diamond," for assisting in the duties of the port.

11 April 1855.

I am, &c.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

(signed) *Ed. Lyons*,
Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-chief.

Enclosure to Mediterranean Letter, No. 287 of 1855.

(No. 41.)

Sir, "Diamond," at Balaklava, 11–12 April 1855.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of the regulations I have established for the harbour of Balaklava, and of the instructions I have given to Captain Hamilton, of Her Majesty's ship "Diamond," for carrying on the duties of the port, which I request you will be pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I have, &c.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Bart., G.C.B. &c. &c., Commander-in-chief.

(signed) *Edward Boxer*,
Rear-Admiral.

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* An intelligent gunnery officer; and, on his pressing application to be permitted to join in the siege of Sebastopol, I ordered him up, considering his qualifications as a gunnery officer would render his presence of great service. Since his appointment to the "Melampus," I ordered him down to resume his duties.

Sub-Enclosure, No. 1, to Enclosure to Mediterranean Letter, No. 287 of 1855. Appendix, No. 5.

Regulations for the Port of Balaklava.

No vessel to enter the harbour without permission, which will be signified by the Rendezvous flag (blue and white chequered), with the vessel's number under it, hoisted at the signal-post on the eastern side of the entrance. When the flag is not hoisted, permission is not granted, and a boat to be sent in for orders.

Masters of vessels not in the employ of the Government, to communicate personally with the senior naval officer before they be allowed to enter.

A boom will be drawn across the mouth of the harbour at sunset every evening, and no vessel will be permitted to enter or depart after that time.

The signal-post is in possession of Marryat's signals.

On entering the port, the harbour-master will berth the ship (which berth is not to be changed without permission), and when she is secured, the master is to wait on the senior naval officer with his manifest bills of lading, and a list and description of all passengers on board, stating their names, the nation to which they belong, the object of their visit, and the name of the authority who has given the required pass. He will then proceed to the principal agent of transports, and afterwards to the military departments to whom the cargo is consigned.

It is hereby notified that masters of vessels will be held responsible for all passengers they may bring to Balaklava. No passengers to be received on board without a pass from the senior naval or military officer, or the consular officer or agent at the port of embarkation; and any arriving without such guarantee will be detained on board the vessel which brings them, and conveyed away, on her leaving the port, at the master's expense. All passengers, on arrival, to present themselves immediately at the office of the military commandant, to have their pass *viséd* by that officer, without which they will be liable to arrest by the provost-marshal.

Vessels arriving with cargoes for sale on private account will receive written notification of the time they are to remain in port, at the expiration of which it is expected they will leave the harbour.

The sale of spirits, either to sailors, soldiers, or to parties for retail, is strictly forbidden, and any attempt to evade the law will be followed by the seizure of all the spirits on board the offending vessel, and immediate expulsion.

No person can be permitted to proceed to the front without obtaining permission from the Adjutant-general of the Forces, to whom application must be made.

All drunken men and persons creating a disturbance will be apprehended by the police, or guard-boats, and kept in custody on board a ship of war, pending the proper inquiry into their misconduct. Any persons misbehaving on shore will be summarily punished by the provost-marshal.

The guard-boats and police have orders to stop all boats pulling about the harbour after 10 p.m., to ascertain their object, and that no suspicious or improper persons are abroad.

No offal of any description to be thrown overboard, but to be carried to sea. Should the state of the weather not permit a boat to leave the harbour, it is to be buried in Cossack Bay.

Masters of cattle vessels are strictly directed to cause all dead animals to be thrown overboard before nearing the harbour; and on landing their cargo, no time is to be lost in effecting the necessary purifying and whitewashing.

As dead cattle and other nuisances are constantly collecting in this close harbour, which has no rise or fall of tide, thereby rendering such accumulations highly prejudicial to health, the harbour-master is to be supplied, on his requisition, with boats from any ships to tow the same away, as well as with every other required assistance in the execution of his duty.

As the large number of vessels in harbour renders it imperative to take more than ordinary precautions against fire, the following directions are to be strictly attended to:—

Each ship of war to have a fire engine in a boat every evening after sunset.

Vessels having portable fire engines are to keep them, as well as the hoses and fire buckets, in immediate readiness for service; and a boat's crew, to be called the "Fire boat's crew," to be told off in every ship; the hatches to be kept ready for putting on at once.

Galley fires to be extinguished at 7 p.m., and all "lights" and "fires" to be out by 10 p.m., except the commander's cabin lamp, and such deck-lights as may be considered necessary.

The Admiralty Regulations relative to smoking to be strictly adhered to, and no smoking allowed after 9 p.m. No smoking on any account to be permitted off deck or in cabins. Any accident arising from a disobedience of this order will affect the insurance.

No firearms to be discharged inside "Powell Point."

The magazines of all ships having powder on board to be kept in readiness for drowning.

No combustible materials to be permitted to lie about the ships. Greased and oiled rags, or oakum, being liable to spontaneous combustion, to be carefully put into iron casks or buckets on deck.

Coal bunkers to be frequently looked to, and should the temperature be higher than usual, examination to be made to ascertain if the coals have ignited, and a report made to the senior officer.

Ships to have cables ready for slipping, and hawsers at hand for towing.

No pitch on any account to be boiled on board ship, or in a boat, but to be taken to a safe place on shore.

Appendix, No. 5.

A watch on deck to be kept at night in every ship. The police have orders to hail ships on going the rounds, and to report those which do not answer.

Should a fire be discovered, the alarm-bell to be rung immediately, but only on board the ship in which the fire has broken out; upon which, ships having portable engines are to send them without delay to the spot, with directions to the officers in charge of the boats to follow the orders of the senior naval officer present, who will conduct the measures for extinguishing the fire. A carpenter is to accompany each boat, with the necessary tools for scuttling a ship either of wood or iron. No other persons to leave their ships on any account, but to remain on board to take every precaution against the fire spreading.

Steam-ships to light their fires, and those immediately to leeward, or in the vicinity of the fire, to be removed or to proceed out of the harbour as soon as possible, each one towing off the nearest sailing-ship.

Steam-tugs to be held in readiness for any service.

Should the fire be in a ship having powder on board, and it appears likely to spread, the magazine to be immediately flooded, and the ship scuttled, should the senior naval officer present consider such a step necessary.

All bumboats and shoreboats are to be registered, and have their numbers painted legibly on each side of the bow. Applications for registers to be made to the senior naval officer, and no boat to be permitted to ply without the necessary authority.

The harbour-master to have charge of all vessels leaving the port.

All commanders of vessels will be held responsible for the due observance of these regulations, both by themselves and by those under their immediate orders.

(signed) *Edward Boxer*,
Rear-Admiral and Senior Officer.

"Diamond," at Balaklava,
6 March 1855.

Sub-Enclosure, No. 2, to Enclosure to Mediterranean Letter, No. 287 of 1855.

"Diamond," at Balaklava, 6 March 1855.

INSTRUCTIONS for Captain *C. B. Hamilton*, of Her Majesty's Ship "Diamond," to assist in carrying on the Duties in the Harbour of Balaklava, or for the Officer to whom the same may be transferred.

THE port is under the general superintendence of the Senior Naval Officer, but to aid in carrying out the public service in a systematic and satisfactory manner, you are hereby directed to superintend the following departments, and to see the duties properly and efficiently conducted, furnishing the necessary instructions, as hereinafter detailed, to the officers placed at your disposal.

HARBOUR MASTER.

The duties of this office to be performed by two officers, who will be selected from Her Majesty's ships.

They are as follows:—

When vessels are permitted to enter the harbour, to proceed outside and bring them in, by tug if required.

To proceed to vessels in distress, in the vicinity of the harbour, with the means of affording the necessary assistance.

To berth the transports and other vessels in such situations as will allow of their respective cargoes being landed with the greatest facility at the wharves appropriated to the several departments of the army.

To allow no transport with powder for the army or navy to proceed above Cossack Point until it is removed.

To station colliers in the most favourable positions for delivering their cargoes to the steam transports, &c., and to ascertain what vessels require supplies of fuel, reporting the same to me; and on obtaining approval, to lose no time in making the necessary arrangements for the same, furnishing me every Monday morning with a return of the quantity of coal in harbour.

To keep a working channel through the harbour, and clear passages for boats to the ordnance and commissariat wharves, and from the commissariat wharf to the "Diamond," which are most essential for carrying on the public service, as well as to stop the progress of fire.

To furnish all vessels, if not already provided, with a copy of the Harbour Regulations (which are to be returned before leaving); to see that they are strictly attended to; and to report any neglect of the same.

To make a daily return of arrivals and sailings of all vessels, in Form No. 1, with lists of passengers, as required by the Harbour Regulations.

To see that vessels, when unloaded, do not delay their departure; to pilot them to sea, taking the tug if necessary. Vessels may go to Cossack Bay to take in their ballast, if they think fit.

To inform the provost marshal when any ship is going to sea, and to convey him on board, if he wishes it.

UNLOADING TRANSPORTS AND FREIGHT SHIPS.

The great object of the Naval Department being stationed at Balaklava is to assist the military authorities in obtaining regular and proper supplies of provisions, ammunition, fuel, and other stores, and the greatest exertions must be made in carrying out so important a service.

A lieutenant

A lieutenant from one of Her Majesty's ships will be placed under your orders to superintend this duty, and he is to co-operate cordially with the military officers employed on similar service. He is to communicate daily with the different heads of departments on shore, and receive their wishes as to their requirements, which he is to insert in his pocket book, leaving a space to note the hour when the required stores may be landed.

He is to have charge of the all lighters and boats, and of the working parties afloat, told off for this service, and to see that the craft are kept in proper order, reporting to you when they require repairs.

To see that the boats are properly stationed, and that they are loaded and conveyed to the allotted wharves with dispatch.

To regulate, as far as possible, the clearing of one vessel before commencing on another with a similar cargo, in order to prevent an accumulation of partially laden ships.

Such vessels as cannot have Government boats put on them are to go on landing their cargoes by their own boats; the wharves to which they are to proceed being pointed out to them.

The transport boats being also engaged on this service, the lieutenant is to keep up a constant communication with the officer appointed by the principal agent to superintend, and to be careful that no obstructions take place from any misunderstanding as to the nature of their respective duties.

The landing of the stores and hay will be superintended on the western side by the master of the "Diamond," who is to be directed to see that they are carefully stowed, and that the working parties do not loiter about the wharves.

In landing ammunition the greatest caution is always to be used, and no smoking to be allowed in the vicinity of the Ordnance Wharf.

To report specially when vessels are unloaded, that they may be ballasted and sent away.

Lighters and Boats.

There are five troop boats and six heavy lighters in my charge; also a double boat with a platform, used as a floating wharf, and a Turkish long-boat. They are all available for landing stores and provisions, as are the heavy boats of Her Majesty's ships when necessary; the paddle-box boats being admirably adapted for the purpose. Many of these craft now require repair, and they can be taken in hand, one at a time, as the service will permit. The long-boats of the transports are employed by the principal agent, and any not appropriated will be told off to you on requisition to that officer.

Working Parties.

Large parties from Her Majesty's ships are constantly employed on shore in constructing wharves, roads, &c. as well as in landing provisions and stores. They require constant supervision, as well as to see that no more men are employed than necessary. Cavalry, infantry, heavy artillery, and stores, can be landed from the smaller steamers on the wharves at the western side of the harbour with ease and facility.

The working parties to be paid the regulated extra pay, provided they work satisfactorily, and no complaints are made by the officers in charge. No party to be sent on duty without proper superintendence.

Care to be taken to assimilate the working hours of the men from Her Majesty's ships with those of the transports.

Embarking the Sick.

This important duty is performed by the principal agent of transports.

Steam Tugs.

Four small steamers are stationed here, "Circassian," "Malta," "Pigeon," and "Sulina." The latter is never to be employed in towing, being solely intended for the conveyance of troops to and from vessels in and outside of the harbour. You are to frequently inspect them, taking with you the chief engineer of one of Her Majesty's steam-vessels, to ascertain their state of efficiency, and that they are kept ready for service.

One of the tugs is always to have fires lighted and banked up, night and day, and to proceed at sunset to Cossack Bay, to be in readiness for any emergency.

Naval Yard.

A space in the small bay on the western side of the harbour is appropriated for hauling up boats, spars, &c. and to set up the ships' forges. A depôt for the stores of the Naval Brigade is also established there.

Night Guard Boats.

Care to be taken that the boats from the ships having the night guard, established by my General Orders of the 7th February, and this date, go round the harbour at least twice in every watch from 8 p.m. to daylight.

Water Police.

Richard Farrell, quarter-master of the "Vesuvius," has been appointed by me to act as one of the police-officers of the harbour, and you will select another steady petty officer for the same purpose. I have purchased a boat for them, and a crew of four men is to be furnished, two for day, and two for night service.

The police are to see the harbour regulations strictly carried out, particularly as regards the removal of offal; and the principal agent for transports has been requested to tell off

Appendix, No. 5.

one boat, or more if necessary, daily from the transports, under the directions of the police, to tow all dead cattle, &c. to sea, if the weather is moderate, or to Cossack Bay if otherwise.

To allow no boats above the "Diamond" from 8 p.m. till daylight, and no shoreboats to be permitted to lie up in that locality on any consideration.

To examine all boats pulling about the harbour after dark, to ascertain that no improper persons are abroad; and if the parties cannot give a satisfactory account of themselves, they are to be taken in custody to the "Diamond."

To hail the transports by name or number occasionally, to see that the night watch is on the alert, and should no answer be made, to report the same.

To apprehend drunken and riotous seamen and other persons, and convey them in custody to the "Wasp," there to remain till their misconduct can be inquired into; and assistance is to be promptly afforded when requisite towards carrying these orders into effect.

The police to make a joint report every morning, at nine o'clock, of the proceedings of the previous 24 hours, in Form No. 2.

Signal Station.

This post has heretofore been under the control of the principal agent for transports, but I consider it should be transferred to the senior naval officer. You are therefore to select a steady and intelligent midshipman to have charge of the station, who is, with the two men placed there by Captain Christie (belonging to Her Majesty's ship "Ceylon" at Malta), to reside in quarters on the hill. They will receive extra pay for this service.

The signals now in use appear simple and explicit. The officer in charge is to keep a vigilant look out, and report every occurrence by means of the telegraph established between the post and the "Diamond"; to demand all vessels' names by Marryat's signals, and to hoist the appointed signal when permission is given for any vessels to enter the harbour.

A light gun is to be placed at the post to call attention and enforce signals, and you will endeavour to procure a large bell, which in the day-time, and during the foggy weather which may be shortly expected, is to be tolled every hour for about a minute.

All suspicious vessels and boats to be reported immediately, and should any be observed after dark approaching the harbour, or hovering about, a blue light is to be burnt, on which the guard-boat for the entrance is instantly to proceed to the steam-tug in Cossack Bay, and examine the stranger. On observing the blue light, the tug is to get ready for slipping.

A signal log to be kept in Form No. 3, a copy of which is to be furnished to me every Monday morning.

In the foregoing instructions I have endeavoured to show the most prominent points in which your services will be most beneficial, but I request you will freely communicate personally with me on all matters relating to the duties of the port, and you may rely on my cordial support in carrying out the same, to enable us to meet, or I hope anticipate, the wishes of Field Marshal Lord Raglan and Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.

(signed) *Edward Boxer*,
Rear-Admiral and Senior Officer.

Captain C. B. Hamilton,
Her Majesty's Ship "Diamond."

Form, No. 1.

Return of Arrivals at Balaklava on the day of 1855.

Number of Transport.	Name.	Sailing, Screw, or Paddle.	Tons.	Where From.	Cargo.	Remarks.

Return of Sailings from Balaklava on the day of 1855.

Number of Transport.	Name.	Sailing, Screw, or Paddle.	Tons.	Where To.	For what Purpose.	Remarks. Number of Sick Embarked to be added.

Approved,

Harbour Master.

Captain of H. M. Ship "Diamond."

FORM, No. 2.

REPORT of Occurrences in the Harbour of Balaklava during the previous day, day of 1855.

Time of Inspection.	Ships Hailed or Boarded.	General Report.

Approved,

Officers of Water Police.

Captain of H. M. Ship "Diamond."

FORM, No. 3.

Log kept at the Signal Post at Balaklava between

Day and Date.	Hour.	Signal made to the Post from	Signal made from the Post to	State of the Weather.	General Remarks.

Approved,

Midshipman in Charge.

Captain of H. M. Ship "Diamond."

RETURN of the DISPOSITION of the STEAM and SAILING TRANSPORTS in the *Black Sea* on the 28th October 1854.

Number of Vessel.	NAME.	PRESENT POSITION.	REMARKS.
	HIRED STEAM VESSELS:		
29 Screw	Kangaroo - -	Varna - - -	Sent with despatches to bring back troops.
64 „ -	Hope - - -	Constantinople -	Commissariat stores.
65 Paddle	Tonning - - -	Balaklava - -	Landing horses of Turkish troops.
66 „ -	City of London -	Constantinople -	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
67 „ -	Emperor - -	Balaklava - -	Waiting orders.
68 Screw	Sovereign - -	Constantinople -	Commissariat stores.
69 „ -	Albatross - -	- ditto - - -	- - ditto.
72 „ -	Victoria - - -	- ditto - - -	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
73 „ -	Melbourne - -	Balaklava - -	Principal agent on board.
74 „ -	Emeu - - -	Constantinople -	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
75 „ -	Golden Fleece - -	- ditto - - -	- - ditto.
76 „ -	Sydney - - -	Balaklava - -	To receive wounded soldiers.
84 „ -	Jason - - -	Constantinople -	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
86 „ -	Harbinger - -	- ditto - - -	Sent for vegetables for the army.
87 „ -	Hydaspes - -	- ditto - - -	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
100 „ -	Andes - - -	Balaklava - -	Coaling; waiting orders.
102 „ -	Tynemouth - -	- ditto - - -	Receiving wounded troops.
103 „ -	Cormorant - -	Constantinople -	Commissariat stores.
104 „ -	Himalaya - -	Varna - - -	Sent to bring over military stores, &c.
„ -	Simla - - -	Constantinople -	Repairing hawser pipes.
„ -	Columbo - - -	Balaklava - -	Waiting orders.
„ -	Mauritius - -	- ditto - - -	- - ditto.
„ -	Cottingham - -	- ditto - - -	Coaling the "Andes."
„ -	Australian - -	Constantinople -	Conveyed wounded troops.

 (*continued*)

Appendix, No. 5.

Number of Vessel.	Name.	Present Position.	Remarks.
	Hired Steam Vessels—*continued.*		
Paddle	Trent	Varna	Sent to bring military stores remaining there.
„	Cambria	Constantinople	Conveyed wounded troops.
„	Medway	Katcha	Waiting orders.
„	Orinoco	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
„	Avon	Odessa	Conveyed provisions to Her Majesty's ships there.
„	Sea Nymph	Balaklava	With cargo of charcoal for the army; waiting orders.
	Sailing Transports:		
1	Pyrenees	Balaklava	With cattle for army from Eupatoria.
2	Mercia	- ditto	Commissariat stores on board.
3	Her Majesty	Eupatoria	Waiting orders; ready for service.
4	City of Carlisle	Varna	With Commodore Rawstorne as resident agent.
5	Resolute	Balaklava	Magazine ship for army.
6	Earl of Shaftesbury	- ditto	- - ditto.
7	Palmerston	- ditto	Receiving wounded soldiers.
9	John Masterman	- ditto	Medical stores of the army on board.
10	Edendale	- ditto	To receive wounded or sick soldiers.
14	Arnotdale	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
16	Lady Valiant	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
19	Caduceus	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
20	Ganges	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
21	Pride of Ocean	Varna	Sent for cattle.
23	Dunbar	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
24	Bombay	- ditto	- - ditto - - ditto.
25	Cornwall	- ditto	- - ditto - - ditto.
27	Bride	Balaklava	Commissariat stores.
28	Arthur the Great	- ditto	Waiting orders; regimental baggage on board.
31	Eveline	- ditto	- - ditto - - ditto.
32	Sultana	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
34	London	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
35	Culloden	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
36	Lady McNaughten	- ditto	Conveyed sick troops to Scutari.
37	Rodsley	Katcha	Waiting orders.
39	Harkaway	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
40	Kenilworth	- ditto	- - ditto.
42	Mary Ann	Balaklava	Discharging cattle from Eupatoria.
43	Calliope	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
44	Echunga	Constantinople	Conveyed wounded to Scutari.
45	Medora	Balaklava	Magazine ship.
46	Mary Anne	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
47	Wilson Kennedy	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
48	Shooting Star	- - ditto	Conveyed sick troops to Scutari.
49	Star of the South	Balaklava	Magazine ship.
50	Courier	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
51	Timandra	- - ditto	- - ditto - - - - ditto.
53	Asia	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
54	Gertrude	Balaklava	Discharging ordnance stores.
55	Glendalough	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
56	War Cloud	Balaklava	To proceed to Katcha to water.
57	Tyrone	- ditto	Discharging cattle.
58	Pedestrian	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
59	Negociator	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
60	Monarchy	Katcha	Commissariat stores.
61	Harbinger	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
63	Wild Wave	Balaklava	Commissariat stores.
70	Coronella	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
71	Panola	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
78	Orient	Katcha	- - ditto.
79	Sir George Pollock	Balaklava	Commissariat stores.
80	Canterbury	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
81	Georgiana	Balaklava	Discharging cattle from Eupatoria.
82	Rip Van Winkle	Varna	Receiving cattle.
83	Arabia	Balaklava	To receive wounded troops.

Number of Vessel.	Name.	Present Position.	Remarks.
	Sailing Transports—*continued.*		
85	Burmah	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
88	Sir R. Sale	ditto	ditto.
89	Lord Raglan	ditto	ditto.
90	Sutlej	ditto	ditto.
91	Maori	ditto	ditto.
93	William Jackson	ditto	ditto.
95	Libertas	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
96	Deva	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
97	Escort	ditto	ditto.
98	Talavera	Balaklava	To receive wounded.

"Melbourne," Balaklava,
28 October 1854.

(signed) *P. Christie,*
Captain and Principal Agent of Transports.

A RETURN of the Disposition of Steam and Sailing Transports in the *Black Sea* on the 8th of December 1854.

Number of Vessel.	Name.	Present Position.	Remarks.
	Hired Steam Vessels:		
102 Screw	Tynemouth	Varna	To convey Turkish troops to Eupatoria.
,,	Simla	ditto	To convey Turkish troops and horses to Eupatoria.
,,	Colombo	ditto	To convey Turkish troops to ditto.
Paddle	Europa	ditto	To convey Turkish troops to ditto.
29 Screw	Kangaroo	Bosphorus	Under orders of Rear Admiral Boxer.
64 ,,	Hope	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
65 Paddle	Tonning	Constantinople	Ditto - - cattle ship.
66 ,,	City of London	Eupatoria	Conveying live stock from Eupatoria to Balaklava.
67 ,,	Emperor	ditto	Conveying live stock from Eupatoria to Balaklava.
68 Screw	Sovereign	Constantinople	Defective; requires extensive repairs.
69 ,,	Albatross	ditto	Commissariat store ship.
72 ,,	Victoria	Balaklava	Receiving sick for Scutari.
73 ,,	Melbourne	Constantinople	Receiving new masts.
75 ,,	Golden Fleece	Balaklava	Discharging heavy ordnance.
76 ,,	Sydney	ditto	Disembarking troops from Scutari.
84 ,,	Jason	Constantinople	Embarking Commissariat horses and stores for Crimea.
86 ,,	Harbinger	Balaklava	Principal agent on board.
87 ,,	Hyduspes	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
100 ,,	Andes	Marseilles	Sailed from Balaklava, 2d December.
103 ,,	Cormorant	Eupatoria	For live stock for the army.
,,	Mauritius	Marseilles	Sailed from Balaklava, 2d December.
,,	Cottingham	Balaklava	Discharging timber.
,,	Australian	ditto	Landing shot and shell.
,,	Faith	Varna	Commissariat store ship.
,,	Jura	Corfu	Sailed from Balaklava, 4 December, for 34th Regiment.
,,	Queen of the South	Balaklava	Coaling, to take troops from Varna to Eupatoria.
136 Screw	Cleopatra	ditto	Discharging cargo.
137 ,,	Ottowa	ditto	ditto. ditto.
Paddle	Trent	Malta	For mules from Spain.
,,	Medway	Marseilles	Sailed under orders from Rear-Admiral Boxer.
,,	Orinoco	ditto	ditto - - ditto.
,,	Avon	Constantinople	Conveyed sick to Scutari.
,,	Sea Nymph	ditto	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer, to convey timber to Crimea.
,,	Lion	Balaklava	Discharging cargo.
130 Screw	Brandon	ditto	Landing troops, and discharging cargo.
	Sailing Transports:		
2	Mercia	Balaklava	Dismasted, waiting opportunity to be towed to Constantinople.
4	City of Carlisle	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.

Appendix, No. 5.

Number of Vessel.	Name.	Present Position.	Remarks.
	Sailing Transports—*continued.*		
6	Earl of Shaftesbury	Balaklava	Magazine ship of army.
7	Palmerston	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
9	John Masterman	Balaklava	Medical store ship.
10	Edendale	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
14	Arnotdale	- ditto -	- ditto - - ditto.
15	Josh. Shepherd	Balaklava	Receiving sick for Scutari.
16	Lady Valiant	- ditto -	Commissariat store ship; dismasted.
19	Caduceus	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer; dismasted.
21	Pride of the Ocean	Balaklava	Dismasted; appropriated as hospital ship for marines.
23	Dunbar	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
24	Bombay	- ditto -	- ditto - - ditto.
25	Cornwall	- ditto -	- ditto - - ditto.
27	Bride	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
28	Arthur the Great	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
30	Blundell	- ditto -	- ditto - conveyed sick to Scutari.
31	Eveline	- ditto -	- ditto.
32	Sultana	- ditto -	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
34	London	- ditto -	- ditto - - ditto.
36	Lady McNaughten	Balaklava	Discharging hay.
39	Harkaway	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
42	Mary Anne	- ditto -	- ditto - - ditto.
43	Calliope	- ditto -	- ditto - - ditto.
44	Echunga	- ditto -	- ditto - - ditto.
45	Medora	Balaklava	Magazine ship; dismasted.
46	Mary Anne	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
48	Shooting Star	Varna	Conveying Turkish troops to Eupatoria.
49	Star of the South	Balaklava	Magazine ship.
50	Courier	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
51	Timandra	Balaklava	Receiving sick troops for Scutari.
54	Gertrude	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Conveyed sick troops from Crimea.
56	War Cloud	- ditto -	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
58	Pedestrian	- ditto -	- ditto - - ditto.
59	Negociator	Balaklava	Discharging forage.
60	Monarchy	- ditto -	Discharging Commissariat stores.
70	Coronella	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
71	Panola	- - ditto -	- - - - - ditto.
78	Orient	Balaklava	Receiving ship (temporarily).
79	Sir George Pollock	- ditto -	Commissariat store ship.
80	Canterbury	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Naval depôt ship.
83	Arabia	- - ditto -	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
85	Burmah	- - ditto -	- - - - - ditto.
88	Sir R. Sale	Balaklava	Receiving ship for the Naval Brigade.
90	Sutlej	Constantinople, Bosphorus.	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
91	Maori	- - ditto -	- - - - - ditto.
93	William Jackson	- - ditto -	- - - - - ditto.
96	Deva	- - ditto -	- - - - - ditto.
97	Escort	- - ditto -	- - - - - ditto.
98	Talavera	- - ditto -	- - - - - ditto.
105	Belgravia	Balaklava	Discharging cargo.
27	Bucephalus	- - ditto -	- - ditto.
26	Gomelza	- - ditto -	Landing 34th Regiment.
89	Lord Raglan	Khersonese	Dismasted, having been got off at Katcha.

(signed) *P. Christie,*
Captain and Principal Agent of Transports.

Transport "Harbinger," at Balaklava,
8 December 1854.

Appendix, No. 5.

A RETURN of the Disposition of Steam Transports employed with the Eastern Expedition, 18th December 1854.

Number of Vessel.	Name.	Present Position.	Remarks.
74 Screw	Emeu	Constantinople	Arrived with French troops from Marseilles; broken down.
100 „	Andes	Marseilles	Sent for French troops.
„	Mauritius	„	„ „
Paddle	Orinoco	„	„ „
„	Medway	Khersonese	Conveyed French troops brought from Marseilles by "Emeu."
Screw	Simla	Eupatoria	Conveying Turkish horses from Varna.
135 „	Queen of the South	Varna	Conveying Turkish troops to Eupatoria.
Paddle	Europa	Balaklava	Coaling; conveyed troops from Varna to Eupatoria.
102 Screw	Tynemouth	Eupatoria	Conveying Turkish troops from Varna.
29 „	Kangaroo	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
64 „	Hope	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
65 Paddle	Tonning	Constantinople	„ „
66 „	City of London	ditto	Sent for bât horses.
67 „	Emperor	Varna	„ „
68 Screw	Sovereign	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
69 „	Albatross	ditto	Commissariat cattle ship.
72 „	Victoria	ditto	Repairing defects.
73 „	Melbourne	ditto	Getting new masts.
75 „	Golden Fleece	ditto	Conveyed sick troops to Scutari.
76 „	Sydney	ditto	ditto ditto.
84 „	Jason	Balaklava	Landing cargo, warm clothing, &c.
86 „	Harbinger	Eupatoria	Sent with treasure for Commissariat service.
87 „	Hydaspes	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
103 „	Cormorant	„	Commissariat cattle ship.
„	Colombo	Balaklava	Coaling for further service.
„	Cottingham	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
„	Australian	Balaklava	Disharging cargo; to be transport for sick.
„	Faith	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
„	Jura	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
137 „	Ottawa	Balaklava	Receiving sick troops for Scutari.
136 „	Cleopatra	Constantinople	Conveyed sick troops to Scutari.
139 „	Brandon	Balaklava	Discharging cargo.
„	Candia	Constantinople	Conveyed sick troops to Scutari, on her way to England.
Paddle	Trent	Malta	For mules for Alicant.
„	Avon	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
„	Sea Nymph	ditto	Conveying tar for the army.
„	Lion	Tendra	Sent for hay captured by H. M. cruisers.
„	Ripon	Constantinople	Conveyed sick troops for Scutari.
„	Niagara	Balaklava	Discharging. Conveyed 89th Regiment from Gibraltar.
„	Thames	Varna	Sent for English troops and bât horses.
„	Tamar	Balaklava	Discharging. Conveyed 17th Regiment from Gibraltar.

(signed) *P. Christie*,
Captain and Principal Agent of Transports.

 (*continued*)

Appendix No. 5.

RETURN of the Disposition of Steam and Sailing Transports in the *Black Sea*, dated 8th November 1854.

Number of Vessels.	Name.	Present Position.	Remarks, &c.
	Steamers:		
68 Screw	Sovereign	Balaklava	Conveyed Turkish troops from Constantinople.
87 „	Hydaspes	Constantinople	Expected with Turkish troops.
Paddle	Trent	Varna	Embarking French horses for army.
„	Orinoco	Katcha	Disembarking French troops.
29 Screw	Kangaroo	Constantinople	Accompanied "Himalaya" from Varna, that vessel being crippled.
64 „	Hope	ditto	Commissariat ship.
65 Paddle	Tonning	Eupatoria	ditto.
66 „	City of London	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
67 „	Emperor	Varna	For regimental staff horses.
69 Screw	Albatross	Balaklava	Conveyed cattle from Varna.
72 „	Victoria	ditto	Discharging cargo, charcoal for army.
73 „	Melbourne	ditto	Principal agent on board.
74 „	Emeu	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
75 „	Golden Fleece	Balaklava	Waiting orders.
76 „	Sydney	Constantinople	Conveyed wounded troops to Scutari.
84 „	Jason	Balaklava	Waiting orders.
86 „	Harbinger	ditto	Discharging vegetables.
100 „	Andes	ditto	Waiting orders; coaling.
102 „	Tynemouth	Constantinople	Conveyed wounded to Constantinople.
103 „	Cormorant	ditto	Commissariat store ship.
104 „	Himalaya	ditto	Repairing defects from a collision.
„	Simla	ditto	Receiving new horse pipes.
„	Colombo	ditto	Conveyed wounded troops to Scutari.
„	Mauritius	Balaklava	Receiving wounded troops for Scutari.
„	Cottingham	ditto	Discharging patent fuel for army.
„	Australian	Constantinople	Conveyed sick troops for Scutari.
„	Faith	Balaklava	Commissariat ship.
„	Prince	ditto	Arrived 8th November; disembarking 46th.
„	Cambria	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
„	Medway	Balaklava	Receiving wounded troops.
„	Avon	Katcha	Waiting orders.
„	Sea Nymph	Balaklava	Discharging charcoal, &c. for army.
	Sailing Transports:		
1	Pyrenees	Katcha	Watering. Waiting orders.
2	Mercia	Balaklava	Commissariat stores on board.
3	Her Majesty	ditto	Waiting orders.
4	City of Carlisle	Varna	To conduct transport service.
5	Resolute	Balaklava	Magazine ship.
6	Earl of Shaftesbury	ditto	ditto.
7	Palmerston	Constantinople	Conveyed sick troops to Scutari.
9	John Masterman	Balaklava	With medical stores for army.
10	Edendale	ditto	Receiving wounded troops.
14	Arnotdale	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
16	Lady Valiant	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
19	Caduceus	ditto	Waiting orders.
20	Ganges	Eupatoria	ditto.
21	Pride of the Ocean	Balaklava	Landing cattle from Varna.
23	Dunbar	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
24	Bombay	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
25	Cornwall	ditto	ditto - ditto - ditto.
27	Bride	Katcha	Commissariat store ship.
28	Arthur the Great	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
31	Eveline	ditto	ditto.
32	Sultana	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
34	London	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
35	Culloden	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
36	Lady M'Naughten	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
37	Rodsley	ditto	ditto.
39	Harkaway	ditto	ditto.
40	Kenilworth	ditto	ditto.
42	Mary Ann	ditto	ditto.
43	Calliope	ditto	ditto.
44	Echunga	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.

Number of Vessels.	Name.	Present Position.	Remarks, &c.
	Sailing Transports—*continued.*		
45	Medora	Balaklava	Magazine ship for army.
46	Mary Anne	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
47	Wilson Kennedy	Proceeding to England.	
48	Shooting Star	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
49	Star of the South	Balaklava	Magazine ship for army.
50	Courier	Constantinople	Repairing defects from a gale of wind.
51	Timandra	ditto	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
53	Asia	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
54	Gertrude	Balaklava	ditto.
55	Glendalough	Eupatoria	ditto.
56	War Cloud	ditto	ditto.
57	Tyrone	ditto	ditto.
58	Pedestrian	ditto	ditto.
59	Negotiator	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
60	Monarchy	Katcha	Commissariat store ship.
61	Harbinger	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
63	Wild Wave	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
70	Coronella	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
71	Panola	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
78	Orient	Katcha	ditto.
79	Sir Geo. Pollock	Balaklava	ditto.
80	Canterbury	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
81	Georgiana	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
82	Rip Van Winkle	Balaklava	Landing cattle from Varna.
83	Arabia	Constantinople	Conveying wounded troops to Scutari.
85	Burmah	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
88	Sir R. Sale	ditto	ditto.
89	Lord Raglan	ditto	ditto.
90	Sutlej	ditto	ditto.
91	Maori	ditto	ditto.
93	William Jackson	ditto	ditto.
95	Libertas	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
96	Deva	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
97	Escort	ditto	ditto.
98	Talavera	Constantinople	Conveyed wounded troops to Scutari.

"Melbourne," off Balaklava,
8 November 1854.

(signed) *P. Christie,*
Captain and Principal Agent for Transports.

A RETURN of the Disposition of Steam and Sailing Transports in the *Black Sea*, on the 18th November 1854.

Number of Vessels.	Name.	Present position.	Remarks.
	Steam Vessels:		
66 Paddle	City of London	Balaklava	Brought French troops from Marseilles.
67 „	Emperor	Khersonese	ditto from Varna.
84 Screw	Jason	Bourghas	Sent for French cavalry.
„	Simla	ditto	ditto ditto.
Paddle	Trent	Balaklava	Brought French horses from Varna.
29 Screw	Kangaroo	Constantinople	Employed between Varna and Scutari.
64 „	Hope	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
65 Paddle	Tonning	Constantinople	ditto cattle ship.
68 Screw	Sovereign	Balaklava	ditto store ship.
69 „	Albatross	ditto	ditto cattle ship.
72 „	Victoria	ditto	Discharging charcoal for army.
73 „	Melbourne	Constantinople	Towed Caduceus; both dismasted.
75 „	Golden Fleece	Malta	Sent for heavy ordnance.
76 „	Sydney	Constantinople	Conveyed wounded troops.
86 „	Harbinger	Balaklava	Discharging vegetables for the army principal agent.
87 „	Hydaspes	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
100 „	Andes	ditto	Conveyed wounded soldiers.
102 „	Tynemouth	ditto	ditto ditto.

(*continued*)

Appendix, No. 5.

Number of Vessels.	Name.	Present Position.	Remarks.
	Sailing Vessels—*continued.*		
103 Screw	Cormorant	Balaklava	Commissariat cattle ship.
104 „	Himalaya	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
„	Colombo	Balaklava	Discharging heavy ordnance from Constantinople.
„	Mauritius	Constantinople	Conveyed wounded soldiers.
„	Cottingham	Sinope	To obtain wood for army.
„	Australian	Constantinople	Conveyed wounded soldiers.
„	Faith	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
„	Jura	Khersonese	Landed troops brought from England.
Paddle	Cambria	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
„	Medway	Balaklava	To convey sick and wounded to Scutari.
„	Avon	- ditto	To convey sick to Scutari.
„	Sea Nymph	- ditto	About to return to Constantinople.
	Sailing Transports:		
2	Mercia	Balaklava	Commissariat stores; dismasted.
4	City of Carlisle	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
6	Earl of Shaftesbury	Balaklava	Magazine ship.
7	Palmerston	Constantinople	Conveyed sick to Scutari.
9	John Masterman	Balaklava	Medical stores for the army.
10	Edendale	- ditto	Has sick troops on board for Scutari.
14	Arnotdale	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
16	Lady Valiant	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship; dismasted.
19	Caduceus	Constantinople	To repair defects; dismasted.
21	Pride of the Ocean	Balaklava	To repair defects; dismasted.
23	Dunbar	Varna	To convey stores to Scutari.
24	Bombay	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
25	Cornwall	- ditto	- - ditto - - - - ditto.
27	Bride	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
28	Arthur the Great	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
31	Eveline	- ditto	- - ditto.
32	Sultana	Constantinople	Repairing defects.
34	London	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
35	Culloden	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
36	Lady M'Naughten	- ditto	- - ditto - - - - ditto.
39	Harkaway	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
42	Mary Anne	- ditto	- - ditto.
43	Calliope	- ditto	- - ditto.
44	Echunga	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
45	Medora	Balaklava	Magazine ship. Dismasted.
46	Mary Anne	Eupatoria	Eupatoria.
48	Shooting Star	Off Balaklava	Waiting orders.
49	Star of the South	Balaklava	Magazine ship.
50	Courier	Varna	Dismasted; to proceed to Constantinople.
51	Timandra	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
54	Gertrude	Balaklava	Receiving sick soldiers.
56	War Cloud	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
58	Pedestrian	- ditto	- - ditto.
59	Negotiator	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
60	Monarchy	Katcha	Commissariat stores on board.
70	Coronella	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
71	Panola	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
78	Orient	Katcha	- ditto.
79	Sir George Pollock	Balaklava	Commissariat store ship.
80	Canterbury	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.
83	Arabia	- ditto	- - ditto - - ditto.
85	Burmah	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
88	Sir R. Sale	Balaklava	- ditto - - Dismasted.
90	Sutlej	Eupatoria	- ditto.
91	Mario	- ditto	- ditto.
93	William Jackson	Varna	To convey stores to Scutari.
96	Deva	- ditto	- - ditto - - ditto.
97	Escort	Eupatoria	Waiting orders.
98	Talavera	Constantinople	Under orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer.

(signed) *P. Christie,*
Captain and Principal Agent for Transports.

Transport "Harbinger," Balaklava,
18 November 1854.

Appendix, No. 6.

RETURN of all Commissariat Stores Ordered and Shipped previous to the 22d December, for the Use of the Army in the East, exclusive of Salt Provisions, Biscuit, Porter, and Flour, either from Ports in *Great Britain*, in the *Mediterranean*, or elsewhere.

NAME OF VESSEL.	FROM WHAT PORT.	DATE OF SAILING.	RUM.	COFFEE		SUGAR.	RICE.	TEA.	CHOCOLATE.	SCOTCH BARLEY.	POTATOES		VEGETABLES PRESERVED.	HAY.	OATS.	BARLEY.	STRAW.	SULLA and CLOVER.	COALS.	CANDLES.	COST, exclusive of Packages, unless stated.	DAT First
				Raw.	Roasted (whole).						—	Preserved.										
			Gallons.	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Tons.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*		*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Tons.*		£. s. d.	
Hope (S.)	Deptford	15 March 1854	4,612	12,320	- - -	18,032	32,256	2,730	3,477	3,500	- -	9,996	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,849 14 -	Malta,
Wild Wave	Plymouth	31 March „	10,029½	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,086 10 7	Gallip
Bride	Deptford	12 April „	13,088	29,680	- - -	63,896	135,408	2,534	3,063	3,000	- -	29,996	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	5,534 - -	Malta
Sovereign (S.)	Ditto	11 April „	2,192	12,320	- - -	18,032	32,256	2,768	3,414	3,500	- -	10,008	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,632 5 2	Ditto
Martha Miles	Ditto	29 April „	- - -	26,040	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	740 10 3 (Including packages.)	Ditto
Balbec	Liverpool	6 May „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	19,990	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	374 16 3	Ditto
Trident	- - -	20 May (about) „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	434	- - - -	1,702 3 8	-
Taurus (S.)	Deptford	12 June „	- - -	- - -	- - -	100,184	- - -	8,003	10,048	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,761 13 2 (Including packages.)	Const
Tynemouth	Ditto	10 June „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	29,756		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	156 4 10	Varn
Ripon (S.)	Southampton	20 June „	- - -	53,200	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,425 - -	Malta
Arthur the Great	Deptford	18 June „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	80,426	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	300 17 -	Const
	Malta	July „	16,994	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	Not known -	-
Wanderer	Deptford	6 July „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	968,960		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	5,208 3 2	Varn
Progress	Liverpool	15 July „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	891,747	67,520		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	3,690 1 2	Const
Marmion	Deptford	22 July „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	91,505	145,680		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,385 13 8 (Including packages.)	Ditto
Manilla (S.)	Southampton	July „	- - -	26,880	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	720 - -	-
Peltorna	Gosport	24 July „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	74,550	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	278 17 -	Varn
Orinoco (S.)	Malta	About 25 July „	- - -	- - -	- - -	30,831	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	Not known -	Beicos
Jabez	Deptford	26 July „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	587,680		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	3,158 15 7	-
Sibyl	Portsmouth	28 July „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	65,599	40,000		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	455 10 10	Varna
Sextus	Malta	29 July (about) „	19,990	- - -	- - -	49,326	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	Not known -	Consta
Industry	Gosport	About 1 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	5,000	111,440	2,828	15,029	- - -	10,043	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	2,043 3 5	-
Phantom	Ditto	6 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	49,565	39,040		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	390 10 -	Varna
Harbinger	Plymouth	11 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	13,600	- - -	- - -	- - -	18,400	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	322 6 4 (Including packages.)	Malta, Const
Cottingham	Gosport	8 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	38,556	33,576	- - -	- - -	21,274	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	696 4 8	-
Wild Irish Girl	Ditto	13 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	378,851	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,417 3 8	Varna
Robert Ingham	Haulbowline	30 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	135,393	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	506 9 4	Varna
Tanjore	Deptford	14 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	197,645	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	739 6 9	Malta
Indian Queen	Haulbowline	18 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	131,964	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	Not known -	Varn
Roman Empress	Deptford	28 Aug. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	697,280		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	3,486 8 -	Varn
Vifredo	Portsmouth	21 September „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	20,000	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	147 9 3 (Including packages.)	Const
Helen Mary	Deptford	9 September „	- - -	79,940	- - -	150,000	64,000	- - -	- - -	5,520	- -	39,988	- - -	129,892	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	6,523 10 6	Varn
Briton (S.)	Ditto	22 September „	4,382	21,000	- - -	- - -	40,000	- - -	- - -	29,932	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,570 19 4	Cons
Choice	Ditto	28 September „	12,785	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	1,598 2 6	-
Jelica	Malta	August „	20,000	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	2,500 - -	Varr
Giovanni	Ditto	October „	5,027	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	96,671	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	628 7 6	-
Baobab	Ditto	October „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	91,190	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	Not known -	-
Franz Alois	Ditto	October „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	9,748	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	Not known -	-
Faith (S.)	Deptford	28 September „	18,290	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- -	- - - -	2,286 5 -	Cou

Note.—On a Requisition from the Commissary-general in charge in Turkey, for 2,000,000 *lbs.* of Barley, Contracts were entered into at Malta for the Supply and Delivery at Constantinople of 4,922 Salms, but no particulars of Shipment and Delivery have been furnished to this Department.

* The dates of sailing, arrival at the first port of destination, and ultimate discharge, have been furnished as far as information exists in the Transport Department.

T PORT.	DATE OF SAILING.	RUM.	COFFEE Raw.	COFFEE Roasted (whole).	SUGAR.	RICE.	TEA.	CHOCOLATE.	SCOTCH BARLEY.	POTATOES —	POTATOES Preserved.	VEGETABLES PRESERVED.	HAY.	OATS.	BARLEY.	STRAW.	SULLA and CLOVER.	COALS.	CANDLES.	COST, exclusive of Packages, unless stated.	DATE OF ARRIVAL at First Port of Destination. *	DATE OF ULTIMATE DISCHARGE. *	To w Consi
		Gallons.	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Tons.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Tons.*		£. s. d.			
	13 October 1854	7,312	39,534	- - -	- - -	50,000	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	2,294 15 6	Constantinople, Nov. 1854	- - -	
	12 October „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	40,000	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	285 14 3	- - - - - -	- - -	
	8 November „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	402,775	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	1,506 13 6	Ditto, 25 November	- - -	
	24 November „	10,001	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	108,100	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	1,611 11 7	Ditto, 14 December	- - -	
	1 December „	4,036	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	88,459	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	825 11 5	- - - - - -	- - -	
	10 November „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	20	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	173 11 7 (including packages)	- - - - - -	- - -	
	17 November „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	5	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	40 19 8 (including packages)	- - - - - -	- - -	
	20 November „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	5	With three tierces of turnips, &c., as samples.	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	215 16 7 (including packages, and samples of vegetables)	- - - - - -	- - -	
	8 December „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	15	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -				
	15 December „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	about 10	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	105 17 – (including packages)	- - - - - -	- - -	
	20 December „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	115	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	1,453 17 1 (including packages)	- - - - - -	- - -	
	4 December „	4,053	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	80,365	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	798 6 3	- - - - - -	- - -	
	7 December „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	265,157	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	962 8 5	- - - - - -	- - -	
	26 December „	† 9,093	- - -	8,011	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	200,376	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	2,151 4 –	- - - - - -	- - -	
	About 2 Dec. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	29,970	- - -	- - -	Not known -	- - - - - -	- - -	
	7 December „	5,081	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	108,272	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	1,028 2 2	- - - - - -	- - -	
	About 12 Dec. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	98,726	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	383 18 8	- - - - - -	- - -	
	December „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	23,807	- -		54,829	73,680	- - -	- - -	Not known -	- - - - - -	- - -	
	17 December „	- - -	- - -	12,869	137,200	98,800	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	2,707 16 –	- - - - - -	- - -	
	14 December „	28,490	- - -	71,979	100,744	56,160	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	7,504 1 8	Balaklava, 26 Jan. 1855	- - -	
	18 December „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	19,230	- - -	- - -	Not known -	Dardanelles, 20 Jan. „	- - -	
	About 21 Dec. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	66,818	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	242 10 5	- - - - - -	- - -	
	27 December „	10,017	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	111,697	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	1,657 10 10	- - - - - -	- - -	
	30 December „	- - -	- - -	3,561	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	119 1 9	Constantinople, 25 Jan. -	- - -	
	22 December „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	438,657	- -		- -	- -	- - -	- - -	1,586 12 1	- - - - - -	- - -	
	23 December „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		35,640	8,663	- - -	- - -	Not known -	Ditto, 9 February - -	- - -	
	About 20 Dec. „	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -		22,133	- -	- - -	- - -	Ditto - -	- - - - - -	- - -	
	TOTAL SHIPPED -	† 205,472	300,914	101,420	818,241	598,884	31,064	20,002	115,169	170	109,978	- - -	4,417,955	2,575,916	- -	112,602	131,543	434	The undermentioned quantity of stearine candles it is supposed were shipped with the magazine implements sent with the first division of the army embarked for the East.				
	TOTAL ORDERED -	190,000	300,000	† 455,000	† 1,368,157	† 1,330,000	31,000	20,000	110,000	280	110,000	Supply sufficient for 40,000 men for 14 days.	‡ 4,761,301	2,575,916	- -	General.	General.	500	*Stearine.* 9,000				

Note.—On a Requisition from the Commissary-general in charge in Turkey for 2,000,000 *lbs.* of Barley, Contracts were entered into at Malta for the Supply and Delivery at Constantinople of 4,922 Salms, but no particulars of Shipment and Delivery have been furnished to this Department.

* The dates of sailing, arrival at the first port of destination, and ultimate discharge, have been furnished as far as information exists in the Transport Department.

† Shipments to the extent of 225,000 lbs. of roasted coffee, 394,000 lbs. of sugar, and 450,000 lbs. of rice, were directed to be made in three separate portions, at intervals of one month, after the shipment of similar quantities of each of these articles had been effected. An additional quantity (9,099 gallons) of rum was shipped.

‡ In addition to the 4,761,301 lbs. of hay here noted, directions were given for the purchase of 1,200 tons (equal to 2,688,000 lbs.) in addition; the delivery of which, however, was not to commence before the end of December.

Appendix, No. 7.

RETURN of the QUANTITIES of WINE shipped by this Department for the use of the ARMY in the EAST, with the Dates, Names of Ships, and Ports of Destination.

Port Wine.	Date of Shipment.	Name of Ship.	Port of Destination.
Dozen.	1854:		
100	11 April - - -	Bride - - - -	Gallipoli.
500	1 May - - -	Balbec (s.) - - -	Gallipoli.
300	20 September - -	Vifredo (s.) - - -	Constantinople.
300	21 September - -	Briton (s.) - - -	Constantinople.
600	1 November - -	Robert Lowe (s.) - -	Constantinople.
600	11 November - -	Brandon (s.) - - -	Constantinople.
2,400	TOTAL.		

Admiralty, 19 April 1855.

Thos. T. Grant,
Comptroller of Victualling.

Appendix, No. 8.

RETURN of Medical Comforts supplied for the Army in the East, since the Commencement of the War, up to the 22d of December 1854.

NAME of VESSEL.	Port from which Vessel sailed, and Date of sailing.	Date of Vessel arriving at first Port of Destination.	Ultimate Port of Discharge.	To whom Consigned.	Date of Delivery to Consignee.	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLE, AND PRICE.*							
						Port Wine.		Brandy.		Ale.	Barley.	Sugar.	Tea.
						Gallons.	*Dozen.*	*Gallons.*	*Dozen.*	*Gallons.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*
Bride	15 April	27 May 1854	Scutari	Purveyor to the Forces		-	100	50	-	-	560	1,680	800
Balbec	London, 2 May	27 May 1854	Scutari	Senior Purveyor or Senior Commissariat Officer.		-	500	250	-	-	1,120	3,000	1,400
Mauritius	Southampton, 17 Aug.	20 Sept. 1854	Scutari	Senior Purveyor or Senior Commissariat Officer.		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vifredo	Portsmouth, 20 September.	1 Oct. 1854	Scutari	Principal Medical Officer of Lord Raglan's Army.	Not known in this Office.	-	300	200	-	-	-	2,000	400
Briton	Southampton, 28 September.	9 Nov. 1854	Scutari	Commissary-general Filder		-	300	-	-	-	-	5,000	-
Robert Lowe	Deptford, 28 November.	10 Jan. 1855	Varna	Senior Commissary British Force, Constantinople.		-	600	200	-	-	-	7,000	400
Brandon	Deptford, about 14 November.	1 Dec. 1854	Scutari	Senior Commissary British Force, Constantinople.		-	600	200	-	-	-	7,000	400
Army and Navy	London, 9 December 1854.	25 Jan. 1855	Scutari	Purveyor-in-chief, General Hospital, Scutari.		1,380 40 *l.* p'pipe.	300 22/ p'doz.	350 10/6 p'gall.	-	-	3,000 18/ per cwt.	2,458 22/6 p'cwt.	2,574 1/3¼ p'lb.
Eagle	London, 20 January 1855.	9 Feb. 1855	Scutari	Purveyor-in-chief, General Hospital, Scutari.		2,280 42 *l.* p'pipe.	300 22/6 p'doz.	-	-	108 6 *l.* 4 *s.* per hhd.	8,000 18/ per cwt.	2,974 22/6 p'cwt.	1,053 1/3 per lb.

continued below.

continued from above.

DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLE, AND PRICE.*																			NAME of VESSEL.
Arrow Root.	Rice.	Preserved Potatoes.	Dried Potatoes.	Boiled Mutton.	Soup and Bouilli.	Essence of Beef.	Oatmeal.	Cocoa and Milk.	Concentrated Milk.	Solidified Milk.	Sago.	Macaroni.	Tapioca.	Soda Water.	Meat Biscuit Powder.	Preserved Milk.	Boiled Beef.	Jelly.	Stout.	
Lbs.	*Cwts.*	*Cwts.*	*Cwts.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Cwts.*	*Lbs.*	*Pints.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Doz.*	*Lbs.*	*Pints.*		*Galls.*	*Doz.*	
224	-	15	-	224	-	224	-	-	-	-	224	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Bride.
448	-	30	-	896	-	896	-	-	-	-	448	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Balbec.
560	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	1,120	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Mauritius.
336	-	10	30	672	-	1,120	2	560	560	-	448	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Vifredo.
896	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	448	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Briton.
1,792	-	10	30	672	-	1,120	7	560	560	-	2,016	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Robert Lowe.
1,792	-	10	30	672	-	1,120	7	560	560	-	2,016	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Brandon.
522 /8 per lb.	10½ 21/ per cwt.	-	-	-	-	1,000 1/ per pint and /8 per pint.	-	-	-	-	655 29/ per cwt.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Army and Navy.
560 /7 per lb.	-	-	-	-	-	1,000 1/ per pint.	-	500 8 *l.* per 100 lbs.	500 15 *l.* per 100 pints.	112 4/ per lb.	500 29/ per cwt.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Eagle.

* The price of the different articles cannot be given by this Department previous to the sailing of the "Army and Navy" and "Eagle," as all medical comforts were, up to that date, purchased by the Admiralty.

A. Smith, Director-General.

War Department, 27 April 1855.

FREDERICK PEEL.

Appendix, No. 9.

RETURN stating the Name of each Person, not previously in the MILITARY MEDICAL SERVICE, appointed to proceed with the ARMY to the EAST, or to join the ARMY since it departed from this Country; with a STATEMENT showing the MEDICAL SCHOOLS in which such Persons had studied, and the Nature of the Certificates showing their respective Qualifications.

NAME.	RANK.	WHERE STUDIED.	QUALIFICATIONS.
Adrien, J. J.	Staff Assistant Surgeon	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Dublin.
Cockburn, J. B.	ditto	London and Edinburgh	ditto London; M.D., Edinburgh.
Lawson, G.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Evans, G.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Jackson, P. N.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
M'Neece, J. M.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Glasgow.
Kellett, E. Y.	ditto	ditto	ditto Dublin.
Chapple, R. A.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Ricketts, C.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Hooper, L. G.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Hamilton, F. G.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Bayfield, S. J.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Mulock, J. J.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Reid, A.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Hungerford, R.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Johnson, J.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Calder, W. M.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh.
Price, W. H.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Rendell, W. J.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Sheeby, T.	ditto	Dublin	ditto ditto; M.D., Dublin.
Titterton, H.	ditto	Edinburgh	Surgical diploma, London; M.D., Edinburgh.
Taylor, A. H.	ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Dublin.
Taylor, D. C.	ditto	Aberdeen	ditto Edinburgh; M.D., Aberdeen.
Poppelwell, G. B.	ditto	Manchester	Surgical diploma, London.
Grant, W.	ditto	Aberdeen	ditto Edinburgh; M.B., Aberdeen.
Reid, A. R.	ditto	ditto	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh; M.D., Aberdeen.
Rutter, T. W.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London; M.D., Glasgow.
Walker, T. H.	ditto	Liverpool	Surgical diploma, London.
Skipton, S. S.	ditto	London	ditto ditto, M.D., St. Andrew's.
Street, J. P.	ditto	Edinburgh	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh; M.D., Edinburgh.
Eames, J. A.	ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Dublin.
Tarrant, T.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto; M.D., Dublin.
Hooper, A.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London
Carte, W.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Gulland, A. D.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh.
Salter, A.	ditto	Exeter	ditto London.
Mitchell, H.	ditto	Glasgow	ditto Edinburgh.
Tovey, C. H.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Steuart, W. R.	ditto	Quebec and Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh.
Bradshaw, W.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Longheed, J. F.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Hawkins, A.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Biddle, T. J.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.

(*continued*)

NAME.	RANK.	WHERE STUDIED.	QUALIFICATIONS.
Erskine, J. L.	Staff Assistant Surgeon	Edinburgh	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Smith, J. C.	ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh.
Dolan, T.	ditto	ditto	ditto Dublin.
Paliologus, W. T.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Williamson, B.	ditto	Aberdeen	ditto Edinburgh; M. B., Aberdeen.
Cullen, D.	ditto	Edinburgh	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Macartney, F. A.	ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, London.
Longhurst, A. E. F.	ditto	London	ditto ditto.
Macnamara, W.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Corbett, A. P. M.	ditto	Canada	ditto London; M. D., Montreal.
Bellew, H. W.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Slaughter, G. M.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Mines, T.	ditto	Belfast	ditto ditto.
Reade, J. B. C.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh.
Hale, T. E.	ditto	Birmingham	ditto London; B. A., London University.
Marston, J. A.	ditto	Glasgow and Newcastle	Surgical diploma, London; M. D., St. Andrew's.
Boyle, E. P.	ditto	Glasgow	Surgical diploma, Glasgow.
Macartney, J.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Finlay, G. H.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
De Chaumont, F. S. B. F.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Gamble, E. P.	Acting Assistant Surgeon	Dublin and Cork	Surgical diploma, London; M. D., Glasgow.
Clery, G. C.	ditto	ditto	Surgical diploma, London.
Hearn, J. H.	ditto	Dublin and Galway	ditto Glasgow.
Ludlow, H.	ditto	London and Paris	ditto London.
Greig, D.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Johnston, J.	ditto	ditto	M. D. Edinburgh.
Mackay, A. J.	ditto	ditto	Surgical diploma - ditto.
Ball, T.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Grant, J.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh.
Hollingsworth, T. S.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Fair, G.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Cambell, I. G.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Edwards, R.	ditto	Edinburgh and London	ditto Edinburgh.
Acton, W.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Stewart, W.	ditto	Cork	ditto ditto.
Leach, W.	ditto	Birmingham	ditto ditto.
Reynolds, F.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Barr, W. A.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Barton, G. P.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Barnett, O.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Yates, W. H.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Cullen, W. F.	ditto	Glasgow	ditto Glasgow.
Spittal, A.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Marsden, A. E.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Beatty, J. M'N.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Creasy, J. G.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Dickson, R. G.	ditto	Malta and Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Roch, S.	ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, London.
Simons, R. T.	ditto	London	ditto ditto.
Corbett, W. H.	ditto	Canada	ditto ditto; M. D., Montreal.
Webb, R.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Jardine, J.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Sherlock, H.	ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, London.
O'Callaghan, C.	ditto	London	ditto ditto.
Ramsay, W.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin; M. D., Dublin.
White, J. H.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Weir, A.	ditto	Glasgow	ditto Edinburgh.
Dickerson, S. H.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Beaufoy, C.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Carolan, G. M. G.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Edinburgh.
Watson, P. H.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto ditto; M. D., Edinburgh.

NAME.	RANK.	WHERE STUDIED.	QUALIFICATIONS.
Graham, F.	Acting Assistant Surgeon	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Dublin.
Miles, H. C.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Gilborne, J. H.	ditto	Dublin	ditto ditto.
Hoey, P. J.	ditto	ditto	ditto Dublin.
Hine, D. B.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Randell, H. L.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Philpot, H. J.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
French, H. J.	ditto	Dublin	ditto ditto.
M'Gill, E.	ditto	Belfast and Glasgow	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Dublin.
Wood, J.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
M'Kertcheon, A.	ditto	Edinburgh and Glasgow	ditto Edinburgh.
Bakewell, R. H.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Orton, T. J.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Hyde, G. C.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Kilgour, P.	ditto	Aberdeen	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Aberdeen.
Bubb, E.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Read, J.	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Muschamp, N. H.	ditto	London	ditto dttto.
Hepworth, A. J. L.	ditto	Leeds	ditto ditto.
Morris, W.	ditto	London	ditto ditto.
Stockwell, W.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh.
Pratt, F.	ditto	London	ditto London.
Struthers, A.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Irwin, W. T.	ditto	Glasgow and Dublin	Surgical diploma, London.
Smith, A. R.	ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh.
Stewart, A. J.	ditto	Dublin	ditto Glasgow.
Barry, T. S.	ditto	Cork	ditto London.
Lucas, R.	ditto	Dublin and Cork	ditto ditto.
Brock, W. R.	ditto	Bristol	ditto ditto.
Grant, A.	ditto	Aberdeen	ditto ditto.
Marston, J. A.	ditto	Glasgow and Newcastle	ditto ditto; M. D., St. Andrew's.
Morris, C. J.	ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Mackley, W. R.	ditto	Leeds	ditto ditto.
Fraser, P.	Civil Surgeon	One of the physicians of the London Hospital.	
Gant, T. J.	ditto	Assistant-surgeon, Royal Free Hospital; surgical diploma, London.	
Hilles, M. W.	ditto	Lecturer on anatomy; surgical diploma, Dublin.	
Birt, H.	ditto	Assistant-surgeon, Marylebone Infirmary; surgical diploma, London, F. R. C. S.	
Mason, R.	ditto	Surgical diploma, London, house-surgeon, St. Bartholomew's Hospital.	
Rowden, H.	ditto	Lecturer on anatomy, Middlesex Hospital.	
Woollaston, R.	ditto	House-surgeon, London Hospital; Fellow of the College of Surgeons, London.	
Holl, H. B.	ditto	Surgical diploma, London.	
Rooke, H. T. L.	ditto	House-surgeon, Westminster Hospital; surgical diploma, London; M. D. Edinburgh.	
Knight, M.	ditto	Surgical diploma, London.	
Nicholas, G. E.	ditto	ditto ditto.	
Howard, E.	ditto	ditto ditto; M. D., Edinburgh.	
Brabazon, A. B.	ditto	ditto Dublin.	
Dombory, C. G.	ditto	M. D., Pesth.	
Glover, R. M.	ditto	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.	
McEgan, W. B.	ditto	Assistant-surgeon Bengal Army, H. E. I. C. S.	
Bryce, C.	ditto	Fellow of the Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons, Glasgow; has resided and practised in the East.	
Williams, S. G.	ditto	East India Company's Service, M. D.	
Pincoffs, P.	ditto	M. D., Leyden; Extra Licentiate, College of Physicians, London.	
Cattell, W.	Assistant Surgeon, 5th Drg. Gds.	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Hulseberg, J. W.	ditto 8th Hussars	ditto	ditto ditto.
Ancell, M. C.	ditto 11th ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Armstrong, L.	ditto 13th ditto	Edinburgh and London	ditto ditto; M. D. Edinburgh.
Stanley, S. J.	ditto 17th ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Lawrence, H. J. H.	ditto Gren. Gds.	ditto	ditto ditto.
Trotter, J. W.	ditto Coldst. ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Turner, H.	ditto Scts. F. ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.

NAME.	RANK.	WHERE STUDIED.	QUALIFICATIONS.
Baker, F. B.	Assistant Surgeon, Scots Fusiliers	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Greene, J. B.	ditto — 1st Foot	ditto	ditto, London and Dublin; M. B., Dublin.
Dumbreck, W.	ditto — ditto	Edinburgh	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh.
Atkinson, R.	ditto — ditto	Dublin	ditto — — ditto.
Ekin, J.	ditto — 4th ditto	London	ditto — — London; M. B., London.
Langham, J. P.	ditto — 7th ditto	ditto	Surgical diploma, London.
Tippetts, A. M.	ditto — ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Meadows, R. W.	ditto — 9th ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Johnston, J. C.	ditto — ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Hyde, J. M.	ditto — 14th ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Ryall, E. C.	ditto — 18th ditto	Dublin	ditto — — ditto.
Philip, T. R.	ditto — ditto	Aberdeen	ditto — — ditto; M. B., Aberdeen.
Semple, A.	ditto — ditto	Glasgow	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh.
Webb, W. M.	ditto — 19th ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin.
Grylls, W. R.	ditto — ditto	London	ditto — — London.
Hiffernan, E. L.	ditto — ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin.
Wright, T.	ditto — 20th ditto	ditto	ditto — — London.
Carter, R. W.	ditto — ditto	London	ditto — — ditto.
Wolseley, R.	ditto — ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin.
West, J. H.	ditto — 21st ditto	ditto, Glasgow, and Belfast.	ditto — — Edinburgh; M. D., Glasgow.
Patrickson, J. H.	ditto — ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Dublin.
Woods, D.	ditto — 23d ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Sylvester, H. T.	ditto — ditto	Aberdeen	ditto — — Edinburgh; M. B., Aberdeen.
Raymond, H. H.	ditto — ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Risk, A.	ditto — ditto	— Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Paris.	ditto — — Glasgow; M. D., Glasgow.
Irwin, C. G.	ditto — 28th ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, London.
Steuart, J. F.	ditto — ditto	Edinburgh	ditto — — Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Milroy, D.	ditto — 30th ditto	ditto	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Clark, T.	ditto — 33d ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Dublin.
Seddall, J. V.	ditto — ditto	Edinburgh and Malta	ditto — — Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Worthington, R. J.	ditto — 34th ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Haward, W.	ditto — ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Wrench, E. M.	ditto — ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Lewes, J. H.	ditto — 38th ditto	Cork	ditto — — ditto.
Jeeves, W. Y.	ditto — ditto	London and Sheffield	ditto — — ditto.
Sparke, G. W.	ditto — 39th ditto	London	ditto — — ditto.
Madden, E. D.	ditto — ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin.
Abbott, F. J.	ditto — 41st ditto	ditto	ditto — — London.
Davidson, W. A.	ditto — 42d ditto	Aberdeen	ditto — — Edinburgh; M. D., Aberdeen.
Maclean, A.	ditto — ditto	Edinburgh	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh.
Butler, R. L.	ditto — 44th ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin.
Dempster, C. C.	ditto — 46th ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Scott, R. R.	ditto — ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Duffin, J.	ditto — ditto	ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Cusack, J. A.	ditto — 47th ditto	ditto	ditto — — London.
Grange, H.	ditto — ditto	ditto	ditto — — Edinburgh.
Hannan, J.	ditto — 49th ditto	London	ditto — — London.
Jephson, J. H.	ditto — ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin; M. D., Glasgow.
Noott, E. G.	ditto — 50th ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Davis, G. F.	ditto — ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin.
Cowan, J. M'H.	ditto — 55th ditto	Edinburgh	ditto — — Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Norris, J. J.	ditto — ditto	Cork	Surgical diploma, London.
Phelps, J. S.	ditto — 57th ditto	Sydney and Dublin	ditto — — ditto.
Alder, S.	ditto — 62d ditto	Leeds and ditto	ditto — — ditto.
Mills, W. W.	ditto — 63d ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin.
Flower, W. H.	ditto — ditto	London	ditto — — London.
Odell, F.	ditto — ditto	Dublin	ditto — — Dublin.
Johnston, A.	ditto — 68th ditto	Edinburgh	ditto — — Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.
Grabham, J.	ditto — 71st ditto	London	Surgical Diploma, London.
Burton, R. G.	ditto — 77th ditto	Edinburgh	ditto — — Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh.

NAME.	RANK.	WHERE STUDIED.	QUALIFICATIONS.
Miller, O.	Assistant-Surgeon, 77th Foot	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Dublin.
Humfrey, A.	ditto ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Lundy, E. L.	ditto 79th ditto	Cork	ditto London.
Drysdale, A. K.	ditto ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh.
Williams, T. R.	ditto 88th ditto	ditto	ditto London; M. D., Edinburgh.
Harris, W.	ditto ditto	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Meade, R. W.	ditto ditto	Cork and Dublin	ditto ditto.
Wiles, J.	ditto 89th ditto	London	ditto ditto.
Roe, W. C.	ditto ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Jackson, R. W.	ditto 90th ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Reid, D. A.	ditto ditto	London and Edinburgh	ditto London; M. D., Edinburgh.
Nelson, C. R.	ditto ditto	Dublin	Surgical diploma, Dublin.
Menzies, R.	ditto 93d ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
Pollard, W. H.	ditto ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Glasgow.
Swinhoe, G. M.	ditto 95th ditto	London	ditto London.
Sinclair, E. M.	ditto 97th ditto	Manchester	ditto ditto; M. D., St. Andrew's.
Bryson, A.	ditto ditto	Glasgow	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh; M. D., Glasgow.
Shorrock, J. A.	ditto Rifle Brigade	Edinburgh	Surgical diploma, Glasgow.
Williams, J. S. P.	ditto ditto	Liverpool	ditto London.
Brown, J. L.	ditto ditto	Edinburgh	ditto Edinburgh; M. D., Edinburgh
White, C. J.	ditto 3d Drg. Gds.	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Hudson, A. R.	ditto 6th Foot	Dublin	ditto M. B., Dublin.
Teevan, T.	ditto 3d ditto	ditto	Surgical diploma, ditto.
Webb, S. M.	ditto 36th ditto	London	ditto, London; M. D., Edinburgh.
Young, G.	ditto 60th ditto	Edinburgh	Surgical diploma, Edinburgh.
Youell, G.	ditto 54th ditto	Dublin	ditto Dublin.
Wason, E. S.	ditto 13th ditto	London, Edinburgh, and Paris.	ditto London; M. D. Edinburgh.
Bowen, E.	Assistant-surgeon Ordnance Medical Department.	London	Surgical diploma, London.
Cockerill, R. W.	ditto	Birmingham	ditto ditto.
Haughton, W.	ditto	Dublin	ditto ditto.
Humfrey, A. M.	ditto	Aberdeen	ditto Edinburgh; M. B., Aberdeen.
Joseph J. L.	Apothecary		In employment of a large wholesale firm in London 14 years, by whom he was most strongly recommended.
Macintosh, I.	ditto		Apothecary to the General Field Hospital, Rangoon, during greater part of Burmese war. Recommended by S. Tweedie, Physician-general, Honourable East India Company's service.
Fernandez, F.	ditto		Educated near Winchester; with a chemist at Bishop's Waltham, two years.
Kersey, I. E.	Dispensers		Was in dispensing practice in Norfolk.
Andrews, J.	ditto		Served with the firm of Savory & Son, by whom recommended.
Darrac, J. M.	ditto		Studied at Richmond Hospital, and recommended by Mr. Mansell, M. P.
Philpot, F.	ditto		Educated in London; apprenticed three years at Kensington.
Wallis, L.	ditto		Educated in Bath; apprenticed in Bath for five years.
Mossman, R. C.	ditto		Educated in London; apprenticed in Ross for five years.
Beeching, J.	ditto		Educated at Ramsgate; served five years with druggists at Maidenhead, Bath, and Chatham.
Poad, M. L.	ditto		Assistant dispenser at King's College 18 months; studied medicine and surgery at Charing-cross Hospital. Examined by Messrs. Savory.
Beveridge, J. M.	ditto		Employed for three years in General Dispensary, Ordnance Hospital at Woolwich. Member of Pharmaceutical Society. Recommended by Deputy Inspector-general, Dr. H. Briscoe. Examined by Messrs. Savory.
Brown, G. B.	ditto		Served with chemists. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Smeeton, G. H.	ditto		Served with J. Bell, Oxford-street, for two years. Recommended by Mr. Bell. Examined by Messrs. Savory & Sons. Associate of Pharmaceutical Society.
Tepper, J.	ditto		Served for some years with London chemists. Recommended by J. Bell, Oxford-street. Examined by Messrs. Savory.

(*continued*)

NAME.	RANK.	WHERE STUDIED.	QUALIFICATIONS.
Fitze, J.	Dispensers		- - Member of Pharmaceutical Society; served three years with chemists in town and country; recommended by Bishop of Exeter. Examined by Savory & Son. Decidedly superior.
Rickards, E.	ditto		- - Served an apprenticeship to a chemist, and assistant to a surgeon; highly recommended. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Crompton, W. P.	ditto		- - Served for one year as dispenser to St. George's Hospital. Examined and recommended by Savory & Son.
Allenby, E.	ditto		- - Apprenticed five years at Sleaford; served five years with chemists at Kibburn, London and Paris. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Harvey, L.	ditto		- - Served a surgical apprenticeship; three years resident at Windsor Royal Dispensary; lately in business at Birmingham; member of Pharmaceutical Society. Examined by Savory & Son.
Weaver, T.	ditto		- - Served for some years with chemists in Cheltenham, Hastings and London. Examined and recommended by Savory & Sons.
Brewer, J.	ditto		- - Served for many years with first class chemists; last with Mr. Pound, in Oxford-street. Examined by Messrs. Savory. Superior.
Peachey, A.	ditto		- - Served some time as chemist. Examined by Messrs. Savory & Sons and Apothecary Army Medical Department, and considered decidedly superior to generality of chemists' and druggists' assistants.
Thomson, E. D.	ditto		- - Apprenticed five years to surgeon in Edinburgh; served one year with J. Bell, Oxford-street. Examined by Savory & Sons. Decidedly superior.
Arthy, H. P.	ditto		- - Served some time with chemists; was two years assistant to a surgeon; recommended by Dr. Bowman as a good chemist. Examined by Messrs. Savory.
Rowell, C.	ditto		- - Served seven years with various chemists and druggists. Examined by Savory & Son.
Clayton, G. A.	ditto		- - Served seven years with chemists; member of Pharmaceutical Society. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Williams, D. W.	ditto		- - Served for some time with chemists in London. Examined and recommended by Savory & Sons.
Davies, J.	ditto		- - Served four years' apprenticeship, and lived 18 months with chemists in London. Examined by Savory & Son.
Pidduck, J. W.	ditto		- - Been 10 years a dispenser in a first-rate house; recommended by B. Travers, jun., esq. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Watts, H. T.	ditto		- - Well educated in pharmacy at the Pharmaceutical Society; served with chemist in London eight years; recommended by J. Bell & Co. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Knight, C.	ditto		- - Served for two years with Mr. Squire, Oxford-street; also with J. Bell & Co. Recommended and examined by Savory & Sons.
Blakeley, T.	ditto		- - Served with chemists for 15 years as dispenser. Examined by Messrs. Savory.
Collin, J.	ditto		- - Served some years as dispenser with chemists, including J. Bell & Co. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Guyer, J. B.	ditto		- - Apprenticed five years with chemist at Southampton; has served at Apothecaries' Hall; member of Pharmaceutical Society. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Barber, W. I.	ditto		- - Employed for several years at Godfrey & Cooke's, and Apothecaries' Hall; member of Pharmaceutical Society. Examined by Messrs. Savory.
Whitwell, I.	ditto		- - Served for some time with chemists; and one year with Savory & Son, by whom he is recommended.
Dunsford, W. H.	ditto		- - Served as dispenser with Mr. Squire, of Oxford-street. Examined by Savory & Sons.
Richardson, W. H.	ditto		- - Served with chemists; head assistant to chemist in Edgeware-road. Recommended by Mr. O. Duncumbe. Examined by Savory & Sons.

NAME.	RANK.	WHERE STUDIED.	QUALIFICATIONS.
Avent, N.	Dressers	London Hospital	Hospital attendance.
Atkinson, J.	ditto	St. Thomas's Hospital	ditto.
Watts, J. W.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Bellingham, W.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Baines, J. E.	ditto	Guy's Hospital	ditto.
Bennett, W. F.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Elliott, R. A.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Pavey, F.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Tucker, O.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Kinsley, E. A.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Woodfall, S. P.	ditto	London Hospital	ditto.
Giles, J.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Castle, W.	ditto	King's College	ditto.
Taylor, S. C.	ditto	Guy's Hospital	ditto.
Wilkinson, A. G.	ditto	General Hospital, Birmingham.	ditto.
Chavasse, H.	ditto	Ditto ditto	ditto.
Swann, W. F.	ditto	King's College	ditto.
Ambler, R.	ditto	London Hospital	ditto.
Harrison, H.	ditto	King's College	ditto.
Kemp, R.	ditto	Norfolk and Norwich Hospital.	ditto.
Gray, C.	ditto	St. Bartholomew's Hospital.	ditto.
Moore, E. D.	ditto	General Hospital, Birmingham.	ditto.
Oppenheim, L.	ditto	London Hospital	ditto.
Flewitt, J. A.	ditto	London University	ditto.
Leeson, R. H.	ditto	St. Thomas's Hospital	ditto.
Croome, W.	ditto	London ditto	ditto.
John, W.	ditto	St. Thomas's ditto	ditto.
Elliott, E. H.	ditto	Chichester Infirmary	ditto.
Hayes, R. O.	ditto	Queen's College, Cork	ditto.
Hawkins, B. L.	ditto	Westminster Hospital	ditto.
Hall, C.	ditto	London ditto	ditto.
Oxford, F. J.	ditto	General Hospital, Birmingham.	ditto.
Morgan, E. M.	ditto	King's College	ditto.
Ortouk, I.	ditto	Free University, Brussels	ditto.
Baynten, F. J.	ditto	Bath United Hospital	ditto.
Fell, T.	ditto	Was for some years assistant to Mr. Thomas Gough, surgeon, at Kendal, and seven years in business for himself as chemist and druggist.	

A. Smith,
Director-General.

War Department,
27 April 1855.

Frederick Peel.

Appendix, No. 10.

Appendix, No. 10.

No. 1.—RETURN showing the TOTAL NUMBER of MEN of Lord *Raglan*'s ARMY SICK during each Month, from the Landing in *Turkey*.

MONTHS.	Total Sick or Wounded of all Arms during each Month.
1854:	
April - - - - - -	503
May - - - - - -	1,835
June - - - - - -	3,498
July - - - - - -	6,937
August - - - - - -	11,236
September - - - - - -	11,693
October - - - - - -	11,988
November - - - - - -	16,846
December - - - - - -	19,479
1855:	
January - - - - - -	23,076
To 17 February - - Crimea -	9,284
To 25 „ - - Scutari -	6,725
To 17 „ - - Abydos -	385
To 25 „ - - Gallipoli -	70
To 20 „ - - Smyrna -	500
TOTAL to latest dates in February	16,964

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
14 March 1855.

A. Smith,
Director-General.

No. 2.—RETURN of the Number of SURGEONS, APOTHECARIES, NURSES and PASSENGERS during each Month, from the Landing of the ARMY at *Gallipoli*.

MONTHS.	Surgeons.	Apothecaries.	Nurses.		Passengers.
			Female.	Hospital Orderly Room.*	
Memo.—No Returns received previous to November.					No return of passengers received.
November - -	298	9	about 50	730	
December - -	329	19	ditto	1,138	
January - -	402	28	ditto	-- no returns received.	
February - -	430	39	ditto		

* It is assumed that the number of orderly-men in attendance on the Sick was at least that allowed by Her Majesty's Hospital Regulations; viz. 1 to every 10 Sick. But it appears that at least, up to 2d December, the number allowed to attend on sick and wounded men proceeding on board ship from Balaklava to Scutari was limited to 1 man to every 25 sick and wounded, by an order to the Commandant of Balaklava, issued by Lord Raglan.

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
14 March 1855.

A. Smith, M.D.,
Director-General.

No. 3.—

No. 3.—RETURN of the NUMBER of the BRITISH ARMY in the *Peninsula* at the time of th Battle of *Vittoria*, and the Strength of the Medical Staff.

	Officers, exclusive of Medical Staff.	Serjeants.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.			Total Number of Men.
				Present and fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	
Cavalry - - - -	446	657	111	7,025	602	1,116	9,511
Artillery and Engineers -	183	180	71	3,868	590	953	5,662
Infantry - - - -	2,129	3,075	1,087	37,034	8,413	2,225	51,834
TOTAL - - -	2,758	3,912	1,269	47,927	9,605	4,294	67,007

MEDICAL STAFF.

Regimental	Surgeons - - - - - - - - - -	71
	Assistant Surgeons - - - - - - - -	172
Staff -	Inspectors of Hospitals - - - - - - - -	2
	Deputy Inspectors of Hospitals - - - - - -	8
	Physicians, including one Physician in chief - - -	16
	Surgeons - - - - - - - - - -	33
	Assistant Surgeons - - - - - - - -	4
	Apothecaries, including one Apothecary in chief - -	5
	Hospital Mates - - - - - - - - -	107
	Dispensers - - - - - - - - - -	17
	Purveyors - - - - - - - - - -	3
	Deputy Purveyors - - - - - - - -	17
	TOTAL - - - -	455

N. B. The Returns on which the above Statement is founded, are dated 25th May 1813, and the battle of Vittoria was fought on 21st June following.

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, 22 March 1855.

G. A. Wetherall, Adjutant-General.

No. 4.—RETURN of the Number of Officers and Men of Cavalry and Infantry sent to the East from *England*, *Ireland*, or the Colonies, before the Army under the Command of Lord *Raglan* proceeded to the *Crimea*, in the Beginning of September 1854, specifying the several Regiments, with the Dates of Embarkation.

REGIMENTS.	Dates of Embarkation of Head Quarters.	Ports of Embarkation.	Originally sent out.				Officers and Men since Embarked to September 1854.				Dates of Embarkation of Drafts, to Sept. 1854.	Total Force sent out to Sept. 1854.	
			Officers.	Men. Sergeants.	Men. Trumpeters and Drummers.	Men. Rank and File.	Officers.	Men. Sergeants.	Men. Trumpeters and Drummers.	Men. Rank and File.		Officers.	Men.
CAVALRY:	1854:										1854:		
4th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons	2 June	Kingstown	20	18	4	275	–	–	–	–	–	20	297
5th ,, ,,	27 May	Cork	19	18	4	273	–	–	–	–	–	19	295
1st Dragoons ,,	10 May	Liverpool	19	18	4	272	–	–	–	–	–	19	294
2d ,, ,,	25 July	ditto	18	21	4	274	–	–	–	–	–	18	299
4th ,, ,,	18 July	Plymouth	20	21	5	273	–	–	–	–	–	20	299
6th ,, ,,	29 May	Devonport	19	18	4	273	1	1	–	21	24 June	20	317
8th Hussars ,,	2 May	ditto	20	18	5	271	–	–	–	–	–	20	294
11th ,, ,,	15 May	Kingstown	18	19	4	272	–	–	–	–	–	18	295
3th ,, ,,	12 May	Portsmouth	20	16	4	275	–	–	–	3	24 June	20	298
17th Lancers ,,	25 April	ditto	20	18	5	271	–	–	–	7	24 June	20	301
TOTAL CAVALRY			193	185	43	2,729	1	1	–	31	–	194	2,989
Grenadier Guards, 3d Battalion	22 February	Southampton	32	43	18	885	3	7	–	155	27 June	35	1,108
Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion	22 February	ditto	33	44	19	857	8 2	2 –	– –	149 1	27 June 29 June	43	1,072
Scots Fusilier Guards, 1st Battalion	28 February	Portsmouth	30	45	19	868	4 1	4 –	– –	150 –	27 June 21 August	35	1,086
TOTAL FOOT GUARDS			95	132	56	2,610	18	13	–	455	–	113	3,266
INFANTRY:													
1st Foot, 1st Battalion	21 April	Plymouth	30	46	15	850	2	–	–	–	22 May & 29 June	32	911
4th ,,	9 March	Edinburgh	32	46	15	850	–	–	–	–	–	32	911
7th ,,	5 April	Southampton	30	46	15	850	1	2	–	100	29 June	31	1,013
19th ,,	20 ,,	Woolwich	31	47	15	851	2	2	–	100	27 June	33	1,015
20th ,,	17 July	Plymouth	30	46	15	900	3	–	–	–	9 & 31 Aug.	33	961
21st ,,	15 August	Cork	33	55	19	900	–	–	–	–	–	33	974
23d ,,	4 April	Southampton	31	45	15	851	2 1	– 2	– –	– 100	20 May 29 June	34	1,013
23th ,,	22 February	Liverpool	31	46	14	839	–	–	–	–	–	31	899
30th ,,	1 May	Gibraltar	34	39	14	842	–	–	–	–	–	34	895
33d ,,	1 March	Kingstown	33	47	15	853	1	2	–	100	4 July	34	1,017
38th ,,	26 April	Portsmouth	32	45	15	850	2	–	–	–	24 June & 17 July	34	910
41st ,,	10 ,,	Malta	28	46	15	808	1 –	– 1	– –	– 50	6 May 4 July	29	920
42d ,,	20 May	Portsmouth	33	46	20	852	–	1	–	50	27 June	33	969
44th ,,	10 March	Gibraltar	31	47	19	857	2	–	–	–	16 May & 27 June	33	923
46th ,, (part)	17 July	Southampton	6	10	4	209	1	3	–	31	9 August	7	257
47th ,,	10 April	Malta	29	41	13	835	1	–	–	50	4 July	30	939
49th ,,	9 ,,	ditto	27	44	13	850	1	–	–	–	18 April	28	907
50th ,,	24 February	Kingstown	31	44	15	851	–	–	–	–	–	31	910
55th ,,	10 May	Gibraltar	31	38	15	839	–	–	–	–	–	31	892
63d ,,	21 July	Cork	31	56	21	900	–	–	–	–	–	31	977
68th ,,	7 August	Malta	28	45	18	778	–	–	–	–	–	28	841
77th ,,	10 March	Liverpool	31	45	13	852	1	–	–	102	29 June	32	1,012
79th ,,	4 May	Portsmouth	31	45	21	851	–	1	–	50	27 June	31	968
88th ,,	4 April	Liverpool	32	46	15	850	1	2	–	100	29 June	33	1,013
93d ,,	27 February	Plymouth	33	41	20	850	2 1	2 –	– –	98 –	27 June 9 August	36	1,011
95th ,,	6 April	Portsmouth	30	46	15	850	1 1	2 –	– –	100 –	27 & 29 June 9 August	32	1,013
Rifle Brigade, 1st Batt.	13 July	ditto	25	54	21	900	–	–	–	–	–	25	975
Ditto 2d ,,	24 February	ditto	32	46	15	900	1 1	– 2	– –	– 150	19 April 24 June	34	1,113
TOTAL INFANTRY			836	1,248	440	23,268	29	22	–	1,181	–	865	26,159
GENERAL TOTAL—CAVALRY, GUARDS AND INFANTRY			1,124	1,565	539	28,607	48	36	–	1,667	–	1,172	32,414

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, 22 March 1855.

G. A. Wetherall, A. G.

No. 5.—

No. 5.—RETURN of the TOTAL NUMBER of OFFICERS and MEN of all Arms who Landed in the *Crimea* before the Battle of the *Alma*.

THERE are no documents in the Adjutant-General's Office upon which this Return can be prepared; but, on inquiry at the War Department, it appears that the following numbers were engaged in the Battle of the Alma on the 20th of September 1854, which, it is considered, include all the men who landed in the Crimea up to that date; viz.—

1,100 Cavalry.
3,100 Artillery and Engineers.
22,600 Infantry.

26,800

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, 22 March 1855. *G. A. Wetherall*, A. G.

No. 6.—RETURN of the NUMBER of KILLED and WOUNDED in the Battle of the *Alma*, on the 20th of September 1854.

	OFFICERS.		MEN.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Cavalry	-	1	—	—
Artillery and Engineers	3	1	9	21
Infantry	23	78	318	1,518
TOTAL	26	80	327	1,539

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, 22 March 1855. *G. A. Wetherall*, A. G.

No. 7.—RETURN of the EFFECTIVE STATE of the ARMY after the Flank March to *Balaklava*, showing the Number of Sick and Wounded.

No state of the Army on the 26th of September 1854, the day on which the troops arrived at Balaklava, has been received; and the following numbers have been extracted from the Morning State of the 2d of October, which shows the number of sick, but does not give, *separately*, the number of wounded.

ABSTRACT of the MORNING STATE of the ARMY in the *Crimea* on the 2d of October 1854.

	Officers.	Serjeants, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Rank and File.						
		Under Arms.	Bâtmen and otherwise Employed.	On Command.	Total Effectives.	Total Sick.	Sick.	
							Present.	Absent.
Cavalry	163	1,982	112	190	2,284	490	159	331
Artillery and Engineers	149	3,154	73	151	3,378	230	5	225
Infantry	772	18,246	1,053	2,904	22,203	6,057	164	5,893
GENERAL TOTAL	1,084	23,382	1,238	3,245	27,865	6,777	328	6,449
					34,642		6,777	

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, 22 March 1855. *G. A. Wetherall*, A. G.

Appendix, No. 10.

No. 8.—RETURN of the EFFECTIVE STATE of the ARMY the Day before, and the Day after, the Battle of *Inkermann*.

THERE are no Documents in the Adjutant-General's Department upon which the above Return can be prepared.

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, 22 March 1855.

G. A. Wetherall, A. G.

No. 9.—RETURN, showing the Date of Arrival, and the Amount of DRAFTS and REINFORCEMENTS of CAVALRY and INFANTRY after the Battle of the *Alma*, specifying to what Corps belonging, and whether previously part of Lord *Raglan's* Army, up to the latest Period.

Regiments to which the Drafts were sent out, and which *previously* formed Part of Lord *Raglan's* Army.	Officers and Men who arrived in the Crimea after the Battle of the Alma.					Date of Arrival in the Crimea.
	Officers.	Serjeants.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL Number of Men.	
4th Dragoon Guards	–	–	–	–	–	—
5th „ „	1	–	–	–	–	—
	1	–	–	2	2	18 November.
1st Dragoons	1	–	–	–	–	30 November.
2d „	1	–	–	–	–	In December.
4th „	–	–	–	–	–	—
6th „	–	–	–	–	–	—
8th Hussars	1	–	–	–	–	In October.
	1	–	–	1	1	In November.
11th „	–	–	–	–	–	—
13th „	–	–	–	–	–	—
17th Lancers	–	–	–	–	–	—
TOTAL	6	–	–	3	3	
Grenadier Guards, 3d Battalion	2	–	–	3	3	4 September.
	2	2	–	80	82	22 November.
	9	9	2	404	415	29 December.
	2	–	–	1	1	February.
	15	11	2	488	501	
Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion	2	–	–	2	2	18 October.
	3	–	–	2	2	- ditto.
	2	1	7	50	58	November.
	1	–	–	–	–	30 November.
	6	1	–	152	153	25 November.
	1	–	–	1	1	February.
	15	2	7	207	216	
Scots Fusilier Guards, 1st Battalion	2	–	–	3	3	In October.
	4	2	–	100	102	- ditto.
	3	2	1	151	154	30 December.
	2	–	–	2	2	In January 1855.
	1	–	–	1	1	
	12	4	1	257	262	
TOTAL GUARDS	42	17	10	952	979	

Regiments to which the Drafts were sent out, and which *previously* formed Part of Lord *Raglan's* Army.	Officers and Men who arrived in the Crimea after the Battle of the Alma.					Date of Arrival in the Crimea.
	Officers.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total Number of Men.	
1st Foot 1st Battalion - -	2	2	3	119	124	In November.
	1	1	–	80	81	In December.
	1	–	–	–	–	23 January 1855.
	2	2	–	100	102	27 January „
	1	1	–	90	91	27 February „
	7	6	3	389	398	
4th Foot - - - - -	3	1	–	2	3	8 November.
	1	1	–	80	81	9 December.
	1	1	–	101	102	27 January 1855.
	1	–	–	66	66	28 January „
	–	1	–	57	58	27 February „
	6	4	–	306	310	
7th „ - - - - -	1	2	–	102	104	21 and 28 November.
	–	1	–	50	51	
	2	1	–	75	76	25 January 1855.
	2	2	–	100	102	27 February „
	5	6	–	327	333	
19th „ - - - - -	1	–	–	–	–	In October.
	–	2	–	100	102	21 November.
	3	–	–	16	16	5 January 1855.
	1	–	–	51	51	22 January „
	5	2	–	167	169	
20th „ - - - - -	–	1	–	50	51	In December.
	3	1	–	30	31	26 January 1855.
	3	2	–	80	82	
21st „ - - - - -	–	2	–	120	122	2 December.
23d „ - - - - -	4	2	–	130	132	22 November.
	–	2	–	100	102	28 November.
	1	–	–	–	–	20 January 1855.
	2	2	–	100	102	25 January „
	1	–	–	–	–	27 February „
	2	2	–	99	101	
	10	8	–	429	437	
28th „ - - - - -	1	–	–	16	16	In December.
	1	1	–	152	153	26 January 1855.
	1	–	–	–	–	20 January „
	1	1	–	65	66	27 January „
	1	1	–	45	46	27 February „
	5	3	–	278	281	

Appendix, No. 10.

Regiments to which the Drafts were sent out, and which *previously* formed Part of Lord *Raglan's* Army.	Officers and Men who arrived in the Crimea after the Battle of the Alma.					Date of Arrival in the Crimea.
	Officers.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total Number of Men.	
30th Regiment - - -	1	2	–	100	102	15 November.
	2	1	–	50	51	2 December.
	2	1	–	50	51	8 February 1855.
	5	4	–	200	204	
33d „ - - - - -	1	2	–	100	102	In November.
	1	1	–	60	61	In December.
	3	2	–	95	97	5 February 1855.
	5	5	–	255	260	
38th „ - - - - -	2	–	–	–	–	8 November.
	1	1	–	80	81	9 December.
	–	3	–	159	162	13 and 27 January 1855.
	2	1	–	65	66	
	1	2	–	100	102	
	6	7	–	404	411	
41st „ - - - - -	6	2	–	100	102	15 November.
	–	1	–	67	68	21 January 1855.
	3	2	–	97	99	8 February „
	9	5	–	264	269	
42d „ - - - - -	2	1	–	50	51	2 December.
44th „ - - - - -	2	3	–	149	152	27 January 1855.
	3	2	–	90	92	7 January „
	–	1	–	50	51	26 January „
	5	6	–	289	295	
47th „ - - - - -	–	2	–	101	103	15 November.
	–	1	–	53	54	2 December.
	1	1	–	61	62	6 February 1855.
	1	4	–	215	219	
49th „ - - - - -	3	3	–	130	133	In November.
	–	1	–	50	51	17 January 1855.
	1	1	–	66	67	6 February „
	4	5	–	246	251	
50th „ - - - - -	3	2	–	100	102	22 November.
	1	2	–	73	75	2 December.
	–	–	–	17	17	4 February 1855.
	4	4	–	190	194	
55th „ - - - - -	2	2	–	161	163	In November.
	1	1	–	127	128	2 December.
	1	1	–	36	37	6 February 1855.
	4	4	–	324	328	

Regiments to which the Drafts were sent out, and which *previously* formed Part of Lord Raglan's Army.	Officers and Men who arrived in the Crimea after the Battle of the Alma.					Date of Arrival in the Crimea.
	Officers.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total Number of Men.	
63d Regiment	2	1	–	70	71	16 November.
	2	1	–	18	19	31 January 1855.
	4	2	–	88	90	
68th „	2	1	–	70	71	15 November.
	1	1	–	25	26	2 December.
	–	–	–	45	45	4 February 1855.
	3	2	–	140	142	
77th „	1	–	–	–	–	8 November.
	3	2	–	100	102	29 November and 2 December.
	2	–	–	–	–	18 January 1855.
	1	4	–	248	252	25 January „
	1	1	–	54	55	24 February „
	8	7	–	402	409	
79th „	2	–	1	99	100	19 October.
88th „	2	–	–	50	50	19 October.
	1	–	–	–	–	19 October.
	1	–	–	–	–	
	–	2	–	100	102	5 January 1855.
	2	2	–	100	102	22 January „
	2	1	–	80	81	24 February „
	8	5	–	330	335	
93d „	2	1	–	40	41	In December.
	1	1	–	53	54	18 February 1855.
	3	2	–	93	95	
95th „	2	2	–	80	82	22 November.
	1	–	–	–	–	10 December.
	1	–	–	–	–	18 January 1855.
	1	–	–	–	–	23 January „
	2	–	–	40	40	26 January „
	1	–	–	–	–	21 February „
	8	2	–	120	122	
Rifle Brigade, 1st battalion	–	1	–	50	51	In November.
	2	1	–	101	102	27 January 1855.
	2	–	–	–	–	10 and 27 January 1855.
	1	1	–	50	51	26 January 1855.
	1	2	–	100	102	22 February.
	6	5	–	301	306	

 (*continued*)

Regiments to which the Drafts were sent out, and which *previously* formed Part of Lord Raglan's Army.	Officers and Men who arrived in the Crimea after the Battle of the Alma. Officers.	Sergeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total Number of Men.	Date of Arrival in the Crimea.
Rifle Brigade, 2d battalion -	3	1	–	50	51	In December.
	2	–	–	–	–	
	1	1	–	52	53	— February 1855.
	1	1	–	101	102	
	1	1	–	58	59	
	1	–	–	–	–	
	9	4	–	261	265	
Total Infantry - - -	137	107	4	6,367	6,478	
General Total—Cavalry, Guards, and Infantry—of Drafts to Regiments *previously* forming part of Lord Raglan's Army -	185	124	14	7,322	7,460	

Regiments sent to the East *after* the Battle of the Alma, and which did *not* previously form Part of Lord Raglan's Army.	Numbers embarked in the First Instance. Officers.	MEN. Sergeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Date of Arrival in the Crimea.	Officers and Men since Embarked from the United Kingdom. Officers.	MEN. Sergeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Date of Arrival of *Drafts* in the Crimea.	TOTAL. Officers.	Men.
57th Regiment (from Corfu) - - -	19	42	10	690	In September	1	–	–	1	8 Nov. -	30	998
						7	4	–	243	,, -		
						3	–	–	8	8 Feb. 1855		
						11	4	–	252			
46th (the remainder of the Regiment) -	26	33	13	660	In November	–	1	–	44	9 Dec. -	30	808
						2	–	–	–	15 Jan. 1855		
						1	1	–	25	26 ,,		
						1	1	–	30	22 Feb. 1855		
						4	3	–	99			
9th (from Malta) -	20	30	12	507	In November	2	2	–	92	8 Jan. 1855	29	700
						7	2	–	55	15 Feb. 1855		
						9	4	–	147			
34th (from Corfu) -	21	35	11	554	In December	1	–	–	1	In December	35	980
34th (ditto) -	5	6	5	182	In Feb. 1855	7	3	–	120	22 Jan. 1855		
						1	1	–	62	20 Feb. ,,		
	26	41	16	736		9	4	–	183			
62d (from Malta) -	20	41	12	493	In November	1	2	–	105	5 Jan. 1855	21	653
90th - - - -	32	56	18	740	4 December	–	–	–	–	- - -	32	814

Regiments sent to the East *after* the Battle of the Alma, and which did *not* previously form Part of Lord Raglan's Army.	Numbers embarked in the First Instance.				Date of Arrival in the Crimea.	Officers and Men since Embarked from the United Kingdom.				Date of Arrival of *Drafts* in the Crimea.	TOTAL.	
	Officers.	MEN.				Officers.	MEN.				Officers.	Men.
		Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.			Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.			
97th (from Greece) -	28	40	12	837	In November	2	2	–	99	In December	30	1,004
						–	–	–	14	In Jan. 1855		
						2	2	–	113			
17th (from Gibraltar) -	23	41	17	661	In December	3	4	–	162	In Jan. 1855	34	1,002
						8	6	2	107	7 Feb. „		
						–	–	–	2			
						11	10	2	271			
89th (from Gibraltar) -	23	41	17	633	19 December	8	4	–	220	31 Jan. 1855	31	915
39th (from Gibraltar) -	24	44	13	603	31 December	9	6	4	173	10 Feb. „	33	843
18th Regiment - -	30	31	18	772	in Jan. 1855	3	6	2	134	20 Feb. „	33	963
14th „ - -	22	52	15	604	19 Jan. „	9	4	1	135	10 Feb. „	31	811
71st (from England)	11	20	6	391	20 Dec. 1855	–	–	–	- -	- - -	32	891
71st (from Corfu) -	21	26	15	433	In Feb. „							
	32	46	21	824								
Total Reinforcements and Drafts to Regiments which *did not* form part of Lord Raglan's Army until after the Battle of the Alma - -	325	538	194	8,760	- - -	76	49	9	1,832	- - -	401	11,382
General Total of Officers and Men arrived in the Crimea after the Battle of the Alma, Cavalry, Foot Guards and Infantry - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- - -	–	–	–	- -	- - -	586	18,842

ABSTRACT.

	Officers.	Men.
Number of Officers and Men sent to the East before the Army proceeded to the Crimea, as per Return, No. 4 - - -	1,172	32,414
Number of Officers and Men who arrived in the Crimea after the Battle of the Alma, belonging to Regiments which *previously* formed part of Lord Raglan's Army - - - - -	185	7,460
Number of Officers and Men who arrived in the Crimea after the Battle of the Alma, belonging to Regiments *not* previously forming part of Lord Raglan's Army - - - - -	401	11,382
Total Force, Cavalry, Guards and Infantry sent to the East - - - - -	1,758	51,256

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, 22 March 1855.

G. A. Wetherall, A. G.

Appendix, No. 11.

Appendix, No. 11. A RETURN of the Number of TENTS Issued for Service of the ARMY in the EAST, from the Commencement of the War to the 31st March 1855, specifying the Description of Tent, the Store from which Issued, and where made, and whether they had been previously used.

Issued from the Store at	Total Number Issued.			Where made.	Number previously used.		
	Marquees.		Round Tents.		Marquees.		Round Tents.
	Hospital.	Officers'.			Hospital.	Officers'.	
The Tower - -	142	207	5,888	In London.	65	101	1,238
Portsmouth - -	23	6	2,636				
Devonport - -	6	3	505		- -	- -	45
Chatham - -	1	- -	107				
Chester - - -	- -	- -	4				
Woolwich - -	- -	3	7				
Edinburgh - -	1	- -	107				
Dublin - - -	5	- -	427				
Cork Harbour -	16	4	1,055		- -	- -	77
TOTAL - - -	194	223	10,736	- -	65	101	1,360

The used tents issued from the Tower had been in previous use at Chobham, to which place they had been sent quite new. On their return they were strictly examined, and any repairs that were found necessary were carried into effect before their final issue to the army in the East, for which service they were in a perfectly good condition; and they were so applied in consequence of the store of tents not being sufficient to meet the demands required. The 122 used tents issued from Devonport and Cork Harbour had been but slightly used and were quite fit for service.

Of the total number of round tents (10,736) issued for the army, 2,835 were sent direct to the Crimea, and 7,921 delivered to the different regiments at their respective ports of embarkation in the following proportions:—

To officers, infantry and cavalry - - { 2 round tents to each field officer.
1 ditto ditto to each other officer.

Infantry regiments - - - - { 1 tent to every 15 men.
4 do. extra per regiment for Guards.

Cavalry regiments - - - - { 1 do. to every 12 men.
4 do. extra per regiment for Guards.

Office of Ordnance, 24 April 1855.

By Order of the Board of Ordnance,
J. Wood, Secretary.

Appendix, No. 12.

COPY of a LETTER written by *A. Stafford*, Esq., M.P., to the War Department, in reference to the Propriety of opening a Hospital at *Smyrna*. Appendix, No. 12

My Lord Duke, Smyrna, 6 November 1854.

HAVING visited the English and French hospitals here, I am anxious to inform the War Office that the French have just placed their hospital under more efficient management, and have added several beds, in the expectation of more patients during the winter.

Several soldiers and sailors (French) who were taken ill during their voyage either to or from Constantinople have been left here, and from the arrangements in progress, it is evident that the French hospital here will be of considerable service to the French troops during the war. The English hospital is by no means in so satisfactory a state, though there is, I understand, a considerable revenue from shipping dues dedicated to its support; and there is a resident English surgeon here whose services would be available. Almost every transport ship touches or could touch here, and the climate is infinitely milder and better during the winter than that of Constantinople.

I therefore call the attention of the War Office to this subject as a matter of public duty.

I have, &c.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *Augustus Stafford.*

COPY of the APPOINTMENT of Lord *William Paulett.*

The Duke of *Newcastle* to Colonel the Lord *William Paulett.*

My Lord, War Department, 5 January 1855.

HER MAJESTY having been pleased to approve of your appointment to a special service, and as British Military Commandant in the Bosphorus, it is necessary that I should issue such instructions to your Lordship as may be requisite for your information and guidance in the responsible office and duties which now devolve upon you.

In doing so I must in the first place assure your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government confidently rely upon your zeal and discretion, and upon your full appreciation of the urgent necessity for instant and effective measures towards the relief of the sick and wounded of the British forces in Turkey, and for the preparation of ample and good accommodation for those whose arrival there must be constantly expected.

I need hardly point out to your Lordship that the success of the arduous service in which you are engaged will greatly depend upon the confidence in your judgment and discretion which you may establish in the opinions, not only of the chief medical officers and other authorities who may be now or hereafter connected with the administration of the British hospital, commissariat, and transport services in Turkey, but it is also of the highest importance that your Lordship should, by your example and precept, promote an active cordiality and cheerful co-operation between every individual acting under your Lordship's orders, or who may be connected with the prosecution of those duties which will hereafter be subject to your Lordship's direction.

Your Lordship will no doubt already have entered upon the fullest and most confidential communications with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; and although neither under his Excellency's orders, nor in any way dependent upon his Lordship either to sanction or authorise the necessary expenditure which must arise whilst carrying out these instructions, and whilst occupying your present post, yet I trust that your Lordship will draw freely upon Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's experience and counsel, with regard to your plans and operations, whenever his Lordship's opinion may become necessary on matters connected with the inhabitants or the local institutions of the Ottoman empire, and, indeed, whenever his Lordship's accredited position and acquired influence with the government of the Sublime Porte can be of advantage to the great purposes which are entrusted to you.

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As the care of the sick and wounded, and accommodation for their reception at and passage to the hospitals under your Lordship's charge, is the most urgent and earliest of your duties, I commit to your Lordship, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, full power and authority (after consultation with Dr. Cumming or the other principal British medical authorities upon the spot), to hire, adapt, or repair existing buildings, or to erect temporary buildings in proper localities for the reception of the patients.

I should hope that some steps have been already taken with respect to additional hospital accommodation at Kulleli; but your Lordship, after consultation with Dr. Cumming and the other medical authorities connected with the British service in Turkey, will decide whether it is better to open a new hospital at Kulleli, or in any other locality which may be considered more advantageous and more easily attainable; and in case your Lordship's decision should be in favour of a new hospital, your Lordship will then proceed to detach such persons from the different departments as you may consider fit for that purpose, to organise the new establishment. Or if your Lordship should consider it preferable to erect temporary buildings in such proximity to existing hospitals as to secure the advantage of those hospitals, your Lordship will be pleased to lose no time in carrying that decision into effect. And if it be advisable to adopt both the courses which I have suggested, your Lordship will in like manner proceed to give directions accordingly.

The probability of new buildings being required for these purposes suggests itself so strongly that I must not omit urgently to recommend to your Lordship, that in case it be decided that new buildings are to be erected, the temporary hospitals put up by the French in the Seraglio Gardens should be first inspected, as valuable suggestions may be derived from the French experiment; but every exertion should be used to create this fresh accommodation without loss of time, as the state of the army in the Crimea unhappily renders extensive and well-arranged accommodation urgently necessary.

As both speed and efficiency in the arrangement or creation of these buildings is of the greatest importance, no application should be made to the Turkish Government to perform any part of the work which, to be done at once and done well, must be done by workmen engaged and paid under your Lordship's authority.

Arrangements are being made to send out English carpenters, to assist in the works which will probably be constantly carrying on; but your Lordship must not defer any part of the work till their arrival, but commence it without delay with such workmen as you can procure upon the spot.

I am informed, upon competent authority, that hulks have many disadvantages as hospitals for the convalescents, whose recovery is retarded by the weariness and depression caused by constant confinement.

Convalescent hospitals should, therefore, be prepared. Rhodes and Smyrna have been recommended as places suitable for such hospitals; the first having the advantage of an excellent climate and large buildings which might be procured for such purposes, but no market for supplies, and little facility for obtaining anything requisite for the hospital, and of which there is not a store in hand. Smyrna, on the contrary, though probably inferior in respect of climate, yet, being a place of great trade, affords facilities for procuring stores of different kinds to a greater degree than any other place in the Levant.

That your Lordship may the more fully understand, and be informed of my opinions with respect to convalescent hospitals at Rhodes and Smyrna, I transmit confidentially with this despatch copies of letters which I have already written to the Earl of Clarendon and to Field Marshal the Lord Raglan upon this subject.

It has been stated to me that the condition of the pier at which the sick and wounded are landed at Scutari requires immediate attention; and I am also informed that it might be so lengthened as to enable a landing to be effected in almost all weathers.

The supply of boats is also stated to be inadequate. Boats must in this case be purchased and retained for the use of the hospital, with proper crews, who, when the boats are not in use, might be employed in conveying supplies to the hospital, or at other works about the building.

If boats of proper capacity for the purpose in view cannot be procured at Constantinople, application must be made to Sir E. Lyons, or to the admiral at Malta, who have received instructions to forward such as can be spared from the fleet.

A sufficient number of mules or horses should be purchased for the use of the hospital, for the service of the ambulance, and for bringing in supplies. Arabas should be procured with the same view.

As regards the hospital at Scutari, there is reason to hope that much has been effected towards bringing that establishment into a state of greater efficiency.

A laundry has been organised outside the building, by the exertions and at the cost of individuals, who, however, ought not to be burdened with any expenditure on this account. All the expenses connected with this establishment will therefore be defrayed by Her Majesty's Government.

It is understood that the laundry within the hospital has been useless owing to its being filled with stores, which ought not to have been the case, and for such stores some other room must either be found or created.

Dr. Smith, the Director-general of the Army Medical Department, is sending out washing and wringing machines, and some persons who will undertake the washing either

in

in conjunction with those actually engaged, or separately, as your Lordship may, after consulting the authorities of the hospital and Miss Nightingale, consider most advantageous to the efficiency of the service.

The bath-rooms, and some of the kitchens, have been stated to be in a similar way misappropriated, and it is left to your Lordship's discretion to make whatever arrangement, after due consideration, you may think most advisable.

If it be thought right to restore these buildings to their original uses, temporary sheds will probably be required for the stores so displaced. It cannot be too much impressed upon your Lordship, that ample store-room is indispensable to the orderly arrangement as well as the expeditious issue of all stores.

With respect to the staff of the Purveying Department, I am informed that it is so insufficient, and the forms of procedure so complicated and cumbrous, as to interfere with the expeditious and ready issue of the articles required.

It is probably owing to this that there appears to have been a deficiency in the hospital, at the time when they were wanted, of articles of which abundance existed in store.

It is also stated that articles, such as bed-trestles, &c., which had been asked for at a period when there were none in store, had, upon subsequent arrival from England, remained unused, because the purveyor had neglected the simple expedient of communicating lists of the stores newly arrived to the medical authorities, whom it is his duty to keep informed as to his means of meeting their requisitions.

Part of this deficiency, namely, that of the number of clerks under the purveyor, has already been in some degree met by the Secretary-at-War, who has sent out six additional clerks (who have already arrived at Scutari), and who were originally selected on the ground of their alleged acquaintance with mercantile business. The Secretary-at-War has also selected others who it is expected will shortly arrive at Scutari.

I have also to inform your Lordship that the Secretary-at-War is likewise about to send out Mr. Milton, a gentleman in the War Office, who has shown considerable ability in conducting an inquiry into the state of a military hospital in England, which led to great improvements in it. This gentleman will be accompanied by two intelligent clerks from his office, and will have a commission as purveyor to enable him to act under Mr. Wreford, and give him all the assistance he can in the organisation of his department, after which he will proceed to Balaklava on a similar errand.

Reports have reached this country that considerable irregularity has prevailed in the supply of fuel to the hospital, and an inference has in consequence been set up that the Commissariat Establishment is either wanting in numbers or in the efficiency of the men of whom it is composed. Additional Commissariat officers will be immediately sent out, whose services, if required, your Lordship will direct Deputy Commissary-general Smith to retain at Scutari. If, however, your Lordship should be of opinion that with better arrangement the present staff is sufficient, or that the delay of a reference to the Commissary-general in the Crimea will not be productive of inconvenience, you are authorised to send on such additional Commissariat officers as are not required, to Balaklava, where they are to be placed, and will remain, under the orders of Commissary-general Filder.

Your Lordship must nevertheless, at the same time and without hesitation or delay, send home persons connected with either the Commissariat or the Purveying Departments who are inefficient, and therefore an obstruction to the due performance of the public service.

As it is important that Dr. Cumming should, as soon as possible, take charge of the hospital at Scutari in the place of Dr. Menzies, your Lordship is required to do everything in your power to facilitate and expedite the work of the Commission, on which, together with Mr. Maxwell and Dr. Laing, Dr. Cumming is now engaged, with a view to his resuming his professional duties, as principal medical officer at Scutari.

The Commissioners acting under this Commission have received orders to report to your Lordship from time to time all practical alterations which they recommend with a view to the better organisation and working of the hospital; and your Lordship, after consultation with them, will take immediate steps for the immediate introduction of such alterations as it may appear to you advisable to adopt without waiting for the completion of their report, or for reference home; much time will thus be saved. I feel no doubt that your Lordship will gain much valuable information from these gentlemen, and you probably cannot do better than be guided by their advice, founded as it will be on an accurate knowledge of the state of the hospital, and of the causes of the evils which we seek to remedy.

The Director-general of the Army Medical Department is engaged under the directions of the Government in the organisation of a permanent hospital staff, to supersede the use of orderlies taken from the ranks for duty in the hospital, and returned to them after a short service.

It seems obvious that the hospital duty cannot be well performed by a succession of fresh and inexperienced hands, possessing no interest in the permanent well-being of the establishment. The military authorities in the Crimea having expressed this opinion to the Government, no time has been lost in attempting to remedy the deficiency; but the new system will require great care in its introduction, and must be made gradually to supersede the old one.

Your Lordship will be pleased regularly to report to Lord Raglan all your proceedings, sending duplicate copies of your reports so made to myself as Secretary of State for the War Department in England. Your Lordship will also be pleased to keep Lord Raglan informed on all subjects generally which come to your knowledge, and which may be of use

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to him as regards the transport of men and stores, and the sending or procuring of provisions, forage, baggage, animals, &c.

It is stated that goods to a large amount, directed either to the army or to individual officers, are accumulated in the Turkish Custom-house. If this be so, your Lordship will be pleased at once to confer with the Admiral on the station as to the best means of sorting and forwarding these goods.

Her Majesty's Government connot too strongly impress upon your Lordship the importance they attach to the affording of every accommodation and comfort to the sick and wounded of our army. This is a sacred duty, for the due performance of which no exertion and no cost must be spared. Whatever is necessary for the furtherance of this object must be procured, and if any assistance can be obtained upon the spot, the Government rely upon your Lordship at once to take measures to procure it.

If it can only be obtained at home, you will be pleased to give the earliest notice of your wants and requirements, with a view to their immediate satisfaction.

Lists will be regularly sent to your Lordship of all stores sent out for the use of the hospital.

Although I am not aware that your Lordship will, on any occasion in the course of your special service, be without the assistance of Commissary officers for the purpose of raising money, entering into contracts, or incurring expenditure of any kind, I have considered it advisable to state, for your Lordship's information and guidance, certain rules and regulations laid down by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury with respect to finance and expenditure connected with war services, not absolutely controlled or carried on under the direction of the Commissariat, but upon those occasions when expenditure is carried on under officers on special service without the aid of the Commissariat, or by Her Majesty's Ministers at foreign Courts:

1. The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury should be furnished with early information of any orders involving expenditure which the authorised officer may deem it necessary for the public service to give otherwise than through the established channels of the Commissariat abroad, or the public departments in this country; and that, besides the nature and extent of the order, an estimate of the expense should, if possible, be furnished.

2. That the bills of exchange drawn for the payment of such orders should be drawn directly upon their Lordships at 30 days' sight; that all such bills should bear consecutive numbers, which should be quoted in the letters of advice; and that their Lordships should be furnished with the earliest advice of their having been drawn.

3. That detailed accounts should be furnished of the expenditure, supported by the receipts of the parties to whom the payments have been made, and by certificates from competent persons that the rates of exchange do not exceed the proper market-value of the articles, and that the bills are drawn at the fair current rate of exchange of the day.

It is, I am sure, unnecessary for me to enjoin upon your Lordship to cultivate the most friendly relations on all occasions connected with the special service on which you are engaged with our allies, and to encourage the same feelings on the part of those who serve under you.

No one is more sensible than your Lordship of the benefits arising from the strictest discipline, and that the maintenance of it depends upon a prompt suppression of all disorders when they first arise.

I am well aware of the efficient aid which you will require in carrying out your orders through so large a range of duties; and I shall be prepared to assist your Lordship in the selection of a sufficient number of competent persons to form your staff.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Newcastle.*

(156,786-5.)

Sir, War Office, 10 February 1855.

I AM directed to enclose for your information, and for your guidance so far as they are applicable to the important duties you have to fulfil, the letter of instructions issued by the Secretary of State for the War Department, to Lord William Paulet, the commandant at the Bosphorus, and the military hospital at Scutari.

Though these instructions do not strictly apply to your command, they will sufficiently indicate generally the powers and duties with which you are charged, and I am to add that the Secretary at War fully relies upon your discretion and judgment in acting under them.

It may be necessary to send you further instructions, and more specially applicable to your command, and modifying or altering those enclosed; in that case they will be forwarded to you.

Colonel Storks, Smyrna. (signed) *B. Hawes.*

(156,475-167.) Appendix, No. 12.

War Office, 13 March 1855.

INSTRUCTIONS for the SUPERINTENDENT of the CIVIL HOSPITAL at *Smyrna*.

1. THE medical charge and care of the hospital is vested solely in the superintendent.

2. He is to make all rules and regulations necessary for the proper reception and care of the sick in the hospital, and arrange the dieting of the attendants.

3. He is to have the power to suspend officers; and in all cases upon the suspension of an officer, he is without delay to report the circumstances for the consideration and final decision of the Secretary of State for the War Department.

4. He is to have the power to dismiss any of the hospital attendants, being civilians, for misconduct or inefficiency in the discharge of their duties, anything to the contrary in the printed purveyor's instructions notwithstanding.

5. In case of absence on duty, or in case of illness, the superintendent may appoint a deputy, reporting the appointment home for the consideration of the Secretary of State for the War Department.

6. The superintendent is to make requisitions in writing upon the purveyor for all such supplies as in his opinion is necessary for the efficiency of the hospital and the welfare of the patients, which the purveyor, in accordance with his instructions annexed, is bound to provide.

7. With regard to any alteration of the buildings, the providing additional accommodation in or out of the hospital, the superintendent will give the necessary instructions to the purveyor in charge, who will make the arrangements for the execution of the work. The superintendent, however, will ascertain as nearly as possible the probable cost of the alteration, and undertake no works of magnitude without previous sanction, or without the concurrence of the commandant in the event of the required alterations being too urgent to admit of the delay of a reference home.

8. Estimates monthly of salaries and wages prepaid by the paymaster are to be sent to the superintendent, who, if approving them, is to sign and transmit them to the commandant, in order that he may grant his warrant for the amount on the Commissariat Chest.

9. He is to make weekly nominal returns of admissions and deaths in, and of discharges from the hospital.

10. He is to report monthly fully upon the general state of the hospital in all respects.

11. He is to place himself in communication with the commandant at Scutari through the commandant on the spot, with regard to the number of patients which the hospital is capable of receiving from time to time.

12. He will inform the medical officers and others employed in the hospital that all official representations are to pass through the superintendent, who is to transmit the same without delay to the Secretary of State.

13. As the whole medical charge and responsibility of the hospital in reference to the care and treatment of the sick soldiers in hospital is vested in the superintendent, so the general maintenance of order and discipline amongst the soldiers is vested solely in the commandant. But as many questions may possibly arise regarding the duties of the commandant and the superintendent, the Secretary of State feels confident that the known judgment and discretion of these officers, and a desire on their part to render the hospital as conducive as possible to the care and welfare of the sick and wounded, will prevent any differences arising calculated to impair the interests of the public service.

(signed) *Panmure.*

NOTE.

SPECIAL instructions are not issued to purveyors of hospitals, nor are Commissariat officers attached. Their relative duties are however defined by the annexed Instructions to the Purveyor in Chief in the East, and by the following extract from the Commissariat Regulations:

HOSPITALS.

166. The attention of the officers of the Commissariat is particularly called to the following Articles, numbered 59 and 80, of the Secretary at War's Regulations for the management of Army Hospitals; and with reference to the last paragraph of Article 59, their Lordships are of opinion that the facilities and experience possessed by the officers of the Commissariat will, as a general rule, enable them to contract for, or purchase, all articles that may be required, on terms more advantageous than those at which medical officers

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could obtain them upon the spot; and that there are not any articles obtainable by the medical officers at the several stations abroad, which cannot be as readily and advantageously obtained through the Commissariat:

"59. On foreign stations, fresh meat, bread, wine, and all other articles required for the use of hospitals and of the sick, which can be provided by the Commissariat, are to be obtained from that department, upon requisitions signed by the medical officer in charge of each hospital, who will settle with the commissariat officer for the same every month.

"No deviation from this rule is to be permitted, unless with the express sanction of the principal medical officer on the station, who is immediately to report the cause thereof to the Secretary at War for his approval.

"Those supplies which cannot be obtained through the Commissariat, the medical officer is to purchase, taking care to substantiate by satisfactory vouchers his charges for such supplies.

"80. The principal medical officer at each station will transmit to the War Office quarterly statements of the expenditure of the several hospitals subject to his superintendence, and quarterly returns of the sums paid to the Commissariat Department."

167. The fuel, light, and water required for the use of the sick in hospitals, are to be supplied by the Commissariat, but the value thereof is not to be repaid by the medical officers out of the hospital funds.

168. Articles required for the use of the Ordnance hospitals, are to be supplied under the same regulations as for the hospitals of the troops of the line, and are to be paid for in the same manner.

COPY of INSTRUCTIONS on the subject of SCUTARI and SMYRNA HOSPITALS, issued to Medical, Military, or Commissariat Officers holding Offices in them.

INSTRUCTIONS to the PURVEYOR-IN-CHIEF in the East.

THE Purveyor-in-chief is responsible for the conduct and management of his department.

He is to obey such orders as the inspector-general of hospitals, or the principal medical officer in charge for the time being, may think necessary for the welfare of the sick, and the interests of the public service.

Should such orders involve considerations of expenditure or finance generally, which the purveyor-in-chief shall think it to be his duty to bring under the notice of the Secretary-at-War, he will communicate his opinions and observations direct to the Secretary-at-War, furnishing at the same time a copy of his communication to the inspector-general of hospitals, or the principal medical officer in charge for the time being; pending, however, the reference home of such questions for the decision of the Secretary-at-War, he will act upon the requisitions of the inspector-general, or the principal medical officer for the time being.

He will superintend the purveyors and purveyors' clerks attached to the army, calling for any explanations from them with reference to their duties which he may think necessary for the good of the service, and bring any subject connected therewith to the notice of the inspector-general, with a view to further proceedings, should such be necessary.

He will communicate freely with the inspector-general in reference to the duties which immediately attach to his department, and will suggest for the inspector-general's consideration, from time to time, such alterations or improvements as he thinks likely to contribute to the better working of his department.

He will furnish confidential reports to the inspector-general, in reference to the purveyors and purveyors' clerks, state their respective merits, capabilities, &c., and recommend to the inspector-general for promotion, when vacancies occur, such clerks as he considers eligible for and most deserving of promotion, who is to forward the same for the confirmation of the Secretary-at-War.

PURVEYOR.

1. The purveyor has the charge, and is held responsible for the due care, management, and issue, of all stores (except those in charge of the apothecary), furniture, and provisions, from whatever source derived.

2. It is his duty to superintend the packing or unpacking of all stores received, belonging to his department, taking the orders of the inspector-general of hospitals, or principal medical officer on the spot, regarding Boards of Survey thereon.

3. The purveyor is to issue to the steward of the hospital, on demands duly approved by the senior medical officer, a due proportion of bedding, dresses, and utensils for each ward, holding him responsible for the care and preservation of the same. He will take from the steward receipts for all articles issued to him, and grant to him receipts for all articles received

received from him; and to ensure accuracy and regularity, all persons in charge of stores should be furnished with proper receipt books, the pages of which should be numbered, and the number written in words on the first sheet, and signed by the principal medical officer.

4. The purveyor is to furnish all articles of provisions required for the use of the hospital, whether supplied from England or drawn from the Commissariat Department; and he is held responsible that the diets and extras are issued in strict conformity with the diet rolls. To enable him to perform this part of his duty, he will be allowed a clerk, a steward, and a storeman, according to the extent of his charge; but this does not relieve him from the responsibility of this part of his functions.

5. The purveyor is to take charge of and issue, on duly approved requisitions, all the stationery, books, and printed forms required for the use of the department. He will make out a return, agreeably to the prescribed form, of those receipts and issues quarterly, and he will include these articles with his quarterly demands for stores.

6. The purveyor (in a book kept for the purpose) is to make accurate entries of the receipt and expenditure of all articles of consumption in his charge, and from which book he will prepare his weekly, monthly, and quarterly returns, and submit them to the inspector-general of hospitals or principal medical officer, who will convene Boards to examine them with the diet rolls. If found correct, they will receive the approving signature of the president and members of the Board, and then be transmitted to the inspector-general of hospitals.

7. The purveyor is to prepare a quarterly return of the stores under his charge (not including articles of daily consumption) according to the prescribed form, exhibiting the receipts and issues during the preceding three months. This return will also be submitted to a Board of Survey appointed by the inspector-general of hospitals or principal medical officer, which Board will compare the return with the invoices of stores received and vouchers of stores issued, and see that they correspond. They will ascertain that the quantities stated to be remaining are actually present in the store; that the store is properly arranged, well ventilated, and the articles in good preservation. Such stores as have, from fair wear or other causes, become unserviceable, will be surveyed by the Board, which will note such articles as are repairable, and such as are totally unserviceable.

This return, when so examined and signed by the Board of Survey, will be transmitted by the purveyor to the inspector-general of hospitals, along with his quarterly requisition for articles required for the next three months.

8. The purveyor is to keep a register, in which he will enter the regiment, name, rank, and regimental number, date of admission, discharge, or death of every man who is received into hospital.

9. He is to keep a book of the establishment of the hospital, containing the names of all the officers and servants of every description belonging thereto, with the dates of their appointment and removal, and the rates of their daily pay, or wages and allowances.

He will make out the pay return of the officers every two months, and the returns for extraordinary field allowance every three months; viz., 1st January, 1st April, 1st July, and 1st October.

He will also make out the ration return for the officers, their servants, and horses, at such periods as may be fixed by the Commissariat Department.

10. The purveyor is carefully to enter all official letters written or received by him, as well as duplicates of all his returns and accounts in books or guards kept for the purpose. These books, &c., in case of removal, will be handed over to his successor, as a record for reference on all future occasions.

11. The purveyor will keep a pack and arms store book, into which he will enter an account of all money and valuables belonging to sick officers or soldiers, and a correct inventory of the effects of men who die in hospital.

12. It is his duty to make all funeral arrangements, and to report to the commanding officers the death of all men belonging to their regiments. He will at the same time apply for instructions regarding the disposal of the men's effects, and ask for payment of their funeral expenses.

13. The purveyor, or his clerk, should examine daily the diet roll of each ward previously to issuing the ingredients of the diets marked thereon, pointing out any errors or unusually large demands that he may discover to the principal medical officer of the hospital.

14. The purveyor is specially charged with the supervision of the hospital servants, and he will report any neglect or inefficiency that comes under his notice to the principal medical officer.

He will enter or cause to be entered, in the hospital defaulter book, copies of all complaints or breaches of discipline made by medical officers against either servants or patients, the originals of which should be transmitted to the men's regiments when they are discharged from hospital.

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15. It is the purveyor's duty to look to the cleanliness and order of the exterior of the exterior of the hospital, the passages, privies, yard, &c.

He is also responsible for the cleanliness of the kitchen; and it is his duty to see that the steward discharges his duty properly in that department, by having the cooking utensils kept clean, the quality and quantity of the provisions duly examined, and the patients' meals punctually and properly prepared and served to them.

16. It is the purveyor's duty to look to all repairs and alterations required both in the interior and on the exterior of the hospital, and report the same to the principal medical officer, who will forward the statement to the Engineer Department.

17. It is his duty to prepare all wills for patients, when requested so to do; and he will take care that the medical attendant of the man is always one of the two attesting witnesses, as a guarantee to his friends that the man was in a fit state of mind at the time to make a will. Printed forms of wills may be had from the War Office, on application.

He will keep a correct register of all wills executed in the hospital, for future reference.

18. The purveyor will enter into contracts for washing the body linen of the patients, and the soiled hospital bedding and dresses; and where this cannot be effected, he will hire people on the most advantageous terms he can for Government to perform this duty.

19. It is to be understood that, whenever any articles of subsistence or extras for sick men, other than the ordinary health ration, are drawn for by regiments or detachments, such men are to be placed under the regulated hospital stoppage for the period they are so maintained, although they may not belong to a regularly established general or regimental hospital, and the supplies are to be furnished whenever practicable through the purveying department.

Accounts.

20. The purveyor or clerk in charge of one or more hospitals will obtain the necessary funds by imprests from the commissariat chest on the station, for which purpose he will prepare a monthly estimate in triplicate in sufficient time before the commencement of the month; one copy is to be laid before the general commanding on the station, who, if satisfied of the propriety of the estimate, will grant a warrant on the commissary for the amount, and this copy of the estimate is to be afterwards forwarded to the War Office by the Military Secretary; the duplicate copy of the estimate is to be transmitted by the purveyor to the commissariat officer, and the triplicate to be retained by himself.

21. The amount of each estimate is to be drawn for, from time to time during the month, as required, in order to avoid having too large an amount of cash in hand; and if the estimate is for a larger amount than is found to be necessary, the overplus is to remain in the commissariat chest.

22. The precise amount of each issue is to be credited in the purveyor's accounts with the War Office, and the particular estimate on which received is to be invariably specified.

23. The proportion of the amount of the estimate which may be required on account of supplies of bread, meat, and other articles of subsistence to be furnished, through the contractors, by the commissariat, under the rules prescribed in the 59th article of the Hospital Regulations (1845), is not to be actually drawn from the commissariat chest; but at the end of the month an exact settlement is to be effected with the commissariat officer for all such supplies by means of a draft for the proper amount, for which the commissariat officer will give a receipt in acknowledgment of payment for the supplies; while, on the other hand, the purveyor will give the usual receipt for the amount as an ordinary imprest issue, duly crediting the same in his accounts to be rendered to the War Office, in precisely the same manner as he credits the bills on which he receives cash.

24. The commissary's receipt must be annexed to the purveyor's account, in addition to the other vouchers in support of the charge for such hospital supplies.

25. The directions contained in Article 166 of the Commissariat Code of Regulations (1852), which enjoins that every article of diet required for the sick shall be obtained through the commissariat contractor on foreign service, should be followed whenever practicable.

26. If any surplus cash remain in the purveyor's hands, which may not be immediately required, he should pay a round sum on account thereof into the commissariat chest, and charge such repaymrnt in the general state of his accounts, vouched by the commissary officer's receipt.

27. All sums inserted in the general state are to be either charges or credits, no deduction being admissible on either side of the account.

28. Fractional parts of pence to be excluded from totals of estimates and drafts, also from the general state, so as to exclude the same from the balance at the end of each quarter.

29. The explanatory directions to paymasters and others, as to the due regulation of estimates and drafts, so as to leave small balances at the close of the quarter, and as to confining

confining the transactions within the period to the 31st of March to the account terminating on that day, should be conformed to as much as practicable, and the cause of any excess above 100*l.* in any quarterly account should be specially explained. Appendix, No. 12.

30. The quarterly accounts and other returns to be used by the purveyors with the army in the East are to be on the forms used by purveyors on the home service, so far as applicable; and a stock of these may be obtained on application to the War Office, in the usual manner, upon the prescribed form of requisition. The articles of the explanatory directions to paymasters relative to army hospitals, from 406 to 420, will apply very closely to the hospitals in Turkey, and are to be attended to accordingly. In like manner the separate regulations for hospitals, dated 1st February 1845, are to be followed, so far as applicable, and not contrary to the special instructions herein contained.

31. These instructions relative to the accounts are, however, liable to any modification hereafter which the Secretary-at-War may approve of, on due representations from the purveyor in chief after his arrival in Turkey.

32. The pay and allowances of the purveyor in chief, and the officers and clerks of his department, will not be included in the purveyor's accounts, but drawn for and charged separately through the Commissariat Department, in like manner with the pay and allowances of other staff officers.

War Office, 14 November 1854. (signed) *B. Hawes.*

War Department, 23 April 1855. FREDERICK PEEL.

Appendix, No. 13.

REPORTS of Officers superintending the TRANSPORT OF HORSES from *Varna* to *Balaklava*, on board the Ships "War Cloud," "Wilson Kennedy," "Rip Van Winkle," and "Star of the South;" also, Report of the Proceedings of the COURT OF INQUIRY which sat to Inquire into the Loss of HORSES on board the "War Cloud," in the voyage from *Varna* to *Balaklava*, with all Documents sent therewith. Appendix, No. 13.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Rear-Admiral Boxer (No. 80), dated 5 October 1854, "Canterbury," Constantinople.

THE "Wilson Kennedy," cavalry transport, put into Buyukdéré Bay in distress on the 1st instant, on her way from Varna to the Crimea, having lost 90 horses in a heavy gale of wind. I shall make a strict inquiry into the circumstances of this serious loss.

LOSS of HORSES on board the TRANSPORTS.

(No. 17.)

Sir, "Harpy," at Constantinople, 31 December 1854.

IN reply to your letter of the 25th ultimo, relative to the loss of horses on board the transports named in the margin, I transmit, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a letter from Captain Christie, principal agent for transports, dated 22d instant, reporting the circumstances attending the losses on board the "War Cloud" and "Rip Van Winkle."

"Wilson Kennedy."
"War Cloud."
"Rip Van Winkle."

I beg to refer to my letter, No. 97, of the 4th November, for the loss on board the "Wilson Kennedy."

I have, &c.

The Comptroller of Victualling, &c. &c. &c., Somerset House. (signed) *E. Boxer.*

Appendix, No. 13.

Enclosure to No. 17.

Sir, "Orient," Balaklava, 22 December 1854.

In reply to your letter of the 18th ultimo, relative to the great loss of horses on board the transports "War Cloud" and "Rip Van Winkle," during the heavy gale in September last, whilst on passage from Varna to the Crimea.

I have the honour to enclose, for your information, the reports of the masters of those ships upon the subjects.

I beg to state, that in obedience to directions from Lord Raglan, the following sailing transports, in tow of the steamers, were despatched from Kalamita Bay to Varna on the 19th September, under the orders of Commander Kynaston, of Her Majesty's ship "Spiteful," to embark such cavalry for the Crimea as might be put on board by Brigadier-general Scarlett; viz.,

No. 21.	"Pride of the Ocean" - -	Steamer "Simla."
„ 47.	"Wilson Kennedy" - - -	„ "Jason."
„ 56.	"War Cloud" - - - -	„ "Trent."
„ 57.	"Tyrone" - - - -	„ "Victoria."
„ 82.	"Rip Van Winkle" - - -	„ "City of London."
„ 83.	"Arabia" - - - -	„ "Tonning."

It appears that having duly embarked the cavalry, the masters received their orders from the Commander of the "Spiteful," on the 26th September, to put to sea; the "War Cloud" in tow of the "Emperor," and "Rip Van Winkle" in tow of the "Trent," and were unfortunately caught in the gale of wind on that night and the following day. The great success with which the expedition had previously made the voyage, it would seem led to want of precaution in putting so many horses on board the sailing ships, particularly in placing the chargers of the dragoons indiscriminately into the lighter constructed stalls intended for bât horses. This arose no doubt from the anxiety to send all the cavalry possible, which were then much wanted in the Crimea.

I cannot trace any neglect to the masters of these vessels, and can only attribute our loss of horses to the unusually severe gale which so soon followed upon the departure of these vessels from Varna, and which it would be presumptuous to suppose could have been anticipated.

I have, &c.

Rear-Admiral Boxer, C.B., &c. &c. &c. (signed) *P. Christie.*
Bosphorus.

To Captain *Christie*, Principal Agent of Transports.

Extract of the Log of Transport "War Cloud."

Sunday, September 24.—The ship at Varna took on board 33 horses, and 20 baggage horses; at 11 a.m. reported to Captain Manley that the stables had not been cleaned out, upon which he replied he did not intend to have them cleaned at all for the short time he had to remain on board; two horses then dead of inflammation; reported the case to the colonel of the regiment on board the steam ship "Trent," upon which he sent a note to Captain Manley.

Tuesday, September 26.—In the afternoon went to sea in tow of steam ship "Emperor," and in the evening the gale began to increase and the ship to labour; in the night the horses began to fall, and no proper attention was paid to them by officers or men; no attempt made to raise or sling them up.

Wednesday, September 27.—No food or water was given to the horses all day, nor were any dead ones thrown overboard.

Thursday, September 28.—The doctor came aft, and demanded that the crew should be called from aloft, when in the act of reefing topsails, to hoist up the horses and throw them overboard, which could not be complied with until the ship was under proper sail, upon which he spoke to the master in a most insulting manner; at 9 a.m. the crew threw overboard 76 horses, and cleaned out the stables, which was the first time of its being done since leaving Varna.

I am, &c.

21 October 1854. (signed) *Thomas Fox*, Master.

Sir, Balaklava, 10 October 1854. Appendix, No. 13.

I BEG leave to inform you that the vessel under my command was ashore at Varna on the 23d ultimo, under the following circumstances, viz.:

Extract from Log.

"Light breezes and clear at 6 a.m. Captain Kynaston, of Her Majesty's ship 'Spiteful,' the officer in command of transports at Varna, came alongside and ordered me to move further in shore. I protested against doing so, when he gave me peremptory orders to move immediately, telling me to run a line out to the 'Wilson Kennedy,' No. 47, and subsequently to 'Victoria,' No. 72. I accordingly weighed anchor, running the lines out as directed. The ship swinging to the line fast to 'Victoria,' grounded on a shoal in 2 ½ fathoms water; the ship striking heavily, I went on board the 'Spiteful,' and reported the fact, demanding to tug us off, at which Captain Kynaston demurred and at length granted, ordering the 'Trent' to get up his steam. Before the 'Trent' came to our assistance, we succeeded in heaving her off, and at 11 a.m. anchored in 5 fathoms water, with 30 fathoms to the hawse; sounded the well, and found no increase of water."

I am happy to add that the ship has sustained no damage by this accident.

I have also to report to you the loss of 50 horses of all kinds on my passage from Varna to Eupatoria, the principal part during this disastrous gale of the 26th and 27th ultimo. I cannot better explain it than by the following extract from the log of the 26th September:

"4 p.m. Barometer falling; sky threatening; squally, with rain; wind north. The 'Trent' took us in tow; weighed anchor, and at 5 p.m. passed Cape Galata, steering E. by N. ½ N. At 8, strong increasing breeze and heavy rain; midnight, heavy gale and rain, the sea running high, and cross; ship labouring heavily. September 27th: This day commenced with heavy increasing gale, with a high, hollow, heavy sea running. The ship labouring heavily; could not always see the steam-boat, as she had no lights.

"Tow-lines carefully clothed and attended to. At 2 a.m., the port tow-line belonging to the 'Trent' carried away in the nip of the hawse-pipe of the 'Trent.' 3: Got additional lashings on spars and long-boat, &c. 4: Violent gales and heavy rain; the sea running high and hollow; ship labouring violently in the trough of the sea, shipping considerable quantities of water; pumps carefully attended.

"At this time, 4 a.m., the gale being at its height, the gallows supporting the horse fittings, spars, long-boats, &c. gave way, crushing the officers' horses and doing other damage, tearing the decks up, and precipitating some of the horses which escaped the crush down the hatchways. 5: Parted the starboard hawser; the 'Trent' steamed on and left us, Her Majesty's ship 'Spiteful' passing us to windward under full steam. Hove the ship to, under storm main-trysail, and secured the long-boat, spars, &c., to leeward; a furious sea running, ship labouring violently; got preventer stays and braces up. Noon: cloudy with heavy rain, sun obscure; set close-reefed main topsail. Many horses down in the hold not expected to live."

This gale continued for upwards of 36 hours, during which time, though every exertion was made to save the horses, so violent was the storm, and so great the struggles of the unfortunate and, in many instances, infuriated animals below, that it was positively unsafe even for those men who were not suffering from sea sickness, to go near. I may here mention that each horse had a bale between it and its neighbour. As soon as all was secure on deck, and the ship under canvas, I sent the crew down to the assistance of the soldiers; but very little could be done until the gale abated somewhat of its violence.

I attribute this calamity, in the first place, to the fact of being sent to sea in the face of plain indications of a heavy gale; and, secondly, I consider that the horse fittings on deck and in the between-decks were not suited for the conveyance of chargers or troop horses in bad weather below. I think all might have gone well but for this; but when some of the stalls in the 'twixt-decks gave way, the horses plunged down the hatches, and in their struggles in the hold kicked others down, who did the same for their neighbours; this making the whole one mass of confusion. This was further increased by our having 120 gabions below. Colonel Yorke wrote me a note thanking me for my attention on this trying occasion, and exculpating me from any share in the causes of this disaster. I believe I can afford no further information on the subject, and beg to remain,

(signed) *T. S. Allen*,
Commanding "Rip Van Winkle."

Captain Christie, R. N.

"Rip Van Winkle," 4 October 1854.

THE Officers of the Royal Dragoons, who have sustained severe loss of property on board Her Majesty's hired transport "Rip Van Winkle," in consequence of the total destruction of their chargers during the disastrous gale in the Black Sea on the night of the 26th September 1854, beg to express their united thanks to Captain Allen for his kind attention and assistance on that trying occasion. They further express a hope, that no blame may hereafter be attached to him relative to the said calamity, which, in their opinion, no measures at the time could possibly have averted. They consider the deck fittings of the ship were inadequate in strength to withstand the violence of such an unusual storm; and from this cause they attribute the loss of their horses.

(signed) *John Yorke*,
Lieut.-Col. 1st Dragoons.

Appendix, No. 13.

(No. 97.)

"Canterbury,"
Constantinople, 4 November 1854.

Sir,

Referring to the 3d paragraph of my letter No. 80, of the 5th ultimo, relative to the loss of 90 horses on board the transport ship "Wilson Kennedy," I beg to transmit, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a report of inquiry into the circumstances, dated the 24th October.

It appears to me, that this loss was occasioned by the insufficient fittings on the upper deck of the transport.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Edward Boxer*,
Rear-Admiral, Superintendent.

The Secretary of the Admiralty,
London.

Enclosure to No. 97 of 1854.

H. M. S. "Vulcan,"
Constantinople, 24 October 1854.

Sir,

We have the honour to inform you, that in obedience to your order of this date, we have been on board the "Wilson Kennedy," No. 47, transport, to inquire into the loss of 90 horses belonging to the 1st Royal Dragoons, which occurred in that ship between the evening of the 26th and morning of the 27th September.

We find as follows:—That with reference to the fittings, those on the main deck were as perfect as could be; those on the upper deck were secured to the gallows-bits, which were only fastened to the upper deck beams, and not sufficient to bear the weight of 20 horses, besides numerous spars which were placed on them.

With reference to the loss, it appears with reference to the log and statements, that the vessel left Varna in tow of the "Jason" steamer, at 6 p. m. on the 26th September. Two hours previously, the captain anticipating a rough night, caused his topsails to be double reefed.

During the first watch, the breeze continued to freshen with a rising sea, so much so, that at 2 a. m. the towing hawsers parted, the main trysail was immediately set, and every preparation made for setting the topsails, when about 3 a. m. the whole of the 20 horse stalls on the upper deck broke adrift, caused by the weather gallows-bits snapping close to the deck, and the lee one tearing up three planks.

The 20 horses and spars being adrift, and the night extremely dark, prevented entirely sail being made until about three hours after, when the topsails being set, the ship became comparatively easy, but during this interval the main loss appears to have occurred.

It appears that during the first watch several horses fell down, in a great measure we consider owing to not being swung, these immediately upset those next to them, and when the hawsers parted, the whole of the horses on the weather side fell down, and rolled under the manger board into those on the lee side, after which it was impossible for any men to assist the horses owing to the ship's violent rolling, which was caused by not being able to make sail, the upper deck being in a great state of confusion.

We are of opinion that no blame is to be attached to the captain; he appears to have taken every precaution in his power, and in conclusion we beg to say that we consider it to have been an unavoidable occurrence, the ship being at sea in such weather under similar circumstances.

We have, &c,

(signed) *E. P. Von Donop*, Commander,
C. Grigg, Master,
Thomas Flamark, Master of "Bombay" Transport.
} H. M. Ship "Vulcan."

Rear Admiral Edward Boxer, C. B.,
Constantinople.

Note.—The Secretary to the Admiralty states that nothing has been found respecting the transport "Star of the South." By periodical returns from Captain Christie, it would appear that the following number of horses are reported as lost.

Wilson Kennedy	82	in a gale.
Rip Van Winkle	50	„
War Cloud	72	„

War Department,
27 April 1855.

FREDERICK PEEL.

Appendix, No. 14.

Appendix, No. 14.

RETURN of Hospital Stores Purchased by the Army and Ordnance Medical Department for the use of the Sick of the Army in the East, from the commencement of the War to the 27th March 1855.

DATE OF ORDER.	ARTICLE.	NUMBER.	TOTAL NUMBER.
22 March 1854	Air beds	60	140
7 December „	Ditto	80	
22 March „	Air and water cushions and pillows	190	590
7 December „	Ditto	300	
20 January 1855	Ditto	100	
7 December 1854	Pairs bellows		24
22 March - „	India rubber baths		5
Ditto - - „	Canteens (two quarts)		100
29 June - - „	Barton's collapsing baths		2
7 November „	Commodes—Arm-chair stool	20	71
7 December „	Ditto - - ditto	27	
30 January 1855	Ditto - - ditto	24	
7 November 1854	Lamps (Nursery)		100
Ditto - - „	Etnas for boiling water		50
Ditto - - „	Albert night lights		5 gross.
Ditto - - „	Hand towels	1,000	19,164
7 December „	Ditto	5,000	
20 January 1855	Ditto	1,000	
30 „ - „	Ditto	2,000	
27 March - „	Ditto	10,164	
7 December 1854	Washing machines		4
Ditto - - „	Ditto dollies		6
Ditto - - „	Drying machines		2
Ditto - - „	Mangles		2
Ditto - - „	Lifters		2
Ditto - - „	Iron bedsteads	50	55
27 March 1855	Ditto	5	
7 December 1854	Iron basins		2,000
20 January 1855	Tins of blacking		10,000
Ditto - - „	Hair combs		10,000
Ditto - - „	Ditto brushes		10,000
Ditto - - „	Tooth combs		1,000
Ditto - - „	Shoe-brushes (sets)		1,000
Ditto - - „	Razors		5,000
Ditto - - „	Scissors		200
Ditto - - „	Mitts and comforters (5,000 of each)		10,000
Ditto - - „	Door-mats		100
Ditto - - „	Towelling, yards		2,055
Ditto - - „	Spring beds		20
7 December 1854	Emigrant kitchens		6
30 January 1855	Trucks with trays		6
Ditto - - „	Hoists with four trays		2
Ditto - - „	Patent colorifier		1
8 February „	Knives for opening tins		72
10 March - „	Sack trucks		2
27 March - „	Canvass bags		800
Ditto - - „	Packing needles		100
Ditto - - „	Saddle bags		100
Ditto - - „	Twine (lbs.)		9
Ditto - - „	Cork mattrasses		20
Ditto - - „	Corkscrews		108
Ditto - - „	Neckerchiefs		15,000
Ditto - - „	Aprons for orderlies		2,000

Compared and found correct,

H. Pilbeam,
Staff Surgeon, 1st Class,
President of Store Board.

3 May 1855.

Appendix, No. 15.

PAPERS delivered in by Dr. *Andrew Smith*, in reference to his Examination.

(Required by Question 8126, page 402.)

REQUISITIONS for Hospital Stores on Ordnance Department.

No. 1.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East.—17 February 1854.

Axes, felling	11
Adzes, coopers'	11
Borer, tap, small size	11
Bedding:	
Blankets, single	2,200
Rugs	1,100
Palliasses	1,100
Bolster cases	1,100
Sheets, white	3,300
Beds or mattrasses, hair, 2 ft. 3 in. wide	440
Bolsters, 2 ft. 3 in. long	440
Boards and trestles	550
Cases for beds, waterproof	220
Bearers for wounded men (folding)	330
Baths, tin, slipper	11
Basons, pewter	88
Brushes:	
Long, scrubbing	44
Hand „	44
Long, sweeping	44
Hand „	22
Whitewashing	44
Boxes, lucifer matches	132
Candlesticks, with snuffers, iron	88
Chisel sockets, 1 ½ inch	22
Cocks, with keys, brass, ½ inch	22
Coppers:	
20 gallons	11
12 „	22
Trivets for ditto	33
Choppers, for meat	22
Carts, hand	4
Cups, drinking, tin:	
Quarts	198
Pints	1,320
Dishes, tin, 13 ½ inch	220
Dresses:	
Woollen:	
Gowns, serge	660
Trowsers, ditto	660
Waistcoats, ditto	660
Caps, worsted	660
Flannel shirts	330
Half stockings, worsted, pairs	330
Slippers, leather, pairs	550
Dresses—*continued.*	
Linen:	
Shirts	660
Gowns	660
Trowsers	660
Waistcoats	660
Caps	660
Funnels, tin:	
Six inch	22
Eight inch	22
Frame, iron, close-stool	66
Forks, flesh	22
Gimlets, assorted	44
Hatchets	22
Hammers, claw, in sizes	22
Hessens, pieces of 33 yards	11
Huckaback, pieces of 18 yards	11
Kettles:	
Nests of eight, tin	33
Tea, seven quarts, iron	33
Tea, four quarts, iron	33
Knives and forks:	
Common	528
Carving	22
Lamps:	
Passage or ward	176
Burners, double wick, for ditto	176
Cotton wick for ditto, lbs.	66
Hand, agitable	11
Lanterns, tin, punched	22
Ladles, soup	22
Mops	132
Mallets, wood	11
Needles:	
Packing, assorted	44
Sewing - ditto	550
Nails, assorted	11,000
Pails or water-buckets	44
Padlocks, with hasps and staples	44
Pans:	
Bed, pewter	110
Stool pans	66
Frying	11
Plates, tin	1,6[illegible]0
Measures:	
Tin, imperial, 1 gallon to ½ gill, for oil	4
Copper, ditto to ditto, for wine	4

Pots:	
Chamber	660
Coffee, tin	11
Tea, 5 pints	44
„ 3 pints	44
Spitting	110
Rollers and brackets, towel	33
Saucepans, tin, nests of 8, 6, 3, 2, 1 quart, and 3 pints	11
Spoons, iron	1,650
Scales and beams:	
Copper pans, to weigh 28 lbs.	11
Weights for ditto, sets	11
Tin, hand, for diets	11
Weights for ditto, sets	11
To weigh 112 lbs.	4
Weights for ditto, 56 lbs.	4
Shovels	11
Spades	11
Saws, hand	22
Screw-drivers	22
Screws, assorted	1,100
Tarpaulings, small	44
Towels:	
Round	132
Hand	132
Thread:	
Sewing, white, lbs.	22
„ white-brown, lbs.	22
Twine and cord, in 3 sizes	132
Tubs, washing	33
Urinals, pewter	33
Hospital canteens, A. and B.	22
Water-decks, painted	110
Panniers, pairs	15
Pack saddles	15
Pack for bât horses	15
Cherry's carts	12
Hospital spring waggons (small size)	Cancelled on 9th March. Vehicles below substituted — 6
9th March 1854:	
Spring waggons; viz. 20 of the pattern exhibited on Tuesday the 7th instant at the Wellington Barracks, and 20 of the patterns which have been delivered to Mr. Holmes, of Derby	40
Flanders waggons	4
Portuguese tents	40

No. 2.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the Use of the Sick of the Army of the East.—23 March 1854.

Brushes:	
Heads, long, scrubbing	60
„ „ sweeping	60
Hand, scrubbing	60
„ sweeping	30
Whitewash, 9 dozen	60
Thread:	
Packing, large, lbs.	75
„ middling, lbs.	52 ½
„ small, lbs.	30
Twine, sail, 2 thread	22 ½
Candlesticks, iron	120
Snuffers	120
Lanterns, tin, punched	30
Lamps, hand, agitable	15
Rollers, wood, for towels	45
Brackets	90
Thread:	
White, lbs.	30
Whited-brown, lbs.	30
Bath, slipper	15
Kettles, tea, tin, 4 quart	45
Pots:	
Pewter, 5 pint	60
„ 3 pint	60
Coffee	15
Funnels:	
Tin, quart	30
„ pint	30
Lamps:	
Passage or ward	240
Burners for ditto, double wick	240
Cotton wick for ditto, lbs.	90
Plates, tin	2,250
Dishes, tin, 13 ½ inches	300
Knives and Forks:	
Common	720
Carving	30
Spoons, iron, large	2,250
Huckaback, yards	270
Boxes of matches	180
Nests of saucepans, 8, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1 quart, and 3 pints	15
Frying pans	15
Ladles, iron	30
Flesh forks	30
Drinking Cups:	
Tin, quart	270
„ pint	1,800
Chamber-pots, zinc	900
Bed-pans, zinc	150
Urinals	45
Tea kettles, iron, 7 quart	45
Frames, close-stool, iron	90
Pans, zinc	90
Basons, wash-hand, zinc, 9 inch	120
Pots, spitting	150
Sets of scales and beams, with copper pans, to weigh 28 lbs.	15
Weights for ditto; viz. 14, 7, 4, 2, 1, ½, ¼ lb., and 2, 1, and ½ oz.	150
Sets of diet scales	15
Weights for ditto, 2, 1, ½, ¼ lb., and 2 oz.	75
Mop heads, with nails	180
Nests of 8 tin kettles each	45
Felling axe	15
Cooper's adze	15
Tap borer (small size)	15
Chisel socket, 1 and 1½ inch	30
Cocks, brass, with keys	30
Choppers for meat	30
Gimlets	60
Hatchets	30
Hammers, claw	30
Mallet, carpenters'	15
Needles:	
Packing, assorted	60
Sewing	750
Nails, iron	15,000
Screws, assorted	1,500
Padlocks, middling	60
Staples and hasps, iron	60
Handsaws	30
Screw-driver	15
Brace, with screw-driver bit	15
Slippers, leathers, pairs	750
Hessens, pieces of 33 yards	15
Blankets	3,060
Rugs	1,530
Palliasses	1,530
Bolster cases	1,530
Sheets, hospital	4,590

Hair beds, single	600
Hair bolsters	600
Bed-covers, waterproof	300
Trestles, wood	1,500
Boards for ditto	2 250
Gowns, blue serge	900
Trowsers	900
Waistcoats	900
Caps, worsted	900
Gowns, cotton	900
Trowsers	900
Waistcoats	900
Nightcaps	900
Pairs socks, worsted	450
Shirts:	
Flannel	450
Linen	900
Towels:	
Round	180
Hand	180
Bearers for wounded men	450
Tarpaulings for carts, 12 × 9	60
Water-decks	150
Shovels, common	15
Spades	15
Handles:	
For long scrubbing brushes	60
For long sweeping „	60
For mops	180
Coppers:	
20-gallon	15
12-gallon	30
Trivets for ditto, iron	45
Pails, water	60
Washing-tubs, hospital	45
Oil tin measures, sets	5
Wine ditto (ditto copper and pewter)	5
Scales:	
Set of beams and chains to weigh 112 lbs.	5
Five weights for ditto, 14 lbs., 7 lbs., 4 lbs., 2 lbs., and 1 lb.	5
Pairs of scale boards for ditto, sets	5
Two weights for 112 lb. scales; viz. 56 lbs. and 28 lbs., sets	5
Canteen of hospital utensils, A. and B., including 12 sets of bedding	18
Panniers	25
Pack-saddles	65
Bridles for bât horses	65
Frames, iron, close-stool	90
Pans, close-stool	90
Pots, spitting	450

No. 3.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East.—(Reserve Store). 23 March 1854.

Brushes;	
Heads, long, scrubbing	100
„ „ sweeping	100
Hand, scrubbing	100
„ sweeping	50
Whitewash, 9 doz.	100
Thread:	
Packing, large, lbs.	125
„ middling, lbs.	87 ½
„ small, lbs.	50
Twine, sail, two-thread,	37 ½
Candlesticks, iron	200
Snuffers „	200
Lanterns, tin, punched	50
Lamps, hand, agitable	25
Rollers, wood, for towels	75
Brackets „ „	150
Thread:	
White, lbs.	50
Whited-brown, lbs.	50
Baths, slipper	25
Kettles, tea, tin, four quart	75
Pots:	
Pewter, five-pint	100
„ three-pint	100
Coffee	25
Funnels:	
Tin, quart	50
„ pint	50
Lamps, passage or ward	400
Burners for ditto, double-wick	400
Cotton-wick for ditto	150
Plates, tin	3,750
Dishes, tin, 13 ½ inch	500
Knives and Forks:	
Common	1,200
Carving	50
Spoons, iron, large	3,750
Huckaback, yards	450
Boxes of matches	300
Saucepans, nests	25
Fryingpans	25
Ladles, iron	50
Flesh-forks	50
Drinking Cups:	
Tin, quart	450
„ pint	3,000
Chamber-pots, zinc	1,500
Urinals	75
Tea-kettles, iron, seven-quart	75
Frames, close-stool, iron	150
Pans „ zinc	150
Basins, washhand, zinc	200
Pots, spitting, zinc	250
Sets of scales and beams, to weigh 28 lbs.	25
Weights for ditto	250
Sets of diet scales	25
Weights for ditto	125
Mop-heads, with nails	300
Nests of eight tin kettles each	75
Bed-pans, zinc	250
Felling axes	25
Coopers' adze	25
Tap-borer, small size	25
Chisel socket, 1 and 1 ½ inch	50
Cocks, brass, with keys	50
Choppers for meat	50
Gimlets	100
Hatchets	50
Hammers, claw, large and small	50
Mallets, carpenters'	25
Needles:	
Packing, assorted	100
Sewing	1,250
Nails, iron	25,000
Screws, assorted	2,500
Padlocks, middling	100
Staples and hasps, iron	100
Hand-saws	50
Screw-drivers	25
Braces, with screw-driver bits	25
Slippers, leather	1,250
Hessens, pieces of 33 yards	25
Blankets, single	5,100
Rugs	2,550
Palliasses	2,550
Bolster cases	2,550

Sheets, hospital	7,650
Hair beds, single	1,000
Hair bolsters	1,000
Bed-covers, waterproof	500
Trestles, wood	2,500
Boards for ditto	3,750
Gowns, blue serge	1,500
Trousers, blue serge	1,500
Waistcoats	1,500
Caps, worsted	1,500
Gowns, cotton	1,500
Trowsers, cotton	1,500
Waistcoats, cotton	1,500
Night caps	1,500
Pairs socks, worsted	750
Shirts:	
Flannel	750
Linen	1,500
Towels:	
Round	300
Hand	300
Tarpaulings for carts	100
Water-decks baggage, for mules	250
Shovels, common	25
Spades „	25
Handles:	
For long scrubbing brushes	100
„ sweeping	100
„ mops	300
Coppers:	
20 gallons	25
12 „	50
Trivets for ditto, iron	75
Pails, water	100
Washing-tubs, hospital	75
Measures:	
For oil, tin (7 sizes), sets	8
For wine (2 copper, and 5 pewter), sets	8
Set of beams and chains for scales 112 lbs.	8
Weights for ditto (8) sets	8
Scale boards	8
56 lbs. and 28 lbs. weights, sets	8
Frames, close-stool, iron	150
Pans, close-stool	150
Pots, spitting	750

No. 4.—REQUISITION for Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East (in Letter to Military Secretary, dated 23 March 1854).

Small ventilators for bell tents	500
Large „ for hospital marquees	300

No. 5.—REQUISITION of Tarpaulings for Hospital Marquees for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East.—9 May 1854.

Tarpaulings for hospital marquees	30

No. 6.—REQUISITION of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 11 May 1854.

Pick-axes	50

No. 7.—REQUISITION of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 7 June 1854.

Agitable hand lamps	50

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No. 8.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East.

Canada stoves	200

Ordered verbally by Dr. Smith to Mr. Minnie, Board of Ordnance.

No. 9.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of Detachments proceeding from Portsmouth and Cork to the East.—8 June 1854.

Hospital marquees	7
Sets of bedding	84

No. 10.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 12 July 1854.

Bedsteads, Dr. Smith's pattern	500
,, Dr. Clark's ,,	500

No. 11.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 22 July 1854.

Blankets, single	3,468	Waistcoats (serge)	1,020
Rugs	1,734	Caps, worsted	1,020
Palliasses	1,734	Flannel shirts	510
Bolster cases	1,734	Stockings, worsted, pairs	510
Sheets (white)	5,202	Slippers, pairs	850
Gowns (serge)	1,020	Beds or mattrasses, hair	680
Trowsers (serge)	1,020	Bolsters	680

No. 12.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 24 July 1854.

Folding camp tables	6
Ditto chairs	12

No. 13.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 21 October 1854.

Blankets	6,000	Caps	1,500
Sheets	9,000	Flannel shirts	1,000
Rugs	3,000	Worsted stockings, pairs	1,500
Boards and trestles	1,500	Slippers, pairs	2,000
Woollen gowns (serge)	1,500	Cotton shirts	2,000
Trowsers, pairs	1,500	Iron bedsteads	667
Waistcoats	1,500		

No. 14.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 4 November 1854.

Iron bedsteads, of the same size and pattern as those now in use in the General Hospital, Fort Pitt, Chatham - - -	2,000

No. 15.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 15 November 1854.

Easy chairs - - - - - - - - - - -	50

No. 16.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 18 November 1854.

Iron bedsteads, similar to those used in barracks - - -	2,283
Blankets - - - - - - - - - - -	150
Sheets - - - - - - - - - - -	150
Rugs - - - - - - - - - - -	100
Dresses:	
Gowns (serge) - - - - - - - -	4,420
Trowsers - - - - - - - - -	4,420
Waistcoats - - - - - - - - -	4,420
Caps (worsted) - - - - - - - -	4,420
Flannel shirts - - - - - - - -	3,000
Socks (worsted), pairs - - - - - - -	3,000

No. 17.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 28 November 1854.

Cotton shirts (washed) - - - - - - - -	60,000
Cotton sheets ditto - - - - - - - -	60,000
Worsted socks, pairs - - - - - - - -	60,000

No. 18.—Requisition of Ambulance Carriages for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East.—29 November 1854.

Ambulance carriages (Holmes) - - - - - - -	2

No. 19.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 9 December 1854.

Cholera belts - - - - - - - - -	40,000

No. 20.—Requisition

No. 20.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 9 December 1854.

Close-stools and pans (zinc)	650	Drinking cups (1 pint each)	1,000
Bed-pans - - - - do.	700	Buckets (2 gallons each)	100
Chamber pots - - do.	5,000	Wash-hand basins	200
Urinals - - - - do.	1,200	Spoons	200
Hair brooms, long sweeping	200	Soup ladles, with long handles	40
Tin cans (2 gallons each)	100	Frying pans	12
Spitting boxes	300	Sheets, in pairs	1,500
Mop heads	500	Rugs	1,000
Mop handles	100	Blankets	2,000
Hand scrubbing brushes	100	Slippers, in pairs	1,000
Tin plates	1,000		

No. 21.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 28 December 1854.

Iron bedsteads	200
Bearers (new pattern)	500
Hair mattrasses	2,000
Single ditto	1,800

No. 22.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 29 December 1854.

Single iron bedsteads	2,000

No. 23.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 1 January 1855.

Common knives and forks	7,552
Carving - ditto	200
Iron spoons	2,150
Flesh forks	100

No. 24.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 8 January 1855.

Thick flannel drawers	8,000

No. 25.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 13 January 1855.

Buckets	500	Steelyards, large	10
Candlesticks	500	Ditto - ditto	10
Cans, tin (for soup)	200	Brushes, long scrubbing	500
Dishes, 13½ inches	500	Ditto hand ditto	500
Frying-pans	200	Ditto long sweeping	500
Drinking cups	1,000	Ditto hand ditto	500
Spitting cups	2,000	Ditto black lead, sets	300
Plates	2,000	Chamber-pots (zinc)	2,000
Saucepans, 3 quarts	200	Mop heads	1,000
Ditto - 2 „	200	Mop handles	200
Ditto - 1 „	200	Slippers, pairs	2,000
Shovels	50	Hospital canteens, A. and B., without blankets	20
Spades	50		

No. 26.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 16 January 1855.

Litters	200
Chairs	200
Pack-saddles	210

No. 27.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 22 January 1855.

Bedsteads	2,000

For Balaklava.

Nos. 28 and 29.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for Scutari.—24 January 1855.

Palliasses	5,000	Blue serge clothing (complete)	5,000
Bolsters	5,000	Cotton shirts	5,000
Hair beds	500	Flannel shirts	500
Hair bolsters	500	Slippers, pairs	3,000
Blankets	10,000	Socks, pairs	5,000
Sheets	15,000	Rugs	5,000

No. 30.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for Scutari.—7 February 1855.

Hospital bedsteads	4,000	Sheets, pairs	8,000
Hair mattrasses	2,000	Rugs	4,000
Palliasses	2,000	Flannel drawers	6,000
Bolster covers	2,000	Ditto shirts	6,000
Pillows	4,000	Cotton gowns, trousers, and waistcoats	4,000
Blankets	8,000	Serge suits	4,000
Slippers, pairs	2,000		

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No. 31.—Requisition of Ambulance Waggons and Carts for the use of the Army serving in the Crimea.—20 February 1855.

Ambulance waggons of same pattern as now at Woolwich	20
Carts - - - - - ditto - - - - - - - ditto	60

No. 32.—Requisition of Hospital Marquees for the Use of the Sick of the Army of the East. 6 March 1855.

Hospital marquees	100

No. 33.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East.—14 March and 2 April 1855.

Coloured lamps	100
Candles for ditto, lbs.	800

No. 34.—Requisition of Hospital Stores for the use of the Sick of the Army of the East.—27 March 1855.

Axes, felling	50	Pick-axes	50
Brushes, long scrubbing	300	Plates, tin	3,000
„ hand ditto	200	Pots, spitting, pewter and zinc	500
„ whitewashing	300	Rollers and brackets	200
Carts, hand	10	Spoons, iron	3,000
Cups, drinking tin quarts	7,000	Shovels	100
Ditto - ditto - pints	2,000	Spades	50
Dishes, tin, 13-inch	500	Saws, hand	100
Dresses, cotton gowns	3,000	Screw-drivers	50
trousers	3,000	Screws, assorted	5,000
waistcoats	3,000	Tents, Portuguese	140
caps	7,000	Tarpaulings	100
Frames, iron, close-stool	400	Towels, round	500
Handles for brushes and mops	2,000	Tubs, washing	300
Hatchets	50	Water-decks, painted	300
Hessens, pieces of 33 yards	60	Bearers, or stretchers, new pattern	500
Huckaback, ditto of 18 yards	50	Tin cans, for tea	1,200
Kettles, nests of 8, tin	50	Wheelbarrows, garden	6
Ladles, soup	160	Beds, sheets, waterproof	4,000
Nails, assorted	20,000	Tin vessels, half pint	20,000
Padlocks, with hasps and staples	200	Tent bottoms	500
Pans, stool, pewter and zinc	500	Bedside stools, made to fold	5,000

Compared and found correct.

H. Pillean,
Staff Surgeon, 1st Class, President of Store Board.

3 May 1855.

(As required by Question 8220, page 412.)

(Immediate.)

LETTER from Dr. *A. Smith*, to the Military Secretary, Horse Guards.

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
Sir, 18 February 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, requesting to be informed what arrangements I consider it necessary should be made for providing the means of conveyance and transport for the sick and wounded from the field, in reference to the force now about to proceed to Malta.

In reply, I beg to state, for the information of the General Commanding-in-chief, that 300 bearers, 12 of Cherry's spring carts, and six hospital spring waggons, will be forwarded from this country for the purpose above mentioned. These are the only means of conveyance it has been considered necessary to require at present; but others, now being planned, may hereafter be forwarded, should the reports from Constantinople or the head-quarters of the British force state that to be necessary.

In Turkey there are certain vehicles (arabas or waggons, and small carts) to be had in abundance; and as the roads are generally very bad, these may be found more suitable than the wheeled carriages to be forwarded from this country. I enclose a memorandum from Mr. Wreford in reference to them.

I find it will be easy to secure a large supply of parties to carry the bearers; and it is my intention to propose that an hospital corps of 600 or more men should be organized and officered as soon as it is known that the force will take the field.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Smith*,
Director-General.

MEMORANDUM.

London, 18 February 1854.

THE modes of conveyance in Constantinople and its vicinity are, first, a waggon on four wheels, called an araba; it has usually a covering or tilt, and not quite so large as the waggons used in our own service during the Peninsular War for the transport of the sick and wounded; but it has no springs, and is drawn by bullocks.

There is also a smaller vehicle, on two wheels, which is generally drawn by one or two horses, but also without springs.

These are the only vehicles that came under my observation, and I believe the only ones used there.

(signed) *M. Wreford*,
Purveyor to the Forces.

LETTER from Dr. *A. Smith* to Sir *Thomas Hastings*.

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
Sir, 3 March 1854.

ADVERTING to my letter of the 17th ultimo, transmitting a return of hospital stores, &c. necessary for the use of the expeditionary force proceeding to the Mediterranean, and in which waggons for the removal of wounded from the field were stated to be required, I beg now to submit two models of two different kinds of waggons planned by myself, which waggons, if properly constructed, will, I think, answer well the purposes for which they are wanted.

In the event of the Master-general and Honourable Board approving the forms proposed, I beg to recommend that one full-sized waggon of each description be built, and that I may be put in communication with the builder, so that I may explain in detail much that is not evident in the models.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Smith*, Director-General.

Pressing.)

LETTER from Dr. *A. Smith* to *J. Wood*, Esq., Ordnance Office.

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
Sir, 25 April 1854.

PRESUMING that the spring and Flanders waggons required by my requisition of the 9th March, a copy of which is herewith forwarded, must now be nearly ready, I beg to recommend that I be informed as soon as they are ready, in order that I may have an opportunity of carefully inspecting them at Woolwich before they be dismantled to be embarked for Turkey, I consider this to be essential to the interests of the service, and also to my own, as I feel I am the individual the Government will hold responsible that they

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they possess all the requirements which render them likely to answer the purposes for which they are wanted, I therefore hope my request will meet with your favourable consideration.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Smith*, Director-General.

RETURN of VEHICLES for the TRANSPORT of the SICK and WOUNDED, required for the use of the Expeditionary Army proceeding up the Mediterranean.

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
9 March 1855.

40 spring waggons, 20 of the pattern exhibited on Tuesday, the 7th instant, at the Wellington Barracks; and, 20 of the patterns which have been delivered to Mr. Holmes, of Derby.
4 Flanders waggons.
40 Portuguese tents.

(signed) *A. Smith*,
Director-General.

The Military Secretary, Horse Guards.

(Required by Question 8382, page 423.)

LETTER from Dr. *A. Smith* to Colonel *Mundy*, War Department.

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
28 October 1854.

Sir,

As it appears that the medical staff serving with the Army in the East have been occasionally without a sufficient supply of hospital stores and other articles necessary to the general well-being and professional treatment of the sick and wounded, and as I have reason to believe that these deficiencies have arisen in a great measure from the want of efficient means of transport, particularly by sea, I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, that I am of opinion the like disadvantages will continue to be experienced, unless some special provision be made for the particular service referred to.

Believing that nothing short of the following arrangement would prove effectual, I have the honour to propose to his Grace that a steamer of about 200 tons should be immediately engaged and sent to the East, to be exclusively at the disposal of Dr. Hall, the chief medical officer of the expeditionary army, and that her captain should be strictly enjoined and bound to act in conformity with his orders, and to acknowledge no other authority but his.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Smith*,
Director-General.

LETTER from Dr. *A. Smith* to Colonel *Mundy*, War Department.

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
18 November 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, adverting to mine of the 28th ultimo, in which I proposed that a steamer should be sent from this country to be placed at the entire disposal of Dr. Hall for the conveyance of medical stores, &c., for the use of the troops in the East, and requesting me to state whether, in the event of such a vessel being sent out, I have sufficient cargo to freight her from England.

In return, I beg to state that I have delayed my reply with a view of ascertaining the probable extent of supplies for the use of the hospitals and the sick it might be possible to collect for the purpose of being forwarded to Turkey in one vessel, and I am now, after much consideration and inquiry, able to state, for the information of the Duke of Newcastle, that hospital stores, &c., to the extent of 200 tons, will be ready for shipment in about 10 days hence; and I am informed by Mr. Howell, of Mark-lane, that the "Army and Navy" steamer, which has lately been used as a Government despatch boat, is at present in the port of London unemployed, and may be taken up for the purpose in question; she could be got ready for sea in a week from this date, and could proceed as soon as loaded.

I am, for many reasons, most anxious that a vessel should be chartered with a view to convey the whole of the supplies now preparing, as I find it utterly impracticable to ensure the immediate delivery of the stores required for the general hospital at Scutari by any other method.

At the present time, a large supply of hospital stores, bedding, &c., is about to leave this country, part of which has been placed in the "Ottawa," and part in the "Robert Lowe;"

Lowe;" both of these vessels I am informed, are to pass Constantinople without delivering any part of their cargoes; hence, articles much required for the use of the sick and wounded may be carried for months backward and forward in the Black Sea, before an opportunity offers of their being disembarked at their proper destination.

As bad, if not worse than the above, has already occurred; therefore I trust I may, without being considered disrespectful, urge on his Grace the necessity for the adoption of a better arrangement for the transport of medical and hospital stores required for the use of the Army in the East, than has hitherto been in force.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Smith*, Director-General.

(Pressing.)

LETTER from Dr. *A. Smith* to the Military Secretary, Horse Guards.

Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
Sir, 15 December 1854.

REFERRING to previous correspondence respecting the engagement of a vessel to convey medical stores to the East, I regret to have to state that the "Army and Navy" steamer, which was hired for that purpose, was not of sufficient tonnage to contain the various supplies that were prepared for despatch in her.

It is therefore especially desirable that another vessel should be engaged for the conveyance of the articles for which there was not room in the "Army and Navy," as well as for others which have been ordered, and will soon be ready for shipment. The vessel selected should not be less than 500 or 600 tons burden, and it is necessary that she should sail within one fortnight from this date.

Unless the foregoing arrangement is effected, I am of opinion that serious inconveniences will be experienced by the sick and wounded in hospital at Scutari.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Smith*, Director-General.

(Required by Question 8595, page 437.)

LETTER from *J. Hall*, Esq., Inspector-General of Hospitals, to Dr. *A. Smith*.

Sir, Scutari, 20 October 1854.

1. I HAVE the honour to enclose a state of the sick, wounded, and convalescent in hospital and on board ship at this station, and I have much satisfaction in being able to inform you that the whole hospital establishment here has now been put on a very creditable footing, and that the sick and wounded are all doing as well as could possibly be expected.

2. I mentioned to you in one of my former letters that some little confusion had been occasioned in the first instance by the sudden influx of an immense number of sick and wounded, which was increased by Mr. Purveyor Tucker's neglect of my order of the 3d September, to send down all the spare stores from Varna to Scutari to fit up the barrack hospital, but the "Bombay" has since arrived with 500 sets of boards and tressels and other stores, but no bedding, and I am happy to inform you that, by the strenuous exertions and unceasing labours of first-class Staff-surgeon Menzies and the medical officers under him, all our difficulties have been in a great measure surmounted, and in a short time I flatter myself we shall have an hospital establishment that will bear a comparison with any one of the same magnitude formed under similar disadvantages, or, indeed, I may almost venture to say, under any circumstances; and I feel assured, the arrival of Mr. Wreford, Chief Purveyor, will infuse new life and order into the purveying department, which were much required.

I should wish, however, that the footing on which the purveyor's department, with regard to the medical department, is to be placed, should be distinctly defined by official authority. I, as I frequently told you before, have never been able to obtain returns of stores, until yesterday from Mr. Ward, and no accounts whatever of expenditure have been rendered by him beyond the sum total of what had been spent, and an estimate for more money; and Dr. Menzies tells me, when spoken to by him on the subject, his answer invariably was, "I will communicate with the Secretary-at-War on all financial concerns."

Now this may all be right and according to regulation, for anything I know to the contrary, but I have certainly never seen any positive regulation to that effect, and it would be well to have the thing properly defined and settled at once. I have no ambition, I can assure you, to add to my labours, or incur additional responsibility, and if the financial concerns of the hospitals are removed from my control, I shall be delighted; but I question, from what I have seen, if it will be a proceeding to the interests of the public, to remove the department from local control and supervision; and where the establishments are vast, like the hospitals here, it is not judicious, in my opinion, to let the accounts run on for months without check or examination.

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In August last, in consequence of Mr. Tucker's proceedings, I felt called on to draw up some instructions for the guidance of purveyors' and hospital servants, which I submitted to Lord Raglan, and I think, I must certainly have sent you a copy of them; but these instructions, from my absence in the field and one cause or another, have hitherto remained a dead letter. And, as Mr. Wreford assures me, special instructions are to be sent out from the War Office immediately, I have deferred taking any steps until they arrive.

I embark in the "Himalaya" this afternoon for the Crimea. She takes up 600 men to the army, making about 1,700 that have rejoined from this since the commencement of the present month, which is doing very well on our part for the cause.

The mail from the Crimea has not come in, but as the batteries were to open on Sebastopol on the 17th, I should not be surprised to hear of the fall of the town; but Fort Constantine, the citadel, on the other side of the harbour, will still have to be reduced, even should the town have already been captured.

I have, &c.
(signed) *John Hall*,
Inspector-General of Hospitals.

(*See* Reply to Question 12922, page 661.)

LETTER from Dr. *Burrell* to Dr. *A. Smith*, Director-General, Army and Ordnance Medical Department.

Principal Medical Officer's Office,
Sir, Military Hospital, Scutari, 8 May 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I arrived here on the 30th ultimo, in the "Emeu" steamer, and assumed the charge of the department.

I wrote you a hurried letter from Gallipoli, giving a very imperfect sketch of medical matters at that station. As regards this, there is now assembled 10,420 troops, consisting of artillery and infantry. The former are stationed about three miles distant from this; together with two companies of the 77th regiment.

The whole force, with the exception of three regiments, are under canvas. The ground occupied by the encampments is high, dry, and otherwise unexceptionable.

The health of the troops up to this date has been satisfactory, viz. from 2 ½ to 3 per cent., only four deaths having occurred. These, though from ordinary disease, were marked by an unusual rapid course. As yet there appears to be no decided tendency to the prevalence of any particular disease. The cases now in hospital are of little severity. Two cases of small-pox have been reported in the 95th regiment of a modified character. As relates to hospital accommodation, the upper floor of a splendid and most commodious hospital, in the vicinity of the barracks and encampment, has hitherto been appropriated.

This accommodates about 180 patients; good bedding is provided by the Turks; but many conveniences are yet wanting. The first floor and basement are occupied by about 200 sick Turkish soldiers; we are in consequence obliged to have about 100 slight cases in camp and barracks. The hospital authorities, however, seem well disposed to afford further accommodation, and as I have suggested to Lord Raglan the eventual necessity of having the whole, it is not impossible we shall soon obtain exclusive possession. At present the hospital has been conducted on the regimental system; but the purveyors and part of the stores having arrived by the "Melita," the general hospital plan will be established as soon as possible.

I herewith enclose the distribution of medical staff officers to the several divisions and brigades. This of course will be subject to constant fluctuations both in numbers and individuals, according to the exigencies of the service. You will, however, be able to estimate the extent of medical aid necessary for the force in the event of its being much separated. At present there is more than enough; but more surgeons, first and second, will probably be required eventually for hospital work. In any event, a large staff will be required to be left here, which is likely to become a central hospital for straggling sick of all descriptions, both on account of its relative position, and its ample accommodation and salubrity.

The convenience for any deliberate or systematic work is still deficient, the office of the principal medical officer being scarcely in operation. This will, I hope, account for any irregularity in the due transmission of returns, and other matters relating to the force. All is in fair training; but, amidst rather novel difficulties, time is necessary to arrange and organize.

The health of the troops at Gallipoli (who are reduced, by the removal to head quarters of the 93rd Regiment and Rifle Brigade, just arrived, to about 5,000) is satisfactory.

Drs. Forrest, Anderson, and Carr are at that station, with a due proportion of junior officers. All the other officers are here, and have duties assigned to them, except a few of the assistant surgeons, whom it is desirable to keep disposable for unforeseen exigencies. Dr. O'Flaherty, first class, and Dr. Forteath, arrived yesterday evening in the "City of London."

No movement of the force from this is spoken of as imminent. Few of the artillery have as yet arrived, and none of the cavalry.

The

The weather for the last fortnight has been changeable, with occasional heavy showers. The temperature is moderate, but variable, a hot day being frequently followed by chilly or even cold nights. The barracks are spacious and well ventilated, but much nuisance and other defects abound, and will become matters for our interference, should the force remain here in the hot months.

I have, &c.
(signed) *W. H. Burrell*, M. D.,
Deputy Inspector of Hospitals,
Principal Medical Officer.

DEPARTMENT MEMORANDA.

THE undermentioned MEDICAL OFFICERS will be attached to and take Superintendence of the Several Divisions and Brigades of the Expeditionary Force, as follows:

Duke of Cambridge - - -	FIRST DIVISION.—Deputy Inspector-general of Hospitals Linton, M. D.
Sir C. Campbell - - - -	Brigade of Highlanders.—1st Class Staff-surgeon Mitchell, M. D.
	1st Brigade.—2d Class Staff-surgeon Cooper.
	Assistant-Surgeon Wilson, 7th Hussars.
	2d Brigade.—Assistant-surgeon Armstrong, 2d Dragoons.
	Assistant-surgeon Bone, 17th Foot.
	Surgeon Gibson, M. D., 17th Lancers, will be attached to this division.
Sir De Lacy Evans - - -	SECOND DIVISION.—1st Class Staff-surgeon Menzies.
Brigadier-General Pennefather -	1st Brigade.—1st Class Staff-surgeon Cruikshank, M. D.
	2d Class Staff-surgeon Maclise.
	Assistant-surgeon Young, 11th Foot.
Brigadier-General Adams - -	2d Brigade.—1st Class Staff-surgeon Prendergast.
	Assistant-surgeon Holton, 2d Foot.
	Assistant-surgeon Ligertwood, 40th Regiment.
Sir R. England - - - -	THIRD DIVISION.—Deputy Inspector-general of Hospitals Forrest, M. D.
Brigadier-General Sir John Campbell	1st Brigade.—1st Class Staff-surgeon Anderson.
	2d Class Staff-surgeon Trousdell.
	Assistant Staff-surgeon Fitzgerald.
Brigadier-General Eyre - - -	2d Brigade.—1st Class Staff-surgeon Carr, M. D.
	2d Class Staff-surgeon Meikleham, M. D.
	Staff Assistant-surgeon Adrien.
Sir G. Brown - - - -	LIGHT DIVISION.—Deputy Inspector-general of Hospitals Dumbreck, M. D.
Brigadier-General Airey - -	1st Brigade.—1st Class Staff-Surgeon Alexander.
	Assistant-surgeon Smyth, 1st Foot.
	Assistant-surgeon Gree, 92d Regiment.
Brigadier-General Buller - -	2d Brigade.—1st Class Staff-surgeon Tice, M. D.
	Assistant-surgeon Coates, 26th Regiment.
	Assistant-surgeon Poulton, 73d Regiment.

First Class Staff-surgeon Jameson, M. D., will take the general superintendence of the General Hospital under Deputy Inspectors-general Dumbreck and Linton, who will take charge of the medical and surgical divisions respectively.

The Staff-surgeons of brigades will take the superintendence of the sick of the regiments, composing their respective corps.

(signed) *W. H. Burrell*, D. I. G. H.

Appendix, No. 16.

STATEMENT of Medical Stores and Comforts forwarded to the East.

Detailed Statement of Contents of each Requisition for Medical Stores and Medical Comforts, Received from Dr. Andrew Smith.			Date of Requisition.	Date of Order of the Board for the Supply of such Requisition.	Date at which the Articles Ordered were reported Ready for Embarkation.	Date at which they were actually Shipped; with Name of Ship.	Date at which such Ship took her Departure from England.	Date of her Arrival at the Port of Destination, mentioning the Port.	Name of the Officer to whom Consigned.	Date of Delivery to such Officer.
			1854:	1854:	1854:	1854:				
6650	Port Wine	*doz.* 100	February	20 February		15 April; Bride			Purveyor-General of the Forces.	
	Brandy	*gals.* 50								
	Preserved Meats	*cwts.* 2								
	,, Soup	,, 2								
	Sugar	*lbs.* 1,680								
	Tea	,, 800								
	Preserved Potatoes	*cwts.* 15								
	Sago	,, 2								
	Arrowroot	,, 2								
	Barley	,, 5								
7199	Portuguese Tents	40	9 March	10 March		9 June; Tynemouth.				
	Spring Wagons	40								
	Flanders ,,	4								
	Complete with Harness and Stores.									
7266 (C—215)	Bedding, Sets of 12 to 22, Hospital		13 March	15 March	7 March	11 May; Melita.				
	Canteens ordered									
7509 (C—252)	Hospital Marquees	70	23 March	24 March	7 April	18 May; Martha Miles.				
7410 (C—230)	Air Beds	60	16 March	21 March		From the Royal Carriage Department, Woolwich.				
	Air and Water Cushions	200								
	India-rubber Slipper Baths	8								
7510 (C—257)	One Case, containing a large quantity of Brushes, Thread, and other Hospital small stores, weighing	*lbs.* 98			1 July	7 August; Golden Fleece.				
	One Case, containing Slipper Baths, Kettles, Pewter Pots	,, 106		24 March, for 25 proportions; being for 2d Division of Army proceeding to the East.		27 September; Stromboli.				
	Three Lamp Burners	,, 62			1 May	12 June; Taurus.				
	One ,, ,,									
	One Plates, Tin	3,750			26 June	27 June; Kangaroo.				
	And nine other Packages containing similar stores.					4 August; Medway.				
	Blankets	5,100			25 August	21 October; Jura.				
	Rugs and Sheets in proportion.				24 November	January 1855; Kangaroo.				
	Gowns, Serge and Cotton, each	3,000			,,	13 January 1855; Eagle.				
	And other Articles of Hospital Dress in proportion, and a great quantity of small stores for Hospital.									

18 (C—208)	Twenty Boxes, each to contain a quantity of Knives, Spoons, and Miscellaneous Articles constructed to fit within the box in front of the two-horse spring carts - - 20 Nine Gallon Kegs, also with Taps, to be strong in front - - - 2 Also, Cases of Iron Splints for Thighs, Legs, and Arms - - 2 Box of Medicine - - - - 1 Bottles of Brandy, secured in a Case - - - - - - 6		31 March - -		Shipped from Royal Carriage Department.	
26 (M—1113)	Cholera Belts - - - - 40,000	14 March -	1 April - - -	1 May - - „ „ - - 26 June - -	20,000, 12 June; Taurus - - 10,000, 27 June; Kangaroo - - 10,000, 4 August; Medway - -	Senior Commissariat Officer for Senior Purveyor.
7616 (C—260)	Port Wine - - - - - *doz.* 500 Brandy - - - - - *gals.* 258					
By Admiralty,	Boiled Mutton - - - - *cwts.* 8 Essence of Beef - - - - „ 8 Sugar - - - - - *lbs.* 3,080 Tea - - - - - „ 1,410 Preserved Potatoes - - - *cwts.* 30 Sago - - - - - - „ 4 Arrowroot - - - - - „ 4 Scotch Barley - - - - „ 10	24 March -	3 April - - -		Balbec, Steamer.	Senior Purveyor, Gallipoli.
934 (C—404)	Panniers, empty - - - - 10	8 May - -	9 May.			
1000 (C—409)	Tarpaulings, to cover ground under Hospital Tents - - - - 30 Lamps, agitable, hand - - - 51	9 „ - -	10 „ - - - - 9 June - - -	26 June - -	4 August; Medway. 27 June; Kangaroo.	
1734 (C—533)	Hospital Marquees - - - 7 Bedding - - - - - *sets* 84		„ - - -		Issued to Cork and Portumna, 14 and 15 June.	
1812 (C—546)	Filtering Machines - - - 20	12 June -	13 „ - - -	26 June - -	4 August; Medway.	
2486 (C—672)	Bedsteads, N.P. - - - - 500 „ of pattern sent from Medical Department - 500 Mattrasses - - - - - 500	12 July -	13 July - - -	1 September - 24 October - - 26 January 1855 -	Jura; 21 October. 20 November; Robert Lowe. 21 March 1855; William Oldham.	
2749 (M—1322)	Field Instruments, capital - - 4 Pack Saddles for Canteens - - 6	24 „ - -	25 „ - - -			
2665 (C—714)	Blankets - - - - - 3,468 Rugs, Sheets, &c., in proportion. Beds, hair, and Bolsters - - 680	24 „ - -	24 „ - - -	18 July - - „ „ - - 15 September -	28 July; Jason. 7 August; Golden Fleece. 21 October; Jura. 18 October; Prince.	
2977 Per Admiralty,	Arrowroot - - - - - *lbs.* 560 Sago - - - - - - „ 1,120 Oatmeal - - - - - 560	8 August -	8 August.			
3418	Good Port Wine - - - - *doz.* 300 Sugar - - - - - *lbs.* 5,000 Arrow Root - - - - - *cwts.* 8 Sago - - - - - - 4	2 September	4 September - -		21 September; Briton - - -	Commissary-general of Army in Turkey, on account of Purveyor-in-chief.

(continued)

STATEMENT of Medical Stores and Comforts forwarded to the East—*continued.*

Detailed Statement of Contents of each Requisition for Medical Stores and Medical Comforts, Received from Dr. Andrew Smith.			Date of Requisition.	Date of Order of the Board for the Supply of such Requisition.	Date at which the Articles Ordered were reported Ready for Embarkation.	Date at which they were actually Shipped; with Name of Ship.	Date at which such Ship took her Departure from England.	Date of her Arrival at the Port of Destination, mentioning the Port.	Name of the Officer to whom Consigned.	Date of Delivery to such Officer.
			1854:	1854:	1854:	1854:				
4216 (O—1007)	Blankets	6,000	21 October	23 October	13 October	2 November; Ottawa.			Hospital Stores, Senior Commissariat, Constantinople.	
	Sheets	9,000			,, ,,	17 November; Rajah				
	Rugs, Gowns, and other articles of clothing, in proportion.				24 ,,	20 November; Robert Lowe.				
	Iron Bedsteads	667			,, ,,	25 November; Manilla.				
4510 (C—1047)	Iron Bedsteads, Hospital	2,000	4 November	9 November	Vessels taken up by Army Medical Department	13 January 1855, Eagle 30 ,, ,, Whitley Park 12 February ,, Hollander 21 February ,, New Pelton ,, ,, ,, Imperial			Ditto.	
4672 (O—720)	Easy Chairs	50	16 ,,		Ditto	13 January; Eagle.				
4752 (C—1102)	Bedsteads, Hospital	2,283	18 ,,	20 November, in part	Ditto	13 January 1855, Eagle			Ditto.	
	Blankets	150			Ditto	12 February ,, Hollander.				
	Gowns, Trousers, &c.	4,420				17 March ,, Stella.				
4684 (O—5115)	Stoves, Patt. 1 and 5 With suitable quantities of Pipes, Elbows, &c. &c.	200	17 ,,	17 November, in part	Ditto	Army and Navy. 12 December 1854.				
5018 (C—1139)	Cotton Shirts	60,000	28 ,,	28 November, in part		21 February 1855; Imperial			Ditto.	
	,, Sheets	60,000				13 January ,, Eagle.				
	Worsted Socks	60,000				27 ,, ,, Imogene.				
						12 February ,, Hollander.				
5372 (C—1213)	Close Stools and Pans	650	11 December not sent.	13 December		12 February 1855; Hollander			Ditto.	
	Bed Pans	700				21 ,, ,, Imperial.				
	Chamber Utensils	5,000				30 March ,, Raphael.				
	Urinals	1,200								
	Spitting Pots, Drinking Cups, Washing-hand Basins, in proportion.									
	Sheets	1,500								
	Rugs	1,000								
	Blankets	2,000								
	Slippers, pairs	1,000								
5789 (C—1287)	Bedsteads, Hospital	200	28 December	30 December, in part	Taken up by Army Medical Department	26 January 1855, Imogene			Ditto. For Purveyor-in-Chief.	
	Mattrasses, Hair	2,000				12 February ,, Hollander				
	,, Single	1,800				21 ,, ,, Imperial.				

6314 (D—1217)	Cholera Belts - - - - -	1,000	28 Nov. -	29 December - -	Issued to Troops from Devonport.	
5844 (M—1303)	Common Knives and Forks - -	7,552	1 Jan. 1855	1855: 2 January - -	Taken up by Army Medical Department.	13 January; Eagle.
	Carving ,, - -	200				
	Spoons - - - - - -	2,150				
5941 (M—1802)	Shoulder Belts for Hospital Bearers, *prs.*	500	30 Dec. 1854	3 January - -	26 January -	24 March; William Oldham.
6476 (M—1876)	Bedsteads - - - - - -	2,000	1855: 22 Jan. -	24 January - -	,, ,, - -	24 March; William Oldham. 30 March; William Becket.
	Flannel Drawers - - - -	8,000		10 January - -		12 February; Hollander. 21 ,, Imperial.
	Fire Engines - - - -	3		10 ,, - -		17 March; Edina.
	SCUTARI.					
6327 (C—102)	Buckets - - - - - -	500				
	Candlesticks - - - -	500		17 Jan., in part -	Taken up by Army Medical Department.	20 February; Imperial. 13 February; Hollander. 21 February; New Pelton.
	And other Stores of like description in proportion.					
	Hospital Canteens, without Blankets	20				
	SMYRNA.					
6512 (M—1883)	Blankets and Bedding - - *sets*	3,434				
	And other articles in proportion.					
	Dresses, Woollen - - - *sets*	1,250				
	Flannel Shirts - - - -	4,000		24 Jan. 1855, in part	Taken up by Army Medical Department.	17 March 1855; Caroline. 21 February; New Pelton.
	Stockings, Worsted - - -	10,000				
	And a suitable quantity of Hospital Utensils.					
	SCUTARI.					
7164 (M—1926)	Bedsteads, Hospital - - -	4,000				
	Hair Mattrasses - - - -	2,000				
	Paillasses - - - - -	2,000				
	Pillows - - - - - -	4,000				
	Blankets - - - - -	8,000				
	Sheets - - - - - *prs.*	8,000				
	Rugs - - - - - -	4,000	5 Feb. -	8 Feb. 1855, in part	Ditto - - - -	7 March 1855; Stella. 13 ,, ,, Black Sea. 30 ,, ,, Raphael.
	Flannel { Drawers - - -	6,000				
	Flannel { Shirts - - -	6,000				
	Cotton Gowns, Trousers, Waistcoats - - - - -	4,000				
	Serge Suits, complete - - -	4,000				
	Slippers - - - - - *prs.*	2,000				

(continued)

STATEMENT of Medical Stores and Comforts forwarded to the East—*continued.*

Detailed Statement of Contents of each Requisition for Medical Stores, and Medical Comforts, Received from Dr. Andrew Smith.			Date of Requisition.	Date of Order of the Board for the Supply of such Requisition.	Date at which the Articles Ordered were reported Ready for Embarkation.	Date at which they were actually Shipped; with Name of Ship.	Date at which such Ship took her Departure from England.	Date of her Arrival at the Port of Destination, mentioning the Port.	Name of the Officer to whom Consigned.	Date of Delivery to such Officer.
			1855:	1855:	1855:	1855:				
7288 (M—1937)	Canteens, Hospital	6	15 February	16 February.						
	Bearers for Sick	30								
7754 (M—1952)	Carts, Hospital	20	22 February	28 February.						
7705 (M—564)	Towels (Smyrna)	1,500		2 March.						
	Pails, Dust Shovels, &c. &c.									
	Lime Juice *hds.*	1								
6587 (M—1884)	Paillasses and Bolsters	5,000	24 January	25 January	Taken up by Army Medical Department.	21 February 1855; Imperial. 7 March; Stella.				
	Hair Beds, &c.	500								
	Blankets	10,000								
	Sheets	15,000								
	Suits, Serge	5,000								
	Shirts, Cotton	5,000								
	„ Flannel	5,000								
	Socks *prs.*	5,000								
	Rugs	5,000								
	Price's Candle Stoves, Hospital,	100		31 January		17 March 1855; Volunteer.				
	„ „ Crimea.									
	„ „ Scutari	100				17 March; Stella.				
	„ „ Smyrna	50				17 March; Caroline.				
	Marquees, Hospital	100		6 March		60 per Black Sea, 13 March 1855. 20 per Raphael, 30 March 1855.				
	Hair Beds, Clock, &c., Civil, Hospital, Smyrna.				27 Feb. in part	17 March, per Caroline.				

The columns left blank in this Return cannot be filled up for want of information on the points to which they refer.

Store Accounts Office,
Pall Mall, 25 April 1855.

Samuel Roper, Chief Clerk.

Appendix, No. 17.

SKETCH of MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS for a Force of 12 Regiments of Infantry, 4 Batteries of Artillery, &c. &c., in all perhaps 12,000 Men, based on the experience of the War in the Peninsula. Appendix, No. 17.

Regimental officers.

1. ONE surgeon and three assistants to accompany each regiment; one assistant-surgeon to accompany each battery of artillery, and one regimental surgeon to every four batteries.

It is advisable that these officers should always, if possible, remain with their respective corps, except the surgeon of artillery, and go into action with them, when they may take as much care of themselves as they can. At a siege, one assistant-surgeon accompanies each relief into the trenches, and is exposed like any other person.

Staff surgeon with a division.

2. One staff surgeon should be attached to each division, to superintend and regulate its proceedings.

He also accompanies the troops into action, but avoids musquetry fire, cannon shot, if he can; for, once an officer loses his regiment at the commencement of an action, it has happened that he could not find it again until it was over, not even if he should be a staff officer.

Medical conveyance independent.

3. The medical conveyance for an army in the field should be, as far as possible, independent of the commissariat, although receiving assistance from that service on every occasion in which it can be afforded.

4. The first principle of a medical military movement in the field is, that wherever a gun can go, an hospital cart should be able to follow and keep up with it.

Nature of an hospital cart.

5. An hospital cart should be on two wheels, with shafts and outrigger for two horses, capable of being taken off the springs, and put on again easily; it should have a light permanent cover, and side curtains. It ought to be able to hold a cot slung high. A seat for two persons in front, covering a waterproof box for surgical stores. There should be a similar, but narrower, seat behind for two persons, affixed to the doors, and everything belonging to the cart should match, as near as possible, similar articles, such as wheels, &c. in the artillery. Two horses and two men to be permanently attached to it, and it should carry eight spare horse-shoes.

One cart to each regiment.

6. One of these spring carts should be attached to each regiment of cavalry or infantry, and to each battery of artillery not serving with a brigade.

One should be specially attached to the horse artillery, and capable of accompanying them everywhere.

Disposition of hospital carts.

7. A quartermaster and two non-commissioned officers, old hospital sergeants, if possible, should be attached to every 12 carts, the whole being under the orders of the staff surgeon of the division, six of the 12 being in reserve. All the carts should be numbered. The six attached to regiments should carry nothing but the box aforesaid of surgical and medical stores; a tent and six bearers, with poles and slings. It should follow the regiment into action at a convenient distance, near enough, on any movement taking place, to pick up the wounded.

The six reserved carts should carry in addition, two hard-pressed packages of 10 sets of bedding, each set consisting of one rug, two blankets, three sheets and one paillasse case; these carts are to be with the staff surgeon, and as near as possible to the scene of action, without incurring much risk.

8. There would thus be 24 carts for two divisions, and 12 more and a forage waggon should be attached to the head quarters of the army; in all 37.

The forge waggon should have two blacksmiths and a cutler, a handy man at all hardware work.

What they should carry.

These carts are intended to replace any defective ones with the divisions, or for particular services. One half should carry the same stores as before mentioned, with the addition of five caoutchouc bed cases ready for inflation by air; the other six should carry, instead of the bedding, such articles constituting the materials for a field hospital (well packed), as may be immediately required.

Water especially required.

The Inspector-general taking care that every cart shall be provided with the best means for carrying water, whether by barrels or skins, &c., as the country will afford; the want of water having often given rise to the greatest sufferings after a battle.

Number of horses and men.

9. Thirty-seven two-horse carts will require 90 horses for them, and the non-commissioned officers. The men required for each cart may walk when the cart is required for the wounded; and as servants for the medical staff officers should be furnished from this corps, 150 men in all will be required, although none perhaps need be fully efficient for service in the field.

These carts, &c. should be under the direction of the Inspector-general of the Medical Department for their duties, and under the commanding officer of the artillery for their discipline

Appendix, No. 17.

discipline and payment. The great store of materials for general hospitals should be carried on bullock cars, at a sufficient distance in the rear of the army.

Carriage of general stores.

Regimental conveyance for sick, &c.

10. Each regiment should have two bullock cars for the purposes of the sick only; they should be hired, say at Constantinople, from persons, if possible, who will supply 12 for each division, with one superintendent, to be paid for at Constantinople at a fixed price, stipulated rations being granted to each driver and his two bullocks; the Commissariat to be at liberty to kill a lame or disabled beast, and to pay for it at a fixed price; the contractor to furnish another beast from the country at a fixed price, or the pay to be stopped as long as the cart is found unserviceable. This will prevent the irregular pressing found so prejudicial in the Peninsula.

Return conveyance.

11. The return conveyance, of whatever kind, belonging to the Commissariat of each brigade or division, should always carry sick to the rear, so as to leave the hospital conveyance as effective as possible in the field.

Regimental surgeon's horse for stores.

12. Every regimental surgeon should find a horse, mule, or camel out of his allowance, like captains of companies, or as their case may be; and two panniers should be furnished by Government for each beast, made of wickerwork, covered by bull-hide with the hair on, and having an additional covering or lining made of some waterproof material. A Portuguese field officer's tent should be above and between the panniers, the whole being covered by a painted waterdeck, or other waterproof material, firmly girded on by a rope. The animal thus loaded should never be sent to the rear with the baggage when preparing for action, but should always march in front of the last section of the regiment, if not with the commanding officer at the head of the regiment.

13. Each staff surgeon, and each surgeon unattached (absurdly called second-class), should have an animal and packsaddle found once by the Commissariat; panniers and stores should he furnished by the medical department, together with a tent; a man to take care of the animal should be supplied from the hospital conveyance corps, as above indicated.

Sick on landing.

14. Supposing 12,000 infantry to land at Constantinople, there will be some sick, or men unable to march, dependent principally on the time they may be kept on board ship, and on the discipline observed, particularly as to ventilation by night.

Hospital at Constantinople.

15. A building should be obtained for an hospital a mile at least out of the town near which the troops land, airy, roomy, capable of containing 600 sick; it should be walled in, if possible, with a field or garden behind.

Bedding, less the straw, and all other hospital stores, should go out by the same ships for at least 1,500 men. One staff surgeon and one or two of the best assistant staff surgeons should be allotted to this hospital, with a purveyor or clerk, and two or three hospital serjeants or stewards, if procurable, from the pensioners attached to the hospital conveyance corps.

This hospital should not only receive all sick on landing, but all that are left on the advance of the army, and all that return from it as it proceeds.

It should be so augmented from time to time as always to be ready to admit 200 more, whatever be the number present. It may be the depôt for the apothecaries, and for all other stores. If the force sent should ultimately amount to 25,000 men, this establishment must be greatly increased.

Military commandant.

16. There should be a military officer attached to take charge of the convalescents, and to repress any great irregularities; if this officer should not act cordially in concert with the principal medical officer, they should both be removed.

Duties of Deputy Inspector-general.

17. One Deputy Inspector-general of the Medical Department should remain, it is presumed, in Constantinople, with one staff-assistant surgeon and one clerk.

This officer ought to superintend the landing of troops, and the departure of invalids, apportion their supplies, regulate the hospital, and approve the contracts to be made for it. He should correspond with the Inspector-general at head-quarters, and have a separate correspondence on every point relative to the station with the Director-general of the Army Medical Department at home, copies of which should be sent to the Inspector-general at head-quarters. He provides attendance for all sick officers arriving from the army, and reports them when fit for duty. He should be an officer of inspectorial rank, as he will have business to transact with the Turkish and other foreign authorities, perhaps even with the Ambassador. The quantity of writing will require a clerk, more particularly as the accounts of the expenditure of the hospitals should be made out weekly, and submitted to him every Monday morning.

The army moving.

18. The army being prepared to move, the Inspector-general goes with the head-quarters. He is almost entirely a pen-and-ink man, and will require two clerks for 24,000 men, as his correspondence will be unbounded, his returns complicated, his attention wanting in every direction; for the General commanding should never be troubled about the sick or wounded unnecessarily. A staff surgeon, or surgeon unattached, will be required for the sick at head-quarters.

Deputy Inspector in the field.

19. The second Deputy Inspector should accompany any division detached from the army, and should be in the field in the event of a battle. In a retreat he should accompany the General commanding the rear-guard, and should, with the staff surgeon of his division, be the

the last man to leave the bivouac at daylight, except perhaps the Brigadier or General commanding. The whole of the reserve carts should be with him, together with an assistant staff surgeon, and such others as may be disposable.

Staff surgeons to each division.

20. A staff surgeon should be attached to each division of the army. He ought to be selected by the General, but should not consider himself permanent. He should form a part of the General's family, and it may be advisable to make an allowance for him, as for an aide-de-camp. On this officer mainly depends the efficiency of a division; he should be a young and vigorous person, equal to anything, and when he does no longer possess the confidence of the General, he should be removed. (His duties are not here stated.)

Good water an essential after a battle.

21. When a battle has been fought the wounded should be, if possible, collected in tents, or in villages, or in a town; the essential thing in all being good water.

The Deputy-general should take charge of the whole. The Inspector-general may remain a few days if the loss has been severe, to approve or to censure. The whole of the unemployed medical staff should be brought up. All the regimental assistant surgeons should be called in, and the hospital establishment of each regiment, viz., the sergeant, nurse, and orderlies, should accompany them, the surgeon alone remaining with the regiment.

One surgeon with a brigade if the loss have been great.

22. The staff surgeon of the division should remain with the wounded as long as he can be spared from the division, and if the loss should have been great, one surgeon only should remain with each brigade. The surgeons of artillery should join the general hospital, and the assistant surgeons attached to batteries also, if wanted.

23. The wounded of each brigade and division should be, as far as possible, placed together under the assistant surgeons and hospital establishment of each regiment. The hospital establishments should remain until they can be dispensed with. Regimental surgeons are, in fact, the men for work on such occasions; they understand their business, obey orders, and have an *esprit de corps* that carries them through everything. They never give in, under a staff surgeon who knows his duties, and sets the example of doing them.

24. Medical men are not to be computed according to the force employed, but according to the loss likely to be sustained in the first battle. If a force of 12,000 men should have 1,500 wounded, including officers, they would require (Toulouse being taken as an example, and there is no other so good) 52 surgeons, besides four apothecaries or dispensers.

Medical staff enumerated.

The whole force of doctors being,

Inspector-general	1
Deputy Inspectors	2
Staff Surgeons	8
Assistant Staff Surgeons	10
Regimental Surgeons	12
Assistant Surgeons	36
Artillery Surgeons, four batteries	5
TOTAL	74

Exclusive of four apothecaries, or dipensers of medicine.

Deduct,		
Inspector-general	1	
Regimental Surgeons	12	Always in the field.
Artillery Surgeons	4	
Deputy Inspector	1	At Constantinople.
Staff Surgeon	1	
Assistant Surgeons	2	
Absent or sick of the whole medical department	3	
TOTAL	24	

If 24 be deducted from 74, it will leave 50, being two less than the number required at Toulouse for the first week, to take a proper and scientific care of 1,359 wounded men, and 12 less than were present on the second week.

25. If a second battle should take place within a few days, there would be only 12 regimental surgeons to depend upon, and if the loss were only half of that which occurred at the first battle, all scientific treatment would be at an end.

State after a second battle.

The proposed medical staff is, then, insufficient for the duty if two battles are fought within a week; yet, in the south of France three large hospitals were established in less than four weeks, viz. at Tarbes, Orthez, Toulouse, besides some smaller ones. If, in addition to this, any of the diseases common to the country should be superadded, and it is much to be feared they will, the medical officers will be totally unequal to the duties, a consideration of the utmost importance.

If the diseases of the country should prevail.

26. If the reports of the Inspector-general of the Medical Department in May or June next should appear to indicate such an evil, 20 assistant surgeons might be allowed with advantage

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advantage to volunteer from the regiments at home, some four or five of whom should find themselves promoted to unattached or second class surgeoncies on their arrival at Constantinople, unknown to themselves.

The General commanding should have authority to call for all the medical men who can be spared from Malta, Corfu, and Gibraltar; the navy may be able, under such circumstances, to take charge of the hospital at Constantinople.

Medical officers should be under 30 years of age.

27. The Inspector-general may be of any age, provided he is not subject to the back ache, the gout, chronic cough, or other inconvenient derangements.

All others will do their duty better if under 30 years of age.

After six campaigns, a larger share of practical labour than anyone else, and perhaps, with one exception, of more responsible administrative duties, I was, at the termination of the war in the Peninsula, 28 years of age. What I could do then, anybody else can do now.

If an addition be made to the original force.

28. If an addition of 12,000 men be made to the original 12,000 now sent, one Deputy Inspector-general, eight staff surgeons of both classes, and 12 staff assistants. Volunteers, if possible, from regiments, should accompany them, together with one spring-cart for each regiment and six for a reserve; in all 18. Under the belief that 24,000 men will probably suffer little more in one action than half their numbers, if opposed to a superior force.

Rewards for good service.

29. Medical men will not work well without some hope of reward. The promotion on all death or retired vacancies should be granted to those who have worked; not by seniority, but by desert; the medical inspector and the General commanding must judge of their merits. The director-general at home should not have a veto.

Preference given to regimental hospitals.

30. In the early part of the Pensinsular war the establishment of general hospitals, in preference to regimental or divisional hospitals, was most approved.

In the latter part, regimental or divisional hospitals were considered to be most advantageous. General hospitals should be looked upon as necessary evils, becoming even pest-houses sometimes; and, unless under vigorous management, they impair very materially the efficiency of the army.

Topography, prevailing diseases, and capabilities.

31. The Inspector general should make himself acquainted with the topography, prevailing diseases, and the capabilities of every kind of each place he visits, what it can furnish which the army may require, and the price of each article; so that nothing may be imported from England which can be procured upon the spot on more advantageous terms.

32. The accounts of the hospitals in the Peninsula were made out by the purveyor-general after a form ordered by the Treasury, which form could not be complied with without falsifying every figure in and every voucher and receipt attached to them; nevertheless, these accounts, amounting, it is said, to two or three millions or more, were duly examined in London at a subsequent period, and approved.

Accounts, how to be made up.

33. All accounts of general hospitals, whether on the field or afterwards, should be made up weekly, added together monthly, and finally settled quarterly, by an accountant of repute upon the spot, never to be re-opened; he should not be a person who contracts, nor one who pays.

Contracts, &c.

34. The contracts should be approved, as well as the payments, by the principal medical officer of each station, who should also examine and approve the weekly account of each separate hospital establishment of the station, whatever may be their number. There is little difficulty in doing this, if the principal medical officer have a clerk who understands accounts, and a deputy purveyor who is willing to do his duty.

G. J. G.